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Delegates, I am absolutely ecstatic to welcome all of you to GA 1 (DISEC) at the 25th annual UGAMUNC! My name is Kartik Khanna and I will be your chair for this committee, where we will explore the intricacies of foreign policy and global security together! DISEC plays a crucial role in ensuring global peace and is involved in almost every international and security-related issue, from nuclear disarmament to terrorism. Furthermore, I know that each one of you is brimming with potential and will bring brilliant and ingenious ideas with you come February! Before I dive any further into the intricacies of the conference and committee, however, I would like to introduce myself! I was born and raised in the South and graduated from Northview High School in Johns Creek, GA in 2017. At Northview, I was Secretary-General of my high school MUN team and competed at conferences ranging from UGAMUNC to BMUN (UC Berkeley) to NHSMUN! At UGA, I am currently a sophomore studying Finance and hope to work in investment banking or venture capital after graduation. In addition to UGA Model UN, I am involved with the Apollo Society (a Terry College of Business finance organization), am a budding photographer, and work as the Session II director for the World Bank at the National High School Model UN Conference (NHSMUN)! In my free time, you can most likely catch me cheering on the Dawgs or binge-watching Netflix! On the dais, my partner-in-crime and co-chair is Gustavo Cervantes, a third-year Public Relations major and Spanish minor from beautiful Evans, Georgia! At UGA, Gustavo has been on the UGA Model UN team for three years and has previously chaired and co-chaired! In addition to competing with UGA’s Model UN team as a delegate and staffing UGAMUNC, Gustavo serves on the executive board for UGA's chapter of the Public Relations Student Society of America and also is involved at the UGA Catholic Center. In his free time, you can most likely catch him updating his blog, eating a Mr. Goodbar, or playing Marvel vs. Capcom 2 on the SEGA Dreamcast! While preparing for DISEC, I hope that you will all evaluate the underlying causes behind each topic and analyze how each decision or policy connects to both other policies/decisions and also the issue as a whole. Moreover, I highly encourage you to evaluate all aspects of an issue, not just the aspects pertaining to DISEC’s mandate, as the best resolutions are often those which view the issue through both broad and detailed lenses. Most importantly, however, I hope that you unleash your creativity and have fun preparing for the conference! As a general reminder, position papers are due by 11:59 PM on Friday, February 1, 2019 to kartik.khanna@uga.edu. Remember — you must turn in a position paper to be considered for any awards! Also, feel free to reach out to me at the above email with any questions about the committee, topics, UGA, or life in general! I would love to hear from you! Go Dawgs, Kartik Khanna & Gustavo Cervantes

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History of UN General Assembly’s First Committee - Disarmament and International Security

The United Nations General Assembly was established as one of the main governing bodies of the UN with the original UN charter from 1945. The General Assembly and other UN 1

bodies were given the power to create subsidiary organs as needed, and thus were born the six main committees of the UN, the first of which originally focused more on political and security issues, but in the 70's became what it is today, when the committee was recommended by the General Assembly to, "devote itself primarily to problems of peace, security and disarmament." 2

Today, the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security provides a space for states to discuss their various positions on disarmament related matters and work as a team to create compromises or enact resolutions that create tools to better understand and approach disarmament and international security-related issues. The committee creates the opportunity for 3

states to build consensus on issues and tries to create a paradigm shift in which states no longer ensure "security" for themselves through the size of their arsenals, but rather, negotiate cooperative security arrangements that lower spending on weapons, reduce arms production, trade, and stockpiles, along with increasing global security. 4

More recently, the committee's work and goals on disarmament have included a review conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a Review Conference of the Programme of Action to combat illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, along with resolutions that established a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in Africa, along with resolutions that created similar zones in Central Asia and the southern hemisphere. The body has also been responsible for the 5

immediate resumption of negotiations on a treaty that bans the production of fissile (nuclear) materials for military purposes, along with demanding that international legal instruments be established to guarantee security for non-nuclear states. 6

On the powers of the committee, DISEC works closely with the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the Geneva-based Conference of Disarmament. The committee 7

in its modern forms seeks out solutions on challenges and threats to global peace in the international community and seeks solutions to problems in the international security regime. 8

The reality of the modern debate in DISEC is often static discussion caused by states' limited knowledge of other state's perspective, leading to a committee whose members have become entrenched in their own positions and opposition to resolutions that would otherwise demonstrate consensus on disarmament-related issues. 9

1 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, Art. 7 2 "United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly." United Nations. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.un.org/en/ga/about/ropga/anx4.shtml#a. 3 First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga. 4 Ibid. 5 "FEATURE: The UN General Assembly's First Committee - Disarmament and International Security Issues | UN News." United Nations. Accessed October 26, 2018. https://news.un.org/en/story/2012/12/429112-feature-un-general-assemblys-first-committee-disarmament-and-international. 6 Ibid. 7"United Nations, Main Body, Main Organs, General Assembly." United Nations. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/. 8 Ibid. 9 First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Accessed October 26, 2018. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga.

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I. Drug and Arms Trade in Latin America Introduction

The modern drug trafficking problem has its roots in 1970s Colombia with the Medellin cartel. Founded by Pablo Escobar, the Medellin Cartel was responsible for supplying over 80% of America’s total supply of cocaine and earned almost $4 billion USD per year during the height of its operations in the 1980s. Fueled by corrupt police and a weak central government, 10

the Medellin Cartel was able to thrive in Colombia unchecked, where it based most of its production and operations. For example, Escobar’s infamous saying--plata o plomo-- offered all who posed a threat to the cartel’s operations or the partners’ freedom with either hush money (bribes) or death. Without adequate law enforcement or a capable central government, however, 11

the cartel’s violence quickly spread to the rest of Colombia and affected innocent citizens, such as Avianca Flight 203, in which the cartel attacked a commercial flight to silence potential informants, killing 107 people in the process. With increasing violence, Colombia’s 12

government was forced to act, and it successfully dismantled the Medellin cartel in the late 1980s through assassinating Pablo Escobar. However, this simply shifted cocaine operations from the 13

Medellin Cartel to the Cali cartel, who itself lost its fight with the Colombian and American governments and was dismantled in the mid-1990s, husshifting drug production (and its inherent violence) to Mexico. 14

The present-day drug war in Mexico began when former Mexican President Felipe

Calderon sent more than 6,500 soldiers to the state of Michoacan to crack down on drug traffickers. In following years, Calderon’s administration (in addition to Nieto’s administration) 15

arrested many public officials accused of corruption and captured many drug traffickers, most notably Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman. However, this battle took a toll on the Mexican 16

population as well, such as when drug cartels grenaded Independence Day parades in Moriela in 2008, killing 9 individuals. In just 2017 alone, the Mexican drug war claimed over 29,000 17

casualties, primarily caused by drug trafficking-related incidents. Additionally, as many Latin 18

American drugs flow to the United States, it created an economic network in which humans and

10 “Sponsor Content: Cocainenomics,” accessed 17 October 2018, http://www.wsj.com/ad/cocainenomics/. 11 Ibid. 12 Ap, “All 107 Aboard Killed as Colombian Jet Explodes,” The New York Times, 28 November 1989, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/28/world/all-107-aboard-killed-as-colombian-jet-explodes.html, https://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/28/world/all-107-aboard-killed-as-colombian-jet-explodes.html. 13 “The Business - Colombian Traffickers | Drug Wars | FRONTLINE | PBS,” accessed 17 October 2018, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/business/inside/colombian.html. 14 Ibid. 15 C. N. N. Library, “Mexico Drug War Fast Facts,” CNN, accessed 17 October 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/index.html. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 “Mexico Saw A Record of 29,000 Homicides in 2017,” Time, accessed 17 October 2018, http://time.com/5111972/mexico-murder-rate-record-2017/.

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drugs flow to the developed world in exchange for weapons and money, further perpetuating regional violence and threatening instability. Furthermore, Mexican cartels and gangs have 19

expanded their “turf” into Central America. This expansion has led to the following in the region: mass exodus/refugee crisis, increased violence and per capita murder rates, further undermining of government authority, and general pandemonium. Furthermore, this 20

phenomenon has caused black market arms demand to soar, which further strengthens the drug trade and violence, while crippling regional security . 21

History and Description of the Issue Los Zetas and MS-13

One of the main driving forces behind Mexican drug production (and thus a main target for the Mexican government) is Los Zetas. Originating from ex-Mexican special force soldiers who became mercenaries for the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas recruited many former law enforcement officers and ex-Special Forces soldiers, from Mexico to Guatemala, collectively serving as the cartel’s policy enforcement team. They finally splintered off from the Gulf Cartel and formed 22

their own drug trafficking cartel, and as of 2012, “command over 10,000 gunmen from the Rio Grande, on the border with Texas, to deep into Central America”. At peak of operations, Los 23

Zetas was the primary trafficking organization for large parts of Mexico and often used extreme violence, from executions to decapitations, to conduct their illegal activities before the arrest/death of crucial leaders diminished Los Zetas’ capabilities. However, Los Zetas had one 24

lasting impact: the influence of gang MS-13. 25

MS-13 was formed in the 1970s in Los Angeles, California by Salvadoran immigrants and currently operates in 42 US States and Washington, DC, with membership currently estimated at 10,000 members in the USA, with 30,000 internationally. However, unlike the 2627

Zetas and other cartels, MS-13 is not primarily a drug production/trafficking organization, but rather is a street gang which commits, racketeering, extortion, money laundering, murder, and kidnapping in addition to drug trafficking. Essentially, MS-13 commits crime for influence, 28

protection for its members, and profits. The Zetas capitalized on MS-13’s desire for influence 29

19 Harold Trinkunas, “The Network Effect: Trafficking in Illicit Drugs, Money, and People in Latin America,” Brookings, 3 December 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/12/03/the-network-effect-trafficking-in-illicit-drugs-money-and-people-in-latin-america/. 20 “Fragile States: The Drug War in Central America,” Pulitzer Center, 14 September 2011, https://pulitzercenter.org/projects/drug-war-smuggling-central-america-obama-administration. 21 Harold Trinkunas, “The Network Effect: Trafficking in Illicit Drugs, Money, and People in Latin America,” Brookings, 3 December 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/12/03/the-network-effect-trafficking-in-illicit-drugs-money-and-people-in-latin-america/. 22 “Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,” accessed 25 October 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/los-zetas-and-ms-13-nontraditional-alliances/. 23 Ibid. 24 Jeremy Bender Macias Christopher Woody, Amanda, “Here Are the Powerful Mexican Drug Cartels That Operate in the US,” Business Insider, accessed 25 October 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-cartel-guide-2015-12. 25 “Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,” accessed 25 October 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/los-zetas-and-ms-13-nontraditional-alliances/. 26 Ibid. 27 “What Is MS-13 and Why Is It So Scary?,” HowStuffWorks, 12 July 2018, https://people.howstuffworks.com/what-is-ms13.htm. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

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and profit and used the gang to execute the Zetas’ needs, from controlling “turf” to committing acts of violence. Even with the demise of Los Zetas, MS-13 and other street gangs remain an 30

important link in transporting drugs from Latin America to the US and abroad. MS-13, in 31

addition to their Mexican rivals, M-18, established strongholds in Central America following a large American deportation effort which sent many gang members to Guatemala, El Salvador, México, etc. As many gangs move drugs upwards to America, they often capitalize on existing 32

supply chain networks to engage in arms and humans trafficking, often using the same routes and systems. 33

Currently, 90% of all cocaine documented passes through Central America, bringing with it increased violence and decreased safety. Through trafficked arms which often originate from 34

the USA as a byproduct of the drug trade, these organizations have also been responsible for the majority of murders in the region. This continued violence has led to a mass exodus from the 35

region to the United States and has undermined many Central American governments via corruption and “double agents” within government enforcement organizations, who actually work for gangs and cartels. This lack of effective government threatens regional stability and 36

allows criminal organizations to thrive, further threatening “international peace and security”, thus placing the issue under DISEC’s purview. Delegates must remember that while this is a drug/crime related topic, main solutions should focus on the topic’s effect on global security. 37

Cartel Activities After the fall of the Cali Cartel, the heart of Latin American drug production shifted from Colombia to Mexico, as former Mexican partners of the Cali cartel who helped transport South American cocaine to the United States decided to vertically integrate and control all parts of the production process, from manufacturing to transportation. One of these former partners, the 38

Gulf Cartel, developed a drug corridor between Mexico and Texas, and by capitalizing upon this advantage after the fall of the Cali Cartel, was one of the first Mexican cartels to vertically integrate and quickly turned into a mega-operation which controlled all aspects of drug production, from (partial) manufacture to delivery. However, no Mexican cartel has been as 39

prolific as the Sinaloa Cartel, which is seen as the predominant criminal/trafficking organization in Latin America and as of 2013, was responsible for supplying 80% of the “heroin, cocaine,

30 “Los Zetas and MS-13: Nontraditional Alliances – Combating Terrorism Center at West Point,” accessed 25 October 2018, https://ctc.usma.edu/los-zetas-and-ms-13-nontraditional-alliances/. 31 “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 25 October 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle. 32 “Central America’s Violent Northern Triangle,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 25 October 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-violent-northern-triangle. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 “General Assembly of the United Nations,” accessed 26 October 2018, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/. 38 Jeremy Bender Macias Christopher Woody, Amanda, “Here Are the Powerful Mexican Drug Cartels That Operate in the US,” Business Insider, accessed 26 October 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-cartel-guide-2015-12. 39 Ibid.

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marijuana and methamphetamine”, primarily of which ended up in the metro Chicago area. 40

However, with the capture of former cartel leader Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, the Sinaloa Cartel is undergoing an internal power struggle which, in addition to increased competition from rival cartels, increased violence throughout Mexico and Central America. Furthermore, the 41

weapons most cartels use to perpetuate violence are from the United States, with the US Government Accountability Office stating that 70% of Mexican seized guns originated from the USA and were bought legally. However, regardless of the specific cartel, most Latin American 42

drugs still originate from Colombia and South America, and with increased American drug enforcement efforts, most cartels are forced to transport their goods through Central America, exacerbating the region’s issues. 43

Furthermore, the free flow of drugs and arms (as well as the increase in criminal activity throughout Latin America) is in large part due to the cartels’ and gangs’ abilities to infiltrate governments and secure “distribution rights, market access, and even official government protection for drug traffickers in exchange for lucrative bribes”, which undermines the effectiveness of law and has led to a de-facto war between cartels and national governments, with drug cartels and gangs launching massive offensives against government forces in order to assert dominance and influence. This phenomenon further threatens regional security and opens 44

Latin America up to further spread/influence of crime.

International Response/ UN Actions and Conclusion The compounding of these factors have led to a volatile Central American and Mexican situation which not only threatens the wellbeing of millions of citizens and has caused a mass exodus, but threatens to undermine the governmental institutions of an entire region. While the Mexican government has launched a massive campaign to flush out cartel influence in completely in Mexico, it has had questionable successes. Former Mexican President Calderon’s crackdown led to the splintering of many larger cartels, which further makes it harder to track and stop cartel activity, and his successor, President Nieto, uses the same “operational strategy” as Calderon, and the Mexican homicide rate rose to 22.8% in 2016, while cartel strongholds and influence has not eroded. At the same time, spectators have placed blame on the Mexican government for 45

extrajudicial killings and the “disappearances of 27,000 people since 2006” in the name of fighting the cartels. 46

40 Ibid. 41Juan Fern and o Gutiérrez, “Sinaloa Cartel,” InSight Crime, 5 November 2013, https://www.insightcrime.org/mexico-organized-crime-news/sinaloa-cartel-profile/. 42German Lopez, “Where Do Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Guns? The US.,” Vox, 14 January 2016, https://www.vox.com/2016/1/14/10771628/gun-violence-america-mexico. 43 “Mexico’s Drug War,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed 26 October 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/mexicos-drug-war. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

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The United States’ role in the Latin American drugs and arms trade primarily consists of funding, training, and intelligence, while increasing border security domestically, while the United Nations provides observational assistance (i.e.: to ensure seized drugs are destroyed) and has regional task-forces via the UNODC to coordinate regional initiatives and prosecution efforts. However, delegates must fully understand how the humanitarian crises as well as 474849

gang/cartel involvement have led to the current situation, where many Latin American countries, as well as their people, are highly susceptible to violence, unrest, and the undermining of democratic values and functioning government. Furthermore, delegates must be able to link all of these underlying factors and create cohesive plans of action. Additional Resources

“How the MS-13 Formed an Unholy Alliance with the Powerful Mexican Cartels - Houston Chronicle.” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.chron.com/crime/article/How-the-MS-13-formed-an-unholy-alliance-with-the-10992655.php.

“Inside the Drug Cartels Destroying Latin America | Time.” Accessed 26 October 2018. http://time.com/4184368/drug-cartel-gangsters-ioan-grillo-book-excerpt/.

“Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean.” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/mexico-central-america-and-the-caribbean.html.

“Second Gun Used in ICE Agent Murder Linked to ATF Undercover Operation - CBS News.” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/second-gun-used-in-ice-agent-murder-linked-to-atf-undercover-operation-23-02-2012/.

wola. “Four Common Misconceptions about U.S.-Bound Drug Flows through Mexico and Central America.” WOLA. Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.wola.org/analysis/four-common-misconceptions-u-s-bound-drug-flows-mexico-central-america/.

47 Ibid. 48 “Mexico Enlists US and UN Observers for War on Drugs,” accessed 26 October 2018, https://www.telesurtv.net/english/news/Mexico-Enlists-US-and-UN-Observers-for-War-on-Drugs--20170408-0003.html. 49 “Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean,” accessed 26 October 2018, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/drug-trafficking/mexico-central-america-and-the-caribbean.html.

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II. Yemeni Civil War Introduction

Starting in late 2010, a wave of pro-democracy movements swept the Middle East, from Morocco to Iraq, which focused on reducing governmental corruption, unemployment, and oppression (which all resulted from decades of autocratic rule). Millions of Middle Eastern 50

citizens staged protests and used social media to effect regime changes, increase social freedoms, and expand governmental participation. Collectively referred to as the Arab Spring, this 51

movement had mixed results. In Tunisia, for instance, the Arab Spring led to the ouster of dictator Z. Ben Ali, increased civil liberties, limited executive power, and established democratic governance. However, while the Arab Spring in Yemen led to the ouster of dictator Ali Saleh, 52

it created a power vacuum which, in 2014, turned into a civil war. 53

The Arab Spring swept Yemen when the former Yemeni president, Ali Saleh, tried to remove term limits, which led to widespread protests focusing on poverty levels and governmental corruption. As many of the populace’s grievances focused on Saleh and his 54

actions, he was forced to step down as President in 2012 after 22 years of rule, and hand over power to his vice president, Abdrabbuh Hadi. Hadi initiated budget and constitutional reforms 55

which angered Houthi rebels, who then seized control of sizable parts of Yemen in 2014, including the capital Sanaa, and pushed Hadi’s government to southern Yemen. Moreover, 56

Yemen has always experienced sectarian conflict between its Sunni majority and Shia minority. 57

However, the Hadi-Houthi conflict led to unparalleled Sunni-Shia tensions, as the Yemeni government was primarily Sunni, while the Houthi movement self-identifies as Shia, which made the Yemeni conflict both religion and ideology-based. After capturing Sanaa, the Houthi 58

rebels forced President Hadi to “resign” (in reality, he just relocated his government’s capital) and assumed, albeit internationally unrecognized, control of Yemen. With the support of 59

50 “Arab Spring - HISTORY,” accessed 14 October 2018, https://www.history.com/topics/middle-east/arab-spring. 51 Ibid. 52 “Tunisia Is an Arab Spring Success Story,” Observer, 20 April 2016, https://observer.com/2016/04/tunisia-is-an-arab-spring-success-story/. 53“Key Facts about the War in Yemen,” accessed 15 October 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html. 54 “UPDATE 1-Protests Erupt in Yemen, President Offers Reform,” Reuters, 20 January 2011, https://af.reuters.com/article/tunisiaNews/idAFLDE70J2BZ20110120. 55 “Arab Uprising: Country by Country,” 16 December 2013, //www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482293, //www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-12482293. 56 “Key Facts about the War in Yemen,” accessed 15 October 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html. 57 An official student organization at the University of Zurich, “Yemeni Civil War,” accessed 15 October 2018, https://www.mun.uzh.ch/en/session/Past-Sessions/yemenicivilwar0.html. 58 Ibid. 59 Mona El-Naggar, “Shifting Alliances Play Out Behind Closed Doors in Yemen,” The New York Times, 19 January 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/middleeast/yemeni-parliament-cancels-meeting-on-presidents-resignation.html.

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former President Saleh, who still had a large amount of influence over Yemen’s military, the Houthis proceeded to advance southward towards the port city of Aden (Hadi’s provisional capital), which spurred a Saudi-led (and US and French-supported) Arab coalition aimed to drive out Houthi occupation and returned control of Aden to the Hadi government in 2015. Many 60

external sources also claim the conflict is a proxy war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran. However, as of 2017, Hadi is exiled in Saudi Arabia, Saleh (ironically, who was 61

considered Yemen’s best option for peace and stability) was killed, and the battle for Yemeni control still rages, with no end in sight, increased terrorism due to instability, and large civilian casualties. 6263

History and Description of the Issue The Humanitarian Crisis Both sides of the Yemeni conflict have launched massive military campaigns to claim power, including massive airstrikes and ground operations. However, these operations have led to a 64

large humanitarian crisis, including massive civilian casualties, disease outbreaks, and famine. 65

From 2015 to 2018, the UN estimated 9,245 civilians died (with another 52,800 wounded) due to the Yemeni Civil War, largely due to Saudi-led airstrikes. Furthermore, these military 66

operations have destroyed infrastructure, decreased healthcare access, and sparked widespread famine, with more than one million suspected cholera cases and more than 8.4 million people at risk of starvation. 67

Additionally, both Houthi rebels and the Saudi coalition/2014-era Hadi government have been accused of human rights violations, including rape, arbitrary detention, and torture, which also contributed to the deteriorated Yemeni situation. These human rights abuses and humanitarian 68

crises have further led to large numbers of Yemeni refugees and have increased the terrorist presence (al-Qaeda, ISIS, etc.), who are thriving with the regional instability and poor human

60 “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?,” 30 January 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423. 61 Frank Gardner, “Yemen Crisis: An Iranian-Saudi Battleground?,” 25 March 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32044059. 62 Frank Gardner, “Yemen Crisis: An Iranian-Saudi Battleground?,” 25 March 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32044059. 63 “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?,” 30 January 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423. 64 “Key Facts about the War in Yemen,” accessed 15 October 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html. 65 Deutsche Welle (www.dw.com), “Yemen’s War Explained in 4 Key Points | DW | 10.08.2018,” DW.COM, accessed 15 October 2018, https://www.dw.com/en/yemens-war-explained-in-4-key-points/a-40056866. 66 “Yemen Crisis: Who Is Fighting Whom?,” 30 January 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-29319423. 67 Ibid. 68 “Both Sides in Yemen Conflict May Have Committed War Crimes, UN Says,” The Independent, 28 August 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/yemen-civil-war-saudi-arabia-houthis-uk-airstrikes-un-report-us-a8511361.html.

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condition. As the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated, “upholding human rights and 69

the rule of law is the safest way to prevent “a vicious circle of instability and resentment””. As the main belligerents in Yemen have failed to uphold human rights, terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda have found the perfect climate to recruit and carry out terrorist attacks with fewer repercussions, which threatens Middle Eastern stability and security and undermines DISEC’s mission to promote safety and stability. 7071

The Spread of Terrorism In the wake of the Yemeni conflict, the terrorist organization al-Qaeda was able to conquer much of Yemen, bringing with it conflict and instability. In 2011, al-Qaeda’s Yemeni subsidiary, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), conquered much of Yemen’s Abyan province, where they established short-lived Islamic emirates in Ja’ar and Zinjibar, before they were forced out the following spring. 72

However, with the instability and power vacuum caused by the Arab Spring, AQAP assumed control of al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth-largest port, in 2014 until a UAE-backed military operation ousted the group. Even 73

with these military successes, al-Qaeda/AQAP maintain a large presence in the region, as illustrated in the map to the right. 74

In addition to al-Qaeda, ISIS has a large strategic presence in Yemen, establishing training camps in the South and claiming “credit for attacks on Houthi-linked targets”. For example, in 75

2015 ISIS conducted suicide attacks in Sanaa mosques which resulted in upwards of 140 casualties. 76

69 Frank Gardner, “Yemen Crisis: An Iranian-Saudi Battleground?,” 25 March 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32044059, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-32044059. 70 Ibid. 71 “General Assembly of the United Nations,” accessed 15 October 2018, http://www.un.org/en/ga/first/. 72 “Mapping the Yemen Conflict | European Council on Foreign Relations,” accessed 17 October 2018, https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/yemen#. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 Ibid. 76 “Key Facts about the War in Yemen,” accessed 17 October 2018, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html.

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However, combating Yemeni terrorism has proven to be difficult, as al-Qaeda militants are often fighting Houthi rebels alongside the Saudi-led coalition, and by extension, the United States. It 77

is important to note, however, that while the US knows about al-Qaeda involvement in coalition forces, it does not fund those forces. While many Middle Eastern allies fighting against the 78

Houthis recognize AQAP’s threat, they have prioritized restoring Hadi’s government and driving out Houthi forces over battling terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s collaboration with Hadi’s government 79

and the anti-Houthi coalition is so deep-rooted that a top Yemeni commander’s closest aide is a known al-Qaeda member. Additionally, Saudi-backed coalition militias often recruit al-Qaeda 80

fighters due to their supposed capability. 81

Prior UN Actions and Conclusion The most relevant UN action regarding the issue is the United Nations Security Council’s (UNSC) Resolution 2216, which outlined a plan for restoring President Hadi to power in a unified Yemen, while simultaneously codifying the necessity for Houthis to withdraw and hand over “heavy weapons”. However, many independent parties are concerned that this resolution 82

overtly favors the Saudi position on the situation, even while President Hadi’s support has diminished, even within coalition-controlled regions. Moreover, in 2015 the UNSC rejected 83

Sweden’s proposal for a simple ceasefire resolution which did not codify Hadi’s reascent to power. However, this resolution is contingent upon the international community’s success in 84

seized the port of Hodeidah to gain an operative advantage and break the war’s current stalemate. Furthermore, the UN Special Envoy for Yemen has suggested making Hodeidah an internationally supervised port, but acceptance of these terms seems unlikely on both sides.85

Delegates must understand this volatile situation and derive possible resolutions which help resolve the conflict on both sides, quell the threat of terrorism, while also keeping in mind the Yemeni people and the underlying humanitarian crisis when creating plans of action.

77 Maggie Michael, Trish Wilson, and Lee Keath, “AP Investigation: US Allies, Al-Qaida Battle Rebels in Yemen,” AP NEWS, 7 August 2018, https://apnews.com/f38788a561d74ca78c77cb43612d50da. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Bruce Riedel, “Amid a Brutal Stalemate in Yemen, the United Nations Must Act,” Brookings, 25 June 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/25/amid-a-brutal-stalemate-in-yemen-the-united-nations-must-act/. 83 Ibid. 84 “Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases,” accessed 17 October 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm. 85 Bruce Riedel, “Amid a Brutal Stalemate in Yemen, the United Nations Must Act,” Brookings, 25 June 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/06/25/amid-a-brutal-stalemate-in-yemen-the-united-nations-must-act/.

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Additional Resources “Key Facts about the War in Yemen | Yemen News | Al Jazeera.” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/key-facts-war-yemen-160607112342462.html. “U.S. Approach to Yemen Is Challenged as Country Splinters and Government Vanishes.” Washington Post. Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-approach-to-yemen-is-challenged-as-country-splinters-and-government-vanishes/2018/09/21/93470fc6-b6ae-11e8-ae4f-2c1439c96d79_story.html. “What Is the Yemen War about, Is There a Famine, Why Is Saudi Arabia Involved and How Many People Have Died?” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2395690/yemen-war-famine-death-toll-saudi-arabia-houthi-rebels-iran/. “Yemen and the ‘War on Terror’ | Middle East Policy Council.” Accessed 26 October 2018. https://www.mepc.org/commentary/yemen-and-war-terror.

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III: Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa

Background

Over the course of the past decade, the impact of terrorism has grown, resulting in untold destruction and instability. Terrorist acts have rocked the international community, causing states across the globe to call for swift and immediate action. Terrorism is a difficult concept to define, representing decades of scholarly dispute, but it is widely understood to mean the use violent acts against civilians to meet a political, social, or religious end. It’s crucial to remember that for an event to be classified as terrorism, it must be against a non-combatant. According to the 2017 Global Terrorism Index, “94 percent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia,” demonstrating the importance of finding solutions for terrorism in the developing world. Beyond issues of stability and politics, it is of 86

the utmost economic importance for the international community to address terrorism, as terrorism resulted in a global economic loss of $84 billion in 2016. 87

88

Sub-Saharan Africa remains vulnerable to the consequences of terrorism, stifling the region’s development and success. Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of forty-eight countries, not

86 Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2017. Sydney: IEP, 2017. October, 2018. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf. 87 Ibid. 88 "Africa's Active Militant Islamist Groups." Chart. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. January 26, 2018. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/activity-fewer-fatalities-linked-african-militant-islamist-groups-2017/.

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including the Middle Eastern states Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 2017, the number of fatalities from terrorism dropped, but the total number of incidents increased. The Council on Foreign Relations notes that three centers of terrorism exist in Sub-Saharan Africa: jihadist groups in Mali, al-Shabab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Despite initial 89

concentration, terrorism can spread into surrounding states. For example, Boko Haram reaches beyond Nigeria into Cameroon and Chad and Al-Shabab has launched attacks in Kenya and Uganda. Nigeria has invested billions of dollars and legions of troops to fight Boko Haram with mixed results, as Boko Haram lost territory, but maintains an active presence in Nigeria and the neighboring region. The United Nations has supported the Multinational Joint Task Force to fight Boko Haram, a joint military action of the multiple states that neutralize terrorist cells. 90

This military intervention led to an 80% decline in fatalities in 2016 through coordinated military efforts. 91

A frequent feature of sub-Saharan African terrorism is the prevalence of youth recruitment. In a case study from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, researchers analyzed young members of Somalia’s Al-Shabab. They divide reasons for joining terrorist organizations into two categories which include “push factors...commonly known as ‘underlying/root causes’ such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political/economical marginalization. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that ‘pull’ vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group’s ideology (e.g., emphasis on changing one’s condition through violence rather than ‘apathetic’ and ‘passive’ democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits.” 92

Other studies explain terrorism as a product of “poor family circumstances, lack of education and poverty.” “Journey to Extremism,” a study conducted by the UN Development 93

Program, notes that one frequent factor is the African governments themselves. Ironically, the strategies employed by governments to counter terrorism actually push more people to join terrorist groups. The immediate reaction of many states to terrorism has been military action, yet military responses may breed isolation among citizens. Governments often counter terrorism through state control and suppression, which alienates citizens. The study implies that the most successful approach to terrorism would simply be good governance. The UNDP also notes that 94

religion is not a major factor in attracting people to terrorism. Although terrorist groups may operate under the guise of religion to attract a minority of recruits, Islamophobic notions that

89 Campbell, John. "Mapping Islamist Terrorist Incidents in Africa for 2017." Council on Foreign Relations. February 2, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/blog/mapping-islamist-terrorist-incidents-africa-2017. 90 Gberie, Lansana. "Terrorism Overshadows Internal Conflicts." African Renewal Online. April 2016. Accessed October 09, 2018. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/april-2016/terrorism-overshadows-internal-conflicts. 91 Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2017. Sydney: IEP, 2017. October, 2018. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf. 92 Hassan, Muhsin. "Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of Al-Shabab and Somali Youth." CTC Sentinel 5, no. 18 (August 2012). https://ctc.usma.edu/understanding-drivers-of-violent-extremism-the-case-of-al-shabab-and-somali-youth/. 93 Hussein, Rikar, and Nisan Ahmado. "UN Study Finds Government Action a Main Factor of Extremism in Africa." VOA. September 22, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/study-government-action-main-factor-extremism-africa/4039688.html. 94 Ibid.

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Islam causes terrorism are misleading and incorrect because terrorism is much more likely to be political than religious. Some scholars suggest that countering extremism in Mali would also 95

require repairing the relationship of the people to the government. The International Centre for Counter-terrorism at the Hague proposes “platforms at the municipal level, where citizens can raise their political demands and discuss their needs and requests with the local authorities and national representatives.” The ICCT also suggests the need for research before action, 96

encouraging the international community to invest money and time to conduct research on projects in the state. 97

Primary Issues

One issue facing the international community is counter-terrorism versus counter-insurgency. Counter-terrorism attempts to keep terrorism from escalating and controls for damage from terrorist attacks. Counter-insurgency operates with the intention of curing the root causes of terrorism, rather than simply correcting the damage. Counter-terrorism is 98

appealing from a militaristic standpoint, as it creates more immediate results. Counter- insurgency requires patience, as it may take years to break the cycle of terrorism in a single community and decades for an entire country. However, some argue that counter-terrorism is ineffective, as it does not prevent the development of terrorism in the future. Counter-insurgency is more likely to address root cause issues, such as youth recruitment, as discussed previously. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency alike require research, time, and resources. The international community must decide which strategy they will pursue in sub-Saharan Africa.

Another key component is containment, or how to prevent terrorism from spreading beyond current strongholds. African states note unique difficulties in preventing the transfer of arms and resources across borders, such as in Kenya where al-Shabaab has been prevalent for years. If African nations are unable to quell the spread of terrorism, they will be unable to maintain economic partnerships with Western powers and will begin to experience intense emigration due to international security concerns. 99

Finally, the United Nations must balance the promotion of democracy with counter-terrorism strategies. The National Intelligence Council explains that “democratization efforts will be in tension with other strategic goals, including counterterrorism.” A more 100

comprehensive security plan is required to counter terror, yet these enhanced security features

95 Ibid. 96 Santo, Elena Dal. "Mali: Is It All About Terrorism?" ICCT. April 17, 2018. https://icct.nl/publication/mali-is-it-all-about-terrorism/. 97 Ibid. 98 Pratt, Simon. "What Is the Difference between Counter-insurgency and Counter-terrorism?" E-International Relations. December 21, 2010. https://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/21/what-is-the-difference-between-counter-insurgency-and-counter-terrorism/. 99 "Sub-Saharan Africa: Pitched Contests for Democratization through 2022." Office of the Director of National Intelligence. February 2018. https://www.dni.gov/files/images/globalTrends/documents/GT-Africa_Democratization_ForPublishing-WithCovers.pdf. 100 Ibid.

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may appear undemocratic. As noted above, poor governance and repression breed terrorism. 101

Yet, the Brookings Institute contests that the most effective counter-terrorism strategy is actually for a state to improve its democracy and human rights record. However, it is important to note that many drivers of terrorism are local, requiring unique responses. All states involved in 102

counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency alike may have to decide what is more important to international security: strong, democratic governments or states without terrorism.

UN Involvement

The United Nations has taken a clear anti-terrorism stance, adopting a UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006, proclaiming that terrorism serves to aid in “the destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy, threatening territorial integrity, security of States and destabilizing legitimately constituted Governments.” The UN established four pillars that encompass the strategy: acknowledging conditions that breed terrorism, combating terrorism, increasing the power of the state and the UN to act, and maintaining human rights. 103

Furthermore, the Security Council condemned armed groups in Mali for slowing the progression of peace agreements, announcing that “terrorism and organized crime are the drivers of insecurity in northern and central Mali today.” The Security Council established a set of sanctions for individuals labeled complicit in the actions that threaten peace in Mali. So far no sanctions have been applied. The United Nations acknowledges that “youth grievances, 104

alienation, and poor governance play a significant role in violent extremism.” Meanwhile, the 105

Security Council allowed “the G5 Sahel joint force, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger, to combat terrorism and transnational organized crime in the restive region.” In September of 2017, African leaders spoke at the General Assembly, asking for 106

assistance and resources to make the G5 Sahel Task Force operational, representing the importance of UN backing for such action against terrorist groups. 107

101 Hussein, Rikar, and Nisan Ahmado. "UN Study Finds Government Action a Main Factor of Extremism in Africa." VOA. September 22, 2017. https://www.voanews.com/a/study-government-action-main-factor-extremism-africa/4039688.html. 102 Piccone, Ted. "Democracy and Terrorism Policy Brief." Brookings. September 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/fp_20170905_democracy_terrorism.pdf. 103 "UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy | Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force." United Nations. July 1, 2016. https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/ctitf/en/un-global-counter-terrorism-strategy. 104 "Final Report of the Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2374 (2017) on Mali." Ruben De Koning, Marc-Andre Boisvert, Aurelien Llorca, and Holo Makwaia to The President of the Security Council. August 9, 2018. In the United Nations. August 24, 2018. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol= S/2018/581. 105 United Nations Development Programme - Regional Bureau for Africa, Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach (UNDP: 2016), available from http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Democratic%20Governance/Local%20Governance/UNDP_RBA_Preventing_and_Responding_to_Violent_Extremism_2016-19.pdf 106 "At UN Assembly, African Leaders Call for More Support to Fight Terrorism in Sub-Saharan Sahel | UN News." United Nations. September 21, 2017. https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/09/566222-un-assembly-african-leaders-call-more-support-fight-terrorism-sub-saharan-sahel. 107 Ibid.

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Questions to Consider

I. How do strategies of local terrorist organizations differ from those of national or international organizations? Should international responses differ as well?

II. How should the international community respond to terrorism in countries with weak national governments?

III. Which states would prefer counter-terrorism strategies? Which states would prefer counter-insurgency?

IV. Should DISEC prioritize democracy or counter-terrorism? Can they exist together? V. What is the importance of containment and how is it best achieved?

Suggested Readings

I. Global Terrorism Index 2017

Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2017. Sydney: IEP, 2017. October, 2018. http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf

II. Sub-Saharan Security Tracker

Campbell, John. "Sub-Saharan Security Tracker." Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed October 09, 2018. https://www.cfr.org/africa-sub-saharan/sub-saharan-security-tracker/p37884.

III. Democracy and Terrorism Policy Brief

Piccone, Ted. "Democracy and Terrorism Policy Brief." Brookings. September 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/fp_20170905_democracy_terrorism.pdf

IV. Does counterterrorism militarize foreign aid? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa

Heinrich, Tobias, Carla Martinez Machain, and Jared Oestman. "Does Counterterrorism Militarize Foreign Aid? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa." Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 4 (2017): 527-41. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343317702708