individual write up

8/6/2019 Individual Write Up

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/individual-write-up 1/14

JEE 488 ± SYSTEMS DESIGN PROJECT

SUBMISSION 2 ± DESIGN DOCUMENTATION

SAFETY CASE REPORT

Australian Maritime College

National Centre For Maritime Engineering And Hydrodynamics

PROJECT INFORMATION SUBMISSION INFORMATION

STUDENT M. JOHNSTON WEIGHTING NA

LECTURER JOHN SEATON DUE DATE SIGNATURE DATED

UNIT COORDINATOR JOHN SEATON 29/07/2011



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

2

Contents

1. Operators Contact Information ................................ ................................ ...................... 4

Brisbane Office ................................ ................................ ................................ ............. 4

2. Introduction................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 5

2.1. Scope of Safety Case ................................ ................................ .............................. 5

2.2. Facility Layout and Location ................................ ................................ .................. 6

2.3. Safety Philosophy ................................ ................................ ................................ ... 8

2.3.1. Terminology Surrounding Risk ................................ ................................ ........ 9

2.3.2. Method of Assessment ................................ ................................ ..................... 9

2.3.3. Hazard Identification ................................ ................................ ..................... 10

2.3.4. Risk Assessment ................................ ................................ ............................ 12

2.4. Industry Involvement ................................ ................................ ............................ 13

3. Operations ................................ ................................ ................................ ................... 13

3.1. Risks Present during Maintenance................................ ................................ ......... 13

4. Design Modifications ................................ ................................ ................................ .. 13

4.1. Design Philosophy ................................ ................................ ................................ 13

4.2. Summary of Modifications ................................ ................................ ................... 14

4.3. Risks Present During Instalation ................................ ................................ ........... 14

4.4. Control Measures and Risk Mitigation ................................ ................................ .. 14

4.5. Workplace Policy ................................ ................................ ................................ . 14

5. Compliance with Safety Case ................................ ................................ ...................... 14



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

3

Nomenclature

Abbreviations

AISM Association of International Maritime Signilisation

ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable

AS Australian Standard

Aton/AN Aid to Navigation

CAP Civil Aviation Authority (U.K)

IALA Internasionale Akademie vir Leierskap deur Avontuur

(International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and

Lighthouse Authorities)

ISO International Standards Organisation

MAE Major Accident Event

MWL/MSWL Mean Sea Water Level

NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority

OH&S Occupational Health and Safety

SMS Safety Management System



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

4

1. Operators Contact Information

Australian Maritime Safety Authority

Australian Search and Rescue (AusSAR)

Head Office: Canberra

82 Northbourne Avenue

Braddon ACT 2612Australia

Postal

GPO Box 2181

Canberra ACT 2601

Australia

Courier

AMSA Head OfficeInformation Centre

82 Northbourne AvenueBraddon ACT 2612

Phone

(02) 6279 5000

Fax

(02) 6279 5950

Internet: [email protected]

Brisbane Office

Level 10, 410 Ann St

Brisbane QLD 4000

Australia

Postal

PO Box 10790

Adelaide Street

Brisbane QLD 4000Australia

Phone

(07) 3001 6800

Fax

(07) 3001 6801



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

5

2. Introduction

Nardana Patches AN 307 is an IALA Category 1 Short Range Aid to Navigation located in

the Prince of Wales channel in Torres Straight. According to AISM its inclusion as aCategory 1 AtoN ranks it as a being of ³vital national significance´ (IALA, 2004) and as such

the lighting system undergoes annual services. Additional to marking the safe shipping lane,the platform also hosts tide and current sensors, one of which requires bi-yearly services. It is

for these maintenance periods that this safety case is intended, as these are the only timeswhen personnel work on the platform.

The term Safety Case was adopted in Australian Legislation shortly following the

introduction in Britain of the 1992 Offshore Safety Act. Offshore safety cases in Australia are

required under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations

2009 and are submitted to the regulatory body National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority.

While a document of this type is not required for a platform serving in the role of AN307,

this document has been produced at the request of AMSA; the body responsible for operation

of the platform. It is the intent of the following submission to bring together relevant

requirements of a NOPSA specified safety case as well as to submit safe working guidelines

in accordance with the Maritime Union of Australia¶s recommendations.

Future upgrades to the platform are also planned based around mitigating fatigue issues due

to ongoing vibration of the structure and installation of a current power generation unit.Under subclause 4(7)(b) of Schedule 3 of the OPGGSA, operations on the platform and on

any work vessel in a non-navigable condition engaged in this installation fall under the scopeof the platforms safety case. Considerations relating to installation are included in the body of

the safety case for general operation, but are titled separately so as to be removed uponrevision of the safety case after completion of the upgrades. Considerations relating to

operation and maintenance of the planned upgrades are to be included in the next revision.

2.1. Scope of Safety Case

NOPSA itemises platforms according to facility type in order to more clearly define elements

to be covered in the safety case. Apart from drilling and hydrocarbon production facilities,the installation can be categorised under Item 1 of the Scope of Validation. A ValidationPolicy in this context is defined by NOPSA to cover the platforms facilities rather than

operations, which fall under the scope of the safety case itself. Relevant elements to becovered for an unmanned non-production platform are most clearly outlined in the parallel

UK safety case guidelines. Particulars from this list to be covered are:

Name and address of the owner of the installation;

Summary of how industry representatives were consulted;

Layout and configuration of the facility;

Exit routes and evacuation facilities;

The maximum number of persons catered for on the facility;

Description of how the duty holder will ensure compliance with regulation;

Inventory of toxic and hazardous substances on site;

Access to medical facilities;

Limits of the environmental conditions beyond which the facility cannot safely be

manned;

Details of combined operations including co-ordination and management systems as

well as hazards created by the joint operation.



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

6

Additional to these, a separate set of recommendations are made for a design notification,some of which are pertinent to the planned upgrades to AN 307. Relevant particulars to be

included are:

A description of the design process and design philosophy;

How risks inherent in the new design were kept as low as reasonably practicable;

The criteria used to select the concept; The location of the modification within the system layout;

The meteorological and oceanographic conditions which the installation may

experience;

Particulars of the type of operations necessary to complete the installation;

A general description of how the duty holder will ensure compliance with relevant

statutory provisions including OH&S conditions.

It is noted in the guidelines that vessels being moored in location for production purposes

must be deemed suitable for service in the new location by the duty holder, however this is

not the case where vessels are being moored to conduct maintenance or upgrades to the

platform. In this circumstance it is the responsibility of the operator of the vessel to ensure its

fitness for service in the new location.

Additional to the relevant NOPSA requirements, the AISM makes certain recommendation

regarding safety in relation to Aids to Navigation. While these do not cover operations

occurring on the installation, they are briefly discussed as they pertain to vessel collision.

2.2. Facility Layout and Location

The Nardana Patches Aid to Navigation is located approximately 9.5 nautical miles North

East of Hammond Island in 12.8 metres of water at co-ordinates:

Latitude 10 30.2850 S

Longitude 142 14.6290 E

Chart Datum WGS 84

Structurally the platform is a mono-pile structure with the first of two decks fixed to the top

of the column at 7.5 meters above chart datum. The structural framework for the upper deck

originates at the perimeter of the work-deck and supports the helideck at a height of 12.8

meters above chart datum. This arrangement leaves the interior of the lower deck clear for

operations and equipment storage.

The AtoN is visible to passing ship traffic by way of navigation lighting and a radar reflector,

both mounted on the lower of the two decks. The lower deck also hosts a glass reinforced

polymer cabinet containing batteries for power storage and the control system for the

oceanographic equipment mounted on the platform. The platforms upper deck is a helipadused for drop off and pick up of work crews to the installation. An elevation representation

for the as built structure has been included in Figure 2-1, showing access ways connecting the

two decks and berthing position.



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

7

Figure 2-1 Nardana Patches Elevation Drawing

Several ladders are used to connect the berthing location to the workdeck and the workdeck

to the helideck. The berthing ladder runs between the fenders and exits through a manholethrough the grating of the workdeck. This ladder is vertical and extends from lowest

astronomical tide to the workdeck. The ladder joining the workdeck and helideck extendsonly 3 meters vertically and is oriented at 20o from vertical.

Figure 2-2 Plan Veiw of Helideck



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

8

2.2.1. Site Infrastructure Summary

Information on a number of specific fields is specifically suggested in safety case guidlines.

This information is presented in the table below; where appropriate the information is

expanded on in Section 2.2.2.

Field Number on Platform

Max Number Of Personnel Day-Shift 5

Number of Personnel Overnight Accommodation 0

Catering Facilities None

Production Infrastructure None

Drilling Infrastructure None

Hazardous Chemicals Hydraulic fluids; Petrochemical cleaners

Mechanical Hazards Winch; High pressure cleaner; Equipment on

berthed vessels; Helicopter rotors

Work at Height Accessway from berthed vessel to workdeck

exceeds safe height

Table 2-1 Recommended Fields

2.2.2. Installed Equipment

Radar Reflector: AGA SR166

CHARACTER: Fl(4) 12.0 secs

Flash: 0.5 sec

Short Eclipse: 1.5 sec

Long Eclipse: 5.5 sec

ARC of VISIBILITY: Red: 235° - 122° (247°)

Obscured: 122° - 235° (113°)

COLOUR OF LlGHT: Red



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

9

2.3. Safety Philosophy

NOPSA mandates a safety approach centred on minimising risks to their lowest practicable

level; this is given the acronym ALARP for As Low As is Reasonably Practical. Within this

framework it is important that the safety case reflects the actual safety measures in place onthe platform or what can realistically be implemented following submission of the safety

case.

2.3.1. Terminology Surrounding Risk

Guidelines published by NOPSA encourage the use of terminology relating to safety

documentation within strict interpretation. These interpretations have been adopted in thefollowing discussion and are given by the National Government agency ComCare as follows:

Hazard: is the potential to cause harm. Anything that may cause harm or an adverse

health effect on a person is hazardous.

Risk: is the likelihood that a hazard will cause harm, through injury or ill health, to

anyone at or near a workplace. The level of risk to health increases with the severity of the

hazard and the duration and frequency of exposure to the hazard.

Exposure: Occurrence of a person coming into contact with a hazard.

(Australian Government, 1999)

Likelihood: in qualitative analysis of risk is the number of incidents compared with

the number of exposures. A number of qualitative scales of likelihood also exist but these are

generally industry specific (the automotive and space industry for example have different

measures of ³rare´).

Consequence: is the harm caused or cost of an accident. It can include medical,

operational or financial consequences.

2.3.2. Method of Assessment

In construction of the Formal Safety Assessment it is attempted to follow a linear structure,with hazards being first identified and then assessed according to the risk they pose. This

generally involves identification of the control procedures surrounding the hazard and asubsequent assessment of the likelihood of the events leading to a Major Accident Event

occurring. Where a Major Accident Event is identified, a Formal Safety Assessment is then

required; should no Major accident Events stem from the hazard then the hazard is dealt with

in the Safety Management System. This process flow is neatly described in the diagram

provided by NOPSA, reproduced in Figure 2-3.

Hazard

Identification

Identify Controls

& Screening

Determine

Likelihood &Consequences

Asses Risk Posed

by Hazard

Implement Additional

Controls



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

10

2.3.1. Hazard Identification

Several hazard identification techniques were found useful during the construction of the

safety case. In general the more complex techniques were not used, since workflow on the

platform was not inherently complex or dangerous. Of the techniques suggested by NOPSA

those used were:

Brainstorming Event Tree What-if

Given the manual nature of the maintenance tasks performed on the platform, integrating

human factors is considered very important to develop a complete list of hazards present.Llyods register present some key principals to remember when considering human factors in

safety assessment:

Caution in including human intervention in hazard mitigation

Staffing level and workload

Training/competence

Actual rather than intended organisation structure Communications

Expectation of human error

Regarding human intervention in hazard mitigation, it is understood that workers responsesduring an incident will be unpredictable and should thus not be relied upon. Expectation of

immediate action or action which would endanger the individual is not made in the safetyassessment as it is understood to be unrealistic.

(Donovan, 2008)

2.3.2. Identification of Controls/Screening

The Screening provided by safety procedures will be different depending on the path from

hazard to MAE.

MAE

Hazard 1

Hazard 2

Hazard 3

Screening

Screening

Screening



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

11

Figure 2-3 NOPSA Screening Process (N-04300-GN0165, 2010)

Screening of hazards is conducted according to a ³hierarchy of controls´. This hierarchyattempts to provide protection from hazards on the most permanent basis possible. This

hierarchy governs both the implementation of screening from hazards as well as their

identification.

Hierarchy of Controls:

Eliminate: Where possible the process which presents the hazard is eliminated. This

requires removing the process from the facility (including facilities connected even on only atemporary basis).

Substitute: If the function must be performed on the facility, it may be possible to find analternate means which does not present the same level of hazard.

Engineer: Were performing the hazardous process cannot be avoided, solutions can beengineered to limit the exposure of personnel.

Administrate: Administrative approaches to safety management commonly take the formof restricted access, minimum training requirements and limiting conditions of operation.Application of administrative procedures is kept to a minimum where engineered solutions can befound as an alternative.

PPE: Personal Protective Equipment mainly refers to products worn to limit exposure tolow level hazards such as small dropped objects or hot shards. PPE is also implemented in



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

12

conjunction with administrative procedures in the form of height access equipment or survivalequipment.

Further classification of screening procedures is then recommended based on whether the procedures are proactive of reactive. This is summarised in the ³bow tie´ diagram produced

by NOPSA and reproduced in Figure 2-4.

Figure 2-4 Bow Tie Classification of Screening Procedures

The ultimate aim of this classification system is to ensure that sufficient layers of protection

exist between a hazard and a Major Accident Event.

2.3.3. Risk Assessment

The assessment of risk for work-crews operating on the Nardana Patches Platform is

conducted quantitatively where possible. This most often takes the form of a risk assessment

criteria table, combining the likelihood of an incident with its predicted consequences. This is

in actual fact a semi-qualitative method but it does allow for easy comparison of risks.

Likelihood is most often expressed as a return period for the event, which is convenient for

the Nardana Patches Installation as scheduled maintenance is organised in a similar way.

Assessment of the consequence is also conducted quantitatively where possible, such as

expressing operational losses as percentage time spent non-operable. Some consequences

however do resist quantitative categorisation and these are usually ranked on a sliding scale.

Level Descriptor Example Detail Description Return Period

1 Rare Occurs only in exceptional circumstances Less than 1 in 10 years

2 Unlikely Could occur at some time At least 1 in 10 years

3 Moderate Will occur at some time At least 1 in 5 years



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

13

4 Likely Will occur in most circumstances 1 in a year

5 Almost Certain The event is expected to occur More than 1 a year

Table 2-2 Likelihood Assessment

The rationale behind the development of a safety case is given by NOPSA as:

³that those who create the risk must manage it. It is the operators' job to assess their processes, procedures and systems to identify and evaluate risks and implement the appropriate controls, because the operator has the greatest in-depth knowledge of their installation.´

Since the installation is an existing structure, the implications to safety can no longer beconsidered at the design stage

2.4. Industry Involvement

3. Operations

Work over and routine maintenance.

Max number of persons present during maintenance operations.

Helideck designed to UK CAP 347 which is the offshore industry norm and is recognised for

insurance and legal coverage. The standard contains an effective inspection regime for

structural integrity and operational considerations; aluminium platforms being covered in

detail.

3.1. Risks Present during MaintenanceMeteorological and oceanographic conditions which the installation is subjected too andlimits placed on conditions

4. Design Modifications

Purpose

4.1. Design Philosophy

NOPSA suggests the inclusion of the design philosophy as a means to demonstrate that all potential uses of the facility have been considered; specifically the hazards presented by each

use of the facility. The implications of these

Options considered.

Basis of decision

How risks were minimised during the design process:

- Avoid welding during installation. Confine to fabrication.

- Reduction of vibration increases safe working window.



SAFETY CASE JEE-488

14

-

4.2. Summary of Modifications

Location within installation layout

Technology to be used

Structural coupling required.

4.3. Risks Present During Installation

Hot works in form of angle grinders will be necessary.

Review of original safety case hazards associated with modification.

Hazards associated with installation.

4.4. Control Measures and Risk Mitigation

Temporary refuge

Fire fighting facilities

Escape routes ± evacuation facilities

First aid facilities

Rescue equipment

4.5. Workplace Policy

AMSA Hazard/incident Report FormPPE

5. Compliance with Safety Case

Site specific induction before each maintenance visit

Ensure that all personell have valid work site safety cards (Queensland Construction White

Card or equivilant)

individual write up

Documents