hobbes and spinoza - john thrasher and spinoza principles he was expounding were 'those which i...

i8 Hobbes and Spinoza

N O E L M A L C O L M

i Hobbes

When the Parliament sat, that began in April 1640, and was dissolved in May following, and in which many points of the regal power, which were necessary for the peace of the kingdom, and the safety of his Majesty's person, were disputed and denied, Mr Hobbes wrote a little treatise in English, wherein he did set forth and demonstrate, that the said power and rights were inseparably annexed to the sovereignty; which sovereignty they did not then deny to be in the King; but it seems understood not, or would not understand that inseparability. O f this treatise, though not printed, many gentlemen had copies, which occasioned much talk of the author and had not his Majesty dissolved the Parliament, it had brought him into danger of his life. (Hobbes i839~45a, iv, p. 414)

Such was Hobbes ' o w n account , wri t ten t w e n t y - o ne years later, o f the origins o f his first w o r k o f political theory, The Elements of Law. Hobbes had himself been an unsuccessful candidate for election to the Short Parl iament (Beats 1978, pp. 74—6), so no doubt he fo l lowed its proceedings closely. T h e disputed 'points o f the regal p o w e r ' emerged most pointedly in John P y m ' s famous speech o f 17 Apr i l , w h i c h asserted fundamental constitutional rights o f parliament against the c r o w n ( 'Parliament is as the soule o f the c o m m o n weal th ' , ' the intellectual parte w h i c h Governes all the rest') and attacked 'the Doc t r ine that w h a t proper ty the subject hath in any thinge m a y be lawful ly taken a w a y w h e n the K i n g requires it ' . T h e latter point was taken up b y Sir John S t rangways on the fo l l owing day: 'for i f the K i n g e be j u d g e o f the necessitye, w e have noth ing and are but Tennants at w i l l ' ( C o p e and Coates 1977, pp. 149, 155, 159).

T h e k ing dissolved this parliament on 5 M a y . Four days later Hobbes signed the dedicatory epistle o f his treatise, w h i c h was addressed to his patron, the staunchly royalist earl o f Newcas t l e ; he explained that the

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principles he was expound ing w e re 'those w h i c h I have heretofore acquainted y o u r Lordship wi tha l in private discourse, and w h i c h by you r c o m m a n d I have here put into me thod ' (Hobbes 1928, p . x v i i ) . T h e polemical purpose o f the w o r k is evident, and is reflected in its circulation in numerous manuscript copies, at least nine o f w h i c h survive. (Three o f them we re wri t ten b y scribes and signed b y Hobbes : this suggests a form o f clandestine publicat ion b y a product ion-l ine o f copyists .) 1 Hobbes ' a rgument was designed to show first o f all that gove rnmen t b y a civil sovereign was necessary, and secondly that the reasons w h i c h made it necessary also made the sovere ignty absolute. H e attacked those w h o 'have imagined that a c o m m o n w e a l t h m a y be constituted in such a manner, as the sovereign p o w e r m a y be so l imited, and moderated, as they should think fit themselves ' ; he sought to over turn the claim that the sovereign p o w e r can be 'd iv ided ' or shared be tween k ing and people, and (in a transparent reference to the recent proceedings in parliament) he de-nounced those w h o ' w h e n they are c o m m a n d e d to contribute their persons or m o n e y to the public service . . . think they have a propriety in the same distinct f rom the domin ion o f the sovereign p o w e r ' (n.i .13, n.viii .4, 1928, pp . 68, 135). It was Hobbes ' a rgument on this last point above all w h i c h made h im fear for his life w h e n the next parliament assembled in N o v e m b e r and began its impeachment o f Strafford (Aubrey 1898,1, p . 334; Z a g o r i n 1978). W i t h i n a f ew days Hobbes fled to Paris, whe re he was to remain for e leven years; and it was there that he w r o t e his t w o other major w o r k s o f political theory (De Give, printed in 1642, and Leviathan, printed in 1651) , each o f w h i c h in turn developed and added to the arguments o f The Element/s-of Law.

Tha t Hobbes ' career as a political wri ter should have begun wi th a polemical ly royalist w o r k in 1640 is, in biographical terms, not ve ry surprising. His entire adult life, since his graduation f rom O x f o r d in 1608, had been spent in the service o f aristocratic families as a tutor, secretary, and companion . E m p l o y e d at first b y the Cavendish family at H a r d w i c k and Cha t swor th , he had gained some experience o f quasi-public affairs cooperat ing w i t h the second earl o f Devonsh i re as an active m e m b e r o f the Vi rg in ia C o m p a n y (Ma lco lm 1981). In 1629 (prompted, it has been suggested, b y the Peti t ion o f R i g h t o f the previous year: R e i k 1977, p . 37) he had published a translation o f Thucyd ides , w h o appealed to h im for his

1. These three M S S are: B L Had . M S 4235; Chatsworth , Hobbes M S S A 2 B and A 2 A (which n o w lacks the dedication, but cf. the description in T o d d 1973).

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dispassionate analysis o f the w a y s in w h i c h democrat ic governments could be corrupted and manipulated. For most o f the 1630s Hobbes was a tutor to the y o u n g third earl o f Devonshi re ; wardship over the y o u n g earl was exercised by his cousin, the earl o f Newcas t l e , w h o helped to awaken Hobbes ' philosophical interests and no doubt his royalist sympathies.

The Elements of Law is not, h o w e v e r , s imply a piece o f royalist propaganda. Its importance lies in the w a y that it derives its political conclusions f rom a set o f philosophical assumptions. Hobbes ' philosophical awaken ing had taken place, it seems, during the 1630s w h e n he had b e c o m e preoccupied w i t h an area o f over lapping fundamental problems in physics, metaphysics, and ep is temology . H e had adopted enthusiastically the Galilean principle o f the subjectivity o f secondary qualities; this meant that a secondary quality such as heat did not inhere in a 'hot ' object, but was a feature o f the experience o f someone perceiving that object, and could be causally explained in terms o f the pr imary qualities w h i c h be longed to the object itself (such as the shape and mot ion o f its particles). For Hobbes , this principle was a lever w h i c h could be used to over turn scholastic physics and metaphysics. H e attacked the not ion that the ult imate reality o f physical things consisted in their intelligible ' forms ' or 'essences'; scholastic phi losophy had used this explanation to account for the w a y in w h i c h our process o f sense-perception begins w i t h the. action o f physical causes (light acting on the eye, for example) but ends w i t h an immaterial mental object in the intellect. M o s t medieval philosophers, d r awing on a mixture o f Aristotelian and Neopla tonis t thought , had distinguished be tween physical existence and non-physical intelligibility ('esse existentiae' and 'esse essentiae'), and had subordinated the former to the latter in the order o f real be ing. A tree physically existed b y virtue o f be ing an expression o f the essence o f a tree, and so the mind could abstract this essence f rom its perceptions o f a tree's physical properties.

This v i e w o f the w o r l d as constituted b y intelligible essences had usually also assumed that these essences w e re systematically related to each other in an e c o n o m y o f perfection: they all participated in absolute B e i n g , w h i c h was unitary and was derived from (or was perhaps identical wi th) G o d . T h e rational order o f the w h o l e system could be described in terms o f the laws o f reason or laws o f nature w h i c h gove rned all its parts. This w a y o f describing things gave rise to a w a y o f valuing them: a thing became better the more it fulfilled its essential nature, and thereby fulfilled its place in the w h o l e system o f essences. T h e more arboreal a tree was , the more it expressed its essential nature. H u m a n beings also had an innate te leo logy to

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fulfil, but as rational beings they were conscious o f their o w n ends and were able to direct their actions towards them. In R i c h a r d Hooker ' s words , ' A l aw therefore generally taken, is a directive rule unto goodness o f operation . . . T h e rule o f natural agents that w o r k b y simple necessity, is the determination o f the w i s d o m o f G o d . . . T h e rule o f voluntary agents on earth is the sentence that Reason g ive th concerning the goodness o f those things w h i c h they are to d o ' (Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, i .viii.4, 1888, 1, p . 228).

Hobbes rejected this not ion o f reason intuiting natural teleological values, because he rejected the metaphysics and theo logy f rom w h i c h those values w e re derived. His most t ho rough attack on the old metaphysics came in a monumenta l refutation o f a w o r k b y a Ca tho l ic Aristotelian, T h o m a s W h i t e ; this refutation, w h i c h remained unpublished till 1973, was wri t ten in 1642—3. T h e fundamental principle f rom w h i c h Hobbes argued in this w o r k was that o f G o d ' s f reedom to create the w o r l d if, h o w , and w h e n he pleased (1973, chs. 30—4), a principle w h i c h severed any intrinsic connect ion be tween the natures o f created things and the nature o f G o d , and reduced 'essences' to mere descriptions o f existing things (p. 381). These metaphysical assumptions can already be seen at w o r k in an earlier manuscript, p robably wri t ten be tween 1637 and 1640, in w h i c h Hobbes had asserted that 'the original and s u m m o f K n o w l e d g e stands thus: there is noth ing that truly exists in the w o r l d but single and individual l B o d y e s p roduc ing single and individual l acts or effects' (Rossi 1942, p . 102). A n d in another early manuscript, p robably also wri t ten in the 1630s, he had begun to apply these principles to the construction o f a system o f p s y c h o l o gy in w h i c h all change was to be accounted for in terms o f mechanical causation (the 'Shor t Trac t ' , printed in Hobbes 1928, pp. 152—67).

Scholastic p s y c h o l o g y had explained the operation o f desire, for example , in terms o f the mind 's apprehension o f the ' fo rm ' or essence o f the desired thing; Hobbes explained it in terms o f a strictly causal process leading f rom sense-perception to the setting in mot ion o f the body ' s 'animal spirits' (conceived o f as a fine fluid in the nervous system), causing the b o d y ' s mo t ion towards the desired thing. T h e ' thought ' o f the desired object was s imply that part o f the sequence o f mot ion w h i c h t ook place in the brain, whe re it m igh t also interact w i t h m e m o r y ' s store o f residual mot ions f rom previous sense-impressions. Hobbes denied that the feeling o f desire was a special k ind o f thought , and analysed it as a combinat ion o f hav ing the mental image o f the desired object and beginning to m o v e towards it (1839—45b, v , p . 261) . This idea o f the 'beginnings o f mo t ion '

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became a key feature o f Hobbes ' p s y c h o l o gy and physics; later described b y h im as 'conatus ' or ' endeavour ' , it enabled h im to reduce intentions to infinitesimal actions.

For Hobbes , reason neither participated in the nature o f desire nor supplied any substantive k n o w l e d g e o f values. 'For the Though t s , are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the w a y to the things Desired ' (1651 , p . 35) . 2 Reaso n could on ly calculate means to ends, apply ing the merely formal principles o f ratiocination to the brute facts o f sense-experience and desire. T h e ends themselves we r e supplied b y the causal mechanism o f desire and aversion. Such a v i e w o f human nature migh t suggest that even i f one tried to m o v e f rom 'is' to ' ough t ' b y assigning value to the fulfilment o f desire, one w o u l d still not be able to form any universal value system: values w o u l d be individual rather than general, refracted and fragmented into a number o f conflicting egoisms. There is, as w e shall see, a deep sense in w h i c h Hobbes ' values are individual rather than universal, but it is not s imply a matter o f hav ing an 'egoist ic ' mora l p s y c h o l o g y . Mo t iva t i o n in Hobbes ' account is necessarily egoistic on ly in a nuga tory , definitional sense: each person strives to fulfil his o w n desires. This does not mean that the contents o f those desires cannot be concerned w i t h the g o o d o f others. T h e definitions o f the passions w h i c h Hobbes supplies in chapter 16 o f Leviathan include 'Desire o f g o o d to another, BENEVOLENCE, GOOD WILL, CHARITY . If to men generally, GOOD

NATURE ' (p. 26; cf. Ger t 1965 and 1967). It is true that Hobbes did tend to explain the passions in terms o f self-interest, as w h e n he w r o t e that ' Griefe, for the Ca l ami ty o f another, is PITTY; and ariseth f rom the imaginat ion that the like calamity m a y befall himselfe ' (p. 27); but is is often unclear in such cases whether 'ariseth f rom' explains the feeling in the sense o f analysing its true content or in the sense o f point ing to its causal predecessor. T h e origin o f m a n y o f these definitions is found in Hobbes ' early summary o f Aristotle 's Rhetoric; Aristot le is often as ambiguous as Hobbes and almost as reductive. A n d w h e n Hobbes translated Rhetoric 1369b 18 as 'In summe, every Voluntary A c t i o n tends either to Profit, or Pleasure' (1986, p. 55), w e can see that draining a w a y Aristotle 's t e leo logy f rom his p s y c h o l o g y can leave us w i th a ve ry Hobbesian residue.

Hobbes ' con temporary critics denounced h im for arguing that men were naturally selfish and hostile towards one another. His reply was

2. References to Leviathan are given in the form o f page numbers in the first edition: these can be located in the text o f the 1968 Penguin edition (ed. C . B . Macpherson) and in the margin o f the 1909 Clarendon Press edition (ed. W . G . Pogson Smith).

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commonsensical : first, that a l though men were sometimes benevolent , a state could not be founded on benevolence alone, and secondly, that ' t hough the w i c k e d were fewer than the righteous, yet because w e cannot distinguish them, there is a necessity o f suspecting, heeding, anticipating' (1983, p . 33). A third reason, more important but less commonsensical and less directly stated, also emerges: the pr imary state o f conflict be tween individuals posited b y Hobbes is not a contingent , factual conflict w h i c h migh t not exist i f people ceased to be irascible or compet i t ive , but rather a necessary jural conflict be tween people whose rights over lap or conflict in some sense w i t h one another until they have been renounced.

In order to show that men can all agree on the need to pass from a state o f conflict to a state o f peace, Hobbes argues that it is possible to abstract a set o f universal rules o f human action from the cont ingent facts o f conflicting individual desires. Individual desires are various and are constantly in mot ion , so they can be neither consummated in the achievement o f a final, systematic goal (Hobbes rejects the not ion o f a ' s u m m u m b o n u m ' in this life), nor dispensed w i t h b y means o f Stoic wi thdrawal . ( W h e n Hobbes characterises life as a 'restlesse desire o f P o w e r after p o w e r ' (1651 , p. 47), he is not mak ing the empirical observation that men are p o w e r - h u n g r y , but mere ly conjoining his v i e w o f life as mot ion w i th his definition o f p o w e r as the 'present means, to obtain some future apparent g o o d ' (p. 66).) O n l y one desire can have any sort o f priori ty over all other desires, namely the desire to avoid death; being alive is a necessary condit ion, the present means to all future apparent goods . H a v i n g established this one general truth over and above the mass o f individual desires, Hobbes proceeds to d raw from it a system o f means towards the avoidance o f death, p rov id ing a set o f rules o f action w h i c h all men must find valid i f they reason correctly. T h e most important means towards self-preservation is peace, the establishment o f stable and trustable social relations. A n d the o p t i m u m means towards peace can be formulated as ' L a w s o f Na tu re ' or mora l principles w h i c h wi l l be immutab ly and eternally true. In this w a y Hobbes has performed the transition f rom the subjective and relative vocabulary o f ' g o o d ' and ' ev i l ' ( ' good ' meaning 'object o f desire') to an objective system o f virtues and vices w h i c h can apply universally.

And therefore so long a man is in the condition of meer Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: And consequently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, 8c the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good; that is to say, Morall Vertues. (p. 80)

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Hobbes has thus cleverly passed f rom 'is' to ' ough t ' almost w i thou t appearing to take upon himself the responsibility for using normat ive language: g iven that men use such language in an unreliable w a y to express their o w n desires, Hobbes offers a reliable, systematic use o f it in the fo rm o f ' L a w s o f Na tu re ' w i th w h i c h they must all agree. T h e laws are 'Conclus ions , or Theoremes concerning wha t conduceth to the conserva-tion and defence o f themselves ' (pp. 122—3); a l though usually framed convenient ly as imperatives, they w o u l d be more correct ly spelt out as theorems o f the form: ' g iven that y o u desire to do x y and z, i f y o u reason correct ly y o u wi l l also desire to do the fo l l owing ' . T h e laws o f nature specify an o p t i m u m set o f actions designed to br ing about peace, the o p t i m u m condit ion for self-preservation. B u t there wi l l also be occasions w h e n obey ing those laws wi l l endanger an individual 's life rather than preserving it (e.g. w h e n faced wi th a man o f violence); in such circumstances the need for self-preservation wi l l dictate breaking the laws o f nature and responding w i th violence in self-defence. This entit lement to g o against the laws o f nature in order to fulfil the purpose w h i c h they serve is called the ' r ight ' o f nature. In chapter 14 o f Leviathan Hobbes shows that both laws and right flow from the same source, w h i c h he calls the 'rule ' o f nature: 'Tha t every man, ough t to endeavour peace, as farre as he has hope o f obtaining it; and w h e n he cannot obtain it, that he m a y seek, and use, all helps, and advantages o f W a r r e ' (p. 64). Whi l s t the laws put forward a determinate set o f actions, the right covers an indeterminate range o f possible actions contrary to natural law; hence Hobbes ' statement in the same chapter that 'RIGHT , consisteth in liberty to do , or to forbeare; Whereas LAW , determineth and bindeth to one o f them' (p. 64). B u t in any particular set o f circumstances w h e n the right needs to be used, using it w i l l be no less necessary than obedience to the laws normal ly is w h e n they can safely be obeyed . Ca l l ing the right a ' l iberty ' does not mean that at critical moments o f self-defence it is a matter o f indifference whether the right be used or not; it connotes rather the right 's nature as an 'enti t lement ' to act against the usual requirements o f natural l a w . 3

This account has so far been concerned wi th wha t migh t be called an internal valuation o f men's actions: each man has to consider his o w n need

3. Hence it is not necessary to accept the argument (Warrender 1957) that the laws o f nature cannot be based on self-preservation because self-preservation is a right, and rights involve 'liberty to do, or to forbeare'. It must also be stressed that Hobbes ' argument in Leviathan is not that men have a right to preserve themselves but that they have a right to attempt to preserve themselves. O n this important distinction see Viola 1979, pp. 88—9.

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for preservation, and this need generates a particular set of laws and ageneral right. In the state of nature, when conditions are always potentiallyhostile and the scope for acting in accordance with the laws of nature isreduced almost to vanishing point, all sorts of actions may be justified bythe right of nature. But some actions will still not be justified by it, if theydo not meet the internal standard of conduciveness to self-preservation. Inan important note added to the second edition of De Cive, Hobbesexplained that wanton cruelty or drunkenness in the state of nature wouldnot be covered by the right of nature (1983, p. 73). Yet elsewhere Hobbesclearly stated that in the state of nature 'Every man by nature hath right toall things, that is to say, to do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, topossess, use, and enjoy all things he will and can' (1928, 11.xiv.10, p. 55; cf.1651, p. 64, 'this naturall Right of every man to every thing'). This suggestsa different use of the term 'right'; we might call it Hobbes' account of men'sexternal rights, that is, their rights vis-a-vis other men, as opposed to hisinternal account of rights overruling laws in the system of actions for self-preservation.

The old undifferentiated notion of a right or 'ius' as 'that which is right'was still in the process of being broken up during this period (see Tuck1979); although Hobbes was one of its main attackers, his own argumentsare sometimes ambiguous because he uses the term in more than one way.His internal account of the right of nature made a procedural and categorialdistinction between it and the laws of nature, but still conceived of it as an'objective' right of the traditional kind, a way of justifying actions becausein their particular circumstances they were right to do. Externally, however(in the field of inter-personal relations), Hobbes put forward a strongversion of the modern 'subjective' notion of a right, a freedom or liberty ofaction which, far from being generated by any normative requirements,consisted of an absence of obligations. Hobbes was presupposing a sort ofmoral vacuum so far as inter-personal moral duties were concerned. Thiswas a condition of his argument that the only standard by which an actioncould be judged to be wrong in the state of nature was the internal standardof conduciveness to self-preservation: in the state of nature there is norequirement to 'respect' the rights of others, no duty towards other people.To illustrate: if in the state of nature A snatches B's food, this action cannever be judged to be wrong on the grounds that A has some dutiestowards B which he is thereby breaking. A has no duties towards him oranyone else, and therefore his (external) rights of action are total and all-encompassing. So the only standard by which the action can be judged to

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be w r o n g is the (internal) standard o f conduciveness to self-preservation: b y this standard A wi l l have the r ight to snatch the food i f his preservation requires it, but he w i l l not have that r ight i f he does not need the food and is mere ly increasing his chances o f suffering retaliatory hostility.

Separating external and internal rights in this w a y helps us to see that a l though the natural laws and natural rights concerned w i t h preservation are in some w a y s similar to a traditional corpus o f 'object ive ' rights and duties, they are still fundamental ly different f rom any normal set o f universalisable mora l rules. These laws and rights are universal only in the sense that they are duplicated in every individual . The i r derivation is essentially egoistic: each person m a y assign a value to modesty , humil i ty , generosity, etc., but his reason must ul t imately be that each quality has an instrumental value to him. T h e altruism w h i c h flows f rom obedience to natural l aw is, for Hobbes , a fo rm o f enlightened self-interest, and it can only be expected o f individuals once they have jo ined together in the c o m m o n security o f the state.

There is a danger, in f o l l o w i ng Hobbes ' account o f the state o f nature and the format ion o f political society, that the reader begins to treat it as a literal, historical narrative. Hobbes presented it in this w a y for the sake o f exposi t ion, but wi l l ing ly admit ted o f the state o f nature that 'I bel ieve it was never generally so, ove r all the w o r l d ' (1651 , p. 63). H e concluded that families in the state o f nature w e re to a l imited extent miniature political societies, because children could be deemed to have consented to obey their parents (pp. 102—6). His o w n favourite example o f a state o f nature was that o f the relations be tween sovereign states (p. 63); in a letter to a friend he also suggested, rather unsatisfactorily, that soldiers or travell ing masons, w h o passed th rough various states but o w e d settled allegiance to none o f them, migh t also be thought o f in this w a y . 4 B u t in essence the state o f nature is the product o f a thought -exper iment in w h i c h Hobbes considers wha t rights o f action and reasons for action men w o u l d have i f there were no c o m m o n authori ty to w h i c h they could turn to settle their disputes, or on w h i c h they could rely to g ive stability to their expectations o f h o w other men w o u l d act towards them.

Conve r se ly , w h e n Hobbes describes the formation o f political authority

4. This letter does not survive, but the reply o f its recipient does, objecting that these t w o instances are not proper examples o f the state o f nature 'because this is only a war o f each against each successively and at different times': Peleau to Hobbes, Bordeaux, 4 January 1657. (Chatsworth, Hobbes papers, letters from foreign correspondents, letter 34. I am grateful to the trustees o f the Chatswor th Settlement for permission to cite this letter.)

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th rough a covenant he is not ty ing his a rgument to a putative historical event , but t ry ing to characterise the kind o f c o m m i t m e n t w h i c h members o f society must have towards the political arrangement w h i c h they accept. Cont rac t theories o f the state have often taken a quasi-historical form because o f the element o f cont ingency w h i c h is one possible reason for appealing to the not ion o f a contract. Instead o f marshalling general principles to p rove that the political arrangement in question is the only just and proper arrangement that could have been made, contract theorists can argue that it is one o f a number o f possible arrangements, and that men are bound to this one s imply b y the fact that they have agreed to it. In some cases, notably that o f John Selden, the contract theory o f the state did have a genuine, t hough complex , historical character; on the question o f w h e n resistance to the gove rnmen t becomes justified, his m a x i m was that ' w e must l ook to the contract ' , and this required the services o f legal and constitutional historians (such as himself). M o r e frequently, h o w e v e r , contract theory became an excuse for ahistorical arguments about wha t people 'must have ' rationally contracted to do; in other words , a w a y o f presenting conditions w h i c h ough t to be deemed to be incorporated in any grant o f p o w e r f rom people to gove rnmen t . Hobbes fo l lowed this ahistorical tendency, but w i t h a radical difference: he used the not ion o f necessary consent as a lever to over turn all claims about implici t conditions or limitations o f the rights o f gove rnmen t .

Hobbes was able to do this because o f the unitary nature o f his foundation for natural l aw: self-preservation. T h e main Ciceronian and Thomis t traditions o f natural l aw saw self-preservation as the g round floor, so to speak, o f a w h o l e structure o f human needs and values, and it was out o f those higher-order values that rational contractarians could construct the implici t conditions w h i c h they thought were invo lved in the grant o f p o w e r f rom people to gove rnmen t . In Hobbes ' a rgument , self-preservation is a sheer need w h i c h takes precedence over other needs; that a subject should be preserved b y his gove rnmen t is the on ly essential condi t ion o f his allegiance to it. Since, in Hobbes ' theory, self-preservation could in extremis justify do ing anything , the subjects must have granted their gove rnmen t the p o w e r to do anything for the sake o f their preservation. The i r consent to this eliminated all scope for further 'condit ions ' or constraints.

It m a y still be wondered , h o w e v e r , whe ther Hobbes ' account needed to use a concept o f contract at all: in any argument w h i c h hinges on the phrase 'must have contracted' , it is surely the reasons for saying 'must have ' w h i c h

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are doing the real w o r k . Hobbes ' reasons are laid d o w n in his laws o f nature, w h i c h enjoin people to enter society, submit to arbitration, and so on. Indeed, the third law o f nature is 'that men performe their Covenan t s made ' ( i 6 5 i , p . 7 i ) . I f the reasons for obey in g covenants are to be found in a system o f prudential rules, w h y has Hobbes not d rawn up his w h o l e theory o f obedience in terms o f long- te rm benefits and dispensed w i t h the not ion o f contract altogether? T h e answer must be that contract was only a formal device in Hobbes ' theory, but a device w h i c h served some important subsidiary purposes. First, it enabled h im to insulate the language o f justice f rom the rest o f the mora l vocabulary: a sovereign gove rnmen t migh t be iniquitous, that is, it m igh t break the laws o f nature, but it could not be unjust, because injustice consisted o f breach o f contract. (In Hobbes ' theory, the sovereign is not a party to the contract: the contract is be tween the subjects, w h o agree to hand over their rights and p o w e r to the sovereign: p. 89). In a classic example o f his reduct ive technique o f argument , Hobbes dispensed w i t h the traditional claims o f distributive and commuta t ive justice, reducing the former to equity and the latter to contractual justice (p. 75) . T h e claim that rulers cannot be convic ted o f injustice had not been wi thou t polemical point in the England o f 1640.

Secondly , Hobbes ' theory requires people to renounce not only rights o f action but also rights o f j u d g e m e n t . O n l y the sovereign can j u d g e w h a t w i l l be necessary for the preservation o f peace in the state: i f subjects claimed the right to j u d g e this, they w o u l d be undermining the sovereign 's role as final arbiter and frustrating the purpose for w h i c h a sovereign was instituted. (This too had had a topical relevance in the late 1630s, f o l l owing the Ship M o n e y case.) T h e not ion o f a covenant is a kind o f shorthand for the type o f c o m m i t m e n t to obedience this requires, in advance o f any k n o w l e d g e o f the contingencies o f particular decisions by the sovereign.

T h e state forces its subjects to keep their covenant b y annexing punishments to its laws. 'Covenan t s , w i thou t the S w o r d , are but W o r d s , and o f no strength to secure a man at all ' (p. 85). B u t Hobbes is not arguing here that the desire to avoid punishment is the on ly mot iva t ion for o b e y i n g the laws. T h e prospect o f punishment is a short- term consideration, necessary to concentrate the minds o f passionate men, and thereby to create secure surroundings for those w h o do wish to keep their covenant . A n d there is a lways an adequate long- t e rm consideration p rompt ing this wish, namely the conduciveness to self-preservation o f peace and stable g o v e r n -ment . Hobbes is sometimes associated w i th modern 'positivist ' or 'realist' theories o f l aw w h i c h explain the obl igat ion to obey laws in terms o f the

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mot iva t ion to avo id the punishments w h i c h those laws predict; but in Hobbes ' theory there is thus a lways a further m o t i ve to obedience. This point comes out s trongly in his criticism o f the doctrine o f 'passive obedience ' in Behemoth, his history o f the C i v i l W a r . 'Eve ry law is a c o m m a n d to do, or to forbear: neither o f these is fulfilled b y suffering' (1889, p. 50). L a w s do not propose value-free alternatives o f action leading to punishment and action leading to non-punishment ; there is a lways a value attached to obedience to laws, because there is a lways a duty towards the legislator, whose cont inuing authori ty ensures peace.

Hobbes does, h o w e v e r , raise an apparent except ion to this principle w h e n he writes about 'the Ob l iga t ion a man m a y sometimes have, upon the C o m m a n d o f the Sovera ign to execute any dangerous or dishonourable Office ' . Here he concludes: ' W h e n therefore our refusall to obey frustrates the End for w h i c h the Sovera ign ty was ordained, then there is no Liber ty to refuse: otherwise there is' (1651 , p. 112) . This seems to transgress Hobbes ' rule that on ly the sovereign can decide whether an action is necessary for the safety o f the state. Bu t , leaving aside the ment ion o f dishonour (which is not fully supported b y the rest o f Hobbes ' theory) , it is clear that Hobbes is concerned here w i t h the uncertain, probabilistic borderline at w h i c h the need to obey gives w a y to the need for self-preservation; the 'danger ' referred to here is danger to the subject's life, and it was an i m m o v a b l e sticking point in Hobbes ' theory that no one could ever covenant to kil l h imself (p. 69). It cases o f capital punishment, Hobbes argued, the convic t had a right to resist his gaolers and executioners. B u t it was also an important feature o f his a rgument that at the same t ime the sovereign ( w h o could c o m m i t no injustice) had a r ight to execute the man. T h e sovereign acted w i t h the rights o f the people, on their behalf.

T h e most striking formulat ion o f this point comes in De Cive, whe re Hobbes writes that ' T h e People rules in all Government s , for even in Monarchies the People C o m m a n d s ' (1983, p . 151 ) . H e contrasted the 'people ' , w h i c h was the corporate entity created b y the political agreement o f its members , w i t h the 'mult i tude ' , w h i c h was any mere aggregate o f individuals. His intention was to undermine those w h o claimed to speak on behalf o f ' t h e people ' against their ruler, b y s h o w i n g that individuals gained a corporate identity only b y virtue o f being united under a sovereign. B u t since the 'people ' was also the term w h i c h Hobbes used for the sovereign itself in the case o f a democrat ic constitution, this a rgument had the probably unintended consequence that the foundation o f any type o f state had required a pr imary phase o f democracy . In the quasi-historical

541



accounts o f The Elements of Law and De Give this is w h a t happened, and the democracy then dissolved itself i f it handed ove r sovere ignty to a monarchy or an aristocracy (1928, p . 94, 1983 pp. 1 0 9 - 1 1 ) : even i f the hand-over occurred at the first gathering o f the people, the fact that it did so b y majori ty vo te w o u l d i m p l y the m o m e n t a r y existence o f a democrat ic constitution. Hobbes was obv ious ly t roubled bo th b y the quasi-populist appearance o f his a rgument in these w o r k s (as i f democracy we r e s o m e h o w more natural), and b y the theoretical awkwardness o f identifying the corporate w i l l o f the state w i t h an entity, the 'people ' , w h i c h apparently cont inued to exist after it had disappeared, like the grin o f the Cheshire C a t . In Leviathan he streamlined his account b y treating the original majori ty principle as a necessary procedural assumption (rather than as a min i -constitution), and w o r k e d out a n e w w a y o f describing the cont inuing corporate entity as the 'person' o f the state. T o g e t h e r w i t h this concept o f a 'person' , w h i c h was d r a w n f rom the legal fiction that corporations could act as persons at l aw, he e m p l o y e d the related legal vocabula ry o f 'authorising' and 'representing' : the sovereign (whether an individual or an assembly) represents its subjects because it is authorised to act as the bearer o f their 'person' , and they have a unitary 'person' on ly b y virtue o f being represented b y a unitary sovereign (1651 , pp. 80—3; see also Pol in 1953, pp. 229—40, and Forsyth 1981). T h r o u g h o u t his account, Hobbes a l lows that the sovereign m a y be an aristocratic counci l or a democrat ic assembly; a l though he gives reasons for preferring a monarchy (pp. 95—8), the nature o f the sovere ignty is the same in each case.

T h e not ion o f authorising is taken up again w h e n Hobbes considers the sovereign 's legislative action and permissive inaction. 'AH Lawes , wri t ten , and unwri t ten, have their Au thor i ty , and force, f rom the W i l l o f the C o m m o n - w e a l t h ; that is to say, f rom the W i l l o f the Representa t ive ' (p. 139). C u s t o m a r y l aw thus has its val idi ty not f rom any intrinsic force o f its o w n but f rom being 'authorised' b y the sovereign, w h o could cancel it i f he wished. (This was the starting point for H o b b e s ' attack on the claims o f c o m m o n l aw jurists in his Dialogue . . .of the Common Laws of England.) In a w ide r sense, all activities wi th in the state are authorised b y the sovereign so long as they are not forbidden. T h e state authorises g e o m e t ry professors to teach g e o m e t r y just as it authorises people to w a l k th rough public parks; this does not mean that eve ryone is acting on instructions f rom the state, and it does not mean that the sovereign authori ty is m a k i ng the professors' g e o m e t r y true, or ob l ig ing people to bel ieve it. O f course the range o f things w h i c h might be forbidden b y the state is almost unlimited; but

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Hobbes ' theory supplies no reason for the state to use this p o w e r except for the preservation o f peace and prosperity. It is in the sovereign's interest to a l low individuals to pursue their o w n interests, because this produces a more contented and prosperous populat ion: 'where the publ ique and private interest are most closely united, there is the publ ique most advanced . . . T h e riches, p o w e r , and honour o f a M o n a r c h arise onely f rom the riches, p o w e r , and honour o f his Subjects ' (p. 96; cf. G u n n 1969, pp. 65—81). Hobbes summarised his a rgument at one point in the Elements of Law by saying that it was the sovereign 's duty b y the l aw o f nature ' to leave man as m u c h liberty as m a y be, wi thou t hurt o f the publ ic ' (1928, p. 141) .

Hobbes ' apparently unobjectionable claims about the authorisation o f g e o m e t r y teachers shadowed forth his a rgument on a m u c h more contentious subject: the status o f the church wi th in the state. H e regarded the church as a society o f men engaged in teaching the doctrine o f the Bib le . T h e sovereign migh t authorise this teaching in the strong sense o f endorsing as laws the injunctions to action w h i c h the teaching contained; or the sovereign could authorise it in the looser sense o f permit t ing the act ivi ty o f teaching. T h e distinction be tween bel ief and action was an important one: 'For internall Faith is in its o w n nature invisible, and consequently exempted f rom all humane [i.e. 'human ' ] jurisdict ion' (1651 , p. 285). If the church claimed an independent authority to direct the actions o f men wi th in the state, this was contrary to the unitary and absolute nature o f civil sovereignty . T h e church's o w n actions must be subject to the civil p o w e r , and those actions must include not only acts o f worship but also wr i t ing and speaking. B u t Hobbes distinguished carefully be tween forbidding teaching and forbidding men to believe w h a t they were taught: 'such Forbidding is o f no effect; because Beleef, and U n b e l e e f never fo l low mens C o m m a n d s ' (p. 271) . P rov ided that the church did not claim independent rights o f action, and provided that the doctrine it taught was not subversive to the peace o f the state, Hobbes ' theory a l lowed for a great degree o f religious toleration. Ideally the sovereign should have no more reason to interfere w i t h the church than w i t h geome t ry lessons. Hobbes is only loosely to be described as an Erastian; he did not think that any strong connect ion be tween state and church was necessary, and his theory permitted R o m a n Cathol ic i sm in England, for example , provided that it we re understood that the pope appointed teachers o f doctrine in England only on sufferance f rom the English sovereign (p. 296). After the Restora t ion, C h u r c h o f England bishops such as E d w a r d Stillingfleet and Samuel Parker used Hobbesian arguments to justify gove rnmen t action

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against the Dissenters, on the grounds that they were a threat to civil peace; but in some w a y s it was the Dissenters w h o were wie ld ing the most centrally Hobbesian arguments w h e n they said that religious beliefs should not be subject to civi l compuls ion .

T h e difficulty, o f course, was that some versions o f religious bel ief w o u l d not fit into Hobbes ' scheme, because they did invo lve bel ief in rights o f action or jurisdict ion independent o f the sovereign. M o s t varieties o f institutional Christ ianity taught beliefs o f this sort, and Hobbes ' arguments on this point are thus fiercely anti-clerical and above all ant i -Cathol ic . B u t even wi th in the R o m a n Cathol ic church there were traditions o f Marsilian and Gallican argument on w h i c h Hobbes could draw in his attack on papal p o w e r (Ma lco lm 1984, pp. 82-3). W i t h i n the Ang l i can church Hobbes was in some w a y s fo l l owing in the tradition o f rationalist religion, o f writers such as W i l l i a m Chi l l ing w o r t h and Falkland at Great T e w . Hobbes agreed w i th them that the essential doctrinal truths contained in the Bib le were few and easily k n o w a b l e (1651 , pp. 325—6). A n d in the third part o f Leviathan he subjected the Bib le to a more thorough course o f rational textual criticism than had been attempted by any previous English writer . His aim was to show that scripture, far f rom demanding beliefs or actions contrary to those o f his o w n theory, actually matched and confirmed his account o f men's duties at every point. It may be tempt ing to describe this as a rather cynical arrière-pensée on Hobbes ' part; but, equally, it can be described as a necessary consequence o f his o w n theological position. His theo logy , as w e have seen, severed all essential links be tween the nature o f G o d and the nature o f the w o r l d . Natura l t heo logy migh t arrive at the k n o w l e d g e that G o d existed, but it could supply no further k n o w l e d g e o f his nature. Evidence o f G o d ' s wi l l could exist in the form o f something historically contingent , such as the text o f scripture; but in order to interpret this evidence, principles o f interpretation had to be applied, and they could not be derived from the evidence itself. It was inevitable, then, that in interpreting the Bib le men w o u l d use their natural reason and interpret a w a y any aspect o f it w h i c h appeared to conflict w i th the dictates o f natural reason - dictates already arrived at in the first t w o parts o f Leviathan. Hobbes ' similarity to rational theologians such as Falkland was therefore only skin-deep. T h e y read rational beliefs into the Bib le because they felt they had substantive k n o w l e d g e o f the rational nature o f G o d ; Hobbes did the same because o f his lack o f k n o w l e d g e o f G o d ' s nature, w h i c h forced h im to interpret the Bib le by the l ight o f human nature and human reason. Denounced and dismissed as an 'atheist', Hobbes countered

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w i t h a reply w h i c h it is hard to gainsay: ' D o y o u think I can be an atheist and not k n o w it? O r , k n o w i n g it, durst have offered m y atheism to the press?' (i839~45a, vn , p . 350).

ii Spinoza

Outs ide England, the D u t c h republic was the country where Hobbes ' wr i t ings exerted their greatest influence. T h e conditions o f intellectual life there were favourable to ' f ree-thinking' , w i t h a flourishing b o o k trade on w h i c h regulation and censorship were compara t ive ly l ight ly enforced. T h e second edition o f De Cive was printed there in 1647; a D u t c h translation o f Leviathan appeared in 1667; and an important collect ion o f Hobbes ' Latin wri t ings , including his n e w Latin version o f Leviathan, was published in A m s t e r d a m in 1668.

G i v e n its recent birth and the cont inuing uncertainty o f some o f its constitutional arrangements, the D u t c h republic was a country in w h i c h basic questions o f political theory were often o f pressingly topical concern. Hobbes ' pupil , the second earl o f Devonshi re , had wri t ten about 'such as professe to reade Theor i e o f Statisme; fe l lows that swarm in most places abroad, especially in Germany, or those places where the Dutch most usually frequent, that nation being easie and apt to be gulled by these Imposters ' (Cavendish 1620, p. 40). T h e w o r d 'Statisme' has overtones o f 'etatisme' and 'raison d'etat '. W h e r e the internal w o r k i n g s o f the state were concerned, this meant a value-free, compara t ive study o f constitutions as p o w e r structures; where their external actions were concerned, it meant a study o f all the tricks and devices o f d ip lomacy and warfare — a study w h i c h could be amply justified b y the dependence o f D u t c h foreign pol icy , th roughout the seventeenth century, on kaleidoscopical ly shifting patterns o f uncertain alliances. T h e leading academic exponent o f this sort o f power-analysis was M . Z . B o x h o r n , w h o taught at Leiden Univers i ty f rom 1633 to 1653; he published an edition o f Tacitus in 1643, and in his o w n political wri t ings he used examples f rom Taci tus to show that rulers w o u l d a lways be impel led b y self-interest to encroach on the liberties o f their subjects (e.g. B o x h o r n 1663, pp. 18—22; Kossmann i960, p . 20; Wans ink 1981, pp. 93-100 , 149-53) .

T h e history o f the D u t c h republic had also fostered public interest in another area o f political controversy: the relation be tween rel igion and the state. T h e main patterns o f a rgument had been laid d o w n in the second decade o f the century, w h e n the Remonst rants (liberal theologians w h o

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fo l lowed Jacobus Arminius) had appealed to the civil powers to protect them against the hard-line Calvinis t Counte r -Remons t ran t s . P r o -Remons t ran t writers, such as Grot ius in his De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra (writ ten c. 1614 and printed pos thumously in 1647), had deve loped a theory o f jurisdict ion in w h i c h all p o w e r over Human actions — including teaching, preaching, and acts o f worsh ip - had to be vested ul t imately in the civi l authority. Churches , in this theory, we re regarded as voluntary associations wi th in the state. T h e Remonst rants defended a pol icy o f religious toleration b y arguing that the Calvinis t church had no jurisdictional p o w e r to persecute, and b y cla iming that rel igion was essentially a matter o f beliefs, not actions, thus i m p l y i n g that a variety o f religious beliefs should pose no threat to the state's activities. There was a natural congruence be tween this attitude and the Taci tean v i e w o f religion, w h i c h regarded public religious observances as part o f the trappings, the psychologica l theatre, o f the state, and therefore as something w h i c h must be control led b y the civil p o w e r . In the abstract, o f course, these arguments did not dictate whe ther the civi l p o w e r should be monarchical or republican. T h e contingencies o f political history ensured that the Remonst ran ts and tolerationists sided w i t h republicanism, wh i l e the supporters o f the princes o f O r a n g e upheld the powers o f the Calvinis t church. B u t these al ignments w e re not quite accidental. For it was the republican theorists w h o , in their at tempt to w o r k out f rom first principles wha t the nature and powers o f the state should be, came closest to deve lop ing a rationalist-utilitarian type o f political theory f rom w h i c h the traditional categories o f sacerdotal and ecclesiastical p o w e r we r e most l ikely to be absent.

B y the mid-century , the influence o f Descartes ' phi losophy in the D u t c h academic w o r l d was g i v i ng a powerfu l impetus to the desire to replace traditional bodies o f theory w i th n e w systems o f deduct ive science. Cartesianism flourished at the Universi t ies o f Ut rech t and Leiden, where its influence was strongest in the areas o f medicine and physics. T h e anti-scholastic nature o f Descartes ' v i ews on human p s y c h o l o g y was taken further b y D u t c h Cartesians such as Henricus R e g i u s and Gerard Wassenaar at Utrecht , w h o deve loped a more mechanistic, materialist phi losophy o f mind w h i c h denied the existence o f innate ideas and described the mind as a ' m o d e ' o f the b o d y . This was a version o f Cartesianism w h i c h was ideally suited to the reception o f Hobbesian theories too . A n d Hobbes ' w o r k , for Cartesians, could usefully remedy the lack o f any political theory in Descartes ' o w n wri t ings . Lamber t van Vel thuysen for example , w h o had

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studied at Ut rech t in the 1640s, published defences o f Descartes, C o p e r n -icus, and Hobbes , and in the preface to his ' apologia ' for De Give he defended Hobbes ' w o r k as i f it we re a s traightforwardly Cartesian enterprise: all previous attempts at political phi losophy were flawed, he wro te , because they had not used 'this device o f doubt ing every th ing ' , and had failed to deduce their various principles f rom one single starting point (1651 , sig. *5r) .

A l l these strands o f a rgument - reason o f state, Taci t ism, religious toleration, the defence o f unitary civi l p o w e r , republicanism, Cartesianism and Hobbesianism — came together in the w o r k o f the most influential D u t c h political writers o f the 1650s and 1660s, the brothers Johan and Pieter de la C o u r t . After the death o f W i l l i a m II in 1650, and during the chi ldhood o f W i l l i a m III ( w h o was born a few days after his father's death), most o f the D u t c h provinces found themselves operat ing a truly republican constitution for the first t ime, hold ing in abeyance the office o f 'stadt-holder ' w h i c h had prev iou ly been filled b y the princes o f O r a n g e . U n d e r John de W i t t , the quasi-presidential 'grand pensionary' o f Hol land, a v igorous campaign o f republican propaganda was w a g e d to persuade Hol land and the other provinces to abolish the office o f stadtholder altogether. T h e brothers de la C o u r t and Spinoza w e re a m o n g the most prominent writers to support h im.

B o t h brothers had studied at Leiden in the early 1640s, where they had b e c o m e Tacitists and Cartesians, and Pieter had gone on in 1645 to study medicine under R e g i u s at Ut rech t (Van Thi jn 1956, pp. 309—15). Johan m a y have been responsible for the unauthorised printing o f some lectures b y B o x h o r n , the Commentariolus, in 1649: the w o r k bears a suspicious resemblance to Johan's o w n notes on the lectures, w h i c h he heard in 1643 (Wansink 1981, pp. 150—1). A n d a more spectacular example o f literary piracy was Pieter's publicat ion, over his o w n initials ( ' V . D . H . ' : 'van den H o v e ' , the D u t c h equivalent o f 'de la Cour t ' ) o f a b o o k , Naeuwkeurige consideratie van staet (A Close Examination of the State), w h i c h was in fact wri t ten b y that other pupil o f R e g i u s , Wassenaar (Haitsma Mul ie r 1984). Wassenaar 's b o o k seems to have g iven the de la Cour t s the idea o f combin ing Taci tus and Machiave l l i w i t h a Cartesian theory o f the passions, so that the task o f political phi losophy was seen as that o f constructing the state as a mechanism to regulate the passions o f individuals and force both rulers and ruled to identify their individual interests w i t h the c o m m o n g o o d . A n d it was w i t h this task in mind that the brothers de la C o u r t turned eagerly to the wri t ings o f Hobbes .

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T h e wri t ings o f the de la Cour t s form a homogeneous g roup o f works , in w h i c h the same arguments keep reappearing. 5 'Se l f - love is the origin o f all human actions' , begins the Consideratien (1660, p. 1). 'Self-preservation is the supreme law o f all individuals ' (Discoursen, 1662a, p. 91) . M e n are governed by their passions, and most men are therefore evil by nature; wi thou t a political p o w e r to keep them in check they wi l l lead a diffident and violent existence in a 'state o f nature' , each j u d g i n g partially in his o w n cause (Consideratien, 1660, pp . 1-8). People are equal b y nature, and only the state, an artificial human construct, has introduced inequalities (p. 346, mispaginated '246'). O n c e the state is established, the subjects o w e it a debt o f gratitude for their protection; and they are justified in rebelling only w h e n their individual lives are threatened (p. 347, mispaginated '247' , Discoursen, 1662a, p. 27).

Thus far, the Hobbesian overtones are obvious . T h e 1660 Consider atien shows a close familiarity w i t h De Cive, and the later editions suggest a reading oi Leviathan as we l l . B u t this is a version o f Hobbes f rom w h i c h all the jural categories — rights, covenants, authorisation — have been stripped a w a y . For Hobbes , the essential conflict in the state o f nature is a conflict o f rights. For the de la Cour t s , it is a conflict o f passions; there is thus no qualitative distinction be tween men's relations in the state o f nature and their relations in civil society. ' A l l obedience is caused b y compuls ion ' (Discoursen, 1662a, p . 29). Each individual wishes to l ive according to his o w n wi l l ('t Welvaren, 1 9 1 1 , p. 10): this principle means that force is required to get any individual to l ive according to the wi l l o f another, and it also means that rulers wi l l constantly be t ry ing to extend their wills more fully over their subjects.

5. The corpus o f their works , however , poses many problems o f individual attribution. Most o f the major works appeared over the initials ' V . H . ' , ' V . D . H . ' , or ' D . C , but other works which have been attributed to them appeared anonymously . Johan died in 1660; he is thought to have been largely responsible for the Consider atien o f that year, which was expanded in subsequent editions by Pieter, and Pieter may wel l have quarried material from Johan's papers in putting together the other works o f the 1660s. T h e major works are: 't Welvaren der stad Leiden (The Prosperity of the City of Leiden), M S dated 1659, ed. F. Driessen (Leiden: NijhorT, 1911) . Consider atien en exempelen van staat (Observations and Lessons on the State) (Amsterdam, 1660); 2nd (expanded) edn published 1661 under the title Consider atien van Staat ofte Polityke Weeg-Schaal (Observations on the State; or, the Political Balance); 3rd edn (also expanded) and 4th and 5th edns published under this title, 1662. Politieke Discoursen (Political Discourses) (Amsterdam, 1662) Interest van Holland (The Interest of Holland) (Amsterdam, 1662); 2nd edn, expanded with t w o additional chapters possibly by de Wi t t , published 1669 as Aanwysing der heilsame politike Gronden en Maximen van de Republike van Holland en West-Vriesland (An Indication of the Salutary Political Principles and Maxims of the Republic of Holland and West Friesland). O n other works by the de la Courts see Gey l 1947.

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A s a result o f this line o f argument , the problems o f consti tution-bui lding assumed a central place in the w o r k o f the de la Cour t s . For Hobbes , the nature o f an individual 's covenantal c o m m i t m e n t to obey the sovereign p o w e r w o u l d be the same, regardless o f the constitutional fo rm w h i c h that sovereign p o w e r assumed. T h e arguments in favour o f monarchy in De Cive and Leviathan thus have a purely secondary status in Hobbes ' overal l theory. B u t T o r the de la Cour t s the pr imary p rob lem was to design a constitution w h i c h could keep the encroaching wil ls o f bo th rulers and ruled in check. M o n a r c h y was the least attractive solution, because any individual entrusted w i t h p o w e r was l ikely to use it for his private benefit (Consider atien, 1660, pp. 13—74). G o v e r n m e n t b y a large assembly was better, because in such a gathering the divergent private passions w o u l d tend to cancel each other out (p. 203, mispaginated '103 ' ) ; and since the basic urge o f each individual was to l ive according to his o w n wi l l , any more or less democrat ic system w o u l d enable individuals to obey the wi l l o f the gove rnmen t and at the same t ime obey their o w n wi l l , w h i c h was a componen t o f the government ' s w i l l (p. 353, mispaginated '253') . If this sounds like a version o f consent theory, then it is a version quite unlike Hobbes ' : this version does not explain the nature o f sovereignty , but is confined to one type o f constitution. It mere ly gives a democrat ic gove rnmen t a psychologica l advantage w h i c h may , in effect, increase the amount o f p o w e r w h i c h the gove rnmen t can wie ld .

These considerations m a y p rompt the conclusion that the de la Cour t s o w e d little to Hobbes b e y o n d their starting point in mechanistic p s y c h o l o g y . B u t there was one important area o f their a rgument w h i c h did draw directly on Hobbes ' political theories: their v i e ws on the unitary nature o f sovereign p o w e r and the relation w h i c h this implied be tween church and state. T h e state, they argued, must have p o w e r over all external acts, and therefore over all acts o f religious worsh ip . T o further the interests o f bo th rulers and ruled, it must exercise this p o w e r for purely secular ends, namely peace and prosperity. Hence the need to tolerate all religions w h i c h are not themselves subversive o f the state (Discoursen, 1662a, pp. 19-24) . A n d for the subject, mere ou tward conformi ty is sufficient (pp. 69—74). T h e peculiarly Hobbesian twist to this a rgument is the insistence that 'the public determination o f w h a t is g o o d and wha t is evi l belongs only to the sovereign: otherwise the political state wi l l change, th rough the conflict o f m a n y private judgements , into a state o f nature' (p. 24). This a rgument struck at the moral jurisdict ion o f the Calvinist church, and was accompanied b y some thorough ly Hobbesian j ibes against the deleterious effects o f clerical p o w e r on intellectual life (pp. 36—41).

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T h e late 1650s and early 1660s saw numerous attempts b y the Calvinists to reassert their mora l and intellectual jurisdiction. Pressure was b rough t to bear on the university authorities at Leiden to curb the teaching o f Cartesianism and 'the application o f phi losophy to the prejudice o f t heo logy ' (Molhuysen , 1 9 1 3 - 2 4 , in, pp. 109—12); the anti-clericalism o f the de la Cour t s ' wr i t ings p r o v o k e d a s torm o f sermons and pamphlets (Van Gelder 1972, p. 253); and in Utrecht , whe re the Hobbesian philosopher van Vel thuysen had penned similar attacks on clerical p o w e r in 1660 (Ondersoeck and Het predick-ampt), the leading anti-Cartesian, Gisbertus Voet ius , w r o t e a major defence o f the jurisdictional power s o f the Calvinis t church (Politica ecclesiastica, 1663). In 1665 a br ief but important treatise at tacking the Calvinis t arguments, Dejure ecclesiasticorum (The Right of the Clergy) was published over the p seudonym 'Lucius Antistius Constans ' . This w o r k , w h i c h was once attributed to Spinoza himself, draws so heavi ly on the arguments o f the de la Cour t s that it can quite plausibly be attributed to Pieter de la C o u r t (e.g. b y V a n der Linde 1961, p. 16); but it goes b e y o n d the de la Cour t s ' other published w o r k s in its at tempt to assimilate the jura l concepts o f contract and 'jus' ( 'right ') . It distinguishes be tween right and p o w e r , but observes that the former w i thou t the latter is worthless (pp. 54—5). Differences o f r ight wi th in the state are created b y the p o w e r o f the state; and the state's p o w e r arises either th rough the conquest o f the w e a k b y the strong, or th rough a social contract, w h e r e b y people transfer their ' r ight and p o w e r ' to the ruler (pp. 9—12). Just as the not ion o f ' r i g h t ' is weakened , in the course o f this argument , by its constant association w i t h ' p o w e r ' , so too the not ion o f contractual obl igat ion is absorbed into the pattern o f factual p o w e r relations: the ' conven t io ' ( 'agreement ') can be entirely implici t , something to be identified 'not in words but in deeds' (P-35).

This is the background against w h i c h w e must situate Spinoza's o w n wri t ings on the nature o f the state. It was in 1665 that Spinoza started w o r k on wha t was to b e c o m e his major political treatise, the Tractatus theologico-politicus (henceforth cited TTP), a iming, as he explained to one corre-spondent, to defend 'the f reedom o f phi losophizing . . . for here it is a lways suppressed th rough the excessive authori ty and impudence o f the preach-ers' (Spinoza 1928, p . 206, letter 30). A n d w h e n the w o r k was published in 1670, he explained that he had been p rompted b y the 'fierce controversies o f the philosophers in church and state' ( T T P , preface, 1924, in, p . 9). His l ibrary contained copies o f the de la Cour t s ' Polityke Weeg-Schaal (the enlarged second edition o f the Consideratien) and Discoursen

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(Freudenthal 1899, pp. 161—2), and he described the former w o r k as ' ex t remely shrewd ' (Tractatus politicus (henceforth cited T P ) , vn .31 ) . If Pieter de la C o u r t was not the author o f De jure ecclesiasticorum, then the most l ikely candidate is L o d o w i j k M e y e r , a Cartesian doctor and theologian w h o was a close friend o f Spinoza (Spinoza 1928, p. 50; Meinsma, 1896, pp. 146-50) .

T h e anti-clerical, tolerationist, republican wri t ings o f the 1660s form the main background to Spinoza 's political w o r k s ; but o f course his o w n personal history had also g iven h im cause to consider the relation be tween religion, state p o w e r , and individual f reedom. Baruch (Benedictus in Latin) de Spinoza was the son o f a Portuguese Jew; born in Ams te rdam in 1632, he was educated at a Jewish school up to the age o f thirteen, and probably attended a Yesh ivah (a society for the study o f the Bib le , the T a l m u d , and the Torah) for several years thereafter (Meinsma 1896, pp. 58—65; V a z Dias and van der T a k 1932, pp. 56—61). B u t in 1656 he was excommunica ted f rom the synagogue for 'the horrible heresies w h i c h he taught and practised'; the exact nature o f his offence is not k n o w n , but all the evidence suggests that he had propounded a rationalist, deist t heo logy w h i c h demoted the status o f the Bib le as divine revelation, questioned its historical accuracy, and probably cast doubt on the immorta l i ty o f the soul ( R e v a h 1959). A c c o r d i n g to some early sources, he w r o t e a thorough ly unapo lo-getic ' A p o l o g y ' after his excommunica t ion , w h i c h contained an historical critique o f the Bib le and a wide - rang ing attack on the Jewish religion (Preposiet 1973, pp. 345, 417) . If this is so, then it is reasonable to assume that some o f this material was put to use in the Tractatus theologico-politicus. H o w e v e r , the main outlines o f the political theory in that b o o k are d rawn not f rom debates wi th in Judaism but f rom the D u t c h H o b b e s i a n -republican tradition. Even the lengthy discussions o f the O l d Testament in that treatise m a y also o w e something directly to Hobbes : a l though Spinoza did not read English, he was a friend o f the man w h o was translat-ing Leviathan into D u t c h in the period 1665-7 , and he m a y also have had t ime to benefit f rom the Latin translation o f Leviathan (1668) before finishing the Tractatus theologico-politicus in 1670 (Schoneveld 1983, pp. 8, 40).

T h e main arguments o f the treatise are succinctly summarised by Spinoza himself. He argues first that phi losophy and theo logy are radically different in nature, 'and that the latter a l lows each person to philosophise freely' ( T T P , ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 189); then 'that rights over rel igion be long entirely to the sovereign, and that external acts o f worsh ip must be adapted

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to serve the peace o f the state' (ch. 19, 1924, in, p . 228); and finally that f reedom o f speech 'is not on ly compat ible w i t h civil peace, piety and the right o f the sovereign, but in fact ough t to be permitted in order to preserve all those things ' (ch. 20, 1924,111, p . 247). T h e separation o f phi losophy and theo logy is carefully managed, in a w a y w h i c h preserves an apparent respect for the special nature o f revelation whi le at the same t ime suggesting that it is ul t imately unnecessary. Phi losophy can teach both virtue and the k n o w l e d g e o f G o d (these t w o things being inseparable in Spinoza's theory) ; theo logy , on the other hand, w h i c h is based on revelation, aims only at teaching obedience to G o d (chs. 7, 14, 15). For this purpose the teachings o f the O l d Testament were 'adapted' to the understandings o f ordinary people o f the t ime: the validity o f a theological doctrine lies not in its truth but in its p o w e r to instil obedience (ch. 14, 1924, in, pp. 176—7). O n l y gradually does Spinoza make it plain that obedience is an inferior substitute for understanding, that the principal contents o f revelation — prophecy and miracles — are fictions adapted for w e a k minds w h i c h cannot understand that G o d w o r k s in nature b y means o f immutab le laws, and that the peculiar injunctions g iven to the Jews in the O l d Testament were essentially political devices, designed to further political obedience and social cohesion. S o m e o f these arguments m a y have derived f rom Moses Maimonides ' theory o f divine law, w h i c h stressed that divine commands were adapted to historical conditions in the O l d Testament, and suggested that the dietary and ceremonial laws were s imply devices for instilling moral virtues - virtues w h i c h could in principle be arrived at phi losophi-cally, w i thou t the use o f revelation (Maimonides 1975, pp. 7 1 - 2 , 1904, pp. 312-80). B u t Spinoza 's comment s on the use o f rel igion as an instrument o f political p o w e r also reflect his careful reading o f Tacitus and Machiavel l i .

This is particularly apparent in his account o f the Jewish state in chapter 17 o f the treatise, where he implies that w h e n the Jews made G o d their sovereign they were in fact being cleverly manipulated by Moses , w h o became their effective ruler as G o d ' s representatives on earth. Since rel igion is such a powerfu l force in human p s y c h o l o g y (combining love , fear, and admiration — the last t w o o f w h i c h are the products o f defective understanding), this pseudo-theocracy was a very successful form o f cover t monarchy; but Moses ' system o f gove rnmen t was flawed, Spinoza argues, because it a l lowed the Levi te priests to retain a form o f religious jurisdiction, and in later generations they were able to assume political p o w e r and reduce the Jewish nation to civil wa r (ch. 18).

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Spinoza's theory o f the nature and purpose o f political p o w e r is set out in the Tractatus theologico-politicus (esp. ch. 16) and in the first six chapters o f his later, unfinished w o r k , the Tractatus politicus. L ike the de la Cour t s , he starts w i th the assumption that men are passionate creatures, guided b y short-term self-interest; as they become more rational, they wi l l be guided by longer term self-interest, but self-interest remains the key to all human actions ( T T P , ch. 17, 1924, in, pp. 215—16). Social cooperat ion is necessary for leading a secure and pleasant life. T h e more rational a man is, the more he wi l l desire cooperat ion because he understands this; but political p o w e r , wie ld ing coercive force, is needed to keep irrational men from pursuing their o w n short-term interest against the interests o f society at large. A n d since rulers as w e l l as ruled wi l l be subject to passions, constitutions must be designed to ensure that subjects and rulers wi l l subordinate or assimilate their o w n interests to the interests o f the w h o l e state (ch. 17, 1924, in, p. 203). In the Tractatus politicus Spinoza intended to show h o w this could be achieved in each form o f constitution (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy) ; unfortunately he died before comple t ing his section on democracy , w h i c h he held to be the most natural and most rational o f the three forms. Like the de la Cour t s , he argued in the Tractatus theologico-politicus that the subjects o f a democracy w o u l d enjoy a greater sense o f freedom, because in obey ing the sovereign they were o b e y i ng themselves (ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 195); and he also fo l lowed the de la Cour t s in c la iming that the process o f decis ion-making in a large assembly w o u l d cancel out individual passions and ensure the prevalence o f reason (ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 194; on his debt to the de la Cour t s in TP see Haitsma Mul ie r 1980, pp. 187-208).

Thus far, Spinoza 's theory seems confined to the bare analysis o f mot iva t ion and p o w e r structures. M u c h o f the interest o f his theory, h o w e v e r , lies in the w a y in w h i c h he assimilates the concepts o f ' r i g h t ' and 'contract ' into his argument . H e makes use o f the concept o f ' r ight ' , but identifies it comple te ly w i th ' p o w e r ' . This is not a piece o f casual cynic ism on his part: it flows f rom the heart o f his philosophical theo logy , w h i c h attributes bo th infinite r ight and infinite p o w e r to G o d , and identifies the physical universe as an expression o f G o d ' s nature. It fo l lows f rom this that every event in the physical w o r l d is an expression both o f G o d ' s p o w e r and o f His right. ' W h a t e v e r man does, whether he is led to do it b y reason or only be desire, he does it according to the laws and rules o f nature, that is, b y natural r ight ' ( T P , 11.5, 1924, m, p. 277). W h e r e Hobbes argued bo th that natural rights w e re all-encompassing and that there were some actions

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(contrary to self-preservation) w h i c h people did not have the right to perform, Spinoza can argue both that men have the right to do wha tever they can do, and that an order o f preference can be established w h e n considering alternative courses o f action: actions w h i c h help ensure the agent 's self-preservation wi l l increase his right because they increase his p o w e r , so that in some sense he wi l l have less r ight to perform those actions w h i c h diminish his p o w e r .

Just as Spinoza uses the term ' r ight ' but reduces it to ' p o w e r ' , so too he uses the term 'contract ' but reduces it to a relationship o f p o w e r . In chapter 16 o f the Tractatus theologico-politicus he describes, in terms reminiscent o f De Cive, h o w people must have transferred their natural right to the sovereign th rough a 'contract ' ( 'pactum' or 'contractus') . In the later Tractatus politicus this account o f a contract is notably absent: the not ion o f ' agreement ' ('consensus') is used instead, and men are said to ' c o m e together ' to fo rm a state not because they are led b y reason but because they are driven b y c o m m o n passions (v i . i , 1924, m, p. 295). This has led some commenta tors to suggest that Spinoza bel ieved, in the earlier w o r k , in an historical contract w h i c h the founders o f society had entered into out o f 'rational foresight ' , and that he later abandoned this bel ief ( W e r n h a m 1958, pp.25—6). Y e t the real differences be tween the t w o accounts are not so great. A transfer o f right, as the earlier w o r k has already made clear, can only amount to a transfer o f p o w e r , and this is something w h i c h can c o m e about w i thou t 'rational foresight ' p laying any special role. Spinoza emphasises in the Tractatus theologico-politicus that 'a contract is b inding only b y reason o f its uti l i ty ' (ch. 16, 1924, in, p. 192); as soon as it becomes advantageous for someone to break his contract, he w i l l have the right to do so. This means that men keep their contract o f obedience only because the sovereign wields real p o w e r . Such a v i e w is entirely compat ible w i th the idea that the origins o f the state g o back not to a set o f formal articles o f agreement but to a gradual coalescence o f human p o w e r relations. W h e n Spinoza introduces the idea o f a contract in chapter 16 o f the Tractatus theologico-politicus he says, in a revealing construction, that men 'must have ' contracted (1924, m, p. 191) ; the not ion o f a contract is noth ing more than a device for describing a power-relat ionship w h i c h is informed b y an understanding o f mutual benefit, and to describe such an arrangement as rational does not imp ly that it can only have been introduced th rough a conscious act o f reason.

Spinoza seems to have adopted, at this point in the earlier treatise, a Hobbesian t e rmino logy of ' t ransferr ing ' natural rights, because he wanted

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to make the Hobbesian anti-clerical point that all rights be longed to the sovereign. (This was the first stage o f his tolerationist argument , aimed at r e m o v i n g the jurisdictional powers o f the c lergy w h i c h w o u l d otherwise be dep loyed against f reedom o f opinion.) A t one point he says that the subject must have ' comple te ly yie lded ' his natural right (ch. 16, 1924, in, p . 195). B u t this is a misleading form o f w o r d s for Spinoza to use, and it can only amount to saying that the subject is sufficiently mot iva ted to act a lways in comple te accordance w i t h the wi l l o f the sovereign. For each person, in Spinoza 's theory, retains natural r ight so long as he retains natural p o w e r : w h e n asked b y a friend to explain the difference be tween his theory and Hobbes ' , he replied that it 'consists in this, that I ever preserve the natural r ight intact, so that the Supreme P o w e r in a State has no more right over a subject than is proport ionate to the p o w e r b y w h i c h it is superior to the subject' (Spinoza 1928, p . 269).

This is the essential a rgument w h i c h enables Spinoza to conclude that the toleration o f religious and philosophical opinions is both compat ible w i t h the sovereign 's p o w e r and beneficial to it. In Spinoza's state the p o w e r o f the sovereign can rise or fall, according t o h o w the subjects becom e more or less fully mot iva ted to obey it. M o r e p o w e r , and therefore more right, inheres in a pol icy w h i c h is popular: it is in the interests o f the sovereign to avoid alienating his subjects. L a w s forbidding beliefs are, as Hobbes pointed out, fatuous; but Spinoza adds that laws forbidding people to express their beliefs wi l l render those people sullen and hostile, and thereby w e a k e n the p o w e r o f the state ( T T P , ch. 20). O n l y the preaching o f seditious doctrines must be proscribed; all opinions w h i c h do not disturb the peace o f the state are to be a l lowed.

Despite, or perhaps because of, his reductive style o f p o w e r analysis, Spinoza seems possibly to have arrived at a liberal, pluralistic theory o f the state w h i c h matches the liberal elements o f Hobbes ' theory. It is possible to argue that the role o f the Spinozan state is s imply to provide an external f r amework o f peace and security wi th in w h i c h individuals can continue to pursue their o w n interests (den U y l 1983, esp. pp. 111—28). Such an interpretation, h o w e v e r , ignores the implications o f Spinoza 's metaphysics and p s y c h o l o g y . His major exposi t ion o f these subjects, the Ethics, was comple ted concurrent ly w i t h the wr i t ing o f the Tractatus theologico-politicus in the second half o f the 1660s, and he referred to the Ethics, i m p l y i ng that it was part o f the same systematic b o d y o f theory, in chapter 2 o f the Tractatus politicus (1924, in, p. 276). O n l y f rom the Ethics do w e learn just h o w radically different Spinoza 's metaphysics were f rom Hobbes ' , and therefore

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h o w comple te ly his theory o f reason and his theory o f human liberty differed f rom Hobbes ' too .

In Spinoza 's metaphysics, all reality is comprehended in G o d , w h o is the only substance, that is, the only absolutely self-subsistent be ing. G o d is k n o w a b l e th rough an infinite number of 'a t t r ibutes ' , o f w h i c h only t w o are actually k n o w n to us: extension and thought . A human b o d y is a ' m o d e ' (i.e. a modificat ion, a particular entity) o f extension, and a human mind is a m o d e o f thought . There is a strict parallelism be tween these modes o f different attributes: neither can act causally on the other, but each is an expression (in a comple te ly different dimension, so to speak) o f the same componen t o f the divine substance. Thus a human mind is the 'idea o f a human b o d y ; the deve lopment o f the mind and the deve lopment o f the b o d y wi l l consist o f the same deve lopment being manifested in different forms.

Physical bodies exist in an order o f causes; thought exists in an order o f reasons or implications. T h e human mind, be ing the idea o f the human b o d y , contains the ideas o f the experiences w h i c h the b o d y undergoes. If the mind fails to understand these ideas 'adequately ' (that is, i f it fails to recognise the w a y in w h i c h each is implici t ly part o f the w h o l e system o f the divine substance) then it experiences an impai rment o f p o w e r , a passive emot ion , or 'passion' (e.g. fear). B u t i f the cause or reason is understood adequately b y the mind, then the mind is exercising and enlarging its p o w e r o f action, and the passion is transformed into an active emot ion (e.g. love) . A l l active emot ions are ul t imately forms o f the love o f G o d , because they derive f rom acts o f understanding w h i c h invo lv e relating particular things to the totality o f things, w h i c h is G o d . T h e more active the mind is — the more , in other words , it 'contains' the causes o f its action wi th in itself— the more free it is. Spinoza is a classic exponent o f the rationalist theory o f f reedom (cf. TP 11.7), and therefore lies at the opposite pole f rom Hobbes ' v i e w o f f reedom as the absence o f impediment .

In Part iv o f the Ethics Spinoza explains that whi le passions are individual and particularising, reason is universal and harmonising. ' M e n can be opposed to each other insofar as they are afflicted w i th emot ions w h i c h are passions' (prop. 34, 1924, 11, p. 231); 'men necessarily agree w i t h one another insofar as they l ive according to the dictates o f reason' (prop. 35, dem. , 1924, 11, p . 233). This ' agreement ' is a real harmonising and converg ing o f minds, Hot just an attitude o f liberal non-interference: as Spinoza wro t e in his early Short Treatise, i f I teach k n o w l e d g e and the love o f G o d to m y neighbours, 'it brings forth the same desire in them that there

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is in me , so that their w i l l and mine b e c o m e one and the same, constituting one and the same nature, a lways agreeing about eve ry th ing ' ( x x v i . 4 , 1924, 1, p . 112) .

A l t h o u g h in his metaphysics he rejected te leo logy in the strict sense, Spinoza 's account o f reason as the defining feature o f the 'human essence' gives rise to a quasi-teleological scale o f values for mankind: man fulfils his nature more fully w h e n he acts rationally. Such a theory could not be further r e m o v e d f rom Hobbes ' v i e w , in w h i c h reason is s imply the servant o f the desires. Even the apparent agreement be tween the t w o writers on the p r imacy o f self-preservation is r e m o v e d b y Spinoza 's a rgument that a man's true self, his ' p o w e r o f act ing ' , is his reason (Ethics, part 4, prop. 52, dem. , 1924, 11, p . 248).

T h e aim o f Spinoza 's state is to make men rational and free. ' W h e n I say that the best state is one in w h i c h m e n l ive harmonious ly together, I mean a fo rm o f life . . . w h i c h is defined above all by reason, the true virtue and life o f the mind ' (TP, v . 5 , 1924, m, p. 296). Spinoza recognises that the state must be constructed to contain those w h o are not predominant ly rational and vir tuous; but the state can aim gradually to m o u ld its citizens into a more rational k ind o f existence b y imposing rational laws on them. In ve ry general terms, w e migh t say that the history o f republicanism in political phi losophy presents t w o fundamentally different defences o f republican gove rnmen t . There is a mechanistic type o f theory, w h i c h sees the construction o f a republic as the solution to the p rob lem o f organising and balancing a mass o f conflicting individual forces; and there is the rationalist-idealist type o f theory, w h i c h believes that in a republic men are freed f rom the corrupt ing ties o f dependence on or subjection to personal authority, and are enabled to participate most fully as rational beings in the rationality o f the state and its laws. Spinoza manages to combine both types o f theory in a single system: that is the distinction, and the ambigu i ty , o f his achievement .

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hobbes and spinoza - john thrasher and spinoza principles he was expounding were 'those which i...

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