gnss vulnerability sg7/cns sg7-ppt6.… · gnss vulnerability midanpirg cns sg/7 meeting cairo,...

GNSSvulnerability

MIDANPIRGCNSSG/7MeetingCairo,Egypt31May-2June2016

Egypt

1CNSSG/7Cairo,Egypt31May– 2June2016

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PresentationOutlineGNSSinAviationOperationalbenefitsFourpillarsofGNSSservicesChicagoconvention&GNSSGNSSVulnerabilitiesSpectrumregulationsGNSSVulnerabilitiesmitigationICAO/ANC12&GNSSvulnerabilitiesmitigationchallengesConclusion

CNSSG/7Cairo,Egypt31May– 2June2016

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GNSSinAviation

• Direct,obvioususesofGNSS:1) AircraftNavigation:Ø SupportsAreaNavigation,UserPreferredRouteØ Universalcoverageworldwide- Terrestrial, OceanicØ Accuracyadequate forallopsexceptPrecisionApproachØ ProvenveryhighAvailability,Continuity,Accuracy&Integrity

2) AircraftAutomaticPositionReporting:Ø ADS-B– broadcast– usedbyotheraircraftandATCØ ADS-C– contract– usedbyATC


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GNSSinAviation

• NotsoobvioususesofGNSS– Timing:Ø Clocks– ATC&SystemmonitoringofflightprogressØ Multi-Radar/ADS-BTrackingØ CommunicationBearersØ Multi-Lateration – TimedifferenceofArrival


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GNSSinAviation

Navigationwithgroundbased


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GNSSinAviation

NavigationwithSatellitebasedCNSSG/7Cairo,Egypt31May– 2June2016

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Operationalbenefits

benefits

Safety

UnderconsiderationofGNSS

vulnerability

Capacity

Traffic increase

Efficiency

Betterroutes

Environment

Noisecomplaints&emissionsreeducation

AccesstoAirspace

Increaseairspaceaccessibility


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FourpillarsofGNSSservices:

accuracy Availability

Continuity Integrity


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FourpillarsofGNSSservices:1) Accuracy:


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FourpillarsofGNSSservices:2) Availability:

Proportionoftime theSystemisavailabletothetime ithadbeenplannedforthesystemtobeavailable

planned

available


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FourpillarsofGNSSservices:3) continuity:

Theprobabilitythatasystemwillperformitsrequiredfunctionwithoutunscheduledinterruption.

ImagesourcefrompocketGPSworldwebsite


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FourpillarsofGNSSservices:4) Integrity:

Theleveloftrustthaterrorswillbecorrectlydetected


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Chicagoconvention&GNSSArticle28ofChicagoconvention:Airnavigationfacilitiesandstandardsystems:EachcontractingStateundertakes, sofarasitmayfindpracticable, to:a)Provide, initsterritory,airports, radioservices,meteorological services andotherairnavigationfacilities tofacilitateinternationalairnavigation, inaccordancewiththestandardsandpractices recommended orestablished fromtimetotime,pursuant tothisConvention;b)Adoptandputintooperation theappropriate standardsystemsofcommunicationsprocedure, codes,markings, signals,lightingandotheroperationalpracticesandruleswhichmayberecommended orestablished fromtimetotime,pursuant tothisConvention;C)Collaborate ininternationalmeasures tosecure thepublicationofaeronauticalmapsandcharts inaccordancewithstandardswhichmayberecommended orestablished fromtimetotime,pursuant tothisConvention.Reference: ICAODOC.7300/9


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Chicagoconvention&GNSSImplicationsofArticle28oftheChicagoConvention:"Astate maydelegate theprovisionfunction toanotherentity, includingacommercialorprivateoperator..." TheState”nevertheless remains responsible forsettingandmaintainingthestandardsoftheservices providedandforthequalityofservices provided.

Under thosecircumstances, therelevant Statescontinuetoberesponsible underArticle28oftheChicagoConvention, “regardlessofsuchdelegation.”

Reference: ICAODOC.7300/9


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Chicagoconvention&GNSSImplicationsofArticle28oftheChicagoConvention:

TheimplementationofGNSSleavesunaffected theresponsibilityofStatesunderArticle28,therefore aStateusingthesesignalsforprovidingAirNavigationServicesremained responsible under thisArticledespite thefactthat itdidnotcontrol suchsignals.

ICAO,AirNavigationServicesEconomicPanel,Reportonfinancialandrelatedorganisational andManagerial AspectsofGlobalNavigationSatelliteSystem(GNSS)Provision andOperation, ICAODoc.9660

Reference: ICAODOC.7300/9


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Chicagoconvention&GNSS

Reference:AN-Conf/11-WP/160presentedbytheUnitedStates

Differentpointofviews:

USA:Ø Noprobleminlegalframeworkorsettingthelawbutthe

problemsduetotechnicalnatureoramatterofthelackofresourcesandpoliticalwill.

Ø WorkonlegalissuesmustnotbepermittedtodelaytechnicalimplementationofCNS/ATM


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Reference:AN-Conf/11-WP/153presentedbyEUROCONTROL

Differentpointofviews:EUROCONTROL:Ø mostStateswillnotbedirectlyinvolvedintheoperationof

GNSSsystems...Airnavigationwithintheirsovereignairspacewillconsequentlyrelyheavilyonfacilitiesbeyondtheirdirectcontrol.

Ø Statesneedtobesatisfied..thattheGNSSsignalsandservicesofferedwithintheirairspacemeettheappropriateperformancerequirementsintermsofintegrity,reliability,accuracyandcontinuityandthattheirliabilityisclearlydefined.


AfricanStatesØ stateswhobythemselvescannotprovidetheGNSSservices

butyetcannotberelievedoftheirresponsibilitiesundertheChicagoConvention.

Ø authorizetheuseofthesystemoverwhichtheyhavenocontrol.

Ø committingbothprovidersanduserstoacceptcertaininternationalrightsandresponsibilitiesinaformofabindingandenforceablelegalinstrumentwhichshouldclearly“spellouttherightsandresponsibilities”.

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Reference:AN-Conf/11-WP/143presentedbyAFI

Differentpointofviews:


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GNSSvulnerabilities:Vulnerability:referstotheinability(ofasystemoraunit)

Interference

unintentional Intentional

q Ionosphereq Solarstormq mobileandfixedVHFcommunications,q harmonicsoftelevisionstations,q certain radars,q mobilesatellite communicationsand

military systems.

q Jammingq Spoofing


Ø Late2009;engineersnoticedthatsatellite-positioningreceiversfornavigationaidinginairplanelandingsatNewarkairportinUSweresufferingfrombriefdailybreaks.

Ø FAAafter2mothsinvestigationtrackdowntheproblem.

Ø AcheapGPSjammerontruckpassedbyonnearbyhighway.

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GNSSvulnerabilities:Jamming:


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GNSSvulnerabilities:Spoofing:isthebroadcastofGNSS-likesignalsthatcauseavionicstocalculateerroneouspositionsandprovidefalseguidance.


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GNSSvulnerabilities:

Whatactionshallbetakingbystates????

Ø identifythevulnerabilitiesofthissystem;and

Ø developthenecessarymitigations


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SpectrumregulationsØ Statesshouldprohibitallactionsthatleadtodisruptionof

GNSSsignals.Ø Statesshouldtodevelopandenforceastrongregulatory

frameworkgoverningtheuseofintentionalin-bandradiatorsincluding:q GNSSrepeaters,q pseudolites,q Spoofers&jammers

Ø Alsoin-bandradiatorsincludingcertaintelevisionbroadcastchannelsandotherindustrialapplications.

Ø ICAOElectronicBulletinEB2011/56InterferenceØ statesshouldestablishregulationsthatforbidtheuseof

jammingandspoofingdevicesandregulatetheirimportation,exportation,manufacture,sale,purchase,ownershipanduse.


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SpectrumregulationsØ SomeStatesprohibitallactionsthatleadtodisruptionofGNSS

signalsandprescribeseverepenaltiesforthepurchaseoruseofjammers.

Ø Statesshoulddevelopthemeanstodetectinterferencesourcesinsupportofenforcementprograms.

Ø StatesshouldtakemorepreventivemeasurestoreducethelikelihoodofGNSSdisruptiontoaviationbynon-aviationusers.

Ø ICAODOC.7300&ITURegulationsprotectGNSSfrequenciesforaviationuseespeciallyforelectromagneticspectrumofnewapplicationlikemobilephonesandbroadbanddataservicewhichemitsignalsstrongerthanGNSSsignals


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SpectrumregulationsØ futuremulti-constellationandmulti- frequencyGNSS

equipmentforaviationwillbedesignedtomaximizeinterferencerobustnessasmuchasreasonablypossible,itisimportantthatnewspectrumservicesdonotneutralizetheseimprovements.


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GNSSvulnerabilitiesmitigation

Ø Installationandoperation:qOn-aircraftinterference:canbepreventedbyproper

installationofGNSSequipment,itsintegrationwithotheraircraftsystems(e.g.antennaseparation,out-of-bandfiltering)andrestrictionsontheuseofportableelectronicdevicesonboardaircraft.

q Spectrummanagement:creationofregulations/lawsthatcontroltheuseofspectrum;enforcementofthoseregulations/laws;andvigilanceinevaluatingnewRFsources(newsystems)toensurethattheydonotinterferewithGNSS.


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ØNewsignalsandconstellations:Strongersignals,diversefrequencies,additionalsatellites/constellations,futureGEOsatellitesusingsatelliteswhichlinesofsightareseparatedbyatleast45°

Ø Inertialnavigationsystems(INS)andreceivertechnologies:qUseofINSRNAVcapabilityafterthelossofGNSSorother

positionupdatingqUseoftechnologiesthataddrobustnesstoGNSSreceivers

tomitigateinterference:Anti-jamtechnologiesincludeadvancedantennasandreceiversignalprocessingtechniques


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Ø Proceduralmethods:Aircraftcanrevertvisualnavigation,ATC,air-to-aircommunicationswithinnon- ATCornon-radarairspace

Ø Terrestrialradionavigationaids:RNAVDMEsupportinginfrastructure(enroute,TMAandapproachwithinareacoverage),orILS/MLSinfrastructureforprecisionapproach.


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ICAO/ANC12andGNSSvulnerabilitiesmitigation:

Ø Recommendation6/7–AssistancetoStatesinmitigatingGNSSvulnerabilities

Ø Recommendation6/8–PlanningformitigationofGNSSvulnerabilities:

Ø Recommendation6/9–IonosphereandspaceweatherinformationforfutureGNSSimplementation:


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ChallengesØGNSSNOTAMsØMitigationprocessØGNSSRegionalMonitorØ ICAOGuidanceMaterialsØ StateGNSSregulationØNationalspectrumregulation(maybedifferentpartiesareinvolved– notlimitedtoCAAsandTRAs)

Ø IncompletePBNimplementationnationalplans


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CONCLUSION

ØGNSShasalotofoperationalbenefits.ØGNSSismustbuthowcanweimplement!!!!ØHowtomitigateGNSSVulnerability.ØConventionalorterrestrialNav.Aidsbecamenotenoughtomeetaviationrequirementswithreasonablecost(especiallythirdcountries).

ØTomorrow,spacealsowillbemorecongestedthanairspace.


CNSSG/7Cairo,Egypt31May– 2June2016 32

Thankyou

EhabRaslanAssistantMinisterofEgyptiancivilaviationEmail:[email protected]

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