CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, DETERMINANTS AND OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARDS INDIA

I. Historical Backeround

Cordial relations between the Soviet Union and India could not develop before the

mid-50s, although diplomatic relations were established on 13 April 194 7. 1 Their were

reasons behind such belated development of closer Soviet relations with India. First, the

Soviet Union was preoccupied '"Yith its own postwar problems such as rehabilitation of a

war devasted economy and the threat to her own security in the Cold War started by the

Western Powers, which, in turn, prevented Moscow from giving enough attention to

developing relations with the newly independent countries including India. Secondly, the

Soviet leaders suspected the policies of the Indian leadership during the 194 7-1952 period.

During Stalin's period, the Soviet Union suspected the genuine independence of

India. In most of the Soviet writings India was treated as an Anglo-American colony. The

strong presence of foreign capital in India and its continued membership in the British

Commonwealth of Nations was. considered a proof of the country's vassal status. The

Soviets believed that the British had merely changed the style of their control over India.

India's policy of non-alignment was seen as a hypocritical play between the two camps-

the imperialist and the socialist camps. India's membership in the Commonwealth of

Nations and opposition to Communist revolution in Malaya created suspicion in the Soviet

1 Devendra Kaushik, Soviet Relations with India and Pakistan (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971 ), p.26.

Union that India's non-alignment policy was not a really independent policy but a

camouflage for its basically pro -Western course? Nehru's visit to the United States in

October 19493 caused concern in Moscow. The Soviets were of the opinion that India

was moving towards the American camp. The Soviet weekly New Times wrote that the

vacancy left by Chiang Kai Shek was being offered to Prime Minister Nehru who would

play the role of Chiang Kai Shek on behalf of the American camp.4

From 194 7 to 1952, the Soviet Union took an indifferent attitude towards India.

But a slow change in the Soviet policy towards India could be marked towards the end

of 1952 and early 1953, i.e., during the last days of Stalin. The Soviet Union was

influenced by India's recognition of the People's Republic of China, India's role as an

independent anti-colonial power in and outside the U.N., particularly in the Korean War

and India's refusal to sign the Japanese peace treaty (1951). Stalin's successors continued

to support this. new course. Premier Georgy Malenkov in his address to the Supreme

Soviet on 8 August 1953 appreciated India's mediatory role in the Korean War and its

contribution to the efforts of peace-loving countries. He stated: "The position of such a

considerable State as India is of importance for the strengthening of peace in the East".

"We hope that relations between India and the Soviet Union will continue to develop and

strengthen with friendly cooperation as their key note", he further added. 5 This was an

2Iqbal Khanam, "Indo-Soviet Relations", Indian Journal of politics (Aligarh), vol.28, September-December 1984, p.ll7.

3Vijay Sen Budhraj, Soviet Russia And The Hindustan Subcontinent (New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 1973), pp.36-37.

4"Chiang Kai Shek's Successor", New Times (Moscow), no.42, 12 October 1949, pp. 20-21.

5Pravda (Moscow), 9 August 1953.

2

early official expression of a Soviet shift in attitude towards India and its non-alignment

policy. In December 1953, the first comprehensive trade agreement was concluded

between India and the USSR laying the foundation of Indo- Soviet economic relations.6

Close relations between the Soviet Union and India were established in the

mid-50s. There were certain factors which were responsible for bringing the Soviet Union

and India closer to each other. The immediate objective factor which brought the two

countries closer to each other was derived from their security needs in the mid-50s. The

United States succeeded in persuading Pakistan to join the US-led military alliances in the

region. Pakistan joined the SEJ\TO (September 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (February

1955). 7 This event aroused the historical fear of the encirclement of the Soviet Union by

hostile powers. Under such conditions, it was natural for the Soviet Union to make

friendly overtures to India, an important country in this region which had refused to

participate in the Dullesian strategy of containing communism. It was India whose

non-participation in the military alliance system foiled the US attempt to complete the

encirclement of the USSR Hence, in the Soviet view, India's neutrality became a

minimum requirement for ensuring the Soviet security.8 Pakistan's participation in the

US sponsored military alliances also posed a security threat to India. As Pakistan became

a member of the US-led military alliance system, America concluded a mutual defence

assistance pact with Pakistan on 19 May 1954, in Karachi, under which it agreed to

6Jyotim10y Banerjee, "Security Relations", Seminar (New Delhi), no. 265, September 1981, p.l2.

7Richard B. Remnek, Soviet Policy towards India: The Role of Soviet Scholars in the Formulation of Soviet Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing Company, 1975), p.l3.

l!Nirmala Joshi, "Regional Situation", Seminar, n.6, p.l7.

3

provide military aid to Pakistan.9 Though the US motive behind such military assistance

to Pakistan was to prevent the Communist expansion, it was clear that Pakistan was

preparing herself militarily to solve the Kashmir issue in her favour. This fact was

admitted by Feroz Khan, the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who stated: "We want

them (members of the Baghdad Pact) for our defence ... Our first duty is to strengthen our

. defence particularly against India no matter what others might say". But later on, this

argument was disapproved by the Pakistani President Ayub Khan. 10 It was quite natural

for India to perceive a security threat in the American military assistance to Pakistan and

the latter's membership of military pacts because of India's hostile relations with Pakistan.

Thus, convergence of the Soviet-Indian security interests against the backdrop of the

US-Pakistan alliance became instrumental in bringing the two countries closer to each

other. The basic community of interests created by the anti-imperialist aims of the two

countries provided the objective ground for their close relations, .whereas the US military

assistance to Pakistan, worked as decisive subjective factor behind India's favourable

response to the Soviet Union's friendly overtures aimed at thwarting America's design to

isolate the USSR in Asia and encircle it by hostile military blocs. 11

The signing of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet in 195412 embodying the five

principles of peaceful co-existence was highly appreciated by the Soviets. Moreover, the

9yed Vati Chaturshreni, Indo-US Relations (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1980), p.223.

10S.S. Bindra, Indo-Pak Relations: Tashkent to Simla Agreement (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1981 ), p.32. ·

11Devendra Kaushik, "The New Cold War: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe", in Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy. 1982-83 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1985), p.144.

12Keesing's Contemporary Archives (London), vol. 9, 1952-1954, p.l3588.

4

Bandung Conference of Asian and African nations, held in April 1955,13 added new

dimensions to the Soviet Union'& understanding of the Afro-Asian world and India's place

in it. The USSR realised the importance of uniting the forces of the newly independent

Afro - Asian countries to influence world politics.

A breakthrough in Soviet-Indian relations occurred in 1955, when state visits were

exchanged by the leaders of the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru

paid a visit to the USSR from 7 to 23 June 1955. After his meeting with Premier Nikolai

Bulganian, a joint communique was issued on 23 June 1955, in which a convergent

position was found on a number of issues such as international recognition of China and

desirability of improved Soviet-'Yugoslav relations and disarmament. The two countries

also agreed that their relations would be guided by the five principles of peaceful

co-existence. 14 The return visit of the Soviet leader Khrushchev and Bulganin took place

in November - December 1955.15 This visit was a landmark in Soviet - Indian relations.

The Soviet leader Khrushchev publicly rendered Soviet support to India's position on

Kashmir and Goa which India needed strongly. 16 At a reception given by the Premier

of Kashmir in Srinagar on 10 December 1955, the Soviet leader Khrushchev stated: "The

question of Kashmir as one of the States of the Republic of India has already been

13Robert Litwak, "The Soviet Union in India's Security Perspective", in Timothy George and others, Security in Southern Asia 2: India and Great Powers (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1984 ), p. 76.

14Bimal Prasad, Indo-Soviet Relations. 1947-1972: A documentary study (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1973), pp.103-06.

15N.A. Bulganin, N.S. Khrushchev, Speeches During Sojourn in India, Burma and Mghanistan. November-December 1955 (New Delhi: Representative of TASS in India, 1956), p.ll3.

16"Statement of N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev at a Press Conference in Delhi, December 14, 1955", in Bulganin, Khrushchev, n.l5, p.l03.

5

decided by the people of Kashmir. "17 The Kashmir issue had a direct bearing on Soviet

national interests due to its geographical position. Khrushchev was worried because of

Western opposition to India's policy towards Kashmir. He decided to support India on the

Kashmir issue because the inclusion of Kashmir in a non-aligned friendly India would

have served Soviet interests better than its merger in unfriendly Pakistan, which was

providing military bases for the Americans in that part of Kashmir which was under

Pakistan's control. 18

On 2 February 1955, the Soviet Union agreed to give assistance to India for

constructing a steel plant at Bhilai. 19 This agreement was significant as it came at a time

when negotiations to construct another steel plant had failed, and when the United States

was not willing to extend aid to the public sector. One of the political aims of the Soviet

Union behind such economic assistance was to reduce India's economic dependence on

Western countries. In their joint statement issued on 13 December 1955, both India and

the Soviet Union expressed their adherence to five principles of peaceful co-existence,

disarmament and opposition to military alliances or regional military blocs.20 During

their visit, the Soviet leaders concurred with the Indian view on three issues - Kashmir,

Goa and opposition to military alliances. This sharing of Indian perceptions could be

17Ibid., p.86.

18J.A. Naik, Soviet Policy towards India: From Stalin to Brezhnev (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1970), p.91.

19"lndo-Soviet Steel Agreement", Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of Ex1emal Affairs, Government of India), vol.l, no.2, February 1955, p.32.

20"Joint Statement By N.A. Bulganin, Chariman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, Member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR And Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, December 13, 1955", in Bulganin, Khrushchev, n.l5, pp.ll3-17.

6

possible due to change in the Soviet policy towards India and due to the embittered Soviet

relations with the West.

Yet, even during the heyday of development of Soviet-Indian relations in mid-50s,

Prime Minister Nehru refrained from criticising NATO. Despite the differences with the

United States on some issues, Nehru's Government maintained cordial and friendly

relations with the USA. Nehru did not want to earn disfavour of the Western countries.

In this context, the assurance given by the then Secretary General of the External Affairs

Ministry Pillai to the Canadian High Commissioner, Escott Reid, deserves attention. Pillai

gave assurance to Escott Reid that the reference to military pacts in the Indo-Soviet joint

communique issued after the 1955 visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin, did not apply to

NATO but only to the Baghdad Pact.21 On the other hand, Nehru strongly criticised the

formation of SEATO and Baghdad Pact. In the Lok Sabha of India, on 29 march 1956,

he stated " ... that the approach of military pacts, like the Baghdad Pact ~d SEATO, is a

wrong approach ... both for larger reasons and for the narrow reason of self-interest. ... "22

The understanding which was achieved between the Soviet Union and India

through exchange of state. visits in 1955 was further developed by the 20th Congress of

the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) held in February 1956.23 This

Congress pointed out the emergence of a vast peace zone of peace-loving states both

21 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981), p.140.

22Jawahar1a1 Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru Speeches. March 1953 -August 1957 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1958}, vol.3, pp.319-20.

23Pravda, 15 February 19 56.

7

socialist and non-socialist of Europe and Asia. 24 In his report to this Congress,

Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, specifically

referred to India as a "Great Power" and praised its contribution to strengthening of peace

in Asia and the whole world. 25 He also stated that the visit of Soviet representatives to

India confirmed the identity of views existing between the Soviet Union and Republic of

India on fundamental international issue, i.e., the preservation and consolidation of

universal peace and the national independence of all states. 26 He further stated that the

famous five principles of peaceful co-existence advanced by the People's Republic of

China and India and supported by the Bandung Conference provided the best form for

relations between countries with different social systems?7 The Indian Prime Minister

Nehru was impressed by the adoption of "a new line and a new policy" by the CPSU

Congress. In the Indian Parliament, he hailed it as "a step towards the creation of

conditions favourable to the pursuit of a policy of peaceful co-existence, is important for

us as well as others" _28

Cordial and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union by that time had become

the cornerstone of India's foreign policy. India and the USSR adopted a common

approach in the Suez crisis condemning the predatory character of Western colonialism.

2~.S. Khrushchev, Report of"the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union at the 20th Party Congress (New Delhi: Representative ofT ASS in India, 1956), p.19.

25Ibid., p.23 and 29.

26Ibid., p.27.

27Ibid., p.39.

28 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy: Selected Speeches. September 1946-April 1961 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1961), p.578.

8

Nehru promptly reacted to the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956.

However, the cordiality in Soviet-Indian relations was marred by India's unfavourable

attitude towards the Soviet Union in the Hungarian crisis (1956). In the Lok Sabha, Nehru

described the events in Hungary as "tragic" but showed his indication to accept the

Yugoslav assessment of the situation in Hungary that it was a revolt inspired by internal

reactionaries with foreign instigation and aid. 29 India abstained from voting on the

American sponsored resolution the UN General Assembly passed on 4 November 1956,

condemning the Soviet "intervention" while demanding the withdrawal of the Warsaw

Pact forces and authorising the Security Council to form a commission for thoroughly

investigating the Hungarian crisis.30 India did not vote in favour of this resolution as it

considered the tone and content ?fthe resolution objectionable. It did not like to condemn

any country and the institution of a commission to go into the affairs of Hungary. India

also abstained on the resolution passed on 9 November in the General Assembly calling

for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the subsequent holding of free elections in

Hungary under the auspices of the UN. Nehru did not favour such election under the

auspices of the UN as he felt that this was contrary to the UN Charter and would reduce

Hungary to less than a sovereign state. 31 He made it clear in the Lok Sabha that when

India abstained in the voting on UN resolution, it stood for withdrawal and rejected the

other resolution due to the phrase that free elections were to be held "under the United

29lndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, pt.2, vol.9, no.3, 20 November 1956, col.38l.

30GAOR, yr 2, mtg 569, 4 November 1956, p.44.

31 "Nehru's Statement in Lok Sabha, 16 November 1956", see Nehru, n.28, p.556.

9

Nations auspices."32 On 19 November in the Lok Sabha he said, "We want foreign

forces to be withdrawn from Egypt as well as Hungary. "33 Later on, the Indian

delegation, together with those of Ceylon and Indonesia, moved a resolution which, while

incorporating the Western charges against the Soviet Union and the Soviet denial of them

demanded the Hungarian Government "to permit observers designated by the Secretary

General to enter the territory of Hungary to travel freely therein, and to report their

finding to the Secretary General. "34

Nehru's critical stand on. the Soviet intervention in Hungary greatly irritated the

Soviet leaders. Yet, they remained sympathetical towards India on the Kashmir issue. In

one meeting of the Security Council,held on 20 February 1957, the Soviet delegate

Sobolev pleaded for "direct approach" of "bilateral negotiations" for the peaceful

settlement of Kashmir question, and opposed to the matter of sending U.N. forces to

Kashmir for holding a plebiscite there. Js When the draft resolution sponsored by the UK,

the USA, China and Australia was put to vote on 20 February 1957 in the UN Security

Council, which recommended the despatch of UN forces to Kashmir in order to conduct

a plebiscite, the Soviet Union used its veto against the resolution.36 This support made

the Indian leaders realise that the Soviet Union was the most dependable friend of India.

The Soviet Union continued to support India on the Kashmir issue in later years. Like a

32Nehru, n.22, p.334.

33Ibid., p.327.

34GAOR, session 2. plen mtg 587, vol.l, 1956-57, p.188.

35SCOR. year 12, mtg 773, 20 February 1957, pp. 4-6.

36Ibid., p.29.

10

trusted friend, the Soviet Union in June 1957 extended support to India's unsuccessful

attempt to find a place on the proposed Five-Power Disarmament Commission in

London.37 The Soviet Union was not quite happy with Nehru's public criticism of the

soviet campaign against Yugosl(\via in the year 1958 and with Congress Party's campaign

against the Communist government in Kerala and also with Nehru's article "The Basic

Approach, "38 where he strongly criticised the Indian Communists as devotees of

violence. Nehru's views were strongly criticised by Soviet Academician Pavel Yudin.

Nehru was wise enough to moderate his anti-Soviet criticisms following the further

deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in 1959. Sino-Indian border clashes occurred in

August-September 1959.39 India needed Soviet support in the sense that the latter might

perswtde fraternal China to keep away from such hostilities. The border conflict put the

Soviets in a difficult position of· choosing between "fraternal" State with which relations

were deteriorating rapidly and a "bourgeoisie" State with which relations were being,

carefully cultivated. The Soviet Union preferred to be neutral in the Sino-Indian border

conflict. It called for the settlement of the dispute by means of direct negotiations between

Beijing and New Delhi. But over the next few years, the Soviet Union became critical of

China's attitude towards India. It enhanced its economic and cultural relations with India

and initiated a military assistance programme. In 1960, for the first time, India purchased

37Hemen Ray, Indo-SoYiet Relations. 1955-1971 (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1973), pp.73-74.

38Jawahar1a1Nehru, "The Basic Approach", A.I.C.C. Economic Review (NewDe1hi), no.IO, 15 May 1958, pp. 3-6.

3~y, n.37, p.80.

11

arms from the Soviet Union such as helicopters and planes.40 In August 1962, the

military relationship strengthened further when the Soviet Government agreed to allow

India to produce Mig-21 aircraft under licence although it had supplied only Mig-19s to

China. 41 The Soviet decision to grant licence to India to manufacture Mig - 21 came at

the time when Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to the lowest point.

However, during this short period of closeness, differences developed between the

Soviet Union and India over the Congo issue.42 Khrushchev got annoyed with Nehru

when in September 1961 in the Conference of Non-aligned countries held in Belgrade,

Nehru expressed his concern over the resumption of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union.

He stated that the danger of war coming nearer and had been enhanced perhaps by the

decision of Soviet Government to start nuclear tests.43 Nehru came to Moscow on 6

September 1961 to convey the message of the non-aligned countries to the Soviet

Government regarding this issue.44 He personally appealed to Khrushchev to stop further

nuclear tests and told that "it is not fitting for a great country to indulge in tests for

experiments of this type"; 45 Khrushchev explained the motives and reasons which led

the Soviet Union to decide to rt::sume nuclear tests. He stated that the Soviet Union was

4<>peter J.S. Duncan, The Soviet Union and India (London: Routledge, 1989), p.16.

41 Jyotinnoy Banerjee, "Moscow's strategic link with New Delhi: An Interim Assessment", China Report (New Delhi), vol.l9, no.1, January-February 1983, p.7.

42For details see Ray, n.37, pp.96-97.

43"Speech at the Conference of Non-aligned Nations, Belgrade, September 2, 1961", in Jawaharlal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches. September 1957- April 1963 (New Delhi: Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1964), vol.4, p.363.

4"The Hindu (Madras), 7 September 1961.

45Cited in Ray, n.37, p.99.

12

compelled to adopt this course in self-defence, because the Western Powers had stepped

up the arms race thereby aggravating the international situation. 46 Although Khrushchev

justified Soviet nuclear test, he was obviously embarrassed by Nehru's condemnation of

resumption of nuclear test by the USSR. In spite of these differences, Khrushchev

commended traditional friendship and growing cooperation between the Soviet Union and

India, and offered increased assistance for the economic development of India. The main

objective behind Khrushchev's decision to continue such friendship with India and

maintain understanding with Nehru was the Soviet leader's desire to use India as a

"bulwark" against the Communist China. The Soviet Union supported India on the

liberation of Goa from the Portuguese rule in 196147 which further strengthened the

Soviet-Indian relations.

India faced a serious challenge in October 1962 due to the Chinese armed

aggression against India. 48 At t~is critical juncture, it was natural for India to seek Soviet

support. But it was difficult for the Soviet Union to give support to India against China

because of its involvement in the Cuban missile crisis where the Chinese had rendered

fullfledged support to the Socialist camp. Keeping into consideration this fact, the Soviet

leaders initially backed China in the Sino-Indian War as they needed Chinese support in

the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet newspaper Pravda wrote its first editorial on the

Sino-Indian War on 25 October 1962, supporting the Chinese proposals for the end of the

46"1ndo-Soviet Joint Statement, II September 1961 ", in Prasad, n.l4, p.223.

47See SCOR, yr 16, mtg 987, 18 December 1961, p.26.

48S.P. Singh, Political Dimensions of India-USSR Relations (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1987), p. 75.

13

conflict and describing them as "constructive".49 But Nehru did not agree to accept the

Chinese proposal for ceasefire unless the Chinese troops were withdrawn to the position

of 8 September 1962. Lack of Soviet support to India at this critical hour for its security

served to stir-up anti-Soviet feelings. It appeared that certain degree of coolness crept into

Soviet-Indian relationship. However, the Soviet policy in the Sino-Indian War changed

when the Cuban missile crisis subsided and the Soviets did not require the Chinese

support. At that time, Pravda brought out another editorial on the Sino-Indian War on 5

November 1962, which expressed Soviet neutrality in the war. The editorial demanded

ceasefrre and peaceful settlement of the conflict through negotiation. It further expressed

that the bloodshed could not be allowed to continue. 5° It is clear from these two editori­

als brought out by Pravda that the main concern of the Soviet Union was to maintain

peace in the region through negotiations and not through military means.

d' As the Sino-Soviet relations further deteriorated during 1963-64, a change could

be observed in the Soviet policy towards the Sino-Indian conflict. The Soviet Union

abandoned its policy of neutrality and started accusing China for fomenting a crisis. It

switched back to a policy of cordiality towards India which was manifested in the Soviet

military and economic assistance given to India. The purpose of Soviet aid to India was

to promote India's political and economic independence. In the political field too, the

Soviet Union remained consistent supporter of the Indian Government at the international

forums on the issue of Kashmir, which is directly related to India's national interest,

49J>rnvda, 25 October 1962.

50pravda, 5 November 1962.

14

i.e.,her territorial integrity.

Pakistan's growing relations with China also influenced the Soviet policy towards

India. A major consequence of the 1962 Sino-Indian border War had been the warming

of relations between India's two major adversaries - China and Pakistan. On 2 March

1963, a border agreement was signed between Pakistan and China.s1 Under this

agreement, Pakistan ceded 2,050 square miles territory from Pakistan occupied Kashmir

to China.s2 This agreement afforded de facto recognition to Pakistan's claim to Kashmir.

This new development, Sino-Pakistan rapprochement, increased Soviet concern in

the subcontinent as it had a bearing on Soviet security considerations. The Soviet Union's

relations with China had already been strained. In this situation, the Soviets were not

inclined to view favourably the development of close Sino-Pak relations and increase of

the Chinese influence in the region. Hence, at this point of time, the main concern of the

Soviet Union was to wean Pakistan away from China. The Soviet Union started

cultivating Pakistan from 1964-65 onwards and the result was Pakistan President Ayub

Khan's visit to Moscow in April 1965, the first ever visit by a Pakistani head of the

State.SJ

The development of Soviet-Pakistan relations caused much concern in India. The

Indian Prime Minister L.B. Shastri paid a visit to Moscow in May 1965,54 just after one

51 "Boundary Agreement between China and Pakistan, 2 March 1963 ", in R.K. Jain, ed., China. Pakistan and Bngladesh: Basic Documents, 1950-76 (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1977), vol. 2, p.52.

52" Jawaharlal Nehru's Statement in Lok Sabha, 5 March 1963 ", India, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 3,

vol.l4, 5 March 1963, col. 2163.

53Singh. n.48, p. 116.

S4Foreign Affairs Record (New Delhi), vol. 11, no.5, May 1965, p.IO 1.

15

month of Pakistan President's visit to that country. The purpose of Shastri's visit to the

Soviet Union was to discuss the·recent flare-up of Indo-Pakistani fighting in the Rann of

Kutch and other important matters. The development of Soviet-Pale relations did not mean

that the Sovi~t Union had left India or India's importance decreased in the eyes of the

Soviets. In fact, the Soviet Union wanted to balance its relations with India and Pakistan.

It never thought of adopting a competitive approach to these two countries. The USSR

desired to be friendly with both India and Pakistan and never tried to incite one against

the other. The main objective of the Soviet Union in South Asia was to check the Chinese

influence in the region. When the Soviet Union got opportunity in the sense that Pakistan

responded favourably to Soviet overtures, the former actively engaged itself in weaning

Pakistan away from China. But at the same time, the Soviet Union did not want to expand

its relations with Pakistan at the cost of its primary regional relationship with India. As

such, the USSR felt it necessary to remove Indian misgivings about Ayub Khan's visit

to Moscow. During Shastri's visit, Premier Kosygin made it clear to Shastri that "when

the Soviet Union is striving to improve its relations with a third country,this does not have

to be at the cost of Soviet-Indian friendship ... ss He also clarified that the purpose of such

friendship was to "stabilize the situation in South Asia. "s6

The USSR adopted an impartial attitude towards India and Pakistan in the

hostilities in the Rann of Kutch. It sent similar messages to Indian and Pakistani

governments demanding a cessation of hostilities. The impartiality had also been shown

55Pravda, 16 May 1965.

56Prnvda, 9 May 1965.

16

in the Indo-Pak War of August 1965 fought on the issue of Kashmir. The USSR knew

very well that continuation of hostilities between India and Pakistan would weaken the

two countries and strengthen China in the region. This was the reason why A.N. Kosygin,

the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, sent messages to both Lal Bahadur

Shastri and Ayub Khan on 4 September 1965 to stop military operations and settle the

dispute by peaceful means. He ~so offered Soviet good offices to settle their dispute. s?

On the contrary, C~a instigated Pakistan to continue fighting. It threatened India by

issuing an ultimatum to India on 17 September 1965 demanding the removal of all Indian

military establishment on the Chinese side of the Sikkim-Chinese border. ss

The Soviet Union became cautious due to the Chinese move and interference in

the Indo-Pak conflict. The Soviet leaders favoured a rapid termination of the Indo-Pak

conflict which was the best guarantee against any further escalation of the conflict and the

possible Chinese interv~ntion on behalf of Pakistan. Any Chinese involvement in the war

would have adverse consequences for India and would further affect peace and stability

in South Asia. Moreover, the Chinese involvement in the war would compel India to seek

military assistance from Washington which would ultimately jeopardise Soviet relations

with India and Soviet interests in South Asia. In that case, the Soviet Union might have

to abandon its neutral posture and get itself involved in the war. But the USSR did not

want any open hostility with China. Taking into consideration all these possible

consequences of the. Chinese involvement in the Indo-Pak War, the Soviet Union thought

57Pravda, 12 September 1965.

581ndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 3, vol.46, session 12, 17 September 1965, cols. 6332-335.

17

that the immediate termination of war was essential to maintain peace and stability in

India and Pakistan. Moreover, the Soviet Union was concerned, because the war was

taking place in a region immediately adjacent to the frontier of the Soviet Union. So, it

was necessary to stop the escalation of war immediately. The Soviet Premier Kosygin, on

17 September 1965, i.e., the day Indian Government received Chinese ultimatum, sent

message to both Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan in which he proposed

to have a direct meeting between the leaders of India and Pakistan on the Soviet soil,

preferably in Tashkent to reach an agreement on the establishment of peace between the

two countries. He also offered his good offices on request for this purpose. 59 The

lndo-Pak War came to an end when both India and Pakistan accepted the Security Council

resolution passed on 20 September 196560 and implemented the ceasefire. After the

ceasefire, on the initiative of Premier Kosygin, Prime Minister L.B. Shastri and President

Ayub Khan met in a conference held at Tashkent from 3 January to 10 January 1966.61

The Soviet leaders played host at Tashkent Summit and the agreement for the termination

of war and restoration of peace between India and Pakistan was signed at Tashkent on I 0

January 1966.62 This agreement CO\lld be concluded due to the great pains taken by

Premier Kosygin to bring the two sides closer. Although Kosygin's mediation did not suc­

ceed in settling the political futu~e of Kashmir it brought to an end the immediate conflict.

The conclusion of Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan was a victory of

5~vda, 20 September I965.

60Singh, n.48, p.I25.

61Ka~ n.l, p.94.

62Thc Statesman (New Delhi), II January I966.

18

Soviet diplomacy. The Soviet Union emerged as a peace maker in the subcontinent. The

Soviet mediation helped in bringing rapprochement between India and Pakistan which was

essential to contain the Chinese influence.

The USSR tried to bring India and Pakistan closer to each other. It made efforts

to strengthen its relations with both India and Pakistan and to bridge the gap between the

two countries. The Soviet policy was directed to wean Pakistan away from the USA and

China so that it could build up ·both India and Pakistan as a counterpoise to China. In

continuation of this Soviet policy, the Soviet Premier Kosygin paid a five-day visit to

Pakistan in April 1968 (17 to 20 April 1968}, the first ever visit of the Soviet Prime

Minister to Pakistan. 63 The main purpose of this visit was to remove the Pakistani fears

aroused by Soviet decision to supply arms to India. Keeping in view Pakistani demand

for arms, Kosygin agreed to give a very limited quantity of arms to Pakistan such as

helicopters, spare parts for aircraft, some medium tanks and field guns. The Soviet Union

signed an arms deal with Pakistan in July 1968 during the visit of Commander-in-Chief

of the Pakistani Army General Yahya Khan to Moscow.64

India was watching these Soviet moves towards Pakistan during the few years

since Tashkent meeting and was seriously concerned over the new approach of the Soviet

Union towards India and Pakistan. The Soviet military assistance to Pakistan, which was

not friendly to India raised Indian anxieties. The Indian Prime Minister Mrs. Indira

63Kaushik, n. I , p. I 07.

64Raghunath Ram, Soviet Policy ':fowards Pakistan (New Delhi: S.Chand & Company Ltd., 1983), p.203.

19

Gandhi reacted on 9 July 1968 in Calcutta while talking to newsmen. She said: 11We are

not happy with the reported Soviet offer of arms to Pakistan ... .''65 But she also made it

clear that India's policy towards the Soviet Union would not undergo any change. 66 Mrs.

Gandhi even apprised the Soviet leaders of India's concern. The matter of Soviet decision

to supply arms to Pakistan was seriously discussed in the Indian Parliament. Mrs. Gandhi

informed the Lok Sabha that she had received assurances from the Soviet Government

that the Soviet agreement with Pakistan would not be allowed to affect Indo-Soviet

relations or harm India's interests.67 The argument given by the Soviet Union was that

the arms deal was only symbolic and would not upset the military balance in South

Asia. 68 It could further be argued that their limited military assistance to Pakistan would

increase Soviets' leverage then~ - an influence which would be exercised against any

military venture. 69 The Soviets considered the arms. deal as a means of neutralising the

growing Chinese influence there and reaffirming its balanced policy towards

India-Pakistan subcontinent. However, India had to subdue its official reaction on this

issue due to its economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union. But Indian

dissatisfaction with the Soviet approach towards the subcontinent prompted her to make

attempt to expand the scope of its diplomatic manoeuvrability. For instance, in August

6Yn1e Statesman (Calcutta), lO July 1968.

6ilndia, Lok Sabha, Debates, series 4, vol. 18, session 5, 22 July 1968, col.290.

68Pravda, 29 July 1968.

6~ohammed Ayub, "Soviet Arms Aid to Pakistan", Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), 19 October 1968, pp. 1613-614.

20

THESIS 327.47054

Su59 So

Ill II II II \Ill 111111111111 TH6820

1968 and January 1969, Mrs. Indira Gandhi approached the Chinese Government about

a possible normalisation of relations although China was unreceptive to these overtures. 70

A careful analysis of the Soviet policy towards India and Pakistan in the 60s

reveals that the Soviet Unio~ had been motivated by its national interests in the region.

Since India and Pakistan were strategically important for the Soviet Union due to their

geographical location close to its southern borders, the latter wanted to maintain peace and

stability in this area and keep this area free from outside interference. The establishment

of friendly relations with only India would not have served Soviet purpose. Pakistan was

equally important for the USSR due to the former's strategic location. From the very

beginning, the Soviet Union tried to develop good relations with Pakistan. But the latter's

joining of Western military alliances thwarted Soviet attempt in this direction. The Soviets

were aware of the reality that no amount of economic aid would be as effective as a

symbolic supply of arms to Pakistan. Moscow agreed to supply arms to Pakistan only with

a view to wean Pakistan away from China as well as the Western camp. It was not

interested in exploiting the Indo-Pakistani conflict by giving arms aid to Pakistan. Its

move to go in for an arms deal with Islamabad was aimed at increasing its influence

there. It was genuinely interested in improving relations with both India and Pakistan. It

made sincere efforts since the days of Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and the Tashkent

declaration to bridge the gulf between the two countries. It always demanded a mutual

and bilateral settlement of the lndo-Pak conflict through peaceful means. It never wanted

a war between India and Pakistan as it would invite the possible intervention of outside

7~h Kapur, "India and the So,iet Union", in K.P. Mishra, ed., Foreign Policy of India: A book of readings (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1977), p.264.

I r-\ A r ~~;,.~ ~ ' q ~\', v~~\~.7· I T ~ g ( t:n: ~t ,\~-· ~- •.

\. ,, ., ....., ,~

21

.•. '\.. ·:;

powers and lead to escalation of conflict which would definitely affect Soviet national

interests.

During the late 60s, the Soviet-Indian relations were marked by strains and

stresses. First, the Government of India discovered in 1968 certain Soviet maps which

showed the borderterritory of Aksai Chin, claimed by India as belonging to China. India

was upset by discovering such Soviet maps. Despite Indian protests in 1956, 1958 and

1966, no alterations were made in the Soviet maps favouring the Chinese position in the

territorial dispute. Secondly, the critical stand of Indian Government on the Soviet

inv~ion of Czechoslovakia on 21 August 196871 along with Polish, Bulgarian, Hun­

garian and East German armed forces annoyed the Soviet Union. Most of the Indian

newspapers condemned the Soviet bloc intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Indian

delegate G. Parthasarathi in the U.N. Security Council discussion expressed India's firm

"respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia". He

demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Czechoslovakia and the "safety and

security of its leaders and people. '172 Despite Indian support to the Czech people against

the Soviet intervention, India abstained from voting on the Western sponsored draft

resolution, condemning Soviet and her allies' armed intervention in Czechoslovakia which

was moved in the Security Council on 22 August 1968.73 India preferred to abstain from

voting in the Security Council against the Soviet Union, because it was not in favour of

71 Ray, n.37, p.167.

72SCOR, year 23, mtg 1443, 22 August 1968, p.26.

731bid., p.29.

22

incurring Soviet displeasure.

Thirdly, the Soviet and Indian stand differed on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

issue. The Soviet Union was one of the sponsors of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

which was signed in the year 1968.74 India did not sign the treaty on discriminatory

ground and resisted Soviet pressure to sign it. India wanted to keep her nuclear options

open to protect her national interest. However, the Soviets tried to persuade India to

refrain from developing her own nuclear weapons.

Besides the above mentioned issues, there were some other issues on which Indian

and Soviet positions diverged such as India's reluctance to recognise the Provisional

Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and the German Democratic Republic.

Furthermore, differences developed due to India's negative response to Brezhnev's

proposal for an' Asian collective security system' which India viewed as directed against

China. The Soviet prop~sal for establishing collective security system in Asia was intro­

duced in June 1969.75 This proposal carne up in the immediate aftermath of the

Sino-Soviet border War, which flared up on the Ussuri River in the Demanskiy island

area in March 1969.76 During 1969, the Soviet Union increasingly perceived a threat

from China. It was widely believed that the real motive behind the Brezhnev proposal was

the need to counteract the Chinese threat. Brezhnev' s proposal for collective security

74Vinod Bhatia, Indira Gandhi and Indo-Soviet Relations (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1987), p.29.

75Soviet Review (New Delhi : Published by the Infonnation Department of the USSR Embassy in India), 14 June 1969, p.55.

760.B.Borisov and B.T.Koloskov, Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1945-1970 (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 322.

23

system incorporated the principles like renunciation of use of force, respect for

sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs etc. keeping in line with the principles

of the UN charter.77 Perhaps, the inclusion of the "inviolability of borders" indicated that

Moscow placed the onus for Sino-Soviet border tensions on Beijing, which had concluded

final border agreements with most of the countries on its periphery with the exception of

the Soviet Union and India.

India did not react favourably to Brezhnev's plan. The Indian Prime Minister Mrs.

Indira Gandhi's first response to Brezhnev's proposal was not enthusiastic. She stated on

10 June 1969 that "unless each country is strong in itself, even collective security will not

amount to much. "78 She further expressed her opinion regarding Asian collective security

system while delivering a speech before the members of the Diet in Tokyo on 25 June

1969. According to her, the Asian collective security system proposed by the Soviet

Union was probably meant to restrain the USA and China from making inroads into

Asia. 79 Mrs. Gandhi stated that China was showing an inclination to spread its influence

in Asia and that in such a situation it was desirable that all the countries in Asia should

have political and economic stability to prevent Chinese expansionism. 80 But India did

not endorse the idea of Asian collective security system fearing that India's interest in it

would further alienate China.81 At a time, when India was trying to normalise its

77Soviet Review (New Delhi), 28 March 1972, p. 24.

78Times of India (New Delhi), II ·June 1969.

79Summarv of World Broadcasts/F E-3110, 25 June 1969.

80Ibid.

81 Times of India, 28 June 1969.

24

relations with China joining of ~y such Soviet sponsored collective security arrangement

would have only foreclosed the door of improvement of relations with that country. At

a Press conference held in Djakarta, Mrs. Gandhi stated: "If he is talking of military

alliance or pact, we would disagree. If he is talking of economic cooperation, it would be

a different matter." 82Mrs. Gandhi described "an alliance of Asian countries as useless

since an alliance of one group would cause an immediate reaction by another with a

consequent increase in tensions. "83 India did not want to be drawn into a military

alliance as it was against her policy of non-alignment. Besides, it did not like to make

itself dependent on any outside power to protect its security interests. India was not even

enthusiastic about the regional economic cooperation plan proposed by Kosygin. As

Pakistan did not accept this plan, India also felt reluctant to endorse the Soviet initiative

for regional cooperation. India also refused to accept Kosygin's offer to mediate the

Ganges river water dispute between India and East Pakistan.

However, these differences did not affect the overall bilateral relationship as the

two countries emphasised those areas where their interests and policies converged. For

instance, both the Soviet Union and India adopted similar positions vis-a-vis the Middle

East and Vietnam conflict. In the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967, both the Soviet Union and

India asked for Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territories and supported the UN

sponsored Jarring peace mission. In the case of Vietnam, the USSR and India registered

their opposition to the American bombing campaign against North Vietnam. Their

82Hindustan Times, 1 July 1969.

83Cited in Hemen Ray, "SO\iet Diplomacy in Asia", Problems of Communism (Washington, D.C.), March-April 1970, p. 78.

25

opposition was incorporated even in successive joint Soviet-Indian communiques from

1965 onwards. But, still the point of difference remained between the USSR and India as

the latter's position was not extended to an overall criticism of American policy in

Vietnam.

In the decade of 1970s the Soviet-Indian relations were marked by many

divergences although their interests converged on certain issues, such as the crisis in East

Pakistan which erupted in March 1971 and also on the Chinese aggression against

Vietnam in 1979. The situation in East Pakistan deteriorated with the imposition of

military rule, which led to the outbreak of a civil war between West and East Pakistan.

Due to the atrocities committed on the Bengali people of Ea5t Pakistan by the Pakistani

Junta many of them started fleeing to India. The influx of refugees to India increased day

by day and reached to a number around I 0 million. 84 This development created a major

domestic political instability . for the Indian Government. This created several

socio-economic and political problems for India and turned the internal affairs of Pakistan

into a serious crisis for India. The influx of refugees put a burden on India's limited

resources. Naturally, India was interested in resolving the crisis as soon as possible so that

the refugees could return to their own country.

The Soviet Union did not want the escalation of civil war in East Pakistan which

might lead to a major war between India and Pakistan and possibly result into the

involvement of outside powers in that war. Of course, a war in South Asia with the

84Baljit Singh, "India's Foreign Policy Under New Leadership: A Glimpse into the 1980s", in Lawrence Ziring. ed., The Subcontinent in World Politics: India. its Neighbours and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger, 1978), p.l23.

26

involvement of outside powers was not in the interest of the USSR. The USSR was

basically interested in the maintenance of peace and stability in South Asia which would

serve the Soviet objective. Hence, the Soviet President Podgorny sent a letter to President

Y ahya Khan of Pakistan on 2 April 1971 in which the former expressed his concern about

the situation in East Pakistan and advised the Pakistani leadership to take immediate

measures to stop the bloodshed and repression against the populace in East Pakistan and

to tum to methods of a peaceful political settlement. 115 But Pakistan did not give any

importance to Podgorny's letter. Pakistan considered it as interference in the domestic

affairs of Pakistan and interpreted it as a partisan stand. However, the Soviet Union was

genuinely concerned over suppression of the freedom of the people of East Pakistan and

the problem created for India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. Moscow

condemned military repression and atrocities in East Bengal. It favoured the adoption of

immediate measures to stop bloodshed in Pakistan and recommended a peaceful political

solution to be worked out within Pakistan. During his visit to the USSR, Swaran Singh,

the External Affairs Minister of India, held talks with the Soviet Premier AN. Kosygin

regarding the refugees question and both of them considered it necessary that Pakistan

should take urgent measures to stop the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. They also

suggested that additional steps be taken to ensure that peace was restored in East Pakistan

and conditions created for the safe return of the refugees to their homes. 86 Thus, the

Soviet and Indian stand fully converged on this refugee issue.

85Pravda, 4 April 1971.

86"Friendly visit completed", Pravda, 9 June 1971.

27

ln the meantime, there started a process of rapprochement between the People's

Republic of China and the United States. Pakistan played the role of a middleman in

organising Henry Kissinger's secret visit to China via Rawalpindi in July 1971 87 in order

to improve Sino-US relations, which culminated in the Sino-US-Pak alignment against the

Soviet Union and India. Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai promised to extend all help to

Pakistan in the event of "lndip.n expansionists" daring to launch aggression against

Pakistan. 88 Henry Kissinger warned L. K. Jha, the Indian Ambassador in the United

States, that in the event of China helping Pakistan in a war with India, India should not

count on the US support. 89 The Sino-US-Pak axis increased India's concern for its

security. Under these circumstances, the Soviet support became critical for India. Mrs.

Gandhi realised that only a strong Soviet support would enable India to discourage

Pakistan and her supporters from plunging the subcontinent into a bloody conflict and

guarantee India's secu~ity. The Soviets were also concerned at the development of a

Sino-American rapprochement.· They were not in favour of another wasteful and

destabilising war in the subcontinent from which in their perception only China might

gain. Such a development would have posed a threat to Soviet security interest. Thus, here

the Soviet and Indian interests converged and required a joint effort to deter the outbreak

of war in the subcontinent. It was under such circumstances that the Soviet-Indian Treaty

87Raghunath Ram. "Soviet Policy towards India from Tashkent Conference to the Bangladesh War", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.22. no.4, 1985, p. 365.

l!l!Ibid.

28

of peace, friendship and cooperation was signed in New Delhi on 9 August 197190 for

a period of twenty years, which was a high watermark in Soviet-Indian relations. The

treaty bound both the Soviet Union and India to extend each other all out support in the

event of an outside aggression. Article IX of the treaty stated:

Each of the High Contracting Parties pledges to refrain from giving assist­ance to any third party taking part in an armed conflict with the other side. In the event that either side is attacked or threatened with attack, the High Contracting Parties will immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to eliminate this threat and take appropriate effective measures to ensure the peace and security of the other countries. 91

The purpose of India's signing the treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was

to safeguard her security, whereas from the Soviet point of view, the main purpose of the

treaty was to formalise and extend Russian influence for immediate purpose of stabilising

the situation in South Asia.92

In spite of India's repeated demand for creating conditions for the safe return of

Bengali refugees, Pakistan Government remained adamant and continued the genocide

instead of taking any fresh step in the direction of a political settlement of the problem.

India extended full support to the Mukti Bahini (Bangladesh Liberation Force) fighting

for the liberation of East Pakistan from the West Pakistani military regime. On 3

December 1971, Pakistani Air F:orce launched an attack on nine Indian Air fields in the

West and North including Kashmir.93 With this a war broke out between India and Paki-

~imes of India, I 0 August 1971.

91 Pravda, 10 August 1971.

92TI1e Times (London), 28 September 1971.

93T.N. Kaul, Diplomacy in Peace and War (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1979), p.l84.

29

stan. Indian Government gave both moral and material support to the Mukti Bahini. On

6 December 1971, India recognised Bangladesh and its Independent Government. 94 On

16 December, West Pakistan forces surrendered to the Joint Command of India and

Bangladesh forces. 95 India declared a unilateral ceasefire on the Western front on 17

December as her mission, i.e., the liberation of Bangladesh was fulfilled. 96 Thus, the war

fmally came to an end on 17 December with the announcement of unilateral ceasefire by

India.

The Soviet Union stood firmly with India in the Indo-Pak War of 1971. It was

compelled to change its policy of balancing relations with both India and Pakistan and

reverted to its Indo-centric orientation of pre-1965 Indo-Pak conflict. When the war broke

out, the Soviet Premier Kosygin criticised Pakistan for the outbreak of the war in the

Indian subcontinent. At a dinner speech at Copenhagen on 4 December, he made an

appeal to all the peace-loving countries to extend help in bringing an end to the lndo-Pak

War and also urged for an immediate solution of the internal political crisis in East

Pakistan in accordance with the outcome of December 1970 elections. Moreover, he

emphasised normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan.97 The first statement

of the Soviet Government on Indo-Pak War was issued on 5 December. The TASS

statement condemned the military regime of Pakistan for the breakdown of March

negotiations between Yahya Khan and Mujibur Rahman, arrest of Mujib and mass terror

941bid.

95India, Lok Sabha, Debates. vol.IO, no.25, 16 December 1971, co1s. 146-47.

96-yfie Statesman, 18 December 1971.

91Pravda, 6 December 1971.

30

in East Pakistan and held Pakistani regime responsible for it for not adopting any measure

in the direction of a political solution and for continuing war preparations against India.

This statement also warned Pakistan by saying that, "Pakistan's armed attack against

India, under whatever pretext, would evoke most resolute condemnation by the Soviet

Union which would not remain indifferent to the events taking place in her direct

neighbourhood and thereby involving her security". It demanded the leaders of Pakistan

and other countries "to refrain from steps, which might invite their involvement in the

conflict and bring further aggravation of the situation in the Indian subcontinent". 98 The

USSR also extended valuable support to India in the Security Council of the United

Nations. It vetoed the US draft resolution moved in the Security Council which was aimed

at bringing ceasefrre to rescue the Pakistani military regime.99 By vetoing the Security

Council resolution the Soviet delegate foiled the attempt to censure India at the world

body and impose a solution on it.

While the Soviet Union extended support to India on the East Bengal crisis and

in the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, the stand adopted by the Soviet Union on Bangladesh

crisis was different from that of India. The Soviet Union from the very beginning of the

crisis demanded a peaceful political settlement of the problem within the framework of

a United Pakistan. It was not in favour of dismemberment of Pakistan and did not

visualise the prospect of an ind~pendent Bangladesh. Since Pakistan was geographically

and strategically important for the Soviet Union, it did not want to jeopardise its relations

!It! Ibid.

99SCOR, yr 26, mtg 1613, 13 December 1971, pp.72-93.

31

with the former by supporting the liberation struggle of the people of East Pakistan. Even

later, when the Soviets recognised that the crisis in East Pakistan was a liberation struggle

they wanted to avert the possibility of a war and were only interested in the maintenance

of peace and stability in the subcontinent. However, when full scale war started in

December 1971 between India and Pakistan and the latter was openly supported by the

USA and China, the Soviet Union was left with no option but to render full support to

India with a view to defusing the crisis. On the other hand, India was sympathetic to the

demands of the Awami League. When the West Pakistani Government did not restrain

itself from pursuing a repressive policy towards the people of East Pakistan and did not

make any effort to restore normal situation there, India extended its helping hand to the

liberation forces in East Pakistan. India wanted to mitigate the sufferings of the people

of East Bengal even by helping them to create a separate independent state and India

could do so successfully. From this analysis, it is clear that when their national interests.

demanded both the Soviet Union and India differed from each other. But these differences

were contained when their strategic perspectives coincided.

The victory of India over Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a

sovereign, independent nation had clearly changed the balance of power in the

subcontinent in India's favour. India emerged as the dominant regional power.

Consequently, India's strategic perception was changed. It no longer perceived a serious

threat from a weak and dismember~d Pakistan. India was capable of safeguarding her

western frontier as was proved in the 1971 War. Similarly, the threat from China lost its

intensity due to China's preoccupation with the Soviet threat and its internal

32

developments. Under such conditions, India's dependence on the Soviet Union had less­

ened. In this changed strategic situation, India desired to play a leading role in the region

and not to get too much burdened with Soviet friendship or too dependent on Soviet ties.

This desire of India was reflected in India's rejection of a Soviet offer to mediate between

India and Pakistan and its insistence on negotiation with Pakistan on a bilateral basis.

India had many political differences with the USSR in spite of having treaty

relations with the latter and the latter's support to India in the Indo-pak War of 1971. The

post - 1971 relations between the Soviet Union and India was marked by many

divergences on issues such as Asian collective security, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty, conversion of the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, Sino-Indian normalisation

of relations, recognition of Kampuchea, the concept of 'natural ally' of Non-aligned

countries and Mghanistan crisis. In fact, a divergence appeared in the Soviet-Indian

relations in 1973 itself as India did not endorse the 'Asian collective security' proposal

when it was revived after the Bangladesh War. Leonid Brezhnev during his November

1973 visit to India, personally tried to persuade the Indian leadership to join the Soviet

sponsored Asian collective security arrangement. In his address to the Indian Parliament

on 29 November 1973, he laid emphasis on both the political and economic aspects of the

idea of collective security in Asia. 100 Since Mrs. Gandhi did not respond to the

Brezhnev plan it was omitted from the final communique. Mrs Gandhi was more

interested in normalising India's relations with China and she considered this step as more

effective for solving India's security problem. In spite of India's rejection of the Soviet

1rorimes of India, 30 November 1973.

33

proposal of Asian collective security, in subsequent years, the Soviet leaders during their

exchange of state visits and in their talks with their Indian counterparts renewed the

Soviet call for joint efforts of the Asian states to ensure peace and security iJl the region.

Yet, India did not endorse even this more general proposal. Thus, in this security related

issue the Soviet and Indian positions diverged.

Difference was seen in the Soviet-Indian relations on the nuclear issue. India's

peaceful nuclear explosion in May 1974101 at Pokhran was not received well in the

USSR Yet, the Soviet media ~efrained from publicly condemning India. Rather they

repeated India's phrase about peaceful purposes and also drew attention to the Chinese

nuclear capability.

Another issue, in which a divergence appeared in the Soviet-Indian relations, was

the issue of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In order to remove threat of a

Super Power arms race in the Indian Ocean, ~e Non-aligned countries at their Lusaka

Summit in 1970 proposed that the Indian Ocean be declared as a 'zone of peace'. India

supported this proposal. India also extended full support to the Sri Lankan sponsored

resolution no. 2832 passed in .the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1971 on

Declaration of the "Indian Ocean as a zone of peace". 102 Both the Super Powers

abstained on the motion and argued that the implementation of such a proposal would

interfere with freedom of navigation. India was not happy over abstention of the Soviet

Union. Since that time, the proposal has. been regularly raised at the UN and NAM

101 K.K.Pathak, Nuclear Polig• of India: A Third World Perspective (New Delhi: Gitanjali Prakashan, 1980), p.l32.

102UN Document, A/Res/2832, session 26, 16 December 1971.

34

meetings, but attempts to convene an international conference on the Indian Ocean have

failed. When in November 1973, the resolution for making the Indian Ocean a zone of

peace was moved again in the General Assembly, both the Super Powers once again

abstained, whereas India voted for the proposal. The Soviet Union's stand on this matter

was that it should not be treated equally with the U.S.A. in the militarisation of the Indian

Ocean. According to the Soviet Union, her interests in the Indian Ocean arose due to

American presence and her movement in the Indian Ocean was purely for defensive

purpose. It was true that, the Soviet Union adopted a defensive strategy and responded to

the US military build-up in the Indian Ocean by its naval deployments. But India raised

her voice against the Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union was

dissatisfied with India as the latter equated the Soviet Union with the US, for militarising

the Indian Ocean and creating tensions in the region.

However, later on, during Brezhnev's visit to India in November 1973, a

compromise was reached between the Soviet Union and India. In the Indo-Soviet joint

communique which was issued at the end of the visit, both the countries agreed to

participate together with other countries, on an equal basis in order to find out fair

solution to the question of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. 103 Thus, at last

despite the continuing disagreement on Super Power rivalry in the Indian Ocean the

Soviet-Indian stand converged on the issue of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.

In addition to the abov~ mentioned divergences, the Soviet Union and India

differed in their perceptions of China. India made attempts to improve her relations with

103Singh, n. 48, p.208.

35

China as she desired to lessen her dependence on the Soviet Union for her security needs.

India thought that better relations with China would definitely strengthen her security. In

fact, India tried to normalise her relations with China during the late 60s itself as a reac-

tion to improvement of Soviet-Pakistan relations and particularly Soviet - Pakistan arms

deal of 1968. Mrs. Gandhi declared on 1 January 1969 India's willingness to open up

talks with China without insistence on its acceptance of Colombo proposal as a

precondition. 104 It was very much clear that this step of Mrs. Gandhi was taken with

a view to ward off the Soviet move to get closer to Pakistan. By attempting to improve

relations with China India played the China card to make the Soviet Union pay more

attention to India rather than Pakistan. However, India's overture towards China was not

responded.

The Soviets felt concerned due to Mrs. Gandhi's offer in January 1969 to China

regarding border talks with no precondition. Soviet dependence on India's support

increased after the bloody conflict with China in March 1969 on the Ussuri river. 105

Keeping in view the object of getting Indian support and keeping India away from its

steps to normalise relations with "China, the Soviet Defence Minister Grechko visited New

Delhi in March 1969. Premier Kosygin also paid a visit to New Delhi in early May to

attend the funeral of Indian President Zakir Hussain. Both Grechko and Kosygin

emphasised that India with an unsettled border dispute could hardly afford to take any

104Nancy Jetly, India-China Relations 194 7-77: A Study of Parliament's Role in the Making of Foreign Policy (New Delhi:Radiant Publishers, 1979), p.259.

105Borisov and Koloskov, n. 76.

36

chance by ignoring or even minimising the dangers of a sudden conflict with China. 106

At the time of Foreign Secretary Kewal Singh's Moscow visit in November 1975, the

Soviet weekly New Times brought out an article entitled, "Peking's provocations against

India". In this article the Soviet author asserted: "Evidently the shots fired by the Chinese

troops on the Indian patrol parties were Peking's reply to India's desire to normalise

relations with China"_l07 In the early months of 1976, further divergence was marked

in Indian and Soviet perceptions of China. Several gestures of goodwill were made by

India towards China. The development of India's better relations with China

coincidentally took place at the time when the Sino-Soviet rift became irrevocable. This

led to divergences in Indian and Soviet perceptions of China. Sino-Indian diplomatic

relations were restored to ambassadorial level in 1976. On 15 April1976, India's External

Affairs Minister, Y.B. Chavan announced in the Lok Sabha India's decision to restore its

. diplomatic representation in Beijing to the ambassadorial level. 108 K.R. Narayanan

assumed the post of India's Ambassador to China on 7 July 1976.109 Beijing also named

its Ambassador to India, Chen Chao Yuan on 12 July 1976 who arrived in Delhi in

September 1976.110 Mrs. Gandhi paid a visit to Moscow in June 1976 with a purpose

to explain India's China policy to Moscow and gain further Soviet support in the form

106-yfie Hindu, 24 October 1969.

107Y.Gotlober, Y.Shtykanov, "Peking's Provocations· Against India", New Times(Moscow), no. 46, November 1975, p.12.

108India, Lok Sabha, Debates, vol.60, 15 April 1976, col.l04.

109Jetly, no. 104, p.289.

11 <1'hid.

37

of enhanced economic cooperation. On the other hand, the Soviet Government wanted

reassurances from Mrs. Gandhi that the change regarding China would not affect

Indo-Soviet relations. While deiivering welcome address Brezhnev spoke about "forces

of Asia, which ignoring the rights and sovereignty of states, are striving to subordinate

other people to their rule". Mrs. Gandhi, however, replied that "Darkness is not dispelled

by cursing but by lighting lamps. Along with international efforts for peace, each country

must act on its own to reduce areas of suspicion and to enlarge areas of goo~will". I I I

The succeeding Janata Government of India, which came to power in 1977, u 2

continued efforts towards India's normalisation of relations with China. However, the new

Government cleared its stand regarding India's relations with the USSR. When A.B.

Vajpayee, the External Affairs Minister was asked a question, "whether India's friendship

with the Soviet Union will come in the way of improving relations with China", he

replied that the new lead~rs "do not feel that the process of normalisation between India

and China should be at the cost oflndia's friendship with any other country". At the same

time, he did not forget to reassure the Chinese that "India's existing good relations with

any country need not be an obstacle to the promotion of better relations with China". I 13.

The Soviets reacted to India's normalisation with China during the Indian Foreign

Minister Vajpayee's visit to Mo~cow in September 1978. The Soviet leaders resorted to

anti-Chinese rhetoric and warned India about China's designs on normalisation. Vajpayee

111The Statesman, 9 June 1976.

112Singh, n.48, p.220.

113Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), 7 October 1977, p. 32.

38

made it clear to his counterpart Groinyko that India desired to improve its relations with

China as part of its policy of normalising and improving ties with its neighbour. He

assured that his visit to China would in no way affect Indo-Soviet friendship and asserted

that India had its own experience of China and New Delhi's "eyes and ears were wide

open". 114

Vajpayee paid a visit to China on 12 February 1979. 11s He had to cut short his

visit abruptly due to the Chinese invasion of Vietnam at the time when he was their state

guest. Prime Minister Desai expressed his "profound shock and distress" over the Chinese

action and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Vietnam. 116

The Soviets reminded the Indian people who were still having misperceptions about

China's game with India that China had occupied 36,000 square kilometres of Indian

territory, supported separatists within India, interfered in Kashmir and threatened India's

security by constructing the strategic highway through Karakoram. "The timing of the

aggression against Vietnam to coincide with the Indian Foreign Minister's visit to China

once again demonstrated to the world the duplicity of the Chinese leaders and their utter

disregard for India's prestige".117

The anti-Chinese attitude of the Soviets was also seen in the Soviet Premier

Kosygin' s visit to India during 9 to 15 March 1979. In his Parliamentary address, he

114Quoted in Robert C. Horn. Soviet-Indian Relations: Issues and lnfluence(New York: Prneger, 1982), p.163.

115Times of India. 13 February 1979.

11 6-J'imes of India, 19 February 1979.

117Cited in Horn. n.ll4, p.166.

39

referred to the Chinese action as "criminal" seeking to decide the fate of another nation

by use of force. 118 He asserted that India and the Soviet Union had emerged as forces

that would not permit such an outrage. 119 Kosygin even warned the Indians that "China

might want to teach India a lesson at some point in the future, just as it had sought to do

with Vietnam in the present" .120 He stressed on the need for further coordinating the

efforts of peace-loving forces like India to overcome the threat to peace on the Asian

continent. 121 The joint communique which was issued at the end of Kosygin's visit

referred to "massive armed attack by China" and called for "immediate unconditional

withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam". 122Thus, a convergence

was found in the Soviet arid Indian stand on Chinese aggression on the Socialist Republic

of Vietnam.

The Soviet Premier Kosygin sought to give impression of identity of views

between India and the USSR on the Chinese issue as he declared that "the talks have

ended very successfully indeed and we have agreed on all subjects".123 But the fact was

that on this issue Kosygin failed to persuade India and differences still persisted. The

Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai made it clear to the Soviets that normalisation with

China would still be pursued when circumstances permitted.

1181ndian Express (New Delhi), 10 March 1979.

11"rhe Statesman (New Delhi), 11 March 1979.

1201bid.

121 Soviet Review (New Delhi), Supplement to no.14, 1979, p.10.

122Pravda, 16 March 1979.

12~imes of India, 16 March 1979.

40

The USSR and India adopted different positions on the issue of the recognition of

Vietnam installed Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. The Soviet Union backed the Heng

Samrin regime of Kampuchea but the Janata Government of India had taken a posture of

non-recognition. However, when Mrs. Gandhi came back to power in India after the

elections in January 1980, she reversed the Janata policy of non-recognition of Heng

Samrin's Government of Kampuchea. Her Government announced its recognition ofHeng

Samrin regime on 7 July 1980.124 So, at last India took similar position with the Soviet

Union on Kampuchea issue by recognising Heng Samrin's Government.

Besides all these, India did not like the concept of 'natural ally' of the non-aligned

countries. Cuba and other allies of the Soviet Union in the Non-aligned Summit held at

Havana in 1979 argued that the USSR and the Socialist countries were the 'natural ally'

of the non-aligned countries. 12s The caretaker Government of India headed by Charan

Singh strongly objected and opposed the attempt to revise the basic principles of the

NAM. So, this stand of India was not liked by the Soviet Union.

Lastly, the Soviet intervention in Mghanistan towards the end of 70s widened the

divergences existing in Soviet-Indian relationship. The USSR sent troops to Mghanistan

to protect the revolutionary regime there and intervened in Mghanistan to install Babrak

Karmal's Government on 27 December 1979. 126 India never favoured foreign

intervention in any country. The Indian Prime Minister Charan Singh conveyed to the

12+rriclib Chakraborti, India and Kampuchea: A phase in their relations. 1978-81 (Calcutta: Minerva, 1985), p.78.

125Duncan, n.40, p.62.

1~ew York Times. 28 December 1979.

41

Soviet Government, through its Ambassador in New Delhi, "India's deep concern at the

substantial involvement of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan and sought their

withdrawal as soon as possible" .127 This issue will be discussed in further detail m

chapter three.

ll. Determinants and Objectives of Soviet Policy towards India

The Soviet policy towards India has to be studied in the broader context of the

Soviet policy towards South Asia. The Soviet Union has pursued an active policy in South

Asia since 1955. India is a major country in South Asia with which the Soviet Union

forged strong political, economic and diplomatic ties. In order to have a comprehensive

understanding of Soviet-Indian relations it is necessary to analyse critically the

determinants which have shaped the Soviet foreign policy towards India.

There were geopolitical, strategic, ideological, economic as well as international

factors which influenced the making of Soviet policy with regard to India. These factors

motivated the USSR to forge strong links with India, the major power in the South Asian

subcontinent. The most important factor which compelled the Soviet Union to take interest

in India was the latter's geographic location. India is located in close proximity to the

southern frontier of the former USSR sharing borders with China and Pakistan. The

northern frontier of the Indian ~ubcontinent is the Pakistani occupied area of Kashmir,

which is almost contiguous to the Tazik Republic of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The

127Bimal Prasad, "India and Afghanistan Crisis", International Studies (New Delhi), vol.19, no.3, July-September 1980, p.635.

42

Indian state of Jammu and KaShmir was thus geopolitically important for the former

USSR. The Soviet Union looked at the lndo-Pak subcontinent close to its soft belly as an

area of great strategic importance for its security. It feared any foreign military presence

in this area as that would expose its southern flank to attack.

There is good reason to believe that on account of its strategic location India

continued to figure prominently in Soviet security thinking since the days of the Bolshevik

Revolution. The Soviet Union is quite vulnerable to the air power of a hostile power

based in Kashmir. The Soviet Central Asian Republics could easily be attacked through

long-range bombers stationed in northern Kashmir. 128 Naturally, the Soviets were quite

worried over the possibility of American presence in this area. The Soviet attitude towards

the Kashmir problem was largely determined by such anxieties. It would thus be proper

to conclude that the Soviet policy towards India was mainly determined by the

geopolitical factor. Moscow's policy was influenced by bro~der considerations such as the

security of its Central Asian territory and the growing Sino-Soviet rift. Mter the

development of Sino-Soviet rift, the Soviet Union wanted to contain the Chinese influence

in Asia. In this context, the strat~gic location of the Indian subcontinent was an important

factor for the Soviet Union. The prime objective of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union

was to ensure its own security. India could be helpful to the Soviet Union in this context

by not joining the hostile alliance system and not allowing her territory to be used as a

possible launching point for attack on the Soviet Union.

Apart from the above mentioned geographical position of India, its proximity to

128Hemen Ray, How Moscow sees Kashmir (Bombay: Jaico Publishing House, 1985), p. 9.

43

the Gulf and location in the Indian Ocean made India more important for the Soviet

Union. The presence_ of hostile powers in this area was likely to pose a security threat to

the Soviet Union. Hence, in order to safeguard her security the Soviet Union was obliged

to have good relations with India. As such, the Soviet-Indian relations became close and

friendly largely due to the convergence of their national interests. Issues which had a vital

bearing on India's security considerations also impinged on Soviet strategic perceptions.

The Soviet Union extended valuable support to India on several major foreign policy

issues and the latter occupied a pivotal place in Soviet security considerations. When the

United States pursued the strategy of containing communism through a network of

military alliance system and one of the South Asian countries, Pakistan joined the SEATO

(September 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (February 1955), 129 it aroused the Soviet fear

of being encircled by hostile countries. India's refusal to join these alignments made the

encirclement incomplete. Hence, the Soviet Union developed a vital stake in India's

non-alignment policy which served as the minimum requirement of Soviet security

interest. In the late 50s, the development of Sino-Soviet schism further added to Soviet

security concern. The policy makers in the Soviet Union saw a friendly India as a possible

counterweight to China. All that the Soviet Union wanted, however, was to frustrate the

US design to establish a solid phalanx in South Asia to contain it. Since the beginning of

Sino-Soviet rift Moscow had sought to counter the Chinese influence in the area as well.

It could effectively meet the situation on its southern flank only by maintaining cordial

12~emnek, n. 7.

44

relations with both India and Pakistan. 130 So, the Soviet Union wanted to have influence

in both India and Pakistan instead of having influence in India alone. Thus, geopolitical

and strategic factor served as an important determinant of the Soviet foreign policy

towards India.

The role of ideological factor is no less important in shaping the Soviet foreign

policy towards India. Although the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with

India on 13 April 1947, 131it took a long time for Moscow to pursue an active policy

towards India. The reason was that the Soviets were ideologically not prepared to accept

the fact of India's peaceful attai~ment of political independence in 1947. They were still

not convinced about the fact that the British had lessened their grip on the subcontinent.

According to the Soviet viewpoint, the Mountbatten plan for the partition of India into

two separate states was aimed at perpetuating the political turmoil in the subcontinent

necessitating an arbiter's role for Britain pursuing the policy of "divide and rule". The

Soviets believed that India had changed its status from a colony to only a semi-colony

which was not a significant step in the Marxist typology. 132

India did not find a place in Andrei Zhdanov' s two camp thesis which was

pronounced at the Cominform in September 1947. 133 At the Cominform, Andrei

Zhdanov, the chief Soviet delegate, who was a leading member of the politburo put

13<>J\..D.Kapur, Soviet strategy in South Asia: Perspectives on Soviet Policies towards the Indian Subcontinent and Mghanistan (New Delhi: Young Asia Publications, 1983), p.~O.

131 Kaushik, n.l.

132Remnek, n.7, p. 6.

133Ibid., p.2.

45

forward a "two-camp" analysis of the international situation where he divided the world

into two hostile camps: "the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, headed by the United

States, aimed at strengthening imperialism and stifling democracy", and "anti-imperialist

and democratic camp led by the Soviet Union which wanted to undermine imperialism

and consolidate democracy. "134 Zhdanov demanded the Communist Parties to "take into

their hands the banner of defence of the national independence and sovereignty of their

countries". Keeping in view the Cold War situation in the world the Soviet Union sought

to oppose and weaken the imperialist bloc through the revolutionary activities in the

colonies under the aegis of Communist Parties. Zhdanov did not refer in his statement to

the class leading. the "powerful movement of national liberation". He did not even mention

about the role to be assigned to the national bourgeoisie and big capitalists in their

anti-imperialist national liberation movement. mBut Andrei Zhdanov included India

among those exceptional states which though not socialist were not part of the imperialist

camp either. India was seen by him as sympathising with the anti-imperialist (i.e., Soviet)

campY6 Zhdanov's 'two camp' theory proclaimed by the first Congress of the

Cominform however kept India out of active Soviet interest as it did not fit into the

ideological line of the Soviet Union. E. Zhukov, Corresponding Member of the Academy

of Sciences of the USSR, applied Zhdanov's 'two camp' theory to the colonies in an

article entitled, "The Growing Crisis of the Colonial System", which appeared in the 15

134Budhraj, n.3.

1351bid., pp. 37-38.

136Hom, n.ll4, p.2.

46

December issue of the Journal Bolshevik. 137 In this article, he suggested to form a broad

revolutionary front led by the coptmunists against the imperialists. He assigned a positive

role to the Communist Party of India for leading India towards full independence. 138

~hukov brought out another article, "The Colonial Question after the Second World War",

in Pravda of 7 August 194 7, wherein he wrote that "the grant of formal independence to

the colonies by no means guaranteed their actual independence." 139Stalin too refused

to recognise the fact that these colonies had become independent and denounced their

independence as sham independence. India's non-alignment policy was denounced as an

"imperialist device to slander: the USSR by placing it(Russia) on the same level with

American imperialism. "140 The· Soviets viewed Indian bourgeoisie as reactionary and

in "the camp of imperialism". Stalin's bipolar world view obstructed the possibility of

developing fruitful relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent

countries of South Asia.

During Stalin's period, a policy of open hostility was pursued against the ruling

elites or the national bourgeoisie in the former colonies. This policy continued till

Khrushchev came to power. Although a change in the Soviet policy towards the newly

independent countries started appearing during the last days of Stalin, it was only after

Stalin's death in 1953 that the Soviet Union became seriously concerned with the Third

137Buclhraj, n.3, p.39.

138Ibid.

13~. Zhukov, "The Colonial Question After The Second World War", English translation in A.Z. Rubinstein, ed., The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1972), p.427.

140Cited in Budhraj, n.3, p.57.

47

World in general and with South Asia in particular. The Soviet approach towards India

changed in response to the Indian foreign policy stand on 1) support for the seating of

Communist China in the UN., 2) refusal to condemn China in the Korean War and its

offer. to mediate that conflict, 3) refusal to sign a Japanese peace treaty at Sanfrancisco

in 1951. These policies of India made quite clear to the USSR that India's non-aligned

policy would not be an obstacle to Soviet interests and that India was not an "imperialist

lackey".

It was Khrushchev who changed the orientation of Soviet policy towards the newly

independent countries, including India. He explored the possibility of Leninist thesis

regarding the possibilities for a communist nationalist alliance against the imperialist

designs. Four decades earlier, Lenin had laid the ideological foundations for the

communist alliance with the forces of national liberation in the context of his theory of

imperialism. In the. opinion of Lenin, nationalist movements in Asia led by revolutionary

minded elements of the bourgeoisie were worthy of support by the proletariat, because

they created the internal conditions necessary for Capitalist (and then Socialist)

development and they were directed against the imperialist powers. Khrushchev revised

Lenin's policy of extending support to the national liberation movement in the Third

World which was aimed against imperialism. He held the view that Soviet assistance to

this movement would further Soviet interests. He recognised the need for a temporary

alliance between the communists and the national bourgeoisie to fight against Western

imperialism. 141 In his report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet

141Robert H.Donaldson, "Soviet Involvement in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region", in Roger E. Kanet, ed., Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s (New York: Praeger, 1982), p.333.

48

Union, Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Party, put emphasis on the

importance of the uncommitted nations in international politics. He referred to the

emergence of a "peace zone" comprising "both Socialist and non-Socialist peace-loving

states of Europe and Asia who have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as the principle

of their foreign policy. "142 As a matter of policy shift the USSR also recognised that

for the socialist transformation of Society violence was not considered essential and that

under certain circumstances it could be achieved even under a Parliamentary system.

Besides, the Soviet Union recognised that according to a country's concrete

socio-economic conditions, historical traditions, it could have its own specific path of

socialism. It further recognised-the need of extending support to a country which might

follow non-capitalist path of development. 143 This very declaration removed the

ideological obstacle which stood in the way of peaceful co-existence between countries

following different social systems. The 20th Congress adopted peaceful co-existence as

a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy.144 "And this is natural, for there is no

other way in the present-day conditions. Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful

co-existence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way."145 So, the

Soviet Union felt the necessity of supporting the non-aligned states and forging some sort

of alliance with them which would ultimately help the Soviets to strengthen their own

position vis-a-vis the West. Consequently, the Soviet Union made a positive evaluation

142Khrushchey, n.24.

143Ibid., pp.41-45.

144lbid., p.37.

145Ibid., p.39.

49

of the role of the nationalist leaders and nationalism in the world revolutionary process.

Khrushchev announced that the Soviet Union would consolidate the bonds of friendship

and cooperation with the Republic of India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria

and other countries, which stood for peace, and would support ~untries, which refused

to be involved in military blocs, and sought to preserve peace. 146 According to him, the

countries which had gained .independence since World War II still faced serious problems:

"the aftermath of the colonial misrule". Their main difficulties were the lack of economic

independence as the key econ?mic positions continued to be controlled by "foreign

monopoly capital". Therefore, he asserted that the Soviet Union could play a crucial role

by offering these new nations an alternative to their Western ties, i.e., by offering modem

equipment and technology and establishing mutually beneficial trade "free from any

political or military obligations. "147 As Khrushchev declared in the 20th Congress:

These countries, although they do not belong to the Socialist World system, can draw on its achievements to build up an independent national economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples. Today they need not go begging for up-to-date equipment to their former oppressors.

They can get it in the socialist countries, free of any political or military obligations. 148

He further stated:

The very fact that the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist camp exist, their readiness to help the under-developed countries with their industrial development on terms of equality and mutual benefit are a major

146Ibid., p.46.

wHom, n.ll4, p.5.

14MK.hrushchev, n.24, p.24.

50

stumbling block to colonial policy. The imperialists can no longer regard the underdeveloped countries solely as potential sources for the extraction of maximum profits. They are compelled to make concessions to them. 149

During the Khrushchev period, the Soviet policy towards India was also in line

with its new policy of developing relations with the non-Communist countries. In order

to implement Khrushchev's new policy of establishing state- to-state relations with

existing governments, support for local communists was dropped out. The basic goals of

the Soviet foreign policy in Asia at that time were to counter the Chinese influence and

contain the US moves. In this context, India occupied a very important place in the new

Soviet strategy based on the~e twin objectives. The Soviet Union found India ideologically

more close to it as both the countries were opposed to colonialism, imperialism and

racialism which to a large extent determined the Soviet policy towards India. In fact, the

anti-imperialist principles of the two countries brought them closer to each other. In the

context of changing Soviet perceptions towards the Third World, India occupied a

prominent place in the Soviet foreign policy. India was large in size and population and

strategically located near the Soviet borders and held a prominent position in the Indian

Ocean region. It was economically more developed than the other states in Asia and

politically also seemed to be stable. Above all, India's policies of non-alignment and its

emphasis on morality in foreign affairs had given India an important position in world

politics. Therefore, India, which was most significant and powerful Third World country

was likely to respond to Soviet overtures among those states that fitted in the Soviet

policy framework.

1491bid.

51

The Soviet policy towards India was also determined by economic consideration.

India provided the source of rehitively inexpensive food, raw materials, consumer goods

and semi-manufactured articles which could be paid for in soft currency due to the rupee­

trade system. In addition to that, with the advancement of technological level of Indian

industry it has become a source of more sophisticated products and services, advantageous

to the Soviet economy and available in rupee currency. Besides, India provided a ~heap

market to Soviet manufactured goods in comparison to the increasingly competitive world

markets. India served as a customer to the products of the Soviet defence industry. Thus,

the consideration of getting economic benefits out of its contact with India also influenced

the making of Soviet foreign policy towards India.

Lastly, the role of international factor was also very important in influencing the

Soviet policy towards India. Soviet relations with America and China served as constant

determinants in the Soviet foreign policy towards India. The beginning of Soviet

mvolvement in the Indian subcontinent was primarily motivated by its worsening relations

with America in the Cold War period. In particular, the Soviet activity in India grew in

the wake of the conclusion of the US - Pakistan defence agreement of 1954 under which

the USA agreed to provide military assistance to Pakistan. Towards the late 50s,

Sino-Soviet relations started deteriorating. Coincidentally, India's relations which China

also worsened. At this juncture, the Soviet policy makers showed more interest in

developing strong ties with India and use India to contain the Chinese influence in South

Asia. The Soviet Union did not want China to become a dominant Asian power.

Therefore, the USSR desired to use India as a counterweight against China in Asia. In the

mid-60s, after the Sino- Indian border War, relations between China and Pakistan became

52

close. At this moment, the Soviet Union tried to wean Pakistan away from China and this

Soviet effort brought a change in the Soviet policy towards India. Over the years,

Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese relations continued to shape the Soviet policy

towards India.

Thus, all the above mentioned factors have influenced the making of Soviet

foreign policy towards India. Tlie objectives of the Soviet Union in India can be inferred

from the former's policies and behaviour towards India. First, the Soviet Union wanted

to maintain peace and stability in the Indian subcontinent as this would help her to realise

the principal objective of her foreign policy, i.e., to safeguard her own security. The

Soviet Union particularly sought Indian stability. Second, one of the basic objectives of

the Soviet policy towards India was to reduce Western influence there as far as possible.

Third, the Soviet Union wanted to reduce or at least contain China's involvement in South

Asia and therefore, wanted to use India as a counterweight against Chinese expansion. In

fac~ this has been a major goal of the Soviet Union since 1959 when Sino-Soviet

relations started deteriorating.

Fourth, the Soviet Union has sought to secure its own influence in India, since the

latter is a bastion against Chinese expansion.

Fifth, the Soviet Union wanted to advance close relationship with· India in order

to get India's support on many global and regional issues.

Sixth, the Soviet Union wanted to get economic benefits from Indo-Soviet rupee

trade.

Lastly, the Soviet Union wanted socialist economic development in India.

53