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JCC MACCABI GAMES 2009 Volunteer Staff Security Training Program

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JCC MACCABI GAMES 2009

Volunteer Staff Security Training Program

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3

Information Sharing

JCC Directorate • Command & Control

Federal Agencies • Support

Police Departments • Operations

Security • Contract Services

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Session Objectives Identify target specific threats

Understand the 3 R’s Develop awareness of the event security infrastructure Conduct risk assessment for assigned area of responsibility

Develop behavioral assessment skills

Enhance recognition of IED components

Establish the fundamentals of good reporting Identify risks related to IEDs and active shooters

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Target Specific Threat Who are they? International extremists Domestic extremists Racially motivated Criminals

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Target Specific Threat

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Target Specific Threat Holocaust Museum Incident

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1.Surveillance 2. Elicitation

3. Security Probes

4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6. Dry Run

7. Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

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Presentation Notes
The first sign of terrorist activity is Surveillance. It is an assumption, that all bombing events will be preceded by surveillance. This has proven to be a historical fact, and does not account for the possibility that a terrorist might commit an act simply because an opportunity presented itself…but given their desire to cause the greatest damage possible, we can assume that they will rely on surveillance to accomplish that goal.

1. Surveillance

2.Elicitation

3. Security Probes

4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6. Dry Run

7. Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

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Elicitation is the solicitation of information from unwitting staff members.

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3.Security Probes 4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6. Dry Run

7. Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

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Presentation Notes
Probes of the security system you have in place, is consistent with battlefield tactics. In combat, battlefield commanders will often direct the strike of a smaller force against a perceived weakness in the enemy line…to test the defensive perimeter. If a weakness is located, the commander will focus a full scale directional attack at that point. Exactly the same thing occurs with security infrastructure, and the response of the security and staff personnel, as well as the operational capacity of the physical infrastructure itself…determines the likelihood that the attack will occur at that location. When we talk about access points, consider the desire of the bomber to enter the facility….which he/she can do through the use of several techniques.

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Security probes

4.Acquiring Supplies 5. People Who Don't Belong

6. Dry Runs

7. Deploying Assets / Getting Into Position

Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Security Probe

4. Acquiring Supplies

5.Suspicious Subjects 6. Dry Run

7. Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Security Probe

4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6.Dry Run 7. Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

Presenter
Presentation Notes
We must assume that even amateur terrorists have heard of Murphy’s Law, “If something can go wrong, it will”. In order to make sure that their mission doesn’t end up like the Bronx bombing plot, they will probably do a dry run. A dry run is necessary to get timing and coordination issues worked out. It may include many of the facets of the actual attack: players, vehicles, etc….lacking only the IED. This is a last chance opportunity for them to validate the intel, to identify a better course of action, or address other deployment concerns.

1. Surveillance

2. Elicitation

3. Security Probe

4. Acquiring Supplies

5. Suspicious Subjects

6. Dry Run

7.Deploying Assets / Staging

Signs of Terrorist Activity

7 Signs Summary Be aware of surveillance - Mobile - Fixed

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Pre-Attack Surveillance

Characteristics: Conducted on foot and

from moving vehicles

Vehicles and attire will fit the environment

Mobile Surveillance

Fixed Surveillance

Characteristics: Conducted on foot and

from vehicles and buildings

Same vehicle multiple days,

different vehicles different days, same person(s) subsequent days, or the same person in different attire, or use of a team approach.

7 Signs Summary Be aware of surveillance - Mobile - Fixed Recognize people soliciting unusual information - Questions about security - Who is present after hours

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7 Signs Summary Be aware of surveillance - Mobile - Fixed Recognize people soliciting unusual information - Questions about security - Who is present after hours Identify security probes - Access without badge - Trying doors other than main access

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7 Signs Summary Be aware of surveillance - Mobile - Fixed Recognize people soliciting unusual information - Questions about security - Who is present after hours

Identify security probes - Access without badge - Trying doors other than main access Recognize suspicious subjects - Loitering - Taking photos of security operation - Sitting in a vehicle for long periods of time

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Suspicious Subjects

7 Signs Summary Be aware of surveillance - Mobile - Fixed Recognize people soliciting unusual information - Questions about security - Who is present after hours

Identify security probes - Access without badge - Trying doors other than main access

Recognize suspicious subjects - Loitering - Taking photos of security operation - Sitting in a vehicle for long periods of time Spot staging - Bags/vehicles being dropped or parked

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Threat Types

Improvised Explosive Device (IED)

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Threat Resolution Process

1. Recognize the Threat - Isolate it - Articulate it

2. React to the Threat - Time for law enforcement? - Distance from threat?

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The Three R’s Recognize Report React

Shock Front

Barrier

Ground Level

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Event Security Infrastructure

Site Control

LE Operations Invest

Support JCC Event Management

Observe & Report

Act on Reports

Investigate Reports

Decisions & Control

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Security Manager

Law Enforcement

Contract Security

JCC Directorate (Operations) You Security

Manager

You

Security Manager

Law Enforcement

Contract Security

JCC Directorate (Operations)

Reporting Chain (Option 2)

Reporting Chain (Option 1)

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Contract Security

Responsibility: Access Control Bag Screening Stationary posts Walking patrols Event assistance Communication with Law Enforcement

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Sworn Law Enforcement

Presence / Control Arrest violators

Responsibility:

Resolve

specialized tactical issues

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Event Operational Center

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Area Risk Assessment

Collateral: (anything outside secondary area) * Streets / Woods / Lots / Buildings / Routes surrounding the venue, and off-site locations and accommodations

Secondary: (just outside the secure area) * Bus lots / General parking / Grounds

Primary Responsibility: (secure area) * Stadium / Athlete assembly points

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Elevated Threat Area (1)

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Elevated Threat Area (2)

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Elevated Threat Area (3)

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Elevated Threat Area (4)

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Elevated Threat Area (5)

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Elevated Threat Area (6)

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Elevated Threat Area (7)

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Elevated Threat Area (8)

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Criminal Mindset

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Access Control

Crowd control Maintain secure area Allow visual screening Allow bag screening Identify potential threats

Purpose:

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Visual Screening

What am I looking for? Badges Concealment Unusual acts Avoidance

Hands Heavy bags

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Bag Screening: Intent

Because you DON’T have x-ray vision!

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Gaylord Memorial Stadium

October, 2005

Back-pack

2-3 pounds of TATP

1 death

Potential threat: 84,000 fans

Bag Screening: Case Study

Synopsis:

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Good example of: Transactional indicators, and if security did in fact turn him away from the stadium indicates they where aware, trained and disciplined. At approximately 08:00 PM on 01 October 2005, 21-year old Oklahoma University (OU) engineering student Joel Henry Hinrichs III died in an apparent suicide bombing on the school's campus in Norman, Oklahoma. Hinrichs was sitting on a bench located 173 yards west of the football stadium, during the university's opening game of the season. The stadium was filled with approximately 84,000 spectators when Hinrichs's homemade explosive device detonated. Investigators have not conclusively determined whether Hinrichs ever attempted to enter the stadium, or whether he intended the bomb to detonate when it did. The initial blast destroyed the park bench but caused no other damage, except to a nearby bus that was sprayed with Hinrichs's blood. Device Description: The main charge reportedly consisted of two to three pounds of TATP (triacetone triperoxide). It is not clear whether Hinrichs was holding a backpack filled with explosives or the explosives were strapped to his body. Analysis/Trends: It is possible that the timing of the explosion was an accident. TATP is a highly unstable compound, extremely sensitive to heat, friction, and shock. One local bomb expert speculated that Hinrichs accidentally blew himself up. The incident is widely considered a suicide Evidence, however, is fragmentary: other unconfirmed reports suggest that Hinrichs attempted to enter the football stadium, carrying the bomb in a backpack, during the game. According to these sources, Hinrichs abandoned his attempt when security personnel requested to search his backpack. In any event, the explosion that killed Joel Hinrichs closely mirrored many of those perpetrated by Islamic extremist suicide bombers: Hinrichs' device was body-borne, and he chose TATP, one of several peroxide-based explosives commonly used by Palestinian terrorists and a similar compound to the one used in the 07 July 2005 London subway bombings and the Richard Reid shoe bombing incident. Soon after the incident, rumors of Hinrichs attending a nearby mosque and/or converting to Islam began to surface. 2 days before the bombing, Hinrichs attempted to purchase ammonium nitrate (the chemical used in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing) at a local seed store. The owner, who no longer sold ammonium nitrate because of paperwork and other restrictions imposed on its purchase, decided to "play coy" and asked whether Hinrichs wanted to "green up his lawn." When Hinrichs simply shrugged and mumbled, the seed store owner stated that Hinrichs would not be able to purchase the ammonium nitrate at his store. An off-duty police officer who overheard the conversation followed Hinrichs out of the store, wrote down his license plate number and initiated a background check. The officer contacted the Norman, Oklahoma bomb squad and had agreed to file a report the Monday after the bombing. It is unclear whether Hinrichs intended simply to use the ammonium nitrate to kill himself, or whether he in fact had other intentions. Following the incident, FBI agents investigated Hinrichs's off-campus apartment and found several types of chemicals, instructional materials on explosives, and bomb-making equipment, including mixing bowls, a slow cooker, a circuit board, and a thermometer. Officials also discovered 0.4 pounds of triacetone triperoxide (TATP), which they later detonated.

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Bag Screening: Challenges

Resistance based on: (with the law abiding citizen) Contrary personality

Value extreme privacy

See no benefit in screening

(with the criminal) Crime in progress

Testing security system

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Bag Screening: Indicators

Indicators:

1. Weight

2. Bag Structure

3. Odor

4. Contents

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Bag Screening: Techniques

Options: Clockwise Counter-clockwise Left to Right, then Up and Down Item by item screening

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Bag Screening: Other Indicators

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IED Recognition

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IED Component: Container

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IED Component: Explosive

Black/Smokeless Powders

C-4

KinePak Cast Booster - TNT

Dynamite

ANFO

Detonating Cord TATP

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Presentation Notes
We saw the IED components last week, but I have included them for the sake of those people that we signed up for Session 1 but were unable to join us. There are just five slides, so bear with me for a second while I briefly cover the components again. Every IED needs a primary charge….these are just a few of the primary charges that have been used in the past…and very well may be used in the future.

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IED Component: Power Source

Polaroid Camera Battery

Car Battery

Time Fuse

Solar Power Systems

Fuse Lighter

Motorcycle Battery Rechargeable

Battery packs

Electrical

Non- Electrical

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No IED would be complete without a power source…nothing special here, either the energizing of an electrical circuit or the initiation of flame

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IED Delivery Methods

Area of

Responsibility

IED

PBIED WBIED

VBIED

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The Three R’s Recognize Report React

Shock Front

Barrier

Ground Level

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React Blast Matrix:

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This is a blast reference tool….based on volumes of incident research and independent testing. While it represents the worst case scenario building, we simply want to present it in the context of a better understanding of IED impact….and it legitimately serves as general baseline that you can use in your planning. When I say ‘general’….I imply that the distances reflected on this chart are generous meaning the furthest point that fragmentation or overpressure might travel from the seat of the blast)….but by the same token, they will give you the margin for error, and good blast impact start point.

Observations of persons:

Reporting Descriptions

Hair Style/ Length

Eyewear/Eye Color

Facial Hair

Clothing Color/ Description

Race/Age

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- Sex                                 - Race - Age - Height (approximate; use 2 inch blocks) - Weight (approximate; use 10 lb. blocks) - Build (medium, heavyset, thin, etc.) - Hair (color, length, include facial hair) - Complexion (light, dark, ruddy, olive) - Eyes (color, glasses) - Peculiarities (scars, tattoos, missing limbs) - Clothing (from head to toe, style, defects) - Weapons (if any) - Method of escape (direction, vehicle, etc.) - Compare the person to yourself or someone you know

Reporting Activity

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Presentation Notes
People that you talk to are much easier to recall than the person you see momentarily…..as they walk or run away. It is necessary, in the moment, for you to register the importance of obtaining a mental picture….and say out loud what you see. Speaking it creates an imprint in your mind. From the pictures here, what can you really tell about the people you see….? The picture on the left depicts a person running to a white or silver car, right? Which is very important, but what else can you report? Is it a male? Yes, we could state that. Can we make any assumptions about his age or ethnicity. No. From this perspective, we could probably only say that he was average height and build. If we took note, we could say, “He had dark hair or wore a dark hat, a beige long sleeve jacket or sweater…with a bright blue shirt underneath (sticking out the back)…..black pants and dark footwear”. Other than the glasses being worn by the subject on the right, what would separate him from a hundred other guys in the area?

Observations of Vehicles:

Reporting Vehicles

Make / Model

Vehicle Color

Unusual Characteristics

Vehicle Type

Registration

(i.e. windows tinted)

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Presentation Notes
When reporting a vehicle, include: Year, make and model Body type (2 door, 4 door, van, SUV, etc.) Passengers (number of people in vehicle) License Plate (most important) Damage or anything unusual (logos, etc.) Accessories

Deter Mitigate Defeat Detect Predict

INTENT INITIAL PLANNING OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ATTACK CONDUCT OPERATIONS LONG-TERM EFFECTS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

Session Summary

Alert presence

Eye contact

Greeting

Sound screening procedures

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Deter Mitigate Defeat Detect Predict

INTENT INITIAL PLANNING OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ATTACK CONDUCT OPERATIONS LONG-TERM EFFECTS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

Session Summary

Avenue of approach

Method of attack

Vulnerabilities

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Deter Mitigate Defeat Detect Predict

INTENT INITIAL PLANNING OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ATTACK CONDUCT OPERATIONS LONG-TERM EFFECTS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

Session Summary

Suspicious vehicles

Suspicious persons

IED components

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Deter Mitigate Defeat Detect Predict

INTENT INITIAL PLANNING OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ATTACK CONDUCT OPERATIONS LONG-TERM EFFECTS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

Session Summary

Report!

Assist!

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Deter Mitigate Defeat Detect Predict

INTENT INITIAL PLANNING OBTAIN OPERATIONAL RESOURCES ATTACK CONDUCT OPERATIONS LONG-TERM EFFECTS IMMEDIATE EFFECTS

Terrorist IED Attack Timeline

Session Summary

Distance!

Shielding!

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Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Wendell Phillips

Vigilance

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These are priceless words, and applicable to this session.

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Tom Walton / Ken Jaeger

Security Specialists Office for Bombing Prevention

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC

703-235-5408

[email protected] [email protected]

Contact Information

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Presentation Notes
You have just completed an awareness-level workshop designed to provide basic prevention considerations about IED incidents.