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Patience as a Political Virtue: Delayed Gratification and TurnoutAuthor(s): James H. Fowler and Cindy D. KamReviewed work(s):Source: Political Behavior, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Jun., 2006), pp. 113-128Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4500214 .

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PolitBehav2006) 8:113-128DOI10.1007/s1109-006-9004-7

Patienceas a Political Virtue:DelayedGratificationand Turnout

James H. Fowler"

Cindy D. Kam

Publishednline: July 006@Springercience+Businessedia,nc.2006

Abstract A number f scholarshavedemonstratedhatvoter urnouts influencedby the

costs of processing nformation ndgoing to the polls, and the policy benefitsassociated

withtheoutcomeof the election.However,no one hasyetnoted hat he costsof votingare

paidon orbeforeElectionDay,whilepolicybenefitsmaynot materialize ntilseveraldays,months,or evenyears ater. Sincethecostsof votingmustbe bornebefore he benefitsare

realized,peoplewho are morepatientshouldbe morewillingto vote. We use a "choice

game"fromexperimentalconomics oestimate ndividual iscount actorswhichareusedto measurepatience.We thenshow thatpatiencesignificantlyncreasesvoterturnout.

Keywords Voterturnout Discount actor- Patience Delayed gratification

Patience as a Political Virtue: Delayed Gratificationand Turnout

Does the aphorism,"Patience s a virtue"applyto politicallife? Is patiencea politicalvirtue?We argue hat t is, and we show thatpatientcitizens are more ikelyto participatein politicallife. Our accountof patienceas a politicalvirtuecontributeso the abundant

literaturehathas soughtto explain why citizens turnout to vote andparticipaten other

activities (Campbell,Converse,Miller, & Stokes, 1960; Rosenstone& Hansen, 1993;

Verba, Schlozman,& Brady, 1995; Wolfinger& Rosenstone,1980). Severalempiricalstudiessuggestthat voterturnouts influencedby thecosts of processing nformation nd

going to the polls, and the policy benefits associatedwith the outcome of the election

(Franklin& Grier, 1997; Hansen,Palfrey,& Rosenthal,1987;Highton,1997; Jackson,

2000;Kaempfer&

Lowenberg,1993;Knack

1997, 2001;Nagler,1991).However,none of

these studiesconsiders he fact that he costs andbenefitsof turning ut to vote areborneat

differenttimes. The costs of voting are paid on or before ElectionDay, while policy

J. H. Fowler (E)?

C. D. Kam

Departmentof Political Science, Universityof California,One Shields Avenue, Davis,CA 95616, USA

e-mail:[email protected]

Springer



114 PolitBehav2006) 8:113-128

benefitsmaynotmaterialize ntil severaldays,months,or evenyearsafterElectionDay.Ifan individualmustbear he costs of participationongbefore he benefitsarereceived, henan individual's evel of patienceshouldalso affect the decision to turnout. Patient ndi-viduals-that is, those who place greatervalue on the future benefits of participa-tion-should be morelikelyto vote, while impatientndividuals,whoplacegreater alue

on the immediate osts of participation,houldbe less likely to vote.This articleprovidesan initialexaminationof the relationship etweenpatienceandturnout.To do so, we incorporate technique romexperimental conomics,where sub-

jects play a "choicegame" (Coller& Williams,1999; Harrison,Lau,& Williams,2002;

Harrison,Lau, Rustr6m,& Sullivan,2004) in whichthey are asked to make a series ofchoices betweena prizethatwill be awarded n 30 days anda largerprizethat will beawardedn 60 days.The choices made revealthe degreeto whichsubjectsarewillingtowait for futurebenefitsandcan be usedto estimatehow much heydiscount uturepayoffs.In other words, this procedureyields an innovative measure of the patience of each

individual hat does not require ntrospection r self-report.We beginwith a brief overviewof ourconceptualizationf patienceandwhywe thinkit shouldpropelcitizensto turnout to vote.We thenreview themeaningandmeasurementof patience n the literaturesn psychologyandeconomics,with specialattention o lab-

oratory-based esearchmethodology.We conducttwo analyses:first, we uncoverthe

structural orrelatesof patience,as we have measured t. Second,we identifythe rela-

tionshipbetweenpatienceandturnout.We find, ndeed, hatpatiencepredicts urnout.Weconclude with a discussionof the generalizabilityof our approachand its potentialapplicationso otheraspectsof political ife.

Patience and Political Life

Is patiencea virtue that is relevantto politicallife? Normative heorysuggestsit mayindeed be. In his discussionof liberalvirtues,Galston 1988) characterizes atienceas avirtuerequiredby modernmarkets.Modernmarketeconomiesrequireseveralvirtues,

amongthem "the achievementof a mean between ascetic self-denialand untrammeled

self-indulgence-call it a capacityfor moderatedelay of gratification;or while marketeconomies rely on the liberationand multiplicationof consumerdesires, they cannot

prosper n the long run without a certain evel of saving,which rests on the abilitytosubordinatemmediategratificationo longer-run elf-interest" p. 1283). Additionally,liberal polities also require ong-termtime horizons: "The greatestvices of populargovernments re the propensity o gratifyshort-term esires at the expenseof long-terminterests"(Galston,1988,p. 1283).

What is the empirical ink between patienceand political life? Here, we pose the

questionof whetherpatiencepredictsa willingness o engagein politicalaction,specifi-

cally, to turn out to vote. A wide rangeof empiricalstudies of voting has shown thatturnouts influencedby the costs associatedwithmakinga decisionandgoingto thepollsand thebenefitsassociatedwiththeoutcomeof theelection(Aldrich,1993).Forexample,Verba, Schlozman,& Brady(1995) arguethat socioeconomicstatusmeasures ike edu-cationaffectturnoutbecausetheyinfluence he cost of obtainingandprocessingpoliticalinformation. Restrictive registration aws increase the cost of voting and therebydiscourage urnout Franklin& Grier,1997;Highton,1997; Knack, 1997, 2001; Nagler,1991), while liberal absenteeballot laws and all-mailelections encourage t (Karp&

Banducci,2000; Oliver,1996;Southwell&Burchett, 000).EvenrainfallonElectionDay

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Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128 115

has been shown todepress urnout mongsome voters(Knack,1994).Although ess well

documented,benefitsrelated o the election outcome also have an effect on turnout.For

example,peopleare more ikelyto vote in "highstakes" elections hathavelargerpolicyeffects(Hansen t al., 1987;Jackson, 000;Wolfinger&Rosenstone,1980)andwhentheythink here s a largerdifferencenthepoliciesofferedbythecompetingparties Kaempfer

& Lowenberg,1993).Animportant versightn thisliteratures that here s a time dimension o the costs and

benefitsof voting. While the costs of voting are paid on or before ElectionDay, anybenefitsrelated o the policyoutcomearenot obtaineduntilafterElectionDay. In fact, it

maytake severalyearsfor an election resultto yield the policy outcomesthatmotivatedcitizens to go to thepolls. Given thatpresentcosts arebeingcomparedo futurebenefits,

subjective ime preferencesmay influence he decision to vote. Citizenswho arepatientmightbe willingto beartheimmediate ostsof votingbecause hey placea highvalue onfuturepolicybenefits. ncontrast, itizenswho areimpatientmightplacemoreweighton

thecosts of voting,whichare felt immediately, ndbe less likelyto gainutility romfuturepolicy benefits. Thus variation n patiencemay be an important actor in explainingindividual urnoutdecisions.

The expressivebenefitsof votingandbenefitsrelated o fulfillinga social obligationmayalso invitepatience o playa role in the turnoutdecision.If respondentsxperiencedonly immediate osts fromthe act of votingand immediategainsfrom the act of voting(for example, immediatesocial affirmationrom wearingthe "I voted" sticker),then

patiencewouldbe irrelevant, ince all voterscould receive immediatebenefits.However,the act of voting arguably aps both immediateand future-orientedxpressivebenefits.

These futurebenefitsmightbe understood, ccording o RikerandOrdeshook1968), assupporting,n the long-term, he democratic ormof governance.Patientcitizens mighttherefore ave a greater take n usingthevote as a meansof affirming ystemsupportorthe uture stabilityof the regime.As Downs(1957) notes,a citizenmighteven throwhis

support ehinda "hopeless"party"in thebelief thathis supportwill enable t togrowand

somedaybecome a likely winner-thus giving him a wider rangeof selection in thefuture"(p. 49). Patientcitizens would be more likely to use the vote as a means of

affirming llegiance o a party,againfor thefuturebenefitof the party.Forthesevarious

reasons,we expectto see a relationship mergebetween urnout ndpatience: orpatience

to be a politicalvirtuethatpropelscitizens to turnout.We have found little in the politicalscience literatureo guide ourconceptualunder-

standingof patience,and no studiesempirically est for a relationship etweenpatienceand political participation.'As a result,we have groundedour conceptualization nd

empiricalapproachn the existing literature n delayedgratifications,ime orientations,andfuture ime horizons rompsychologyand economics.

Followingthe existing approachn psychologyandeconomics,we conceptualizepa-tienceasanindividual-level isposition.Patience s a moreor less stablepropensityoreactto situational emandswitha willingness odefer mmediateorshort-term)ratificationorfuture ewards.Some individuals re more

patienthan

others,andtheseindividualswould

be more ikelyto exhibitdelayedgratificationehaviors.Contextual onditions an also set

Renshon's(1977) piece deals explicitly with the concept of time horizons and political behavior,but the

concept Renshon develops is very different from ours. Renshon analyzes individual's views about "the

propensity o expect or desire immediaterather hanlong-termrewards rom the political system" (p. 263).Instead of identifyingan individual'sgeneralizedtime horizon in willingness to wait for returns,Renshonfocuses on an individual's beliefs abouthow quickly (or slowly) the political systemshould operate.

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116 PolitBehav2006) 8:113-128

upincentives orindividuals, ven thosewho are notpredisposedo delay gratification,oexhibitdelayedgratification ehaviors.Thus,delayedgratification ehaviors determined

by both ndividual-level ispositions e.g., patience)and contextualnducements.2or our

purposes,we are interestedn the individual-level isposition,patience.In the psychologicalliterature,patience, delay behavior,and more generally,time

preference, ave beenconceptualized s a psychologicaldisposition-a moreor less stableindividualdifference hat influenceshow a personresponds o situations hat arise. The

willingness o delay gratificationasbeen "anenduringocus" of studywithin he field of

personality sychology Funder& Block, 1989,p. 1041).Variationn willingness o delayimmediate ratificationor thepromiseof future ewards ppears mongchildren s youngas fouryearsold andcorrelateswithdispositionsmeasured ater n life (Funder,Block,&

Block, 1983). A willingness to delay gratificationhas relevance for a wide range of

behaviors, ncludingdrugaddiction, ducational ttainment,avingsandinvestment,and

gambling Funder t al., 1983;see Mischel,1974for a review).

Patiencealso playsa prominent ole in the economics iterature.As Becker and Mul-ligan(1997) note, "Timepreferenceplays a fundamentalole in theoriesof savingsand

investment, conomicgrowth, nterest atedeterminationnd assetpricing,addiction,and

manyother issues that are getting increasingattention rom economists"(p. 729). The

economics iterature, ccording o Becker andMulligan,equates "time preference'with

the marginal ate of substitution etweencurrent nd futureconsumption" p. 731).Researchers ave measuredpatiencewith bothself-reports ndwithchoice behaviors.

Self-reportcalesrequire ubjects o rate heirown characteristics. ayandNajman 1986)have compileda 12-itemself-report cale that has been used in studies of pathological

gambling Parke,Griffiths,& Irwing,2004) and educational chievementBembenutty&Karebenick, 004). Strathman,Gleicher,Boninger,andEdwards 1994) developa Con-sideration f FutureConsequencescale to measure hewillingness o sacrifice mmediatebenefits andabsorb mmediate osts)for futurebenefits.They argue hat "thereare clearand reliable ndividualdifferencesn the extentto which individuals relikelyto considerdistantoutcomesin choosingtheirpresentbehavior"(p. 724). Strathmant al. (1994)furthernotethatpatiencecan be viewed as a continuum, nchored t one endby "thoseindividualswho consider future outcomes as a matterof course...Theyare willing tosacrifice mmediatebenefits ike pleasureor convenience o achievemoredesirable uture

states" (p. 724) and anchoredat the otherby "individualswho are not interested n

consideringpossible futureconsequences.These individualsare more concernedwith

maximizing mmediatebenefitsat the expenseof costs or benefits hat will not occur for

sometime,andthey placea high priorityon such immediatebenefits"(p. 724).

Self-reports, speciallyfor questionsthat triggersocial desirabilityconcerns or that

require ndividuals o introspect,maybe less reliableand less valid indicators han other

measures,such as those derivedfrom behavioralobservation Berinsky,2004; Kagan,19883;Mischel, 1974;Schwarz,1999;Webb,Campbell,Schwartz,& Sechrest,2000). As

2 As anexample of the latterapproach,Dubin and Kalsow (1996), discuss "patience" in the context ofwhetherindividualswill vote on ballot propositions.In theiranalysis, the length of the ballot propositions

tries an individual'spatience; "the longer the descriptionof the proposition, he more impatient he voter

becomes, and the less supportthe propositionreceives" (p. 407). We conceptualize patienceas an indi-

vidual-level disposition,whereas Dubin and Kalsow (1996) view (im-) patienceas inducedby the politicalenvironment, he length of ballot propositions.

3 "A seriouslimitationof self-report nformation s that each personhas only a limited awarenessof his or

her moods, motives, and bases for behavior,and it is not obvious thatonly conscious intentionsand moods

make up the main basis for variation(Wilson, Hull, & John 1981)", cited in Kagan(1988, p. 617).

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PolitBehav 2006)28:113-128 117

such,patience,or willingnessto delay gratification, as also been measuredwith obser-vationof behavioral hoices. Inpsychological tudiesof children,orexample,researchershave examined he extent to whichsubjects oregosomeprizethat is immediatelyavail-able in order o obtaina more desirableprizein the future Mischel,1974).

Economistshave also used a similarchoice-basedapproacho measurewillingnessto

delay gratification.n thesestudies,subjectsarepresentedwith a series of choicesbetweentwo payoffs,a smalleramountpaidnow anda largeramountpaid ater.Eachchoiceyieldsinformation bouthow mucha subjectdiscounts uturepayoffs,whichallows us to esti-matethesubject'sdiscountactor (6). Forexample, f a subject hooses$90 nowinsteadof$100 later,we know that she valuestheearlierpaymentmore han he laterpayment.This

impliesa subjectivenequalityorherdiscount actor:$90 > 6100 or 6 <0.9 for theperiodbetween hepresentand futurepayoff.If the samesubjectalsochooses$100 later nsteadof $80 now for the sametimeperiod, hen we know that$80 < 6 $100 and thediscountfactor must lie in the interval0.8 < 6 < 0.9. A series of choices with differentvalues for

the sametimeperiodallowsus to identify heinterval n whichthe discount actor alls foreach subject.Those who morefrequently hoose the futurepayoffwill havehigherdis-countfactors.Thus, hereshouldbe a positiverelationship etween he discount actorand

patience fora discussion,see Becker & Mulligan,1997).One potentialwrinkle n the procedureor measuringpatience s thatdiscount actors

maybe hyperbolic,meaning hatpeopletendto value thepresentmuchmorestrongly hanotherperiods Laibson,1997).As a result,recenteffortsby economists o elicit discountfactorsusuallyavoid choices with immediatepaymentsand insteadgive subjectstwofuturechoices (Coller& Williams, 1999;Harrison t al., 2002). This worksuggeststhat

beyond heimmediatepresent he discount actor s approximatelyonstant-people makeconsistentchoices when they are faced with similarfuturetime intervals.Forexample,subjectsmake the same choices between a smallerpaymentin 30 days and a largerpayment n 60 days as they do when they must choose betweena smallerpayment n90 daysanda largerpayment n 120days.

Research Design and Subject Profile

We tookadvantage

of alaboratory etting

to examinetherelationship

etweenpatienceand turnout.The laboratoryettingenables us to implementa choice-basedmeasureof

patience,as yet unseenin politicalscience,andit enables us to do so in an environmentthatallowsfor a high degreeof anonymity. nMay2004,about350 subjectswererecruitedfromtwointroductory ndergraduateoliticalscience courses o participaten a computer-basedsurvey.Subjectswereofferedcredit owards heircoursegrade or theirparticipationin thestudy,and 249 (about70%)of themchoseto participate.Of these,235 wereeligibleto vote in the March2004 Californiaprimaryelection. Each subjectansweredseveralstandard ocioeconomicand politicalattitudequestions(exactquestionwordingcan befound in the appendix).4

4 Subjectsranged n age from 18to 27 years,wereevenly divided betweenwomen andmen,andabout 53%were minorities.This convenience sampleis similar to the undergraduate ody from which it is drawn(theundergraduate ody is 56% female and 51% minority).The average subject leaned left and Democratic,placing herself at 3.57 on the seven-point liberal conservative scale and 3.27 on the seven-point partyidentificationscale. Admittedly, we rely on a convenience sample of undergraduatesor our study. Wediscuss the advantagesand disadvantagesof this sample in the conclusion.

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118 PolitBehav 2006)28:113-128

Subjectswere askedwhetheror not theyvotedin the March2004 Californiaprimary,which ncludednominationsor nationaland ocal offices andfourwidely publicizedballot

measuresrelated o the Californiabudgetcrisis.Typicalfor a youngerpopulation, bout

21%of thoseeligible saytheyvoted,comparedo 31% n thepopulation sa whole.About

39%said they were very interestedn the electioncampaign,but only 34%agreedthat

votingin electionsis a duty.At the endof thesurvey,eachsubjectwas informedhathe or she waseligibleto wina

prize and then asked to makea series of choices betweena $100 prize in 30 days or a

largerprizein 60 days5 see theappendixor a full description). ollowingHarrison t al.

(2002)both a dollaramountandan effectiveannual nterest ateweredisplayedn order o

helpsubjects hinkabout heirchoices.At theconclusionof thesurveya lotterywas used

to choose a single prize winner and another otteryto decide which set of alternativesdeterminedhe payoff. It shouldbe notedthatjust like previousexperimentsusing this

method Coller&Williams,1999;Harrisont al., 2002),theexpectedvalueof theprizeto

each subject in this experiment s quite low (approximately 100/N, $0.40 to eachsubject).However, Camererand Hogarth 1999) show that stake size has only a small

effect on averagebehavior n experimentsike these andthe biggesteffect of stakes on

behavior s changing rom zero to positivestakes.Collerand Williams 1999) specificallyshow that discount factors elicited with a single prize are significantlydifferentfrom

discount factors implied by hypotheticalchoices, suggestingthat even a small prizeincentivecausessubjects o take theirdecisionsseriously.

If subjectsare consistentand make no mistakes, hey shouldalwayschoose the earlier

payoff,alwayschoosethe laterpayoff,orswitchfromthe earlierpayoffto the laterpayoff

atexactlyonepointduringheirseriesof choices.The

pointatwhich

theyswitch ndicates

the intervalof the implieddiscount actor.Forexample,a subjectmaychoosethe earlier

$100 prizewhen the laterprize s less thanorequalto $104.25andthen switchto the later

prizefor all valuesgreater hanorequalto $106.44.If so, thentheimplieddiscount actor

is estimated o fall somewherebetween$100/$106.44,

0.94 and$100/$104.25e 0.96.About 82% of the subjectsin the experimentmade consistentdecisions across all 20

choices, while 15%madeonly one 'mistake'.Inconsistent hoices aredropped rom thedata as in Harrison t al. (2002) and Coller and Williams 1999),but none of the analysischanges significantlywhen the firstobservedchoice of the largerprize,the last observed

choice of the smallerprize, or multiple imputations used to estimatethe remainingdiscount actors.

FigureI shows the distributionof monthlydiscount factors implied by subjects'

responses n thischoicegame.6Forsubjectswho alwayschoose theearlieror laterprize,discount actorsare set to the value impliedby maximumand minimumvalues,respec-

tively.All othervaluesare set to themidpoints f the estimatedntervals.Notice that here

aremodes at theendpoints, uggesting hat severalsubjectswere eitherwillingto wait for

all futureprizes(thepatient),ornotwillingto waitforanyof them(theimpatient).There

5To be sureall studentswould be

presentat the time of the futureawards, he surveywas administeredmore

than 60 days priorto the end of the quarter.Specific discountfactors and the dollaramountsthey imply for

the futureprizeare takendirectlyfrom Harrison t al. (2002). This and other discountfactor studiessuggestthat results are robustto differentgradationsof choices.6 Although these experimentaldiscount factorsmaybe high relative to those implied by annual marketrates

of interest,they fall within the wide rangeof discount factors estimatedby other scholarsin the literature

(see Frederick,Loewenstein,& O'Donoghue, 2002 for a comprehensivereview) and should still be useful

for resolving whetheror not people who preferthe earlierprize behavedifferentlyfrompeople who preferthe laterprize.

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PolitBehav 2006)28:113-128 119

50-

40 -

o (DsoutFat

~ 20IL

10-

C C(0 -0 C) m) LO rO- M

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Patience

(DiscountFactor)

Fig. 1 Distributionof patience in the discount factor choice game

is anothermode in the center wheresubjectschose the futureprizeonce its value roseabove $110. This is consistentwith evidence from Harrison t al. (2004) showingthat

subjectssometimesfocus on dollar values instead of ratesof returnand thus may be

influenced y "focalpoints" n the dollaramount.The restof thediscount actorestimates

spanthe distribution,nsuringa wide rangeof variation or evaluating he influenceof

patienceon turnout.

Who Is Patient?

Before we test thehypothesis hatpatient ndividuals re morelikelyto vote,we analyzethe structuralorrelates f patience,as we have measuredt. Table 1displays hepairwisecorrelations etweenpatienceand a numberof factorsthat are widely thought o affect

turnout, ncludingsocioeconomicstatus,political engagement,political efficacy, civic

duty,and churchattendance.Consistentwith earlierfindingsby Harrison t al. (2002) and Coller and Williams

(1999), patiencedoes not correlate ignificantlywith any of our demographic r socio-

economic status variables.However,we do observe two intriguingrelationships.First,patiencecorrelatespositivelywith politicalinterest,suggesting hatindividualswho aremoreoriented owards uturerewardsare morelikely to pay attention o politics.Most

campaign ssues revolve aroundpolicies and political outcomes that will not have animmediate ffect-it usuallytakes months o legislatesuchchanges,yearsto implementthem,andit maybe even longerbeforetypicalvoters notice a change n theirown lives.Individualswho only careaboutthe present husmay not pay attention o politicalcam-

paignsbecausethey prefer o pay attention o other events that are morelikely to affectthem immediately.Second, patiencecorrelatespositively with churchattendance, on-

sistentwith otherstudies hat ndicatea linkbetweenpatienceand churchattendance. orexample, annaccone 1998)shows that hose who believein an afterlifeare more ikelytoattendchurch,andBecker andMulligan 1997, p. 741) arguethatreligious peoplehave

higherdiscount factors becausethey believe in an afterlife and thus have longer timehorizons.Given thatpatiencecorrelateswith bothpolitical nterestand churchattendance,it will be importanto includethese variablesas controls n our modelsof turnout o besure thattherelationship etweenpatienceand the decision to vote is notepiphenomenal.

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120 Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128

Table1 Individual-levelariablesnd heircorrelations ithpatience

Variable Correlationwith patience p-value

Turnout 0.15 0.04

Age -0.01 0.88

Female 0.08 0.25

Nonwhite -0.06 0.37Parents'income -0.01 0.86

Parents'education -0.06 0.37

Strengthof partyID 0.08 0.25

Political interest 0.20 0.00

Reads news 0.02 0.73

Watches news 0.00 0.99

Political information 0.03 0.71

Externalefficacy -0.01 0.93

Internalefficacy 0.07 0.32

Civic duty -0.12 0.08

Churchattendance 0.20 0.00

Patience and Turnout

In Table 1, we see that there is a significantbivariatecorrelationbetweenpatienceand

turnout0.15,p = 0.04).Examination f therawdatamakes hisrelationshipmoreconcrete.

Subjectswho hadhigher hanaveragediscount actors 6 > 0.91)turned ut ata rateof 26%

compared o 16%turnout or those with lower than averagediscountfactors.Among

subjectswho alwayschose the earlierprize (the least patient),only 13%voted.Among

subjectswhoalwayschosethe laterprize(themostpatient),20%voted.Votersalso tendedto be morepatient,with significantlyhigherdiscountfactorsthannonvoters two-sidedt-test,p = 0.02). Peoplewhoare morewillingto wait fora largerprize n the choicegameare morelikelyto vote, supportinghe connectionbetweenpatienceandturnout.

To be sure this correlation s not the result of otherconfoundingrelationships,we

present esults romthree ogitmodelsof turnoutn Table 2. Model1 is a simplebivariate

regressionof individual urnout n the discount actormeasured n the study.The results

confirm hat the relationship etweenpatienceand turnouts positiveandsignificant. n

Models2 and3, we includea number f factors hatarewidelythoughto affectturnout.n

Model2, we runthe "standard"model of turnout, xcludingpatience, n order o providea baseline orcomparison etweena standardmodelof turnout ndonethat ncludes hese

standard redictors longwithpatience.These standard redictorsncludesocioeconomic

status(SES), politicalengagement,politicalefficacy,civic duty,andchurchattendance.

SES is includedon the idea that individualswith higherSES are more likely to vote

because theircosts are lower (Verbaet al., 1995;Wolfinger& Rosenstone,1980). To

captureSES, we include variablessuch as age, gender,and race, as well as subjects'

reportsof parentalncome andeducation, ince parental haracteristicsre influentialn

the developmentof turnoutbehavioramong young people (Plutzer,2002). Interest n

politics,the frequencyof news readingor viewing,andthe abilityto answerbasicques-tions about government ndicatepolitical engagement,which tends to correlate with

turnout.Moreover, f individuals eel that they can understand oliticalissues (internal

efficacy)and theirgovernment esponds o them(externalefficacy),thenthey are more

likelyto go to thepolls.Churchattendance as alsobeenfoundto be significantly elated

to turnout e.g. Timpone, 1998). In particular,Verbaet al. (1995) argue that churchattendance s importantbecause people acquirecivic skills in religious organizations

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Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128 121

Table 2 Effect of patienceand other variables on voter turnout

Variable Dependentvariable:Did subjectvote?

Model I Model 2 Model 3

Coef. S.E. p-value Coef. S.E. p-value Coef. S.E. p-value

Patience 4.91 2.54 0.05 7.98 3.49 0.02

Age 0.27 0.14 0.06 0.29 0.14 0.05

Female -0.76 0.51 0.13 -0.91 0.52 0.08Nonwhite -0.66 0.52 0.20 -0.61 0.54 0.26

Parents' ncome 0.21 0.15 0.16 0.21 0.15 0.17

Parents' education -0.16 0.18 0.37 -0.14 0.18 0.45

Strengthof partyID 0.15 0.28 0.60 0.14 0.28 0.63

Political interest 0.52 0.43 0.23 0.25 0.45 0.58

Reads the news 0.27 0.11 0.02 0.32 0.12 0.01

Watchesthe news 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.05

Political information 0.12 0.16 0.45 0.17 0.17 0.32

Externalefficacy 0.16 0.28 0.56 0.19 0.29 0.50

Internalefficacy -0.03 0.18 0.88 -0.03 0.19 0.86

Civic duty 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.11 0.17 0.53

Churchattendance 0.03 0.18 0.88 -0.04 0.18 0.82

Constant -5.71 2.34 0.01 -11.18 3.52 0.00 -18.50 4.95 0.00Deviance residual 198.7 143.7 138.1Null deviance 194.8 185.5 185.5

N 186 170 170

Note: Model estimatedusing GLM with logit link function

(writing etters,publicspeaking,and so on) thatmaymake t easierfor themto participatein politics.Finally,we includea variable or civic duty (Riker& Ordeshook,1968) tocontrolfor the possibilitythat the feeling that voting is an obligation nducesturnout.Detailson coding, questionwording,andsufficient tatistics or all these controlscan befoundin the Appendix.

In Model 2, we see that turnout s positively influencedby age, parents'income,

strengthof partyidentification, oliticalinterest,mediaexposure,politicalinformation,externalefficacy,civic duty,and churchattendance. t is also related o race andgender,with males and whites

beingmore

likelyto vote. While most of these resultsare

onlyweakly significant, hey are consistentwith past studies that utilize muchlargersamplesizes to showsmallbutsignificant elationships etween hese variables ndturnoutVerbaet al., 1995;Wolfinger& Rosenstone,1980).We also note thatmanyof theserelationshipsaresignificantn simplebivariate orrelationssee the appendix).

Since ourgoal is a strongtest of the hypothesis hatpatience nfluences urnout,weretainall of these variables-includingthose that are not significant-in Model 3. Notethat n spiteof the smallsamplesize and even withthe additionof numerous ontrols, hecoefficientonpatience ontinues o be strongandsignificant.A x2 test confirmshataddingpatience o the modelsignificantly mprovesmodel fit (deviancereduction f 5.6, df = 1,

p = 0.02) andsuggeststhatwe shouldrejectModel2 in favorof Model 3. To make theseresultsmoreconcrete,Fig. 2 shows the predicted ffect of patienceon the probability f

votingwhileholdingraceatnonwhite,genderatmale,andall othervaluesat theirmeans.Theleastpatient ubjectsvote ata rateof about9%comparedo 32%forthe mostpatientsubjects.These results uggestthatsubjective imepreferences ave animportantffect onthe decisionto vote.

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122 Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128

0

>

C-o

oI

0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00

Patience

Fig. 2 Effect of patience on turnoutNote: Predictedturnoutprobabilitiesand 95% confidence intervalscalculatedfrom Model 3 in Table 2 byvarying patience and holding race at nonwhite,genderat male, and all other values at their means

Conclusions

A numberof scholarshave demonstratedhat individualdecisions to vote dependon the

costsof processingnformation ndgoingto thepolls,and the benefitsassociatedwith theoutcomeof the election.This articledrawsattention o the fact that hecostsof turnout reborneonorbeforeElectionDay,whilebenefits elated o the outcomeof theelectionarenot

reapeduntilmuchlater.As a consequence,patienceshouldplay an importantole in theturnout ecision.Patient itizenswho arewillingto wait for futurebenefits houldbe more

likelyto vote because heyplaceagreater alueon theimpactof theelectionon futurepolicychanges. mpatientitizensshouldbe lesslikelyto vote because heyaremore nfluenced ythe immediateburdens f decision-makingndphysicalparticipation.

Evidence rom the laboratory upportshis hypothesis.Subjectsweregiven a seriesofchoices betweenanearlier, mallerprizeand a later, argerprize.Thosewho consistentlychose the laterprize were significantlymorelikely to vote than those who consistentlychose the earlierprize.The statisticalrelationship etweenpatienceandturnout emainseven when we control or numerous therfactors hought o affect the decisionto vote.

We argue hatbehaviorn thechoicegamerepresents atience: hewillingness o defer

short-termainsin order o obtain arger ong-termgains.However,we concede that t isentirelypossiblethat alternativemechanisms ouldexplainthe empirical elationship e-tween an individual'sdiscount actorand an individual'sikelihoodof turning utto vote.

Perhapsa third ndividual-level actorstructures oth choice behaviorandturnout; ossi-bilities includeSESorintelligence.Withourdatawe can be confident hatSES is probablynot theconfounding ariable, ince we control or it in ouranalysis.We do not,however,have a measureof intelligence, o we cannotdispute his as an alternativexplanation.

One might worry hat these resultsare of limited value becausetheyare based on thebehaviorof a groupof college studentswho are neither epresentativef thepopulation s

a whole, norrepresentativef college studentsas a whole. College students,admittedly,represent groupof individualswhoby virtueof matriculatingntohighereducationhave

alreadyengaged n "one form of investmentn future-orientedapital"(Becker& Mul-

ligan, 1997, p. 751). These individualsalready possess some dispositionfor delayedgratification-abaseline evel of patience,one mightargue.As a consequence, ariationn

the underlying evel of patience s likely to be smallerwithin our conveniencesample,comparedwith what we might see using a more representativeample.This limited

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Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128 123

variationmakesfor a more,not less, difficulttest of ourproposition. n fact, we do see

effects attributableo our measureof patience, despite the likely truncation n the

underlying onstruct.We might expect to see even largereffects manifested n a more

representative ample,where we wouldcapturewider variationn level of patience.We

believeourresultswould stillhold,andmightbe strengthened,f thestudywerereplicated

with a morerepresentativeample.We also note that the settingof our studyis unique: t was a low salience,primaryelection.Conceptually,we believe thatpatienceshouldpredictelectoralbehavioracross

elections-be theynational, ubnational, eneral,or primary.However, he magnitude ftherelationship etweenpatienceandturnout ouldvarywiththe salience of the election.One might imaginethathighlypublicizedelectionsprovideadequategratificationn the

short-termor individuals uch that the effect of patiencecould be crowdedout in these

elections. As a consequence,patience might be more likely to propel individuals nto

politicalactionwhen more mmediate osts andbenefitsrecede nto thebackground. hat

is, patiencemightbe moreconsequentialn propellingndividualso the votingbooths inlowersalienceelectionscomparedwithhigher alienceelections.To theextent hatpatienceis systematically orrelatedwith otherdemographics nd dispositionsof interest(e.g.,education),t would n these circumstances ccentuateystematicnequalitiesnwho votes.

Inthis initialexamination f patienceas a politicalvirtue,we have focusedexclusivelyon therelationshipetweenpatienceand urnout, ndourevidencesuggests herelationshipis strongand substantial.Extensions o this research rajectory ome readilyto mind--

patiencemightbe linked with otheracts of politicalparticipation,r the relationship e-tweenpatienceandpolitical participationmightbe contingentuponthe typeof act;e.g.,

patient ndividualsmightbe morelikely to engage in letter-writinghan to join demon-strations.The conceptof patiencemightalso be relevant n consideringcitizens' viewstowardspolicyissues. To whatextentarecitizenswillingto makesacrifices n thepresent-dayin order o enactpolicieswithlong-runbenefits?Variationn patiencemightbe linkedwith policy prioritiesand the directionof policy preference.This possibility s directlyrelevant o contemporaryssues,fromthe moremundane iscussionsaboutwhetherandtowhatextent citizens arewillingto toleratedelaysin airport ecurity ines;to larger ssuesabout Social Securityand its long-run olvency;to discussionsaboutthe federalbudgetdeficit;to tradeoffs hat must be made betweenpolicies designed o provideemploymentopportunitiesn theshort-runhatmightposeenvironmentalonsequencesn thelong-run.Ourevidenceso farsuggests hatpatient itizensaremore ikelyto turnout to vote,and t is

easy to imagine hatpatiencecouldpose even broader oliticalconsequences.

Acknowledgments We would like to thankRobertHuckfeldt,BrianSala, Liz Zechmeister,and membersof the Micro Politics Group n the Department f Political Science at the Universityof California,Davis for

helpful comments.

Appendix:Variable Descriptionand QuestionWording

The discount actor s based on behavior n the choice game.Thegamewas described o

subjectsas follows: "Twoprizeswill be awarded n class at the conclusionof thisstudy.If

you are chosen to receive the second prize7,your answers to the following series of

7 There was anotherprize relatedto a dictatorgame experimentthat came earlier in the omnibus survey.Responses in the otherexperimentare not correlatedwith those made in the choice game.

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124 PolitBehav2006) 8:113-128

questionswill determine he amountof the awardand the dateof payment.You will beasked to choose thepaymentoptionthatyou wouldprefer n eachof 20 differentpayoffalternatives.Note thateach of the 20 payoffalternativeswill pay$100 in 30 days (optionA) or $100 + $x in 60 days (optionB), wherex differsundereachpayoffalternative. oreachpayoffalternative ouwill select thepayment ption A orB) thatyouwouldprefer f

youare chosen to

receivethe

prize.Whenthe

study s completed,a randomdrawingwillbe held in class to choose whichone of the 20 payoffalternativeswill determine heprizeand another andomdrawingwill be held to determineheonepersonwho will receivethesecondprize.When andhow muchthe winnerwill be paidwill be based on the payment

optionhe or she chooses under he payoffalternative elected."Inthe tableof alternativeshere s a column abeled "Annual nterestRate." This is

the interestraterequiredon the initial balance of $100 (optionA) that wouldyield theamount n optionB, afteraccountingor the fact that nterest s compounded ailyon theinitial balance. For comparison,most banks are currentlypaying 1%-2% interest on

savingsaccounts or certificatesof

deposits.Most credit card

companiesare

chargingcollege students12%-16% nterest o borrowmoney.Thus,you have an opportunityo

earnmoneyatmuchhigherratesof interestn thisstudy.Below is thetableof thepaymentoptionsfor the 20 differentalternatives. orpayoffalternative , wouldyou preferoptionA ($100 in 30 days) or optionB ($100.17 in 60 days)?" Subjectswere askedto makechoices over twentysets of alternatives.TableAl shows each set of alternatives s theywere displayed o the subjects.

Political nformations thenumber f correctanswers o thefollowing8 multiple hoiceandopenanswerquestions."Whichpartycurrently as the most members n the Houseof

Representativesn

Washington?" Republican/Democrat)Which

partycurrentlyas the

most membersn the Senate n Washington?" Republican/Democrat)Who has the final

responsibility o decide if a law is constitutional r not?" (President/Congress/Supreme

Appendix 1 Choices availableto subjects

Payoff Paymentoption A Payment option B Annual Payment optionalternative (pays amount($) (pays amount($) interest rate (%) preferred

below in 30 days) below in 60 days) (choose A or B)

1 100.00 100.17 2.0 AB

2 100.00 100.25 3.0 A B3 100.00 100.33 4.0 A B

4 100.00 100.42 5.0 AB

5 100.00 100.63 7.5 AB

6 100.00 100.84 10.0 A B

7 100.00 101.05 12.5 AB

8 100.00 101.26 15.0 AB

9 100.00 101.47 17.5 A B

10 100.00 101.68 20.0 AB

11 100.00 102.10 25.0 AB12 100.00 102.96 35.0 A B

13 100.00 104.25 50.0 AB14 100.00 106.44 75.0 A B

15 100.00 108.68 100.0 A B

16 100.00 110.96 125.0 AB

17 100.00 113.29 150.0 AB

18 100.00 115.66 175.0 AB

19 100.00 118.08 200.0 AB

20 100.00 123.07 250.0 A B

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Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128 125

Appendix 2 Sufficient statistics

Mean S.D. Min. Max.

Vote 0.21 0.41 0 1Patience 0.91 0.07 0.81 1Age 19.77 1.62 17 27

Female 0.49 0.5 0 1Nonwhite 0.53 0.5 0 1

Parents' income 5.73 2.19 1 8

Parents' education 4.23 1.59 1 7

Strengthof partyID 2.99 0.84 1 4

Political interest 2.32 0.6 1 3

Reads news 2.89 2.24 0 7

Watches news 2.58 2.21 0 7

Political information 4.76 1.6 1 8

Externalefficacy 2.37 0.83 0 4

Internalefficacy 3.29 1.29 1 5

Civic duty 2.67 1.32 1 5Churchattendance 2.31 1.34 1 5

Court)"Whoseresponsibilitys it to nominateudgesto the FederalCourts?" President/

Congress/Supremeourt)"What s the ob heldby WilliamRehnquist?""What s thejobheldby TonyBlair?" "What s thejob heldby JohnAshcroft?""What s thejob heldbyBill Frist?"

Readsthe News and Watches he News were basedon answers o thesetwo questions:

"During hepastweek,abouthowmanydaysdidyou reada daily newspaperother hanthe CALIFORNIAAGGIE)or consultan online news source?" and "Duringthe pastweek, abouthow manydays did you watcha nationalnetworknews program n televi-sion?"

Parents' ncome s the answer o: "Please choose thecategory hat describes he totalamountof INCOME arned n 2003 by yourPARENTSor GUARDIANS.Considerallforms of income, includingsalaries,tips, interest and dividendpayments,scholarshipsupport, tudent oans,parental upport, ocial security,alimony,and child support,andothers." (1 = $15,000 or under, 2 = $15,001-$25,000, 3 = $25,001-$35,000,4 =

$35,001-$50,000,5 =

$50,001-$65,000,6 =

$65,001-$80,000,7 =

$80,001-$100,000, 8 = over $100,000). Parents' Education s the averagefor both parentson"Whatwas the highest level of education hatyour father[mother] or male [female]

guardian) ompleted?"1 = Less thanhigh school, 2 = High school diploma,3 = Voca-tionalSchool,4 = AttendedCollege,5 = Bachelor's,6 = Graduate chool.

Forexternal fficacy,we followCraig,Niemi,and Silver(1990) andNiemi,Craig,andMattei 1991) by creatingan index thatsumsresponses rom fourquestions:"Peoplelike

me don'thave any say aboutwhat the governmentdoes", "I don't thinkpublicofficialscare much whatpeople like me think", "How muchdo you feel thathavingelectionsmakes hegovernment ayattention o what hepeoplethink?",and "Overtheyears,howmuch attentiondo you feel thegovernment aysto whatthe peoplethinkwhen it decides

whatto do?".The first woquestionsare coded 0 = agree,0.5 = neither, nd1 = disagree.Thethirdand fourthquestionsare coded 1 = a gooddeal,0.5 = some,and 0 = notmuch.

For theremaining ariables,we follow thecodingprocedurenTimpone 1998)andthe

questionwordingused in the NES. Age is in numberof years.Churchattendance s anindex of religiousattendance,1 = never/noreligiouspreference,2 = a few times a year,

SSpringer



Appendix 3 Pearsoncorrelationmatrix

Vote Patience Age Female Nonwhite Parents' Parents' Strength Political Reaincome education of party ID interest news

Patience 0.15*

Age 0.16* -0.01Female 0.01 0.08 0.08Nonwhite -0.20* -0.06 0.02 -0.12Parents' income 0.22* -0.01 -0.04 0.11 -0.41Parents' education 0.09* -0.06 -0.11 0.15 -0.39 0.54

Strengthof partyID 0.22* 0.08 0.00 -0.04 -0.09 0.18 0.10Political interest 0.25* 0.20 0.06 0.08 -0.26 0.23 0.23 0.20Reads news 0.26* 0.02 0.12 0.32 -0.14 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.32Watches news 0.24* 0.00 0.27 0.15 -0.05 0.19 0.05 0.18 0.19 0.3Political information 0.14* 0.03 0.06 0.37 -0.28 0.23 0.24 0.06 0.31 0.3Externalefficacy 0.09 -0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.15 0.15 0.10 0.16 0.18 0.0Internalefficacy 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.18 -0.20 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.30 0.2Civic duty -0.02 -0.12 0.09 -0.05 -0.02 -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.12 0.0Church attendance -0.01 0.20 0.03 -0.08 0.13 -0.15 -0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.01

*p < 0.05 for correlationswith turnout

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Polit Behav (2006) 28:113-128 127

3 = once or twice a month,4 = almosteveryweek,and5 = everyweek. Internal fficacyis a binaryresponse(0 = true, 1 = false) to the question"Sometimespolitics andgov-ernment eem so complicated hat a person ike me can'treallyunderstandwhat'sgoingon." Strengthof party dentifications coded 1 = independents ndapoliticals,2 = inde-

pendents eaning owardsa party,3 = weakpartisans, nd4 = strongpartisans.Civicduty

is coded 1 = agreestrongly,2 = agreesomewhat, = neither, = disagree omewhat, nd5 = disagree trongly or "If a persondoesn'tcarehow an electioncomes out he shouldn't

vote in it." Female s 1 for female,0 for male.Nonwhite s 1 for nonwhite,0 for white.

Interestn Politics s the answer o thequestion"Somepeopledon'tpaymuchattention o

politicalcampaigns.How interested reyou in the 2004 presidential lectioncampaign?"(1 = not muchinterested, = somewhat nterested, = very muchinterested).

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