Japanese Aggression and the Emperor, 1931-1941, from Contemporary DiariesAuthor(s): Charles D. SheldonSource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1976), pp. 1-40Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/311667 .Accessed: 28/01/2011 01:55

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Modern Asian Studies, o0, I (I976), pp. I-40. Printed in Great Britain.

Japanese Aggression and the Emperor, 1931-1941, from Contemporary Diaries

CHARLES D. SHELDON

University of Cambridge

I. Introduction

IN I971, David Bergamini, a journalist, published a very large book, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy, which sought to prove that the Emperor was virtually the sole cause and instigator ofJapanese aggression in the

I930s and I94Os.1 Bergamini even believes the Emperor planned, among other skullduggeries, several political assassinations. The book is a polemic which, to our knowledge, contradicts all previous scholarly work, whether in English or in Japanese. It also contradicts the facts

upon which this previous scholarship rested. Specialists on Japan have

unanimously demolished Bergamini's thesis and his pretensions to care- ful scholarship.2

It might conceivably be best to let the matter rest there. But countless

David Bergamini, Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (New York and London, I971), 1,239 pp. My own interest in this subject dates back to 1946-7, in Tokyo. As Chief of the Defense Language Section, International Military Tribunal for the Far East (LM. T.F.E.), I supervised translations of many documents, including the entire diary of Marquis Kido, a principal adviser to the Emperor.

2 Bergamini writes: '. .. the essential facts of the story which I have told come from written diaries, memoranda, and memoirs.' Prof. James Crowley (New rork Times Book Review, 24 October 1971), and Prof. Okamoto Shumpei (Journal of Asian Studies, February 1972), have shown how Bergamini grossly misused the Memoranda of General Sugiyama and the Kido Diary through mistranslation and distortion, but mostly by adding incriminating statements of his own fabrication. Prof. Okamoto dismisses Bergamini's obsessive thesis as 'fiction'. See also Richard Storry (Pacific Affairs, Summer, I972, pp. 272-6), A. D. Coox (American Historical Review, October I972, pp. i 69-70), and Herschel Webb (Pacific Historical Review, February 1973, pp. I24-5). Prof. Webb points out that Bergamini's written sources, when tracked down, 'in every single case say something different from what he says they say'. As for oral sources, only one of those many persons reported as saying something scandalous is identified, and Bergamini was quite safe in doing so, because he is dead. Prof. Webb adds that the picture of the Emperor's personality is 'utterly incompatible with everything previously written about him. If the total immunity from scruple or pity is not beyond known limits of human depravity, one at least supposes that some inkling of it would have come to light before David Bergamini's privileged sources told him about it'.

CHARLES D. SHELDON

readers, and even several non-specialist reviewers, unable to check sources, have, in varying degrees, been misled. Moreover, reading the book has made this writer feel the need to comb through the most

important diaries, as yet unpublished in English, especially Marquis Kido's, and the joint memoirs of Baron Harada and Prince Saionji, to see what they actually say about the Emperor's relationship to Japanese aggression. So far, studies in English have made good use of diaries, but scattered references to the Emperor fall short of a full picture of his

position and role before I94I. These diaries are remarkably revealing of the desperate stresses behind the outward facade of stability, har-

mony, and consensus. There is no evidence, or reason to believe, that

they have been deliberately falsified over the years to protect the

Emperor, as Bergamini claims.3 We have discovered that in all such references, of which representative examples follow, the Emperor was

absolutely consistent in using his personal influence to induce caution and to moderate, and even to obstruct, the accumulating, snowballing impetus towards war. This influence was never applied publicly. Privacy was undoubtedly necessary. If the Emperor's political opinions, in theory sacrosanct, were made public, this could commit a govern- ment to a virtually unchangeable position. If the government did change such a policy, this would both damage the Imperial institution by reducing its prestige, and remove legal authority from the government's action. It was better for the Emperor simply to exist, and not be in- volved in politics, at least publicly. And it happened that this political inaction coincided both with Japanese tradition and with the modern idea of a limited constitutional monarchy.

3 The only proven falsifications would appear to be those of Bergamini himself. In the introductions to the published versions in Japanese of both the Kido diary (Kido Koichi nikki, Tokyo University Press, 1966, 2 vols, plus one of miscellaneous papers), and the Saionji-Harada memoirs (Harada Kumao, Saionjiko to seikyoku, Prince Saionji and the political situation, Tokyo, I950-56, 8 vols, plus one) a panel of well-known Japanese scholars including, in both cases, Maruyama Masao, who is justly critical of the Imperial institution, and, if anything, too critical of government leaders, states that both were written initially as private records, with no evident thought of publication (Kido nikki, Vol. I, p. I, and Saionji, Vol. I, pp. 2-3). On p. 304, Saionji, Vol. I, Professors Maruyama and Hayashi Shigeru state, 'We know of few records of the highly confused movements in the background of our political scene, and of the words and deeds of the participants therein, that are made in such detail, and with such sensitive, almost stubborn, faithfulness.' (Quoted in T. F. Mayer- Oakes, Fragile Victory: Prince Saionji and the 1930 London Treaty Issue, from the Memoirs of Baron Harada Kumao (Wayne State University, 1968), pp. 48-9. This book is an elegant and accurate, annotated translation of the first year of the published memoirs, contained in Vol. I, with an excellent introduction. (See esp. pp. 44-65, for details on the memoirs.) We hope further volumes will be forthcoming.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I931-I94I

For the fateful decision which plunged Japan into the Pacific War, and for the surrender which followed, the story has been extremely well told, especially so by Prof. Butow (Tojo and the Coming of the War), who shows clearly that the Emperor continued to use his influence in the consistent pattern already described. For this reason, and because the

Harada-Saionji memoirs end in November I940, when Prince Saionji died at the age of 9I, we will concentrate here on earlier issues of peace or war. Then, we will try to see what light the diaries can throw on the difficult and ultimate question of why the Emperor who, at least

formally, held final political power under the Meiji Constitution, failed in his efforts to prevent war. It is highly doubtful, of course, whether any one person, however powerful, could have prevented it. Also, the Emperor had no personal political organization to support him.

The Harada-Saionji memoirs cover the period I930-I940. They were written by Baron Harada Kumao,4 who was Prince Saionji's political secretary. Prince Saionji was in semi-retirement but was still

serving as the chief adviser to the Emperor and, as the last of the Genr5 (the 'elder statesmen'), he retained the traditional right of the Genr5 to recommend the Prime Minister in any change of Cabinet. Harada played the crucial role of gathering information from the most

important leaders in the government and at court. About once a week, he dictated to a secretary the gist, or, often, full verbatim reports, of his own as well as Saionji's conversations. After these notes were transcribed, Saionji would correct and edit them. Both men were well known for their moderate, 'international' and liberal views, and they were often vilified by their enemies among the militarists and 'right wing' gener- ally.5

Marquis Kido was a close adviser of the Emperor at court, for most of the crucial years I93I-I945, becoming Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal in June 1940. His diary, although much terser and less informative than the one kept by Harada, is of very great importance. It was translated by the Defense Language Branch, I.M.T.F.E. (see note I).

4 Japanese names are given in Japanese order. 5 The Prosecution in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East

(I.M.T.F.E.), commonly called the Major War Crimes Trials, made good use of the huge translation of these joint memoirs. This not very satisfactory mimeographed translation, classified confidential, was made for the I.M.T.F.E. (not for the Defense, as Bergamini says) by G.H.Q., Far East Command, Military Intelligence Service. It has now been declassified, and is available in full at the Hoover Library, Stanford, in part at the University of California Library, Berkeley, and in microfilm in the Library of Congress (SP i61).

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

Wherever we have made use of these unpublished translations, we have checked and corrected them against the original Japanese.

It is perhaps, unnecessary here even to sketch in the early life of

Emperor Hirohito, his grand tour of Europe in 192I, including a visit to England which he later declared unhesitatingly to have been the

happiest and freest time of his life, and the strong anti-war feelings he

acquired while seeing the destruction and ruin left by the First World War.6 That he was well informed as Regent, and later as the Sh6wa

Emperor, can be seen in Prince Saionji's remark to Marquis Kido in

I932 that 'the present ruler has a better understanding of all affairs than the late Emperor Meiji'.7 Using the diaries, we will now look at some of the major issues involving the Emperor.

II. The Emperor and Aggression: His Position on

Major Issues of Foreign and Domestic Affairs

A. NAVAL LIMITATIONS

In I930, the Hamaguchi government's acceptance of the London Naval Limitation Treaty brought to the fore a basic issue concerning the Emperor's relationship to the military, a problem which was never

really solved. This was the Navy's claim to the 'right of supreme command', unfettered by any Cabinet.8 The Navy had held out for a

6 See Leonard Mosley, Hirohito, Emperor of Japan (London and New York, I966). This is a sympathetic and reasonable, popular account, but not always accurate. My review, in Journal of Asian Studies, February I968, I now feel, having read Ber- gamini, may have been a shade too severe. Evidences of the Emperor's friendly feelings towards Britain recur in the diaries. For example, in September 1940, the Emperor told Kido he was 'deeply concerned over the destruction of culture resulting from the German air raids on the British Museum', reported in the newspapers. 'Can we not make representations to Germany and England?' Kido advised the Emperor to wait 'until the actual facts are confirmed', suggesting it might hinder the reconciliation of the Army and Navy over the Tripartite Pact (Kido nikki, II, 820, Io September 1940).

7 Kido nikki, I, 159, 2 May 1932. 8 The Navy and Army Ministers (War Minister is the more common, though freer,

translation) reported to the Emperor on administrative matters either indirectly, through the Prime Minister, or directly, and thus had a dual responsibility, to the Cabinet and to the Emperor. On the other hand, the Supreme Command, ostensibly led by the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, although expected to cooperate with the Cabinet, had a direct responsibility only to the Emperor, in the sense that it was expected to report directly to the Emperor on important matters of strategy, planning and operations. The Chiefs of Staff used the concept of 'Supreme Command' to bypass the Cabinet at will. This often forced the Emperor and his advisers into the role of go-between. The diaries kept by advisers like Saionji, Harada and Kido are

4

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I931-I941

Japan-U.S. ratio of 7 to Io in all categories of warships, but was overruled by the government, which accepted a compromise 6 to o ratio for heavy cruisers. The Cabinet obtained, through the mediation of Admiral Okada, the reluctant agreement of the Navy Chief of

Staff, Kato, to the compromise. The Emperor's agreement was then obtained (I April I930) and the American proposal accepted. The day before, however, Kat6 had failed to obtain permission to see the Em-

peror from the Grand Chamberlain, Admiral Suzuki, Kat6's senior in the Navy. Suzuki found reasons for postponing Kat6's requested audience to present a petition opposing the compromise. After Premier

Hamaguchi had obtained Imperial approval, Kat6 pressed the Em-

peror to review the decision, without success. Admirals Kat6 and

Suetsugu then insisted publicly that this decision had violated Article XI of the Constitution which they considered gave the Chief of the

Navy General Staff final authority over Naval policies, answerable

only to the Emperor. By this they meant, in fact, unlimited authority. The Emperor listened in silence to Kat6's tirade against the govern- ment during which he asked to be relieved of his post. The Emperor told the Navy Minister afterwards: 'What he said seems quite improper. As for his resignation, I leave that to you.'9 Two months later, the

Privy Council approved the London Treaty.

B. CONFLICT WITH CHINA OVER MANCHURIA

Early in September of I93I, Prince Saionji became disturbed over

reports of Army political manoeuvring in Manchuria, and advised the Emperor to caution both the Navy and Army Ministers.10 On 9 therefore of great importance, because negotiations between the military services and the government were at the heart ofJapanese politics in these years. See Ike Nobutaka, Japan's Decision for War: Records of the I941 Policy Conferences (Stanford University, 1967), pp. xviii-xix. By resigning, the Army or Navy Ministers could bring down a Cabinet, and there were cases where they were forced to do so by the 'Supreme Command' establishment. Rivalries and antagonisms between the Cabinet and the 'Supreme Command' were complicated by Army-Navy jealousies and in-fighting, and by warring factions within the Ministries. Narrow loyalties were almost always stronger than wider ones. See also Yale Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-I945 (California, 1957), pp. 22 ff.

9 Saionjiko to seikyoku (cited henceforth as S.T.S.), I, 85, 13 June 1930. (Where the translation has been of use, it will be cited simply as Saionji.) Article XI simply states: 'The Emperor has supreme command of the Army and Navy'. The fullest treatment of the London Treaty-supreme command issue is Mayer-Oakes's very valuable Fragile Victory (see note 3, above). See also James Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton: 1966), pp. 35-81, for an excellent analysis.

10 S.T.S. II, 52-3; Saionji, 65, 23 September I931.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

September the Emperor told Navy Minister Abo that Navy men who were involved in such manoeuvring should be disciplined. The Navy Minister 'was completely surprised'.11 Two days later the Emperor summoned Army Minister Minami, who volunteered assurances on almost all points the Emperor was to raise, including curbing political activities of those under Army jurisdiction, and recognition of the For-

eign Minister's authority in foreign affairs. But later, in a conversation with Saionji, he expressed doubts about the feasibility of doing this, and did not accept responsibility in future for transmitting to the

Army every adverse comment from the Court. Saionji, having been asked by Prime Minister Wakatsuki to talk to Minami, took the oppor- tunity to give him a tough lecture on the need for a well-disciplined, apolitical Imperial Army which would not bring shame upon Japan.12

War Minister Minami, after his audience with the Emperor, wrote a letter on 14 September, four days before the Mukden Incident, to General Sugiyama, presumably transmitting the Emperor's warnings and his own assurances. According to Harada, the letter's intent was to

stop the various Army plots in Manchuria and Mongolia and to control the plotters. Minami consulted with General Koiso, who apparently insisted on General Tatekawa, one of his co-conspirators, to transmit this secret letter. Harada considers that his reason-that 'If it is not

Tatekawa, the young group of officers will simply not be controlled'- was a pretext, and that his real aim was the success of the plot.13 The

story of Tatekawa's slow progress to Manchuria is well known: late on the night of his arrival, I8 September, while he was being enter- tained at a sake party with geisha in a Japanese inn, the Mukden Incident occurred. 14

11 Ibid. The same story is told in Kido nikki, I, 98, Io September I931. Kido adds that Abo 'promised the Emperor to maintain and tighten control'. Cited in Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria (California, I964), p. 58, a very good study of the Manchurian 'Incident'. (The interview with Abo was on 9 September not io Septem- ber, as Miss Ogata has it.)

12 S.T.S. II, 53-4, 67. Later, Harada and Saionji wondered whether an Aide-de- Camp or the Navy Minister had prepared Minami for this audience. Ibid., pp. 53, 66-7. In reply to Saionji's lecture, Minami said that he had already been scolded by Premier Wakatsuki and warned by the Emperor, and that he would take respon- sibility and exercise caution. Ibid.

13 S.T.S. II, 6I-2; Saionji, 74-5. 14 S.T.S. II, 62; Saionji, 75. For details, see Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp.

58-62. Miss Ogata's formulation of the contents of the letter, 'to caution the Kwan- tung Army against rash action and to warn that support could not be expected from the government', is no doubt an accurate summary (although the letter itself was evidently destroyed). The Emperor's distrust of General Tatekawa was one reason why Tatekawa was forced to resign after the February 26th Incident in 1936. S. T.S. V, 144-5; Saionji, I582, 3 September 1936.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-I941

When the Incident began, troops were dispatched from Korea to Manchuria with neither government consent nor Imperial sanction. On 22 September the Cabinet decided to try to localize the incident, turning down the Army Minister's request for consent to send troops. Only after the Cabinet meeting did Minami inform Prime Minister Wakatsuki that one division had already left Korea.15 General Kanaya, Army Chief of Staff, reported this to the Emperor, who withheld his

approval. Kanaya could only apologize for this unauthorized action. On the following day, the Emperor insisted to Premier Wakatsuki that the government's decided policy of non-enlargement of the Incident was entirely suitable and must be faithfully observed. After the Premier left the audience, he told Kanaya what the Emperor had said. Despite this, Kanaya pressed for Cabinet approval of the dispatch of troops. The Premier rejected it on the spot.16

However, in a stormy session of the Cabinet on 23 September I93I, although the Army Minister failed to obtain Cabinet approval for the

dispatch of troops, he succeeded in forcing through a decision to provide, ex postfacto, the necessary funds, and an undertaking to obtain Imperial sanction for this payment.17 Premier Wakatsuki recorded in his memoirs that this was unavoidable, because 'Soldiers could not live for a day without the government's provision of expenses'.18 That evening, Premier Wakatsuki reported this decision to the Emperor. At the next Cabinet meeting he reported the Emperor's words: 'I believe the government's policy of non-enlargement, decided upon by this govern- ment, is most proper. Strive still to achieve that goal.'19 Kido, discussing the matter with Harada, Konoye and others, concluded from this

experience that 'the Army was angry about the Emperor's attitude, which they attributed to the advice and instigation of his close advisers. We agreed that from now on, except under compelling circumstances, it would be better to avoid any issuance of Imperial instructions.'20

After the failure of Wakatsuki's party government (Minseit6) to control the military, it resigned on 12 December I931. Saionji, after hearing Inukai Ki, the Seiyikai leader, express anxiety about the

15 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 66; S.T.S. II, 69-7i; Saionji, 85-87, 28 Sep- tember I931.

16 S.T.S. II, 69-71; Saionji, 87-8, 28 September I931. 17 S.T.S. II, 7I-2; Saionji, 88, 28 September 1931. 18 Wakatsuki Reijir6, Kofiuan kaikoroku (KofCan Memoirs) (Tokyo, I950), p. 378,

quoted in Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, p. 66. 19 S.T.S. II, 72; Saionji, 88, 28 September I931. 20 Kido nikki, I, I I, 22 September 1931. Later, Saionji followed this cautious policy

towards the Army in north China (see fns 95, 97, and pp. 26-7, below).

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

increasing power of the military and fear of eventual conflict with the Western powers, recommended him to succeed Wakatsuki. Saionji informed Inukai and, in a significant break with usual procedure, passed on to him a personal message from the Emperor: 'The indis-

cipline and violence of the military and their meddling in domestic and

foreign affairs is something which, for the welfare of the nation, must be viewed with apprehension. Be mindful of my anxiety'.21 Until his assassination on 5 May I932, Inukai did his best to fulfil his assurances to the Emperor.22

C. WITHDRAWAL FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

After the clash with the League of Nations over the Manchurian 'Incident' and the Japanese occupation of the north Chinese province of Jehol in I933, the Emperor was persuaded, with difficulty, that

Japan's withdrawal from the League was inevitable.23 Then, he worried about the wording of the Imperial Rescript on the withdrawal. On 8 March 1933, he suggested two points to be included:24

(a) It is extremely regrettable for Japan to be placed in the unavoid- able position of being forced to withdraw.

(b) Even though Japan withdraws from the League of Nations, we will continue to cooperate and maintain close relations with other nations.

21 S.T.S. II, I60 (24 December 193i). The Emperor continuously warned the Army leaders about discipline, non-interference in politics, and the need to oppose expansionist schemes andfaits accomplis by young officers overseas. See, for example, ibid., and S.T.S. IV, 346 (27 September 1935); Honj6 Shigeru, Honjo nikki (Tokyo, I967), pp. 17I-2, I8i, 187, 218-19, 228.

22 Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 15I. This writer was unable to find in S. T.S. the reaction of Inukai, no doubt given as described by Crowley. The Emperor continued his efforts to limit the conflict. He told Prince Higashikuni: 'If we return Mukden to Chang Hsiieh-liang, our problem will be simply solved'. Then, he told General Shirakawa to end the conflict as quickly as possible. Higashikuni told Harada that this Imperial interference was improper. S. T.S. II, 338-9 (4 September 1932).

23 Kido nikki, I, 224, 8 March 1933. The Emperor asked Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Makino (abbreviated henceforth to Privy Seal) if it was still necessary to with- draw from the League, as there had been a 'favourable solution to the Jehol problem'. Makino replied: 'although your Majesty's words are reasonable, our Plenipotentiary [Matsuoka Yosuke] is already acting on the decision to withdraw ... If we should now suddenly change our attitude, foreign countries would consider us vacillating and internally the people would become utterly confused'. Ibid.

24 Ibid.

8

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-1941

The wording of the Rescript was debated and changed in Cabinet

meetings, and the Emperor produced two further points:25

(I) Japan does not disagree with the League except, unfortunately, as regards Manchuria, and will continue 'in the same spirit as the

League', despite withdrawal.

(2) The civil and the military should work in harmony in their

respective spheres and should avoid intruding into each other's affairs.

The Cabinet, however, continued making changes and watering down the Rescript. Army Minister Araki was particularly difficult about the second point,26 and the Emperor finally conceded, agreeing on the

wording: 'Military and civilian officers must adhere to their designated duties'.27 Further modifications were proposed by the Cabinet, until the Emperor took a firm stand, telling the Foreign Minister to make no mistake about the meaning of two phrases which were under attack: 'To hope for world peace', and 'Military and civilian officers must adhere to their designated duties'. He would accept no further changes.28

D. THE WAR WITH CHINA

The 'China Incident' got off to a desultory start on 7 July I937. In early September, Army Minister Sugiyama discussed a proposed statement to the U.S.A. and Britain that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China. The Emperor inquired: 'You say this, but can you control your subordinates?'29 Sugiyama answered in the affirmative. The Emperor later suggested to his Aide-de-Camp that since Sugiyama 'told him he could control his subordinates, he might issue a statement to all foreign correspondents in Tokyo that the Empire has no territorial ambitions'.30

25 S.T.S. III, 46; Saionji, 565-6, 3 April 1933. 26 S. T.S. III, 47; Saionji, 565. Saionji was puzzled and amused that Araki should

have opposed something so necessary for the Army. Ibid. 27 Kido nikki, I, 228, 24 March 1933. 28 Ibid., I, 228-9, 27 March I933. Kido adds that 'the Foreign Minister was very

awed' by the Emperor's strong stand. 29 This was a very pointed question, as in the most recent of many such examples,

hopes for a negotiated settlement only a month earlier had been sabotaged by the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai. See Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, 1933-1938 (Harvard, i964), pp. 444-8.

30 S.T.S. VI, 87-8; Saionji, I978, 9 October 1937. The Foreign Minister, who had already issued such a statement, told Harada: 'It's too bad the Army didn't do this earlier'. S. T.S. VI, I I (20 October 1937).

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

Later, Sugiyama issued the statement to United Press and Associated Press reporters in Tokyo. Count Makino, hearing this, was 'deeply impressed with the Emperor's wisdom', and told Harada it was 'a wise action to delegate the responsibility to the Army'.31

Some government leaders desired a negotiated conclusion to the conflict in China. In early I938 the Emperor told Foreign Minister Hirota not to be always suspicious of the Chinese and to try to give some consideration to their desires; in July, the Emperor told Army Minister Itagaki and Chief of the General Staff Prince Kan'in that he

thought the war with China should be ended as soon as possible, but

they simply answered that they would carry on until Chiang Kai-shek was defeated.32 In September, Premier Konoye, having difficulty in

discovering the 'true intentions' of the Army, asked the Emperor to sound them out on peace with China. Later Prince Kan'in told the

Emperor that Staff Headquarters was split, some favouring a peace settlement, some wanting a continuation of the war. The Emperor asked: 'Cannot the entire body be united by those favouring peace?' Prince Kan'in replied: 'When there are two such opposite opinions, there is no alternative but to await developments.'33

The military were in the habit of confronting the government with

faits accomplis, but they did not monopolize the method. Perhaps the most fateful decision of the China war was Premier Konoye's rejection of Chiang's offer to negotiate on Japanese terms after the Japanese drive on Nanking began in December I937.34 A series of decisions by Konoye's government based on his hope, in late I937, to force Chiang to accept Japanese terms, culminated in the combination of clearly unacceptable demands with an ultimatum to the Chiang government presented by Foreign Minister Hirota to an Imperial Conference on I I January 1938. If the Chinese government did not accept the terms

31 S.T.S. VI, 87-8. Makino was Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal until 1935, when Sait6 replaced him. When Sait6 was assassinated in I936 in the February 26th Incident, Yuasa replaced him. Kido replaced Yuasa in June I940. By this time Saionji, the last of the Genro, was 91 and ailing, and the more flexible and compro- mising Kido took over his functions increasingly. Saionji died in November 1940.

32 S.T.S. VII, 32; Saionji, 2169, 14 July 1938; Honjo nikki, p. 203. 33 S.T.S. VII, 97; Saionji, 2242, 7 September 1938. Konoye (Konoe, in the alterna-

tive transliteration) often had difficulties in communicating with the military leader- ship (he had a way of seeming to agree with everyone-happo bijin), and sometimes asked the Emperor to speak to them.

34 The German Ambassador who had been acting as a 'post office' for the negotia- tions with Chiang, said to Hirota when the Foreign Minister informed him of this decision:'. .. a protracted war against China ... would alienate the Anglo-American countries, lead to the Bolshevization of China, and weaken Japan vis-a-vis the Soviet Union'. Crowley, Japan's Questfor Autonomy, p. 375.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-I94I

within three days, Hirota intoned to the Conference, Japan would

'proceed to annihilate the Chinese central government'.35 This was, in effect, a fait accompli by Konoye himself. The announcement, whose

import had apparently been known only to Konoye and Hirota, was

greeted by shocked silence. Finally, Prince Kan'in cautiously objected that the Chiang regime should not be treated as a totally defeated

government, but then indicated his reluctant concurrence with the

policy. Nothing more was said.36 The Emperor, whom Konoye had

requested not to 'make any inquiries at the Conference because the Premier would present a policy which had been decided by the govern- ment',37 did, however, have an opportunity to speak to War Minister

Sugiyama on 14 February. When the Emperor asked him, 'Is it pos- sible for these three programmes, long-term hostilities [in China], preparation against the Soviet Union, and Naval expansion, to exist

simultaneously?' Sugiyama replied: 'In any case, I will discuss it with the government and will find some solution'. The Emperor expressed his dissatisfaction with this reply to the Chief of the General Staff on the

following day.38 Even after this, there were occasional rays of hope for a negotiated

settlement with Chiang Kai-shek between 1938 and I940. In I940, one of Chiang's chief conditions, Japan's continued non-recognition of the Wang Ching-wei puppet government in Nanking, was dis-

regarded. The Emperor, displeased, spoke to Sugiyama on 30 Novem- ber. He regretted that hopes for peace had been virtually eliminated

by Japan's recognition of the Wang government. He suggested that, since Sugiyama had admitted the difficulty of defeating Chiang, troops' should be withdrawn to adjust the front line. Sugiyama, 'as usual', objected that withdrawal would be considered defeat and that

Japan 'must at least retain Hankow'. But he agreed that 'adequate

35 S.T.S. VI, 203-4, 206 (19 January 1938). For background and details, see Crowley, Japan's Questfor Autonomy, esp. pp. 358-78, and Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis, pp. 442-76.

36 Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 370-2. After the Imperial Conference, the Chiefs of Staff, stressing the need to prepare against the U.S.S.R. (see the next section), worked to reverse the decision by having the Emperor pronounce his own views against a war to the finish with China. This proposal was strongly opposed, even by Navy Minister Yonai, as a decision already taken and transmitted to the Chinese government. S.T.S. VI, 292, 206-7 (i9 January 1938).

37 S.T.S. VI, 207; Saionji, I991, 19 January 1938. 38 S.T.S. VI, 248-9 (4 March I938). Harada does not specify when this question

was put, but as the Emperor did not attend Liaison Conferences, the question to Sugiyama, which occurs in the paragraph after the report of the Conference, must have been put to him afterwards. Cf. Crowley, Japan's Questfor Autonomy, p. 378.

II

CHARLES D. SHELDON

planning' was needed which would emphasize 'problems of finances and resources'.39

E. CONFLICTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

As the Japanese feared Soviet more than Chinese military power, emotions among those close to the Emperor ran ever higher over the

danger of war with the U.S.S.R. While the Army was bogged down in

China, a Soviet detachment, on i 2 July 1938, occupied a hill at Chang- kufeng, a point where Korea, Manchukuo and Russia converged, commanding a view of the Soviet naval base at Possiet Bay. The

Japanese prepared to drive them off.40 The Emperor agreed with Yuasa, the Privy Seal, that this was no

time for a war with the U.S.S.R., and asked Yuasa what the result would be if the Army carried out its plans without Imperial sanction. Yuasa replied that if the Army was unable to control its fanatics, the fate of Japan would be in question. The Emperor said: 'Perhaps it must reach that stage before the Army comes to its senses'.41

When, on 21 July I938, War Minister Itagaki and Chief of Staff Prince Kan'in asked for an audience, the Emperor, 'thinking it would reflect on their honour if they failed to obtain his sanction', sent a

message warning them that he had no intention of permitting the use of force. 'If you are coming for that, you needn't come at all'.42 Even so, they persisted, and the Emperor first put them off and then con- sented to see them. Itagaki appealed for permission to use force. The

Emperor asked if the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Navy had been

consulted, and Itagaki replied that they had agreed. The Emperor knew that both Ministers had expressed absolute opposition, and 'felt he had been deceived again'. He said, angrily, 'The methods of the

Army in the past have been unpardonable (keshikaran). In the Man- churian Incident and also in the doings at the Marco Polo Bridge, at the

beginning of the present Incident, there was complete disobedience to central orders. There are frequent instances where the methods used have been arbitrary and sneaky, which is altogether improper as my

39 Kido nikki, II, 840, 2 December I940. The Emperor often pressed for a scaling down of Japan's military commitment in China and the avoidance of involvement with the axis powers. S.T.S. VII, 325, 333-4, 346-7 (I , I8 April, 5 May 1939).

40 Chitoshi Yanaga, Japan Since Perry (New York, 1949), p. 576. 41 S.T.S. VII, 49; Saionji, 2189, 28 July 1938. Saionji, hearing this, remarked

pessimistically: 'I believe the Emperor's observation is wrong. Their eyes won't be opened no matter how far it goes'. Ibid., 50; 2190.

42 Ibid., 50.

12

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-194I

Army. This is disgraceful. Nothing like this must happen this time'.

Turning to the War Minister, he said: 'Hereafter, you may not move one soldier without my command'. Itagaki and Prince Kan'in retired from the audience 'very humiliated'.43

Nevertheless, on 30 July Japanese forces attacked and, after a large- scale battle, drove the Russians from the hill. On Io August an agree- ment was reached which brought the hostilities to an end.44 But the most important border clashes, the next year, were at Nomonhan, on the Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border. The Emperor expressed his

anxiety, before the attack, about a report from the Navy that the

Army had amassed some 25 divisions there. He was given assurances

by his Chief Aide-de-Camp, but was again confronted with a fait accompli.45 The conflict, which began in May I939, went badly for the

Japanese, and the incident was not settled until September.46

F. THE TRIPARTITE PACT

Japan's signing, with Germany and Italy, of the Tripartite Pact in

September, 1940, was a major defeat for the Emperor and his advisers. The earlier Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936 was aimed exclusively at the U.S.S.R., but in 1939 strong groups both inside and outside the Army began to exert pressure to strengthen it into a full-fledged military alliance. Arita, appointed Foreign Minister in October 1938, to replace Ugaki, was troubled about the alliance drafted by General Oshima, Ambassador to Germany. Although rejected by Ugaki, it still had many advocates. At Mussolini's request, negotiations were postponed until the following spring. There ensued some eighteen months of ups and

downs, with one draft following another. In April I939 the Emperor

43 S.T.S. VII, 50-I; Saionji, 2189-90, 28 July 1938. Later the Emperor relented a bit, and told Konoye that he hoped they would not resign. Konoye relayed this message to Itagaki, and added, 'There is absolutely no reason to say that the Emperor lacks confidence in the Army. It was just that he becomes suspicious every time an incident occurs. He spoke critically about that point and he probably meant for you to be careful hereafter'. Ibid., 5I-2; 2190-I.

44 Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, p. 576. Yuasa told Harada that for the Army to use force in this way (he says on the 29th) after the Emperor had absolutely forbidden it, was 'outrageous' (hanahada keshikaran). S.T.S. VII, 73; Saionji, 22 i8, 13 August 1938.

45 S.T.S. VII, 298-9; Saionji 2457, 25 February 1939; S.T.S. VIII, IO--I; Saionji 2571, I July 1939.

46 Yanaga, Japan Since Perry, p. 577. Although the Foreign Minister had told the Emperor he was opposed to the use of force, when Itagaki told him it 'might be used against the Soviet troops', he remained silent. After hostilities began, Itagaki told the Emperor that force had been 'inevitable.' He was severely reprimanded. S.T.S. VIII, Io-I ; Saionji 2571, II July I939.

I3

questioned Prime Minister Hiranuma about the significance of the term 'effective military support'. Hiranuma assured him: 'We will not be able to go into actual combat, but we can dispatch naval craft to facilitate things for Germany and Italy. In other words, I believe that we must do something to restrain .. the enemies of Germany and

Italy. However, to attack Singapore or to invade Europe would be

quite impossible'. The Emperor also asked what would be done if Ambassadors Oshima in Berlin and Shiratori in Italy made unauthor- ized commitments. Upon being assured that they would be recalled, the Emperor ordered that these two points be committed to paper and

presented to him.47 Not long after this, Foreign Minister Arita saw the Emperor and told

him:

Ambassadors Shiratori and Oshima have stated that Japan will participate should England and France fight with Germany and Italy.48 Their state- ments should be rescinded as having exceeded their authority. However, because of the fear that this would cause blemishes on their honour and lead to other complications,49 'participation' should be taken to mean effective and appropriate actions other than military support. Thus, I believe it would be much wiser not to take action against the Ambassadors for over- stepping their authority.

The Emperor answered: 'The action of the Ambassadors ignores the

supreme authority of the Emperor'. Arita told Harada later, 'When I heard this, I didn't know what to answer, and could only stand there

looking at the floor. After I returned, I did not mention this matter to the Prime Minister nor, all the more, to other members of the Cabinet; I just kept it to myself. I feared it might create various rumours or be used as adverse propaganda.'50

47 S.T.S. VII, I93; Saionji, 2339, II November 1938; Ibid., VII, 325-6; Saionji 2486-7, I April I939. Hiranuma asked the Foreign Minister to prepare the docu- ment. It was in very general and vague terms, and was signed by the five Ministers of the Five-Ministers' Conference (Prime Minister, Army, Navy, Foreign, and Fi- nance Ministers). Yuasa blamed Hiranuma for supporting the Army out of fear for his own safety. Ibid., VII, 360 (I6 May 1939).

48 In this context, 'participation' would normally be interpreted to mean 'in hostilities'.

49 No doubt grave difficulties with the Army. 50 S. T.S. VII, 335-6; Saionji, 2496-7, I8 April I939. Angered at this effort of the

Army General Staff to reverse the decision of the Five-Ministers' Conference, Privy Seal Yuasa said to the Deputy Chief of the Army General Staff: 'The Army is absurd! Also, the actions taken by Oshima are beyond reason. He has violated the Emperor's prerogative in diplomacy. In the central circles, the colonels and lieutenant-colonels make their own decisions and force them on the Minister and the Chief of the General Staff. Furthermore, they even force them on the Emperor! What kind of attitude is

CHARLES D. SHELDON I4

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I931-I941

On 20 April, complaining that he was caught between the two fires of the Army and the Court, Kido told Harada that Premier Hiranuma had asked him to 'arrange matters' to gain the understanding of the

Emperor and his advisers. He added: 'The Anti-Comintern Pact received Imperial sanction, but now the Army wants to drop the part of the secret treaty which made it applicable only to Soviet Russia. The Emperor will not hear of it'. Kido, with Hiranuma and the Army, believed that Japan could avoid war with the United States and

England 'within the applicability of the treaty'.51 On io May the Emperor told his Chief Aide-de-Camp, Usami,

'The Chief of the Army General Staff desires an audience. I presume that the object of the audience is a strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact. If he ever mentions anything about participation in war, I will

definitely oppose it. Therefore, I want you to let him know beforehand'.

this ? It is insincere and lacking in loyalty. Shouldn't you think more carefully ?' S. T.S. VII, 281; Saionji, 2438-9, 7 February I939. Kido complained that Yuasa 'decides everything according to law, and forces the law on the Chief of the Metropolitan Police Bureau and others. This shows that he does not understand the situation... government cannot be carried out just by the application of laws'. S. T.S. VII, Io8; Saionji, 2253, I6 September 1938. Ambassador Oshima, a Lieutenant-General, often called by his opponents 'the German Ambassador', tended to follow Army rather than Foreign Ministry orders. He and Shiratori functioned less as ambassadors than as traditional go-betweens, by neglecting their roles as communicators between govern- ments and reformulating the positions taken on both sides to make them more accept- able to the other side. In this way, neither government really knew the real position of the other until confronted with proposals which were not of their own making. This technique was also used, to deleterious effect, by Nomura in the Japan-U.S. negotia- tions in I941. See 'The Role ofJapan's Foreign Ministry and its Embassy in Washing- ton', by Hosoya Chihiro, in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds), Pearl Harbor as History (Columbia, I973), pp. 149-64. Due in part to Oshima's Army connexions, the luckless Army Minister, Itagaki, did not escape the Imperial wrath. The Emperor told Itagaki that to commit the nation to a war policy was an infringe- ment of the Imperial authority, and charged him not only with supporting the Ambassadors, but 'covering up for them at Cabinet conferences'. Again, this required some hasty smoothing over by the Privy Seal afterwards. S.T.S. VII, 334; Saionji, 2495-6, I8 April 1939.

51 S.T.S. VII, 338-9; Saionji, 2499, 24 April 1939. Harada was surprised and indig- nant at Kido's attitude, and launched a strong attack on the rightists, concluding, '. . .although it is extreme of me, I am thinking of possibly killing five or six of these men who will become obstacles in the future'. Kido said: 'I'll think about it some more so don't worry'. S.T.S. VII, 339-40; Saionji, 2501, 24 April I939. The difficulty about concluding the Tripartite Pact was that Germany refused to limit its applica- bility to the U.S.S.R., insisting on a commitment against Britain and America. The Court, the Navy, and the Foreign Ministry opposed these terms. From the German viewpoint, the difficulties of the Japanese about making up their minds may have contributed to Hitler's dislike of them. In a secret speech made in 1939 to army officers, he called the Japanese 'the half-monkeys of Asia'. David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, 1948), p. 150.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

Usami ventured to say it would be terrible to have a conflict of opinions between the Emperor and the Army. Despite the Emperor's warning, Prince Kan'in proposed the matter of participation in war, but the

Emperor rejected it.52 In June, a Five-Ministers' Conference decided there would be no binding agreement except against Russia, but that

Japan would confer with Germany and Italy in case of war.53 Although Navy Minister Yonai's insistence that the Navy would be incapable of

giving any assistance beyond providing certain supplies was crucial,54 the Emperor's stand may also have had an effect on this temporary victory for moderation.

Then, in August I939, the situation suddenly changed when Ger-

many signed a non-aggression pact with the U.S.S.R., to concentrate on war with the West. Premier Hiranuma resigned, declaring Japan had been 'practically betrayed'.55 This was a blow against pro-German groups in Japan, and General Abe Nobuyuki was instructed by the

Emperor to form a Cabinet. 'His Majesty at the same time ordered Abe to cooperate with Britain and the United States.'56 Abe's Cabinet was followed, on I6 January I940, by a Cabinet formed by the moderate former Navy Minister Yonai.

During these two 'caretaker Cabinets', no progress seems to have been made towards an agreement with Germany and Italy, but after the fall of France, great pressure built up within Japan for a military alliance. 'For the public, the war was already won by Hitler's Third Reich, and the British capitulation was only a matter of time. It would have been plain folly for the government not to hitch Japan's wagon onto Germany's. . .'.57 On 8 July I940, Kido recorded that Army

52 S.T.S. VII, 359-60; Saionji, 2521-2, 2524, I6 May 1939. 53 These conferences, comprising the Prime Minister, Army, Navy, Foreign and

Finance Ministers, subsequently reviewed this decision several times, and reaffirmed it. S.T.S. VII, 384; Saionji, 2547, I5 June 1939.

54 David Lu, From the Marco Polo Bridge Incident to Pearl Harbor (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 51-2. Yonai explained to Harada his compromise with the Army, in which he agreed Japan should assist Germany and Italy should the U.S.S.R. or France be involved in a war with them, but if Britain and/or France were involved, Japan might help from the first, from some later date, or not at all, depending on how the situation should develop. S. T.S. VII, 382; Saionji, 2547, 5 June I939.

55 E. 0. Reischauer and A. M. Craig, East Asia, the Modern Transformation (Boston, 1965), p. 607. For details, see Lu, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, pp. 54-8.

56 Konoye Fumimaro, Heiwa e no doryoku (My struggle for peace) (Tokyo, I946), p. I 8; S.T.S. VIII, 62 (I September I939) has the Emperor's actual words.

57 Lu, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, p. Io6. Admiral Okada, in his memoirs, states that because Admiral Yonai had been able to stave off the Tripartite Pact during his Premiership, the Emperor expressed his gratitude to him, saying; 'Through the good efforts of the Navy, Japan has been saved'. Okada Keisuke, Kaikoroku (Tokyo, I950), p. I96.

i6

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I--I94I

Vice-Minister Anami told him: 'The Yonai Cabinet is very incon- venient for initiating talks with Germany and Italy. In any case it is feared it would be inclined to miss an opportunity. The Army is unanimous in desiring Konoye as Premier.'58 War Minister Hata

resigned, and the Army recommended no successor. Much to the

Emperor's regret, the Yonai Cabinet was thus forced to resign.59 Konoye also had strong backing from the Privy Council. Prince Saionji, always doubtful about Konoye, excused himself on grounds of health from making a recommendation, and Kido transmitted to the Emperor the agreement of the Privy Council to recommend Konoye.60 His second Cabinet was announced on 22 July I940, with Tojo Hideki as War Minister and Matsuoka Y6suke as Foreign Minister, able and

energetic, but overambitious and unstable. Matsuoka railroaded through an agreement on German terms,

entirely without consultation even with his staff, except for Saito Yoshie. His 'diplomatic Blitzkrieg'61 was completed in three days, 7-I September. The acquiescence of the government remains puzzling. On I4 September Tojo told Kido that the Navy (which had opposed the Pact) and the Army had reached agreement.62 The Emperor, the next day, confided to Kido his doubts regarding the Pact and its effects on relations with the U.S.A., and his anxiety about Konoye's weakness in opposing the military, as well as his tendency to 'give up when the situation becomes difficult'. If things go wrong, 'I wonder if Konoye would really take the bitter medicine with me'.63 The Cabinet agreed

58 Kido nikki, II, 80I, 8 July 1940. The Emperor expressed his doubts about Konoye to Kido, who encouraged him to give his approval. Ibid., II, 809, 22 July 1940.

59 See ibid., II, 804-5, I6 July 1940 for details. The Emperor asked Kido to con- vey to Yonai his 'gracious intentions'. Kido waited to do so until after the resig- nation. Yonai was 'deeply moved'. Ibid., II, 805. The Emperor told Kido that when the Yonai Cabinet had been formed, General Hata had promised to cooperate with Yonai. At the time of his resignation, the Emperor 'did not give any gracious message to Hata'. Ibid., 805. The Emperor later told Hata that although he profoundly regretted the Yonai Cabinet resignation, 'It was a blessing in disguise in the sense that it shed light on where the responsibility lay'. Hata, knowing it was the Army, shed tears. Ibid.

60 Kido nikki, II, 809-10, 22 July I940. 61 Lu, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, p. I 13. Lu's account of this episode (pp. 106-I9)

is very good, but some may consider his book's treatment of Matsuoka rather too sympathetic. Maruyama Masao, Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics (London, I963), p. 91, considers Matsuoka to have been a borderline psychopath.

62 Kido nikki, II, 822, I4 September I940. 63 Ibid., 15 Sept. 1940. Kido reported to Konoye only the Emperor's worries that

Konoye might resign 'if there was something he didn't like'. Kido passed on to the Emperor Konoye's assurances on that point. S.T.S. VIII, 346; Saionji, 2946, 22

I 7

CHARLES D. SHELDON

to Matsuoka's draft on I6 September. The Emperor's wish that the

Privy Council be consulted was first opposed by Matsuoka, but he

gave way, reluctantly. He need not have worried, however, as the

Privy Council approved the Pact.64 On 20 September, Konoye told Harada that the Emperor had said

to him:

'I believe that in present circumstances, the signing of the German-Japanese. military alliance was inescapable. If there are no other means of dealing with the United States, it probably cannot be helped (itashikata ga arumai). However, just what will the Navy do in the ten-thousand-to-one possibility of hostilities with the U.S.A. ? ... I have often heard that in the map prob- lems of the Naval Staff College, Japan is always the loser in a Japanese- American war. Could you reassure me about that?' (I [Konoye] later asked Navy Vice-Minister Toyoda and he said: 'No such thing-sonna koto wa nai.') The Emperor continued: 'I am very concerned over this situation. What would happen in the event that Japan should become a defeated nation ... Would the Prime Minister share the pains and toils with me?' Ordinarily I am very cool and calm, but when I heard these words of the Emperor, my eyes dimmed with tears. I then told the Emperor... 'Just prior to the Con- ference in the Imperial Presence immediately before the Russo-Japanese War,... the Emperor Meiji summoned Prince It6... and told him that according to the resolutions of the Cabinet Council, Japan was forced to fight Russia. The Emperor asked what It6 would do in the event Japan lost the war ... Prince It6 replied that he would relinquish all his decorations and titles, and ... go into the battlefield to die alone .. Emperor Meiji was deeply moved and nodded his head in approval, as if to say, "Well said"'. I then told the Emperor: 'I understand completely Your Majesty's concern. I am determined to do what little I can to serve the nation'. The Emperor nodded his head in acknowledgement... I reported this incident to my colleagues at the Cabinet Council. Suddenly, Foreign Minister Matsuoka burst into tears, and the room became very quiet.65

September I940. According to Okada, the Emperor warned Konoye that because of this treaty, 'America may soon stop shipments of oil and pig iron to Japan. If this occurs, what will become ofJapan's freedom of action ? After this, over a long period of time we may be plunged into darkness and difficulty. Are you prepared to endure this?' Konoye pledged that he would do his utmost. Kaikoroku, pp. 198-9.

64 Kido nikki, II, 822, i6 September I940. Prince Saionji was not informed about Matsuoka's negotiations with Stahmer, and learned from Harada only ten days later, on 26 September although he had heard something from Konoye. He strongly opposed the Pact, and was 'very worried'. S. T.S. VIII, 354 (4 October 1940). When Harada scolded Kido for not keeping Saionji informed, Kido replied, 'I felt too sorry for Prince Saionji, and it would have been just too painful'. Ibid.

65 S.T.S. VIII, 346-8; Saionji, 2946-7, 22 September I940. Kido recorded a short summary of this conversation. Kido nikki, II, 822, i6 September I940. Kido writes (Nikki, II, 825, 24 September 1940) that the Emperor's opposition to any celebration of the conclusion of the Pact, and his request to Kido to arrange a visit to the Imperial Shrine 'to pray for the help of the gods', moved him 'deeply'. On the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor fifteen months later, Matsuoka was ill in bed, and was visited by

i8

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, 193I-1941

G. THE OCCUPATION OF INDO-CHINA

One of the first fruits of closer relations with Germany was German pressure, at Japan's request, on the Vichy government of defeated France, to permit a 'limited' Japanese occupation of French Indo- China to 'facilitate' Japan's war against China. The French govern- ment resisted, Japan issued three ultimatums, and the French agreed, on 22 September I940, to permit a 'limited' number of Japanese troops in Haiphong and the establishment of three Japanese air bases, to be garrisoned by no more than 6,ooo troops.66 The Japanese Army, against instructions, moved into Indo-China that night, and bombs were dropped on Haiphong, killing 15 and injuring i8.67 Kido wrote in his Diary:

Aide-de-Camp Samejima came to my office and reported as follows: 'The Nishimura Battalion, which was to make a peaceful advance into French Indo-China, made a bold landing in the face of the enemy and bombed

Dr Sait6, his aide in the negotiations with Stahmer which produced the Tripartite Pact. Matsuoka said to Sait6: 'The Tripartite Alliance was my worst mistake. I hoped to prevent the United States from entering the war. I wanted to adjust our relations with Soviet Russia through this Alliance. I hoped peace would be main- tained and Japan would be placed in a secure position. Instead we see face to face the present calamity which indirectly resulted from the Alliance. . .'. In tears, Matsuoka begged the forgiveness of his Emperor. Yoshie Sait6, Azamukareta rekishi (Tokyo, I955), p. 88, quoted in Lu, Marco Polo Bridge Incident, p. I I9. It was rather late for Matsuoka to have qualms. It was his adamant blockage of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations in 1941 that caused Konoye, prompted by the Emperor, to drop Matsu- oka as Foreign Minister in July. See Konoye Fumimaro, Memoirs (Asahi Shimbun, 1946), p. i8. On 25 June Matsuoka reported to the Emperor, 'Now that war has been opened between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan should cooperate with Ger- many and attack the Soviet Union.... In the end Japan will have to fight the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain as our enemies'. Konoye continues, 'Of course, the Foreign Minister did not consult any member of the Cabinet.... His Majesty, astounded at Matsuoka's talk, summoned me at once . . .'. At the Imperial Conference on 2 July the decision was taken not to take action against the U.S.S.R. Ibid., pp. 25-6.

66 Roger Levy, Guy Lacam, and Andrew Roth, French Interests and Policies in the Far East (New York, I94I), p. 161. Earlier, Kido justified to the Emperor the ulti- matums to the French command in Indo-China in terms of the fear that the French there, encouraged by England and America, might decide to ally with China against Japan. Kido nikki, II, 821-2, 14 September 1940. See R. J. C. Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, pp. I92-8, for an excellent summary of Japanese-French relations over Indo-China.

67 Konoye makes the rather astounding admission that his government's decision to move into Indo-China was made as a sop to the extremists in the Army who were angry about having lost the opportunity to attack the U.S.S.R., their 'natural enemy' (Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. I66). The avoidance of trouble seems to have been a way of life for Konoye.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

Haiphong from the air despite having received a communication from the Navy Supporting Command. It was reported that the Nishihara Commission became indignant at this illegal action and left the locality'. .. Local actions taken without any regard to the general situation are truly regrettable. It is gangs like these who make such fatal mistakes.68

But this was only the beginning for the Supreme Command, and

they went ahead with plans for occupying the southern part of the

country, as well as with a military pact with Thailand giving Japan air bases there. On 3 February 1941 the Emperor told Kido:

On Saturday last the Chiefs of Staff and the Premier reported to me the measures to be taken toward French Indo-China and Thailand. Personally, I do not approve of anything in the nature of a thief at a fire (kajiba dorobo- taking advantage of the weakness of an adversary in a crisis to make de- mands). However, to cope with the great changes in the world of today, mistaken benevolence would be unwise. So I approved those policies but we must be very tactful in carrying them out.69

H. 'RIGHT-WING' TERRORISM

The Emperor had a strong aversion to the illegal strong-arm methods of the so-called 'rightists' inside as well as outside the government, and exerted his influence to prevent the government from being too much influenced by them. Immediately after the assassination of Preniier Inukai in the May I5th Incident, 1932, the Emperor, to guide him in his choice of a successor, transmitted ,to Saionji six points, which

Saionji pronounced 'eminently reasonable'. They included the require- ments that the new Prime Minister must not be sympathetic toward

Fascism, he must uphold the Constitution, and favour international

peace. He added that if the Constitution were not safeguarded, 'I would not be able to justify and vindicate myself to the Emperor Meiji',70 and that clear distinction must be made between political and administrative officials and be strictly enforced.71 This last point was

68 Kido nikki, II, 826, 26 September I940. War Minister Tojo took immediate steps to punish those responsible, in contrast to the usual acceptance of Army indiscipline (Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, p. 194). This furthered Tojo's reputation for willingness and ability to control the Army hotheads.

69 Kido nikki, II, 854, 3 February 1941. 70 The Emperor Meiji was anxious to establish a rule of law based on the Consti-

tution, and in foreign relations favoured peaceful methods as far as possible. Viscount Kaneko, who was given the responsibility for publishing Emperor Meiji's Chronicles, found that Meiji 'Was not too much in favour of starting wars. He had a strong desire to solve problems peaceably'. He suggested to the Emperor that this be left out 'for the present'. The Emperor objected, saying: 'I think it is this which should be passed on to future generations'. S.T.S. III, 136 (8 September 1933); Saionji, 682-3.

71 S.T.S. II, 288; Saionji, 349-50, 23 June 1932.

20

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-194 I

apparently meant to strengthen the hand of the higher policymaking officials against the younger, less experienced, narrower extremists in the lower ranks, essential if moderate, sensible policies were to be

pursued. In the I93os, before the major incident of 26 February 1936, there

were three incidents planned but frustrated at the last moment when the authorities got word of them. These were the March Incident, I931, the October Incident, I93I, and the Officers' School Incident of November I934. Four other incidents, however, resulted in the assassi- nation of several moderate government and big business leaders: the Ketsumeidan (Blood Pledge Corps) Incident of February-March, I932, the May I5th Incident, I932, the Shimpeitai (Heaven-sent Soldiers'

Unit) Incident of July I933, and the assassination of General Nagata Tetsuzan in August I935. These and others were plotted, as the first

step towards what their leaders often called a 'Sh6wa restoration', combining Emperorism and militarism with ill-conceived and abstract national socialist ideas including the abolition of the political parties and labour unions and vague plans for a redistribution of wealth.72

Incidents which failed completely were hushed up, the culprits were either exonerated or, at most, given the mildest of 'administrative

punishment'. The then Colonel Nagata, considered an advocate of

discipline, was asked about the October Incident the following March, I932, and replied: 'From the first, this should have been settled accor-

ding to Army criminal law, but, having due regard for the motives and morale (seishin) of the participants and also taking into account the

prestige 'of the Army, it was settled by administrative measures.'73

Ironically, Nagata himself was cut down by an insubordinate subor- dinate officer less than three years later.

There were far more terrorist plans than there were actual incidents, and with almost monotonous regularity, police agents reported the names of moderate leaders and Imperial advisers who had been put on lists for eradication 'for the good of the country'. This had a de-

moralizing effect on responsible government leaders, and for most of them, the gap between their moderate private statements and their

aggressive public ones tended to grow.74 72 See Ben-ami Shillony, Revolt in Japan: The Young Officers and the February 26,

1936 Incident (Princeton, i973), pp. 51-5; the standard study of the 'right wing', earlier and more general, is Richard G. Storry, The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism (London, 1957).

73 Kido nikki, I, I48, 9 March I932. 74 Two typical examples are given in Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy,

p. ioI: In September I935, when War Minister Hayashi told Premier Okada that

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

In 1932, 'right-wing' terrorists planned to 'enter the palace by force, seize the Emperor, and isolate him from his "evil advisers" '. They intended to 'transfer the Emperor to a warship... and make him there sign an Imperial Rescript to be drawn up by Okawa Shfimei',75 one of the most rabid 'rightist' ideologists. The earliest plan, a modest one, for the violence which became the February 26th Incident, was to assassinate the three chief 'villains of the state': the Genro, Prince Saionji, the former Privy Seal, Makino, and the new Inspector General of Military Education, General Watanabe. Saionji and Makino were thought to wield the greatest influence in the Imperial Court and were held responsible for manipulating the Emperor in such affairs as the London Naval Treaty and Manchuria.76 Watanabe had publicly supported the Minobe theory, which viewed the Emperor as an organ of the state, reversing his predecessor, Mazaki, who had issued a directive to all Army units declaring Minobe's theory to be contrary to the kokutai, Japan's 'unique national polity', before the government had made any decision on the issue, and to the disgust of the Emperor himself.77

After the experience of subordinate officers in Manchuria confronting the government with a fait accompli, Finance Minister Takahashi in

1935 voiced his fear that this would happen again in China. In a Cabinet meeting he insisted that Japan 'should not let its petty army officials in China stir up trouble. Japan should cooperate with Britain and the United States in assisting China to build up her economy.' Takahashi was assassinated five months later, in the February 26th Incident. That the Emperor agreed entirely with Takahashi can be seen in the statement of the Army Minister to Premier Okada, after this Cabinet meeting, that the Emperor had told him the same thing.78

Very early on the snowy morning of 26 February, four bodies of

troops, ranging from Ioo to 300 soldiers each, led by young officers, about I,000 young officers had organized and were planning something, Hayashi proposed that either the government should denounce Minobe's Emperor-organ theory, or he (Hayashi) would resign. The possibility of disciplinary action 'seems not to have occurred to him.' Again, in I937, Terauchi, the Commander-in-Chief in China, was having trouble with subordinate officers who were indignant that the government was not getting on with economic measures expected by the 'rightists'. 'In order to console the combatants in North China he has made some very strong statements'.

75 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. Io6. 76 Ibid., p. II . 77 Ibid., pp. 50-I. The Emperor told Honjo that the opponents of the organ theory

were trying to deprive him of his freedom and were placing him in an extremely difficult position, spiritually and physically. Honjo nikki, p. 203.

78 S.T.S. IV, 345-6; Saionji, 1330-I, 27 September I935.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, 1931-1941

set out to take over the palace guard and to assassinate Takahashi, Privy Seal Admiral Saito, and General Watanabe. These murders were

successfully carried out, and Watanabe's wife was wounded. Admiral Suzuki, the Grand Chamberlain, was badly wounded and left for dead, but survived; former Privy Seal Makino escaped when policemen put up a fight; one policeman was killed and a nurse wounded. Three hundred soldiers appeared at the Prime Minister's residence. By mistake, Admiral Okada's brother-in-law, who resembled Okada, was killed. The rebels, and later the Army, announced the Prime Minister's death, but he was in hiding in the house, and escaped later disguised as one of a group of men of about his age permitted to enter the house to attend a mourning ceremony for his death.79

Prime Minister Okada escaped, but his escape was kept secret. In his absence, the most important adversary of the mutineers and

opponent of the 'Sh6wa Restoration' was the Sh6wa Emperor himself. He was very upset when he was awakened and told the news. One of the leaders of the rebels, Captain Yamaguchi, appealed to his father- in-law General Honj6 Shigeru, the Emperor's Chief Aide-de-Camp, for

support. Honj6 reported to the Emperor about the rebellion at about six in the morning of the 26th. The Emperor demanded the suppression of the 'mutineers' (boto) at once. Honj6 replied that such a harsh term should not be applied to Imperial troops. The Emperor replied, 'They have killed my advisers and are now trying to pull a silk rope around

my neck.... I shall never forgive them.... No matter what their motives are, they have moved troops on their own authority, without

my orders, and they are no soldiers of mine.'80 The rebels occupied key government buildings, and at 9.30 War

Minister Kawashima read the rebels' demands to the Emperor and

suggested a strong Cabinet to strengthen the armed forces and reform the economy.81 The Emperor again voiced strong disapproval and said the mutineers 'had brought disgrace to the vital essence of our national character'.82 As Shillony points out, the Emperor's order to crush the rebellion was 'only a verbal instruction, reflecting the personal wish of the Emperor, and not an Imperial Decree countersigned by a Minister

79 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. I35-4I, 17 -2. 80 S.T.S. V, 6-7 (I4 March 1936); Kido nikki, I, 465, 26 February 1936; Honjo nikki,

pp. 27I-2. See also Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. I49. The meaning of 'silk rope' is that they did not intend violence, gaining their ends by other means, while professing loyalty to the Emperor.

81 S.T.S. V, 7 (I4 March 1936); Kido nikki, I, 464, 26 February 1936; Honjo nikki, p. 272.

82 Kido nikki, I, 464-5, 26 February I936.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

of State. Kawashima could thus disregard the order',83 for the time

being. The factional situation in both Army and Navy was complex, and a

number of high-placed Army officers, who had encouraged the hopes of the rebels, and who sympathized with their motives and aims, worked to gain acceptance of their demands, while others sought to

exploit the situation for their own ends, or rather their factional ends, shelving the Emperor's demands that immediate action be taken against those responsible.84 With the Prime Minister thought dead, the Privy Seal murdered, and the Grand Chamberlain near death, Kido, then Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal, came to the fore to support the

Emperor in his tough attitude toward the rebels. According to his

diary, he was worried that the rebels might seize the Emperor and coerce him into proclaiming a 'Restoration'. They had made one unsuccessful attempt to replace the palace guard early on the 26th, but Kido obtained General Honjo's assurance that any attack would be repulsed. The Navy General Staff being opposed to the insurrection, Admiral Yonai quickly moved marines into Tokyo and the First Fleet into Tokyo Bay. The Emperor accepted Kido's proposal to oppose any change of government and to insist that the Cabinet, with an acting Premier, suppress the rebellion.85

As the Incident dragged on, according to Hirohata, the Vice Grand

Chamberlain, the Emperor frequently told the War Minister: 'I will give you exactly one hour to suppress the rebels'. Every fifteen

minutes, the Emperor telephoned Hirohata to find out whether his order had been executed. But the debate in the Army continued. Generals like Mazaki, Araki and Kashii pressed for a settlement by persuasion, based on what they called 'humanity'.86 In the afternoon of 27 February, the Emperor warned Honjo that if the Army did not

suppress the rebellion, he would do it himself.87 Finally, the pressure from the Emperor, and the implied threat from the Navy succeeded in shifting the balance in the Army towards those favouring disciplining the rebels. A combination of a show of overwhelming force and per- suasion by broadcasts and handbills directed to the ranks that, if they

83 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. 150. 84 Ibid., pp. 152-66. 85 Kido nikki, I, 464-5, 467, 26-7 February 1936; S.T.S. V, 29, 307 (I2, 26 March

1936); Honjo nikki, p. 272. On the Navy's role, see Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. I69-71. Yonai planned, if necessary, to rescue the Emperor and escort him to a battleship. Ibid., p. 170.

86 S.T.S. V, 7; Saionji, I427, I4 March 1936. 87 Kido nikki, I, 465, 26 February 1936; Honjo nikki, pp. 275-6.

24

JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93 I-1941

resisted the Imperial Army, they would be branded as traitors, broke the spirit of the insurrection. On the evening of 29 February, the soldiers returned, as commanded, to their barracks. Their officers either gave themselves up or committed suicide. The public was puzzled that those

superior officers who had encouraged them were untouched, while those directly responsible were quickly punished.88 One can hardly disagree with Shillony's conclusion that 'Neither the official theory of the Emperor as an organ of the state, nor the rebels' view of the Emperor as the mystical incarnation of Japan's destiny took into account the

personal attitudes of the man on the throne. Yet the views of the

Emperor played a crucial role in the suppression of the February 26 rebellion . .'.89

The rebels' dream of a fairer society through national socialism was not achieved, and there were rumblings of further plots against the establishment, but no actual outbreaks of violence.90 But even more than in the earlier cases of terrorist threats and violence, Japan was moved inexorably nearer to a complete military takeover and towards a narrower, more emotional and illogical leadership, in a dangerous world of shifting alliances and fluctuating military fortunes.

I. THE EMPEROR AND THE 'IMPERIAL' FORCES

As can be seen by the examples already given, the Emperor was

absolutely consistent in opposing the aggressive policies of the Army. 88 Of 1,483 rebels, 3 officers committed suicide. After secret and rapid military

trials, 13 officers and 6 civilians were sentenced to death; 12 officers and one civilian, as well as 44 non-commissioned officers and 4 soldiers, were given prison sentences. In addition, Aizawa, whose interminable trial had earlier been turned into a propa- ganda marathon, was given a new trial in April and executed on 3 July. Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. 198, 20I-2, 206, 291. It appears that many Japanese would have agreed with General Ugaki, who wrote in his diary, 'How disgusting it is to watch these rascals, holding in one hand the matches and in the other the water hose, setting fire and putting it out at the same time, inciting the pure young officers, pleading their cause and then claiming credit for having put them down'. Cited in ibid., p. 203.

89 Ibid., p. 218. 90 For example, Col. Hashimoto Kingor6, a prominent hothead, threatened, after

the February 26th Incident to kill the Genro and the senior statesmen. He blamed them for blocking a supposed Imperial amnesty for the rebels. S. T.S. V, 123; Saionji, I560, I3 August I936. After the May I5th Incident, Saionji frustrated an attempt to obtain an amnesty for the culprits. Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. I04. In I937, Prince Konoye, as Premier, attempted to obtain one for those involved in the February 26th Incident. He thought his Cabinet agreed, but the Emperor knew they did not. According to Yuasa, 'The Emperor hesitated to voice his opposition to Konoye... but, the other day he told him, "On the whole, I am opposed to an amnesty", and moved on to another subject'. S.T.S. VI, I22; Saionji, 1912, 25 Octo- ber I937. The amnesty was dropped.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

However, the military leaders who, intent on the narrow interests of of 'the Army' or 'the Navy' or, more often, on their own factional

objectives, chose to minimize the Emperor's personal opposition and to rationalize it as the result of the poisonous influence of the Emperor's advisers, who were considered pro-English and pro-American. The extremists believed this to be the case, as evidenced by the assassination of Sait6 and the fact that Saionji, Makino and Harada were often on lists for assassination. The Army and extremists claimed to be working for the welfare of the nation. Saionji commented, in this regard, 'A

military man cannot really understand such matters as the welfare of a nation or the welfare of a people. Military men advocate national

unity, but their national unity is no unity at all. It just means submission to them.'91

In I932, Saionji told Harada: 'Konoye said: "The Emperor, holding very liberal ideas, may be the main cause of friction with the Army" '.

Saionji added: 'It's almost as if Konoye thinks it very bad for the

Emperor to hold liberal ideas'.92 Harada said: 'I do not think that

Konoye feels that.... He probably thinks it is better that the Emperor has liberal ideas, but, in view of present-day Army trends, he no doubt fears there will be clashes of opinion'.93

The Emperor's advisers were caught between these conflicts, and believed they could do little more than try to moderate them, on both sides. Kido put it this way to Harada:

The present Emperor is a scientist and very much of a liberal as well as an advocate of peace. Therefore, if the Emperor's ideas are not changed to some extent, the great gap between His Majesty and the rightist groups will grow.... In order to lead the Army, but still make it appear as if we were being led by them, we must also make it appear as if we understood the Army a little better.

Harada was surprised and indignant, and launched a strong verbal attack on the rightists.94

Even though, after the Manchurian Incident, Saionji prevented direct confrontations between the Army and the Emperor,95 criticisms

91 S.T.S. V, 264; Saionji, 1718, 19 February 1937. 92 This was an indirect criticism, by Konoye, of Saionji, who had helped to instill

such ideas. 93 S.T.S. II, 248; Saionji, 297, 3 April 1932. 94 S.T.S. VII, 339-40; Saionji, 2501, 24 April 1939. For Harada's angry reply to

Kido, who had just advocated the Tripartite Pact, see fn. 5I, above. 95 For example, in early 1933, when the Premier tried to obtain an Imperial Re-

script ordering the Kwangtung Army to halt its advance into north China, Saionji opposed it on the ground that the Army might disobey. S.T.S. II, 420-I; Saionji, 493, '5 January I933.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I-I941

of the Emperor proliferated, especially in the Army. There were

reports that he was being called mediocre, that he spent too much time in his research in micro-organisms, and that young officers, and some older ones as well, were 'questioning the sagacity of His Majesty'.96 In December 1932, Arita, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Saionji that Count Uchida, his chief, was putting up no resistance to the Army on the Jehol issue. He thought the Emperor should caution him and the Army Minister. But Saionji opposed this:

On this issue, if the Emperor cautioned them, the Army probably would not heed him. Deputy Chief of Staff Mazaki, and the like, if the Emperor shows any distress over their reports, are used to going back and saying, 'The Emperor was much displeased'. Then the Army leaders say: 'The Emperor is too pacifistic', or 'He is too nervous', and such things .... Finally, they blame the Emperor's advisers and me. If the Army would not heed even the words of the Emperor, it would greatly impair the Emperor's prestige. So it is a very delicate matter.97

The Aides-de-Camp to the Emperor were in an unenviable position, as their primary loyalty, in fact, remained with the Army. Before the Nomonhan Incident, the Emperor asked Hata, his Chief Aide-de-

Camp, to find out with what intentions 25 divisions had been amassed on the Soviet-Manchukuo border. Hata attempted to answer on the

spot. The Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain severely repri- manded him for this, but Hata complained about the unbridgeable gap between the Army and the Emperor. 'What the Emperor says does not get through. Thinking that His Majesty's virtues should not be injured, I did not comply with his orders. That I did not do as I was told is my fault, but it is really distressing'. There were other cases of this kind.98

The Services, and, to some extent, 'rightist' circles, exerted pressure on the Emperor through members of the Imperial family, especially Princes Kan'in and Fushimi as Chiefs of the Army and Navy General

96 S.T.S. II, 47 (14 September 1931), III, 133 (29 August 1933). See also Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. 102-3. Those who killed Inukai used their trial to air criticisms of the Court, comparing it to the Romanovs in their last days. S.T.S. III, 113 (io August I933).

97 S.T.S. II, 420-I (I5 January I933); Saionji, 493. 98 S.T.S. VII, 298; Saionji 2457, 25 February I939. Harada comments that

although there were other times when Chief Aides-de-Camp did not follow Imperial instructions, this was the first admission of it. See, for another example, S. T.S. VII, 152 (25 October 1938); Saionji, 2297. Later, there were troubles with Honj6's successor, Gen. Usami, who failed to transmit, or to transmit accurately, the Em- peror's messages to the Army, and divulged what the Emperor had told him in confidence, apparently trying to play the traditional role of go-between. S. T.S. VII, 31I (23 March I939). Usami was replaced by Hata on 15 May I939. S.T.S. V, 343.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

Staffs respectively, and by two 'right-leaning' uncles, Princes Higashi- kuni and Asaka. But the Imperial Prince most imbued with 'right-wing' ideas was the Emperor's younger brother Prince Chichibu, who was the

hope of many of the extremists as a friendly replacement for the hostile Hirohito.99 This opposition from within served further to isolate the

Emperor. There are innumerable examples in the diaries of attempts by the

Army, by Konoye, and others, to bypass the Emperor, but an attempt by the Navy in I934 is particularly interesting. Without consulting the Cabinet, the Navy General Staff drafted a resolution proposing the revision of the Naval limitations in the Washington treaty. The

Navy Minister, Osumi, made approval by the new Okada Cabinet of this 'decision' a condition of his remaining in office. He told Okada that Prince Fushimi had obtained the Emperor's approval. Kido, however, found that the Emperor had not approved it. The following morning, I4 July, Prince Fushimi, 'as a member of the Imperial family', gave the resolution to the Emperor, announcing that it was the Navy resolution, and promptly left. The Emperor asked Makino to tell Prince Fushimi that he did not want things like this to happen again. Prince Fushimi was very sorry and said: 'Indeed I was wrong'.100 But when an Army official suggested to Prime Minister (Admiral) Okada that the Emperor might hold an Imperial Conference (Gozen Kaigi) and order the Naval authorities to drop their demands, Okada

replied, 'Conferences in the Imperial presence are very risky. The Cabinet plans to go ahead, shouldering all responsibilities'.lo0

Saionji then suggested to Makino and Kido that, before the govern- ment conceded to Navy pressure, the Emperor speak to the Chiefs of

Staff, Princes Kan'in and Fushimi, but they both opposed it, fearing criticism of those close to the Emperor.102 Later in I934, the Japanese government gave notice of its intention to abrogate the Washington

99 See Shillony, Revolt in Japan, esp. pp. 95-109. The Emperor himself reduced the political influence of all those not in offices of responsibility to him by simply refusing to discuss politics with them. See Kido nikki, I, 346, 13 July I934, Honjo nikki, I63, and Shillony, for examples, mostly concerning Prince Chichibu.

100 S. T.S. IV, I6-I9; Saionji, 945-7, 2oJuly I934. For details of the circumstances, see Imai Sei'ichi, 'Cabinet, Emperor, and Senior Statesmen', in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (eds), Pearl Harbor as History, p. 65, and note I7. The Emperor complained to Foreign Minister Hirota, asking why the Navy was suddenly pressing for parity with the powers. S.T.S. IV, 20; Saionji, 947, 20 July I934.

o10 S.T.S. IV, 47-8; Saionji, 978, 2o August 1934. Navy Minister Osumi threatened Harada with a 'grave situation' if the Emperor frustrated the Navy's desires for parity. Ibid.

102 S.T.S. IV, 49-50; Saionji, 979-80, I9 August 1934.

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, 193I-I94I

Naval Treaty, and in 1935, when demands for parity were not accepted, the Japanese delegates walked out of the London Naval Conference.103

The Emperor's clashes with the Army were, however, much the more frequent, and his anger was perhaps most often vented on Generals

Sugiyama and Itagaki. Further examples may serve to make this point. On 5 July I939, after the incident in Tientsin, where the Japanese Army clashed with the British, Itagaki had a two-hour audience in which, according to Harada, 'the discontents of the Emperor exploded and His Majestry very bluntly said: "There is no one as stupid as you (atama ga warui) !" It seemed that the Army Minister was frightened and no one can understand the situation.' Later, the Emperor sent

Itagaki a message through the Aide-de-Camp, saying, 'The scolding is not meant for him to resign.'104

The very next day, 6 July, Itagaki was back to discuss again a plan to send Admiral Osumi and General Terauchi to Germany for the Nazi Party Conference, 'to make more secure the Anti-Comintern Pact

spiritually'. The Emperor retorted: 'You know my opinions well. Even before ... you reported the falsity that the Foreign Minister was in favour of a military alliance. That is very insolent (keshikaran) !'105 The Emperor then asked about the Tientsin Incident. Itagaki blandly explained that the Japanese demand for the British Concession to surrender 45 million Yuan was 'to maintain the currency exchange'. The Emperor asked, 'Is that all?' Itagaki admitted that it wasn't a a sufficient explanation, and the Emperor said: 'That is very bad

thinking on your part.'106 Later, the Emperor expressed to Premier Hiranuma his desire that anti-British activities be suppressed. He agreed, but said it would be difficult.107

Hiranuma's resignation over the non-aggression pact signed by Germany with the U.S.S.R. gave the Emperor an opportunity to assure that Itagaki was replaced by someone more acceptable to him.

According to Harada, 'The Emperor was very indignant about the faults of the Army', and departed from usual procedure in refusing to accept anyone for Army Minister except Hata or Umezu. The Army selected Hata.108

103 See Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, pp. 77-8. 104 S.T.S. VIII, 13-14; Saionji, 2573, I I July I939. Terauchi later visited Germany

'in a private capacity'. S.T.S. VIII, 86; Saionji, 2651, 2 October '939. 105 S.T.S. VIII, I4; Saionji, 2574, II July I939. 106 Ibid., 15. 107 Ibid., 45; 2607, 14 August I939. 108 S.T.S. VIII, 61-2 (I September I939); Saionji, 2624-5. Hata had been Chief

Aide-de-Camp, and the Emperor apparently thought he had some sympathy with

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

A final example concerns General Sugiyama, who in I94I had

replaced Prince Kan'in as Army Chief of Staff. On 5 September I94I, immediately after the Cabinet's decision that unless negotiations with the U.S.A. were successful (which meant, in fact, unless the Americans

gave some concessions), Japan would attack, Prime Minister Konoye asked to see the Emperor. Kido reproached him for presenting the

Emperor with such a momentous decision only a day before the scheduled Imperial Conference. In the audience, Konoye assured the

Emperor that diplomacy would be put before preparations for war, which was not really true, as the decision had been taken to pursue both simultaneously. Konoye suggested that the Emperor question the two Chiefs of Staff, Sugiyama and Admiral Nagano. When they arrived, the Emperor asked Sugiyama for the Army's estimate of the time required 'to dispose of the matter' in case of war with the United States. Sugiyama began by saying that the initial phase of operations in the South would take about three months. The Emperor broke in to remind him that as War Minister at the beginning of the war with

China, he had said the 'Incident' would be over in about a month. It had dragged on for four years, and was still going on. Sugiyama stressed the vastness of China, which angered the Emperor even more. He said: 'If you call the Chinese hinterland vast, would you not describe the Pacific as even more immense? With what confidence do

you say "three months"?' Sugiyama hung his head, unable to reply. Nagano came to the rescue, but the Emperor was dissatisfied, and

pressed them for an assurance that diplomacy would be given first

priority. They agreed.109 the Emperor's position. The tears Hata is reported to have shed when opposing the Emperor give some idea of the extent of his sympathy. See fn. 117 for a more ex- treme example of the strains of double loyalty.

109 Butow, Tojo and the Coming of the War, pp. 255-7, and Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, pp. 170-I differ slightly, relying largely on the account by Konoye, who was present. In 'The role of the Japanese Army', in Pearl Harbor as History, Fujiwara Akira points out that until 1939 the Army made virtually no plans for a war against the U.S.A., but concentrated on the Russians, the 'natural enemy' since the I9th Century, and the Army authorities were extremely poorly informed about the U.S.A. Even after 1939, and even during the Pacific war, the Army continued to think of the war against the U.S.A. as a matter for the Navy, and competed for men and materials for use in China (see pp. I89-95). The Navy leaders were doubtful about the chances of ultimate success in a war against Britain and America, but after about June I94I, the prospect of Naval power languishing for lack of oil greatly increased their willingness to 'enter the tiger's den'. Again, national interests were seen in the distorting mirror of narrower loyalties.

The Emperor proposed to ask questions at the Imperial Conference on the decision for war, but Kido advised him to let Hara, the President of the Privy Council, ask the questions, after which the Emperor could make a plea for a diplomatic solution

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I931-I94I

III. The Emperor's Political Impotence

The basis for the gap between the Emperor and the Army, and likewise between the Emperor and the people, lay in his dual nature, and the

ambiguity of the Constitution. In legal principle, he was an absolute monarch by a kind of divine right. But in fact, and by understanding among leaders in government, fortified by centuries of political tradi-

tion, the Emperor was a limited constitutional monarch. On all sides, there was general agreement that personal rule by the Emperor could

endanger the Imperial institution. But there was a basic contradiction between the government's policy since I868 to encourage the people to regard the Emperor as a 'living god', and embodiment of Japan's inherent superiority and glorious destiny, which must be achieved

essentially by military means, and the cautious, rational policy of the liberal, international and progressive government leaders such as

Saionji and his small circle. They, along with the Emperor himself, opposed as highly dangerous the concept of a personal and absolute

monarchy and emphasized the Emperor's limited constitutional role to further more logical, gradual, and essentially peaceful means of

achieving Japan's 'proper place in the world', means which were

adapted to the realities of Japan's resources and power. In neither

position was there room for a real political role for the Emperor in

any active and public sense, and this gave rise to the common rationali-

zation, left essentially unchallenged, of 'the real intentions of the

Emperor'. After the Manchurian Incident, Colonel Anami Korechika

(War Minister in I945, at the end of the war), when asked why the

Army had disregarded the Emperor's wishes, replied: 'It is we, taking advantage of the historical opportunity and getting hold of Manchuria for the sake of the nation and for the sake of a thousand years of

tranquillity for the Imperial House, who are obeying the real wishes of His Majesty'.11o

The image of the Emperor as a 'living god' was associated with a

highly charged emotional commitment and willingness to sacrifice for the nation, as symbolized by the Emperor. Most Japanese recognized this as Japan's great 'spiritual' advantage, even superiority. It was an image far more amenable to use for nationalistic, militaristic and aggressive ends than for liberal, moderate, cautious and peaceful if at all possible. Maxon (p. 171) goes on to wonder whether Kido was moved by fear for the safety of the Emperor, the Imperial institution, or whether he thought, after all, the Axis powers might win the war. It may well have been some kind of combination of these considerations, plus, perhaps, fear for his own skin.

110 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. 105.

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CHARLES D. SHELDON

policies. The gap between the Emperor and the Army (and ultimately, the Navy as well, especially after the oil embargoes in the summer of

I941, when the Navy saw itself dying for lack of oil) was thus a gap more in policy, including both ends and means, than in constitutional

interpretation, although, in fact, the Emperor knew that his influence for rationality, however small, would be completely lost if a really right-wing military takeover occurred.

In constitutional interpretation, too, the moderate position was

steadily losing ground. It suffered from being consciously a 'Western

style' view of the monarchy as a limited constitutional one which seemed to the 'rightists' to detract fatally from the lustre of their ideal of an absolute monarchy which, ironically, would have deprived the

Emperor completely of all except ceremonial functions. The moderate

interpretation and cautious policies worked well enough in ordinary times, when there were clear goals and a general consensus, but to most Japanese, they became increasingly uninspiring and ideologically weak in the economic and political stresses of the I930s. They came to be associated in the popular mind with the old men of an earlier, and now out-of-date establishment which incorporated the corrupt political parties and their big-business sponsors. Although the generally felt need for consensus slowed the process, moderation was replaced by extreme nationalism and an ideology of Japanese superiority based on a sacrosanct Emperor who was, in fact, manipulated by leaders unconcerned with the good of the people and mesmerized by dreams of power and glory to be achieved by the Imperial Army and Navy.

Even in a relatively authoritarian state, a degree of understanding of the government's policies and agreement on them by the people is essential, and totalitarian states expend a great deal of effort to gain as much consensus as possible. In Japan in the 1930S, there could hardly have been a greater gap between public opinion and that of the

Emperor, who was at least formally the head of the state. Either the

Emperor's or the public's opinion had to be changed, or one or the other suppressed. The suppression of the Emperor's opinion was by far the easier course.

When Hiranuma became Prime Minister, Harada told him:

It is regrettable to know that no knowledge of His Majesty's intelligence and virtues is being transmitted to his people .. .For instance, in politics, it is the wish of the Emperor to respect and guard strictly the spirit of the Con- stitution, but this cannot be told to the people. Because there are many weak points in society, the Emperor's ideas are not at all evident either in politics or in diplomacy. This is where his immediate officials for some years have

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JAPANESE AGGRESSION AND THE EMPEROR, I93I--I94I

experienced their greatest frustrations. If one should explain that it is the Emperor's desire to conduct a completely constitutional government, it is said that Saionji, Makino, or other immediate officials do what they please behind the scenes by using the name of the Emperor. As a result, the spirit of the Constitution is ignored and matters are conducted in such a way that the Emperor's wish cannot be conveyed to the people.

Harada finished with a plea to Hiranuma to convey the Emperor's ideas to the people. Hiranuma agreed 'to do something',lll but did

nothing. The following year, when the Army was taking over Indo-China,

the Emperor asked Kido why international obligations had not been more respected. Kido replied:

Today, those who are advocating the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire, or the right wing people, are feeling sincerely sorry for Your Majesty because they think Your Majesty must feel it very unpleasant to be in the whirlpool of tyrannies perpetrated by the so-called governing class in league with big business (the zaibatsu). They think that the present treaties, laws and regulations have been drawn up for their own interest and benefit by misleading the Imperial wisdom. It is their contention that this com- bination should be done away with so as to make the Imperial court clean and free from corruption. Needless to say, there are many misunderstandings in their contentions and, at the same time, it is true that this notion has been gaining ground. It is in this regard that our administrative authorities are now racking their brains as to how, as far as possible, to remove this misunder- standing and to let them grasp Your Majesty's august wishes without pro- voking them to precipitate action.112

Again, no effort was made to change public opinion. This was

apparently due to a combination of such considerations as national honour, fear of being thought unpatriotic, fear of personal violence

against anyone speaking out against the general trend, and an addi- tional point: the fear, often expressed in ruling circles, of chaos and civil war in Japan, and even of a Communist take-over which might result from any reversal of policy.113 This last argument was most often heard in 1940 and 1941, and again, towards the end of the Pacific War, when it was used against any thought of a negotiated peace.

11 S.T.S. VII, 278-9; Saionji, 2437, 7 February I939. 112 Kido nikki, II, 81 I, 25 July 1940. 113 An example, Okada's fear of civil war, is cited in Maruyama, Thought and

Behaviour, p. 124. Okada actually congratulates himself and the senior statesmen on having saved Japan from civil war by not blocking the trend toward war abroad! On the other hand, in February 1945, Konoye wrote a memorial to the Emperor, at his request, advocating a negotiated peace, making the point that there might be a Communist revolution in Japan if the war was permitted to continue. See R. J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, I954), pp. 47-50.

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During the Japanese-American negotiations in I941, when the Ameri- cans were demanding a withdrawal of troops from China, the objection becomes more strident that, no matter how gradual the pull-out, and no matter what the quidpro quo, the people would not accept it.114 Thus, what was called 'public opinion', typically held in Confucian contempt by political leaders, suddenly became important as one of those 'inevitabilities' pulling Japan into a wider war. The trend towards ever greater and more ambitious military adventures was arguably neither inevitable nor irreversible,l15 but the passivity of almost

everyone in the government, who considered it impossible to reverse

any general trend, removed little by little the opposition to Japan's slithering into war. As Maruyama has pointed out, the traditional habit of accepting 'general trends' and faits accomplis operated even before they happened. They needed only to be anticipated for people to bend their thinking into conformity.116

The Imperial institution survived for so many centuries chiefly because the reigning Emperor was hardly ever involved in politics. The Emperor was above politics, and others made the political de- cisions and were held ultimately responsible for them. Although the

Meiji Constitution seemed to give ultimate power to the Emperor, it in fact gave him only the ultimate legal authority. Under Article LV, which states, 'The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it', Ministers of State were

supposed to represent the government, but as they were also heads of Ministries, they actually represented (some would say they were the

puppets of) the dominant cliques in their Ministries. Thus, their advice, instead of being based, as Saionji insisted it should be, on agreed government positions, more often represented a narrowly Ministerial position. When, in I939, Prime Minister Hiranuma asked

114 Even the dead were invoked. General Matsui, who had been the Commander- in-Chief at the 'rape of Nanking', wrote: 'If we were now to settle the China Incident by compromising with England and America and co-operating with the Anglo- Saxons, how would we be able to face the myriad spirits of our war dead ?' (Quoted in Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour, p. I 3).

115 See Hosoya Chihiro, 'Twenty-five Years after Pearl Harbor: A New Look at Japan's Decision for War', in Grant K. Goodman (comp.), Imperial Japan and Asia: A Reassessment (New York: 1967), pp. 52-64, for an argument that the decision for war was not inevitable. See also Usui Katsumi's chapter in Pearl Harbor as History, 'The role of the Foreign Ministry', pp. 127-48, in which, by analyzing the inner factional struggles, he disproves the theory that the Foreign Ministry worked for peace and against the military.

116 One example Maruyama gives (p. 104) is Oshima, who, when asked if he had supported the Tripartite Pact, justified his position as having conformed to the national consensus (which he, in fact, did much to create).

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Army Minister Itagaki whether the government should proceed a further stage towards an alliance with Germany, Itagaki replied: 'As Minister of State I of course agree that we should pursue the estab- lished policy, but in so far as I represent the consensus of the Army I also think that we must go ahead with the second stage'.ll7 It is easy to imagine which was the more important to him. Prime Ministers, on their part, were usually too busy trying to achieve, through compromise, some kind of consensus among differing, and shifting cliques, to do much about leading the country toward a logical, well-worked-out national policy. Consensus politics in a time of extreme stress proved very difficult.

This situation left two very important functions to the Emperor: (I) To think about national policy from a national standpoint, with some concern for the people as a whole; (2) To supply badly-needed coordination within the Cabinet, as well as between the Cabinet and the Supreme Command. The Emperor tried hard to do these things, but his efforts were usually frustrated. He was often bypassed, as we have already seen, and communications, especially from the govern- ment to the Emperor, were very personal, haphazard and poor. Harada, while discussing personalities and issues with leaders in government, discovered and did what he could to close many gaps of communica- tions and comprehension, with the help of the Emperor and Saionji, but the Emperor often learned of important developments from the

newspapers.118 One example of many in the Harada-Saionji memoirs of the frus-

tration of the Emperor's efforts at coordination may suffice to make the

point. In November 1937, during the first Konoye government, after the beginning of the war in China, Konoye complained to the Emperor: 'I have heard nothing about Army operations there. I can only watch them do as they please'. The Emperor, complaining to Yuasa that

117 S. T.S. VIII, 42-3 (I4 August I939). A more striking example is War Minister Anami, who held out against acceptance of the terms of surrender, but committed suicide after accepting the Emperor's plea for peace. Admiral Nomura's comments are interesting: 'As a member of the Cabinet he knew the real situation, but as head of the Army he knew that there was a strong feeling in the Army for continuing the war. Therefore he was in a dilemma, and after signing ... he killed himself. He was in a very difficult position. ... he acted truly like a gentleman'. Maxon (p. 21 ) adds, comparing Hata's resignation in I940 and Anami's suicide in I945, '. . both acts illustrated the peculiar nature of Japanese loyalty, which was in essence a loyalty to group or class and not a loyalty to constitutional or legal principles'.

118 Maxon, Control of Japanese Foreign Policy, p. 97. Early in I936, the Emperor told Honj6 that he tried to inform responsible officials of his position on an issue before a decision was made, because afterwards, 'the question of political responsibility arises'. Honjo nikki, p. 235. This proved difficult in practice.

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no plan for peace had been prepared, then decided he should call an

Imperial Conference and call upon the Army to formulate one. Yuasa suggested consulting Saionji, who opposed the Emperor's taking the initiative, believing it was the responsibility of the govern- ment to get together with the Army. He was afraid that the Army in China was too independent to submit to the Imperial wish, and 'this would mean a blemish on sovereign authority'. Konoye was distressed

by the Emperor's attitude and said he did not mean that any action be taken on his complaint. The Imperial Conference was not held.119

The only support for the Emperor's personal opinion was Saionji and his small group, including an occasional Prime Minister, some of whom paid with their lives for their loyalty to the person of the

Emperor. Loyalty to the Imperial institution was safer. Saionji's prestige as Genr6, his semi-retired status away from Tokyo, and his

position as Premier-maker gave him the strongest position of the

Emperor's supporters. On at least one occasion, Saionji's name was removed from an assassination list because the plotters (of the February 26th Incident) decided at the last moment that it would be convenient to have Saionji alive to bestow legality on their choice for Prime Minis-

ter, General Mazaki.120 But, as has often been seen, Saionji, aware of the dangers involved and the weakness of his position, and favouring compromise and acceptance of defeats in the hope of future improve- ment, proved to be a very weak support. Even Saionji, ultimately, proved that his loyalty, too, was to the institution rather than to the

person of the Emperor, and was ultimately willing to sacrifice a rational, constitutional, peaceful policy for its sake. An additional, and especially striking example of his treatment of the Emperor is the following: The Emperor wished to avoid Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, and told Saionji he was thinking of summoning the Prime Minister or some of the other Ministers to report on the situation. Saionji suggested an informal discussion with Foreign Minister Shidehara, and then asked Harada to instruct Shidehara that 'It is not necessary to lie, but tell the Emperor things that will

please him in order to ease his mind'.121 Until about mid-I940, Saionji's support, although weak, was the

strongest available to the Emperor, and there is much evidence of the

respect that the Emperor had for Saionji's political wisdom. When 119 S.T.S. VI, 136-8; Saionji, 125-31, i8 November I937. 120 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, pp. 123-4. Early in I937, Yuasa said the sole reason

why the court officials could stand up to the attempt by the 'right wing' to undermine them was the presence of Saionji. S.T.S. V, 262 (I9 February 1939).

121 S.T.S. II, 115 (24 October I931).

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Saionji recommended caution and even the acceptance of defeat, the Emperor could conceivably have insisted on his way, but he would then have been entirely isolated, a lonely figure indeed. His naturally retiring personality no doubt deterred him from insisting on his way. Also, he was fully aware that an adamant stand against the 'trend of the times' would have exposed his closest advisers and friends to

probable assassination, and himself to complete political impotence, either as a prisoner or as a deposed monarch. A combination of the above factors must have sufficed for him, too, to accept defeat, in the

Japanese manner, on a particular issue, perhaps hoping for future

improvements, and this, of course, proved to be a slippery slope. For

anyone who is not Japanese and who hesitates to impose his own values, clearcut judgements are difficult. How is one to know just how much

weight to allow to individual responsibility in a society which emphasizes group responsibility, and how much to social pressures where tradi-

tionally the majority, when necessary, requires the minority to stifle its views and cooperate at least outwardly? On the side of social

pressures must be weighed the traditional acceptance of the fait accompli and the 'trend of the times', as well as the avoidance of painful personal confrontations.

In November I937, Imperial Headquarters (Daihon'ei) were estab- lished for the Supreme Command, and the Emperor was to attend their formal meetings. Yuasa and Saionji agreed that the Emperor could speak at these meetings, so long as he avoided shouldering any political responsibilities. Konoye, however, told the Emperor he had best remain silent.122 In I94I, Konoye resigned rather than risk a confrontation with the Army, and refused to ask for an Imperial decision on the question of war against the United States.123

After the war, in 1945, Konoye wrote:

Out of reserve, the Emperor seldom expresses his own views. Prince Saionji and Count Makino taught His Majesty not to take the initiative, in adherence to the British-style constitution, but the Japanese Constitution exists on the premise of the Emperor's personal administration. It is fundamentally different from the British Constitution. Especially in regard to the matter of

122 Ibid., VI, 202-4 (19 January I938). 123 Admiral Suzuki, who had broken the deadlock over surrender, criticized

Konoye after the war for not having had the courage to oppose the military in 194I and then ask the Emperor to break the resulting deadlock. See Maxon (p. 75) who is convinced it would have been too late: 'Under the circumstances ..., an appeal to the Emperor ... would have risked reprisals which might possibly have decimated the advisory personnel surrounding the Emperor and even endangered the Emperor himself'.

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Supreme Command, the government has no voice whatever. It is the Em- peror alone who can control both the Government and the Supreme Com- mand.

It is said in peacetime that the Emperor should be passive, but when the country stands at the cross-roads, trouble is likely to occur. If the Emperor merely gives encouragement or advice as in England, military affairs and political diplomacy cannot advance in unison. This point was strongly felt in the last phase of the American-Japanese negotiations.

In view of Konoye's record, his postwar criticisms of the Emperor for not taking decisive action have a peculiarly hollow ring. Not

many would agree that the Constitution was meant to set up a personal, and potentially absolute, rule by the Emperor. Konoye does go on to

say that the Emperor, within his concept of his Constitutional limita-

tions, did all he could to avoid war.124 We find ourselves in agreement with Shillony's conclusion that 'Hirohito's moderateness and liberal attitudes checked, for a while, the military's attempts to control foreign policy in the I930s and brought about the end of the Pacific War in

I945'. 125 In his own interpretation of the Constitution, the Emperor at all times acted constitutionally, and it would have been both out of character and contrary to his convictions about the rule of law for him to do otherwise. In his memoirs, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Foreign Minister in the Tojo and Koiso governments, notes with satisfaction that the

Emperor followed Saionji's advice not to act except on the advice of

responsible officials.126 There were two occasions, however, when the

Emperor acted on his own initiative in an important matter: to put some backbone into the Army to put an end to the February 26th Incident, and to end the war by breaking the deadlock in the govern- ment. But in the first case, in 1936, Prime Minister Okada was thought dead, and there was an immediate danger that the Emperor, and the

government with him, could have become prisoners of the rebels. In

124 Konoye, Memoirs, p. 62. I have adapted the English somewhat. Maruyama (p. 124) agrees with Konoye that the Emperor could have been more decisive. But although he says one reason was the Emperor's 'weak character', he does not seem to blame him for being a 'portable Shrine', representing authority, held aloft by the Official, representing power, who was pushed to action by the Outlaw, representing violence and irresponsibility, prodding the Official from behind, because this was a pervasive and traditional pattern of Japanese society. See Maruyama, Thought and Behaviour, pp. 128-9.

125 Shillony, Revolt in Japan, p. 95. 126 Sh5wa no doran (Upheavals of the Showa period) (Tokyo, 1952), I, I48. Shige-

mitsu records that he heard military men criticizing the Emperor and saying they would depose him if he opposed reform and put an Imperial Prince (probably Chichibu) in his place. Ibid., I, 102.

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the second case, in I945, there seemed to be no way to break the deadlock until Prime Minister Suzuki, as a last resort, and knowing what the Emperor would say, asked him to speak. Perhaps the most

striking thing about the long and tense discussions leading up to this dramatic intervention by the Emperor was that until he spoke, to make a moving plea for an end to the people's sufferings, not a word had been said about the interests of the people of Japan as a whole.127

We have been able to discover only one statement made since the war by the Emperor himself concerning his own responsibility, and we will let him have the last word here:128

It goes without saying that wars must be avoided. Concerning the war, I tried to avoid it as much as possible.... But in spite of all my efforts, I failed, and we plunged into war. I was truly grieved by this. It is often said that the war was ended by my efforts. If this is so, why did I not prevent the war before it began? Indeed, this seems superficially a reasonable argument. But in fact it was not possible.

As you know, we have a firmly established constitution, and the Emperor must act in accordance with it. According to this constitution there are Ministers of State who are given the power and responsibility over state affairs. The Emperor cannot on his own volition interfere or intervene in the jurisdictions for which the Ministers of State are responsible. Whether in domestic or foreign affairs, if those who are constitutionally responsible have adopted a policy after careful deliberation, and submit this for Imperial approval in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, I have no choice but to approve it whether I desire it or not. If I did not do so and approved or disapproved their recommendations arbitrarily, those in posi- tions of responsibility would be unable to take any responsibility because, even though they may do their best, they would know they are subject to the Emperor's whims. If this happened, the Emperor would clearly be destroying the constitution. If Japan were a despotic state, that would be different, but as the monarch of a constitutional state it is quite impossible for me to behave in such a way.

The circumstances at the war's end were different from those at its begin- ning. There was a division between those who favoured ending the war and those who wanted to continue it, and the conflict could not be resolved. Suzuki asked me at the meeting of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to make a decision. Here for the first time I was offered an oppor- tunity to state my opinion freely without infringing anyone's field of responsi- bility or power. As a result, I stated my convictions which I had been storing up, and asked them to end the war.

127 See Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, pp. i89-209. 128 Fujita Hisanori, JijTch6 no kaiso (Reminiscences of a Grand Chamberlain)

(Tokyo, 196 ), pp. 202-5.

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40 CHARLES D. SHELDON

With the advantage of hindsight, we can see that the disaster of the war was an unnecessary tragedy. For this reason, and because this state- ment by the Emperor has the disadvantage of being an ex post facto justification, it may well prompt the reaction, 'If things had been

different, and if responsible people had only had a little more foresight and courage, things could have been different'. Also, one might wish for a more detailed and more closely reasoned statement from the

Emperor. But in view of the realities of his position as revealed in the

private behind-the-scenes accounts written by his closest advisers, and

bearing in mind the limitations imposed on him by Japanese tradi-

tion, it must be said to be a reasonable statement of the Emperor's position.