igor sutyagin: the opposite of air power

Chief of the Air Staff RAFAir Power ConferenceLondon, 18 July 2013

Dr. Igor Sutyagin, Research Fellow,

Russian Studies, RUSI

Air Defence – the Opposite Side of Air Power

Air Power ConferenceLondon, 18 July 2013

Note on sources:

The following materials are based upon both the personal experience of the author, who was formerly an officer of the Soviet Air Defence Troops (Voyska PVO Strany - National Air Defence), and also specialist Russian technical publications and websites. For those who are interested in the more detailed English-language sources, the author would strongly recommend browsing the highly informative website, Air Power Australia (http://www.ausairpower.net/ ) some of whose illustrations are used in this presentation.

http://www.ausairpower.net/


The UK Air and Space Doctrine (JDP 0-30) defines Air Power as «using air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events». It was the extremely interesting discussion on the Air Power issues over the previous two days. The new prospects for exercising air power produced by the new hardware – F-35 «Lightning-II» for example – have been discussed. But it is critically important to remember that – as Lt.-Gen. Jones, Commander, USAFE-USAFAFR perfectly outlined it at this conference – it is more often than not our best wishes are not enough to make the wishes the reality.

That is correct in regard to Air Power too. That is why it is worth mentioning the power which opposes Air Power – the Air Defence (AD) assets which might be met by Air Power practitioners in their prospective future contingencies.


We don’t fly ourselves –

but we don’t let others fly either

(The unofficial motto of the Soviet Air Defence Troops)


One need to recognize that the Soviet (and then Russian) National Air Defence Troops had the good reason to have such the motto – it was the formidable force. Meanwhile, keeping in mind Russia’s activism on the arms market with its AD hardware, one need to be prepared that one day Western air forces and their allies might meet not only Russian-originated AD hardware but Russian tactics as well. Indeed, Russia actively exports its own expertise and operational concepts in air defence along with its armaments. Let us have a look onto all these three elements of the Russian air defence exports.


1. Target Detection


Unlike the Western states Russia kept developing its low-band radars since 1930s – and has achieved the impressive results in their improving. With the modern radar signal shapes and radar return processing algorithms the modern Russian low-band radars have error box small enough to enable SAM/AAM with active or IR seeker to be flown near enough to the least observable target to acquire it and initiate terminal homing. For instance, the export version of the Track Tall (55Zh6U) low-band radar has the publicly announced error box of «less than 60 metres» for distance measurement. (Belorussian producers are more open in disclosing the radar’s capabilities – unlike their Russian counterparts they openly state that error box is just 25 metres.) At the same time the modern technique used to design low-observable (LO) aircraft is much less effective against low-band radars than against the shorter wave-length radars thus making LO aircraft comparatively easier detectable by low-band radars.

Meanwhile those who tried do know that it is the very difficult business to ‘switch off’ low-band radars: airborne jammers are not impressively effective against them and anti-radar missiles (due to physics of metre wave-length emission) tend to plough a narrow ring strip of land around radar instead of hitting radar itself. It is difficult hence to suppress an air defence system built around low-band radars.


55Zh6U «Nebo-U» / Tall Track


Potential customers can opt for the cheaper variant if Track Tall is too expensive and complicated system for them. There are around 500 legacy Spoon Rest D/E (P-18) Russian-produced meter wave-length radars still operational around the globe.


P-18 / Spoon Rest D/E


And one can have the fundamentally modernized - digitized – Spoon Rest D/Es for reasonably low price. That will provide customer the good survivability along with the error box of just 250 metres. Customers can opt for the Russia-originated budget version…


P-18 / Spoon Rest D/E


…or for the more expensive but the more effective Belorussian version of the radar (P-18T). Interestingly enough it is the NATO member state – Czech Republic – which markets the digital upgrade to Spoon Rest D/E-series radars too. Thus NATO aircraft might meet one day a NATO-upgraded low-band radars opposing them in a contingency…


P-18T/TRS-2D


Low-band radars contribute into the advanced air defence tactics using the specialist concept of operations (CONOPS). These are not only the effective detection mean against LO aircraft – low-band radars solve some problems with combat use of SAM against such aircraft. One Russian tactical device is to classify the target as LO aircraft if it is observed by metre-band radars and not observed by centimetre-band ones. In such the case the low-band radar is used to guide SAM to the vicinity of the LO target and SAM themselves are flown in the ‘dog-leg’ pattern to approach the target from the aspects where its cross-section is higher thus making it easier detectable for the SAM seeker.

Metre-band radars CONOPS


© Carlo Kopp - http://www.ausairpower.net/


Physics of the low-band radars CONOPS is based upon the fact that emission-absorbing materials used by the modern LO aircraft are just marginally effective against meter-band emission while the elements of aircraft are too small to conceal aircraft against the meter wave-length radar signals. Thus there are effectively ‘bright spots’ making aircraft visible for low-band radars.

Metre-band radars CONOPS physics




F-35 is highly susceptible to detection by low-band radars (due to its compact size), unlike larger aircraft such as F-22 and B-2A very low observable (VLO) aircraft. It would take much longer wave-length – decametre-band - radars to apply the same ‘bright spots’ technique to «Raptor» and «Spirit».

And Russia does market decametre-band radars – «Rezonans-NE» for instance – to build air defences against VLO aircraft. «Rezonans» has detection range of up to 1 200 kilometres.


«Rezonans-N»


The alternative technique applicable to detection of aircraft of all classes – from ‘traditional’ to LO and VLO ones – is the use of radio-emission intercept paired with triangulation. Every source of radio emission – like Terrain-Avoidance Radars – might disclose the presence of aircraft for tactical (with intercept range up to 50 to 60 km) «Vega» system based upon «Orion» radio-intercept stations…


Intercept of radio emission + Triangulation

«Vega» system«Orion» station


…or the much longer range (up to 500 km) «Valeriya» intercept stations which are similar in their capabilities to the Czech-produced «Vera» radio intercept stations.

The Russian air defence CONOPS dictates that both decametre-band radars and radio-emission intercept/triangulation systems are integrated into the detection/combat engagement component of air defences.


«Valeriya»

Intercept of radio emission + Triangulation


One more element of the modern Russian air defence CONOPS is the use of multi-band radar combines like the «Nebo-M» (55Zh6M) one. The general idea behind the «Nebo-M» design is the fusing of radar information provided by meter-, decimetre-, and centimetre-band radars in one fusion van which constitutes the C2 centre of such the radar combine.


55Zh6M «Nebo-M»

© NIIRT


The metre- and decimetre-band components of «Nebo-M» are already operational and marketed by Russia (the centimetre-band component is at the final stage of development now).


55Zh6M «Nebo-M»

Metre-band component Decimetre-band component

© NIIRT


The «Nebo-M» CONOPS allows the triangulation of LO targets in case of proper operational location of the combine’s elements – which adds the valuable tactical device to the multi-band detection/tracking of targets.


55Zh6M «Nebo-M» CONOPS

© NIIRT



The same concept of multi-band detection/tracking is applied to the airborne platforms too. T-50/Firefox Russian 5th generation fighter is equipped with the dual-band (X- and L-band) radar providing it some tactical advantage over F-35. Indeed, the latter’s LO features will be inevitably degraded against T-50’s L-band radar channel as F-35’s design is mainly optimised against centimetre-band radars.

Thus T-50 might be potentially used as the comparatively effective detection mean against the NATO LO aircraft.


T-50 / Firefox


T-50’s L-band radar


Russia is certainly willing to export its other airborne radar platforms: the mass produced ones like Ka-31 Helix-B radar-picket helicopters with E-801 radar system…


Ka-31 / Helix-B


…as well as to resume by customer’s request the development/production of its previous airborne radar picket aircraft projects like Yak-44E and An-71 Madcap aircraft with E-601 «Kvant» radar system.


Yak-44E


An-71 / Madcap


2. Target Elimination


Russia markets the wide range of air defence systems – S-300 family systems being the longest-range ones among them. SA-20 (S-300PMU-2 «Favorit») and SA-12/SA-23 (S-300VMD/S-300V4 «Antey-2500») provide the intercept range up to 200 km against aerodynamic targets. SA-12/SA-23 are optimised for the tactical ballistic missile defence (TBMD) task too providing the intercept range up to 40 km (altitude up to 30 km) against ballistic missiles with range up to 3 500 km thus making the well-tested Russian system ahead of the French SAMP-T. Like SA-12/SA-23 the SA-20 system has the TBMD capability against tactical ballistic missiles too – it can engage missiles with range of up to 1 000 km.


S-300PMU-2 «Favorit» / SA-20 S-300VMD «Antey-2500» / SA-23


MiG-31 Foxhound is included here not only due its capability to engage aerodynamic targets with its 200 km-range export-oriented RVV-BD Air-to-Air missile (the R-37 version of the same missile operational with the Russian Air Force has range of 280-320 km). The Soviet/Russian National Air Defence Troops practised the operational use of Foxhounds in groups of four in the ‘engage-on-remote’ mode with one aircraft guiding missiles fired by other aircraft within the group since the mid-1980s. Aircraft shared the radar/IR-detector data within the group using datalinks.

As that is not enough the Russian engineers and military make the research now on the possibility to employ SAM in the ‘engage-on-remote’ mode with the use of Foxhounds as the forward-based combat engagement platforms thus dramatically extending the potential intercept range and/or reducing the reaction time of Russian-produced SAM systems against time-sensitive (e.g. low altitude/LO/high speed) targets.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound

RVV-BD air-to-air missile


Russia might be willing to put on the market up to 150 MiG-31FE Foxhound aircraft planned for retirement from the Russian Air Force for the price compared to the price of one new while the much less capable MiG-29 Fulcrum each.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound

RVV-BD air-to-air missile

150 potentially on sale


It is noteworthy that the export-oriented two-seater FGFA version of T-50 Firefox 5th generation fighter being developed jointly by Russia and India will retain all the main features of MiG-31 Foxhound – including those of the dual-band detection/tracking and of the ‘engage-on-remote’ mode with its potential application to the joint FGFA/SAM operational employment. Notice the RVV-BD missile in the forward armament compartment of FGFA.

One should not miss the fact that FGFA is the export-oriented project with three potential customers in the South America and Asia already negotiating the acquisition of the aircraft – thus making it the realistic option that in some future contingencies NATO air forces might meat in combat with the LO aircraft having some potential advantages over F-35.


T-50 / FGFA

RVV-BD


One more potent air defence system being marketed by Russia is S-350 «Vityaz» (50R6). The system is the close equivalent to Patriot PAC-3 having the comparable TBMD capability while the longer intercept range (up to 120 km) against aerodynamic targets. (There is no NATO designator for S-350 yet. S-350 was publicly displayed at the end of June 2013 at the first time.)

04 July 2013Thales, Paris

S-350E «Vityaz» (50R6)


S-350 «Vityaz» employs the element of the Russian air defence CONOPS which calls for dealing with saturation attacks via use of the mixture of missiles of different types. In order not to waste the potent (and expensive) longer-range 9M96-2 missiles S-350 employs the shorter-range (up to 40 to 60 km) 9M96 as the short-range (6 to 10 km) 9M100 SAM to deal with targets which cannot be intercepted on the longer distance (like PGM).

9M96-2 SAM provide S-350 the capability to engage and intercept tactical ballistic missiles (range up to 600 km) on the distance up to 30 km (altitude up to 30 km).


9M96-2

9M96

9M100

S-350E «Vityaz» (50R6)

9M96-2

9M96/9M100


The same concept of dealing with saturation attacks is currently being applied to SA-21/S-400 SAM systems in the Russian possession – while there are no the fundamental technical obstacles which would prevent its employment in the export SA-20/S-300PMU-2 systems too. The Russian S-400 system currently uses the mixture of the 48N6-2/48N6-3 long-range and the 9M96-2 SAM. All three types of SAM have the capability to engage ballistic missiles.

S-400 / SA-21


48N6-2

9M96-2


The Ground Troops Air Defence SA-17/«Buk-M2» system also has the limited TBMD capability (range up to 20-25 km, altitude up to 16-18 km against ballistic target) – while the capability of each SA-17 launcher/tracking/illuminating vehicle to engage 4 aerodynamic targets simultaneously on the distance of up to 52 km is probably the more important feature.


«Buk-M2» (9K317) / SA-17

© M

iros

lav

Gyu

rosi


SA-15/«Tor-M2» is also the multi-channel of fire system with the capability to engage 4 targets simultaneously. SA-15 might be tailored to the customer’s needs being marketed in either mobile (tracked or wheeled vehicle) or containerised variants with the latter having the option to be installed on trailer to provide the limited mobility.


«Tor-M2» / SA-15


«Tor-M2KM» / SA-15


Another important Russian air defence operational concept is the closing the gaps in air defences immediately over SAM systems. The dome AESA is employed for this purpose by the 42S6 «Morpheus» short-range (up to 5-10 km range) SAM system undergoing the final stage of development in Russia now. (There is no NATO designator for 42S6 yet.) The system is already proposed for export.

42S6 «Morfey» («Morpheus»)


© http://militaryrussia.ru


The current Russian Air defence CONOPS calls for the wide use of passive AD systems – either the comparatively longer-range (up to 12 km) «Bagul’nik» («Sosna» in the export version) with the laser-guided SAM and the sector optronic acquisition/tracking station…


«Sosna» («Bagul’nik» in the Russian service)


…or the shorter-range (up to 5.2 to 6.5 km) while all-passive SAM system based upon MANPAD missiles with and the more capable 360-degrees «Feniks» («Phoenix») acquisition/tracking optronic station.


ZRK BD-PS - «Feniks»


One more trend in the development of Russian AD systems (and the Russia-originated ones) is the introduction of the new MANPAD-type missiles into all legacy AD systems.


ZSU-23-4M4 «Shilka-4M»

ZU-23M1 - «Strelets»


This trend includes the integration of all available AD assets (when Russians say ‘integrated air defences’ they mean what they say): the «Shlem» («Helmet») C2 system provides the capability to control up to 9 MANPAD/MANPAD-based modules aiming them into the predicted engagement points before targets appeared in the MANPAD operators’ field of view and seekers detected the targets. The current Russian MANPAD modules provide the capability to fire two SAM simultaneously to complicate the employment of evasion manoeuvres against SAM and increase the probability of kill.


JDP 0-30 emphasises that the information gathering is one of the key elements of the Air Power with satellites being one of the most effective information means – so it should not be surprising that the Russian air defence concepts pay attention to counteraction with space-based information gathering systems. A-60 (1LK222) «Sokol-Eshelon» airborne laser system is the representative example of the Russian approach to solving the task to isolate the battlefield. One could notice the laser beam-director in the hump on the top of the aircraft – as well as the programme’s logo clearly depicting the main operational task of A-60 aircraft.

A-60 «Sokol-Eshelon» (1LK222)



3. Self-defence


The Russian air defence theoreticians and practitioners take very seriously the experience gained out of the recent armed conflicts – and apply the conclusions made on the base of the observed trends to the Russian air defence CONOPS (which is also exported along with Russia-originated air defence systems). It was concluded that the comparative threat to air defences represented by anti-radar missiles (ARM) should be reconsidered. Indeed, 65 per cent of air defence systems (both radars and SAM/AA) were lost in combat during the conflict in Yugoslavia in 1999 due to the use of PGMs with optronic (TV/laser/IR) seekers, not ARMs. That percentage was even higher during the Second Gulf War. That forced Russian military and air defence designers to make the far-reaching conclusions influencing both air defence tactics and the hardware acquisition.

One can see the net result of those conclusions on the following slide depicting a SA-20/S-300PM battalion. The most telling thing about this slide is that there is no any SA-20 equipment on it. What is pictured is the inflatable set imitating the main SA-20 battalion’s characteristics in optic, thermal, and electromagnetic field with the accuracy within the margin of several per cent (which is the current design order of the Russian Armed Forces). The same sort of disguising inflatable sets are currently produced for all Russian main weapons systems and armaments. Sure that might be the comparatively effective self-defence device complicating the task of delivering SEAD air strikes.


Active means of AD self-defence are widely employed too. SA-22/ «Pantsir» anti-aircraft gun/missile system is mainly employed in this role. (Due to its design features SA-22 has very low effectiveness in defending any object not immediately collocated with SA-22 vehicles.)

Like many other Russian AD systems SA-22 can be tailored to the customer’s needs being marketed in mobile (based on tracked or wheeled chassis) or containerised version and with different acquisition/combat engagement equipment – including the newer version with the S-band acquisition radar (shown on the picture).


«Pantsir-S1E» (96K6) / SA-22


«Pantsir-S1E» (96K6) / SA-22

S-bandS-band


Direct-energy systems traditionally attracted the Soviet/Russian designers and military attention. Some of them entered the service (in limited quantity) long ago – like the 1LK14 «Sanguine-1» mobile laser point-defence system.


The more powerful 74T6 «Omega-2» short-range laser air defence system (employed RD0600 gas-dynamic laser) has achieved its first intercept of aerodynamic target as early as in the mid-1980s.


The Soviet Union had the extensive R&D programme on the EMP and microwave systems too. (Russia currently continues the programme.) The large «Astrofizika-Omega» vircator-based system provided over-saturation of p-n bridges within any semiconductor-based electronic devices (like aircraft radars and missile seekers) thus making avionics non-operational for the period ranging from several minutes to several days (depending on the type of electronics). That effect covered area within the range of up to 15 kilometres from an «Astrofizika-Omega» vehicle making it the potentially useful self-defence mean.


Russian industry offers to produce the radar-type «Ranets-E» ‘electromagnetic gun’ with the same design features as «Astrofizika-Omega». The offer mentions the capability to influence avionics within the range «up to 20 naval miles» – while specialists estimate the effective to be closer to 8 to 10 kilometres.


«Ranets-E» mobile microwave protection system


Russian industry has also achieved the impressive successes after nearly 40 years of the «Atropus» R&D programme in the exotic EMP devices which might be called ‘EMP grenades’ to distinguish them from vircator-based EMP systems employed by the USA. (The choice of the programme’s name is very much telling as «atropus» is the Ancient Greek word for «inevitability». Like other EMP/microwave systems also employ the p-n bridges over-saturation effect.)

Some elements of the «Atropus» family are represented on the slide – these were tested against different types of ground-based and airborne electronics (blinding of electronics for periods between minutes and days has been achieved) and proved to be effective against both IR- and radar seekers of Air-to-Air missiles as well as radars. (Quite understandably «Atropus» devices proved to be more effective against radars and radar seekers than against IR-seekers which were blinded within the shorter radius – while at the distances sufficient to break the terminal homing and defend attacked aircraft which was the essence of the experiments at that stage).

«Atropus»

E-29

E-35

E-47

EMP devices able to temporarily blind IR- and radar seekers(not the US-style vircators)



The main difference between Russian «Atropus» devices and the US vircator-based system used in combat against the Baghdad TV station is in their sizes (with the comparable combat efficiency). The US system is included in the case of 2 metric tones-calibre bomb while the E-29 device of the «Atropus» family is the bottle-sized device blinding electronics for minutes to days within the radius of 300-400 metres. Comparative sizes of Russian and US devices are visible on the slide.

The current stage of the Russian CONOPS R&D efforts regarding the EMP systems is concentrated on the possible employment of «Atropus»-type devices for defence of ground-based assets against PGM strikes. In this case «Atropus» devices are to be fired in the pattern similar to that of IR-decoys being fired to break homing of IR-guided SAM.

«Atropus»

E-29

E-35

E-47


US combat vircator


4. Operational implications


To illustrate the possible operational implications of the air defence hardware and tactics described in the previous sections we can make the highly hypothetical case study.


Needless to say that appearance of just one SA-21/S-400 or S-500 battalion might make the huge difference in the situation.


S-400/SA-21S-500/AD mode


Meanwhile the existing air defence systems being actively marketed by Russia now have the potential to complicate exercising the Air Power too providing the very potent Anti-Access coverage.


Anti-Access


SA-20SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

Anti-Access


Integration of airborne AD elements (like MiG-31 Foxhound) into such the hypothetical Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) might extend the coverage even more…


SA-20SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

Anti-Access


…especially in the case if the hypothetical customer arms the Foxhounds with the KS-172 300 km range AAM currently rejected by the Russian Air Forces but being proposed by the producer for export.


SA-20SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

SA-20

RVV-BD

KS-172

KS-172

SA-20

Anti-Access


The effectiveness of the air component of the hypothetical IADS might be increased in the case if the Foxhound’s another design feature is fully utilised. Foxhounds are designed to be the element of the IADS serving as the airborne C2 platform to employ (via datalinks) three Flanker/Fulcrum aircraft per each Foxhound either in the traditional AWACS mode or in the Soviet-style ‘engage-on-remote’ mode. It is worth of keeping in mind that Flankers and Fulcrums are also fully capable to deliver and employ RVV-BD as well as KS-172 AAM.


MiG-31FE / Foxhound

RVV-BD/KS-172 air-to-air missiles

Su-30MK, Su-35 / Flanker MiG-29SMT/M/M2 / Fulcrum


The Russia-originated shorter-range AD systems might provide the effective Area Denial coverage too.


Area Denial


«Sosna» (not all zones shown)

42S6 «Morfey»

42S6

42S6

42S6

42S6

«Sosna»«Sosna»

«Sosna»

«Sosna»

«Sosna»

«Sosna»

Area Denial


S-350 S-350S-350

SA-17

SA-22

SA-22

SA-15

SA-20

SA-15

SA-22

SA-17

S-350

SA-20

Area Denial


Thus all the elements currently being marketed by Russian producers if combined together have the substantial capability to complicate to the very large extent prospective future attempts to «use air capabilities to influence the behaviour of actors and the course of events» thus opposing the exercising of the Air Power.

It is necessary to recognise then that the modern and prospective future Air Defence might seriously influence the ability of other international actors to employ their Air Power to achieve their political aims. One cannot miss the fact that under such the circumstances the Air Defence should be seriously considered as another political power directly opposing the political use of the Air Power – which, after all is said, is the core essence of Air Power.


A2/AD

igor sutyagin: the opposite of air power

Technology

russian air force

air defence systems

air power

error box

air defence

air capabilities

lo aircraft

length radars