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Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906, Tempe, AZ 85287-5906, USA

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Page 1: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory

IEE594 Presentation

Xiangyang Li

Dept. of Industrial Engineering

Arizona State University Box 875906, Tempe, AZ 85287-5906, USA

Page 2: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 2

Current People

• DirectorDr. Nong Ye

• StudentsMaster:

Syed Masum Emran

Ph.D.:

Qiang Chen

Xiangyang Li

Mingming Xu

Dawei Zhang

Yebin Zhang

Page 3: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 3

Current Researches

• Information securityIntrusion detection Technology Study

• Supply chain - Business SchoolEnterprise modeling and simulation

Page 4: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Intrusion Detection Technology

Application of Decision Tree Classifier

Page 5: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 5

Intrusion Detection - Defensive System

• Security Policy– What should we protect?

• Prevention– How can we prevent an intrusion?

• Detection– If there is an intrusion, how can we detect it?

• Response/Recovery– If we detect an intrusion, how can we response? How can we recover the

system from the damage?

Page 6: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 6

Intrusion Detection - Methods

• Norm-based Approach– Statistical-based Techniques (SPC)

• Build up a norm profile with statistical methods

– Specification-based Techniques (ANN, BN,...)

• Build up a norm profile with rules and logical specification

• Signature-based Approach (DT, Clustering,...)– Recognize the pre-defined intrusion signature from system activities.

Page 7: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 7

Problem Definition(1)

• Intrusion Detection

Normality profile method

Signature recognition method– Decision tree technique can be used

to build the signatures of normal activities and attacks automatically. Each path of the tree corresponds to a signature.

– Each leaf represents an IW value. Each leaf corresponds to a specific state of the system.

Page 8: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 8

Problem Definition(2)

• BSM audit event from Solaris event 217

auid -2

euid 0

egid 0

ruid 0

rgid 0

pid 96

sid 0

RemoteIP 0.0.0.0

time 897047263

error_message 91

process_error 0

retval 0

attack 0

• Target variable– Label : 0 - normal activity, 1 - attack– IW(Intrusion Warning) : 0 - 1

• Predictor variables

Only use the information of event type. (284 event types - Solaris 2.7)

• Data sets– Training data set– Testing data set

Page 9: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 9

Problem Definition(3)

• Decision tree algorithms– GINI and CHAID (Answer Tree - SPSS Inc.)

• Analysis of testing results– Comparison of Mean, Max and Min of IW values between normal and

attack events.

– ROC (Receiver Operating Curve) with Hit rates and False alarm rates based on the predicted IW values and the true Label values.

Page 10: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 10

Single-event Decision Tree Classifier

• Single-event classifier– Label -> target variable

– Event type -> the only predictor variable

Page 11: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 11

Result Analysis(1)

IWValue

Min Max Mean StandardDeviation

Normal 0.00 1.00 0.209 0.135

Attack 0.00 1.00 0.368 0.255

Statistics for single event classifier (CHAID)

Page 12: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 12

Result Analysis(2)

ROC analysis for single event classifier (CHAID)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

rat

e

Page 13: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 13

EWMA VectorsWe use one variable to represent one event type. Then there are 284 variables for the 284 event types. In our sample data set there are 49 variables. We use these variables as the predictor variables. Each variable is calculated for each event as:

)1(*)1(1*)( tXtX ii if the audit event at time t belongs to the ith event type

)1(*)1(0*)( tXtX ii if the audit event at time t is different from the ith event type

3.0,0)0( iX

Page 14: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 14

Result Analysis(3)IW

ValueMin Max Mean Standard

DeviationNormal 0.00 1.00 0.209 0.135

Attack 0.00 1.00 0.368 0.255

Statistics for single event classifier (CHAID)

IWValue

Min Max Mean StandardDeviation

Normal 0.00 1.00 0.046 0.210

Attack 0.00 1.00 0.881 0.324

Statistics for EWMA vector classifier (CHAID)

Page 15: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 15

Result Analysis(4)

ROC analysis for EWMA vectors (GINI-CHAID)

0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

ra

te

GINI

CHAID

Page 16: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 16

Moving Window

Moving Direction

Observation Window

E2 E3 E7 E6 E3 E4 E16 E2

Window Size = 4 units

New datavariables {E1… E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7…E284}

values {… 0 1 1 0 1 1 …}

Page 17: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 17

“Existence” and “Count” Classifiers

• “Existence”

In the transferred data set, variable i records whether event type i exists in current moving window.

• “Count”

In the transferred data set, variable i records how many times event type i appears in current moving window. We use this one in moving window classifiers on event types.

• Truncation

Remove the part of transferred data which includes both normal and attack

events.

Page 18: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 18

Result Analysis(5)

IWValue

Min Max Mean StandardDeviation

Normal 0.00 1.00 0.080 0.153

Attack 0.00 1.00 0.790 0.384

Statistics for moving window classifier (CHAID)

Page 19: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 19

Result Analysis(6)

ROC for moving window classifier(CHAID)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

rat

e

Page 20: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 20

Layered Classifiers

Single event classifier

Auditdata

Upper Level

Lower Level

IW

State-ID classifier

IW

Classified States

State-ID Classifiers

Page 21: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 21

Result Analysis(7)

ROC analysis for state_ID classifiers (CHAID)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

rat

e

Count

Existence

Page 22: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 22

Result Analysis(8)

ROC analysis for "count" state-ID classifiers

0.8

0.85

0.9

0.95

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

rat

e

Chaid

Gini

Page 23: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 23

Result Analysis(9)

Comparison of Decision Tree Classifiers(CHAID-Count)

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

False alarm rate

Hit

rat

e

Single event

EWMA vectors

Moving window

State_ID

Page 24: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 24

Conclusions and Problem

Conclusions

• DTCs show promising performance in intrusion detection application

• The performance of a DTC is dependent on its design, i.e. the choice of predictor variables and target variable.

• Different decision tree algorithms impact the results.

Problem

• Computational Feasibility

– Incremental training ability(ITI)

– Scalable/Parallel/Database(ScalParC)

– Bagging and Boosting?

Page 25: Information Integration and Assurance Laboratory IEE594 Presentation Xiangyang Li Dept. of Industrial Engineering Arizona State University Box 875906,

Oct. 2000 25

END

• Other works - http://iia.eas.asu.edu/