TAL IBANIZATION AND TERRORIST ATTACKS

IN THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE

(NWFP) :THE LOCAL POLICE RESPONSE AND

SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

Paper Presented At

“VOICES ON AFGHANISTAN: AUDIENCE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT”UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS-SAN ANTONIO (UTSA)

USA

JANUARY 15 - 17, 2008

FASIHUDDIN (PSP)Deputy Commandant,

Frontier Reserve Police (FRP) N.W.F.P, Peshawar (Pakistan) Phone No: 0092-91-9210566 /9210060

Cell: +92-300-5954055 Email: fasih68@hotmail.com

INTRODUCTION TERRORISM–A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING POLICE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM–A COMPARATIVE STUDY TALIBANIZATION AND TALIBAN INFILTRATION INTO THE SETTLED DISTRICTS OF NWFP SUICIDAL ATACKS__AN ESTABLISHED WEAPON

ANTITERRORISM RESPONSE __SOME SHORT AND LONG-TERM MEASURES

Mobilization and Re-allocation of Existing Paramilitary and Reserve Forces Research and Religious De-Programming at Hot-Spots Arrangement for Immediate Judicial and Legal Remedies Poverty Alleviation in Tribal/semi-Tribal Areas Coordination Amongst Intelligence Agencies Establishment of National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC)

THE LOCAL POLICE–CONSTRAINTS AND RESPONSE AGREED POLITICAL SOLUTION IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL MILITANTS POLICE AND RELIGIOUS HARMONY REMOVING CONCEPTUAL AMBIVALENCE OF US THINK-TANK VIS-À-VIS

PAKISTAN CONCLUSION REFERENCES

ANNEXUREA Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) Operation-Leading Events (JanJuly

2007)B American and Pakistani StatementsC Organizational Structure of NCTC, IslamabadD Information Process of NCTC, IslamabadE Military-Cum-Police operation in Swat (Malakand Division):

Leading Events

ABOUT THE WRITER

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T A L I B A N I Z A T I O N A N D T E R R O R I S T A T T A C K SI N T H E N O R T H - W E S T F R O N T I E R P R O V I N C E ( N W F P ) :

T H E L O C A L P O L I C E R E S P O N S E A N D S O M E R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S

(A) INTRODUCTION: Terrorism, though vaguely defined, is a now a ‘glocal phenomenon’ ___both global and local.

Pakistan as a country of ‘first line of defence’ has greater contribution in the ongoing ‘war on terror’ in Afghanistan and in the adjacent tribal territories of Pakistan, called FATA1___ Federally Administered Tribal Agencies. Taliban is a plural word meaning ‘the students of Islamic seminaries’ called ‘madrassahas’. After the withdrawal of the then USSR forces from Afghanistan and after the inter-necine war and factionalism of ‘Mujahideen’ (the fighters), the students of Islamic schools rose to power in Afghanistan. However, instead of promoting human rights and working for the development and reconstruction of the war torn country, these students-cum-rulers (now collectively called Taliban) resorted to severe and stringent administrative measures and thus aggravated the already existing friction and distrust amongst the various religions and sects. However, their simplicity and speedy dispensation of justice won them a good deal of reputation in the illiterate masses of Afghanistan and tribal communities in Pakistan, who are still not exposed to the modern way of life and democracy. Taliban took on themselves to export their own model of governance to other people and even went on war with the western world.

Pakistan became a staunch ally of the modern world in the ‘war on terror’ and has lost more than a thousand (1000) army personnel in chasing the foreign and local militants in the tribal areas adjacent to Afghan borders. Pakistan has deployed about 90,000 of her forces to check and fight against every terrorist activity in the tribal areas. But, due to the use of sophisticated weapons, modern communication techniques, and after displacement from their hideouts after military operations, these religious fanatics have started creeping into the urban cities of the country__ mostly next to the tribal areas. Their way of life, their unbending attitude and their inhuman actions of terrorism are now known as a process of ‘Talibanization’. Pakistan has ratified/acceded to 10 out of 13 UN conventions relating to terrorism. Pakistan is a signatory to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 (Palermo Convention). Pakistan has also signed and ratified the SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and the OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism 1999. Domestically, we have Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and Terrorist Affected Areas (Special Courts Act) 1992. Moreover, bilateral agreements and MOUs are also signed with many brotherly nations.

Police in Pakistan, as a ‘first line of defence within any civil society’ are now facing a terrible and dejecting wave of ‘talibanization’ in the urban cities of the country, especially in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)2, Pakistan. These terrorist activities in the crowded urban places include bomb blasting, explosions, target killings, suicidal bomb attacks, mortar/missile attacks from unseen places and spreading a sense of extreme insecurity in the general public through dissemination of intimidating letters and articles by religious miscreants. Currently, I am collecting data on the sacrifices of the local police in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). There occurred in the settled districts 44 bomb blasts/explosions, 6 suicidal and 95 rocket launcher/missile attacks from unidentified places in the year 2006. The figures for 2007 are higher than the previous year. At the present, police, including senior officers, are the first target of these terrorists. The terrorist attacks and sabotage activities in the tribal areas are more severe and heart-rending with greater human and material losses but that is not the subject of this paper.

1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)___ total area 27220 sq.km with a total population of four million. These agencies are seven in number, viz, South Waziristan, North Waziristan, Kurram, Momand, Bajaur, Khyber and Orakzai. Malakand is now neither fully integrated into settled area, nor a part of FATA but a hotchpotch of the two. 2 NWFP is one of the four provinces of Pakistan, with a total area of 4521 sq.km and a total estimated population of fourteen millions. (See District map of NWFP and FATA)

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As a law-enforcement agency, the local police are struggling very hard against this situation and despite many resource constraints and technical weaknesses, the police are evolving a new approach to combat such terrorist attacks. The international community is requested to extend all possible help to the local police of NWFP (Pakistan) and an empirical, analytical and comparative research is needed to fully comprehend the current situation of ‘talibanization’ in the country. The philosophy of the ‘Enlightened Modernization’ as envisioned by President Pervez Musharraf as an alternative choice to the philosophy and movement of talibanization needs to be critically evaluated and explored. The local police have to work hard; enhance their professional capabilities and mobilize and reinforce their ranks in order to put a halt to this increasing infiltration of ‘taliban-friendly activities’ into the cities, called by a journalist as ‘the creeping coup’ of informal ‘taliban-style policing’. Police need a drastic overhauling, huge financial support, capacity building and a realistic model of intelligence-led policing.

After these incessant and deadly terrorist attacks in the urban districts, the law enforcement and intelligence agencies in general and the police in particular came under severe criticism from all corners, including top government and opposition leaders. A series of mutual blaming and accusation started amongst the various departments. The local police were not fully aware of the terrorist activities, the conceptual understanding of terrorism and the responses, preparedness and strategies of the police in other parts of the world, who had confronted terrorist attacks in the recent past. This paper was written for the officers of local police department and the decision-makers and policy-planners in the provincial government on a pattern of a situation-analysis so that they know about the theoretical underpinnings and practical implications of the phenomenon of terrorism, especially in the context of police response around the world. This was an educative and informative essay, which was well received by the local police department. Many good points were taken as guidelines for internal police mobilization, allocation of additional resources, provision of modern equipments, new recruitment, new training centers and inter and intra agencies cooperation.

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(B) TERRORISM - A CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING:Terrorism, though still not unanimously defined3, is a global phenomenon with a variety of kinds

like religious terrorism, state-sponsored terrorism, environmental terrorism, narco terrorism, international

3 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations__ “The unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85)Current U.S. National Security Strategy __ “Premeditated, politically motivated violence against innocents.” U.S. Department of Defense__ The “calculated use of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.” The British Terrorism Act 2000__ “Defines terrorism so as to include not only attacks on military personnel, but also acts not usually considered violent, such as shutting down a web site whose views one dislikes.”A 1984 U.S. Army Training Manual __ “Terrorism is the calculated use of violence, or the threat of violence, to produce goals that are political or ideological in nature.”

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terrorism, domestic terrorism, nuclear terrorism, etc. The term terrorism is used with many theoretical underpinnings and with different phenomenal expressions.

“Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed. Although survival entails obviating the governmental counter measures designed to unearth and destroy the terrorists and their organization, success is dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security barriers designed to thwart attack. In these respects, the necessity for change in order to stay one step ahead of the counterterrorism curve compels terrorists to change-adjusting and adapting their tactics, modus operandi, and sometimes even their weapons systems as needed. The better, more determined, and more sophisticated terrorists will therefore always find a way to carry on their struggle.”(Gus Martin, 2004)

The underlying conceptual paradigm vis-à-vis terrorism and terrorists is of increasing interest to academics and researchers involved in the field of criminological studies. Its theoretical and tactical contours are intensively studied and some recent empirical findings have given rise to certain hypotheses formulation:

(i) First, it should be recognized that terrorism is, always has been, and always will be instrumental, planned, purposeful and premeditated. The challenge that analysts face is in identifying and understanding the rationale and inner logic that motivates terrorists. To effectively fight terrorism, a better understanding of terrorists and terrorism must be gained than has been the case in the past.

(ii) Second, it must be recognized that terrorism is fundamentally a form of psychological warfare. Terrorists seek to elicit an irrational and emotional response. The countermeasures response should be psychological as well as physical; diplomatic as well as military and economic as well as persuasion.

(iii) Third, as personal freedom and civil liberties in a democratic system attract the terrorists, so the public, the political leadership and especially the judiciary must have realistic expectations from the law-enforcement agencies that how to protect the general public against the hidden enemies in any open and free democratic society.

(iv) Fourth, incessant recruitment and fresh induction into the ranks of terrorists, must be taken a strong point in the long-term planning, at least to effect and influence successor generations of would-be terrorists, even if the current generation has already been missed.

(v) Finally, terrorism is a perennial, ceaseless struggle with its adaptability to adjust to challenges and countermeasures. It has existed for 2,000 years and is never ending. For success against terrorism, efforts must be as tireless, innovative, and dynamic as that of the opponent. (Gus Martin, 2004)

The list of these ‘hypotheses’ is not ended, and with the passage of time is likely to be added with new findings and observations. Besides variation and differences in definition and explanation of terrorism, there are some common points in all major and minor terrorist activities. According to criminologist Gwynn Nettler, all forms of terrorism (national/international) share six characteristics:

No Rule. There are no moral limitations on the type or degree of violence that terrorists can use.

Brian Jenkins__ “Terrorism is the use or threatened use of force designed to bring about political change.” Vice President’s Task Force__ “Terrorism is the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives. It is usually intended to intimidate or coerce a government, individuals or groups, or to modify their behaviour or politics.” James M. Poland__ “Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, systematic murder, mayhem, and threatening of the innocent to create fear and intimidation in order to gain a political or tactical advantage, usually to influence an audience.” (Quoted in Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, 2007)

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No Innocents. No distinctions are made between soldiers and civilians children can be killed as easily as adults.

Economy. Kill one, frighten 10,000 Publicity. Terrorists seek publicity, and publicity encourages terrorism. Meaning. Terrorist acts give meaning and significance to the lives of terrorists. No Clarity. Beyond the immediate aim of destructive acts, the long-term goals of terrorists

are likely to be poorly conceived or impossible to implement. Terrorism that succeeds escalates. (Frank Schmalleger, 2007)

(C) POLICE RESPONSE TO TERRORISM—A COMPARATIVE STUDY:The very phrase of ‘war on terror’ signifies that terrorism is generally equated with war or war-

like situation, though it ranges from a major criminal behavior to a fight in the battlefield. After the 9/11 incidents, many countries changed or modified the role and structure of their law-enforcement agencies in addition to new legislations or establishment of new units with modern and sophisticated facilities. Some have enhanced the capacity of their regular police force and others have assigned the responsibilities of counterterrorism to the military units, even in the western world. The modernization and expansion of intelligence agencies got the priority in all the western/developed nations and huge financial allocations have been made to them for their greater role in the newly evolved Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) or Intelligence-Driven Policing (IDP) as it is now commonly known in the developed world. Examples are many and can be looked in the available literature on terrorism, criminology, policing and organized crime. First, I would like to quote the example of the USA, the leading country in the war on terror.

“The New York Police Department (NYPD),in response to the terrorist attacks, set up barricades and vehicle checkpoints and mobilized heavily armed officer especially trained in antiterrorism tactics to patrol the city. The local police must prevent the attacks and respond when attacks occur, offering critical evacuation, emergency medical, and security functions to help stabilize communities following an incident. The NYPD lost 23 of its officers in the 9/11 attacks. It has now created a special bureau headed by a deputy police commissioner responsible for counterterrorism training, prevention and investigation. One thousand (1000) officers have been reassigned to antiterrorism duties, and the department is training its entire 39,000-member force in how to respond to various terrorist attacks. The NYPD has also assigned detectives to work abroad with law enforcement agencies in Canada, Israel, Southeast Asia and the Middle East to track terrorists who might attack New York City. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) has announced its Taking Command Initiative, an aggressive project to assess the current state of homeland security efforts in the USA, which will identify the flaws in the existing security arrangements.”(Frank Schmalleger, 2007)

Since 11 September 2001, interest in the study of terrorism has increased dramatically, both globally and locally, and particularly in the US. I have heard of the ex-president of the American Society of Criminology, Prof. Gary La Free, saying that ‘we are receiving a dozen of books on terrorism every month but we do not see a good empirical research on any single terrorist attack’. (His speech to the 14th World Congress of Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA, 2005). This unpreparedness in the US is still a matter of concern in the academic circles. We, in Pakistan, are also facing extremely demoralizing terrorist attacks on the local police these days and we, too, have not done any tangible groundwork to counter the future attacks___ technologically, professionally, socially, politically and even religiously. The criticism against US-unpreparedness holds good for our policy-makers also.

“State security agents had been aware for years of the growing problem of Islamic extremists and Hindus and related problems in Colombia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Indonesia, or the Philippines. And yet, nothing significant was being done about ‘terrorism’ or about the increasing global social, political and economic issues that might have mitigated or prevented violent confrontations such as attack on the Twin Tower. Indeed, prior to the Twin

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Tower incident, despite the state’s ostensible focus on terrorism, critical research on terrorism was in decline.”(Annamarie Oliverio and Pat Lauderdale, 2005)

Terrorism has been a problem with other nations and the way it was tackled by them is a point of academic interest for policy options or locating the best practices and alternatives. Even the US police were not fully aware and equipped to respond to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 or the earlier anthrax boxes and letters; neither the UK or Spain or Turkey police did prevent the attacks in the first instance. Throughout the world, the police have never been trained or equipped to be indulged in a war-like tactics. It is only after the ‘war on terror’ that the police are confronted with the problems and entrusted with responsibilities of national security issues. The criminologists have now identified terrorism prevention and investigation as a ‘core responsibility’ for some police departments and a ‘concern for all’ in policing. Michael D.White, dilates upon this new and evolving police role for responding to and preventing terrorism and its implications for police officers and the police department as,

“Departments have been forced to revise training, deployment, and communication strategies and to create counterterrorism units within their departments. Police now provide extra patrol and guard around critical infrastructures such as power plants, food and water sources, and transportation hubs. Police departments now receive briefings from federal authorities in the FBI and Homeland Security about potential threats and terrorist plans garnered through electronic surveillance and interrogations of incarcerated terrorists.”(Michael D. White. 2007)

Another interesting example of this ‘police-awareness’ can be seen in the letter of Bruce Glassock, former president of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), who, shortly after the 9/11 incident, wrote to the membership of the organization as,

“The United States has begun air and group strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan, taking the war against terrorism home to its instigators. But the war against terrorism is not limited to actions overseas, or even restricted to military actions. The fight against terrorism begins in our own backyards-our own communities, our own neighborhoods-and police chiefs need to prepare themselves, their officers, and their communities-the people they have sworn to protect-against terrorism.”(Quoted in Michael D. White. 2007)

Pakistan, unfortunately, didn’t timely equip or train her police forces for these impending challenges of terrorism. The Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) is still a dream for Pakistan, as intelligence agencies had never developed a joint working-apparatus with the police for this purpose. Mere Information Reports (IRs) or Source Reports (SRs) issued to the effect that ‘security should be tightened; threats are there; sensitive points should be secured; attacks are expected; unidentified terrorists have moved into cities, etc’, are of little practical importance to the local police. These reports will rarely tell you who will attack; at what point; what methods could possibly be adopted by the terrorists, and what precautionary measures the police and other agencies should take timely and promptly. This lack of coordination and the quality of information ultimately result in a poor response, both politically and technologically /professionally. Even the America’s intelligence failure was identified as a major factor in the 9/11 attacks. L. Paul Bremer, III explicitly says,

“In the wake of the September 11 attacks, it has become clear that America’s intelligence failure was mirrored in many other countries: more seemed to be taking enough the clear declarations of war by bin Laden, and none was sufficiently attentive to the activities of suspicious people. Clearly, no matter how good its intelligence organization, no one nation alone can hope to gather enough specific information on a worldwide terrorist network.”(Quoted in Gus Martin,2004 page-48)

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The response of the police should be ahead of terrorists’ techniques. Police need an awareness of how to enhance their operational capabilities in the changed security environment. I would like to quote the example of Northern Ireland in this regard. Analysts of international fame have enumerated a few lessons for the rest of the world from Northern Ireland’s conflict as:

Authorities must pursue every effort to make political compromises with dissidents before violence becomes institutionalized.

Authorities cannot achieve a military victory over terrorists and still maintain civil liberties and democratic institutions.

Counterterror techniques by authorities that kill, injure, or frighten noncombatants provide support for terrorist groups. Indeed, revolutionary terrorist groups depend on the authorities to perpetrate provocation and outrages against noncombatants.

Terrorist groups can be devastatingly effective with very few members, given the worldwide availability of sophisticated weapons and explosives.

Terrorist groups can sustain community support by using both the latent sympathy of citizens as well intimidation.

Even the most technologically sophisticated, well-organized, well-financed, and highly motivated counterterrorist methods can be frustrated by a small group of terrorists that have some community support.

(Clifford E. Simonsen and Jeremy R. Spindlove, 2007)

The above conceptual background is concluded by a remark of the same authors as, “The world does not appear to be any safer since the advent of the War on Terrorism. We are at war against an unknown and unseen enemy who wants nothing less than the seeming destruction of democratic societies. Where is the middle ground? How do we get to the point where negotiation can take place? Wars have a beginning and an end, although we see no end to the War on Terror. With whom can we negotiate a lasting peace?”(Page –556)

Besides the ‘war on terror’ at international level, it is noticed that enormous qualitative and quantitative changes were brought to the US internal security apparatus. Federal government initiatives to combat terrorism include the enactment of various laws designed to reinforce security in the United States and elsewhere. Chief among these initiatives are the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, the US Patriot Act of 2001, the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (commonly referred to as USA Patriot Act II) and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), cited systemic failure and blamed that the elected and appointed government officials in the Congress, the administrations of Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, the CIA, and the FBI all failed to grasp the seriousness of terrorism as an imminent threat. The commission recommended, inter alia, the creation of a single, high-level intelligence director to supervise and oversee 15 intelligence agencies of the United States and an improved homeland security with 180,000 employees. But the researchers’ quest is that all such activities and changes must address the following issues also: -

1. Is counterterrorism the responsibility of public law enforcement? If so, to what extent?2. Who else is responsible for the prevention of terrorist acts?3. What impact might centralization of the United States intelligence functions have on individual

rights and civil liberties? (P.J. Ormtemeier, 2006)

It is of interest to the readers that the 9/11 Commission was created on November 27, 2002 and released its report on July 22, 2004. During this period, the members of the Commission reviewed more than 2.5 million pages of documents and interviewed more than 1,200 people in ten countries. The report was compiled on 585 pages. As a comparison, we should ask ourselves whether we have the same level of commitment, insight and academic output while looking for the causes, response and overall situation analysis of terrorism ___of which the worst kind of its domestic wave is being experienced by the people

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of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). We should also study and learn from the organizational structure of the federal Department of Homeland Security, which started operations on March 1, 2003 and which coordinates the activities of 22 disparate domestic agencies by placing administration of those agencies under five ‘directorates’ or departmental divisions, namely Boarder and Transport Security, (BTS), Emergency Preparedness, and Response (EPR), Science and Technology (S & T), Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP) and Management.

The most important ‘First Responders’ to terrorist attacks at operational/tactical level are the police departments, fire departments, and local and state health providers. In the United States, like many other countries, the lack of inter or intra-agencies cooperation amongst the first responders has always been a serious problem. Instead of cooperation, the various agencies have sought to control each other and “to be in charge” at the scene of crime. Also information is not shared among them timely and adequately. An officer remarked, ‘we see it [in-coordination] in every level of government. The CIA does not tell the FBI. The FBI does not tell the NYPD, and the NYPD does not tell the FDYN.’ (James A. Fagin 2007). However, the US initiatives at all levels significantly addressed these issues like the ones mentioned above, and many more like the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC), the Joint Local-Federal Counter Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) and many informal intelligence networks. It should also be noted that despite such larger national initiatives, the local police resources are strained beyond limits on increased physical security infrastructures. The police officers need the training and equipment to respond effectively and to protect themselves against the potential hazards of terrorist attacks.

“Although federal authorities have assumed much of the responsibility for preventing another major 9/11 aviation-tape terrorist attack, the responsibility and costs of providing everyday security to the average citizen as he or she goes about his or her business in the city has fallen primarily on local police.”(James A. Fagin 2007)

In addition to their ‘hearts and minds’ campaign which is directed to counter radicalization of Muslims in Britain, strengthening moderate elements and preventing mosques from being taken over by extremists, the British government has reorganized its overall counter-terrorism effort. Four joint police and M15 regional offices are being established to strengthen counter-terrorism work outside London. The Home Office is gradually losing responsibility for probation and prisons to a separate ministry of justice, freeing it, in theory, to focus on security, terrorism and immigration. Within the department a special office for security and counter-terrorism has been created, while the prime minister will chair monthly meetings of a national security committee. More than 100 people are currently awaiting trial in Britain on terrorism charges. Recognizing the real worth of intelligence in counter-terrorism strategies, the M15 is expanding substantially, from 1,800 staff in 2001 to a projected 3,500 in 2008. Despite these measures, Peter Clarke, the head of the counter-terrorism branch of London’s Metropolitan Police said, “the only sensible assumption is that we shall be attacked again.” The M15’s recently departed head Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller said in November 2006 that her service was tracking more than 1,600 known active militants (up from 250 in 2001, according to a parliamentary report).(The Economist, May 5th –May 11th , 2007). Researchers and scholars will soon start comparing the Spain police efforts in the post-Madrid bombing with post 7/7 UK-policing and post-bombing legislation in Turkey. All such initiatives need a comprehensive comparison in terms of their desired results.

The Saudi authorities announced in April 2007 that seven separate Al-Qaeda cells have been busted in recent months, netting no fewer than 172 suspected operatives as well as big stashes of weapons and $5 million plus in cash. The Economist (May 5th –May 11th, 2007) regarded the ‘sweep as stricking in the kingdom’. But to me the most striking and beneficial move is the de-indoctrination of the jihadis. Like Yemen, the authorities in Saudi Arabia, send scholars into prisons to try to convince jihadis detainees that their actions run counter to Islamic jurisprudence.

The continuous fierce fighting and civil resistance against the US forces in Iraq have compelled the commanders and policy makers to look for some other conventional but non-military intervention

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which could more possibly prevent the incessant recruitment into the ranks of combating jihadists. At camp Cropper, the high-security facility in Iraq that once held Saddam Hussein, the US forces have 3,800 detainees, 747 of them juveniles. They are given different levels of education, including de-programming experiments and de-radicalization. The officer Maj.Gen. Douglas Stone doesn’t kill Al-Qaeda but says, “I am trying to kill the idea of Al-Qaeda.” (Barak Deghhanpisheh, 2007). This ‘de-indoctrination and re-integration policy’ is seen in the measures adopted by the Philippines where the Abu Sayyaf group has been fighting to create a fundamental Islamic state (in the Mindanao region, particularly the islands of Sulu and Basilan) since 1991. In July 2007, Human Rights Watch blamed the extremist group for the deaths of almost 400 civilians in Mindanao alone. Despite the military operation called ‘Oplan Ultimatum’ or the CMO (the Civil-Military Operations), the Manila has moved from brutal and overwhelming actions to a more subtle and sophisticated tactics, which has resulted in no serious attacks in 2007. Basically, the Manila’s strategy is designed on the pattern of what Indonesia is hotly pursuing after the Bali attacks of October 2002 in which 202 people were killed, mainly foreign tourists. Not only Indonesia developed its underfunded, ill-equipped and poorly trained forces with the aid from the US, Australia and Britain which included advisers, high-tech surveillance equipment and funding for training schools, forensics and DNA-testing facilities but also established two armed counter-terrorist units, known as Detachment 88 and Team Bomb, which are now considered as model units and have racked up impressive arrest records. However, the greatest success is that of the significant change in behaviour and approach of the security people and investigators. Jakarta realized it could accomplish more with a velvet glove than a mailed fist, so it instructed police to use much gentler interrogation tactics than they had in the past. The suspected terrorists in custody were given special treatment if they agreed to cooperate, including money for their wives and children and phones to call home. Coercive methods like shouting, beating and sleep deprivation were strictly forbidden and largely abandoned. The goal? To persuade terrorists to help the police and to deprogram them from radical Islam. (Joe Cocharne, Criselda Yabes and Marites D. Vitug, 2007)

This de-indoctrination process is what I suggest for the religious scholars of my country to go to the tribal areas and persuade the present and potential ‘recruits’ that inflicting injuries to themselves and others is not a religious or divine duty by any standard of religion or law. The efforts of the Saudi authorities are laudable in this context:

“A state-sponsored ideological campaign, promoted by formerly radical preachers, appeared to mute public expressions of support for jihadism. Police also say they convinced some 1,000 extremist detainees to repent through religious re-education and financial incentives. Some former radicals, including 65 released from American custody in Guantanamo Bay, have benefited from $ 30m in state aid, including monthly stipends, cars, dowry payments and wedding presents.” (The Economist, May 5th–May 11th , 2007)

At times, community policing is interpreted in terms of encouraging citizens to be forthcoming with information useful to counterterrorist measures. To sustain public partnership and advocate public satisfaction as the basis of community policing is a real challenge for the state and local police forces who are already facing a serious criticism for this terrorist-oriented mission and close association with military and intelligence agencies which obviously accelerate their militarization and isolation. The utility of community policing in this context has been called by one police chief as ‘terrorist-oriented policing’ (Stephen Mastrofski, 2006). It seems that the advocates for community policing deliberately link it with the ‘war on terror’; may be as a justification for budgetary allocations, which are not less than billions of dollars. Hence, a new name of ‘ terrorist- oriented policing’.

Legislation should not escape our attention. It is generally noticed that tougher legislation, strict rules and stringent policies are announced in the post-terrorist attacks. The developments in the USA and other countries were quoted above. In the UK, a debate for new policing i.e; policing in the post 7/7 attacks has now got its place even in the text books of criminology.

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Though we have copious literature on this point, for example Eugene Mclaughlin’s The New Policing wherein a special chapter is written under the title of ‘Policing the New Terrorism.’ This chapter dilates on the situation and intelligence statements, both the pre 7/7 bombing and the post 7/7 London Police response. The writer elaborates the counter-terrorist protocol of ‘shoot-to-kill-to-protect’, which resulted in the death of a 27 year old Brazilian electrician, mistakenly fired by the London police as a suspected suicide bomber. The writer raises questions like ‘what kind of police force do we want’, and ‘what kind of police service do we want’. (Eugene McLaughlin, 2007)

However, what is more important for the researchers and practitioners is to predict and evaluate the genuine effects of and the potential reactions to such new policies and laws. Some regard it ‘overdoing’ or ‘overreaction’ and some are pacified with the awakening of the governments and their preparation for the future safety of their people. In either case the police are overburdened with new responsibilities of enhanced record compilation and increased checking, patrolling, and of course, going through the ordeals of new training and courses. The police subsequently adjust themselves, especially, when they get more funds, new equipments and new posts or upgradation of their existing status. However, the general public seems to be uneasy with the new developments, particularly, when the initial phases of demanding strict laws are faded away and when they are back home or return to their usual jobs. Legislation is of no effect when not substantiated by adequate resources for prompt implementation. Pakistan is an obvious example of that. The new Anti-Terrorist Act of 1997 has not stopped the incessant terrorist attacks in our cities, as noted in the subsequent pages. In May 2007, Ankara was hit by a severe terrorist attack__not the first of its kind in the country. The police are going to ‘enjoy’ more powers through legislation, for example, police will be able to use force against people and vehicles that don’t stop when ordered to. The use of force will be possible without prior warning depending on the degree and amount of resistance shown. The legislation also enables the police to take into custody those who refuse to make their identity clear. People applying for different licences or post will be fingerprinted. Fingerprints and photographs will be kept by the police department for 10 years. The police will also have the authority to conduct preventive searches and use any source to gather intelligence. But all these developments are not well received by the human rights advocates and have regarded the bill as a huge step backward and an infringement on rights and freedoms. A former Istanbul Bar President Yücel Saynon remarked, ‘This new authority is the same type of authority a totalitarian police state would provide for its police.’(Turkish Daily News, 29 May, 2007)

(D) TALIBANIZATION AND TALIBAN’S INFILTRATION INTO THE SETTLED DISTRICTS OF NWFP:

“A parallel system of Taliban-like administration is taking hold in many southern districts of the Frontier province. The influence of local vigilante groups is increasing in Kulachi, a tehsil of Dera Ismail Khan, Tank district and its frontier region, district Lakki Marwat, as well as in the surrounding areas of Bannu. Darra Adamkhel, a semi-autonomous frontier region about 35 kilometers south of Peshawar, which is known for its arms industry, also appears to be sliding into the hands of militant Islamic Groups. All these groups call themselves ‘taliban’ although they have no direct links to, and are distinct from, the student militia that once ruled Afghanistan.”(Shafiq Ahmad, 2007)

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Taliban is a plural word meaning ‘the students of Islamic seminaries’ called ‘madrassahas4’. After the withdrawal of the then USSR forces from Afghanistan and after the inter-necine war and factionalism of ‘Mujahideen’ (the fighters), the students of Islamic schools rose to power in Afghanistan and captured Kabul in September 1996. However, instead of promoting human rights and working for the development and reconstruction of the war torn country, these students-cum-rulers (now collectively called Taliban) resorted to severe and stringent administrative measures, thus aggravated the already existing friction and distrust amongst the various religions and sects. However, their simplicity, easy availability, tribal affinities, local familiarity and speedy dispensation of justice, initially won them a good deal of reputation in the illiterate masses of Afghanistan and tribal communities in Pakistan, who are still not exposed to the modern way of life and democracy. Taliban took on themselves to export their own model of governance to other people and even went on war with the western world.

Taliban’s ascendancy in Afghanistan and the subsequent US-Nato attacks to chase Bin Laden had tremendous implications for Pakistan and caused serious effects on the simple and religious-loving masses of the country, who were taught in their social and academic institutions that Pakistan came into being in the name of Islam in 1947. After the destruction of Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the foreigners and local fighters scattered into other parts of Afghanistan and are now engaged in a sort of guerrilla war with the Allied Forces. According to Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, a former chief secretary of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and ex-ambassador to Afghanistan, ‘the taliban of Afghanistan should not be mistaken with the taliban of tribal/semi tribal areas of Pakistan’. In an interview with a TV-channel he said, ‘the taliban in Afghanistan want the Allied Forces to go back to their countries whereas the taliban of Pakistani territories want the establishment of an Islamic polity, based on the early teachings of Islam, with the sole aim of implementing God’s word on His earth which is characterised by the quick dispensation of justice and bringing order and peace to the world, as it happened fifteen centuries ago.’ Their simple and straightforward way of doing things and their quick decisions and resolution of disputes made taliban popular in the tribal and semi-tribal areas, where the general population is religious minded, humble, and ready to sacrifice their lives for the cause of their religion, honour, land and tribe. However, their gradually forcible imposition of a certain kind of life, their unbending attitude and their inhuman actions of terrorism are now known as a process of ‘Talibanization.’ In my view, ‘talibanization’ is a “phenomenon of spreading religious fear amongst the civil society through misleading teachings, horrible propaganda and armed conflict with the law-enforcement agencies for realization of a hidden political agenda, the limit and scope of which is still undetermined.”

Though, to some extent, I agree with the analysis of Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, yet no one can approve of the anti-state activities of such militant groups, no matter how naive or religiously motivated they may be. Taliban and their supporters may claim it for a divine cause, but which most of the sensible segments of the society do not agree with their claim. A journalist Shafique Ahmed, who traveled in the districts where pro-taliban forces are gaining ground, tells the story of the overall situation as:

“In the opinion of many people, the police have lost control of the district Tank and are confined to police stations and roadside pickets. I, too, did not see any police patrol during the two-hour journey. Four Taliban groups belonging to the Bhittani tribe virtually govern Tank and its adjacent frontier region, which extends to Bannu. Each group is in charge of a designated area and all four coordinates with each other. These groups take up criminal cases and issue wide-ranging decrees for the Bhittani tribesmen. A similar group has also started activities in district Lakki Marwat. Earlier this year, it even hijacked over a dozen

4 According to the National Education Census conducted by the government for the first time in 2006, there are altogether 13,805 madrassahas in the country, the highest number being in the Punjab. There are 1.5 million students enrolled in them, which is like a drop in the ocean when you count the number of students in the supposedly secular institutions-33.3 million. (Zubeida Mustafa, Daily Dawn, May 9, 2007, Islamabad). Unfortunately, Pakistan didn’t pay enough attention to the reformation of these mushroom grown religious schools since its independence in 1947. However, the present regime of President Pervez Musharraf has launched a series of Madrassah Reforms, including the Amended Society Registration Act of 1860 and an allocation of Madrassah Reform Program of Rs. 5.759 billion (US $= 92144000/-)

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containers carrying goods to the allied forces in Afghanistan and has warned owners of audio -video shops and internet club in Naurang town to close down their ‘immoral business activities.”

(Herald, Karachi, March 2007)

“This over increasing influence and interference in local administration and even the personal affairs of the local population, has caused many people to leave the area for some civilized place to live. A political party activist attributed this social dislocation to the increasing number of local taliban and the police inefficiency.”

(Herald, Karachi, March 2007)

Contrary to the government stance or the views of Mr. Rustam Shah Momand, other hold a different viewpoint which also deserves to be taken into consideration and analysed empirically and impartially. Najum Mushtaq puts the two viewpoints as:

“The basic flaw in the anti-extremism policies of Musharraf is conceptual. His government officials regularly describe the Tabliban as an ‘Afghan problem’ and make spurious distinctions between Islamic freedom fighters, especially those active in Kashmir and international al-Qaeda type terrorists. And yet they berate domestic sectarian terrorists. This categorization is both facile and false because all of them are chips of the same block… Almost all the ‘jihadi’ organizations banned by the government are plying the trade by other names. Many of them appear in the guise of charitable organizations and have earned praise from the highest functionaries of state for their relief work after the 2005 earthquake.” (Najum Mushtaq 2007)

A more gruesome situation is the targeted bombings of CDs shops and barbershops, and threats to girls’ schools. Taliban firmly believe that listening to music or shaving beards is against the true Islamic injunctions and the people, therefore, should refrain from it. Compulsory observance of burqa (veil) and restraining from co-education are the other important points on their agenda. In an editorial, daily The News has called this scenario as ‘The Dark Ages’. It says,

“The bombings in Charsadda and Mardan are part of a calculated and larger goal, to eliminate the presence of ‘Western’ and ‘morally corrupt’ practices through terrorizing and intimidating the general public. In short, it is part of the drive to Talibanise Pakistani society…As a matter of fact, the NWFP government’s credibility would be bolstered if it manages to check this growing Talibanisation since not doing so would mean condoning criminal and violent behaviour. Action against fanatics is essential to send a strong message to them that they cannot go about forcing their flawed and pernicious interpretation of religion on everybody else. Or else we should not complain as the nation continues to slide into the Dark Ages.”(Daily The News, May 8, 2007)

It is because of these illegal activities of taliban and their self-styled morality imposition that has led to severe criticism by international community. Regardless of the above discussion that whether taliban in the territories of Pakistan are local people, or are different from the fighters against the ruling establishment in Afghanistan, the representatives of international community are not satisfied with these explanations anyway. They have firm belief that taliban on both sides are of the same species and have many things in common, in terms of anti-western agenda, war tactics, training and support. Some even link taliban to Al-Qaeda, whereas others think it too far a correlation. The views of British High Commissioner to Pakistan, Robert Brinkley at the ‘Guest Hour’ programme of the Peshawar Press Club is a typical example of the concerns of the international community.

“We do have concerns that some Al-Qaeda leaders are still able to hide in and operate from areas along the border… There was great concern that extremists in Britain were in contact

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with terrorist leaders in the border area, from where they get guidance, ideas and in some cases training for (terrorist) operations. We had better understanding of how extremists in Britain got in touch with terrorist leaders in the tribal region and received guidance and training since the 7/7 bombing and the failed plot to blow up transatlantic flights.” (Daily Dawn, May 11, 2007)

This is also an issue with the international community that how taliban in this part of Pakistan and Afghanistan are infusing their co-religious people in Iraq and the Muslims in the western world, especially their second and young generation. Though we don’t find any empirically tested conclusion of this speculation, yet there is a general perception that the Muslims in the western world and the militants in Iraq are getting inspired ideologically at least, from the fierce resistance of taliban against NATO/US forces. Moreover, some suspect their taking control of the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals if they succeed forcibly or democratically to capture the government, but this is just an accusation and mere speculation. Taliban are not that much powerful to either overthrow an elected government or get themselves elected through popular vote. Even the taliban-friendly religious government in the North-West Frontier Province and the Province of Baluchistan will find it impossible to return to office in the general elections of 2008. These religious parties have lost tremendous political ground due to their failure to deliver and redress the public problems.

The Economist in its issue of April 14th – 20th, 2007 has termed Pakistan’s tribal areas as ‘a safe haven for terrorists.’ The detailed story by The Economist is not a different one from the views of other western writers. Initially, they had confusion between the taliban of Afghanistan and the taliban of Pakistan, but now they have equated all taliban with terrorists. This over simplification or generalization has led to conceptual ambiguity in some parts of the country. The public, in general, do not see the students of Islamic schools as terrorists, and they think that perhaps the west is determined to destroy these schools in the name of ‘taliban-cum-terrorists’ of Afghanistan. These schools provide free and low cost education to thousands of poor people. Some observe that we should make a distinction between the peace loving students who are poor and indifferent, and the well-trained fighters, called taliban, before we announce a value-loaded judgment.

However, the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) debacle in Islamabad is a significant deviance in this regard where not only male but female students of the Islamic school of Jamia Hafsa resorted to illegal and coercive imposition of the Islamic laws in a self-styled moral policing which ultimately led to an eight day severe military operation, giving rise to hundreds of deaths. The events of the Red Mosque are tabulated in Annex: A which shows that how the students of an Islamic school gradually developed into militants. This case should be analysed and a well-documented critical research is to be carried out on the said Red Mosque, which is a sharp contradiction to the other Islamic schools and mosques.

Bruce Riedel, in his account of the recent fighting between taliban and the Afghan forces inside Afghanistan5, has used the word taliban and Al-Qaeda interchangeably. Most of the writers now use the word taliban as synonymous with Al-Qaeda and no distinction is made amongst the taliban of Afghanistan, of Pakistan and Al-Qaeda. Bruce Riedel, with his 29 years of experience in the CIA and an ex-special assistant to the President of the United States, observes no distinction between the developments in Afghanistan and the military operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan. This is one of the most important debates, which needs clarification on the part of the academics and policymakers. In an attempt to summarize all these ‘nomenclature difficulties’, I have shown the interrelationship of various taliban and some important facts about them in the following diagram No. 1.

5 Taliban attacks rose from 1, 632 in 2005 to 5,388 in 2006, according to the U.S military, and suicide operations grew from 27 in 2005 to 139 in 2006. NATO troops held on to the major towns and cities but suffered significant losses, including over 90 dead. (Bruce Riedel, 2007)

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• Infiltration form Afghanistan after US-attack • Pak-Afghan Border—1500 miles• Pak-Army Deployed at the border=90,000 • Total check posts at various points=l 100• Military Operations against Taliban=>100 • Death Toll in Operations= 1700 (600militants +100 Tribal Chiefs + 1000 Army) • Militants handed over to US=600• Pakistan-Afghanistan Grand Jirga (Consultative Body)• Govt-Tribal Treaty in N. Waziristan= Sept 2005 (Revoked on 15 July. 2007)• Govt. Tribal militants peace Agreement in Bajaur Agency =August 2007• Govt. Militants Agreement in Momand Agency =August 2007• Baluchistan/FATA — Safe-Haven for Al-Qaeda (US-intelligence/media)• Current operation—US - Do More Policy. • Pakistan has ratified/acceded to 10 out 13 UN Conventions related to Terrorism + Regional (SAARC) Convention

• Spill-over effect from FATA/Afghanistan__Creeping Coup? • Self-Motivation for Islamic Cause & Life• Lack of containment at urban-tribal borders by the Frontier Constabulary (18000 force)• Dual Administration in FATA—FR—NWFP— (Responsibility Factor) • Intelligence Failure—Federal & Provincial Govts Differences• Fear and Suicidal Attacks — Forceful infiltration • Police — Inefficiency?• Treaty with TNSM (defunct) leaders in District Swat-May 23,07• Private Radio Stations by militants

• Total Madrassahs = 14000 (Registered) + > 200,000 (Un-Registered)• Total Students = 1.5 million• Amended Society Registration Act 1860• Equivalence to other Educational System?• Disorganized/Unsystematic Education & Administration • A case of Red Mosque in Islamabad. (July 2007)• Madrassah Reform Programme by Govt. of Pakistan= Rs. 5.759 billions (US $= 92144000/-)

Taliban in Tribal/FATA/

Frontier RegionMostly visible

Taliban in Settled/Urban Areas

Mostly invisible

Taliban in Islamic

Seminaries/Madrassahs

TALIBAN OF AFGHANISTAN

Potential control on Pakistan nuclear weapons

Effects on Muslims in the Western World (esp. 2nd Generation) IRAQ (Reportedly Reinforcement)

• Miscreants/Outlaws/Proclaimed offenders • Smugglers/Drugs Pushers • Foreigners (Chechen, Uzbek, Tajik)• Foreign-intervention (India, Israel, etc)

TALIBAN OF PAKISTAN

TALIB/TALIBAN

Moreover, the various reasons for taliban’s popularity in certain areas and at certain period of time and also their de-popularizing activities are briefly enumerated in Table: I alongwith the weapons they reportedly use in their coercive activities.

Table: ITaliban’s Popularity

FactorsIllegal Activities

Attributed to Taliban Weapons of TalibanSimplicity and Easy Availability (Nostalgic Factor for Afghan- Taliban)Quick Dispensation of Justice (FR Bannu & Lakki Marwat)Actions Against Local Criminals (Khyber Agency)Restoration of Order in the LocalityAppeal to Islamic Way of Life/ Martyrdom Tribal Affinities/Familiarity with the Area/TerrainSophisticated Weapons/ Communications/ War/Military Experience Support /Donations from Local /Foreign PeopleFresh Recruits from Islamic SchoolsEffective Command and Obedience to LeadersCapitalizing on anti-US FeelingsPeriodic US Air-Strikes on Tribal Areas__ Revenge Factor (Bajaur/ N-Waziristan Agencies)Inflicting Casualties on Pak/US- led Armies__Bravery Factor (N/S Waziristan Agencies)US Threats/Provocative Statements against Pakistan/Holy CitiesFrustration of People due to Poverty, Identity-Crisis, Social- Stratification, etc

Targeted KillingExplosions and bomb blasts Missiles Attacks__from unseen placesForcible Closure of English SchoolsForcible Closure of NGOs offices.Threats, blasts and closures of Audio-Video Shops and Barber Shops Warnings Against Women Freedom/Employment/EducationKidnapping of Govt/NGOs Officials Snatching of Govt/NGOs vehiclesLetters of Intimidation to Opposition /Un-Islamic BusinessesAttacks on LEAs/Army/Police/ Intelligence AgenciesSnatching of containers and vehicles for US/Nato forces in Afghanistan, carrying food and CommoditiesGiving shelter to foreign fighters like Chechen, Uzbaks, Tajiks, etcRunning illegal Radio stations for propaganda against Govt Indoctrinating tender youths for extremism.Suicide-Bombing (Human Bombing)

Semi-Automatic Machine Gun (SMG) Rocket-Launcher Hand Grenade Improvised Explosive Device (IED) G-3 Explosive Jackets Bomb/ Remote Controlled Bomb Anti Tank Mines Revolver Pistol Rifle

It should be categorically mentioned that taliban don’t spare any opportunity to capitalize on the sentiments against US policies. They insidiously wait for every laxity, weakness or any provocative action like periodic US air-strikes against innocent tribal people in FATA or the hyperbolic statements of White House aspirants of 2008 like Barak Obama. Every time, these instigative types of words or work create ripples in the minds of illiterate, unaware and easily susceptible people who flock around the illusionary saviour of taliban. An example of the US and Pakistani statements, made at various levels, is given in Annex: B which indicates that how volatile is the situation on both sides and how badly such statements can affect the public-opinion formation, especially the threatened tribal community who otherwise have no links with the taliban but could easily become a prey to taliban’s persuasion and propaganda.

It is at this juncture that we should not ignore the observation and analyses of Tony Blair, ex-Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. His article, ‘A Battle for Global Values’, which appeared in the famous journal Foreign Affairs, carries his critical and thought-provoking

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assessment of the current debate on how to fight terrorism. His admission that the war against global extremism should be won at the level of values and ideas, and ideology is really a new but scholarly strategic approach. While praising the Holy Quran as ‘progressive’ and ‘reforming book’, and equating ‘fanaticism’ to ‘early revolutionary communism’, Tony Blair openly admits that the anti-US and anti-West feelings around the world should be earnestly and vehemently countered with equally emphatic arguments.

“Islamist terrorism will not be defeated until we confront not just the methods of the extremists but also their ideas. I do not mean just telling them that terrorist activity is wrong. I mean telling them that their attitude toward the United States is absurd, that their concept of governance is prefeudal, that their positions on women and other faiths are reactionary. We must reject not just their barbaric acts but also their false sense of grievance against the West, their attempt to persuade us that it is others and not they themselves who are responsible for their violence………Inaction pushing the responsibility onto the United States alone or deluding ourselves that this terrorism is a series of individual isolated incidents rather than a global movementwould be profoundly and fundamentally wrong.” (Tony Blair, 2007)

Late Ahmed Nadeem Qasmi, a scholar-cum poet, said once, ‘it seems that the words are coined from fire, the smell of ammunition is now spread by newspapers every day’. Recalling his words said eleven years ago in a meeting with the young probationer officers in Civil Services Academy, I took up the famous English newspaper, the daily Dawn and looked for the words of fire and smoke. English dailies are generally more moderate, selective in news items and avoid sensationalization, as compared to our other local papers. I checked the paper for one week and calculated that only the front page, which is usually reserved for more important national or international news, is full with news related to terrorism and extremism. The space and coverage is enormous. For the readers I have noted down only the main headlines of all such news stories appeared on the front page (Table: II). It shows, besides the severity of the events, that out of the total 59 news items there were 20 items related to terrorist/militant activities (33.9%). The other local dailies, undoubtedly, portray a more horrible picture than this and even much more horrible if we consider the inner pages too.

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