impact of strategic communications in preventing …
TRANSCRIPT
IMPACT OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS IN PREVENTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AND COUNTERING TERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL COUNTER
TERRORISM CENTRE IN PUMWANI AREA, NAIROBI KENYA
BY
NAMAN NIMROD OWUOR
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA
SPRING 2019
IMPACT OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN PREVENTING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM AND COUNTERING TERRORISM BY THE NATIONAL COUNTER
TERRORISM CENTRE IN PUMWANI AREA, NAIROBI KENYA
BY
NAMAN NIMROD OWUOR
A Research Project Report Submitted to the Chandaria School of Business in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Masters in
Business Administration (MBA)
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY-AFRICA
SPRING 2019
i
STUDENT’S DECLARATION
I, the undersigned, declare that this is my original work and has not been submitted to any
other college, institution or university other than the United States International University in
Nairobi for academic credit.
Signed: ________________________ Date: _____________________
Naman Nimrod Owuor (ID 653923)
This project has been presented for examination with my approval as the appointed
supervisor.
Signed: ________________________ Date: _____________________
Dr. Caren Ouma (PhD).
Signed: _______________________ Date: ____________________
Dean, Chandaria School of Business
ii
COPYRIGHT
All Rights Reserved. All texts, graphics and other works herein are the copyrighted works of
Naman Nimrod Owuor. Reproduction or otherwise transmission in any form either electronic
or mechanical means without the prior written permission of the author except for short
quotations in critical review Article is not permitted.
Copyright © 2019 Naman N. Owuor
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Caren Ouma who was readily available, accessible and
always willing to help and offer me guidance in this study. I want to also acknowledge my family for
the moral and material support they extended to me in support of my graduate course. I would like to
sincerely appreciate my colleagues at my place of work for encouraging me in my decision to pursue
graduate studies. To all my colleagues at the Chandaria school of Business for their intellectual
contributions. And finally, to the Almighty God for enabling me to come this far in my life!
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
STUDENT’S DECLARATION .............................................................................................. i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................. iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS ...................................................................................................... iv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... xi
ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................................3
1.0 INTRODUCTION.........................................................................................................3
1.1. Background of the Study ........................................................................................ 3
1.2. Statement of the problem ........................................................................................ 9
1.3. Purpose of the study ............................................................................................. 11
1.4. Research Questions............................................................................................... 11
1.5. Importance of the study ........................................................................................ 12
1.5.1. Kenya Government Security Sector ..................................................................... 12
1.5.2. Academia .............................................................................................................. 12
1.5.3. Civil Society Organizations .................................................................................. 13
1.6. Scope of the study and Limitations ...................................................................... 13
1.7. Definition of terms................................................................................................ 14
1.8. Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 16
CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................................17
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................17
2.1. Introduction .......................................................................................................... 17
2.2. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) ................................................................. 17
2.2.1. Global Initiatives for countering violent extremism ............................................. 17
2.2.2. Platforms for delivery of CVE programs ............................................................. 19
2.3. Audience Analysis and Targeting in Countering Violent Extremism .................. 20
2.3.1. Audience Analysis ................................................................................................ 20
2.3.2. The Goal for Audience Analysis and Targeting in CVE ...................................... 21
2.3.3. Impact of Audience Analysis and Targeting ........................................................ 23
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2.4. Counter Narratives in Countering Violent Extremism ......................................... 24
2.4.1. The Approach to Counter Narratives .................................................................... 25
2.4.2. The Dimensions of Counter Narratives ................................................................ 27
2.4.3. Impact of Narratives in Countering Violent Extremism ...................................... 27
2.5. Channels of Communication in Countering Violent Extremism.......................... 29
2.5.1. Social media as a channel for CVE ...................................................................... 29
2.5.2. Media and CVE .................................................................................................... 30
2.5.3. Agents of influence as channels for CVE communication ................................... 32
2.6. Chapter Summary ................................................................................................. 33
CHAPTER THREE ...............................................................................................................34
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ..............................................................................34
3.1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................34
3.2. Research Design ........................................................................................................34
3.3. Population and Sampling Design ..............................................................................35
3.3.1 Population..................................................................................................................35
3.3.2 Sampling Design .......................................................................................................36
3.3.3 Sampling Frame ........................................................................................................36
3.3.4 Sampling Technique ..................................................................................................36
3.3.5 Sample Size ...............................................................................................................36
3.4. Data Collection Methods ...........................................................................................37
3.5. Research Procedure ...................................................................................................38
3.6. Data Analysis Methods .............................................................................................39
3.7. Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................39
CHAPTER FOUR ..................................................................................................................40
4.0 RESULTS AND FINDINGS ......................................................................................40
4.1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................40
4.1.1. Response Rate ...........................................................................................................40
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4.2. Demographic Information .........................................................................................41
4.2.1. Respondents Gender. ............................................................................................. 41
4.2.2. Respondents Age ................................................................................................... 41
4.2.3. Highest Level of Education. .................................................................................. 42
4.3. Countering Violent Extremism .................................................................................43
4.3.1. Violence Witnessed .............................................................................................. 43
4.3.2. Suffering from Violence ....................................................................................... 43
4.3.3. Participation in Violence ...................................................................................... 44
4.3.4. Training on Countering Violent Extremism ......................................................... 44
4.3.5. Training People..................................................................................................... 45
4.3.6. Face to Face Training ........................................................................................... 45
4.3.7. Use of Newspaper as Platform for CVE ............................................................... 46
4.3.8. Use of Social Media as platform for CVE ............................................................ 46
4.3.9. Local Languages in CVE ...................................................................................... 47
4.4. Audience Targeting ...................................................................................................47
4.4.1. Audience targeting by International Extremist Organizations ............................. 47
4.4.2. Government Identified Targets fir CVE ............................................................... 48
4.4.3. Government Understanding of Target Audience .................................................. 48
4.4.4. Targets for Training on CVE ................................................................................ 49
4.4.5. Correlation Test between Audience Targeting and CVE ..................................... 49
4.5. Counter Narratives ....................................................................................................50
4.5.1. Use of SMS Texts about Violence ....................................................................... 50
4.5.2. CVE Information Received via any Platform ....................................................... 50
4.5.3. CVE Warning Information on Extremism............................................................ 51
4.5.4. Ignoring Government Information on CVE ......................................................... 52
4.5.5. Role of Religious leaders in CVE......................................................................... 52
4.5.6. Correlation Test between Counter Narrative and CVE ........................................ 53
4.6. Choice of Communication Channels.........................................................................53
4.6.1. Use of Radio and TV ............................................................................................ 53
4.6.2. Use of Facebook in CVE ...................................................................................... 54
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4.6.3. Use of WhatsApp in CVE .................................................................................... 54
4.6.4. Use of Twitter in CVE .......................................................................................... 55
4.6.5. Use of Billboards in CVE ..................................................................................... 55
4.6.6. Use of mobile text Messages (SMS) in CVE ....................................................... 56
4.6.7. Using Emails for CVE .......................................................................................... 56
4.6.8. Use of Public Barazas in CVE ............................................................................. 57
4.6.9. CVE Programming in Kenya ................................................................................ 57
4.6.10.Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Channels and CVE
58
4.7. Communication Content ...........................................................................................58
4.7.1. Clarity of Messages from Government on CVE .................................................. 58
4.7.2. Understanding of Violent Extremism ................................................................... 59
4.7.3. CVE Messages Delivery mode and Timeliness ................................................... 59
4.7.4. Ability to Differentiate CVE False Messages ...................................................... 60
4.7.5. Behavior Change .................................................................................................. 60
4.7.6. Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Content and CVE ............. 61
4.8. Regression Analysis ..................................................................................................61
4.9. Chapter Summary ......................................................................................................63
CHAPTER FIVE ...................................................................................................................64
5.0 SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION ..64
5.1. Introduction ...............................................................................................................64
5.2. Summary ...................................................................................................................64
5.3. Discussion .................................................................................................................66
5.3.1. Impact of Audience Targeting on CVE.....................................................................66
5.3.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE .....................................................68
5.3.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE ..........................................72
5.4. Conclusion .................................................................................................................74
5.4.1. Impact of Audience Targeting CVE..........................................................................74
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5.4.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE .....................................................74
5.4.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE ..........................................74
5.5. Recommendations .....................................................................................................75
5.5.1.1. Audience Targeting and CVE ....................................................................... 75
5.5.1.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE ......................................... 75
5.5.1.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE .............................. 75
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................77
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................................84
Appendix I: Research Permit ...............................................................................................85
Appendix II: Letter of Research Approval ...........................................................................86
Appendix III: Data Collection Instruments (Questionnaire) ................................................87
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List of Figures
Figure 4. 1: Respondents Gender ............................................................................................ 41
Figure 4.2 : Respondents Age ................................................................................................. 42
Figure 4.3 : Respondents Level of Education ......................................................................... 42
List of Tables
Table 4.1: Response Rate ....................................................................................................... 40
Table 4.2: Violence Witnessed ............................................................................................... 43
Table 4.3: Respondents who have Suffered Violence ............................................................ 43
Table 4.4: Participation in Violence ....................................................................................... 44
Table 4.5 : Training on Countering Violent Extremism ......................................................... 44
Table 4.6: Training People ...................................................................................................... 45
Table4.7: Face to Face Training ............................................................................................. 45
Table 4.8: Use of Newspapers as Platform for CVE .............................................................. 46
Table 4.9: Social Media as Platform for CVE ........................................................................ 46
Table 4.10: Use of Local language in CVE ............................................................................ 47
Table 4.11: Audience Targeting by International Extremist Groups ...................................... 48
Table 4.12: Government Identified Targets for CVE ............................................................. 48
Table 4.4.13: Government Understanding of Target Audience .............................................. 49
Table 4.14: Targets for Training on CVE ............................................................................... 49
Table 4.15: Correlation Test between Audience Targeting and CVE .................................... 50
Table 4.16: Use of SMS Text about Violence ........................................................................ 50
Table 4.17:CVE Information via any platform ....................................................................... 51
Table 4.18: CVE Warning Information on Extremism ........................................................... 51
Table 4.19: Ignoring government information on CVE.......................................................... 52
Table 4.4.20: Role of Religious leaders in CVE ..................................................................... 52
Table 4.21: Correlation Test between Counter Narrative and CVE ....................................... 53
Table 4.22: Use of Radio and TV in CVE .............................................................................. 53
Table 4.23: Use of Facebook in CVE ..................................................................................... 54
Table 4.24: Use of WhatsApp in CVE.................................................................................... 54
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Table 4.25: Use of Twitter in CVE ......................................................................................... 55
Table 4.26: Use of Billboard in CVE...................................................................................... 55
Table 4.27: Use of Mobile text Message in CVE ................................................................... 56
Table 4.28: Using Emails for CVE ......................................................................................... 56
Table 4.29: Use of Public Barrazas in CVE ........................................................................... 57
Table 4.30: CVE Programming in Kenya ............................................................................... 57
Table 4.31: Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Channels and CVE .......... 58
Table 4.32: Clarity of Messages from Government on CVE .................................................. 58
Table 4.4.33: Understanding of Violent Extremism ............................................................... 59
Table 4.34: Messages Delivery mode and Timeliness ............................................................ 59
Table 4.35: Ability to Differentiate CVE False Messages ..................................................... 60
Table 4.36: Behavior Change ................................................................................................. 60
Table 4.37: Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Content and CVE ............ 61
Table 4.38: Model Summary .................................................................................................. 62
Table 4.39: ANOVA ............................................................................................................... 62
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List of Abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AQ Al Qaeda
AS Al Shabaab
AU African Union
BRAVE Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism
CEP Counter Extremist Project
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies
CVE Counter Violent Extremism
DHS Department of Homeland Security
EU European Union
GCTF Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GoK Government of Kenya
IS Islamic State
ISIS Islamic State Iran and Syria
KDF Kenya Defence Forces
MRC Mombasa Republican Council
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NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation,
NCTC National Counter-Terrorism Centre
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIS National Intelligence Service
NPS National Police Service
NSCVE National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PA Public Affairs
PC Peace Committees
POCA Prevention of Organised Crime Act
POCAMLA Prevention of Organised Crime and Money Laundering Act
POTA Prevention of Terrorism Act
PSCU Presidential Strategic Communication Unit
RVE Radicalization into Violent Extremism
TAA Target Audience Analysis
UNDP United Nations Development Program
USAID US Agency for International Development
1
ABSTRACT
The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of strategic communications in
preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism by National Counter Terrorism Center
in Pumwani area within Nairobi County in Kenya. The study explored the role of strategic
communications in fight against radicalization into violent extremism. The three specific
questions the study was seeking to find answers to are: What is the effect of audience
analysis and targeting in Countering Violent Extremism in Pumwani area? What is the
impact of the choice of Counter Narratives and messaging on target audiences; and what is
the impact of the choice of communication / delivery channels in the fight against violent
extremism and terrorism in Pumwani area?
The target population comprised of five youth groups with a total membership of 250 youths
that have continuously been living in Pumwani area within Nairobi County since 2016. The
study had a response rate of 84%. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze data for
frequencies and percentages, while inferential statistics were used to analyze data for
correlations and regressions. The data was collected using questionnaires which comprised of
both open and closed ended questions. The data was analyzed using Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 and presented in the form of tables, frequencies and
percentages.
The first research question focused on the effects of audience targeting on Countering
Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County. The results of the study indicated
that that there is a significant correlation between CVE and both audience targeting. The
second research question sought to find out the impact of counter narratives on CVE. The
results from the study show that there is no significant relationship between CVE and counter
narratives. This is an indication that counter narratives has no significant impact on CVE in
Pumwani area.
The third research question of this study sought to find out the effect of choice of
communication channels have on CVE. From the results, it was found that there is a
significant relationship between CVE and choice of communication channels. The fourth
research question was seeking to determine the effect communication content have on CVE.
2
The results have shown that there is no significant relationship between CVE and choice of
communication content.
This study therefore concludes that audience targeting and choice of communication
channels are important components of strategic communication in CVE that makes the
variation in CVE in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya. These two independent
variables can explain 19.6% of the variation in CVE in the study area. The study also
concludes that in Pumwani area, communication content and counter narratives do not have
significant impact on CVE.
The study recommends that Government agencies and civil society organizations engaged in
CVE considers investing more in development of comprehensive target audience analysis
and segmentation for the CVE programs. This will aid in understanding the target groups and
their mind-set in regards to violent extremism, which makes it easy to take necessary
precautions to prevent vulnerable youths from being radicalised and recruited by the
Extremist organizations. The government should also adopt use of multiple communication
channels to carry out CVE messaging. This will ensure a wider reach of target audiences
more efficiently.
The researcher recommends further research to find out the variables that explain the almost
80% variation in CVE that this study was not able to establish. There is also the need for
further study in the subject area but in different locations and environment of the country
where NCTC has initiated CVE programing using strategic communications as a tool for
prevention and countering violent extremism.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of the Study
The expanding reach and destructive consequences of violent extremism are among the
major challenges to peace faced in today‟s world Dieye (2017). Radicalization into Violent
Extremism and terrorism has steadily become the primary focus of many governments
around the world. According to a report by Green and Proctor (2016) on the new
comprehensive strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, despite the many efforts to
extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root.
In their report to the CSIS, Green and Proctor (2016) further noted that terrorist groups
around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word
of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convincing too many
recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians.
Communication among human beings is literally as old as humanity, but hypothesizing about
strategic communication is rather new. According to Paul (2011), in his review of relevant
studies on communication he argued that strategic communication “should not be limited to
formal messages, yet actions of the communicator convey meaning hence should, be part of
strategic communication”. This argument by Paul would therefore require that when looking
at the impact of Strategic Communications, it‟s imperative to look at both the verbal and the
nonverbal aspects of the process of communication.
According to Ihlen and Verhoeven (2015), Social theory postulates strategic communication
with a basic understanding of the societal role of the practice, and its ethical and political
consequences. Edifying on social theory means recognizing both negative and positive
influences of the practice of strategic communication. The other perspective according to this
social theory is on describing how society works and communication has increasingly been
placed at the centre of such analyses. Drawing on such perspectives, legitimacy and
4
reflection are key concepts for strategic communication, and issues of power and language
are thence highlighted. In their works, Ihlen and Verhoeven (2015) observed that social
theory invites a whole range of empirical methods to consider in strategic communication,
most of them recognizing insights from the communicative turn.
On the other hand Ruler (2018) states that in communication theory, there are at least three
different lenses with which to view how communication process works: communication as a
one-way process of meaning construction, in which the originator attempts to create or
recreate the meaning developed by the receiver; communication as a two-way process of
meaning construction, in which two or more people create new meanings together; and
communication as a omnidirectional diachronic process of meaning construction, in which
the focus is on the continuous development of meaning itself.
According to the (UNDP, 2016) project report on Strengthening Community‟s Resilience
against Radicalization and Violent Extremism, it recommends that citizen awareness and the
understanding of their role is critical to the success of addressing radicalization and violent
extremism at community level. According to (GCTF, 2017) Expert Committee, violent
extremists and terrorist groups are increasingly using communication technologies to
fundraise, intimidate, train, radicalize, recruit and incite others to commit violent extremist
and terrorist acts.
Neumann (2017) in his study observed that strategic communication has emerged as one of
the most effective tools to counter violent extremism and terrorism. On his part Tatham
(2015), noted that failure of military forces in dealing with the social, psychological and
economic aspects that influence radicalization among communities has prompted the need to
consider a soft power approach that aims at dispelling myths and countering the narratives
spread by violent extremist and terrorist groups. In a study carried out in Turkey Özkan
(2015) found out that strategic communication management facilitates proper planning,
designing effective messages, and informing the violent extremism target audiences
smoothly. Tatham (2015) observes that the kinetic approach employed after the 9/11 attacks
in the US that included killing and detaining terrorists failed to keep up with changes in
technology that have made it possible for extremist groups to utilize the media to pedal their
narratives. Counterterrorism communication is part of the overall strategic communication
5
strategy that focuses on countering the information spread by extremist and violent groups
Paul and Sayers (2015).
In responding to the challenges of extremism through use of the soft power, the UN and
European Union (EU), have a Strategic Communications Division that deals with peace
operations as part of their Department of Public Information and European External Action
Service, respectively Reed, Pohl, & Jegerings (2017). The same applies to NATO; there is a
strategic communications policy and a specific military concept for it (NATO 2009, 2010).
Effective strategic communications have also been widely recognized as a necessary part of
countering insurgencies Petreaus (2008) and combating terrorism Fink and Barclay (2013).
In the challenge Forum annual report, Sharland (2015) observes that at the UN, it is now
widely agreed in principle that „a broad-based, well-resourced and accurately evaluated
strategic communications plan is a necessary part of managing evolving expectations and
building lasting support among central constituencies for its contemporary peace operations.
In their policy brief to International Center for Counter Terrorism Reed et al (2017) observed
that US government, European Union and Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), have
changed tact and are now engaged in Countering Violent Extremism through programs that
among other initiatives includes development of strategies for soft power engagement. The
strategies include using strategic communications as a tool for preventing violent extremism
and countering terrorism Radsch (2016).
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) is one of the strategies adopted under strategic
communication management in fighting extremism and violence. CVE includes a number of
strategies that utilizes mass communication to dispel the information shared by extremists
with the aim of marshaling public support for violence. The Countering violent extremism
summit held by President Barack Obama in 2015 was a confirmation that the United States
had opted to rethink the way strategic communications management can be effectively
utilized to counter violence and extremism Radsch (2016). However, according to a study by
Schouten (2016), the U.S strategic communication policies and strategies employed post the
9/11 attack to aid in the fight against terrorism failed in countering radicalization in most
Muslim states. According to Schouten (2016), the creation of a central center for strategic
communications and the designing of messages that target specific group to ensure the
6
effectiveness of strategic communications in the fight against violent extremism is the way to
go in counter violent extremism initiatives.
In Africa, the threat of violent extremist groups started becoming real with African states like
Kenya, Nigeria, Uganda, Libya, Somalia Mali and Egypt becoming direct targets by
extremist groups Williams (2018). Just like the US Government and other western
democracies, the African Government‟s response was through use of hard power. The
challenges faced by the AMISOM forces in Somalia are a testament that the use of hard
power has not served as effective solutions for African nations Ali-Koor (2016).
A comprehensive study by the (UNDP , 2017) on the Journey of young Africans into violent
extremism revealed 83 percent youths believe that government looks after only the interests
of a few, and over 75 percent place no trust in politicians or in the state security apparatus.
The study further found out that it was some form of government action that was the „tipping
point‟ that triggers most of the youths‟ decision to join an extremist group. Strategic
communication is tool that can be used to shape the values and principles that affect the way
citizens perceive the role of the government Özkan (2015). Effective utilization of strategic
communication can aid in dispelling the notion that the government does not care for its
people especially in most African nations where poverty remains a key issue when it comes
to radicalization.
According to Luengo-Cabrera and Pauwels (2016), Horn of Africa region has gained bad
reputation as a breeding ground for violent extremism. The region has experienced the rise of
Al Shabaab and recurrent terrorist attacks in Somalia and Kenya. According to Kessels,
Durner, & Mathew (2016), the responses have however been reactionary and punitive by law
enforcement, military and intelligence services.
The growing violence of Islamist extremists has generated a strong response from security
actors in East Africa Ali-Koor (2016). The ever rising and dynamic youth population in the
East African region is shaping the region‟s security landscape and is creating a ready
resource for extremist groups who target the youths with their narratives. According to Ali-
Koor (2016), while Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and
Somalia, it has been expanding to varying degrees throughout the region. Kenya has of late
become a target of violent extremists for both retaliatory attacks as well as a source for
7
foreign terrorist‟s fighters Kimani ( 2018). Kenyan youth are vulnerable to radicalization by
these extremist groups particularly via online platforms a fact that has seen a sizeable number
of Kenyan youths getting recruited and travel abroad, particularly to Somalia, to join a global
terrorist organization Kimani ( 2018). Kenya has also experienced various forms of violence
ranging from violence fueled by electoral processes, negative ethnicity and religious beliefs,
to acts of terrorism among others. Violent extremism by radical groups, especially Al
Shabaab and some local extremist groups like MRC remain active.
Research by the Rift Valley Institute has found out that Kenya‟s hard military and security
approaches have not successfully addressed the threat of violent extremism, and a new
approach of countering violent extremism (CVE) has emerged as a response (Chome, Miller,
Maki, Abdallah, Boru, & Abdi (2017). However, the government‟s responses have to a large
extent been seen in the form of Anti-Terrorist Police clampdown on suspects and military
operations.
According to Kessels et al (2016), Kenya‟s counterterrorism efforts have been subject to
widespread criticism for their disproportionality and alleged human rights abuses. The
regional conference on countering violent extremism that was held in Nairobi – from 25th
to
28th
June 2015 in its deliberations concluded that experiences in many African countries
revealed that the threat of violent extremism is growing exponentially, wreaking havoc on
economies, and causing widespread social upheaval, including growing inter and intra-faith
intolerance.
As countries grapple with the challenge of violent extremism, the global committee of
Experts (GCTF, 2017)recommends among other approaches that Communications-based
responses be considered in the fight against violent extremism. GCTF further observes that
this approach would support or assist in challenging the appeal of violent extremist and
terrorist propaganda through strategic communications, including supporting civil society
organizations to use counter and alternative narratives both online and offline (GCTF, 2017).
In the briefing paper on the role for media development in countering violent extremism
agenda, Betz (2016) notes that the most common uses of media in CVE is the adaption of
strategic communication activities thus “the purposeful use of communication by an
8
organization to fulfill its mission”. This study was therefore seeking to determine the impact
of strategic communications as a tool for preventing violent extremism and countering
terrorism by the NCTC in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in the Republic of Kenya.
The UN security council in its resolution 2178 (2014) stresses need for Member States to
among other actions develop and implement national communications strategies, in close
cooperation with social media companies and the private sector, that are designed to local
contexts, gender sensitive and based on international human rights standards; to counter the
narratives associated with violent extremism; to encourage more research on the relationship
between the misuse of the Internet and social media by violent extremists and the factors that
drive individuals towards violent extremism (UNGA, 2015).
As a strategy to mitigate the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, the Government of
Kenya in 2004 established the National Center Terrorism Center (NCTC). The NCTC is
multi-agency instrument primarily of security agencies intended to provide a coordinating
mechanism for counter terrorism (NCTC, 2016). A new strategy for preventing and
countering violent extremism and terrorism by the NCTC was launched in September 2016.
President Uhuru Kenyatta who presided over the launch said the strategy aimed at using
modern approaches in preventing violent extremism in the country (PSCU, 2016). The
launch came against a background of increased threats from extremist groups like Al-Qaeda,
Somalia based Al-Shabaab, Islamic State (IS) sympathizers and some homegrown militant
groups like the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC).
The National Strategy for Countering violent extremism has nine pillars namely
Psychosocial, Education, Security, Faith Based, Training and Capacity building, Arts and
Culture and the Media and online pillars (NSCVE, 2016). This strategy by the NCTC
emphasizes the soft power engagement as the new approach to counter youth radicalization
and recruitment into violent extremism (NSCVE, 2016).
9
1.2. Statement of the problem
Violent extremism is the product of historical, political, economic and social circumstances,
including the impact of regional and global power politics (UNDP, 2016). Global initiatives
to counter terrorist narratives are carried out by a number of different actors at the global,
Regional and national levels. The UN Security council resolution 1624 (2005) aver that
effective action against incitement into terrorism must be based not only on legal and law
enforcement measures, but also on initiatives to promote dialogue and counter the messages
of terrorists and violent extremists.
In Europe, following growing incidents of extremist groups‟ activities, the European
Parliament‟s Policy Department for Citizens‟ Rights and Constitutional Affairs
commissioned in 2017 a study that sought to determine current approaches to countering
terrorist narratives. Among the various findings and observations by the study is that
“Strategic communications should be a key, if not the central, consideration in operational,
strategic and policy planning from the beginning of the counter terrorist process” Reed et al
(2017) . However, according to Holtmann (2013) none of the existing de-radicalization and
counter-radicalization programs in countries like Austria, Denmark, Germany, Indonesia,
Jordan, Netherlands, Sweden, the United kingdom and United States have presented reliable
data on how much the appeal of extremist narratives have been reduced through use of
strategic communications.
According to Schouten (2016) the US strategic communications against Islamic
Fundamentalist failed in countering radicalization and moderating the minds of Muslim
populations overseas. Schouten (p.61) recommends active promotion of moderate thought
among Muslims living in various regions of the globe through strategic communication as
being critical in reducing radicalization. The NCTC in its national strategy for countering
violent extremism (NSCVE, 2016) contends that terrorism and violent extremism threat will
continue to be dynamic and extremely dangerous, not only in Kenya but also globally, as it
evolves and adapts to countermeasures. The Counter Extremist Project (CEP, 2018) noted
that Kenya has become a prime location for al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment amid
the terror group‟s rise in Somalia.
10
A study by United States Peace Institute on community resilience to violent extremism in
Kenya, it was found out that there exist socio-economic dynamics in areas like Pumwani,
Majengo, Eastleigh that predispose youths in this areas to radicalization and recruitment into
violent extremism Metre (2016). The study further established how socio-economic
dynamics and strains played out in the violence witnessed in 2007 during forceful takeover of
the Pumwani Riyadha mosque by a group of radical youths led by a radical imam Ahmadi
Iman Nzes (2014). In the Gikomba market, an area within Pumwani violence was witnessed
when radical Wahabbist youths took over market stalls owned by Pumwani Riyadha mosque
(Metre, 2016). According to Metre (2016),the new Riyadha Mosque leadership started using
the center for recruiting Pumwani youth for al-Shabaab in Somalia through its educational
courses that preached an extremist religious ideology. Pumwani area has thus been facing a
malicious, multi-layered threat; that is, recruitment, radicalization, terrorist financial
networks, operating bases and low levels of resilience capacity.
According to Kimani ( 2018), in responding to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism,
the NCTC is utilizing P/CVE as a force multiplier in its ability to build local efforts that
interact positively with the security services in preventing recruitment; the disengagement of
defectors and returnees; and to delegitimize the ideological propaganda by extremist groups.
However, despite the strategic responses by the government on the fight against extremism,
reports of Kenyan youths being radicalized and getting recruited to join extremist groups still
persist in Kenya. In their policy brief (UNDP , 2017)notes that Kenya and its people have
witnessed a surge in terrorist attacks and violent extremism.
This begs the question of whether NCTC the agency charged with the responsibility of
countering violent extremism has effectively deployed strategic communication among the
various strategies that have been deployed in the effort to prevent and counter violent
extremism and countering terrorism in line with the recommendation the UN General
assembly made to member states.
There have been various studies on the subject of Kenya‟s Counter Terrorism measures as
well as Counter Violent Extremism among them; studies by Magogo (2017), Bachmann and
Honke (2010), Mogire and Agade (2011), Okinda (2016) and Salifu and Ndung'u (2017) that
have been carried. However, of these studies none has endeavored to determine the role and
11
impact of using strategic communication as a strategy in preventing violent extremism and
countering terrorism by the National Counter Terrorism Center or any other agency involved
in fight against violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya. In their study, Salifu & Ndung'u
(2017) found out that responding to violent extremism in Kenya relate to difficulties in
conceptualizing and coordinating preventing and countering violent extremism efforts, a
perceived lack of government transparency and consistency in communicating and applying
the responses across Kenya. Betz (2016) , recommends that the most common uses of media
in CVE are the adaption of strategic communication activities.
This study therefore sought to determine the impact of strategic communications in counter
radicalization into violent extremism and terrorism with a focus on the initiatives being
undertaken by the National Counter Terrorism Center in Pumwani area in Nairobi County.
1.3. Purpose of the study
The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of strategic communications in
preventing violent extremism and counter terrorism by National Counter Terrorism Center in
Pumwani area of Nairobi County in the republic of Kenya.
1.4. Research Questions
In carrying out the research, the researcher will be seeking to determine the following
specific research questions:
1.4.1. What is the effect of audience targeting on Countering Violent Extremism in Pumwani
area of Nairobi County in Kenya?
1.4.2. What are effects of choice of Counter Narratives on Countering Violent Extremism in
Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya?
1.4.3. What is the impact of the choice of communication channels on Countering Violent
Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya?
1.4.4. What impact does the communication content have on target audience behavior in
Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya?
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1.5. Importance of the study
A comprehensive study by the UNDP in 2017 on the Journey of young Africans into violent
extremism revealed 83 percent youths believe that government looks after only the interests
of a few, and over 75 percent place no trust in politicians or in the state security apparatus.
The study further found out that it was some form of government action that was the „tipping
point‟ that triggers most of the youths‟ decision to join an extremist group.
Pumwani area youths still remain vulnerable to radicalization as long as radical Imam
Ahmed Imani remains in Somalia as one of the leaders in Al Shabaab. The Wahabbist youths
that were associated to Ahmed Imani in Pumwani area some of whom still subscribe to the
extremist ideology are yet to be fully flashed from the area. The soft power approach for
prevention and countering violent extremism as recommended by the UN General Assembly
and to which the Kenyan government has positively embraced needs to be evaluated.
The study offers valuable lessons to both government officials in the security sector as well
as Civil society organizations engaged in P/CVE initiatives and the academia on the
effectiveness of strategic communications as a tool of prevention and countering violent
extremism and new research areas to adopt within the field of countering violent extremism
respectively.
1.5.1. Kenya Government Security Sector
To the Kenya Government Security Sector, this study contributes to researches about CVE/
CT measures in Kenya by determining the role of strategic communication as a tool for
countering violent extremism and terrorism. The recommendations from the study contribute
to informing and improving on policy matters of government and other relevant stakeholders
by offering an appropriate and effective strategy for prevention of violent extremism and
terrorism in Kenya.
1.5.2. Academia
This study contributes to the body of knowledge on the use of strategic communications to
effectively counter radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism in
Kenya. It offers academic researchers a basis for further research on the role of strategic
13
communications in countering and preventing violent extremism in areas that the study did
not have an answer for. In addition, once published in reputable journal, the study is
accessible by other researchers, academics, students and other individuals interested
broadening their knowledge in the area of study.
1.5.3. Civil Society Organizations
The civil society organizations engaged in disengaging and rehabilitating victims of violent
extremism in the country have a good reference for their decision making on whether to use
strategic communication as a tool to engage with those at risk as well as the radicalized
youths. The findings of the study offer Civil Society Organizations a good starting point for
their CVE programing to achieve meaningful results.
1.6. Scope of the study and Limitations
The researcher confined the Study within the Republic of Kenya and focused on NCTC‟s
strategic responses to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and terrorism. In
terms of time scope, the research focused on NCTC‟s strategic interventions to counter
violent extremism from the year 2014 to 2018.
The study did not delve into the initiatives by other government security agencies like the
Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), The Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) or the National
Police Service as these are purely law enforcement entities and whose strategic operations
require clearance to access.
The target population comprised of the youths who are aged between 15-30 years and
members of the five youth groups operating in Pumwani Division (Bahati, Eastleigh North,
Eastleigh South, Kamukunji and Pumwani) that have been targeted by the NCTC‟s
prevention and countering violent extremism program who were residents of Pumwani
division.
The study aimed to determine the impact of strategic communications in preventing violent
extremism and counter terrorism by National Counter Terrorism Center in Pumwani division
of Nairobi County in the republic of Kenya.
The researcher encountered some challenge of lack of cooperation from some of the
respondents to provide information since they did not like to openly discuss matters
pertaining to radicalization and Government actions against the same. They were suspicious
14
as to why the information was being sought for and they also expressed fear that the
information provided could be used to target them. The researcher however made effort to
cultivate the confidence of the respondents and ensured they remained anonymous.
1.7. Definition of terms
1.7.1. Strategic Communication
strategic communications is “the systematic series of sustained and coherent activities,
conducted across strategic, operational and tactical levels, that enables understanding of
target audiences and, identifies effective conduits to promote and sustain particular types of
behavior” Cornish, Lindley-French, & Yorke (2011).
1.7.2. Extremism
Extremism is the strict adherence to a set of narratives or belief system (whether political or
religious or otherwise) that constitute assaults on the mainstream values, orientations and
principles in a given society, Ali & Bwana (2015) .
1.7.3. Violent Extremism
There is no internationally agreed-upon definition of violent extremism United Nations,
(2016). However for purpose of the study violent extremism is the beliefs and actions of
people who support or use ferocity to achieve ideological, religious or political goals‟
Australian Government Counter terrorism strategy (2015, p7). Thus, for an action to be
qualified as violent extremism there should be ideologically, religiously or politically
motivations to resort to the use of violence, with the objective of achieving individual or
collective desired end state.
1.7.4. Counter Violent Extremism- (CVE)
Counter violent extremism is a realm of policy, programs, and interventions designed to
prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social,
cultural, and religious ideologies and groups Ali and Bwana (2015).
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1.7.5. Radicalization
Radicalization is “a process through which an individual or groups of individuals are
transformed by an ideology or belief system shifting mind sets away from the mainstream”
by Ali and Bwana (2015).
1.7.6. Counter Radicalization
This is defined as “efforts to delegitimize violent extremist ideologies, and to deter
recruitment into specific terrorist groups or campaigns. It involves targeted efforts to reduce
the access to citizens by influential individuals and groups whose deliberate mission is to
expand support for terrorism” Kenya NSCVE (2016).
1.7.7. Terrorism
Terrorism is defined as “criminal acts, including acts against civilians, committed with the
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to
provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons,
intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) .
1.7.8. Terrorist Act
A terrorist act means an act or threat of action (a) which (i) involves the use of violence
against a person;(ii) endangers the life of a person, other than the person committing the
action; (iii) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the
public; (iv) results in serious damage to property; (v) involves the use of firearms or
explosives; (vi) involves the release of any dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive
substance or microbial or other biological agent or toxin into the environment; (vii) interferes
with an electronic system resulting in the disruption of the provision of communication,
financial, transport or other essential services; (viii) interfere or disrupts the provision of
essential or emergency services; (ix) prejudices national security or public safety (Prevention
of Terrorism ACT, 2014).
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1.8. Chapter Summary
This chapter has addressed the general background and strategic response to violent
extremism and terrorism globally and continentally, including Kenya. More importantly the
chapter examined Kenya‟s National Counter Terrorism Center‟s strategy on countering
radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism. The chapter described in brief the
problem statement, objectives of the study, and the importance of the study, scope and
definitions. Chapter two focuses on in-depth review of the strategic responses to countering
violent extremism as highlighted in chapter one. The chapter brings out the role of strategic
communications in the fight against violent extremism as has been applied in various
jurisdictions with particular attention on target audience analysis, use of counter extremist
narratives and the choice and exploitation of communication channels for effective delivery
of the messages to the intended audiences. Chapter three presents the study methodology,
and chapter four present results and findings of the study, while chapter five presents
discussion, conclusion, and recommendation.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
The study sought to evaluate the strategies used by NCTC to prevent and counter violent
extremism and investigate the extent to which strategic communication has been utilized as a
tool to aid in preventing and countering violent extremism. Specifically the study sought to
find out the effectiveness of audience targeting, choice of counter narratives, and the
channels and/or medium of communication as key elements of strategic communication and
the impact they have had in countering violent extremism (CVE) and terrorism in Pumwani
area of Nairobi County in the Republic of Kenya.
2.2. Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)
CVE refers to proactive actions to counter efforts by violent extremists to radicalize, recruit,
and mobilize followers to violence and to address specific factors that facilitate violent
extremist recruitment and radicalization to violence (USAID, 2016). The Australian
Government defines CVE as “the banner used to describe efforts of Australian governments
to prevent processes of radicalisation leading to violent extremism, including terrorism, and
where possible to help individuals disengage from a preparedness to support or commit acts
of violence to achieve political, social or ideological ends”.Violent extremist groups differ in
many aspects from ideology, modus operandi, and geography even though almost all seek
and recruit disillusioned young men as fighters on their front lines Ezekilov (2017).
2.2.1. Global Initiatives for countering violent extremism
The UN Security Council in its resolution 2178 (2014) on stemming the flow of foreign
terrorist fighters (FTFs), highlights that CVE is an “essential element” in mitigating the threat
to international peace and security that the foreign terrorist fighters possess. Countering
violent extremism (CVE) has thus emerged as an internationally funded set of grass-roots
initiatives to address the problem of extremist violence in a preventive rather than the
reactive manner Villa-Vicencio, Buchanan-Clarke, & Humphrey (2016).
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In the US, CVE initiatives adopted are intended to identify and mitigate extremist threats
throughout the radicalization process, while counterterrorism is intended to prevent someone
who is already radicalized from committing an act of violence (Arab Center, 2016). However
the Global Youth Summit Against violent extremism report Global Youth Summit (2016)
contends that many CVE initiatives frame youth as either perpetrators of violent extremism
or as possible victims of recruitment into violent groups. Villa-Vicencio et al (2016) observes
that the major challenge to the field of CVE is that current initiatives are almost exclusively
implemented in Muslim-majority communities.
In Europe, CVE programs have been the vehicle by which European member countries
address the successful recruitment of their citizens by ISIL to either join them on the
battlefield or carry out acts of domestic terrorism in their home country (AAI, 2017).
According to Marsden, Lewis, & Knott (2017) CVE programmes can be targeted at different
stages: primary interventions to prevent the emergence of radicalisation within broad
communities; secondary interventions targeting those „at risk‟ of being radicalised; and
tertiary interventions against those already engaged in violent extremism (including
deradicalisation, disengagement, and reintegration programmes). Marsden et al. (2017)
further argues that Governments need to take account of local needs in order to determine the
right balance between different forms of CVE interventions. CVE Programme designers are
according to Marsden et al. (2017) required to identify appropriate partners to deliver
interventions, building robust procedures for multi-agency working where appropriate and
undertaking an evaluation that should be included in the programme design to ensure that
resources are spent effectively and knowledge about best practice is developed and shared.
CVE programing and its success rely on credibility and legitimacy which are key to
overcoming potential distrust caused by government involvement. Marsden et al (2017)
suggests that government endeavours to build capacity amongst those deemed most credible
to steer to CVE programme. It is important to consider how best to mitigate the potential
risks of government-civil society collaborations. Marsden et al (2017) further avers that
collaboration between community groups and statutory organisations is a common feature of
effective CVE interventions.
The Regional Conference on Countering Violent Extremism in Africa (NCTC, 2015)
identified five essential elements of a successful CVE initiative that include building of
19
Capability, Resilience, Adaptability, Collaboration and Knowledge (CRACK). The
conference also noted that local networks of radicalization and recruitment, which work at
the behest of home-grown violent extremist and terrorist outfits, including Al-Shabaab and
Boko-Haram, are inspired by the global violent religious extremism enterprise, most
prominently driven by Al-Qaeda and Islamic State in Iraq & Syria (ISIS). It was further
observed that these local networks primarily exploit historical grievances held by vulnerable
groups that may feel alienated, socially, economically and politically.Villa-Vicencio et al
(2016) in their research recommended that efforts to effectively address violent extremism
must take into account the psychosocial needs of vulnerable communities and individuals,
and be multi-sectored in order to embrace the diverse paths to violent extremist membership.
According to Mahiri (2016) of the Rift Valley Institute forum, Countering violent extremism
programmes should be informed by local contexts and by the circular and comprehensive
nature of how local drivers cause communities to become vulnerable or resilient to violent
extremism. Mahiri( 2016) further observes that drivers of violent extremism in Kenya are
localized and depend on the socio- political landscape of the communities which serve as
recruitment hubs. In the report, it is opined that CVE programmes to combat extremist
messaging could move away from negative counter-narratives and employ the same
sophisticated social media tactics that extremists use. Villa-Vicencio (2016) argues that
reorientation of CVE within broader, more inclusive peace building and human security
frameworks helps to mitigate some of the potential challenges to the field and improve the
efficacy of government and donor-led CVE initiatives.
2.2.2. Platforms for delivery of CVE programs
During the Global Youth Forum against violent extremism, it was appreciated that in
countries like Kenya and Nigeria traditional media tools can be used for CVE. It was also
noted that television is a great platform to distribute relevant information and cultural values.
CVE programming should thus be aired in local languages and target youth (and their
parents) so that they learn alternatives to violent extremism (Global Youth Summit, 2016). In
their report on violent extremism and instability in the Greater Horn of Africa, Kessels et al
(2016) recommends the tailoring of CVE interventions according to the level of the violent
extremist threat to ensure the CVE efforts are toned to match the level of threat found within
each country. Kessels et al (2016) further argues that CVE programing that focuses on
20
addressing the underlying political and socioeconomic grievances of communities and
diverse streams of development assistance is the primary means of achieving CVE goals.
According to (Ezekilov, 2017), curbing the appeal of violent extremist groups requires
addressing the “push” and “pull” factors at all levels. Ezekilov thus observes that CVE
requires the inclusion of local actors such as NGOs, religious groups, community youth
organizations, women groups, recreation and sports clubs, and other civil society groups,
working at the grassroots level, as well as young people themselves. Deeb et al (2016) in
their study found that previous policies on CVE have too often created stigma and further
resentment, as evidenced by “counter radicalization” interventions in Europe.
2.3. Audience Analysis and Targeting in Countering Violent Extremism
2.3.1. Audience Analysis
Target Audience Analysis (TAA) entails studying a social group of people by examining a
range of pyscho-social parameters with the aim of identifying the best to influence behaviour
change in different groups Tatham (2015). Violent extremism has emerged as one of the
most pressing issues both at the national and global stage as evidenced by the loss of lives
and property destruction attributed to terrorism and related activities Tatham (2015). Albert
Einstein aptly put it that knowing is something that even a fool can manage the key point is
to understand. Audience analysis and targeting is inspired by the need to understand all the
factors that influence violent extremism in order to devise effective strategies. Tatham (2015)
demonstrates the importance of understanding when he outlines the popular misconceptions
about Taliban, legal systems in some Muslim nations, and tribes in Afghanistan. The
effectiveness of a strategy is dependent on its ability to solve the core problems while
ensuring the collateral damage is kept low Barnett (2011). Audience analysis and targeting is
a complex process with the potential to reveal counterintuitive results Tatham (2008). It
increases the chances of success because it ensures all the factors that influence counter
violent extremism are handled effectively and on time.
Audience analysis is a comprehensive process that focuses on identifying the priorities and
influential audience of a specific intervention program Barnett (2011). A priority audience is
the one that is targeted for behaviour change for example targeting the specific group of
young people who are vulnerable to radicalization by extremist groups Rogério dos Santos
21
Alves; Alex Soares de Souza (2014). It is pertinent that the priority group might not be the
group that is affected by the problem. It can be the group that is more likely to bring a
significant change in behaviour when targeted. The influential audience describes the
audience that interacts with the priority audience to bring about change. They include
community leaders, parents and other people who can influence the action and attitude of
young people (Barneet, 2011). Audience segmentation is paramount because it increases the
effectiveness of targeting. It entails dividing a big audience into small groups based on needs,
similarities, values, and any other selected characteristics(Rogério dos Santos Alves; Alex
Soares de Souza, 2014). It makes it easy to design messages and intervention programs that
are specific to a group that share key characteristics. Audience analysis permits a deep
comprehension of the values, behaviour and characteristics that define a given group of
people.
2.3.2. The Goal for Audience Analysis and Targeting in CVE
According to Tatham (2015), lack of proper audience analysis and targeting techniques many
government policies have been misguided. The case of Saddam Hussein is a good example of
how failure to understand the target group and the audience fuels extremism. Understanding
the Taliban in advance would have permitted the U.S military to come up with the right
strategies to handle the conflict with minimal collateral damage. The aim of audience
analysis and targeting is developing an audience profile that can guide the delivery of a
message that can be understood and accepted by the targeted audience (Gootnick, 2005).
From a broad perspective, Audience and analysis is a single step in the process of strategic
communication. The goal is to ensure that the programs designed to aid in countering violent
extremism consider key details about the targeted audience (Tatham, 2015).
Analysing the effect of audience analysis and targeting on countering extremism creates the
need to acknowledge that strategic communication is a critical tool in the fight against all
forms of extremism (Deeb, Woodham, Chin, & Gharaibeh, 2016). Terrorism can be
described as a battle of strategic communication with each group attempting to promote their
narrative. Understanding the complex nature of the digital information space is paramount
because it forms the foundation for an effective strategic communication model that includes
taking time to study the behaviour, culture and beliefs of the target audience (Archetti, Seese,
& Harley, 2014). The narratives presented by government are that extremists do not exist in
22
space but in a network that is made of people who can choose to believe or throw away the
narrative (Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014). Narratives are deeply rooted in social
relationships that are defined by culture, religion, and social status. Audience analysis and
targeting provides the information needed to trace the roots of both individual and collective
narratives with the aim of coming up with effective counter narratives (Archetti, Seese, &
Harley, 2014).
Stephen Harley, one of the notable authors in the expert NATO COE-DAT paper, uses the
example of Somali to explain the importance of audience analysis and targeting (Archetti,
Seese, & Harley, 2014). Somali is a complex nation that consists of people whose ideas,
perspective and beliefs have been defined by their experience and religion. The complex
nature of the Somali environment is part of the reason why the international community has
struggled with brokering peace in the region. In most cases, it appears the strategies used are
not formed based on the reality on the ground. They are theories that have been formed based
on assumptions that are far from what the reality looks like. The case of Somalia
demonstrates the importance of understanding of the audience, which necessitates conducting
a deep research with the aim of understanding the audience and formulating ways to target
the selected audience. The chances of reaching the right people with the message are high
when all the factors that influence the views and actions of a particular group of people are
clear.
The lack of strategic communication has been cited as the key problem that the Indonesian
government faces in countering radical ideology and winning a much bigger public support
(Abubakar, 2016). Abubakar (2016) demonstrates how failing to understand the target
population has made it difficult to involve the Muslim population in countering radical
ideologies that have remained pervasive in the public domain. It is paramount to ensure that
the message is clear for the target audience and the utilization of different channels of
communication. The Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) failure to
analyse the target audience has made it difficult to design appropriate messages and identify
the priority and influential audiences. Lazuard Birru demonstrated that understanding the
target audience is more effective as evidenced by the reduction of radicalization rates. The
participants of the program were empowered to counter radical narratives by promoting
teachers who teach Islam as a religion of love and compassion.
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2.3.3. Impact of Audience Analysis and Targeting
At the core of Audience analysis and targeting is the ability to practically diagnose the exact
groups that exist within a target population. Knowledge about these groupings facilitates
ranking that might depend on the level of involvement in promoting positive behaviour
(Tatham, 2015). TAA extends a simple opinion poll or stereotypes; it must have justifiable
recommendations supported by solid scientific research and interpretation. Tatham‟s study
found that effective audience analysis and targeting builds up information that points to the
values, behaviours, beliefs and norms that define a given social group. According to Tatham
(2015), the case of Afghanistan is a practical lesson for NATO that audience analysis and
targeting is a necessity. The policy makers that allowed the participation of British military
in Afghanistan did not have any idea about the local population, trades and other key factors
that define a group of people. In most cases, the key issues in a social group fit into each
other and make it easy to determine the issue and propose a viable solution. The key purpose
of TAA is fill the population profile gap by building a comprehensive profile of the target
audience with recommendations how it can be influenced (Rowland & Tatham, 2008).
Rowland and Tatham (2008) argue that the lack of audience analysis and targeting
intervention strategies are forced to rely on luck, coincidence, and randomness. It is
preposterous to dedicated massive resources to a program that can be aptly described as a
fluke. The two researchers reiterate the significance of audience analysis and targeting but
cautions against believing that absolute certainty is achieved when it comes to success. The
process of influencing behaviour starts with identifying the key objectives of the study
followed by researching if there is any data that can answer the key research questions. At
some point, it is humble and plausible to recognize that the available data might have been
used to answer a different research question. The success of a TAA program depends on
whether it has met four key conditions, which are the precise identification of target
audience, identification of the best process to influence the priority audience, accurate
measurement of the influenceability of the target audience, and availability of triggers that
measurably and effectively change the behaviour of the audience (Rowland & Tatham,
2008).
The basic thinking behind audience analysis and targeting is that there is no group that relies
on a single channel of communication. There is no universal channel of communication that
24
has the potential to be effective with all social groups (Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014).
Therefore, it makes sense to understand the target audience and formulate messages that are
compatible with the target audience. The chances of success increase by a significant margin
because the policy makers have a compressive understanding of the target audience
(Rowland & Tatham, 2008). Radicalization is an important tool utilized by extremist groups
to get new members and garner public support. The process of countering radicalization
requires one to understand the target audience, which includes their attitude towards
radicalization messages, governments, beliefs, and other key characteristics. The information
makes it relatively easy to identify the areas that can be targeted to bring about behaviour
change. Failure to target the key influencers renders the entire process moot.
Kenya is among the countries that struggle with countering violent extremism as more
Kenyan nationals are radicalized to join terrorist organizations. The popular opinion is that
radicalization is being influenced by international organizations that rely on recruiting locals
to carry out attacks throughout the country (Chome, Miller, Maki, Abdallah, Boru, & Abdi,
2017). The report by Chome, et al. (2017) emphasizes the need to understand that the
characteristics that define the groups that are vulnerable to radicalization. Chome noted that
areas with highest levels of radicalization tend to have poor civic government relationship,
high poverty levels, and human rights abuse. Countering violent extremism is half successful
if the profile of the targeted audience is clear. Increased social change is positively
correlated to levels of radicalization. Understanding local factors that increase the risk of
radicalization makes it relatively easy to counter radical messages and spearhead the fight
against violent extremism. The case of Kenya is a good example of how audience analysis
and targeting brings into perspective the factors that should be handled to reduce levels of
radicalization in communities.
2.4. Counter Narratives in Countering Violent Extremism
The application of strategic communication approaches in countering violent extremism
(CVE) facilitates the formulation of narratives that target key issues that power the messages
from radical groups. Archetti et al (2014) argues that communication is not a simplistic linear
process in reality with the aim of emphasizing the importance of studying and understanding
both individual and collective narratives in CVE. (Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014)
25
identifies the assumption that narratives from extremist organizations are simple messages as
one of the key limitations of strategic communication approach in CVE. The notion that
Western governments have a chance if they craft simple messages that counter the narratives
presented by these organizations it will yield a positive outcome. Understanding that these
messages are far from being simple stories, they have deep social roots. They arise from a
given web of relationships (Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014). It is plausible to believe that
the existence of a narrative means there is an underlying social network. The choice of
counter narratives and messaging on CVE has acknowledged the existence of social networks
that power these messages for them to achieve the intended purpose.
Collective and individual narratives must be clearly distinguished in the examination of
narratives (Chalmers, 2017). An individual narrative describes the way an individual
comprehends the world and the role that he/she plays in it. It is pertinent to note that
identifying of an individual is modelled by the network of relationships that is involved at
any moment. Advancements in technologies have succeeded in extending the network of
relationships beyond face to face communication. In some cases, a relationship can be
imaginary for example, an individual harbouring a strong admiration for the leader of an
extremist group (Tatham, 2008). Individual identity influences the interpretation of
incoming messages. On a daily basis a typical human being comes across the individual
narratives of friends, colleagues and family members. Also, one comes across collective
narratives propagated by corporations, learning institutions, and government organizations
(Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014). The unique interaction with other individual narratives
and collective narratives will shape one‟s behaviour. Behaviour is bound to affect the
position that one occupies in the network of relationships and the process repeats as one
changes behaviour, views, beliefs and attitude. The potential impact of a message from an
extremist group depends on whether an individual is compatible with the narrative presented
by the extremist group.
2.4.1. The Approach to Counter Narratives
The threat of terrorism and violent extremism has been present in South East Asia for
decades as evidenced by the intricate local networks of local and international terrorist
organizations (Zeiger, 2016). Extremist organizations take advantage of local conflicts
regardless of what inspired them to recruit and carry out attacks. A workshop that comprised
26
of twenty practitioners discussed the choice of counter narratives with the aim of coming up
with the best way to counter violent extremism in South East Asia. The report recommends
the development of a counter narrative that is multi-dimensional because of the need to
influence different groups of people at the same time. Also, it entails developing counter
narratives that touch on all the key factors that contribute to the increased rate of violent
extremism in South East Asia (Zeiger, 2016). The choice of counter narratives should
consider the fact that there are multiple levels of target audience, which include general
sympathizers to vulnerable individuals who have increased chance of buying the ideas
communicated in extremist message/narrative.
United Nations, Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO, 2017) provide
a detailed guideline about the use of education to CVE messages and narratives. UNESCO
describes education as a soft approach that seeks to make young people resilient to the
narratives presented by the violent extremist with the ultimate goal of preventing
radicalization. The key aspects of the guide include identifying the right principles,
challenges, and resilience. Education has an impact on the constellation of relationships that
define the behaviour, beliefs and perspective of many people (UNESCO, 2017). Majority of
the narratives fronted by extremist groups focus on a wide range of social, political, moral,
and religious issues that can be real or imagined. Education is a form of empowerment that
allows target groups to verify all incoming messages and explore the wide range of solutions.
In a study by (Chome, Miller, Maki, Abdallah, Boru, & Abdi, 2017), it recommends the
application of a comprehensive strategy to counter violent extremist narratives that are
peddled online. Online radicalization has emerged as one of the most effective tools used by
extremist organizations to recruit new members from different parts of the world. The first
step in countering extremist narratives is the choice of a message that discredits every aspect
of the message from the historical, sociological, psychological, political and instrumental
dimensions. The theological aspect of the message should be dismantled to ensure there is
no chance of some people empathizing with terror organizations(Ashour, 2010). The study
by Ashour recommends the use of former members of these jihadist groups to pass the
message that counters their narrative. It gives the message a strong sense of credibility. The
message forms the first pillar of the strategy to counter online radicalization because of the
potential impact it has on individuals who find they are compatible with the beliefs and views
27
of these terror organizations (Executive Office of the President, 2011; Pate, 2015). The
choice of counter narratives is dedicated by the goal of the message and the original narrative
that is being countered.
2.4.2. The Dimensions of Counter Narratives
According to (Ashour, 2010) the key dimensions of most narratives are socio-psychological,
instrumental, political, and theological. The political narrative puts an emphasis on the
struggles and mistreatment meted by selected powerful enemies (Ashour, 2010). In the case
of Al-Qaeda, the United States, Israel and many western nations have been identified as the
culprits. The political narrative is supported by key historical injustices to provide
legitimacy. The chances of young people who share the same race or religious background
believing such messages are high. The socio-psychological narrative attempts to justify the
actions of extremist organizations by praising their actions (Ashour, 2010). For example,
some messages praise terrorist organizations for the fighting for the rights of Muslims all
over the world. An instrumental narrative acknowledges the violent methods used by
extremist organizations to achieve their goals (Ashour, 2010). The theological narrative seeks
to paint the cause of the terror groups as something with strong roots in religion. The choice
of counter narrative that dismantles all the dimensions ensures that the target audience is
shielded from any form of brainwashing. The inclusion of all these dimensions in one
narrative presents a complex and compelling story that can sway the minds of many people.
In the same way, counter narratives should be compelling and complex stories that include
all these dimensions to increase the chances of countering the narratives peddled by terror
organizations.
2.4.3. Impact of Narratives in Countering Violent Extremism
A report prepared by a team of experts who visited various parts of the world with the aim of
understanding how to counter narratives used by violent extremist groups details the impact
of narratives on countering violent extremism (Atallah, et al., 2016). Countering narratives
has been an Achilles in CVE despite the dedication of massive resources to this cause. The
research team visited Belfast, London, Norway, Minneapolis, Kenya, Uganda, and Sweden.
The counter narrative study points to the existence of home-grown individuals who have
been radicalized and directed to focus on citizens and government officials. One of the key
findings of the report is the fact that despite efforts by governments across the world they
28
have failed in countering narratives that make people join extremist groups. It is costly
because failure to counter the narrative means the groups will continue to gain new members
and the fight is bound to continue for many years to come (Atallah, et al., 2016). Most of the
countries covered in the study admitted that their counter narrative programs were still young
and there was no statistical data to analyse impacts of CVE programmes. The counter
narrative team leans towards prevention with a keen focus on countering the narratives
peddled by extremist groups to prevent people from partaking in terrorism. Most
governments have realized that the choice of counter narratives should vary depending on the
target audience for them to have maximum impact (Atallah, et al., 2016). The notion that a
message is a simple process where one message can counter all narratives must be shunned
to pave way for the formulation of counter narratives that influence the target audience.
Atallah, et al. (2016) acknowledges the lack of a well-defined integrated CVE program in
Kenya despite the massive threat posed by Al-Shabaab in the region. Al-Shabaab has
increased its activities in Dadaab, within communities in Nairobi and North Eastern. The
group relies on spreading the narrative of social injustice and economic disparity that faces
individuals with Somali origin in Kenya to recruit new members. The narratives describe the
Kenyan government as a self-serving entity that is keen on alienating the ethnic Somali
population. The impact of the narrative has been effective because it reflects the sorry state of
the political environment in Kenya. This is a fine example of how the choice of narrative has
been effective in helping a terror organizations gain new members who are used to organize
attacks. There is a need for a comprehensive CVE program that seeks to formulate narratives
that counter the narratives used by Al-Shabaab to recruit many young people. Reliance on
military action alone is not adequate to handle the complexities involved in CVE. Ogada
(2017) expounds on the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) policy
that came into action in September 2016. NSCVE seeks to mobilize support from national
and local levels in CVE. The engagement of local communities will help in coming up with
effective ways to counter the narratives used to radicalize people in the country. It is
imperative to note that the program is still at the beginning stage making it difficult to
evaluate its impact on countering violent extremism (Ogada, 2017).
29
2.5. Channels of Communication in Countering Violent Extremism
2.5.1. Social media as a channel for CVE
Over time and with advancement of technology, Social media is becoming a major channel
for recruitment to violent extremism (Waldman & Verga, 2016). Governments are designing
interventions to detect, understand, and counteract the impact of violent extremist
recruitment materials on social media and other internet channels. The internet has emerged
as one of the most effective mediums used by terrorist organizations to spread their narratives
and recruit new members. The inception of the internet came with multiple benefits for the
human race because it made communication faster and improved access to general
information. The qualities that make the internet a fundamental requirement in basic
operations are the same ones that terror organizations utilize to pass their narratives and
radicalize individuals from different parts of the world (GCTF, 2017). The selection of the
right channel of communication depends on the objective of the communication process,
targeted audience and the relative comparison of all the available channels of
communication. A medium of communication that resonates with the targeted audience
increases the chances of a successful communication.
The one key issue to note is that curious violent extremists use well known social media
networks while the extremists and fans of terror organizations prefer to use secret sites.
Countering violent extremists should focus on the violent extremists who are still curious and
opt to use the normal social media networks (Kandemir & Brand, 2017). Social media is a
powerful tool for both governments and violent extremists because it reaches many people
and provide some level of anonymity. The analysis of social media can help with the
identification of those at the beginning of radicalization and using the right message to
prevent them from joining extremist organizations.
In their report on how extremists exploit social media for propaganda escalation, (Waldman
& Verga, 2016) highlights two ways in which violent extremist groups use the channels to
invoke different types of CVE reactions by State agencies. The first is the use of social media
channels to stimulate, organize and activate violent actions; and using the platform to
advertise activities and views to vulnerable targets like the youths, and also to engage with
potential new recruits. While publicity and recruitment activity constitutes the typical target
30
for counter Violent Extremism intervention, detecting extremist groups and activation on
social media. According to (Okonkwo, 2018) , CVE campaigns which disseminate counter
narrative to those by extremist groups can employ the social media as a powerful and mobile
platform for reaching and engaging youths who are vulnerable to the extremists online
propaganda and who use of social media to recruit and to engender a wide and supportive
environment for their activities.
2.5.2. Media and CVE
Communication is important in averting violent extremists from accomplishing their
intentions. Effective communication can reduce extremists' probabilities of mounting
successful maneuvers, creating threats that instill fear and mayhem in people‟s lives, and
undermining the legitimacy of the societies that they attack (Fischhoff, 2011). The effective
management of strategic communication approaches handling both internal and external
communication channels should be preceded by understanding messages, objectives, and the
utilization of networks to create or learn new knowledge (Fleming, Darley, Hilton, &
Kojetin, 1990). The focus of this study is to explore the adaptation of strategic
communication as a tool for preventing and countering violent extremism. Strategic
communication is possible if there are social actors and organizations with a deliberate
attempt at communication (Ahmad, 2016).
The media is powerful medium of communication because of the ability to reach millions of
people at the same time. Ferguson (2016) explores how the media and communication
strategies can be utilized to counter violent extremism and identity-based violence. The study
acknowledges the key role that the media can play in countering violent extremism
(Ferguson, Countering violent extremism through media and communication strategies: A
Review of the Evidence, 2016). The key findings from the study include the fact that media
projects that are connected to a political agenda are likely to have less impact, there is
evidence that radio and television drama that touch on issues of identity and tolerance have a
positive effect on public attitude and behaviour, and media assistance can help the domestic
media respond well to violent extremist narratives. Effective utilization of media through
rapid reaction and effective communication strategies can help counter extremist narratives
and identity based violence. It is clear from the study findings that a channel of
31
communication has a significant effect on how the target audience reacts to any message.
Also, it determines the type of people who are likely to get the message. The notion that
there is a channel of communication that resonates with all types of audiences remains
unproven. The findings of the study imply that the effectiveness of any channel of
communication depends on the targeted audience and the message.
Strategic communication professionals believe a successful process of communication
depends on the message, audience, and the medium of communication (Philips & Dyke,
2012). This belief leads to the assumption that crafting the right message for the audience
guarantees a social change. However, there are several factors that must be considered when
drafting a message with the social foundation of the message taking precedence. The
message influence model has been applied by the U.S Military for many years. The failure of
the U.S military in obtaining public support in Afghanistan, Iraq and many other nations is
evidence that the message influence model is not based on accurate assumptions. The
process of communication is based on a network of relationships that should be considered
for the message to achieve the desire effect. The utilization of strategic communication CVE
programs is because of the need to involve key stakeholders in preventing radicalization and
violent attacks (Finn et al., 2016).
The relational human theory developed by Philip and Dyke (2012) proposes an intricate
framework for the practice of strategic communication. The theory prioritizes building and
maintaining mutually beneficial connections with key stakeholders and the public. The
stakeholders involved in the network of relationship influence each other and facilitate
communication. Archetti et al (2014) identifies the failure to create and manage mutually
beneficial relationships as one of the limitations of strategic communication approaches used
in CVE programs (Archetti, Seese, & Harley, 2014). It is imperative to note that the channel
of communication selected should be familiar to the target audience to ensure the message
reaches the right people at the right time (Philips & Dyke, 2012). Philips and Dyke (2012)
recommend a relationship management approach because of the fact that it makes it easy to
understand and target key players in the process of communication. The channel of
communication selected varies depending on the target audience.
32
Social media is one of the most influential forms of communication in the world today.
Reports of ISIS radicalizing people from all over the world using popular social media sites
are on the rise. Social media can be considered one of the key channels through which
people connect and communicate (Kandemir & Brand, 2017). Social media analysis
generates key information that permits governments to fight threats from extremist
organizations. Militant organizations have taken advantage of social media to recruit
members from different parts of the world and use them to bring conflicts (Deeb et al., 2016).
According to Warrington (2017), the Islamic State (IS) has benefitted from using social
media to recruit members beyond their physical reach. Social media has made it possible to
send military, religious, and political messages to anyone who has internet access (Bole &
Kallmyer, 2016). Attempts by governments to counter the narratives presented by the IS have
been futile because of the lack of understanding of the social foundation that most of these
messages possess. Regardless, social media is a powerful channel of communication that is
very difficult to control from the perspective of government laws and policies (Warrington,
2017). The study recommends the combination of CVE and a proposed theoretical
framework for securitization and de-securitization can help counter online narratives. The
creation of virtual communities that focus on countering narratives from extremists and
preventing radicalization has the potential to change many people. The lack of trust in
government entities means messages from these organizations might not be taken as the truth
by members of the minority groups. The proposal emphasizes the use of civil actors in
countering narratives online.
2.5.3. Agents of influence as channels for CVE communication
Kandemir and Brand (2017) recommend the use of community leaders, religious leaders, and
other influential members of the society to send counter narrative messages to the ones who
have been radicalized. The Nigerian Counterterrorism Strategy acknowledged the use of
military force is not adequate in handling radicalized individuals (Barkindo and Bryans,
2016). The Nigerian government has created a de-radicalization program that targets
prisoners who are members of extremist organizations. Given the fact that most of the
narratives from terror organizations focus on social injustice and religious issues, it make
sense to use community and religious leaders to pass counter narratives to the radicalized
group. Community leaders and religious leaders can be utilized as channels of
33
communication because of their influence in a given communities. They can help in
providing young people with key information that turns them resilient against radicalization
efforts (Barkindo & Bryans, 2016). The use of community leaders and other members of the
society to pass counter narratives mean governments should priorities integration of
minorities. The increased efforts by governments to integrate Muslims has led to an increased
number of Muslims participating in CVE programs (Archick, Belkin, Blanchard, Ek, & Mix,
2011; Rankin & Cowen, 2012).
2.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter has reviewed existing literature on this topic to understand what previous
researchers have established and identify gaps that could be addressed by this study. Chapter
three will describe in detail how the study will be designed, including methods and
procedures that will be used to carry out the study. The chapter will elaborate on the
methodology that will be applied in carrying out this study. Specific sections will include the
research design, the population and sampling designs, sampling techniques and the sample
size that will be selected. Other information to be covered in the chapter include the data
collection methods and tools that will be used, as well as the research procedures, which will
also elaborate the reliability of the study tool that will be used.
34
CHAPTER THREE
3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Introduction
Methodology is the general research strategy that outlines the way in which research is to be
undertaken and, among other things, identifies the methods to be used in it (Howell, 2012).
This chapter elaborates on the methodology that was applied in carrying out this study.
Specific sections include the research design, which is the plan for the study, the population
and sampling designs, sampling techniques and the sample size that was selected. Other
information elaborated in this chapter include the data collection methods and tools that was
used, as well as the research procedures, which elaborate the reliability of the study tool that
was used.
3.2. Research Design
Research design is the chosen strategy for integrating different components of a study in a
coherent and logical manner, ensuring effectiveness in addressing the research problem. The
research design is the blueprint for collecting, measuring, and analyzing data (Creswell,
2012). It is the arrangement of conditions for collection and analysis of data in a manner that
aims to combine relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure (C.R.Kothari,
2004). The design of a study defines the study type (descriptive, correlation, semi-
experimental, experimental, review, meta-analytic) and sub-type (descriptive-longitudinal
case study), research question, hypotheses, independent and dependent variables,
experimental design, and, if applicable, data collection methods and a statistical analysis plan
(Jalil, 2013).The descriptive survey technique will be used since it is the most suitable
research design that is non-experimental. Descriptive research is “aimed at casting light on
current issues or problems through a process of data collection that enables them to describe
the situation more completely than is possible without employing the descriptive method.
A variable is a characteristic of phenomena that can be observed or measured. A dependent
variable is defined as values that are influenced by one or more dependent variables. An
independent variable is a variable that influences the values of a dependent valuable (Jill and
Rogers, 2009). The independent variable in this research is the strategic communications
35
through target audience identification, message design and delivery channels that influences
the dependent variable acts of violent extremism and terrorism in Pumwani area of Nairobi
County in Kenya.
3.3. Population and Sampling Design
3.3.1 Population
Population is a complete set of cases or elements from which a sample is taken (Saunders,
Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016). Population is further explained as a group of individuals or
objects that have the same form of characteristics (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012, p. 244).
They are the “totality of cases that conform to certain specifications, which defines the
elements that are included or excluded in the target group. The NCTC has been running
programs for prevention and countering violent extremism through use of strategic
communications in Mlango Kubwa, Kariakor, Juja Road Mathare and Eastleigh within
Pumwani area of Nairobi County. NCTC targeted five (5) different youth groups with each
one being picked from the five administrative areas of Pumwani. The youth groups are
engaged in different socio economic activities including, car wash business, theatre, water
vending, social work and community policing. Each youth group has a maximum
membership of 60 youths and a minimum of 35. The NCTC CVE program is covering a total
of 250 youths who are active members of the five youth groups as shown to table 3.1 below;
Project Area Number of Youth Groups on
CVE program
Youth Group
membership
Mlango Kubwa 1 60
Juja Road 1 55
Kariakor 1 50
Mathare 1 50
Eastleigh 1 35
Total 5 250
Source: NCTC (2017)
36
3.3.2 Sampling Design
A sample is a group of individuals, objects, items or cases already selected from the
accessible population (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012, p. 287). For this study, the sample was
drawn from Pumwani division of Nairobi County targeting youth aged between 15-30 Years. The
targeted respondents were youths who are members of the youth groups operating in Pumwani
area and have been residents of Pumwani since 2016 the time when the government initiated its
CVE strategy. The respondents were both male and female.
3.3.3 Sampling Frame
According to (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2012, p. 289) sampling frame is the complete listing of
all the units of the population which is purposely used to draw random samples. In this study,
the population comprised of the youths aged between 15-30 years and members of the youth
groups that were targeted by the NCTC CVE programming and who were residents of
Pumwani.
3.3.4 Sampling Technique
According to (Singleton & Straits, 2010), there are varied types of sampling techniques that
include simple random sampling, convenience sampling and quota sampling techniques
among many others. Sampling techniques are classified in to two: Probability and non-
probability sampling techniques. The researcher for this study used cluster probability
sampling. This is a technique in which clusters of respondents that represent the population
are identified and included in the study (Jackson, 2012). The choice was informed by the fact
that NCTC has zoned and clustered the population they target for CVE in the country. It was
therefore convenient for the researcher and cost effective to use the cluster probability
sampling for study.
3.3.5 Sample Size
A sample size is the number of units, subjects, objects or items in the sample (Mugenda &
Mugenda, 2012). It is used to determine the precision with which population parameters are
estimated and hence the accuracy of the findings made from the sample data and population.
In this study the sample size was the number of Kenyan youths aged between 15 to 35 years
37
and residents of Pumwani area within Nairobi County that the researcher used to collect data
on strategic communications initiatives by NCTC in countering violent extremism.
Yamane (1967) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes.
Where:
n = the sample size,
N = the population size,
e = error of 5 percentage points.
Using this Yamane (1967) formula, the sample size was 220 youths on CVE program in the
study area as shown in table 3.2 below. The formula was preferred since it was easy to use;
it is scientific and can be used in situations where there are large populations.
Project Area Number of Youth Groups
on CVE program
Youth Group
membership
Sample Size
Mlango Kubwa 1 60 52
Juja Road 1 55 48
Kariakor 1 50 44
Mathare 1 50 44
Eastleigh 1 35 32
Total 5 250 220
Source: Author (2018)
3.4. Data Collection Methods
Data collection is the means by which information is obtained from the selected subjects of
an investigation or a study (Mugenda, 2009). The researcher used questionnaires for data
collection. The questionnaire was designed to collect qualitative data. According to Cooper
& Schindler (2014) questionnaires are definite, concrete and have pre-determined questions
which are presented with the same phrasing and language to all the respondents. It is also
38
good as respondents tend to be more truthful while responding to the questionnaires
regarding controversial issues in particular due to the fact that their responses are
anonymous. A five-point likert scale was used for the questions in the survey except for the
section that required the respondent‟s background information and a few open-ended
questions. Likert scale is an ordinal scale comprising of a set of qualitative variations of a
particular attribute or entity ordered sequentially from least to most (Nunnally & Bernstein,
2010) . The questionnaires had different sections as follows: Part A: Background information
and demographic data, Part B: Countering Violent Extremism, Part C: Audience targeting,
Part D: Counter narratives, Part E: Choice of communication channels, and Part F:
Communication Content configuration.
The major drawback is that many respondents who receive questionnaires at times don't
return them and those who do might not be representative of the originally selected sample
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2001).
3.5. Research Procedure
The following are the research procedures that the researcher adopted in the course of the
study; in compliance with the Procedures and Guidelines for Research Authorization in
Kenya regulations, permission for conducting the research was obtained prior to the
conducting of the research such as the review by the ethical clearance committee by USIU-A
and the research permit from the National Commission for Science, Technology and
Innovation (NACOSTI) that approved the research.
With the appropriate approvals, the researcher went on to carry out a pilot study using the
questionnaires that were later refined and used in the survey. Given the sensitivity of the
study subject, the pilot study helped the researcher to pre-assess the relevance of the
questions and how acceptable the study was among the target population. The researcher
used 20 respondents for the pilot study. The results of the pilot study showed that youths in
the study area are still sensitive to openly discussing or being associated with issues of
violent extremism. Given this sensitive nature of the study, respondents were not very
comfortable to provide information that they thought could be used against them; they were
very sceptical to give information at first.
39
Having understood the sensitivity of study area, the researcher gave a full disclosure of the
intention of the study and reassured respondents that the information provided was to be
handled in confidence and would not be divulged to any agency for any other purpose other
than the academic research purposes. Letter of consent to carry out the research was availed
to the respondents.
The respondents were provided with a summary of the key aspects of the survey prior to
being given the questionnaires. On anonymity, respondents were informed before taking the
survey that they would remain anonymous and any information they give will be confidential
and used only for the purpose of academic research.
3.6. Data Analysis Methods
According to Greene (2012), the specification of multiple linear regressions requires one
dependent and more than one independent variable. This study used linear regression to
analyze the data that was collected. A linear regression was an appropriate analysis to this
study since the general purpose of this research was to assess the impact of strategic
communications in countering violent extremism. In this case, the predictor variables were
Audience targeting, counter narratives and channels of communication while the criterion
variable was Violent Extremism. The researcher carried out statistical analyses using
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24.
3.7. Chapter Summary
This chapter describes in detail how the study will be designed, including methods and
procedures that will be used to carry out the study. The chapter elaborates on the
methodology that will be applied in carrying out this study. Specific sections include the
research design, the population and sampling designs, sampling techniques and the sample
size that will be selected. The other information that has been covered in the chapter include
the data collection methods and tools that will be used, as well as the research procedures,
which will also elaborates the reliability of the study tool that will be used. The next
chapter is chapter four which will provide the detailed findings of the study with graphical
representations.
40
CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 RESULTS AND FINDINGS
4.1. Introduction
This chapter provides results and findings of the impact of strategic communications in
preventing violent extremism and counter terrorism by NCTC in Pumwani area of Nairobi
County in the republic of Kenya. Findings on the Demographic information were presented
first followed by the findings on Countering Violent Extremism; audience targeting, Counter
Narratives, choice of communication channels and communication content. Descriptive
statistics and inferential statistics have been used in the analysis.
4.1.1. Response Rate
The study targeted 220 respondents but 184 were validly interviewed. This represent 84%
response rate. The responses from the areas of focus were as shown in the table 4.2 below
Table 4.1: Response Rate
Area Frequency Percent
Mlango Kubwa 46 25.0
Juja Road 37 20.1
Kariako 32 17.4
Mathare 39 21.2
Eastleigh 30 16.3
Total 184 100.0
41
4.2. Demographic Information
4.2.1. Respondents Gender.
The respondents for this study were asked to indicate their gender. The results indicate that
majority of the respondents (56%) were males while (44%) were female as shown in the
Figure 4.1 below.
Figure 4. 1: Respondents Gender
4.2.2. Respondents Age
The research sought to investigate the age of the respondents, it was found that 50% were of
age 18-25 years, 41.8% were of age 26-35 years and 8.2% were of age 36-35 years as shown
in the figure 4.2 below.
103, 56%
81, 44% Male
Female
42
Figure 4.2 : Respondents Age
4.2.3. Highest Level of Education.
This study sought to determine the education level of the respondents .The findings showed
that 61.2% of the respondents had secondary certificate, 30.6% had diploma as their highest
level of education, 6.6% had Bachelor‟s degree as their highest level of education and 1.6%
had graduate degree as shown in the figure 4.3 below.
Figure 4.3 : Respondents Level of Education
50% 42%
8%
18-25 Years
26-35 Years
36-45 Years
61.2
30.6
6.6 1.6
SECONDARY
CERTIFICATE
DIPLOMA BACHELOR'S
DEGREE
GRADUATE
DEGREE
Per
cen
tag
e
Response
43
4.3. Countering Violent Extremism
4.3.1. Violence Witnessed
Research sought to investigate the opinion that violence is witnessed in Pumwani area. The
results showed that 32.6% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 57.6%
agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 9.8% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the
majority (57.6%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.2
below.
Table 4.2: Violence Witnessed
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 8 4.3
Disagree 52 28.3
Neutral 18 9.8
Agree 80 43.5
Strongly Agree 26 14.1
Total 184 100
4.3.2. Suffering from Violence
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have suffered from violence
in Pumwani area. The results showed that 60.2% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the
opinion while 28.2% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 11.6% were neutral about
the opinion. Thus the majority (60.2%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion as
shown in the table 4.3.2 below.
Table 4.3: Respondents who have Suffered Violence
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 14 7.7
Disagree 95 52.5
Neutral 21 11.6
Agree 40 22.1
Strongly Agree 11 6.1
Total 181 100.0
44
4.3.3. Participation in Violence
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have participated in
organizing violence. The results showed that 87.5% disagreed and strongly disagreed with
the opinion while 7% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 5.4% were neutral about
the opinion. Thus the majority (87.5%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion as
shown in the table 4.3.3 below.
Table 4.4: Participation in Violence
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 138 75.0
Disagree 23 12.5
Neutral 10 5.4
Agree 10 5.4
Strongly Agree 3 1.6
Total 184 100.0
4.3.4. Training on Countering Violent Extremism
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have trained on countering
violent extremism. The results showed that 18.7% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the
opinion while 67.6% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 13.7% were neutral about
the opinion. Thus the majority (67.6%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown
in the table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5 : Training on Countering Violent Extremism
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 28 15.4
Neutral 25 13.7
Agree 76 41.8
Strongly Agree 47 25.8
Total 182 100.0
45
4.3.5. Training People
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have trained people on
countering violent extremism. The results showed that 59.1% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 23.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 17.1%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (59.1%) disagreed and strongly disagreed
with the opinion as shown in the table 4.6 below.
Table 4.6: Training People
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 21 11.6
Disagree 86 47.5
Neutral 31 17.1
Agree 34 18.8
Strongly Agree 9 5.0
Total 181 100.0
4.3.6. Face to Face Training
Research sought to investigate the opinion that face to face training about countering
violence in the community is the best way of countering violent extremism. The results
showed that 7.1% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 77.2% agreed and
strongly agreed with the opinion. 15.8% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority
(77.2%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.7 below.
Table4.7: Face to Face Training
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 4 2.2
Disagree 9 4.9
Neutral 29 15.8
Agree 27 14.7
Strongly Agree 115 62.5
Total 184 100.0
46
4.3.7. Use of Newspaper as Platform for CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that newspaper is the best platform for countering
violent extremism. The results showed that 54.1% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the
opinion while 17.5% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 28.4% were neutral about
the opinion. Thus the majority (54.1%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion as
shown in the table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8: Use of Newspapers as Platform for CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 10 5.5
Disagree 89 48.6
Neutral 52 28.4
Agree 28 15.3
Strongly Agree 4 2.2
Total 183 100.0
4.3.8. Use of Social Media as platform for CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that social media is the best tool for countering
violent extremism. The results showed that 14.3% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the
opinion while 52.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 33% were neutral about
the opinion. Thus the majority (52.8%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown
in the table 4.9 below.
Table 4.9: Social Media as Platform for CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 20 11.0
Neutral 60 33.0
Agree 48 26.4
Strongly Agree 48 26.4
Total 182 100.0
47
4.3.9. Local Languages in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that airing how to counter violent extremism in
local languages is the best way of countering violent extremism. The results showed that
18.1% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 70.3% agreed and strongly
agreed with the opinion. 11.5% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (70.3%)
agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.10 below.
Table 4.10: Use of Local language in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 27 14.8
Neutral 21 11.5
Agree 47 25.8
Strongly Agree 81 44.5
Total 182 100.0
4.4. Audience Targeting
4.4.1. Audience targeting by International Extremist Organizations
Research sought to investigate the opinion that violent extremism is influenced by
international organizations that rely on recruiting locals to carry out attacks in the country.
The results showed that 22.7% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while
61.3% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 16% were neutral about the opinion.
Thus the majority (61.3%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table
4.11 below.
48
Table 4.11: Audience Targeting by International Extremist Groups
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 35 19.3
Neutral 29 16.0
Agree 77 42.5
Strongly Agree 34 18.8
Total 181 100.0
4.4.2. Government Identified Targets fir CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the government has identified different
groups and communities it targets with its CVE program. The results showed that 4.9%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 76% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 19.1% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (76%) agreed and
strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.12 below.
Table 4.12: Government Identified Targets for CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 4 2.2
Disagree 5 2.7
Neutral 35 19.1
Agree 101 55.2
Strongly Agree 38 20.8
Total 183 100.0
4.4.3. Government Understanding of Target Audience
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the government agencies have understood the
target audiences in the country and formulate messages that are compatible with the intended
audience. The results showed that 11.3% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion
while 68.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 19.9% were neutral about the
49
opinion. Thus the majority (68.8%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in
the table 4.13 below.
Table 4.4.13: Government Understanding of Target Audience
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 9 6.4
Disagree 7 5.0
Neutral 28 19.9
Agree 73 51.8
Strongly Agree 24 17.0
Total 141 100.0
4.4.4. Targets for Training on CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that training only those who have been involved in
violence is the best way to counter violent extremism. The results showed that 86.3%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 9.3% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 4.4% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (86.3%) disagreed
and strongly disagreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.14 below.
Table 4.14: Targets for Training on CVE
4.4.5. Correlation Test between Audience Targeting and CVE
A Pearson correlation test was done to investigate significant relationship between audience
targeting and CVE. The results shows that there is a significant weak positive relationship
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 122 67.0
Disagree 35 19.2
Neutral 8 4.4
Agree 14 7.7
Strongly Agree 3 1.6
Total 182 100.0
50
between CVE and target audience with(r=0.277, p= 0.001, N= 174). The results are as
shown in the table 4.15 below.
Table 4.15: Correlation Test between Audience Targeting and CVE
Responses CVE Audience Targeting
CVE Pearson Correlation 1 .277**
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 174 174
Audience Targeting Pearson Correlation .277**
1
Sig. (2-tailed) .001
N 174 174
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
4.5. Counter Narratives
4.5.1. Use of SMS Texts about Violence
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have received a text
informing them about violence/terrorism before it happens. The results showed that 85.2%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 9.8% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 4.9% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (85.2%) disagreed
and strongly disagreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.16 below.
Table 4.16: Use of SMS Text about Violence
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 71 38.8
Disagree 85 46.4
Neutral 9 4.9
Agree 15 8.2
Strongly Agree 3 1.6
Total 183 100.0
4.5.2. CVE Information Received via any Platform
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have never received any
information in any platform about violence/terrorism. The results showed that 60.7%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 31.1% agreed and strongly agreed
51
with the opinion. 8.2% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (60.7%) disagreed
and strongly disagreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.17 below.
Table 4.17:CVE Information via any platform
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 73 39.9
Disagree 38 20.8
Neutral 15 8.2
Agree 52 28.4
Strongly Agree 5 2.7
Total 183 100.0
4.5.3. CVE Warning Information on Extremism
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents have come across information
warning people not to join a violent/terrorism group. The results showed that 7.1% disagreed
and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 81.3% agreed and strongly agreed with the
opinion. 11.5% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (81.3%) agreed and
strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.18 below.
Table 4.18: CVE Warning Information on Extremism
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 7 3.8
Disagree 6 3.3
Neutral 21 11.5
Agree 79 43.4
Strongly Agree 69 37.9
Total 182 100.0
52
4.5.4. Ignoring Government Information on CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents always ignore government
information countering violent/terror threats. The results showed that 77.6% disagreed and
strongly disagreed with the opinion while 9.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion.
12.6% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (77.6%) disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.19 below.
Table 4.19: Ignoring government information on CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 73 39.9
Disagree 69 37.7
Neutral 23 12.6
Agree 15 8.2
Strongly Agree 3 1.6
Total 183 100.0
4.5.5. Role of Religious leaders in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that religious leaders helps in countering terror
threats. The results showed that 8.2% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion
while 65.6% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 26.2% were neutral about the
opinion. Thus the majority (65.6%) agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in
the table 4.20 below.
Table 4.4.20: Role of Religious leaders in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 3 1.6
Disagree 12 6.6
Neutral 48 26.2
Agree 93 50.8
Strongly Agree 27 14.8
Total 183 100.0
53
4.5.6. Correlation Test between Counter Narrative and CVE
A Pearson correlation test was done to investigate significant relationship between counter
narratives and CVE. The results shows that there is no significant relationship between CVE
and counter narratives with (r=0.096, p= 0.208, N= 174). This is an indication that counter
narratives has no significant impact on CVE. The results are as shown in the table 4.21
below.
Table 4.21: Correlation Test between Counter Narrative and CVE
Responses CVE Counter Narratives
CVE Pearson Correlation 1 .096
Sig. (2-tailed) .208
N 174 174
Counter Narratives Pearson Correlation .096 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .208
N 173 174
4.6. Choice of Communication Channels
4.6.1. Use of Radio and TV
Research sought to investigate the opinion that radios and TVs are the best communication
channels in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 10.9% disagreed and
strongly disagreed with the opinion while 75% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion.
14.1% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (75%) agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion as shown in the table 4.22 below.
Table 4.22: Use of Radio and TV in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 9 4.9
Disagree 11 6.0
Neutral 26 14.1
Agree 78 42.4
Strongly Agree 60 32.6
Total 184 100.0
54
4.6.2. Use of Facebook in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that Facebook is the best communication channel
in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 23.4% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 40.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 35.9%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (40.8%) agreed and strongly agreed with
the opinion as shown in the table 4.23 below.
Table 4.23: Use of Facebook in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 9 4.9
Disagree 11 6.0
Neutral 26 14.1
Agree 78 42.4
Strongly Agree 60 32.6
Total 184 100.0
4.6.3. Use of WhatsApp in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that WhatsApp is the best communication channel
in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 48.1% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 12.7% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 39.2%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (48.1%) disagreed and strongly disagreed
with the opinion as shown in the table 4.24 below.
Table 4.24: Use of WhatsApp in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 13 7.2
Disagree 74 40.9
Neutral 71 39.2
Agree 18 9.9
Strongly Agree 5 2.8
Total 181 100.0
55
4.6.4. Use of Twitter in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that Twitter is the best communication channel in
countering violent extremism. The results showed that 50% disagreed and strongly disagreed
with the opinion while 11.5% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 38.5% were
neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (50%) disagreed and strongly disagreed with the
opinion as shown in the table 4.25 below.
Table 4.25: Use of Twitter in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 13 7.1
Disagree 78 42.9
Neutral 70 38.5
Agree 15 8.2
Strongly Agree 6 3.3
Total 182 100.0
4.6.5. Use of Billboards in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that billboard is the best communication channel
in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 21.7% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 31.6% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 46.7%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (46.7%) were neutral about the opinion as
shown in the table 4.26 below.
Table 4.26: Use of Billboard in CVE
Responses Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 34 18.5
Neutral 86 46.7
Agree 45 24.5
Strongly Agree 13 7.1
Total 184 100.0
56
4.6.6. Use of mobile text Messages (SMS) in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that Mobile text message is the best
communication channel in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 34.4%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 48.1% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 17.5% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (48.1%) agreed
and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.27 below.
Table 4.27: Use of Mobile text Message in CVE
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 12 6.6
Disagree 51 27.9
Neutral 32 17.5
Agree 64 35.0
Strongly Agree 24 13.1
Total 183 100.0
4.6.7. Using Emails for CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that Email is the best communication channel in
countering violent extremism. The results showed that 53.6% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 10.4% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 36.1%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (53.6%) disagreed and strongly disagreed
with the opinion as shown in the table 4.28 below.
Table 4.28: Using Emails for CVE
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 12 6.6
Disagree 86 47.0
Neutral 66 36.1
Agree 17 9.3
Strongly Agree 2 1.1
Total 183 100.0
57
4.6.8. Use of Public Barazas in CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that Baraza (public gathering convened and
addressed by government administrators at the grassroots level) is the best communication
channel in countering violent extremism. The results showed that 8.3% disagreed and
strongly disagreed with the opinion while 66.3% agreed and strongly agreed with the
opinion. 25.4% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (66.3%) agreed and
strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.29 below.
Table 4.29: Use of Public Barazas in CVE
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 5 2.8
Disagree 10 5.5
Neutral 46 25.4
Agree 88 48.6
Strongly Agree 32 17.7
Total 181 100.0
4.6.9. CVE Programming in Kenya
Research sought to investigate the opinion that CVE programming in Kenya is conducted
and aired in local languages and target youth appropriately. The results showed that 9.2%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 54.7% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 36.2% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (54.7%) agreed
and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.30 below.
Table 4.30: CVE Programming in Kenya
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 4 3.1
Disagree 8 6.2
Neutral 47 36.2
Agree 63 48.5
Strongly Agree 8 6.2
Total 130 100.0
58
4.6.10. Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Channels and CVE
A Pearson correlation test was done to investigate significant relationship between choice of
communication channels and CVE. The results shows that there is a weak positive significant
relationship between CVE and choice of communication channels with(r-=0.402, p= 0.0.00,
N= 174).The results are as shown in the table 4.31 below.
Table 4.31: Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Channels and CVE
CVE Communication
Channels
CVE Pearson Correlation 1 .402**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 174 174
Communication Channels Pearson Correlation .402**
1
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 174 174
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
4.7. Communication Content
4.7.1. Clarity of Messages from Government on CVE
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the messages from government on CVE have
clear meaning and are understandable. The results showed that 12.6% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 67.8% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 19.7%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (67.8%) agreed and strongly agreed with
the opinion as shown in the table 4.32 below.
Table 4.32: Clarity of Messages from Government on CVE
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 9 4.9
Disagree 14 7.7
Neutral 36 19.7
Agree 77 42.1
Strongly Agree 47 25.7
Total 183 100.0
59
4.7.2. Understanding of Violent Extremism
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the messages have helped respondents to
understand better what violent extremism is all about. The results showed that 8.8%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 72% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 19.2% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (72%) agreed and
strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.33 below.
Table 4.4.33: Understanding of Violent Extremism
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 2 1.1
Disagree 14 7.7
Neutral 35 19.2
Agree 97 53.3
Strongly Agree 34 18.7
Total 182 100.0
4.7.3. CVE Messages Delivery mode and Timeliness
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the messages about terrorism are always
delivered to the respondents in the correct manner and on time. The results showed that
23.5% disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 34.4% agreed and strongly
agreed with the opinion. 42.1% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (42.1%)
were neutral about the opinion as shown in the table 4.34 below.
Table 4.34: Messages Delivery mode and Timeliness
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 15 8.2
Disagree 28 15.3
Neutral 77 42.1
Agree 46 25.1
Strongly Agree 17 9.3
Total 183 100.0
60
4.7.4. Ability to Differentiate CVE False Messages
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the respondents are able to differentiate false
messages on violent extremism from the correct ones. The results showed that 8.2%
disagreed and strongly disagreed with the opinion while 72.2% agreed and strongly agreed
with the opinion. 19.7% were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (72.2%) agreed
and strongly agreed with the opinion as shown in the table 4.35 below.
Table 4.35: Ability to Differentiate CVE False Messages
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 4 2.2
Disagree 11 6.0
Neutral 36 19.7
Agree 94 51.4
Strongly Agree 38 20.8
Total 183 100.0
4.7.5. Behavior Change
Research sought to investigate the opinion that the message content delivered about violence
has helped in changing my behavior. The results showed that 7.1% disagreed and strongly
disagreed with the opinion while 80.2% agreed and strongly agreed with the opinion. 12.6%
were neutral about the opinion. Thus the majority (80.2%) agreed and strongly agreed with
the opinion as shown in the table 4.36 below.
Table 4.36: Behavior Change
Frequency Percent
Strongly Disagree 6 3.3
Disagree 7 3.8
Neutral 23 12.6
Agree 95 52.2
Strongly Agree 51 28.0
Total 182 100.0
61
4.7.6. Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Content and CVE
A Pearson correlation test was done to investigate significant relationship between
communication content and CVE. The results shows that there is no significant relationship
between CVE and choice of communication content with(r=0.102, p= 0.0.184, N= 174). This
is an indication that communication content does not have significant impact on CVE. The
results are as shown in the table 4.7.6 below.
Table 4.37: Correlation Test between Choice of Communication Content and CVE
CVE Communication Content
CVE Pearson
Correlation
1 .102
Sig. (2-tailed) .184
N 174 174
Communication Content Pearson
Correlation
.102 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .184
N 174 174
4.8. Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was done to investigate the extent to which audience targeting and
choice of communication channels affect the CVE.
The results from the model summary table indicates that R= 0.443 meaning that the
correlation between CVE and the two independent variables is weak while R-square= 0.196
meaning that both communication channels and audience targeting can explain 19.6% of the
variation in CVE.
62
Table 4.38: Model Summary
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square
Std. Error of the
Estimate
1 .443a .196 .181 .41141
a. Predictors: (Constant), Communication Channels, Audience Targeting
The ANOVA table also indicates that the linear regression model showing the relationship
between CVE and the two predictors is significantly of good fit with ( F= 13.192, df= 2 and
p= 0.00)
Table 4.39: ANOVA
ANOVAa
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
1 Regression 4.466 2 2.233 13.192 .000b
Residual 18.279 108 .169
Total 22.745 110
a. Dependent Variable: CVE
b. Predictors: (Constant), Communication Channels, Audience Targeting
The linear regression model being Y=B0+B1X1+ B2X2 + error term.
Where Y= CVE, B0= Constant, X1= Audience Targeting, X2= Communication Channels.
CVE= Constant + Audience Targeting.B1 + Communication Channels.B2 + error term
The results from coefficients table indicates that
Y= 1.536+0.175X1+0.322X2
This means that increasing audience targeting by one unit, CVE will improve by 0.175 units
while increasing communication channels by one unit CVE will improve by 0.322 units.
This is an indication that communication channels significantly affect CVE more than
audience targeting.
63
Table 4.8: Coefficients
Coefficients.
Model
Unstandardized
Coefficients
Standardized
Coefficients
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 1.536 .338 4.546 .000
Audience Targeting .175 .084 .186 2.078 .040
Communication
Channels
.322 .081 .355 3.969 .000
a. Dependent Variable: CVE
4.9. Chapter Summary
This chapter has provided the results of the findings based on the research questions. The
results have been presented in frequency tables and figures. The presentation covered the
demographic information of the respondents and findings were presented as per the research
questions of the study which were: What is the effect of audience targeting on Countering
Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya? What are effects of choice
of Counter Narratives on Countering Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County
in Kenya? What is the impact of the choice of communication channels on Countering
Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya? And what impact does the
communication content have on target audience behavior in Pumwani area of Nairobi County
in Kenya? The next chapter presents in detail the discussions of the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations based on the results and findings of the study.
64
CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 SUMMARY, DISCUSSIONS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1. Introduction
This chapter entails a detailed summary of the study, discussions, conclusions and
recommendations. The aim is to provide a clear connection between the objectives of the
study, the results and the recommendations for practice and further research.
5.2. Summary
The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of strategic communications in
preventing violent extremism and counterterrorism by NCTC in Pumwani area within
Nairobi County in Kenya. The research questions for the study were as follows: What is the
effect of audience targeting on Countering Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi
County in Kenya? What are effects of choice of Counter Narratives on Countering Violent
Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya? What is the impact of the choice
of communication channels on Countering Violent Extremism in Pumwani area of Nairobi
County in Kenya? What impact does the communication content have on target audience
behaviour in Pumwani area of Nairobi County in Kenya?
A descriptive survey technique was selected for the study because it helps in the collection of
data that aids in the description of a phenomenon. The total study population consisted of
250 youth who are members of different youth groups operating from Pumwani area in
Nairobi County. The sample size for the study was 220 youths participating in the CVE
program in the area under study. Linear regression was selected to facilitate data analysis
because of the need to assess the impact of strategic communications in countering violent
extremism. Tables and figures helped in making sense of analysed data.
Most of the study respondents agreed that violence is witnessed in Pumwani area while over
sixty percent disagreed that they have experienced violence in Pumwani area. On findings
65
about countering violence, most of the respondents disagreed with the opinion that they have
taken part in organized violence. Most of the study respondents agreed that they have taken
part in training to help counter violent extremism. Majority of the respondents have not
trained people on counter violent extremism. Face to face training was considered as the best
way of countering violent extremism in the community by most of the study respondents.
Newspaper was not seen as the best way of countering violent extremism as opposed to
social media, which was selected as the best platform by most of the respondents. The use of
local languages to conduct training was looked favourably by most of the respondents.
The findings of the study on audience targeting showed that majority of the respondents
agreed that international organizations influence violent extremism by hiring locals to carry
out attacks in the country. Most of the respondents agreed that the government has selected
groups and communities with its CVE program. Most of the respondents believed that the
government has selected the right target audience through effective messages. In addition,
most respondents agreed that training only those who have been involved in violence is not
the best counter violent extremism. According to correlation analysis, there is a weak
positive relationship between CVE and audience targeting.
The findings on counter narratives confirmed that most of the respondents have not received
text messages/ information alerting them about terrorism before it happens. Also, they
disagreed with the opinion that they have received information in any platform about
violence/terrorism. Over eighty percent of the respondents have come across information
that warns them about joining extremist groups. Most of the respondents believe religion do
not help in countering threats of terror. According to the correlation analysis there is no
significant relationship between CVE and counter narratives.
Majority of the study respondents selected TV and Radio as the best channels of
communication to counter violent extremism. Facebook was also considered as good
platform by most of the study respondents. On the other hand, WhatsApp, email and Twitter
were not considered as the best platforms for countering violent extremism by most
respondents. Public Barazas and Mobile text messages were looked upon favourably as
channels of communication to counter violent extremism. Most of the respondents agreed
66
that CVE programming that is aired in local languages targets the youth. There is a weak
significant positive relationship between the channels of communication and CVE.
5.3. Discussion
5.3.1. Impact of Audience Targeting on CVE
According to the study findings, global extremist organizations influence the youths into
violent extremism by hiring locals to carry out attacks in different parts of the county.
Tatham (2015) describes audience targeting as the study of a particular group of people to
identify the best way to communicate and influence their behaviour. The success of
international extremist organizations in using locals to carry out attacks is as result of
understanding the best form of action needed to influence behaviour. The identification of
key weak points that can be manipulated to brainwash youth and some adults to engage in
violent extremism is a classic strategy for most international organizations engaged in
terrorist activities. In the case of Kenya, high levels of poverty have been identified as one of
the weak points that international terrorist organizations target to gain followers.
In their policy brief to the Global Center Nemr & Kessels (2016) recommends for a clearly
defined objectives and target audiences in Development programming with CVE objectives.
In his works, Lindekilde (2012) elucidates that there is confusion about whether CVE
activities should target the specific needs and experiences of individuals, as an individual‟s
tendency to turn to violent extremism is shaped by different factors. The results of this study
on the impact of audience targeting on CVE indicate that 76% of the respondents are in
agreement that the government has identified different groups and communities it targets
with its CVE program. Government programming for CVE ought thus to consequently
think about the extent of potential partners and guarantee vital clarity while distinguishing
targets and true objectives and make clear the audience it is focusing on (e.g., networks that
have endured the most on account of vicious fanatics, fragments of society that are most in
danger of enlistment or radicalization to violence) and whose security it is improving.
The government can mitigate the influence of extremist organizations by focusing on
developing the economy to create jobs for the young people. The availability of jobs reduces
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poverty levels, which means fewer youths are at risk of being exploited and lured to work for
extremist organizations. According to Gootnick (2005) an effective audience analysis can
help in listing all the characteristics of the audience, which makes it easy to identify the best
way to engage and deliver content on countering violent extremism. A deep understanding
of the vulnerable is paramount because it informs the best strategy that can be used to reduce
the influence of international terror organizations in the country. The engagement of local
communities can help in monitoring everyone to ensure that action is taken before the
targeted audiences are radicalized and recruited to join terrorist organizations.
There have been cases of Al Shabaab recruiting Kenyans from all walks of life in their
organization. According to Al Jazeera (2018), many young Kenyans especially women have
been recruited by Alshabaab because of lack of employment, which leads to extreme poverty.
The organization relies on these young women to collect key information about local
communities and security systems Al Jazeera (2018). The article cites hopelessness and lack
of opportunities as one of the factors that contribute to the high number of young Kenyans
being recruited by the organization. The role of audience analysis and targeting is to help in
understanding issues like this in order to come up with the most effective campaign. This is
because the government can arrest as many youth as possible but terrorists will always recruit
new ones if the key issues are not handled. The fear of consequences pales in comparison to
the notion of going to bed without food and watching as one‟s kin suffer. Audience analysis
and targeting improves the fight against terrorist because it facilitates the gathering of key
information that guides the strategies that can be adopted to reduce the influence of terrorist
organizations among local communities.
The findings of the study confirm that the Kenyan government has done very well in
identifying vulnerable groups and formulating messages that can prevent brainwashing. The
positive impact of the government CVE education program in Pumwani area can be
attributed to a deep understanding of the target audience. However, it goes without saying
that the underlying issues like poverty and the lack of opportunities for young people should
have long term solutions. The use of words might not have the same impact as time goes
because many young people will submit to any opportunity that allows them to escape
poverty especially when it involves collecting information without getting involved in the
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real attacks. The purpose of audience analysis and targeting is not fully achieved if the
relevant authorities do not make the effort to seal the loopholes that have been identified. For
example, in the case of Kenya it is plausible for the government to figure out a way to engage
young people who are the most vulnerable group. Creating additional opportunities for young
people will reduce the attractiveness of the offers they get from the organizations like Al-
Shabaab.
Also, the findings confirmed that most study respondents shunned the notion of selecting
only those who have experienced violent extremism for CVE program. An effective program
should focus on targeting all the vulnerable groups, which happens to be young people in
different areas and schools. Identifying the points of connection is necessary to
understanding the best approach to preventing the connection in the first place. Archetti,
Seese and Harley (2014) acknowledge that the process of audience targeting and analysis is
relatively complicated. Therefore, it is advisable for NCTC to be thorough to ensure no
details are overlooked. The NCTC has been active in Pumwani area by carrying out
programs that seek to engage the common citizen on the ground. The idea is to create a
community where individuals rely on each other, which makes it easy to identify strange
happenings and take action before any form of radicalization occurs.
Audience targeting and analysis has a significant impact on counter violent extremism as
evidenced by the findings of the study. The application of effective audience targeting and
analysis techniques reduces the influence of terrorist organizations, which means less people
are brainwashed and radicalized into violent extremism. Furthermore, it can facilitate the
identification of key weak points that extremist organizations can manipulate to gain new
followers. However, failure to put the knowledge gained from the analysis to good use makes
the entire process useless. Therefore, it is imperative for the relevant authorities to engage all
stakeholders to strive to prevent cases of youths being radicalized and recruited into violent
extremism.
5.3.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE
Counter narratives are tools that are used to water down the impact of misinformation that
are used by extremists to justify their actions. Archetti et al. (2014) insist that the simple
messages have significant social roots, which helps reinforce their impact on the mind of
69
many people. Effective counter narratives recognize the existence of these social roots and
facilitate the formulation of messages that can help discredit the messages from extremist
groups. The study focused on understanding how the Kenyan government has applied
counter narratives to reduce the impact of key issues that extremist groups rely on to justify
their actions and gain supporters. The delivery of counter narratives can be done through
religious leaders, media houses, mobile text messaging, and billboards. The goal is to ensure
that the message reaches the right people at the right time.
Archetti et al. (2014) believes an effective counter narrative should focus on sensitive social
issues that have the power to change the minds of the common citizens. In most cases,
terrorist organizations will focus on social and religious related issues because they have a
significant effect on the way many people view and judge issues. A good example is the use
of the excuse of the Western allied governments targeting religion to gain sympathy from
particular religious community. The support of such local religious communities makes it
difficult for authorities to track the activities of terrorists and thwart attacks before they are
carried out. A poor counter narrative has the potential to help terrorist organizations in the
effort to brainwash the masses. Therefore, it is imperative for the relevant authorities to
ensure that the right counter narrative is used for every group to achieve maximum effects.
The narratives must be correctly packaged and delivered by the appropriate messengers to
the appropriate target audience.
According to the findings, most of the study respondents claimed they had not received any
message about violence through mobile text messaging. Zeigler (2016) points out that
extremists are likely to target local conflicts and issues to fuel their narratives in an effort to
gain supporters. For example, in Kenya the tendency to paint violent extremism as a war
between Muslims and other religions helps create divisions that can be manipulated to carry
out attacks. The fact that most of the respondents claimed to have not received any message
about violence through their mobile phone is a bad sign. It shows that the government has not
taken effective measures to reach as many people as possible to counter the messages from
extremist groups. Alternatively, it is possible that the government opted not to use mobile
text messaging because other forms of communication have been utilized to deliver key
messages to the masses. The key thing to note is that counter narratives should be direct and
70
precise without any ambiguity so as to prevent cases of the message being twisted to achieve
the opposite effect.
For Counter-narratives to resonate with target audiences and communities they need to be
more pre-emptive and proactive Ekumbo (2017). The success in the use of counter narratives
according to Ekumbo (2017) depend upon the steady, firm, and solidified messaging from all
partners (government, civil society, private segment) that is skillfully created and focused
towards the targeted audiences. However, the findings of this study shows that there is no
significant relationship between CVE and counter narratives with (r=0.096, p= 0.208, N=
174). This could be a pointer that the government‟s CVE narratives are not firm their
assertions for non-violent resolutions, and cultivating a general public sentiment that rejects
violence as an option.
Counter-Narrative campaigns include a wide range of communication activities, including:
public diplomacy, strategic communications by governments, and targeted campaigns Crosby
and Ali (2015) . Considering the results from the study, the choice of the counter narratives
might have failed to have a big impact due to the fact that the government might lack the
trust of the targeted audience. In Kenya, violent extremism counter narratives are
exemplified in government campaigns that ask youth to turn away or to be vigilant of
extremists. Such campaigns may be very moving for audiences who already agree with the
content, but the campaign do little to address the issues that cause the target audience to turn
towards violent extremism in the first place. In the absence of an alternative outlet for the
target audience to address perceived injustice or grievances, such calls to turn away from the
lure of violent extremism to a large extent fall short as it was revealed from the study.
In a study on effective counter-narrative strategies to prevent the spread of violent extremism
and terrorism Hedayah (2014), participants agreed that attractive alternative narratives can
contribute to the prevention of radicalization and recruitment if they are delivered to the
target audience by trusted sources. This study found out that the government messages on
violent extremism is never ignored by the respondents which is a good indicator of the
willingness of the target audience to listen to the government. The government must thus
rethink the use of counter narratives without tangible alternatives.
71
On the positive side, most respondents have seen information warning about the dangers of
joining extremist organizations in different platforms. The relevant authorities have been
quick to warn about the dangers that come with joining extremist organizations while
pointing out that the benefits are short lived and shallow. UNESCO (2017) supports the use
of education to make vulnerable groups resilient to messages from extremist organizations.
Kenya has taken the same approach by carrying out meetings in risk prone areas to educate
locals about the dangers of supporting unlawful organizations. Violence has been shunned as
the least effective way to solve problems. Chome et al. (2017) recommend the application of
a comprehensive strategy that covers all aspects to guarantee success. The current counter
narratives seem to be lacking in this aspect because they mainly focus on one or two issues
without providing a comprehensive justification for some of the claims. It echoes the
thoughts of Atallah (2016) who complains about the lack of a comprehensive and integrated
CVE program in Kenya. The risk of people being brainwashed is always there if the counter
narratives cannot be comprehensive and direct.
In the Kenyan society, religion plays a significant role because it is seen as the institution that
defines the moral standard. This means religion has the ability to sway opinions and
influence the behaviour of the masses to a limited extent. Interestingly, most respondents of
the study do not recommend reliance on religious beliefs or organizations to counter violent
extremism. It is a finding that does not align with the common belief that religious leaders
are more convincing than government authorities. The stand taken by the study respondents
might be informed by the notion that religious leaders do not have an idea about the social
issues and injustices facing common citizens. On the same note, there is the belief that
religious leaders are more likely to brainwash people instead of focusing on the right
message.
A good counter narrative should focus on psychological, social, political and theological
issues while using a secular platform. The use of religion can misguide the entire process
because it makes it easy for terrorist organizations to turn the situation into a struggle of
religions. The lack of a positive significant relation between counter narratives and CVE can
be attributed to the indirect impact of counter narratives on countering violent extremism.
The complicated issues involved make it relatively difficult to establish a direct connection
72
between the two variables. Regardless, it goes without saying that effective counter
narratives make it difficult for extremist groups to justify their actions and gain new
supporters. It increases the chances of being caught because the public can work together
with the authorities by reporting strange occurrences. An effective counter narrative can
spark the right debate at the local level because it allows people to question the message from
the terrorist organizations.
5.3.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE
Most of the study respondents believe TV and Radio are the best channels of communication
to counter violent extremism. A large portion of the population relies on radio and TV to get
news with TV being popular in urban areas and Radio all over the country. The utilization of
popular channels of communication increases the chances of reaching many people making it
easy to achieve the objective of formulating counter narratives. Philips et al. (2012) insists
that the selection of the right communication channels is paramount because it has a direct
effect on the success of the entire communication process. Ferguson (2016) acknowledges
that the media and communication industry can be powerful tool for both terrorists and
governments. The government can rely on the intricate network of media and communication
channels to reach many people to deliver important counter narratives and assure the citizens
of security. The use of radio is likely to have a bigger impact because it has the capacity to
reach people in remote areas as opposed to social media that are limited to areas that have
access to the internet.
The findings of the study show that most respondents considered Facebook as a good
platform to counter violent extremism. Twitter, email and WhatsApp were not looked upon
favourably by most respondents who believe they are not suitable for delivering key
messages about violence. Kandemir and Brand (2017) hail social media as one of the most
influential form of communication in the world today. Facebook as a platform can be used
both positively and negatively. The negative view of social media as a channel of
communication can be attributed to the risk of discussions going out context to the point of
failing to achieve the intended purpose. It is interesting that Facebook is considered good but
Twitter is not viewed as a good platform. Warrington (2017) believes Twitter and Facebook
73
are both huge platforms that can be used by extremist organizations and governments to
deliver key messages. The difference relies on the strategies applied and the impact of the
messages delivered. Mobile text messages were also viewed as good channels of
communication by most respondents. The effective utilization of these platforms makes it
easy to reach many people within a short time. There is option of creating pages for
discussions and allowing people to handle the issues that extremist groups rely on to
brainwash people. Social media outlets are usually exploited by those promoting online
dimensions of radicalization and violent extremism. Persistent effort to counter extremist
messaging and representation through social media has been lacking, though as seen from the
respondents it forms an effective strategy.
Public Baraza was considered a good platform to counter violent extremism by many
respondents. It allows the relevant to engage community leaders who can be used to pass key
messages about violent extremism. The findings echo the thoughts of Kandemir and Bland
(2017) who recommended the use of community leaders and other influential members of the
society to send counter narrative messages. For example, a young man from the village is
more likely to take the message from the village elder seriously compared to the information
he comes across on Facebook while browsing. The seriousness of the message is likely to
improve based on the channel of communication. Convenors of Public Barazas are
influential figures in the community, which means their orders are taken seriously.
CVE program should be modelled to the needs of the targeted audience. The language,
message and the medium of communication should be determined with target audience in
mind. This explains why most respondents agreed that the use of local languages to deliver
counter narratives helps target the youth. Also, it ensures that the older members of the
society can get the message and pass it to the younger generation. The channel of
communication determines whether the message will reach the right people or not. A poor
channel of communication makes it difficult to reach the target audience and waters down the
seriousness of the message. Barkindo and Bryans (2016) advise the selection of channels of
communication that can reach many people without taking away the seriousness of the
message.
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5.4. Conclusion
5.4.1. Impact of Audience Targeting CVE
Based on the study findings, it is clear that the audience targeting and analysis is paramount
in countering violent extremism. It helps in understanding the audience, which determines
the formulation of the counter narrative, the channel of communication and the language.
The study recommends the development of a comprehensive CVE program that takes
audience analysis and targeting seriously. The application of effective audience analysis and
targeting methods increases the chances of success in the fight against violent extremism.
5.4.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE
Counter narratives are designed to counter the issues raised by extremism organizations to
justify their actions. An effective counter narrative message takes into accounts the deep
social roots that come with all the issues involved. According to the findings, the choice of an
effective counter narrative message can improve the fight against violent extremism. The
government should ensure all counter narrative messages cover all the key issues. They
should be delivered at the right time and in the right manner to have maximum impact on the
target audience.
5.4.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE
According to the findings, the use of Facebook, Radio, TV, mobile messages and public
Barazas to deliver counter narrative messages improves the fight against violent extremism.
The channel of communication determines whether the information will reach the right
people. Also, it determines the level of seriousness that one will attach to the message. The
use of community leaders and other members of society with influence like celebrities are
recommended, because they have the power to influence many people.
75
5.5. Recommendations
5.5.1. Recommendations for Improvement
5.5.1.1. Audience Targeting and CVE
From the results of the study, it has been shown that there is a significant weak positive
relationship between CVE and target audience. Increasing of audience targeting by one unit,
CVE will improve by 0.175 units. The study recommends that NCTC develops a
comprehensive target audience analysis and segmentation for the CVE programs. The studies
will aid in understanding the target groups and their mind-set in regards to violent extremism,
which makes it easy to take necessary precautions to prevent people from being radicalised
and recruited by the Extremist organizations.
5.5.1.2. Impact of Choice of Counter Narratives on CVE
The results of the study show that there is no significant relationship of counter narratives on
CVE in Pumwani area. The study recommends the development of a strategic
communication team that is part of the CVE program. The team should be tasked with
analysing messages from extremist organizations to identify their social, psychological and
theological roots. In response the team is expected to formulate counter messages that are
customized to all the target audiences.
5.5.1.3. Impact of Choice of Communication Channels on CVE
The study has shown that choice of communication channels has a significant impact on
CVE. Increasing communication channels by one unit will improve CVE by 0.322 units. The
study recommends the expansion of communication channel infrastructure to many parts of
the country with the aim of reaching the most vulnerable populations that are targeted for
radicalization. A good infrastructure sets the foundation of the development of effective
communication infrastructure, which improves the overall quality of communication
channels. The channel of communication selected to deliver CVE messages should depend
on the target audience. A combination of the channels which ensures increased channels of
communication will have a higher impact.
76
5.5.2. Recommendations for Further Studies
The study sought to determine the impact of strategic communication in countering violent
extremism in Kenya. The results of the study were focused to the specific area of Pumwani
in Nairobi County and which has shown that that there is a significant correlation between
CVE and both choice of communication channels and audience targeting. From the study,
these two independent variables can explain 19.6% of the variation in CVE. The results also
have shown that in Pumwani area, communication content and counter narratives do not have
significant impact on CVE. There is therefore need for further research to find out the
variables that explain the almost 80% variation in CVE that this study was not able to
establish. There is also the need for further study in the subject area but in different locations
and environment of the country where NCTC has initiated CVE programing using strategic
communications as a tool for prevention and countering violent extremism.
77
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APPENDICES
I. Research Permit From NACOSTI
II. Letter of Research Approval
III. Data Collection Instruments (Questionnaire)
85
Appendix I: Research Permit
86
Appendix II: Letter of Research Approval
87
Appendix III: Data Collection Instruments (Questionnaire)
Data Collection Questionnaire
My name is Naman Owuor and am a masters (MBA) student at United States International
University (USIU-A) currently carrying out a research with the topic” The Impact Of
Strategic Communications In Preventing Violent Extremism And Countering
Terrorism At The National Counter Terrorism Centre In Kenya”. The information
provided will be used for academic purpose only.
Kindly complete the following questionnaire using the instructions provided for each set of
question. Tick appropriately.
SECTION A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1. Your Gender
Male Female Others
2. Kindly indicate your age bracket
18- 25 years Bet 26 and 35 years
36 -45 years above 45 years
3. What is your highest level of Education?
Secondary Certificate Diploma
Bachelor‟s Degree Graduate Degree
88
SECTION B: COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements in relation to Countering
Violent Extremism?
N
o
Statements
(Tick appropriately)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 I have witnessed violence in Pumwani area.
2 I have suffered from violence in Pumwani
area.
3 I have been trained on countering violent
extremism
4 I have trained people on countering violent
extremism.
5 Face to face training about countering
violence in the community is the best way
of countering violent extremism
6 Newspaper is the best platform for
countering violent extremism.
7 Social Media is the best tool in countering
violent extremism
8 Airing how to counter violent extremism in
local languages is the best way of countering
violent extremism.
Any other way of countering violent Extremism?
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………
SECTION C: AUDIENCE TARGETING
89
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements in relation to audience
targeting.
Statements
(Tick appropriately)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 Violence extremism can be
prevented through proper civic
government relationships.
2 It is important for the
government to identify
different groups and
communities it targets
with their CVE programs
n3 Training youth groups on
countering violence can help
the society in countering
violent extremism.
4 It is important for government
agencies to understand the
target audiences in the country
and formulate messages that
are compatible with the
intended target audience.
5 Household training on
countering violence can help
in countering violent
extremism.
6 Training only those who have
been involved in violence is
the best way to counter violent
extremism.
Additional
comment………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
90
SECTION D: COUNTER NARRATIVES
1. To what extent do you agree with the following statements in relation to choice of
Counter Narratives?
No
Statements
(Tick appropriately)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
2 I have received a text informing me
on how to deal with violence.
3 I have come across information
warning people not to join a violent
group.
4 The Information about violent
groups is clear and precise
5 The information has helped me
change my behavior
6 Religious leaders are bestto
communicate about violence
7 Government Security are the right
people to help in countering violent
behavior
Additional
comment………………………………………………………………………………
91
SECTION E: CHOICE OF COMMUNICATION CHANNELS
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in relation to choice of
communication channels?
No
Statements
(Tick appropriately)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 Radios and televisions are the best
platform to use to listen to Government
2 Facebook is the best communication
channel Relate with Government
3 Twitter is the best communication
channel in countering violent extremism
4 Billboard is the best communication
channel in countering violent extremism
5 Mobile text message (SMS) is the best
communication channel in countering
violent extremism
6 Email is the best communication channel
in countering violent extremism
7 Barraza is the best communication
channel in countering violent extremism
8 CVE programming in Kenya is
conducted and aired in local
languages and target youth
appropriately
Additional
comment………………………………………………………………………………
92
SECTION F: COMMUNICATION CONTENT CONFIGURATION
To what extent do you agree with the following statements in relation to the depth and clarity
of communication content as used in CVE?
No
Statements
(Tick appropriately)
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly
Agree
1 The message content is easily understood
2 The content relates well with where I live
3 The content has relevance to my life and
the life of my neighbors
4 Details of what my responsibility in CVE
are well illustrated
5 I am recognized and my rights are
respected
6 The role of government in protecting
citizens is well articulated in the
messages
7 The depth of the content used have
helped me understand how violent
extremism affects communities
8 I am able to relate well with people
from divergent groups
9 I am contented with the manner the
information is delivered to me
Additional
comment………………………………………………………………………………