impacts of leak sites - masayuki hatta (surugadai university)

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Impact of Leaksites Masayuki Hatta [email protected] @TICTeC Taipei 2017/09/12

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Page 1: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Impact of LeaksitesMasayuki [email protected]

@TICTeC Taipei 2017/09/12

Page 2: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Leaksites

Page 3: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

What’s “Leaksites”?

● Web-based whistleblowing-support initiatives

● Use of anonymization technologies

Page 4: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

What’s whistleblowing?

● Accusation from the insiders● Traitor? Health checkup?● Legal protection in many countries, but

usually not enough– Some “retaliation” might be possible, e.g.

implicit demotion

● No protection at all in some countries– Whistleblowers’ life sometimes at stake

Page 5: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Anonymization Tech

● An application of Internet Censorship Circumvention Tech

● You can access sites without leaving “footprints” e.g. IP Address

Page 6: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

What’s whistleblowing?

● Watergate Scandal: “Deep Throat”● Pentagon Papers: Daniel Ellsberg● Bradley (Chelsea) Manning● Edward Snowden● Panama Papers: “John Doe”

Page 7: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

What’s “Leaksites”?

● Web-based whistleblowing-support initiatives

– Receiving leaked data mainly via Internet

● Use of anonymization technologies

– Not by all of them

– An application of Deep Web tech● Tor, I2P, GnuPG

– Conceal whistleblowers’ identity technologically, sometimes even from leaksites

● Even if the server is confiscated, leakers should be safe

● An application of Info Tech to Journalism

– Or, an extreme of Civic Tech

Page 8: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Brief History of Leaksites

● Before Wikileaks● 2010: the year of Wikileaks● After Wikileaks

Page 9: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Brief History of Leaksites

● Before Wikileaks– Cryptome (est. 1996)

● No anonymizing tech, though

● 2010: the year of Wikileaks– 4 big scoops in a year

– Had an (truly) anonymous submission system based on Tor

● Not “I know you, but I won’t tell”

Page 10: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Brief History of Leaksites

● 2011: Wikileaks was (almost) gone– Conflicts with the U.S. Govt, Lots of infight, No

transparency, No open source, etc.

– Submission system was also gone● 4 scoops were actually not obtained from this submission system● It finally returned in 2015

● After Wikileaks– Some tried to fill the vacuum created by Wikileaks

● Develop open source alternatives● Including mainstream media outlets

– Leaksites were born

Page 11: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Software behind Leaksites

● SecureDrop● GlobaLeaks● There were some others

– e.g. Honest Appalachia

Page 12: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

SecureDrop

● Originally developed by the late Aaron Schwartz

● Now Freedom of the Press Foundation take care of it

● Used by emerging media outlets including ProPublica, The Intercept, BuzzFeed

● Used by many mainstream media outlets including The New York Times, The Guardian, The Washington Post

Page 13: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

GlobaLeaks

● Developed by Hermes Center, an Italy-based initiative

● Used by many NGOs, including Amnesty International

● Dutch PubLeaks

Page 14: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

My survey

● N=102– Including now-defunct ones

● Many can’t be reached at all● Internet Archive is your friend

● Around 46% use anonymization technologies

Page 15: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Establishment Years

Page 16: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Establishment Years

● 2010: Wikileaks● 2014: Edward Snowden

Page 17: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

The Duration

Page 18: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

The Duration

● Most leaksites die within a year● But the overall survival rate is not that bad

Page 19: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Who’s running leaksites?

Page 20: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Who’s running leaksites?

● Many are some kind of self-described “organization”, possibly an individual

● Not entirely reliable entities, but in this case it’s not a big problem

● “Consortium”: one leaksites used by several media

Page 21: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

https://whistleblowing.jp

● My own effort of running a leaksite in Japan

● Based on GlobaLeaks● Connecting whistleblowers and journos in

an safer way● Almost all Japanese mainstream media

outlets are interested, one is now giving a trial

Page 22: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

How It Works

Whistleblower

Tor Network

GlobaLeaks

“Tip” (provides a way of anonymous communication between whistleblower and journo)

Journalists

Encrypted by GPG

Page 23: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

(Lots of) Challenges

● Tech is easy, others are tough...● Non-tech challenges

– Is Tor legal?● Abuses and busts

– Might lose public support

● New Special Secrecy Law

– Not whistleblowing-friendly culture● Not anonymous-friendly culture

– Training● Requires huge amount of new tech tricks for average people● Getting training itself might be suspicious● Badly needs good introductory materials of anon tech for journos, especially

in Japanese

Page 24: Impacts of Leak Sites - Masayuki Hatta (Surugadai University)

Impact of Leaksites

● Impact measurement is VERY difficult– “Many [journalists] were not willing to disclose the

specific stories that originated with tips or documents from SecureDrop, nor the frequency of these stories. ” (Berret 2016)

– And Leaksites are basically “dumb pipe”

● “The Last Resort”– The fact that leaksites do exist really matters

– A signal that media outlets take seriously the protection of its sources