Working Paper

By

Peter W. Connors, PhD8165906821

COLLAPSE OF THE TALIBAN IN NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Few had anticipated the rapid collapse of the Taliban in northern Afghanistan.

Master Sergeant John Bolduc, leader of Operational Detachment Alpha 585—one of

several US Army Special Forces’ elite A-teams—had expected the worst. The day before

the team infiltrated Afghanistan near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh, he informed his men

that they might not survive and advised them to fight to the death rather than surrender or

be taken prisoner.1 Yet, in just over six weeks, Bolduc and approximately 100 additional

special operations Soldiers assisted the Northern Alliance in both decisively defeating

Taliban military forces and in liberating all six provinces of northern Afghanistan.

How did this happen? What factors contributed? This chapter will examine the

unique set of circumstances that ultimately shaped events in the North, beginning with

President Bush’s call-to-arms and General Tommy Franks’ plan to employ multiple lines

of operations. The discussion will then describe the mobilization of US forces; the

opening days of the OEF bombing campaign; the infiltration of CIA and SOF teams; the

overwhelming dominance of US air power; the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and

Konduz; and the insurrection at Qala-i Jangi prison. Additionally, concurrent logistics,

civil/military, and humanitarian relief operations will be discussed in detail. Finally, the

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implications of such a surprising victory over the Taliban in northern Afghanistan will be

reviewed and analyzed.

On 12 September 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the

development of realistic military options in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As

chapter 3 has already established, nine days later, General Tommy R. Franks, then

Commander in Chief, US Central Command (CENTCOM) submitted a plan to President

Bush calling for the destruction of al-Qaeda and the illegitimate Taliban regime in

Afghanistan. Subsequently, Secretary Rumsfeld approved a mission analysis/military

course of action and presented the plan to the President, who then directed that combat

operations commence on 7 October.

General Franks proposed the simultaneous application of multiple lines of

operation that included obtaining basing, staging, and over-flight rights; setting the

conditions for executing and supporting sustained combat; directly attacking al-Qaeda

and Taliban leadership; destroying the Taliban military and denying them safe-haven;

directing operational fires using SOF; maintaining the capability of using conventional

forces if necessary; and keeping the Afghan people informed. Adhering to these lines of

operation allowed a small contingent of US combat forces to seize the initiative and

defeat the Taliban, while avoiding the appearance of an outright invasion. 2 On 22

December, just 78 days after combat operations began, General Franks and his wife,

Cathy, attended inauguration ceremonies for President Hamid Karzai and the new Afghan

interim government in Kabul.

Composition of the Taliban – Summer 2001

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The term Taliban is typically used in reference to all enemy forces operating in

Afghanistan. By the summer of 2001, three principal Taliban sub-groups, with

approximately 45,000 total combatants, had emerged: indigenous Afghan Taliban, non-

Afghan Taliban, and al-Qaeda (those forces trained by and associated with Osama bin

Laden). 3 The non-Afghan component was comprised predominantly of Arabs,

Pakistanis, Uzbeks, Chechens, and Central Asians.

Having formed in the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal, the Taliban, led

since the mid-1990s by ethnic Pashtun Mullah Mohammed Omar, was a militant group

intent on establishing an Islamist government in Afghanistan and on driving foreign

influence from the country. Affiliation with al-Qaeda in 1996 signaled the Taliban’s

expanded intentions of spreading global Islamist extremism beyond Afghanistan.4 By

2001, the Taliban controlled an estimated 80 percent of Afghanistan.5

Funding for Taliban activities in Afghanistan came primarily from Pakistan;

however, sympathetic worldwide Muslim organizations also contributed. Logistics

support for Taliban operations originated almost entirely in Pakistan as well. Taliban

forces were generally armed with Kalashnikov (AK-47) assault rifles, 7.62mm PK

general-purpose machine guns, anti-aircraft guns and missiles, rocket and grenade

launchers, mortars, makeshift armed vehicles (pickup truck cavalry), and a limited

number of Soviet-era tanks and artillery pieces.6 Stephen Biddle, a scholar at the US

Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, summarized the overall condition of

Taliban fighting forces prior to the US intervention by describing them as inexperienced

with low morale, poorly trained and unmotivated, lacking Afghan support, susceptible to

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high levels of defections, vulnerable to surprise attacks, and overly dependent on fragile

outside sources of support.7

Insight into the Northern Alliance

The anti-Taliban Northern United Front espoused a less severe form of Islam than

did the Taliban, and was led during the summer of 2001 by ousted President Borhanuddin

Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmad Shah Masoud. Since its forces eventually

gained control of several Northern Afghan provinces, the UF has been referred to as the

Northern Alliance (NA) from 2001 onward.8

In 1992, mujahideen fighters loyal to Rabbani seized control of Kabul from the

regime that had been previously supported by the Soviets. These forces coalesced into

the organization that officially became the Northern United Front/Northern Alliance. The

NA was unable to unite the country, and subsequently lost control to the Taliban in

1996.9 As of 2001, the Alliance controlled only the Panjshir Valley, the Shomali plain

north of Kabul, and several small enclaves in the mountains of northern Afghanistan.10

Tragically, General Masoud was killed on 9 September 2001 in Takhar province

by two al-Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. Shortly after his death, dire

predictions arose regarding the possible disintegration of the Northern Alliance. Masoud,

known as the “Lion of Panjshir,” had distinguished himself resisting the Soviet invasion,

and was appointed Afghan Defense Minister after the 1992 recapture of Kabul. He was

considered an exceptional military strategist and successfully built key, enduring

coalitions among disparate anti-Taliban guerilla groups that effectively strengthened the

Northern Alliance.11

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After General Masoud’s death, four primary components emerged within the

Alliance. The largest contingent was made up of ethnic Tajik forces, commanded by

General Mohammed Fahim Khan. Fahim, former head of intelligence for the NA, was

promoted to senior military commander immediately following General Masoud’s

demise. In Ghor and Herat provinces, General Mohammed Ismael Khan took charge of

additional ethnic Tajik NA forces. Known as the “Lion of Herat,” Ismael had been a

mujahideen commander during the Soviet invasion and was previously governor of Herat

province. Ustad Atta Mohammed was another NA Tajik general allied with Fahim in

northern Afghanistan. Ethnic Uzbeks, under General Abdul Rashid Dostum, formed a

third element of the Alliance. In the 1980s, General Dostum’s militia controlled six

provinces in northern Afghanistan. His stronghold had been the city of Mazar-e-Sharif,

which he captured from the Taliban, only to lose it in 1999. The final faction of the NA

was the Hizb-i-Wahdat (Unity Party), comprised of ethnic Hazara Shi’a fighters and led

by Karim Khalili. This group had been driven out of central Afghanistan in 1998 by the

Taliban, yet managed to retain several locations throughout the region.12

During the summer of 2001 prior to the US intervention in Afghanistan, the NA

was short on manpower, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped. It was capable only

of maintaining stalemate conditions with the Taliban. Although troop strength estimates

varied at the time, it was likely that the NA could muster only about 18,000 combat

forces to support upcoming US operations.13 Northern Alliance armaments included AK-

47 rifles; PK machine guns; ZGU-1 heavy machine guns; single and multi-barrel rocket

launchers; and a limited number of artillery pieces, tanks, and other armored vehicles.

Also, the NA retrofitted light trucks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles with 32-shot

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57mm rocket pods recovered from Russian Mi-24 and Mi-25 combat helicopters. In

addition, the Alliance was thought to have had at the time eight Mi-17 and six Mi-8

helicopters, along with four Soviet-built helicopter gunships. Logistics support for the

Northern Alliance was difficult at best. Supply routes to Tajikistan were long, arduous,

and susceptible to Taliban interdiction. Food and other perishable supplies were often

purchased on the local market.14

The Beginning of OEF: The US Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan

In a televised address on 20 September 2001 to a joint session of Congress and

the American people, President Bush described the 9/11terrorist attacks as “an act of war

against our country.” 15 To thunderous applause, he went on to say that the US response

“will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and

defeated,” and that such a response might include dramatic strikes and “covert operations,

secret even in success.”16 Bush then issued a presidential finding authorizing the CIA to

kill or capture terrorist leaders including Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda

members.17

The CIA already had extensive experience in Afghanistan, having provided covert

support to the mujahideen rebels during the Soviet occupation. Since 1999, CIA

paramilitary units had been operating secretly in Afghanistan and had established

important contacts with Northern Alliance leaders prior to 9/11. The agency also had two

Afghan war plans prepared, one titled “Going to War” and the other “Worldwide Attack

Matrix.” On 13 September, Director of Central Intelligence, George Tenet and J. Cofer

Black, Director of the CIA Counterterrorism Center (CTC), briefed these plans to

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President Bush. Two days later, Tenet and Black made the same presentation at a Camp

David war cabinet meeting attended by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld; Assistant

Secretary Paul Wolfowitz; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Army General Hugh

Shelton; and JCS Chairman Select, Air Force General Richard Myers. After this

meeting, the president authorized the CIA to proceed with their plans and gave the

agency all the necessary resources, approvals, and legal authority to do so. The CIA

would be the first “boots on the ground” and would lead the way for the military.18

Less than a week after the President’s congressional address, a team of ten CIA

officers (code named JAWBREAKER and commanded by the CTC) left Dushanbe,

Tajikistan in a Russian-built Mi-17 helicopter, entered Afghan airspace, crossed the

Hindu Kush Mountains through the 14,500 foot-high Anjuman Pass, and landed deep in

the Panjshir Valley near the village of Barak. JAWBREAKER was the first US unit of

any kind to enter Afghanistan in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. They

brought three million dollars in cash with them, and would eventually receive $10 million

more, all to be used in garnering support from the Northern Alliance. Their mission was

to link up with the Northern Alliance and convince them to assist the CIA and the US

military in hunting down bin Laden and al-Qaeda. They were also tasked with assessing

the military readiness of the NA, recommending methods for improving NA capabilities,

developing preliminary intelligence data, preparing initial target designation information,

and laying the groundwork for the arrival of US SOF. Typically, a Northern Afghanistan

Liaison Team from the CIA Special Activities Division would have been assigned a

mission such as this; however, Director Tenet selected Cofer Black to assemble the new

team and to direct agency activities in Afghanistan.19

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US Forces on the Move

On 14 September 2001, Congress authorized the use of military force against the

terrorist groups responsible for the 9/11 attacks.20 Also, President Bush authorized the

activation of 35,500 military reservists (approximately 10,000 of these were Army

Soldiers).21 In addition, the following US active duty military units were ordered to

deploy over the next few weeks:22

552nd Air Control Wing, Tinker AFB, Oklahoma 22nd Air Refueling Wing, McConnell AFB, Kansas 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale, Louisiana (B-52)5th Bomb Wing, Minot AFB, North Dakota (B-52) 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth, South Dakota (B-1) 1st Fighter Wing, Langley AFB, Virginia (F-15)20th Fighter Wing, Shaw AFB, South Carolina (F-16) 27th Fighter Wing, Cannon AFB, New Mexico ((F-16) 388th Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah (F-16) 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp Pendleton, California 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 10th Mountain Division, US Army, Fort Drum, New York 355th Wing, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona (A-10) 366th Fighter Wing, Mountain Home, Idaho (F-15, F-16)US Army Special Operations Units, Fort Campbell, Kentucky USS Bataan Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia USS Carl Vinson Carrier Battle Group, Bremerton, Washington (F-14, F-18) USS Enterprise Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18) USS Kearsage Amphibious Assault Group, Norfolk, Virginia USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Battle Group, Yokosuka, Japan (F-18) USS Peleliu Amphibious Assault Group, San Diego USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Battle Group, Norfolk, Virginia (F-14, F-18)

The USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups were

already on station in the Arabian Sea. Attached to the Enterprise Group were two

submarines, two cruisers, and five destroyers with a combined capacity to launch

approximately 500 conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. The Carl Vinson was

accompanied by two submarines, two cruisers, two destroyers (400 Tomahawk missiles), an

amphibious assault ship and a dock landing ship, along with the USS Peleliu Amphibious

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Ready Group (ARG). On the Peleliu was the special operations capable 15th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU), plus AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft, and AH-1W (Super Cobra),

CH-46, CH-53, and UH-1N helicopters. On 19 September, the USS Theodore Roosevelt

Battle Group (configured similarly to the Vinson Group) and the USS Bataan Amphibious

Ready Group with the 26th MEU on board left Norfolk for the Arabian Sea. Finally, on 30

September, the USS Kitty Hawk Battle Group departed Yokosuka, Japan for OEF duty.

Onboard, however, in addition to F-14 and F-18 Navy aircraft, were Army MH-60

Blackhawk and MH-47 Chinook helicopters and USAF MH-53 Pave Low helicopters, along

with nearly 1,000 special operations personnel from the US Army Special Operations

Command, the Naval Special Warfare Command, the Air Force Special Operations

Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command.23

By the end of September, USAF long-range precision strike aircraft were ready for

combat missions and many had been repositioned to forward operating bases such as Diego

Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean. These aircraft included the B-2A Spirit stealth bomber

based at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. With several in-flight refuelings, the B-2A

was capable of flying round trip, non-stop, from Whiteman to Afghanistan and back, and

could deliver thousand-pound GBU-31 and GBU-32 joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs),

as well as GBU-36 and GBU-37 (deep penetrating) precision guided bombs on each mission.

B-1B Lancer supersonic bombers, based at Diego Garcia and in Oman, were also capable of

carrying JDAM precision guided munitions, plus CBU 87/89/97 cluster bombs and Mk 82

500-pound iron bombs. Numerous B-52 Stratofortresses, also forward-deployed to Diego

Garcia, had been modified to carry AGM-86C air-launched cruise missiles (CALCM), along

with JDAMs and cluster bombs. Also, a large number of additional USAF aircraft (e.g. F-

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15s, F-16s, and KC-135 air-to-air refueling tankers) had been flown to the Middle East,

Turkey, and Pakistan in preparation for OEF.24

In late September 2001, the United States secured basing rights from the Republic of

Uzbekistan to use the former Soviet airbase at Karshi Kandabad (K2) about 100 miles

north of the Afghan border. By early October, nearly 2,000 US military personnel were

operating at K2. Among them were lead elements of Joint Special Operation Task Force-

North (JSOTF-N / TF Dagger); members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation

Regiment (SOAR / “Night Stalkers”); Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC)

personnel, 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division Soldiers to serve as a

quick reaction force and provide base security; along with numerous support forces

(logistics, signal, civil affairs, PSYOPs, etc.). The 5th Special Forces Group (SFG) from

Fort Campbell, Kentucky formed the core of JSOTF-N. This group had previously been

assigned to the CENTCOM area of responsibility, and its Soldiers were language

qualified, culturally trained, and regionally oriented for the OEF mission.25 On 19-20

October, ODA 555 and ODA 595 from the 5th SFG would become the first US military

units to infiltrate Afghanistan.

The 160th SOAR provides aviation support for special operations forces. The

Regimental mission statement asserts that the 160th will “organize, equip, train, resource,

and employ Army special operations aviation forces worldwide in support of contingency

missions and the warfighting commanders.” 26 Night Stalker missions are flown under

the cover of darkness whenever possible; the pilots are equipped with aviator night vision

goggles and forward-looking infrared devices. Nearly 2,000 officers, men, and women

serve in the 160th, which is comprised of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

three Aviation Battalions, and a Special Operations Training Company. The 1st Battalion

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has a Light Assault Company (MH-6 helicopters), a Light Attack Company (AH-6s), and

two Assault Companies (MH-60K Blackhawks and MH-60L integrated direct action

penetrator helicopters). Second Battalion, with three Heavy Assault Companies, flies

MH-47E Chinooks, while 3rd Battalion has two Assault Companies (MH-60Ls) and one

Heavy Assault Company (MH-47Ds).27

The Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) is the USAF component

of the USSOC. AFSOC forces “conduct infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, refueling, and

precision firepower missions” in support of SOF operations worldwide.28 Airborne

broadcasting; advising foreign governments; and providing combat controllers,

weathermen, and para-rescuemen are among AFSOC’s unique capabilities. Additional

mission-oriented tasks include shaping the battlefield, information operations, precision

engagement, SOF mobility, combat support, and aerospace interface. The most

formidable aircraft in the AFSOC arsenal is the AC-130 Gunship. These aircraft are

armed with side-firing weapons systems coupled with highly sophisticated sensors and

can provide either “surgical firepower” or “area saturation” in support of SOF ground

forces. The AC-130H (call sign Spectre) and the AC-130U (call sign Spooky) are armed

with L60 40mm Bofors cannons and M102 105mm Howitzer cannons. “U” models also

now have 25mm GAU-12 Gatling guns. Other AFSOC aircraft include the EC-130J

Commando Solo (airborne broadcasting), HC-130P/N (search and rescue), MC-130E/H

Combat Talon (infiltration, exfiltration, resupply, psyops, helicopter air refueling), MC-

130P Combat Shadow (clandestine, low visibility, helicopter air refueling), MH-53J/M

Pave Low helicopters (low-level, long-range penetration), U-28A (utility aircraft

support), and the MQ-1 Predator (armed, remote-piloted aircraft). There are nearly

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13,000 active-duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian personnel in the

Air Force Special Operations Command.29

Additional strategic airborne assets, including the RQ-4 Global Hawk high-

altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (Brave Axe), U-2 (Dragon Lady) High Altitude

Reconnaissance aircraft, E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)

aircraft, EC-130 Compass Call, E-3 Sentry airborne warning and control system

(AWACS), and RC-135 Rivet Joint reconnaissance aircraft were also deployed to the war

zone. Also, two supplementary task forces were established. Task Force Sword,

comprised of Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (SFOD-D/Delta Force),

would concentrate on capturing/killing Osama bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders,

while Task Force Bowie would gather human intelligence data in support of the OEF

mission.30 Finally, international participation in OEF was limited initially to Great

Britain, Canada, Australia, and Turkey. Britain, for example, deployed units from the

Special Air Service Regiment (SAS), an Air Mobile Brigade, a Parachute Regiment, and

the Royal Marines.31 British aircraft including Nimrods (air-sea rescue), Canberras

(reconnaissance), E3-D Sentries (airborne early warning), VC-10s tankers, and Tristar

transports; three Tomahawk cruise missile-equipped nuclear powered submarines were

also dispatched to the theater.32 Eventually, 27 coalition countries would send more than

14,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the United States and OEF.33

The Air Campaign Begins

Having been in Afghanistan for more than a week, the JAWBREAKER team was

anxious for the US bombing campaign to begin. The team had already completed a series

of GPS surveys of Northern Alliance frontline positions as well as those of the opposing

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Taliban. This had been done in an effort to prevent possible collateral damage to NA

forces. Gary Schroen, JAWBREAKER’s team leader, was convinced that:

Taliban frontline positions offered a clearly defined, target-rich environment made to order for US airpower to strike, and that a concentrated bombing campaign on the Taliban lines would be devastating to their morale and effectiveness. Taliban troops had never suffered the kind of bombardment and punishment they would face from American airpower in the coming fight. Heavy casualties, continuing for days on end, would break the Taliban.”34

Northern Alliance General Ismail Kahn concurred, stating, “If their [Taliban]

front lines are heavily damaged, my forces can complete their destruction.”35 He too,

along with all of the NA leadership, was anxiously awaiting the promised US air strikes.

At 9:10 PM on 7 October 2001, cheers and celebration erupted at the CIA camp in the

Panjshir Valley. Explosions could be seen off in the direction of Kabul; the long-awaited

bombing campaign had begun.

Delays resulted from a number of issues involving primarily combat search and

rescue capabilities, proper target designation, a shortage of approved targets, and a heavy

emphasis on collateral damage avoidance. All potential targets were scrutinized in

painstaking detail. In fact, military attorneys in the Pentagon, at the Combined Air

Operations Center (CAOC), at CENTCOM, and onboard Navy aircraft carriers routinely

assessed potential target lists and approved raids and air strikes.36 Frustrated with the

situation, General Franks stepped in and put a stop to at least some of the

micromanagement from the Pentagon by declaring to JCS Chairman, General Richard B.

Myers “that I am not going along with Washington giving tactics and targets to our kids

in the cockpits and on the ground in Afghanistan.”37

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The campaign was directed by US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF)

Commander and Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) for OEF, Lieutenant

General Charles Wald, from the newly established Combined Air Operations Center

(CAOC) at Prince Sultan Air Base, Saudi Arabia. Wald’s mission statement was clear:

“On order, Combined Forces Air Component Command provides air support for friendly

forces working with the Northern Alliance and other opposition forces in order to defeat

hostile Taliban and al-Qaeda forces and to set the conditions for regime removal and

long-term regional stability.”38

In a televised address to the nation on 8 October, President Bush announced that

“On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes.”39 Although effective, the

first night of bombing was far from overwhelming. Only 31 preplanned strategic targets

in the vicinities of Kabul, Kandahar, Shindand, Herat, Mazar-e Sharif, and Shibarghan

were hit. No frontline Taliban positions were struck. The opening-round attacks were

conducted by Air Force B-2 stealth bombers from Whiteman AFB, Missouri; B-1B and

B-52 bombers from Diego Garcia; and by Navy F-14 and F/A-18 fighters from aircraft

carriers in the Arabian Sea. Also, US Navy cruisers, destroyers, and submarines (along

with two British submarines) launched Tomahawk missiles in support of the initial

offensive.

Later that first night, C-17 Globemasters from Ramstein Air Base in Germany

began dropping food and medical supplies to Afghan refugees who were fleeing the

cities. A US Agency for International Development (USAID) Disaster Assistance

Response Team (DART) had been working (since the previous summer) with refugees

who were forced to leave their homes due to devastating drought conditions. An official

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humanitarian crisis already existed in Afghanistan prior to the beginning of OEF. Years

of war, unproductive agriculture, and failure of the government to provide basic services

had left a majority of Afghanistan’s 26 million citizens impoverished.40 During the first

four nights of the air campaign, C-17s airdropped nearly 150,000 humanitarian daily

rations (HDRs) to these needy Afghans.41 Two and one-half million HDRs would be

dropped in Afghanistan before the end of the year, and by April 2002, the World Food

Program and the USAID had distributed 343,000 metric tons of food throughout the

country.42

Surprisingly, the propaganda war had started two days before the initial OEF air

strikes. On 5 October, EC-130 Commando Solo aircraft, from the 193rd Special

Operations Wing of the Pennsylvania Air National Guard, began broadcasting radio

transmissions over Afghanistan. A Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF),

activated on 4 October at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, developed a variety (different

themes, objectives, and target audiences) of Commando Solo radio scripts such as this

one aimed at the Afghan people: “On September 11, 2001, thousands of people were

killed en masse in the United States…policemen, firefighters, teachers, doctors, mothers,

fathers, sisters, brothers all killed. Why?”43 The overall messages were designed to

encourage the Taliban to cease support of al-Qaeda, to undermine Taliban/al-Qaeda

morale, to promote the legitimacy of US operations, and to convince Afghan citizens that

they were not the target of US attacks.44 Eventually, Commando Solo aircrews would

accumulate nearly 4,000 flight hours in support of OEF.

JPOTF also developed and printed hundreds of thousands of leaflets that were

shipped to Diego Garcia and initially disseminated by B-52 bombers over Afghanistan

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beginning 15 October. Up to 80,000 leaflets could be packaged in a single MK-129 or

modified Rockeye leaflet bomb.45 In due course, F-16, F-18, A-6, and MC-130 aircraft

would also perform high altitude leaflet drops in the AOR. One such leaflet, written in

both Pashto and Dari, described US intentions in Afghanistan as honorable, and pictured

an Afghan man and an American Soldier shaking hands. Another portrayed radio towers

and gave the frequencies for receiving Commando Solo broadcasts. Thousand of

transistor radios (many tuned to the now destroyed former Taliban station frequency)

were also airdropped, allowing more Afghans to listen to Commando Solo messages.

Other leaflets explained how to properly use the daily rations and warned Afghans to stay

clear of unexploded ordnance.46

Meanwhile, the goal of the initial wave of attacks was to gain uncontested control

of Afghan airspace and to destroy Taliban air defense capabilities. To this end, US

planners placed Scud missile launchers; surface-to-air (SAM) missile sites; early warning

radars; and Taliban command-control-communications facilities, airfields, and aircraft on

the primary target list. Also hit were Taliban tanks and artillery, the headquarters of two

divisions, and the former bin Laden training camp south of Jalalabad. Thirty-five

additional targets were attacked on the second day, and by the third day, strikes were

conducted during daylight hours. On the fifth day, Air Force aircraft dropped 5,000

pound GBU-28 laser-guided bunker buster bombs on Taliban mountain cave sanctuaries

for the first time. AC-130 gunships with their own combat controllers (special operations

forces had as yet been unable to enter Afghanistan) and F-15E Strike Eagles from Jaber

Air Base in Kuwait (the first use of land base fighters) entered the fray during the second

week and began attacking Taliban troop concentrations and vehicles. During the second

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week of OEF, the target list expanded, signifying a shift in emphasis from preplanned to

pop-up (emerging) targets, also called “targets of opportunity.”47

Special Operations Forces Infiltrate

Extensive inclement weather, treacherous terrain, and Taliban anti-aircraft fire

had delayed the helicopter insertion of Special Forces A-Teams. Since the beginning of

the air campaign, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had been pushing for a SOF

presence in Afghanistan. “When are the Special Forces people going to get in?” he asked

every day.48 Rumsfeld had championed using SOF, and at a news conference, he

commented on the limitations of aircraft (and the bombing), stating “there are certain

things they (aircraft) can’t do – they can’t crawl around on the ground and find people.”49

On the evening of 19-20 October, however, the first of several SF elements

infiltrated Afghanistan. The 11-member ODA-555 arrived late in the evening from K2 at

the Astaneh JAWBREAKER camp in the Panjshir Valley on board MH-53 Pave Low

helicopters. Within a few days, ODA-555 would link up with NA General Bismullah

near Baghram. That same night, ODA-595 (12 men) infiltrated the Darya-e Suf Valley

on MH-47 Chinooks to join General Dostum’s forces some 70 miles south of Mazar-e

Sharif. Not long after, two additional SF members joined 595 and the detachment split

into four three-man teams. On the 24 October, ODA 585 landed near Dasht-e-Qaleh then

moved south to join General Bariullah Khan’s NA forces near Konduz. October 31st saw

the insertion of ODA 553 into Bamian to support Hazara Commander Khalili. Next an

eight-man command-and-control element, Operational Detachment Charlie (ODC-53),

was inserted to assist General Dostum and his staff on 3 November. On 4 November,

ODA-534 landed 24 miles west of Darya-e Suf at Darya-e Balkh to support Northern

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Alliance General Mohammed Atta. This detachment soon split into two six-man teams;

one remained with Atta’s command group, while the other moved ahead to accompany

forward NA elements. Finally, ODAs 586 and 594 were flown to a remote landing zone

near the Tajikistan border on 8 November. From there, 586 flew south onboard an NA

Russian-built helicopter to link up with General Daoud near Farkhar. Detachment 594

moved farther south to the Panjshir Valley.50

The 5th Special Forces Group A-Teams had been kept in isolation facilities (ISOFAC

—no family, no phones, guarded location) at Fort Campbell prior to leaving for K2.

Major General Geoffrey C. Lambert, Commanding General of the United States Army

Special Forces, met with the teams at the ISOFAC to explain their mission:51

1. Infiltrate the operational area2. Link up and build rapport with the Northern Alliance3. Kill the enemy with precision weapons or sniper rifles4. Equip the NA forces5. Recruit and build the NA forces6. Plan, advise, and coordinate the battles7. Provide “ground truth” to US commanders, and8. Survive.

This complex mission would soon be consolidated into a single, straightforward,

statement for all TF Dagger Soldiers once they reached K2: “Advise and assist the

Northern Alliance in conducting combat operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda.”52

This overly broad statement provided TF Dagger with freedom to command, no

operational constraints, and the appropriate amount of leeway necessary to get the job

done. ODA 534 team leader, Captain Mark Newman, recalled that “his entire mandate

consisted of a handful of PowerPoint slides that told him to conduct unconventional

warfare, render Afghanistan no longer a safe haven for terrorists, defeat al-Qaeda, and

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coup the Taliban.”53 How he accomplished those goals was up to him. “We were given

an extraordinarily wonderful amount of authority to make decisions.”54

General Dostum Reclaims Mazar-e Sharif

“Make no mistake, The United States will hunt down and punish those

responsible for these cowardly acts.” 55 Those remarks by President Bush at Barksdale

Air Force Base on 11 September were about to come to life on the ground in

Afghanistan.

In early November, Mazar-e Sharif became the first Taliban-controlled city to fall to

Northern Alliance forces. Strategically situated in the Balkh River valley some 35 miles

south of Uzbekistan along the 4000-year old Silk Road, Mazar is the capital of Balkh

province and has been a major regional trading center since the days of Alexander the

Great. As the second largest city in Afghanistan and with a population (U.N. estimate

2001) of 200,000 Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens, Mazar (tomb of the saint) was named in

honor of the son-in-law of the Prophet Mohammed, Hazarate Ali, who was enshrined

there in a blue-tiled mosque built during the twelfth century.56

In 1997, the Taliban briefly seized control of Mazar-e Sharif from a mujahideen

militia group commanded by General Abdul Rashid Dostum. The Taliban were repulsed

in just a few days, but returned in force the next year to re-take the city with a vengeance

(“the massacre of Mazar-e Sharif”). Dostum’s militia force, along with two others, led

by General Mohammed Atta and General Mohammed Mohaqqeq, respectively, were

forced to withdraw south through the Balkh Valley to a number of enclaves in the Hindu

Kush Mountains.57 A stalemate would exist between the Taliban and these militia

19

groups, soon to be known collectively as the Northern Alliance, until US forces arrived to

support the NA in the October 2001.

Pakistani government resistance to the prospects of a Northern Alliance (Uzbeks

and Tajiks; no Pashtuns) take-over of Kabul had resulted in the United States’

temporarily withholding SOF support of NA operations even in northern Afghanistan.58

By mid-late October 2001, however, that attitude had changed dramatically. Senior

officials in the Bush administration realized that fully backing the NA offered the best

opportunity the US had for defeating the Taliban.59

Meanwhile, ODA 595 had wasted little time calling in its first series of air strikes

on 21 October against Taliban positions in the village of Chapchal.60 General Dostum

was pleased with this first strike. He radioed the opposing Taliban commander and

announced, “This is General Dostum speaking. I am here, and I have brought the

Americans with me.”61 In quick succession, NA forces then took the villages of

Bishqab, Cobaki, and Oimetan, assisted in great measure by numerous additional air

strikes directed by ODA 595. By this time, General Dostum had his full compliment of

US support personnel (CIA officers, SF teams, an SF command and control element, and

Air Force terminal attack controllers who carried LST-5 satellite radios for contacting

strike aircraft and Laser Acquisition Markers [SOFLAM] for pinpointing enemy targets),

and he was ready to move north and re-take Mazar-e Sharif. Toward that end, US cargo

aircraft dropped much needed food, ammunition, and supplies to NA forces in the Darya

Suf Valley.62 Additionally, since no vehicles were available and terrain in the Darya

Valley was so treacherous (winding mountain trails at elevations in excess of 6,000 feet)

20

NA forces and their American counterparts were forced to travel on horseback and by

mule.

Next, ODA 534 linked up with General Mohammed Atta’s forces in the Balkh

River Valley on 4 November.63 The intent at this point was for Dostum to keep moving

through the Darya Suf Valley, while Atta pushed north in the Balkh. Once they met, the

combined force (which also included an NA group led by General Mohammed Mohaqiq)

would continue up the Balkh Valley and attack the Taliban stronghold at Tangi Gap.

On 5 November, General Dostum’s men were again on the move and carried out a

classic cavalry charge against well-entrenched Taliban troops at Bai Beche. The

astonished Taliban defenders retreated northward toward Tangi.64 At about the same

time, Taliban forces surrendered to General Atta at Aq Kuprok, only to retake the village

in a surprise counterattack. Assisted by US air strikes, Atta’s militia was able to regain

control of Aq Kuprok the next day. Hundreds of Taliban reinforcements had been

slaughtered by additional air strikes as they first moved south to assist at the battles of

Bai Beche and Aq Kuprok, then once again as they retreated north in disarray.65 The next

village north, Sholgerah, fell with little resistance. Then on 9 November, B-52 strikes,

directed by SOF controllers, ended last-ditch efforts by the Taliban to fight at the Tangi

Gap (twelve miles south of Mazar at the northern end of the Balkh Valley). Later that

day, NA forces crossed the Pul-e-Imam Bukhri Bridge and seized the Beh Dadi civilian

airport.66 The next day, General Dostum and his Special Forces advisers rode into town

to the cheers of a grateful local citizenry.

Fighting in the city would resume, however, when several hundred Taliban, who

had taken refuge in the former Sultan Razia girl’s school, refused to surrender. An

21

estimated 300 Taliban fighters, mostly Pakistanis and non-Afghans, were subsequently

killed when US air strikes (called in by Special Forces) destroyed the school.67 Finally,

the Northern Alliance took nearly 3,000 Taliban prisoners in Mazar-e Sharif and the

surrounding area.68 “This is a great victory,” proclaimed NA Deputy Defense Minister,

Atiiqullah Baryalai, “Our forces have captured the city. The Taliban are fleeing.”69 Soon

thereafter, Abdul Henan Hemat, head of the Taliban Bakhtar News Agency, conceded

victory to the Northern Alliance. “For seven days continuously they have been bombing

Taliban positions. They used very large bombs,” Hemat acknowledged reluctantly.70

Victory at Mazar-e Sharif would represent Operation ENDURING FREEDOM’s first

noteworthy success.

Northern Alliance Captures Taloqan and Konduz

The ten-man Special Forces A-Team 585 was inserted by helicopter into a landing

zone near the village of Dasht-e-Qaleh close to the Tajikistan border on 25 October.

From there, they made their way south to rendezvous with local Northern Alliance

commander, General Bariullah Khan near the Taliban stronghold of Konduz. Their

mission was to assist General Bariullah’s forces in taking several small villages and

ultimately capturing Konduz. ODA 585 split into two elements on 28 October—one to

help equip Bariullah’s forces with additional supplies for the move to Konduz and the

other to continue directing air strikes on the Taliban trench lines and command bunkers

that lie ahead. At one point, the team doubled back through Tajikistan and re-entered

Afghanistan behind Taliban lines.71 From there, they called in devastating bombing runs

on the Taliban reverse slope defensive positions. Northern Alliance fighters then overran

22

Taliban positions at Kal-a-Khata, captured the town of Chickha, and pushed south to the

perimeter of Konduz.72

While General Bariullah and ODA 585 were approaching Konduz from the north,

A-Team 586 and Northern Alliance forces commanded by General Daoud Kahn were

moving toward Konduz from the southeast. Initially, ODA 586 flew to a remote landing

zone near the Tajikistan border on an MH-47E Chinook helicopter. From there, they

flew on a Northern Alliance (Russian-built) helicopter to Farkhar for the link-up with

General Daoud. By 11 November, the team was calling in air strikes for Daoud’s forces

as they attacked the city of Taloqan. NA General Massoud had made Taloqan (located

40 miles east of Konduz) his headquarters until the Taliban seized the city in September

2000.73 Although an initial assault faltered, NA troops, with the help of US airpower,

successfully reconquered Taloqan on 13 November. Ten days later, Daoud captured the

city of Khanabad (not to be confused with K2 in Uzbekistan) fifteen miles east of

Konduz.74 ODA 586 controllers had directed dozens of air strikes against Taliban and al-

Qaeda troops, trucks, tanks, mortar positions, and bunkers along the approach to

Khanabad.

At the same time that General Daoud was closing on Konduz from the east and

General Bariullah was approaching from the north, General Dostum was moving in from

the west. Thirty thousand NA troops surrounded the city.75 Each general conducted his

own surrender negotiations. After holding out for several days, the Taliban (along with

numerous Uzbeks, Chechens, Pakistanis, and Arabs) finally acknowledged the bleakness

of their desperate situation and surrendered Konduz to the Northern Alliance over a four

day period from 23-26 November. Dostum set Afghan Taliban free, while foreign

23

fighters and al-Qaeda were held prisoner. With the fall of Mazar-e Sharif, Taloqan, and

Konduz, the entire northern tier of Afghanistan was now in the hands of Northern

Alliance forces. Much of this success was accomplished through devastating US

airpower coupled with SOF operators on the ground pinpointing lucrative targets. “The

more people we get on the ground, the better the targeting information is,” Defense

Secretary Rumsfeld explained after the siege of Konduz.76

An unusual series of events transpired during the last few days of the Konduz

fight. Northern Alliance forces claimed that several Pakistani aircraft had flown into

Konduz to rescue Pakistanis who had been fighting along side the Taliban. Observers

claimed that the planes were flown by the Pakistani Army Inter-Services Intelligence

Agency (ISI) and that those evacuated included Pakistani generals, intelligence agents,

and al-Qaeda leaders. Both the US and Pakistani governments denied the reports. JCS

Chairman, General Richard B. Myers, responded to a Pentagon news conference question

by declaring that “the runway there is not usable….[too]short for your standard transport

aircraft. So we’re not sure where the reports are coming from.”77 Nevertheless,

apparently a significant number of potentially valuable human intelligence sources were

able to elude capture. Eventually, many would conclude that the US allowed the airlift in

exchange for Pakistan’s continued support in the War on Terrorism.78

Qala-i Jangi Prison Uprising

After the Taliban collapse in northern Afghanistan, thousands of Taliban and al-

Qaeda fighters surrendered to victorious Northern Alliance forces. True to the Afghan

fighting tradition, NA leaders accepted at face value the word of the captured Taliban that

24

they would not engage in any further hostilities. As such, the captives were never

thoroughly searched for weapons. What the NA may have failed to realize, however, was

that the majority of those surrendering were non-Afghan Taliban (Pakistanis, Chechens,

and al-Qaeda) who would neither abide by Afghan custom, nor honor their pledge of

surrender. About 500 of these prisoners were taken to the 19th-century Qala-i Jangi

fortress (six miles west of Mazar-e Sharif) that had served as a Taliban military base and

most recently as General Dostum’s headquarters. 79

On 24 November, the day of their arrival at the makeshift Qala detention facililty,

Taliban captives killed two NA commanders in separate hand grenade suicide attacks.80

Despite these unexpected attacks, the NA failed to expand the force guarding the prison

(only about 100 NA soldiers).81 The next morning, two CIA officers, unaccompanied by

security, arrived to interrogate the Taliban and to search for al-Qaeda members. Rather

than questioning prisoners one-on-one in private, the officers interrogated small groups of

Taliban outdoors in the central courtyard of the prison complex.82 Several Taliban

wandered freely within the compound, having been untied by the guards in order to wash

and pray.83 The American presence provoked the Taliban and one attacked a guard with

a rock and grabbed the guard’s AK-47.84 Within minutes, the Taliban seized control of

the prison and the remaining guards fled. One of the CIA officers escaped; however the

other, 32 year-old Johnny Michael Spann, after having shot three Taliban, was killed in

the uprising, thus becoming the first American hostile-fire casualty in Afghanistan.85

Later that afternoon, US Special Forces and British SAS soldiers arrived at Qala-i Jangi

and took control of the situation. For the rest of the day, they called in air strikes on the

south end of the compound where the Taliban had concentrated. On 26 November,

25

additional SF troops and Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division (having been flown in

from K2 to serve as a quick reaction force) joined the US and British forces at the prison.

They established a new command post and positioned an NA tank in the northeast corner

of the facility. Unfortunately, a misdirected 2,000 pound bomb struck the north wall of

the command post later that morning, killing several NA soldiers and wounding five US

and two SAS Soldiers.86 That evening, two AC-130 Spectre gunships strafed the Taliban

end of the prison with cannon fire for more than two hours. By the next day, the

surviving Taliban were nearly out of food, water, and ammunition. NA tanks shelled a

building where the remaining prisoners held out. By late that afternoon, the fighting

ended and a Special Forces team was able to recover “Mike” Spann’s body.

A group of Taliban survived, however, by hiding in the basement of the prison

complex. For several days they refused to come out despite being doused with burning

oil.87 Finally, on 1 December, 86 Taliban emerged and surrendered after the basement

was flooded with frigid well-water. Among the survivors was the so-called “American

Taliban,” John Walker Lindh, who then was treated at the Afghan hospital in

Sheberghan, detained for debriefing at Camp Rhino (the US Marine Corps base in

southern Afghanistan), and held in solitary confinement aboard the USS Peleliu in the

Arabian Sea before being handed over to the US Justice Department. 88 Many of the

Taliban involved in the Qala-i Jangi insurrection were among the first arrivals at the

newly established Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.89

General Dostum felt betrayed by the Taliban uprising at the prison. He had hoped

that his humane treatment of the prisoners would be seen as a gesture of reconciliation.

As a result, he chose to not search the prisoners as thoroughly as he should have. “We

26

treated them humanely….we did not search them well enough because we trusted them,”

he would later remark. “That was a mistake.”90

Dominance of SOF Directed Air Power in Support of the Northern Alliance

SOF-directed joint air power was clearly the decisive factor in the early Northern

Alliance victories in Afghanistan. During the first three months of Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM, 120 stationary targets, 400 vehicles, and numerous Taliban/al-

Qaeda troop concentrations were destroyed in US bombing attacks. Air Force, Navy, and

Marine Corps aircraft flew more than 6,500 strike sorties and dropped 17,500 munitions

(57% were precision-guided) on Taliban targets.91 Carrier-based F-14 and F/A-18

aircraft accounted for 75% (4,900) of strike sorties flown, while US Air Force fighters,

bombers, and special operations aircraft flew 11%, 10%, and 3% of strike sorties,

respectively (Figures 1 and 2).92

Interestingly, however, despite flying fewer sorties, Air Force aircraft delivered

more than 70% of the ordnance dropped during the October to December 2001

timeframe. This was due primarily to the large payload capacity of the eight B-1 and 10

B-52 bombers that were deployed at Diego Garcia and their extended loiter-time

capabilities—missions often lasted up to 15 hours. In addition, B-1s dropped the

majority of JDAMs (2,800), more than all other aircraft combined. In one instance, four

B-1s delivered 96 JDAM bombs in a 20 minute period.93 Conversely, B-52 bombers

delivered the preponderance of Mk 82 500-pound, free-fall, unguided general purpose

(dumb) bombs (approximately 6,000).94 Mk 82 accuracy had improved significantly since

27

Operation DESERT STORM due principally to radar improvements and new weapons

ballistics computers on the aircraft.95

Above and beyond the OEF strike sorties, more than 17,000 aerial support

missions took place in the initial months of the conflict. The United States and Germany

flew 125,000 tons of military materiel and humanitarian relief supplies to the AOR

(4,800 airlift missions). Also, the Air Force, Navy, and Royal Air Force flew 8,000

tanker missions in support of the air war. The extended-range operations undertaken for

OEF could not have been accomplished without the sustained in-flight refueling

capability that tankers provided. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

flights accounted for an additional 1,300 sorties, flown by Predator, Global Hawk, U-2,

RC-135, E-3, E-8, and EC-130 aircraft. Finally, Coalition aviation components flew a

wide variety of OEF-related missions (approximately 3,000).96

Increased use of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) emerged as the dominant

trend in the Afghanistan air campaign. Having represented only nine percent of the

ordnance used in Operation DESERT STORM, PGMs now accounted for 57 percent of

the bombs dropped during the early stages of OEF. Likewise, the ratio of PGMs to

sorties rose from 0.32 during DESERT STORM to 1.66 for OEF. Discussions at the

CAOC would now address how many targets could be destroyed during a single mission

as opposed to how many missions would be required to destroy a single target.97

Logistics Challenges Encountered During Early OEF Combat Operations

Currently, the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has a more

robust organic logistics support capability than it did in the early months of Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM. Prior to OEF, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)

28

were accustomed to deploying/operating in small teams. As a result, their logistics needs

were fairly limited. At the time, the existing, non-deployable, Special Operations

Support Command (SOSCOM) with one support battalion, two forward support

companies, and one headquarters company was sufficient to meet ARSOF team-oriented

logistics requirements.

However, when the 5th Special Forces Group deployed to K2, the assigned

forward support element (members of “A” Company, 528th Special Operations Support

Battalion) was nearly overwhelmed with the enormity of logistics requests. There were

only approximately 400 Soldiers in the entire 528th Support Battalion to provide combat

service support for 15,000 Special Operations Forces in ARSOF. This ratio appears

inadequate in contrast to conventional force levels (3,300 support personnel for a 15,000

troop heavy division, for example).98 Nevertheless, the 528th performed admirably at K2

by quickly establishing a warehouse, a clothing distribution center, a 24/7 dining facility,

and ration and refueling points. The 507th Corps Support Command replaced the 528th in

December 2001 after SF combat operations in northern Afghanistan had subsided.99

Soldiers and Army civilians from the 200th Materiel Management Center

(MMC), 21st Theater Support Command (TSC) in Kaiserslautern, Germany also

provided much needed logistics support to CIA and SOF personnel during the early days

of OEF. A special OEF cell was established at 200th MMC headquarters to provide, as

they claimed, “corner-cutting, on-the-fly, I-want-it-now, customer-driven” support

services as “unconventional as the war being fought.”100 The cell operated 24 hours a day

and was in direct contact with US troops on the ground in Afghanistan via satellite

phones and email. When certain items were not readily available in the system, MMC

29

members used their government credit cards to make the necessary purchases on the local

German economy. When cargo parachutes were in short supply, the cell had hundreds

more sent to Germany by Federal Express. During the first 60 days of OEF, the 21st

TSC air-dropped dozens of western saddles, 12,000 pounds of horse feed, two million

humanitarian meals, two million pounds of wheat, 93,000 blankets, specialized batteries,

nonmilitary tactical gear, camping equipment, mountaineering clothing, plus tons of extra

equipment and supplies.101

Without doubt, the workhorse airlift aircraft thus far in Operation ENDURING

FREEDOM was the C-17 Globemaster III. The Air Force had recently purchased 80 of

these aircraft to replace the aging C-141 fleet for intertheater mobility missions. C-17s

carried a larger payload and could operate from smaller, unimproved, airfields.

Typically, C-5 Galaxy or commercial aircraft airlifted personnel and equipment from US

aerial ports of embarkation to staging bases. To accommodate this movement, the Air

Force established two air bridges—one flowing eastward from Moron Air Base in Spain,

Rhein-Main and Ramstein air bases in Germany, and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey; the

other moved westward from Andersen Air Base on Guam to Diego Garcia in the Indian

Ocean. At these intermediate staging bases, aircrews transferred cargo from the larger C-

5s to C-17s for delivery to the theater. Unfortunately, a single C-17 could not

accommodate all the cargo from a C-5 transport. This discrepancy caused considerable

backlog and congestion at the various staging bases and resulted in split theater

shipments.

From the beginning of the air war until mid-December 2001, C-17s air-dropped

more than two million humanitarian daily rations for the Afghan people.102 Since there

30

were no in-theater bases initially, these food drop missions often lasted up to 30 hours

and required a third pilot joining the C-17 crews in order to rotate rest periods. Despite

the fact that there had been no CENTCOM or Air Mobility Command off-the-shelf plan

for airlift to Afghanistan, the U.S Air Force executed this phase of Operation

ENDURING FREEDOM (and dealt with the various problems that arose) in a highly

professional manner.103

Concurrent Civil Military Operations

Since the principal objective of OEF was to disrupt, destroy, and defeat the

Taliban and al-Qaeda, CENTCOM did not consider nation building and stability

operations to be high priority issues. As a result, CENTCOM planners did not include a

robust civil military operations (CMO) component in the OEF plan. Nevertheless, to

support humanitarian relief assistance for the Afghan people, CENTCOM requested that

the US Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT) establish an appropriate organization

to coordinate these relief activities. A Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Task

Force (CJCMOTF), composed of elements from the 377th Theater Support Command,

the 122nd Rear Operations Center, and the 352nd Civil Affairs Command, subsequently

formed in Atlanta and Tampa, then moved to Kuwait, and eventually deployed to Kabul

in early December 2001.104

Relatedly, just four days after the OEF air war began, an officer from the 96th

Civil Affairs (CA) Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG), US Army Civil

Affairs and Psychological Operations Command deployed to Islamabad, Pakistan to

establish a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) and to organize Coalition

31

Humanitarian Liaison Cells (CHLC), the primary functions of which were to de-conflict

humanitarian vs. combat operations, conduct assessments, and identify potential relief

projects. Also, a Liaison Officer and several Civil Affairs teams from the 96th CA

deployed to K2 during the October-December timeframe in support of the 5th Special

Forces Group. Two of these teams relocated to Bagram and Mazar-e Sharif, respectively,

in late November.

During this same time period, Humanitarian Assistance Survey Teams from the

96th CA joined infiltrated SOF A-Teams. Their mission was to assist Northern Alliance

leaders (and their families) and to initiate collaborative efforts with local Afghan civilian

leadership groups. Some Survey Team members began wearing civilian clothes in an

effort to blend in with Afghans. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) complained

about this practice, however, thinking that locals would be unable to distinguish between

Soldiers (in civilian attire) and NGO personnel. Shortly thereafter, CENTCOM ordered

CA Soldiers in Afghanistan back into uniform.105 After the NA victory in Mazar-e

Sharif, 96th CA, 5th SFG, and 10th Mountain Division Soldiers began working to open a

new hospital and to rebuild the Sultan Rasia girl’s school.106

Analysis of the Sudden Taliban Collapse in Northern Afghanistan

Many US civilian and military officials had expected that defeating the Taliban in

northern Afghanistan would take much longer than it actually did. However, the speed

with which the Northern Alliance routed the Taliban resulted from a unique combination

of military effects that had never previously been employed together. Special Operations

Forces directed precision-guided munitions air strikes in support of an indigenous ally

(the NA) against enemy forces (Taliban) while often not even in contact. Precision

32

directed US airpower was the combat multiplier that enabled an outnumbered NA to

destroy Taliban infantry and armor and to liberate northern Afghanistan in just over six

weeks.

Despite al-Qaeda-led counterattacks at Bai Beche and Konduz, US SOF suffered

no casualties in the battles for Mazar-e Sharif, Konduz, and Taloqan. The principal

reason for the lack of casualties was that Air Force terminal attack controllers attached to

SF A-Teams used laser illuminators and GPS equipment to engage Taliban fighters at

significant stand-off distances. For example, controllers were able to acquire Taliban

targets at ranges of up to 10 kilometers at the village of Bishqab and five kilometers at

Ac’capruk.107 The resulting technique took on a new name, ground-directed interdiction

(GDI), and differed from typical close air support in which supported forces are normally

in direct contact with the enemy. GDI facilitated attacks on moving targets, ensured

compliance with CENTCOM rules of engagement, and enabled the concentration of

devastating effects without concentrating physical forces.108 US Army Colonel Mike

Findley (former Commander, Special Operations Command, Joint Forces Command)

argued. however, that although the mix of players in the GDI equation was

unprecedented, the Northern Alliance (along with its SOF advisers) was essentially no

different than any other conventional ground maneuver force requiring periodic joint fire

support.109 Matching concentrated fire power with nimble ground maneuver elements to

vanquish an enemy force has always been a principle factor for success in warfare. As

such, JSOTF-North became by default the functional ground force (supported)

commander directing A-Team/NA maneuver units against the Taliban and employing

complementary US air support whenever needed.

33

In addition, some have suggested that the Taliban was simply a rag-tag, poorly-

trained, incompetent, and reluctant-to-fight enemy force.110 This may have been true

during the first few days of special operations forces (SOF)-directed US bombing, when

the enemy was exposed and easily acquired. The Taliban learned quickly however, and

by November 2001 had adopted a variety of cover-and-concealment techniques and

began taking cover and dispersing their troops. These efforts proved at least partially

successful in minimizing the devastating effects of American air strikes, and would serve

the Taliban well in future operations such as Tora Bora and Anaconda. Also, although

Afghan Taliban were often hesitant to stand and fight, the al-Qaeda forces—many of

whom had received sophisticated military training—were significantly more likely to

engage in combat, and proved to be formidable adversaries (as demonstrated at Bai

Beche and Konduz, for example).

Furthermore, there were a number of noteworthy aviation component

accomplishments during the initial months of OEF in addition to the unique SOF/strike

aircraft teamwork described above. The expanded use of unmanned aerial vehicles

(UAVs) (Predator and Global Hawk) provided both faster reaction times and longer dwell

times than did traditional orbital assets. This enabled significantly improved ISR data

fusion, near constant surveillance of Taliban activity, a substantial shortening of the kill

chain, and major reductions in sensor-to-shooter link times. Unfortunately, teams on the

ground could not communicate directly with UAV operators. Overall, however,

improved capability to communicate data permitted aircrews to retarget in flight and to

re-strike targets if necessary.111

34

Despite some initial growing pains, the CAOC at Prince Sultan Air Base provided

an unprecedented level (quality and quantity) of timely air support for Special Forces A-

Teams and the Northern Alliance. Joint service cooperation/integration (Air Force/Navy)

was harmonious from the start, as all CAOC members focused on sharing information

and on the common objective of defeating the Taliban. Improved technology provided

CAOC operators with proximate real-time theater connectivity, situational awareness,

and the ability to deliver devastating firepower on demand.112

A few controversies did arise, however. Military/civilian personnel at

CENTCOM and in Washington may have exercised undue levels of centralized control

over mission planning and execution, thereby interfering with timely target approval

decision cycles.113 This, coupled with excessively restrictive rules of engagement (JAG

officers influencing target choices), rear-area scrutinizing of live Predator data, inherently

lengthy mission distances (up to15 hours from Diego Garcia), limited loiter capability,

and the fact that CENTCOM and CAOC were separated by eight time zones may have

detracted from air power reaction times as new targets emerged. Additionally, the CIA

often secretly flew armed Predators within the AOR in support covert SOF/other

governmental organization (OGA) operations without advising the CAOC. To address

this issue, liaison officers at CENTCOM, CAOC, and JSOTF-N developed a broad-based

coordination plan that integrated all friendly OEF participants—SOF, covert SOF, OGA,

and the Northern Alliance.114 Eventually, JSOTF-N established a limited Air Support

Operations Center (ASOC) to coordinate joint fires and began using killbox procedures

along with blue-force tracking to help eliminate friendly-fire incidents.115

35

Fortunately, commanders quickly resolved the few difficulties that arose early on

in OEF. For example, JSOTF-N’s assumption of the role of “supported” command

clarified command relationships among the participants. Also, CENTCOM requested the

first time ever use of commercial satellites to address skyrocketing data transmission

bandwidth demand.116 This, however, did not completely alleviate occasional range and

reliability problems with targeting systems, data links, and FM tactical radios

encountered by infiltrated special operations forces. In addition, extensive mountain

flying operations revealed high-altitude lift limitations with MH-60 Black Hawk

helicopters. Although Black Hawk crews flew hundreds of dangerous OEF support

missions, several such missions involving flights into mountainous terrain were, of

necessity, shifted to MH-47 Chinooks (maximum gross weight of 50,000 pounds vs.

22,000 pounds for the Black Hawk). Taking time to assess variations in aircraft

capabilities complicated mission planning for SOF commanders.117 Special Forces teams

also had to contend with minor language barrier issues. ODA-534 was advised that

General Atta spoke Arabic. No problems were anticipated, since several team members

spoke the language. Shortly after their insertion into the Balkh River Valley, 534 learned

that Atta in fact spoke Pashto and Dari, but not Arabic. The team quickly improvised by

finding a few older NA soldiers who spoke Russian. These Afghans then served as

translators for ODA-534 (most team members spoke Russian) for the remainder of the

mission.118

In fewer than two months, the Northern Alliance, supported by US SOF and air

power, decisively defeated the Taliban, put al-Qaeda on the run, and liberated six

northern provinces, seven key cities, and nearly 50 additional smaller towns and

36

villages.119 NA forces killed nearly ten thousand enemy soldiers and took several

thousand more prisoners. A rare fusion of small SOF teams (trained eyes on the ground),

strike aircraft/bombers, and precision-guided munitions brought about the remarkable

accomplishments realized during combat operations in northern Afghanistan. SOF also

provided tactics, techniques, and procedures advice to the NA and dealt adroitly with

various Afghan factions, rivalries, and tensions. Only roughly 100 SF Soldiers infiltrated

northern Afghanistan (seven A-Teams and one ODC), thereby adhering to “limited

footprint” directives and proving that devastating firepower can be brought to bear by

small, highly trained, units.120 Also, American forces gained valuable insight into how

the Taliban and al-Qaeda would fight. Moreover, CENTCOM had demonstrated to

doubters that the US could rapidly project destructive land, sea, and air power over

exceptionally long distances. In addition, US combat participants proved the concept of

“jointness” both viable and workable, as all—CIA, SOF, conventional Army, Navy, Air

Force, and Marines—cooperated unselfishly in support of the OEF mission. Finally, both

the Mazar-e Sharif airport and the Freedom Bridge to Uzbekistan reopened, thus enabling

large inbound shipments of humanitarian assistance. Afghan refugees were able to return

in significant numbers to Takhar, Konduz, Samangan, Balkh, Jozjan, Sar-e Pul, and

Faryab provinces. Would the battles for Kandahar and Tora Bora, or Operation

Anaconda be as successful?

37

1 Phillip O’Connor, “Two Men Who Fought Terror,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 22 February 2004, sec. A, p. 1 2 Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Statement of General Tommy R. Franks, 107 Cong., 27 February 2002, 7-8.3 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 13. 4 “Taliban.” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, 20 December 2005, 2. http://www8.janes.com/. 5 Ali A. Jalali, “Afghanistan: The Anatomy of an Ongoing Conflict,” Parameters (Spring 2001), 92-93; Biddle, 22, implies that as much as ninety percent of Afghanistan was controlled by the Taliban in 2001. 6 Ibid., 92-94. 7 Biddle, 12.8 B. Muralidhar Reddy, “The Northern Players,” Frontline 18, no. 24 (November 24 – December 7, 2001): 2, http://www.hinduonnet.com (accessed 8 February 2007). The UF was also known as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIF). 9 Library of Congress – Federal Research Division, “Country Profile Afghanistan,” May 2006, 3, http://lcweb2.loc.gov (accessed 6 February 2007). 10 Fiona Symon, “Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance,” BBC News Online (19 September 2001), 3, http://news.bbc.uk (accessed 31 January 2007).11 “Analysis: Masood’s Regional Allies,” BBC News Online (11 September 2001), 1-3, http://news.bbc.uk (accessed 7 February 2007).12 Fiona Symon, 2.13 Rory McCarthy, “Warlords Bury their Differences in Readiness for Long and Bloody Battles,” Guardian (7 November 2001), 1, http://www.guardian.co.uk (accessed 9 February 2007).14 Jalali, 92-95.15 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September 2001, 1-5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases. 16 George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” 20 September 2001, 1-5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases.

17 James Risen and David Johnston, “Bush Has Widened Authority of C.I.A. to Kill Terrorists,” The New York Times, 15 December 2002, sec. 1, p. 1.18 Ambassador J. Cofer Black, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 14 December 2006, McLean, VA, 3; George Tenet, interview by Scott Pelley, CBS News 60 Minutes, 25 April 2007, Washington, D.C., aired 29 April 2007, accessed 30 April 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/25/60minutes/main2728375.shtml 19 Gary C. Schroen, First In (New York: Ballantine Books, 2005), 15-16, 67-78.20 Congress, Joint Resolution, Authorization for Use of Military Force, 107 Cong., S.J. Res. 23, Congressional Record , Vol. 147 (18 September 2001), http://www.usconstitution.net/newsarch_01.html, accessed 20 February 2007. 21 “Bush Calls on U.S. to Defend Freedom: Authorizes Guard and Reserve Call-ups,” TALON, 7, no. 38 (22 September 2001): 4. 22 Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” Center for Defense Information Bulletin (26 October 2001): 4, http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm, accessed 12 February 2001. 23 John D. Gresham, “Forces Fighting for Enduring Freedom,” United States Naval Institute Proceedings, 127, no. 11 (November 2001): 45-48. 24 Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” 3.25 General Bryan “Doug” Brown, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 11 January 2007, Tampa, FL, 3.26 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), “Fact Sheets,” http://www.campbell.army.mil, accessed 16 February 2007.27 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne), “Fact Sheets,” http://www.campbell.army.mil, accessed 16 February 2007.

28 Air Force Special Operations Command, “Fact Sheets,” http://www.af.mil/factsheets, accessed 14 February 2007. 29 Air Force Special Operations Command, “Fact Sheets,” http://www.af.mil/factsheets, accessed 14 February 2007. 30 Michael Smith, “Donald Rumsfeld’s New Killer Elite,” Timesonline (12 February 2006): 3, https://timesonline.typepad.com/mick_smith/2006/02/donnald_rumsfeld.html, accessed 23 April 2007; Richard Stewart, Operation Enduring Freedom: The United States Army in Afghanistan October 2001 – March 2002 (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 2004), 20.31 David Ben-Aryeah, “British Troops Face the Reality That is Afghanistan,” Asia Times Online (16 November 2001), 1-3, http://www.atimes.com, accessed 16 February 2007.32 Stephan Baker and Emily Clark, “Forces in Play,” 4-5.33 The White House, “Operation Enduring Freedom: One Year of Accomplishments,” (7 October 2002), 1-6, http://www.whitehouse.gov, accessed 14 February 2007; Nora Bansahel, The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (Santa Monica: RAND, 2003), 10, 55.

34 Gary C. Schroen, First In, 99.35 Ibid., 125.36 Esther Schrader, “Response to Terror; War, on Advice of Counsel,” Los Angeles Times, 15 February 2002, sec. A, p. 1.37 General Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 295.38 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 83.39 Patrick Tyler, “U.S. and Britain Strike Afghanistan, Aiming at Bases and Terrorist Camps; Bush Warns ‘Taliban Will Pay a Price,” The New York Times, 8 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.40 U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Fact Sheet on Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan,” (26 April 2002), 1-12, http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002, accesses 23 January 2007.41 Gerry J. Gilmore, “Air Force fliers Continue Afghan Food Drop Operations,” American Forces Press Service, 12 October 2001, 1-2, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 17 January 2007.42 U.S. Agency for International Development, “USAID Fact Sheet on Humaintarian Aid for Afghanistan,” (26 April 2002), 4, http://geneva.usmission.gov/press2002, accessed 23 January 2007.43 Douglas W. Jaquish, “Uninhabited Air Vehicles for Psychological Operations-Leveraging Technology for PSYOPS Beyond 2010,” Air & Space Power Journal-Chronicles Online (6 April 2004): 2, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles, accessed 14 March 2007.44 Christopher J. Lamb and Paris Genalis, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons learned from Recent Operational Experience (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2005), 45-46, 172. 45 COL (Ret) James Treadwell, interview by Lynne Chandler Garcia, 8 January 2007, Tampa, FL, 5.46 Herbert A. Friedman, “Psychological Operations in Afghanistan,” Perspectives, the Journal of the Psychological Operations Association, 14, no. 4 (2002), 1-4.47 Benjamin S. Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror, 79-102.48 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, interview by FRONTLINE, 7, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/wolfowitz.html. accessed 23 January 200749 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen Myers,” DefenseLink News Transcript, 18 October 2001, 8, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 21 February 2007.50 Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information Paper, 2002), 3; Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker (New York: Crown Publishers, 2005), 109, 136, 142.51 Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 40-42.52 “The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare,15, no. 2 (June 2002): 39.53 Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25. 54 Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25.55 The White House, “Remarks by the President Upon arrival at Barksdale Air Force Base,” (11 September 2001), 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov, accessed 26 February 2007.56 Kyra Phillips, “Where and What is Mazar-e Sharif?” CNN.com Transcripts (9 November 2001), 1-3, http://www.transcripts.cnn.com, accessed 24 February 2007. 57 “The Heartbreak of Mazar-e Sharif,” CBC News Online (27 January 2004) 1-2, http://www.cbc.ca/news, accessed 23 February 2007.58 Thomas E. Ricks and Alan Sipress, “Attacks Restrained by Political Goals,” The Washington Post, 23 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1. 59 Alan Sipress and Vernon Loeb, “U.S. Uncouples Military, Political Efforts; Officials Decide to Step Up Bombing Without a Postwar Government Arranged,” The Washington Post, 1 November 2001, sec. A, p. 18. 60 Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001 (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information Paper, 2002), 2. 61 Max Boot, “Special Forces and Horses,” Armed Forces Journal (November 2006): 18-25.62 Thom Shanker and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Special Forces Step up Campaign in Afghan Areas,” The New York Times, 19 October 2001, sec. A, p. 1.63“The Liberation of Mazar-e Sharif: 5th SF Group Conducts UW in Afghanistan,” Special Warfare,15, no. 2 (June 2002): 37. 64Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001, 2. 65Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 10. 66Dale Andrade, The Battle of Mazar-e Sharif, October-November 2001, 2. 67 Carlotta Gall, “A Deadly Siege At Last Won Mazar-e Sharif,” The New York Times, 19 November 2001, sec. B, p. 1.68Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology (Washington: U.S. Army Center of Military History Information Paper, 2002), 4. 69Dexter Filkins and Thom Shanker, “Afghan Rebels Report Capture of Major City from the Taliban,” The New York Times, 10 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1. 70 Ibid., sec. A, p. 1.71 Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 112.

72 Andrew Birtle, Afghan War Chronology, 5.73 Jon Lee Anderson, “The Surrender,” New Yorker, 77, no. 39 (10 December 2001): 70.74 Satinder Bindra, “Northern Alliance Takes Khanabad,” interview by Catherine Callaway, CNN.com Transcripts (25 November 2001): 1, http://transcripts.cnn.com, accessed 19 January 2007. 75 Johanna McGeary, Massimo Calabresi, Mark Thompson, et al., “Shell Game,” Time, 158, no. 24 (3 December 2001): 26.76 Eric Schmitt and James Dao, “Use of Pinpoint Airpower Comes of Age in New War,” The New York Times, 24 December 2001, sec. A, p. 1.77 U.S. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing – Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” DefenseLink News Transcript, 26 November 2001, 6, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 2 March 2007. 78 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Getaway,” The New Yorker, 77, no. 45 (28 January 2002): 36-41. 79 Jennifer Whittle and Steve Alvarez, “Special Forces Officer Honored for Heroism in Mazar-e Sharif Prison Battle,” DefendAmerica News, 14 November 2003, 1-2, http://www.defendamerica.mil, accessed 23 January 2007; Carlotta Gall, “In Tunnels Full of Bodies, One of Them Kept Firing,” The New York Times, 30 November 2001, sec. B, p. 3. 80 Alex Perry, “Inside the Battle at Qala-i Jangi,” Time, 158, no. 25 (10 December 2001): 52. 81 Bay Fang, “They Were All fighting to Die,” U.S. News & World Report, 131, no. 24 (10 December 2001): 18-21. 82 Christopher Marquis, “Before He Died, C.I.A. Man Interrogated U.S. Captive,” The New York Times, 7 December 2001, sec. B, p. 4.83 Bay Fang, 18-21.84 Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Bomb Wounds G.I.’s as Battle Rages at Fort,” The New York Times, 27 November 2001, sec. A, p. 1.85 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Press Release, 28 November 2001, George J. Tenet, Director of CIA, “Statement on the Death of A CIA Officer in Afghanistan.” 86 Kalev Sepp, “Uprising at Qala-i Jangi: the Staff of the 3/5th SF Group,” Special Warfare, 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 17. 87 Carlotta Gall, “In Tunnels Full of Bodies, One of Them Kept Firing,” sec. B, p. 3. 88 Cable News Network, “CNN Presents House of War: “The Uprising at Mazar-e Sharif,” air date 3 August 2002, transcript at http:// www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/shows/house.of.war/interactive/interactive/house.of.swf, accessed 3 March 2007; Jeff Gerth, “U.S. Detainee is Questioned, But His Fate is Still Unclear,” The New York Times, 10 December 2001, sec. B, p. 3; Daniel Klaidman and Michael Isikoff, “Walker’s Brush with bin Laden,” Newsweek, 139, no. 1(7 January 2002): 20-21. 89 U.S. Department of Defense, “Rumsfeld Visits, Thanks U.S. Troops at Camp X-Ray in Cuba,” DefenseLink NewsTtranscripts, 27 January 2002, 1, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01272002_200201271.html, accessed 3 March 2007.90 Bay Fang, 18-21; Alex Perry, 51.91 William Arkin, “Response to Terror; Military Memo; Old-Timers Prove Invaluable in Afghanistan Air Campaign,” Los Angeles Times, 10 February 2002, sec. A, p. 12. 92 John Mazach, “The 21st Century Triad,” Sea Power, 45, no.3 (March 2002): 51-55; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 248-249.93 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 26-33. 94 William Arkin, sec. A, p. 12.95 Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 250.96 Ibid., 251.97 Christopher J. Bowie, Robert P. Haffa, Jr., and Robert E. Mullins, Future War: What Trends in America’s Post-Cold War Military Conflicts Tell Us About Early 21st Century Warfare (Arlington, VA: Northrop Grumman Analysis Center, 2003), 46-47. 98 Jorge E. Rodriguez, “What’s Missing in ARSOF Logistics?” Army Logistician, 36, no. 1 (January/February 2004): 7-9.99 Richard L. Kiper, “We Support to the Utmost: the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion,” Special Warfare, 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 13-15.100 Dennis Steele, “Unconventional Logistics,” Army, 52, no. 11 (November 2002): 58.101 Ibid., 58-59.102 Olga Oliker, Richard Kauzlarich, James Dobbins, et al., Aid During Conflict (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2004), 47.103 Daniel L. Haulman, Intertheater Airlift Challenges of Operation Enduring Freedom (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Historical Research Agency, 2002), 1-12.104 Olga Oliker, et al., 43-50.105 William Flavin, Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 2004), 17-48, 91.

106 Jim Garamone, “Humanitarian Success Story in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces Press Service, 18 January 2002, 1-2, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 18 January 2007; Kathleen T. Rhem, “Officials Laud Rebuilding of Afghan Girls School,” Armed Forces Press Service, 31 October 2002, 1-2, http://www.defenselink.mil, accessed 18 January 2007.107 Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, 26.108 Michael Noonan and Mark Lewis, “Conquering the Elements: Thoughts on Joint Force (Re)Organization,” Parameters (Autumn 2003), 38. 109 Mike Findley, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, “SOF on the Contemporary Battlefield,” Military Review (May/June 2003), 11.110 See for example - Anthony H. Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 16-23. 111 Defense News, 3 January 2002, 1.112 Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 280-284.113 See for example - LTG (Ret) Paul T. Mikolashek, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 13 December 2006, Arlington, VA, 9.114 Benjamin Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror, 353.115 Mike Findley, Robert Green, and Eric Braganca, 12-13.116 Anthony Cordesman, The Ongoing Lessons of Afghanistan: Warfighting, Intelligence, Force Transformation, and Nation Building (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 43.117 Conrad Crane, Final Report: The U.S. Army’s Initial Impressions of Operation Enduring Freedom and Noble Eagle (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2002), 4.118 Robin Moore, 64.119 Mark D. Nutsch, interview FRONTLINE, “Campaign Against Terror,” 8 September 2002, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/595.html

120 LTG (Ret) Paul T. Mikolashek, interview by Dr. Peter Connors, 13 December 2006, Arlington, VA, 11; Richard Stewart, 20.