Géopolitique du Moyen-Orient et de l’Afrique de Nord. Une perspective

historique

PIA 6333

Automne 2014

Said Mortaza Zeewari

211615143

The International and Domestic Dynamics of Extremist Governments:

From the Taliban to ISIS

The current era witnessed an intensified and constant trend of destabilization of the Middle-East.

The dominant narrative in the West paints a picture of bloody struggles and civilian suffering at

the hands of extremist violent groups proclaiming the cause of Islam. Images of the Taliban’s

religious police in Afghanistan, whipping burka-clad women and inspecting the bear-length of

men have now been replaced by even more appalling images of ISIS administering its own brand

of puritanical/inhuman policies in areas under its control. Both the Taliban and ISIS established

their versions of “states” by using religious rhetoric as a self-legitimization tool. Of course,

public perception over the last few years has been open to learning the differentiation of Islam

against the broader phenomena of Islamic fundamentalism, and so the aim of this treatise will not

be concerned with that specifically. On otherhand, the role of external interference and influence

in the conflict zones of the Middle-East merits a thorough analysis; the inherent connection

between geo-political interests and socio-political dynamics inside the Middle-East must be

established. In the end of the day, civilian populations seem to increase in both suffering and

indoctrination. The civil war in Afghanistan following the Soviet retreat was intensified with the

American-led international effort against the Taliban. In Iraq, the condition of civil war was

present as a result of civilian suffering both at the hands of government and in opportunistic and

reactionary measures taken by anti-government forces. The treatise aims to demonstrate the

following situation then: The rise of militant Islamist movements in a time of opportunity and

favorable domestic dynamics, while external forces look upon and react to such happenings

based on self-interest and the detriment of civilian populations that results in such a situation.

ISIS and its threat bears the need for comprehensive and rational decision-making. The role of

the international community could be considered counter-productive both based on the response

to the Taliban and the current measures taken against ISIS. In Afghanistan, not only did the Bonn

agreement provide an opportunity for factional interests to hold the political process hostage but,

by largely avoiding the difficult issues of demilitarization, it allowed them to re-establish a

stranglehold over the country1. In Iraq and Syria, demilitarization is another issue overshadowed

by the focus on military strategy. On the other hand, demilitarization itself is complimented by

the violent social turn that the conflicts are characterized by. The international implementation of

1 Johnson, Chris, and Jolyon Leslie. Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London: Zed, 2004. Print

like-minded governments in a geographical area full go weaponry and hate has brought countless

tragedies, and the Taliban and Afghanistan are only some results thereof. The Taliban’s ascent

and decent from power, and the present role of ISIS are but a culmination of international

interference in sovereign states that is catching up to its conspirators. Alarmingly, the civilian toll

in such a process stands out, while the risk of its continuance will remain. So far, in the conflict

against ISIS only the latter’s comportment has been analyzed. The civilian toll generated either

by international forces or domestic actors countering ISIS is left unaccounted for, as will be

demonstrated. The fire of religious extremists has so far been fought with the fire of the

interveners, and it is the innocent and unprotected that are left to burn.

The Taliban’s short history in control of Afghanistan, a country they named as the ‘Islamic

Emirate of Afghanistan’ during their brief rule, is pertinent to analyze due to the fact that their

rise as well as their fall from power has already happened. ISIS has declared its rule and status as

a state by conquering large swathes of Syria and Iraq and is intent on pursuing its expansionist

policies. As of now, we only know as to how the fall of the Taliban government came, while that

of ISIS persists. The most pertinent question today though is what the international response to

the situation will be. In two conferences held in Bahrain and Brussels on the threat of ISIS, there

was general agreement that the movement could not be removed by force alone2. Such

acknowledgment then recognizes the ideological appeal of the group. In an era where many

Muslim nations have been stricken by catastrophes, ISIS has provided a refuge for some

discontented youth. On the other hand, there is the alarming number of converts joining the

movement as well. Contemporary socio-political machinations are always at play in the rise of a

group such as ISIS and the Taliban. The military persistence of ISIS forces is rooted in its appeal

to various groups of people from many parts of the world.

It will become evident that the period in which the Taliban ruled Afghanistan was a lesson

learned by future Islamist groups. Indeed, ISIS can be better understood as an entity evolved

from the Taliban in terms of purpose and capacity. Leaving the discussion as to how they came

to power for later, the Taliban were supported during their time in control of Afghanistan by

Pakistan’s ISI. There were many groups fighting to take Kabul during the civil war, and each

2 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.

different group was under “rule by surrogates”3. Whereas the Soviets had previously enjoyed the

rule of the Afghan communist party in their favor, the Taliban were outfitted as Pakistan’s rulers

in Afghanistan after their rise to power. Whether the Taliban rose or any other group would only

matter in relation to how favorable such a course would be to regional and international powers.

Such a fact is among others in the process whereby extremist groups, such as the Taliban and

ISIS came to assert their rule over swathes of land in the Middle-East. ISIS is an escalation of the

threats posed by the Taliban as the latter was aware of its precarious situation while only being

recognized as a legitimate government by Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.

The international community did not seem to militarily respond to the Taliban as its threat was

only internal to Afghanistan. On the other hand, it becomes clearer by the day that ISIS is intent

on unleashing itself upon the world.

The context in which the Taliban rose to power reflects the lack of an independent state

structure. Because of the competing international interests in influencing Afghanistan, the state

itself was fragmented along spheres of influence. Sovereignty even during the time of the

Taliban’s rule could be questioned, as Ishtiaq Ahmed states that there was a Taliban-ISI nexus4.

Such a fact evokes memories of the CIA implanting regimes in South America, yet the novelty

of the Taliban was that before taking power, the movement was self-driven. On the other hand,

ISIS seems to possess some basic characters of an actual state5. By declaring itself as the rightful

ruler of all Muslims, it permits itself to earn money form kidnappings, looting, but above all oil6.

The nature of statehood not only distinguishes ISIS from the Taliban but all other recent

terrorist movements7 While the Taliban came to rule a country, ISIS directly challenges

international boundaries by extending from Syrian to Iraqi land. However, we must bear in mind

that the period in which these terrorists obtained power was characterized as a power vacuum.

Their rise and rule of ISIS, which include some of the same traits as the Taliban, should be

understood in a manner that engages upon the future integrity of Iraq and Syria. As well, the

3 Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response. Berkeley: U of California, 1995. Print.4 Ahmad, Ishtiaq. Containing the Taliban: Path to Peace in Afghanistan. 2000.5Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham." Middle East Forum, January. Vol. 27. 2014.6 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.7 Ibid

continuous meddling of external forces within the states finally coming to the grasp of ISIS and

the Taliban will become evident.

In 1991, both the U.S and the USSR were conscious of Kabul falling to religious extremists. For

one, Afghanistan succumbing to the anti-western, fundamentalists would evoke the Iranian

current8. The latter had provided material and ideological support for Shia groups operating

during the Soviet War and the ensuing civil war. Thus, the rise of the Taliban certainly came to

Iranian discontent, to the point that the latter almost declared war on the former on two

occasions9. On the other, hand, Russia was weary of extremism brewing in the Caucasus. Such a

trend of external forces forcing their own interests upon the sovereignty of another state. Writing

at the time of the civil war in 1995, while Dr. Najibullah’s communist government is near its

end, Kakar points out that Russia must cease from printing unsupported banknotes for Kabul and

Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Saudi Arabia to stop supporting their surrogates so that the war

can be ended before long10. The previous point brings in mind the fact that identifying certain

groups as surrogates of specific countries could not be made at all times. There was a lack of

coherence as to who the various factions were and the inability to hold them responsible for the

many crimes they committed11. Many civilians who thus suffered from the injustices committed

by the various factions had only one concern in mind - survival. The way to bring that about

would be in the institution of order, which the Taliban established.

Lacking any connection to the warlords fighting it off in Kabul, and devoid of the excesses

characterizing other, the Taliban’s legitimacy grew as it rose to power. The fact that they were a

religious movement merits a discussion as to the role of Islam in Afghan society. The political

vacuum during the civil war was filled by the Taliban, yet they were one of the many groups

espousing diverse ideologies that rose to power. It will be shown that the Taliban shrouded itself

in piety as it gained power, and this had a considerable effect in influencing people towards their

cause.

8 Jawad, Nassim. Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group, 1992. Print 9 Ibid10 Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response. Berkeley: U of California, 1995. Print.11 Afghanistan: International Responsibility for Human Rights Disaster. New York, NY: Amnesty International, 1995. Print

Most people know that Afghanistan cannot be imagined without Islam12. From all the conquerors

that traversed the land, the influence of Islam stands out the most in all matters of life. Its recent

history certainly reflects the importance of religion in the lives of Afghans. The anti-soviet jihad

in which many outsiders came to fight on behalf of their Muslim brothers certainly reminded

Afghans of their belonging to a global umma. Yet it is startling to compare the traditional role of

Islam in Afghanistan and what the Taliban sought out to accomplish in the name of the religion.

In 1992, Ashraf Ghani commented about the relationship between Islam and Afghanistan by

accurately laying out the bounds by which the religion functioned in society:

“On the relation between Islam and state and society in Afghanistan, three

points need to be emphasized. First, Islam has provided the source of unity

for Afghan society and the criteria of legitimacy for the Afghan state. Its role

can be seen clearly during the wars against the British invaders in the 19th

Century and the Soviet invaders in the 20th century. Second, despite the

pivotal position of Islam, state power in Afghanistan has never been

exercised by religious specialists and leaders. Third, inquisition based on

adherence to certain arbitrarily designated orthodox beliefs has not been

part of the past of Afghans.”13

The Taliban brought back the unity and legitimacy of the Afghan state by securing their rule

through an Islamic rhetoric. The preceding societal conditions made it that the lack of leadership

by “specialists” and religious clerics, as well as the ethno-religious rift that followed, would be

tolerated. Low expectations from traumatized and helpless Afghans made the Taliban’s rule

acceptable, and even agreeable to most populations. On the other hand, the ISI supported the

Taliban when the latter entered Kabul due to their ethnicity; The Pashtun Taliban shared

relations with their cross-border Pakistani tribes and so provided Pakistan with a strong

opportunity to exert influence. In parallel to the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, there was an

intimately connected global jihadist movement taking root. Although the Taliban regarded

Mullah Omar as “Amirul Mu’mineen”, leader of the believers, such a conviction was not beyond

12 Johnson, Chris, and Jolyon Leslie. Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London: Zed, 2004. Print13 Ibid

Afghanistan. The remnants of the Mujahideen who came to fight the Soviets from abroad, who

were going to be the backbone of the future Al-Qaeda, did not so much see themselves as the

subjects of the Mullah but more as his guests. The Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, consisting of

strict interpretations of extremist and deviated principle gave much hope to international

Islamist groups aboard. Through the Taliban, they saw themselves bringing religious rule to their

own homelands. While they were created and supported to combat the communist domino effect

taking place in Afghanistan, these extremist groups developed their own goals and aims after the

Soviet withdrawal.

The legitimacy of the Taliban accompanied their quick expansion from Kandahar to Kabul. In a

period of lawlessness, they proved to bring some sort of order. As people could finally rest from

the constant rocket attacks on Kabul, the calm accompanying the Taliban’s rule reassured them.

There was also this mystique about the group and their aims; they seemed intent on bringing

about a so-called Sharia administered state. Of course, in the beginning they succeeded in selling

this ruse. It was only later on that people would embarrassingly wish to be under the rule of

Najibullah once again instead14. The Taliban’s portrayal as an evil force was widely accepted and

promoted in the period leading to and following the American invasion in Afghanistan. In Keys

to the Endgame in Afghanistan the James Phillips asserts that the invasion was justified

due to the Taliban’s sponsorship of terrorism (by hosting Al Qaeda), and that same approach

could be applied to countries like Iraq, Sudan, and other state sponsors or terrorism15.

The American invasion was justified for reasons widely known, and so the discussion will rest as

to what happened to the international fighters who escaped the American-led onslaught. First, we

must examine the immediate effects of the overthrow of the Taliban by international forces as

related by Nabi Misdaq16.

In one instance, U.S. jets bombed a jail where a riot had broken out, killing 470 prisoners and

leaving 86 alive. Another time, U.S. soldiers supervised the loading of Taliban prisoners into

airless and cramped shipping containers. When the prisoners complained about the lack of

14 Jawad, Nassim. Afghanistan: A Nation of Minorities. London: Minority Rights Group, 1992. Print15 Phillips, James. Keys to the Endgame in Afghanistan. Working paper no. 1507. Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2001. Print. Backgrounder Executive Summary16 Misdaq, Nabi. Afghanistan: Political Frailty and External Interference. London: Routledge, 2006. Print

oxygen, Afghan soldiers under the command of General Dostum (who himself was a long-

standing Uzbek client and warlord) began firing into the containers, killing some prisoners in the

process and leaving the rest to a miserable end. Only 2 out of 297 were alive after the four-day

trek to the Uzbek stronghold of Sheberghan, and they were both killed out of pity.

Relating such incidents aims at reinforcing the fact that the international conduct of forces, either

as proxies or as outright invaders, serves only to create long-standing grievances against

themselves, and the epitome of which is now ISIS. The roots of the group stretch back to the

days of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the American invasion. It seems as if the Taliban were

not to be held in any sort of consideration and respect when discussing the future of the country.

The focus on warfare made it move ahead of the political process17. Such a way of approaching

the Afghan situation resulted in the unjustified and unjustifiable ways parties friendly to the

America-led cause acted. Today, people against whom there are strong grievances remain in

influential positions, including Abdul Rashid Dostum, and others supported by Saudi Arabia

such as Abdul Rassul Sayyaf.

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi formed a group in 1999 and when they fled to Iraq, pledged allegiance

to Osama Bin Laden in 2004 and became Al-Qaeda in Iraq18. The overthrow of the Baathist

regime and its replacement with a Shia-led government by the Americans sowed the seeds of

sectarian tensions. Having considerable experience fighting in Afghanistan, Zarqawi formulated

a four-pronged strategy to defeat the American-led coalition19. First, his group would isolate U.S.

forces by targeting its allies, then they would discourage Iraqi collaboration by targeting

government infrastructure and personnel, then they would target reconstruction efforts through

high-profile attacks on civilian contractors and aid workers; and draw the U.S. military into a

Sunni-Shiite civil war by targeting Shiites. Zarqawi was killed in 2006 but his group branched

off in Syria20. Due to the civil war raging in Syria and the government’s lack of legitimacy there,

AQI was able to create a cross border network. The fact that Zarqawi’s aims were carried out

merits an understanding of the societal conditions right after the ouster of Saddam from power.

17 Johnson, Chris, and Jolyon Leslie. Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London: Zed, 2004. Print18 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014. 19 Laub, Zachary. "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria." Ed. Jonathan Masters. Council on Foreign Relations (2014): n. pag. Web20 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.

In 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority fed the insurgency by asserting two specific

obligations upon the future of Iraqi governance21: First, they declared the ban on Saddam era

officials from governmental positions. Secondly, the thousands of armed Sunnis were alienated

and susceptible to joining anti-government forces. Sunni-fundamentalists such as AQI proved

itself as a strong cause to join.

After the American withdrawal, the heaving-handed actions taken by the Iraqi government of

Nouri Al-Maliki made to consolidate his power have further alienated Sunni communities. As

was observed regarding the situations earlier in the Afghan civil war, political expedience was a

priority, not human rights22. The invaders either ignored or were not aware of the dangers of

forcing a government upon a state. The established government of Nouri Al-Maliki, manipulated

sectarian tensions with impunity for his own political ends, while he himself was put in power in

order to consolidate America’s role in the future of Iraq. In the face of the Sunni-led political

upheaval, the Obama administration responded by increasing the CIA’s support for the Maliki

government, including assistance to elite counterterrorist units that report directly to the Prime

Minister, and providing Hellfire missiles and surveillance drones23. Such measures do not reflect

a will to establish a legitimate Iraqi government but rather one that serves American interests on

the ground at the cost of civil discord and chaos.

The well-known slogan of ISIS is “Remaining and expanding” and so any solution seeking its

complete stoppage must know its nature24. Such an approach is still not engendered, and

measures taken are actually reactionary and rash rather than being thought out and deliberated

upon. The military focused mentality that was prevalent in the face of the Taliban threat has

continued against ISIS. Of course, specific situations such as the plight of the Yazidis and the

intervention on their behalf are not being challenged. The general theme of violence has been

reiterated by both ISIS as well as the coalition throughout this short period though. However, just

21 Laub, Zachary. "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria." Ed. Jonathan Masters. Council on Foreign Relations (2014): n. pag. Web22 Afghanistan: International Responsibility for Human Rights Disaster. New York, NY: Amnesty International, 1995. Print23 Laub, Zachary. "Islamic State in Iraq and Greater Syria." Ed. Jonathan Masters. Council on Foreign Relations (2014): n. pag. Web24 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.

as there is an evident obsession by Western leaders to expand democracy in other parts of the

world, now there is an equally, if not more motivated movement battling for their sinister beliefs

to be exported. While external analysts and “experts” are quick to condemn the group’s evil

actions, they do not ask questions as to why so many people have left their families and homes to

join a movement characterized by its nihilistic militancy. As such, “this singular emphasis on the

group’s evil deeds is a missed opportunity to interrogate the group’s evolution beyond parroting

tedious, anti-western condemnations25.”

Many inside and outside the region would argue that ISIS is a direct result of a string of Western

policies - starting with the British and French carve up of the Ottoman empire, right through to

the American invasion of Iraq, and the subsequent removal of anyone who had anything to do

with the old regime, which sharpened Sunni resentment26. Some go even further by losing any

hope for the future27, as Hisham Melhem does:

“The Arab world today is more violent, unstable, fragmented and driven by

extremism—the extremism of the rulers and those in opposition—than at any

time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire a century ago. Every hope of

modern Arab history has been betrayed. The promise of political

empowerment, the return of politics, the restoration of human dignity

heralded by the season of Arab uprisings in their early heydays—all has

given way to civil wars, ethnic, sectarian and regional divisions and the

reassertion of absolutism, both in its military and atavistic forms. With the

dubious exception of the antiquated monarchies and emirates of the Gulf—

which for the moment are holding out against the tide of chaos—and

possibly Tunisia, there is no recognizable legitimacy left in the Arab world.”

Although the Taliban certainly built a reputation of fanaticism, ISIS presents a much more

challenging state of mind in its members. The tactics of beheading enemies and treating women

and children as legitimate targets go back to the 18th century wahabi establishment of Saudi

25 Zakaria, Rafia. "Behind the Barbarism: Misreading Online Militant Magazines." Al Jazeera, November 18, 2014.26 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.27 Melhem, Hisham. "The Barbarians Within Our Gates." POLITICO Magazine. Accessed December 18, 2014

Arabia in the 18th century28. Just like the political opportunities that presented itself for

wahabism to expand, so did the ideology gain ground and flourish in Afghanistan and now in

Iraq and Syria. The defeat of ISIS both as a movement and ideology will be proven to be much

more challenging than what the Taliban presented to the world, since engaging terrorism,

violence, and intolerance requires the West to objectively assess the coherence of its approach.

Instead of dealing with the root of terrorism, extending all the way down the wahhabi founded

anticommunists-turned-anti everyone else, so far international US-led policy has been rather

reactionary and without contempt to the actual domestic situation of people caught in the cross-

fire. Exposing the Saudi-led exportation and support for terrorist ideologies like their own would

have surely put the mutually beneficial economic partnerships and interdependence of the U.S.

and Saudi Arabia. However, such clear disregard for the impact of the Taliban and their

illegitimate rule brought about the present consequence of ISIS in Saudi Arabia’s backdoor.

Some intellectuals, such as Turki Al-Hamdi, have no hope for Saudi Arabia specifically to be

part of the solution-making process - this is evidenced in the declaration that other Middle-

Eastern countries are not known for their exceptional quality of life and legitimate governance

either, as evidenced by the Arab Spring29. Yet, such a threat was even pondered upon by the most

conservative circles in America. Phillips, while supporting the American-led armed intervention,

warns that ideological hothouses, which he qualified Afghanistan as, ultimately “pose a threat to

the stability of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia” and that “the U.S. should press the Saudi government

to restrict the flow of money from Islamic charities and individual donors to these madrassas,

whose graduates have been recruited by organizations that seek to overthrow the Saudi royal

family”30. Now that the hotbed of extremism has moved from Taliban-ruled Afghanistan to Saudi

Arabia’s backyard, it seems that the chickens are coming home to roost.

The domestic dynamics that were imposed on Iraq made it inevitable for Mosul to finally fall to

Al Zarqawi’s veterans who now called themselves the leaders of an Islamic State in Iraq and

Syria. Just as the Taliban gained legitimacy through their seemingly messianic rise to power in a

time of warfare, ISIS also exploited religious convictions to establish itself. Its ability to also

28 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.29 Dorsey, James. "War against ISIS Sowing Seeds of More Extremist Groups - The Nation." The Nation. October 1, 2014. Accessed December 18, 2014.30 Phillips, James. Keys to the Endgame in Afghanistan. Working paper no. 1507. Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2001. Print. Backgrounder Executive Summary

address international socio-political issues in its propaganda is striking though. Indeed, not only

has ISIS exploited the internal domestic politics of Iraq and Syria to establish itself there, but its

recruitment system demonstrates an understanding of salient world issues as well. Several of

their widely distributed propaganda campaigns reiterate that conversion to Islam means

automatic belonging to the caliphate and arrival in their lands automatically confers citizenship

and a passport. Against the backdrop of strict immigration enforcement in the Western world,

where refugees are put in detention centers and forced to return to hostile environments, ISIL

claims to offer a refuge as long as the migrants embrace Islam31. On the other hand, the rise of

ISIS coincides to a period of transnational movement. In the Middle-East especially, such

movement is mostly caused by war, as demonstrated by the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq

throughout the past decade. Other Middle-Eastern countries are not known for their exceptional

quality of life and legitimate governance either, as evidenced by the Arab Spring. As such, in

ISIS a large number of disenfranchised Muslim youth found a purpose and continue to join the

group in droves.

In terms of ideological appeal, ISIS has proven itself more pragmatic than the Pushtun-centered

Taliban structure which ruled Afghanistan to international Muslim populations. ISIS is also

proving itself far superior to the Taliban in consolidating their rule. Educational services, social

administrative skills and media outreach campaigns have assisted the group in establishing a

semblance of legitimacy. It is very probably that the model established by ISIS, especially if it

persists, will set an example for future jihadist movements seeking to establish their rule. Unlike

the Taliban, ISIS allows girls to attend schools but classes are gender-segregated32. Moreover,

the group even offers bus-transportation for the Aleppo town of Al-Bab, among other efforts to

establish good-will from people towards the group. It remains to be seen whether the American-

led initiative to force ISIS out will be welcome by those living under their rule. Just like the

Taliban, ISIS has entered into power while expectations of civilians are very low, yet the group

has really committed itself to maintaining a legitimate image. On the other hand, it should be

remembered that in terms of prestige in the Muslim world, ISIS holds much more than the

Taliban did years ago. Damascus is important in the history of Islam, as is Baghdad. From their

31 Zakaria, Rafia. "Behind the Barbarism: Misreading Online Militant Magazines." Al Jazeera, November 18, 2014.32 Al-Tamimi, Aymenn Jawad. "The Dawn of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham." Middle East Forum, January. Vol. 27. 2014.

stronghold near Hama and Homs, ISIS seems to be intent on capturing the Syrian capital. Their

aims towards Baghdad are evident, as the group has been attacking town along the main highway

capital since capturing Mosul33. The group is threatening two capitals that have significant

regional and international value, and this is the first time that a transnational ideological terrorist

group has managed to do so. It will also be pertinent to note that the Taliban’s rise to power was

done without any external interference. On the other hand, ISIS has been engaged upon militarily

before taking over an entire country, yet their ambition and threat persists.

In its pragmatic appeal and socialist rule, ISIS is clearly trying to legitimize itself not to the

international community, but to those living under its rule. Therefore, the risk of engaging the

group on a violent basis, the risk of appeal to join or support the group increases. Whereas the

Taliban were quickly repelled in the face of the American-led invasion due to their repressive

rule towards their Hazara, Tajik, Uzbek, and countless other counterparts, ISIS might prove itself

more firmly grounded in the areas under its rule. The Iranian support for the Iraqi government

and militias also intensifies the religious divide within Iraq that the group promotes. Certainly

noticeable is that Iran and America, for perhaps one rare moment, are on the same side.

Unfortunately, those whom they oppose happen to claim representation for the Sunni-population

of Islam, which is repartitioned throughout the world. ISIS has been instrumental in devising an

apparent existential crisis for Sunni Muslims throughout the world, as evidence by the fact that

so many international fighters have been bewitched by their call.

The appeal as well as the impact of ISIS reaches further than the Taliban did. Over the years, not

only has the brutality of movements such as ISIS grown, but their definition of legitimate targets

has ballooned34. From warily deciding that conspicuously secular rulers of Muslim populations

could be overthrown by violence, it has grown to include terrorist attacks on security forces, to

any servants of the state, to any citizen who does not oppose their own rulers, and now to any

Muslim anywhere who does not join the struggle. The latest development begs the question of

whether the animosity felt towards the West, leading to sympathy towards ISIS, will then be

counterbalanced by the latter’s own increased illegitimacy over time among Sunni populations.

33 Areas Under ISIS Control." The New York Times. June 11, 2014. Accessed December 17, 2014.34 Mardell, Mark. "Is IS on an Inevitable Path to Destruction?" BBC, December 10, 2014.

As their brutal rule continues, people willing to live under their administration might soon turn

their backs when they realize the true nature and significance of ISIS.

Therein lays the hope - that the domestic populations within Iraq and Syria will neither

seek external support nor make recourse to blood-fueled exclusionary groups as the situation

wanes. If the international community did not resist interfering in the domestic affairs of Middle-

Eastern countries in the past, such as in Afghanistan, it now seems they will be forced out of

them now. Indeed, the future role of American-led initiatives, whether military or diplomatic,

should be heavily resisted by domestic actors, if they seek to attain the legitimacy of their

civilians. However, for there to be a truly hope for the reinstitution of sovereignty for Syria and

Iraq, the needs and concerns of those involved must be addressed. Continuing an approach that is

external-looking-in, characterized as a “Lawrence of Arabia syndrome” will inevitably lead to

the institution of arbitrary power and reinforced social grievances. Writing at the time of the

Afghan civil-war, Kakar points out a recurring theme in American policy: “America must adopt

a more balanced foreign policy and work to reach out to the people themselves, not just their pro-

American governments.35” Perhaps then that the threat of ISIS is a real opportunity in disguise

for substantial positive change in the Middle-East; yet, this will not be realizable if it does not

come from within, as a reflection of a national, sovereign will.

The failure of such a comprehensive and proactive effort to bring back legitimacy to the Iraqi

and Syrian governments poses many risks. There are other groups such as ISIS, the Peshmerga,

and American funded groups fighting against the governments on the ground. However, the

government itself has forces and international backers as well, expanding the impact of the

conflict. Bahrain is maintaining a brittle status quo by the force of arms of its larger neighbors,

mainly Saudi Arabia. Lebanon, dominated by Hezbollah, arguably the most powerful non-state

actor in the world—before the rise of the Islamic State—could be dragged fully to the maelstrom

of Syria’s multiple civil wars by the Assad regime, Iran and its proxy Hezbollah as well as the

Islamic State36. Spillovers are inherent in conflicts that increasingly appear to be sectarian. The

fragmentation that took place in Afghanistan and opened the way for the Taliban to creep up to

35 Kakar, M. Hassan. Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response. Berkeley: U of California, 1995. Print.36 Melhem, Hisham. "The Barbarians Within Our Gates." POLITICO Magazine. Accessed December 18, 2014

power is also happening to Syria and Iraq. Yet, the threat posed by ISIS is in its challenge to

Muslims rather than to anyone else, and so only if domestic actors are given the chance to submit

their grievances and have their legitimate claims provided can the conflicts subside.

Now that international terrorist groups are pledging their allegiance to ISIS, it becomes evident

how extremely needed an inclusive solution is. Perhaps the model of a caliphate in Iraq and Syria

will fuel other extremist desires internationally, just as the Taliban did for ISIS. Based on the

trend in American and Saudi interference and impact on international extremism, their role

cannot rationally be included in the internal affairs of Syria and Iraq. Saudi Arabia based on its

recent arrest of 88 men for ‘plotting attacks’37 now might understand the results of being afflicted

by its own poison. Moreover, other countries around the world should also take an active

involvement in understanding the global threat that ISIS poses. The need for geopolitical

considerations to be forgotten must be proclaimed in the face of such domestic and international

consequences.

Aside from the blame being put on external meddlers, Muslims must realize that they themselves

are the biggest victims throughout this chaos. While a combination of self-defense and white

man’s burden rhetoric has been proclaimed by the West in its solution making-process for the

Middle-East, the innocent populations themselves bear the greatest brunt of political wheeling-

and-dealings. As presented above, it is only a matter of time before the legitimacy of ISIS will

either run out or settle itself throughout the Middle-East and beyond. Are countries in the

Middle-East ready to sit together to constructively make out a domestically applicable solution,

or will they continue being divided among their great-power sponsors?

By the way events are unfolding, comprehensive change can only begin from those who have

suffered most. Between the treacherous and unaccountable political leaders and the animalistic

and bloodthirsty extremists, the middle way must be presented. Arabs and Muslims must assert

their authority and will to bring an inclusive and comprehensive solution to the future of their

states. The importance is not the questions of the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria, but the

human dignity of its populations and those elsewhere both presently and in the future.

37 Zakaria, Rafia. "Behind the Barbarism: Misreading Online Militant Magazines." Al Jazeera, November 18, 2014.

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