internet censorship across the world

qwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmrtyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiopasdfghjklzxcvbnmqwertyuiop

The Era Logic Bombs

Internet Censorship in the World

5/1/2011

Nitin Srivastava

© Nitin Srivastava & Analectic.org

2

THE ERA OF LOGIC BOMBS

INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN THE WORLD – THE WHY AND THE WHAT

INTERNET CENSORSHIP – THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS

INTERNET CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS IN THE WORLD

INTERNET CENSORSHIP SCENARIO IN SELECT ASIAN NATIONS

…. PAGE 3

…. PAGE 4

…. PAGE 7

…. PAGE 10

…. PAGE 14


3

T H E E R A O F L O G I C B O M B S

While you & I are busy social networking, and sometimes feel proud of our immense online connect, a new information technology paradigm is unfolding, albeit in a peculiar manner – It is all pervasive. For most, predominantly, it is sharing pictures, videos and expressing opinions. However, at a deeper level, human – technology interactions are more permeative than most of us can fathom. Banking, trading, purchases are now significantly dependent on the Internet infrastructure. In most developed countries, provision of essential services (public goods) is, in some way or another, dependent on Internet. If one resides in developing world, you would know that with every passing day, we are moving closer towards digitization of almost every essential service. This is the Click Economy, and as much as we pride ourselves on its simplicity & straightforwardness, the settings are not as straightforward, rather based on a complex set of rules. Rules or logic in computing parlance.

Logic is always susceptible to be defied, and therein lies the danger.

Internet as they say is designed for convenience and reliability. Security comes second. In this new paradigm of our inter-twined existence, individual privacy is coming up as a blatant new danger. So conspicuous, that even in highly democratic nations there are voices of discontent. Over the years, as the online population has grown, so have risen the numbers of illegal activity online. World over, governments are trying to hinder the use of internet by criminals and non-state actors. These activities to name a few include hate speech, pedophilia, fraud, terrorism, etc. However, there is a thin line between censoring unlawful activities and stifling free speech. It is observed that censorship norms across nations are arbitrary, that too in democratic nations.

Moreover, Internet censorship norms too are evolving at a rapid pace. It is not that censorship actions are taken with government decree alone. Many a time, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) informally apply censorship at the behest of government. In addition, there is also a desire to build an internet brigade to develop and deploy technologies as and when needed.

This is a race. Every nation, irrespective of its, size and economy is on an equal footing if it has the technologies. And, this is a dangerous precedent.

With this backdrop, we present the Issue 4, our most ambitious endeavor so far, at Analectic.org to you. In this issue, we are trying to mull over the reasons why internet censorship is becoming a norm, how governments fit in to this paradigm? The technologies, their evolution and how they are employed in countries world over.

Besides, we have also tried building a snapshot of Internet censorship norms in different regions of the world. The snapshots have been prepared for the regions of Commonwealth of Independent States, Europeand Asia. These snapshots and majority of our understanding is based on the findings of Open Net Initiative publication Access Controlled. Moreover, if you would like to see the exhaustive list of resources we have utilized please see additional readings and resources.


4

I N T E R N E T C E N S O R SH I P I N T H E W O R L D – T H E W H Y A N D T H E W H A T

BACKGROUND

Internet has always been likened to democratization & empowerment of individuals. However, there is a Catch. Not everything about the internet is sanguine. While on one hand, its ubiquity renders a paradigm shift in the way societies operate & governance systems managed. It has, on the other, put in jeopardy, the interest of those running a nation state.

This danger comes from information flow.

Just about 20 years back, information flow was a controlled and a regulated domain, be it in the parched red corridors of the world or in the famed democracies. Information had a time lag, a top-down nature. Historically too, all communications tools have had a political significance. Be it telegraph, or telephony – the state has significant say in both their operations. With the advent of internet, information started flowing horizontally, primarily through blogs, micro-blogs, wikis, forums and other social networking sites.

Consequently, a generic sensitization of populace, sort of, came underway. The State has little control on the way information flows; more so, what information percolates to the last man and what not. For governments, this is quite unlike the controlled semblance many years ago.

Internet has opened the Pandora’s Box, and this is creating a rift.

As more and more citizens are getting used to the idea of online production & dissemination of information, so is mounting the government’s urge to lay down regulations for moderating opinions online. However, motivations to monitor, regulate and censure vary from country to country. In countries that promote unrestricted freedom of expression, the drive to regulate internet, is to (1) thwart child pornography, (2) terrorist propaganda, (3) fraud and (4) protect intellectual property.


5

In countries that are rather authoritarian, the pressure (in addition to above four) stems from scathing criticisms of government policies. Further, unregulated internet access is also construed as a potential catalyst for social disruptions in many nations. For instance, many Asian & CIS countries block content that are critical of leading national and religious figures. However, things are not as straightforward as mere blocking of access.

Internet censorship is also a dodgy realm. It extends control not only in the domestic domain, but sometimes can also expand to another nation. Usually, when a nation up-streams bandwidth to another, thereby extending filtering norms beyond national boundaries. The real danger, though, stems from the focus of nations to develop and establish technical capacities to control information flow. Sometimes, just in time. While there is no substantially proven precedent so far, there are opinions that these technologies can be utilized during conflicts between nations. Two thoughts buttress this notion. One, Internet, in first place is designed for convenience and reliability, security comes later. And two, internet infrastructure is common, both for us and for running essential services. The dangers are varied and are just as boundary-less as our beloved Internet is.

Internet Censorship, hence, has become a topic of immense political and free speech debates. During the past few years, numerous efforts came underway to understand Internet Censorship / filtering mechanisms, and the motivations behind restrictive policies nations adopt. These are broadly discussed as follows:

DECONSTRUCTING INTERNET CENSORSHIP / FILTERING

Internet Censorship and Filtering mechanisms largely classify under two categories – Political, and Social. However, these can be expanded to include Conflict & Security, and Internet tools as has been done by the Open Net Initiative, the basis of this issue. In our opinion, the latter two are majorly sub-heads of political and social censorship mechanisms.

POLITICAL INTERNET CENSORSHIP / FILTERING

Political Censorship and filtering mechanisms roots themselves in growing governments’ perception of Internet as a nationally strategic instrument. These mechanisms apply both to within the country as well as beyond national borders. Internally, political censorship is achieved by insertion to defamation and slander clauses to deter bloggers, opposition leaders etc from posting materials critical of the government. Besides, at many instances, pro government actors selectively used denial-of-service attacks to silence opposition parties and media agencies not toeing the line of government. These strategies are more evident in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) region. CIS is also a region where such censorship mechanisms extend beyond national borders. CIS region already has witnessed two Cyberwars, the first in Estonia during 2007 when allegedly pro-Russia crackers paralyzed Estonian Internet. The second incident took place in Georgia in 2008, and was more or less on the same lines. Political Censorship Mechanisms are often indirect, un-detectable and supported by legal mandates.


6

SOCIAL INTERNET CENSORSHIP / FILTERING

These instruments find a cause in the prohibiting child pornography, and other such social issues as gambling, and material pertaining to holocaust denial etc. Especially in EU grouping, there is a unanimous consensus on blocking some such content. In some nations, governments are also active on prohibiting and prosecuting individuals and entities involved in copyright infringement. Courts in several nations have asked ISPs to block access to sites providing illegal music and film downloads. A variant of social censorship mechanism exists in US where the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is now actively policing comments left on commercial websites and punishing individual commenters who do not disclose their business interests.

SUMMING UP

Not that everything happening via Internet Censorship mechanisms is done with a mala fide intent. Some things need to be controlled. It is necessary that serious offences like pedophilia on Internet, hate speech etc be regulated. However, Internet Censorship is a subject that, since the cold war, has generated interest of almost every nation. Albeit, there is no grouping; nonetheless, it is equally dangerous. The danger is to access to information and freedom of expression. The risk is replication of censorship models of one country in another. Trends are already there. The peril is from the un-ending race to become technically proficient and reliance on black hat means. The techniques are increasingly getting modern, undetectable, that too with state support. A long-term threat is obstruction of essential services by one nation in another. And, the real threat is logic. Yes, logic. Both, computing and governance decisions base on logic; but perhaps one of these defies good sense.


7

I N T E R N E T C E N S O R SH I P – T H E R O L E O F G O V E R N M E N T S

Internet is a disruption that challenges established governance paradigms. The ability and the pace with which Internet has decentralized power centers have transfixed many a nation. Accepting this disruption and consequently modifying administrative practices is hard. A multifarious exercise, which further complicates with every drop in the democracy index. Then, there are questions of relinquishing control over information flow, and filtering unacceptable content. Consequently, governments world over are mulling over ways to control the wild west that Internet is.

A variety of measures is used for Internet control. These range from, one, legal stipulations and penal measures to control online behavior. Two, collaborative efforts by governments across nations to collectively block some content. Three, ensure control in conjunction with ICT firms / pro government individuals. Broadly, government action in the internet-censorship domain can be categorized in two ways, (1) in a collaborative manner and (2) as a regulator.

COLLABORATIVE INTERNET INFORMATION CONTROL MECHANISMS

COLLABORATION WITH PRO-GOVERNMENT INDIVIDUALS

Since the second half of this decade, the idea of utilizing Web2.0 services in reaching out to populace has dawned on the governments world across. The idea being – if individuals can utilize these tools to create awareness and modify mass attitudes – government can use them too. Some of the notable instances, wherein governments acted in order to control and counter purportedly malicious opinions online include:


8

CHINA

So called 50 cents party, a nationwide group of bloggers / online vigilantes, which are directly organized by the government to ‚guide‛ online public opinion.

SOUTH KOREA

South Korean government ordered government organizations to blog and sensitize public about slander on other online forums / websites.

MYANMAR

Ruling Junta government launched khitlunge.com.mm to spread government propaganda and counter media attacks by exiled Burmese media groups.

However, across nations, government’s approach has been more reactionary than proactive. These mechanisms are carefully concocted symbolic engagements that seek to divert attention from potential problem areas and boost government’s public image. The idea is shock and awe. Pro government individuals produce so much content that it outnumbers contradictory opinions. Moreover, these individuals also keep under check other individuals not toeing government’s line.

COLLABORATION BETWEEN NATIONS, WITH ICT FIRMS AND CITIZENS

EUROPEAN UNION

Internet is largely controlled through the coordinated action of states, usually under the processes of European Union. Moreover, the existing EU stipulations concerning Internet filtering overlaps with or supplements existing policies of individual states. There is a broad consensus on to monitor and block-offending materials like, child pornography, human trafficking, terrorist propaganda, and fraud. EU also runs the Safer Internet Program that funds hotlines for citizens to report offending content, and sponsors education efforts on consumer and data protection.

UNITED KINGDOM

In consultation with the British Home Office, Britain’s largest ISP, BT, launched Project Cleanfeed in 2004 that blocks Web sites declared as promoting pedophilia by the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)

Collaborative Internet Censorship Mechanisms, however, are employed in conjunction with the other broad statutes that directly aim to control user behavior. That is, legal stipulations and penal measures. Herein governments take a regulatory role.


9

INTERNET CENSORSHIP BY GOVERNMENTS AS A REGULATOR

The first instances of Internet Censorship can be traced to China, wherein, access to a list of IP addresses, keywords, and domains is actively blocked. This list – prepared by the government – is then passed to individual Internet Service Providers (ISP) for blocking access to a particular web resource. In principle, this strategy is referred to as the ‚First Generation of Internet Filtering Techniques‛. Right now, this practice is being actively employed in many nations across the world. For instance, Pakistan has been off-and-on formally blocking access to many websites. During 2006, even in India, steps were taken to put a blanket ban on blogger.com blogs; however, the ban was later removed. In 2007, a Danish court ordered an ISP to block Allofmp3.com that offered illegal music downloads. In Romania during 2008, ISPs were ordered to block access to 40 Web sites containing illegal material. In CIS countries, first generation internet control techniques are widely put in to practice.

Presently, the first generation techniques have given way to second and third generation of techniques, which are more potent as they employ both legal and extra-legal methods to deny access. Second and Third Generation Internet Control Techniques comprise both an overt as well as a covert strategies. These include, to name a few, criterion for ‚what is acceptable‛ within national media space, informal request to ISPs to take down or block access to a certain web resource, and Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attacks. Shockingly, it has been claimed that DDOS attacks have been undertaken at the behest of government. These strategies are discussed, in detail, in our post on Internet Control Mechanisms by the Governments in the World.

SUMMING UP

Internet is an equally potent tool irrespective of who uses it – a citizen, or a criminal, or a government. That it erases boundaries – between nations, cultural norms, and socio-political structures, further compounds the problem. That it has the potential to sway the populace in a direction very different from, as thought off by the policy makers of a nation, is a latent possibility. That, taming Internet will be an onerous task, regardless of the strength of a nation. Since it is a relatively new domain, there is a multiplicity of measures to control by governments world across. However, the trends are increasingly leaning to a more subtle, and pervasive approach. A scenario that portends poorly for the world. There is a need to establish a worldwide equally acceptable and an inclusive framework whereby unacceptable content is censured democratically and not arbitrarily. Governments’ dilemma is apparent, but we know that resistance to change is inevitable, and so is change.

Top Image Source: Agony by babblingdweeb, Flickr


10

I N T E R N E T C E N S O R SH I P M E C H A N I S M S I N T H E W O R L D

Most of us, as you would see in the image above, enjoy a relatively free Internet access. But, figure this; nations across the world are currently, in some way or the other, monitoring Internet. Many a time, under the guise of domestic security – a rationale that makes it somewhat palatable to us. More so, since non-state actors and criminals actively use Internet, Internet monitoring becomes a sine qua non for firming up security.

At a deeper level, however, things are murkier than you and I can fathom.

The way we know Internet censorship, is by the China example or the recent threats to ban Blackberry in Gulf States. In real world, Internet Censorship has a larger ambit – from tackling terror to include human rights groups critical of governments, opposition parties, and even individuals who dare to voice their discontent. Internet censorship is also just not limited to mere blocking access to web resources, as is much bandied about in popular culture. It involves legal stipulations on online behavior, and even extra legal methods to deny access.

As a phenomenon, Internet Censorship has gained momentum since 2006. And, so have the technical capabilities behind. The Open Net Initiative has best captured this gradual growth as three waves of Internet Censorship. In short, the governments world over are either (1) directly blocking access or (2) modifying user behavior through regulations and even (purportedly) contracting crackers to bring down a site; and (3) running counter information campaign to confuse and overwhelm opponents. In the world we live in, a mix of these three waves is operational. Moreover, we are moving closer to second and third waves.


11

FIRST GENERATION INTERNET CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS

First generation Internet Censorship mechanisms feature a direct involvement of governments. Internet filtering is achieved by use of specialized software or manual re-configuration of routers at key internet choke points to block web access based on servers, domains, keywords, and IP addresses. These tactics, predominantly, are centered, in regions having authoritative regimes. However, with time, their spread is now expanding to countries with favorable democratic environment too.

SOME OF THE NOTABLE INSTANCES OF FIRST GENERATION INTERNET CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS IN RECENT TIMES INCLUDE:

In Uzbekistan, wherein government department conveys a block lists to individual ISPs that implement a ban.

In Turkmenistan, Turkmentelekom, the country’s sole ISP, heavily filters internet access.

In Asia, China has ordered all internet cafes in Tibet to install a state-of-the-art surveillance system that would not only restrict access but would also trace back the identity of the individual who tries accessing a blocked web resource. Moreover, internet access would be dependent upon an identity card that needs to be swiped before going online.

In Middle East, UAE government has most recently, proposed a ban on Blackberry mobile handsets, purportedly under the guise of national security. Communications back and forth from Blackberry are encrypted, and which the UAE government could not monitor. Reportedly, blackberry ban comes days after the government arrested several youths using Blackberry messaging for organizing a peaceful protest.India and Lebanan too are not far behind in this regard.

In Europe, the government in Turkey has blocked access to more than 5000 internet sites including YouTube.

In Australia, the government is currently in a fix whether to (1) block access to online resources that they do not want their citizens to see, and (2) secretly, snoop upon the web surfing habits of netizens.

An important feature of these mechanisms is that many a time, filtering mechanisms in one country spill over to another country. This happens when a country purchases bandwidth from ISPs located in another country. The originating country can have its own list of blocked web resources. Consequently, Internet censorship norms at the provider country level also become applicable to second country. Second country, can further have a separate censorship list. Thereby, severely affecting the access. Presently, First generation Internet censorship mechanisms, are giving way to more subtle, difficult to trace, and just-in-time tactics under Second and Third Generation Censorship Mechanisms.

SECOND GENERATION INTERNET CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS

Second Generation Mechanisms involve 2 strategic instruments at the hands of the governments. The first is a restrictive legal environment within which service providers, media and bloggers etc have to function. The second aims at development & use of technical capabilities to control access to information within a shortest possible time, and with clandestine means. Second generation controls have an overt and a covert track.


12

OVERT MECHANISMS

Internet sites to mandatorily register with authorities. Noncompliance can become a ground for taking down content, and possibly revoking service providers’ license

Strict guidelines for ‚acceptable‛ content within the national media space

Insertion of defamation, slander, and ‘‘veracity’’ clauses to deter publication of content critical of government

Evoking national security concerns, especially at times of civic unrest, as the justification for blocking specific Internet content and services

COVERT MECHANISMS

These are event based just-in-time denial to specific web resources, further, these are difficult to verify, as they can guised as technical errors.

A formal or even informal request by governments to ISPs to block content

Shutting down Internet access, telecommunications services, especially, short message services (SMS) under the guise of technical errors

Computer network attacks, especially, the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to overwhelm ISPs and selected sites. It is difficult to trace the originating point of DDOS attacks. These attacks are sold and engineered by crackers and can be ordered by anyone. It has been pointed out that in some cases DDOS attacks were initiated on the behest of government.

SOME OF NOTABLE INSTANCES OF THE SECOND GENERATION INTERNET CONTROL MECHANISMS INCLUDE

In Korea, since 2008, Lee Myung-bak administration has criminalized some online comments critical of the government on defamation charges. Besides, it frequently asks portals to delete posts that are critical of the government.

During 2007 in Estonia and in Georgia during 2008, Internet was paralysed by pro-Russia hackers, allegedly at the behest of Russian government.

Second generation Internet Censorship Mechanisms are further evolving. It has been recently reported that in Russia, instead of resorting to a blanket ban on websites, the government is applying regional filters to stop access to objectionable content. Thereby, avoiding accessive media attention and filtering access of a target group only.

THIRD GENERATION INTERNET CENSORSHIP MECHANISMS

Third-generation controls take a highly sophisticated, multidimensional approach to enhancing state control over national cyberspace and building capabilities for competing in informational space with potential adversaries and competitors. These have twin focus

1. Successfully competing with potential threats through effective counter information campaigns that overwhelm, discredit, or demoralize opponents


13

2. Active use of surveillance and data mining as means to confuse and entrap opponents

METHODS

Warrant-less monitoring of Internet users and usage

Creating National Cyber-zones: Countries such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Russia are investing heavily into expanding Internet access to schools. These institutions are tied to special Internet connections, which limit access only to resources found in the national Internet domain

State Sponsored Information Campaigns:Employing ‘‘Internet Brigades’’ to engage, confuse, or discredit individuals or sources. Activities can include posting prepackaged propaganda, disinformation through mass blogging, participation in Internet polls, or harassment of individual users.

SOME OF THE NOTABLE INSTANCES WHEREIN THESE CONTROLS ARE EVIDENT INCLUDE:

In USA, a volunteer based group ‚Project Vigilant‛ – that has been tracking more than 250 million IP addresses daily – helps federal authorities in its intelligence gathering programs. This group has come out publicly recently. The group has developed its own obfuscation network to monitor internet without being noticed. It can ‚develop portfolios on any name, screen name or IP address.‛ Project Vigilant is an example of military – industrial complex. By using them Congressional audits can be avoided and legal barriers can be sidestepped.

SUMMING UP

Internet Censorship, as you would see has significantly advanced from mere blocking access to websites. Right now, it is a complex interplay of government – industry mix. What is notable, however, is the speed with which such developments have happened. That the techniques have evolved at such a rapid pace is even more remarkable. Nonetheless, this is a dangerous precedent, in a way, that the dangers of replication in other nations are quite visible. Somewhere, these techniques shake the very foundation of a democracy and question the idea of a mutually inclusive pluralistic society. There is no denying that some sort of censorship is necessary, but how much and with what means is the question.

Top Image Source – a slightly touched upon version of a Wikipedia Image


14

I N T E R N E T C E N S O R SH I P S C E N A R I O I N S E L E C T A S I A N N A T I O N S

MYANMAR

One of the most severe regimes of information control in the world

A combination of government restrictions, connection speeds, and prohibitive costs has rendered Internet as relatively stagnant

Network-ready computers must be registered (for a fee) with the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications [MPT], any deviations from such law is prone to fines and prison sentences of seven to 15 years

Terms-of-service rules for MPT users provide a warning that online content will be subject to the same kind of strict filtering that applies to Television and print industry

Users must obtain MPT permission before creating Web pages, and they cannot post anything ‘‘detrimental’’ to the government or simply related to politics

Sharing registered Internet connections is also punishable by revocation of access and the threat of ‘‘legal action

It is mandatory for Public Access Centers [PACs] to take screenshots every five minutes, which would then be shared with Myanmar Info-Tech every two weeks

Internet cafe´ have to ensure that only state-run e-mail providers are used

Many bloggers self-monitor their postings with a view to avoid their blogs being added to the blacklist

Government e-mail services, are widely believed to be under surveillance, with delays of up to several days between the sending and receipt of e-mails, or with messages appearing with attachments deleted


15

CHINA

Pursues strict supervision of domestic media, delegates liability for online content providers, and, utilizes a propaganda approach to online debate and discussion

Government aggressively intervenes in news media coverage

Fifty Cent Party members, a nationwide 280,000 web commentators are directly organized by the government to guide public behavior

Ministry of Culture has developed Web commentator trainings programs and major Web sites are required to have in-house teams of these government-trained commentators

Citizens are prohibited from disseminating between nine and eleven categories of content that appear consistently in most regulations

Formal Internet control mechanism like policies & instructions and defamation liability and Informal Internet Control mechanisms like editorial responsibility for content, economic incentives, and intimidation are used

Internet content providers and other user-generated sites, are directly responsible for what is published on their services

Video service providers that produce their own content are required to obtain a broadcast production license and Internet news information services licenses

Video service providers are also required to improve their content administration systems by hiring personnel to review and filter content, especially online music videos and other video entertainment, original content, and even netizen reporter

Blog service providers must not only install filters to block posts based on potentially thousands of keyword combinations, but also flag certain posts for review

All Internet cafe´s are required to install filtering software, ban minors from entering, monitor the activities of their users, and record every user’s identity and complete session logs for up to 60 days

PAKISTAN

Much of the episodic filtering in Pakistan has been ordered in reaction to ‘‘blasphemous’’ content

Broadcast or distribution of any content ‘‘against the ideology of Pakistan‛ is prohibited

Programming that ‘‘defames or brings into ridicule the head of state, or members of the armed forces, or executive, legislative or judicial organ of the state is prohibited

Responsibility for implementing filtering is at the ISP level

Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance requires ISPs to retain all traffic data for at least 90 days and to provide it to the government upon request

Internal security conflicts had become a strong focus for filtering, including Web sites relating to Balochi independence movements, Sindhi human rights, and political autonomy movements

internet censorship across the world

Business