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Personal Experience Paper

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Objective lynx, Haditah Iraq, 26 March- 7 April 03

Unit of assignment at the t ime was 3 'd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment

Serving as the Battalion Fire Support NCO

SGM Steven A. Morris {(13Z) Class #34

6 October 2009

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OUTLINE

Abstract

II

III

IV

Personal and Unit Experience

Body

.1 Setting the stage

bl Pre-mission briefing

cl Planning the assault

dl Doing the "drive-by"

el The siege

lessons learned

·1

bl

cl

dl

Doctrine

Training

Equipment

Principles of Fire Support

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Personal Experience Paper

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Objective lynx, Haditah Iraq, 26 March- 7 April 03

ABSTRACT,

During the battle for the "Dam", a Ranger company (light infantry), with supporting Battalion heavy

mortars and a slice of the Battalion TOC, were surrounded, far from any reinforcements, by a

numerically superior enemy force. This battle raged for six days and nights. The enemy attempted to

use combined arms tactics with mortars and artillery, infantry, tanks, and even assault craft (boats) in

order to regain control of the Dam. Starting with first light on the morning the Dam was taken, the fight

was on . This battle again proved that with the appropriate combination of sustained and precise fire

power a numerically superior enemy can be defeated. This paper details the events of the battle and

the lessons that were relearned.

Personal Experience: RTO, FO, Team Sergeant, Assistant BN FS NCO, and BN FS NCO for 3'd

Ranger Battalion, 7S~h Ranger Regiment. Trained in all types of fire support to include: Artillery and

mortars, Naval Gunfire, and Close Air Support (both Rotary and Fixed wing). Operational experience

includes Somalia in 1993, two rotations in OEF starting with the invasion in 2001, and eight rotations in

OIF starting with the invasion of 2003.

Unit Experience: The 75~h Ranger Regiment has a long and glorious history; two much so for the

confines of this paper. However, as a testament to the tenacity of this unit it is fair to note that this is

the only Infantry Regiment in the military that has been continually employed in combat since 2001. At

least one Battalion from this Regiment has been deployed in combat since September 2001.

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Prior to the actua l mission to be discussed it is important to understand the events leading up to

thit. 5 Corp was pushing toward Baghdad with great success. The Ranger Regiment and additional SOF

forces were tasked with defeating the enemy in the western portion of Iraq (a significant challenge).

Events were proceeding well. No SCUDS hit their target and all objectives to this time were taken with

relative ease considering the sizable enemy formations that were in the western dessert. Then in mid

March a Foreign SOF element (entire Squadron) was compromised and subsequently captured by a

reportedly overwhelming and determined enemy. This event obviously caused both a change of mission

for some elements and additional consternation among all leaders over the risks involved. Several days

later ariother SOF element encountered what was believed to be the same element that had captured

the foreign SOF element only days earlier. This enemy was defeated with both direct and indirect fire

over the course of the day.

Planning for Objective lynx (Haditah, Ira q) started at the Joint Operations Center after receipt of

the mission from the Theater Ground Force Commander. It was believed that the Iraqis would blow up

the Haditah dam in order to flood the Karbala gap in which Sth Corp had to traverse in order to push to

Baghdad. This mission was planned as an air assault. It would insert a Battalion minus and additional

assets in order to secure the dam . This was briefed as the main objective of the Task Force for this

period . At the same time this mission was being planned other operations were unfolding. A Ranger

Company had just jumped deep into the western dessert to secure a location for a forward arming and

refueling (FARP) site allowing deep strikes well into Iraq. This location was called Objective Road

Runner. In less than one hour it was successfully landing its first customers in order to facilitate the

deep attacks of SOF into Iraq.

From the intelligence of the dam and the surrounding area it was reported to have large

amounts of AAA, infantry, possible suicide bombers, and unconfirmed reports of tanks and mechanized

forces. These reports were confirmed by the ground reconnaissance . SOF elements were operating in

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and around the Haditah area for days calling airstrikes on targets and reporting enemy movements. As

it happens weather rolled in and the air assault planning was scraped for a ground assault. With the

main effort (5"' Corp) rolling faster than expected the timeline for the assault was pushed up. With the

expedited time line there was no ability for the force that planned the mission to move from the JOe to

the dam. The decision was made to use pieces of two companies that were already tasked on other

missions to conduct the ground assault. Elements from Band e company from the 3'd Battalion,

including heavy mortars and a slice onoc 2 from Road Runner, were ordered to fink up with SOF

reconnaissance elements in the area to conduct final assault planning.

At the end of March the ad hoc element, referred to as Bco here out, linked up with the SOF

element to conduct final planning. During this planning the SOF element was briefed of our mission and

asked to pass all intelligence and recommendations for the assault since they were operating in the area

previously . The command group of both elements combined to conduct planning. A plan was made and

disseminated . During this planning/dissemination phase the guidance from higher was received that B

co "would assault and control the dam however was not to be decisively engaged" . This guidance was

contradictory to everything the SOF element had briefed us on. They insisted we should not assault the

dam without a substantial increase in force strength; "another company at a minimum". The B co

commander briefed higher on the intelligence gathered from the SOF force and asked to confirm the

guidance. The guidance was repeated as previously said. At this point the company commander stated

clearly that the mission, intelligence, and guidance were incompatible. We would not be able to take

the objective without being decisively engaged. Higher again repeated the same guidance. The

company commander repeated that we could not accomplish that mission as stated. Finally higher

again repeated the guidance and ended the conversation with a very authoritative "out" radio

transmission. With the official "do it" we went to work revising the plan. The previous known enemy

locations we planned for additional engagement as well as suspected and likely targets. This was to be

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an extensive pre-assau lt fire plan starting 24 hours prior and right up to assault. This plan consisted

almost exclusively of pre-planned deep strikes from fixed wing assets.

The force consisted of 3 Ranger rifle platoons, the Battalion heavy mortar section, a TOC slice,

and some additional SOF elements. One platoon (-) was tasked with clearing the dam and the

remainder was reserve, one with securing the eastern flank, and the last the western flank. Being a dam

there was really only two ways into the area without climbing straight up a 100 meter extremely steep

hill on the flanks. This allowed for an amazing view and a complete line of sight of the entire valley

below for almost eight kilometers. However, with little or no concealment the enemy knew our

positions as well. Due to a tactics discrepancy the enemy knowing our position was less of a factor than

it could have been; lesson learned- principles of fire support. In addition to Ranger organic assets a

section of four AH-6 attack helicopters were tasked to support the movement and assault. The

collection of elements moved at first dark to the remain over day (ROD) position to the west and south

of the dam in order to conduct final planning for the next days assault. With the AH6s covering the

movement and wave after wave of heavy bombers pounding enemy locations the assault force moved

unscathed to the ROD sight. Final planning was conducted and the force prepared for the night assault.

During that next day large enemy troop movements had crossed the planned route. Subsequently the

assault force had to find a new route. The chosen route was significantly longer than the previous. This

route would not get the assault force to the objective until the last few hours of night. This would end

up proving significant as the assault force actually conducted the assault with less than two hours of

darkness prior to sunrise and some elements were still maneuvering to clear their assault objectives

while others were still getting into defensive positions when the sun came up.

During final planning the mood was not good. The entire intelligence picture was passed to

everyone, as Rangers do, and the comments from the SOF element about this mission requiring

additional forces quickly escalated to cataclysmic proportions through the "rumit" channel . This was

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exacerbated during the final briefs when leaders dubbed this the "drive-by" mission. It was even stated

that we could very easily be conducting escape and evasion procedures in small elements when the sun

came up. Since no one had maps of the area this was particularly. This was compounded slightly with

guidance from higher that no matter what the AH6s had to be on the ground at base before the sun

came up and would be no less than 10% ammunition remaining in order to defend themselves on the

trip back to base. AU thought this would be a running gunfight; it eventually did not disappoint. With

the AH-6s covering, the assault force set out to its objectives. Once we were in sight of the dam the

assault force broke into its elements and accelerated. All elements got to their initial objectives and

secured them without significant incidents. The clearing element gathered quickly that the intelligence

of the dam was slightly incorrect. It was not nine stories deep as previously briefed. It was actually

closer to nineteen . The clearing effort continued well into the first day however there was very little

shooting inside the dam itself.

Starting approximately f ive minutes after sun rise the real battle began. The TOC was positioned

outside the security perimeter to allow the western flank platoon to clear the buildings inside our

expected perimeter. At the time the platoon was preparing to assault the buildings two armed men

walked up to within 100 meters ofthe assault force unobserved. However, these men appeared to also

not notice that a Ranger Company secured the dam in the night. As the Battalion XO was shouting

orders for the platoon to engage them, they noticed our presence. The men got into a standing firing

position with their rifles but before they could shoot the XO shot both men. One dropped immediately

and the other limped off. Unbeknownst to t he force that man had communications with the other

elements. Within minutes the pre-sighted mortars began falling all around. At the same time hidden

enemy positions emptied of numerous fighters with small arms and RPGS. Moments later the RPG fire

became so intense there was no way to keep track of where or how many were being shot. This is the

point when my radio batteries died- of course! As the fire came in a battery swap was required and on

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the net the AH-6 flight lead was requesting permission from the FO to engage a large amount of enemy

with medium machine guns, RPGs, and mortars. As the FO said stand by to ask the platoon leader if he

was approved the flight lead was cleared to engage all enemy personnel. The flight lead bumped and

proceeded to unleash a hail of 7.62 and 2.75 in rockets on the enemy. As lead broke off the attack and

trail preceded inbound three RPGs and an undetermined amount of machine gun fire followed the

aircraft in an attempt to knock it from the sky. This was quickly silenced when the trail aircraft opened

fire on the enemy position . This continued until both aircraft were out of ammunition. Now, day light

the aircraft had to fly across enemy held territory without any munitions to defend the aircraft. This was

in direct violation of the orders given from higher. This was significant since all acknowledge that if the

AHs did not stay and assist the force there was a distinct possibility that we would have taken a lot more

casualties than we did. As the aircraft departed the comment was made to the aircraft that we owed

them a beer if we lived through the assault. It was now daylight and everyone knew we were there.

The mortar fire while somewhat inaccurate continued to intensify. Originally the force attempted to

keep track of the number of rounds but quickly figured out they were too numerous to count . As the

assault platoon started to move to the four buildings in their sector the BN XO made the call that it was

not happening fast enough and we were in danger by sitting in the middle of the road without cover. He

told the rest of the TOe to stay with him and we moved to the closet building. Once at the building the

XO proceeded to give orders to all about direction of clearing and the TOe subsequently cleared the

building; thankfully no one was in it. Once established the orders were given. Set the mortars, call for

all the CAS we can get, and kill everyone moving on our posit ion. The FSE began to do its job. Duties

were given and a three man element broke off and started calling for CAS and adjusting mortars onto

targets. At approximately this time the heavy artillery started raining down on friendly positions. While

fairly accurate it was not sufficient to induce significant causalities. The enemy did not use the principles

of fire support to its effect; the artillery was shot at low angle and was not massed. However, I can say

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emphatically that it still sucked! Throughout the first day the original 400 rounds of 120 mm mortars

were expended and a resupply was requested. There was no more Army 120 ammo avaifable. In the

constant "make it happen" realm of the Rangers, a support platoon leader (SPl) apportioned himself a

(-130 and flew down to the Marine ammunition depot. The SPl along with some additional help

"confiscated" another 400 rounds of 120 ammunition. They loaded it on the C-130, unloaded it onto an

awaiting MH-47, flew it out to the dam, and then unloaded it again at the mortar firing position while

under intense mortar and artillery fire. As a note, each 120 round weighs approximately 35 pounds (3 5

Ibs x 400 rounds x 3 moves in one day). Now as the day wore onto night and again back to day the

enemy at no time stopped it continuing counter attacks. They attempted foot patrols through the

valley, boat movements from our rear, light skinned vehicle assault down the high speed avenues of

approach, and when all else had failed they tried combined assaults with covering artillery fire, infantry,

and tanks. As the bombs kept falling the enemy dead kept piling up however when the tanks appeared

and everyone finally got fed up with getting shelled by artillery the call was made to start using the "big

stuff". While supporting the assault the tanks stopped and got into firing positions. This tactic flaw

actually played into our hands. With the tanks stationary the call went out to use Army Tactical Missile

System (ATACMS) missiles. Of note, this particular version drops bomb lets over an approximate 1

kilometer square area. While this was well inside the minimum safe distance for the round our elevated

position gave us perfect cover to call it in close. As the giant miss ile came screaming in and exploded a

roar went up. This was one of the most destructive things we had seen and was like Christmas for the

Rangers . After the destruction of all the armor the counter attacks slowed and became more

unorganized. The artillery and mortars however remained a constant. With the requests to higher for

reinforcements for days the remainder of the Battalion was moved into positions to assist the besieged

company on the dam. A co was tasked with securing the southern and western avenues of approach

(AA). This ended up being a task that was again undermanned to say the least. Contact was constant

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however with a superb combat leader the casualties, while each devastating, were kept to a minimum.

Once the AA were secured, C co was then tasked to conduct the assault in the remaining buildings to the

south of the dam suspected of housing all the fighters and ammunition to help relieve the pressure on B

co. The assault, with the help of a devastating and relentless pre-assault fire plan consisting of CAS, AH­

6, 81 and 120 mm mortars, went off with little resistance. C co cleared out the enemy, securing and

destroying thousands and thousands of mortar and RPG rounds (3 entire warehouses full along with

caches all around). After the assault all counter attacks had ceased however the artillery kept coming

down. For the entire six days we tried to figure out where the enemy positions were but we were

unsuccessful until a round landed close enough with enough of a crater to do the old fashion crater

analysis . Under sustained mortar and artillery fire a ranger ran from cover to the crater and conducted

the analysis. With the direction to the guns and a known caliber fighter aircraft were sent out and

immediately found the artillery Battalion (-) in covered positions. At this point the aerial bombardment

commenced and the artillery was finally silenced allowing the first hours of sleep many had had in six

days. B co was finally relieved from A and C companies and sent back to a secure location to get some

much needed rest. While that rest was short Jived it was welcome as we were told we were going to be

the first to go home. Hours later we were told to download ammunition and board the aircraft to

Kuwait where the awaiting Delta Airlines aircraft was standing by.

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Lessons Learned:

Doctrine dictates that you should always have a minimum of a two to one ratio for ground

forces in the offense. While this may be based on fact, I believe the unit, its support, training, and

motivation need to be taken into account. On numerous occasions, too many for this paper, a small SOF

element was able to destroy or neutralize a much larger enemy force. In fact, it is said that the SOF

forces numbering less than a thousand was speculated to have destroyed up to thirteen enemy divisions

in the western portion of Iraq. These forces relied heavily on available fire power however it was the

tenacity of the men and confidence of their leaders that accepted the doctrinal risk and executed with

incredible results.

While in this instance the train ing was evidently a major factor it is obvious to all those that will

look that training of the fire support personnel in the Army is lacking severally. This is never more

evident than the advent of the Jo int Fires Observer school at Fort Sill. This is yet another school created

to try and offset the inadequacies of leaders teaching their subordinates their jobs. Every skill that is

taught to Jr NCOs and officers in that course is something they should have been doing anyway. It has

been a task since before I came in the Army. It appears this is another way for the military to not have

to make the tough calls on inapt leaders that do not know their profession. Had an element been

trapped on this dam without a skilled and highly trained FSE, according to the B co commander and BN

XO, that company would have had to be reconstituted due to enormous casualties .

A precision targeted system that is made for the light infantry support fire supporters needs to

developed immediately. Program offices from Fort Sill are not listening and continue to develop items

that will only be "useful" for mechanized forces. Their size and weight precludes its use by light infantry

forces and the planned systems will not be available until FY 17 at the earliest.

As mentioned in this document the principles of fire support played a big part in the battle on

both sides. First, the Iraqis in ability to understand massed fires and trajectory angles made their

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systems almost completely ineffective. They did have the effect of scaring the hell out of our guys but

were unable to produce the casualties that they could have. Since the artillery was shooting from a

lower elevation on low trajectory the effects of those rounds were limited. Some of them even flew

right over our heads and kept going to blow up harmlessly away from our positions. After firing well

over two-thousand rounds large caliber artillery rounds, having a known, pre-targeted location, using

high angle that artillery would have produced mass casualties and there would have been nothing our

element could have done but try and seek cover. On the other hand our ability to incorporate those

principles was a major factor in our ability to retain control of the area. The now much overlooked

ability to provide sustained fire power complimented with heavy doses of precision delivered a

devastating effect on the enemy. At times our mortars were "spot on" however when they weren't they

were extremely effective in keeping the enemy fixed in order to get precision weapons on target. As

mentioned this sustained fire power is often put aside nowaday's however it is extremely important to

remember that those precision weapons take a long time to coordinate, where some of your sustained

fires are rapid and provide the continued suppression required- hence the principle of sustained fire

power. CAS cannot provide continued suppression no matter how many aircraft you have over head!

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