GeorgetownUniversityLawCenterSJDDissertation

OnARighttoResistantDisobedienceinATransitional

Society

Hung-JuChen

Supervisor:LawrenceB.Solum

2017/05

CONTENTCHAPTERONEINTRODUCTION.................................................................................................................1

1.TAIWAN’SSUNFLOWERMOVEMENTANDITSINSPIRATIONFORDISOBEDIENCE 1

2.THESTRUCTUREOFTHISDISSERTATION 43.THECONTRIBUTIONOFJOHNRAWLS’STHEORYOFCIVILDISOBEDIENCE—THECOMMUNICATIVEFUNCTIONOFDISOBEDIENCE 8

4.THECOREQUESTIONSREGARDINGDISOBEDIENCEANDAWAYOFANALYZINGTHEM 9

5.THREECONCEPTIONSOFDISOBEDIENCE:EXPRESSIVE,COMMUNICATIVE,ANDRESISTANTDISOBEDIENCE 11

6.TWOAPPROACHESTODISOBEDIENCE:AJUSTIFICATION-BASEDANDARIGHTS-BASEDAPPROACH 14

7.CANWEHAVEARIGHTTORESISTANTDISOBEDIENCEINATRANSITIONALSOCIETY? 16

CHAPTERTWORAWLSONCIVILDISOBEDIENCE:THEEVOLUTIONOFHISCONCEPTION...19

1.INTRODUCTION:JOHNRAWLS’STWOTEXTSONCIVILDISOBEDIENCE 192.JOHNRAWLS’SPREVIOUSDEMONSTRATIONOFCIVILDISOBEDIENCEIN1969 212.1.Introduction:TheRoleof“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”inthe

ExplicationofRawls’sMatureTheory 212.2.JohnRawls’sPreviousDefinitionofCivilDisobediencein“TheJustification

ofCivilDisobedience” 222.3.Rawls’sArgumentsforJustifiedCivilDisobedience 24

3.JOHNRAWLS’STHEORYOFCIVILDISOBEDIENCEINATHEORYOFJUSTICE 293.1.AGeneralRoadmapforRawls’sTheoryofCivilDisobedience—TheSocial

Context 293.2.TheConstitutiveElementsofRawlsianCivilDisobedience 313.3.TheJustificatoryElementsofRawlsianCivilDisobedience 42

4.THEIMPLICATIONSOFRAWLSIANCIVILDISOBEDIENCE 484.1.TheComparisonbetween“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”andA

TheoryofJustice 494.2.TheCommunicativeFunctionofRawlsianDisobedience 57

CHAPTERTHREETHREECONCEPTIONSOFDISOBEDIENCE:EXPRESSIVE,COMMUNICATIVE,ANDRESISTANTCONCEPTIONS..................................................................................61

1.INTRODUCTION 611.1.ARoadmapofThisChapter 611.2.TheConceptualToolsUsedinThisChapter 641.3.QuestionsthatMatterinConceptionsofDisobedience 75

2.THREECONCEPTIONSOFDISOBEDIENCE:THEEXPRESSIVE,THECOMMUNICATIVE,ANDTHERESISTANTCONCEPTIONSOFDISOBEDIENCE 772.1.ExpressiveDisobedience 782.2.CommunicativeDisobedience 822.3.ResistantDisobedience 852.4.AComparisonoftheThreeConceptionsofDisobedience 92

3.THESCOPEOFPERMISSIBLEACTIONSWITHINTHREECONCEPTIONS 933.1.ANoteontheIdeaofNonviolencebeforeInvestigatingthePermissible

ActionswithinThreeConceptionsofDisobedience 933.2.ThePermissibleActionsThatCouldbeAdoptedinEachConception 98

4.THEJUSTIFICATORYTHRESHOLDOFDISOBEDIENCE:THENORMATIVECOMMITMENTANDTHEWEIGHTOFNORMALDEMOCRATICPARTICIPATION 1074.1.ExpressiveDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment—TheFreedomof

Expression 1084.2.CommunicativeDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment:anEqual

RelationshipamongMembersofSociety 1094.3.ResistantDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment:DemocraticDefense

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CHAPTERFOURTHERIGHTTODISOBEY:ITSSOURCEANDFOUNDATION.............................117

1.INTRODUCTION 1172.THEDISTINCTIONBETWEENAJUSTIFICATION-BASEDANDARIGHTS-BASEDAPPROACHTOCIVILDISOBEDIENCE 1182.1.JosephRaz’sDistinctionBetweenJustifiedDisobedienceandaRightto

Disobey 1192.2.FirstandSecondOrdersReasonsandtheDistinctionBetweena

Justification-BasedandaRights-BasedApproachtoDisobedience 1242.3.TheIdeaofCircumventionofReasonsinaJustification-BasedApproach

1272.4.TheMoralDifferenceBetweenDisobedienceandOrdinaryCriminal

Conduct--TheFunctionofMoralProfiling 1323.ARIGHTS-BASEDAPPROACHTODISOBEDIENCE:ITSSOURCEANDEFFECT 1363.1.TwoSourcesoftheRighttoDisobey:TheRightofMoralConvictionand

theRightofPoliticalParticipation 1373.2.TheEffectoftheRighttoDisobey:TheAffirmativeAttitudeandthe

BurdensofProof 1433.3.TheSubstantiveImpactonProsecutorialDiscretionandJudicialRole 149

4.CONCLUDINGREMARKS 163

CHAPTERFIVEIMPLEMENTATION:ARIGHTTORESISTANTDISOBEDIENCEINATRANSITIONALSOCIETY............................................................................................165

1.THESTRUCTUREOFTHISCHAPTER 165

2.THEIDEAANDFEATURESOFTHETRANSITIONALSOCIETYINTHISDISSERTATION 1662.1.Burdensofjudgmentarisefromvariousperspectivesandgenerate

disagreementsaboutwhatthepastinjusticewasandwhatoughttobedonetocompensatevictimsinatransitionalsociety. 168

2.2.Opportunistswhogainedsignificantbenefitsduringthepre-transitionalperiodexploitgapsinthelawtomaintaintheiradvantages. 170

2.3.Legalobstaclestopoliticalparticipationarethemajorproblemformembersoftransitionalsocietieswhowishtoexercisetheirpoliticalrights. 172

2.4.Transitionalsocietiesarecharacterizedbystructuralinjusticeconsistingofmoralwrongsthatcannotbeattributedtoindividualactions. 174

3.REASONSTOACCEPTRESISTANTDISOBEDIENCEINTHETRANSITIONALSOCIETY 1773.1.ReasonsWhyExpressiveandCommunicativeDisobedienceCannot

CorrectStructuralInjustice 1783.2.FourTypesofResistantDisobedienceandItsInitiatingConditions 181

4.REASONSTOACCEPTARIGHTTODISOBEYBASEDONTHERIGHTOFPOLITICALPARTICIPATION 1844.1.Membersofatransitionalsocietywouldnotchooseajustification-based

approachbecausewhetherdisobedienceisjustifiedisitselfhighlydisputable. 184

4.2.Membersofatransitionalsocietyshouldadoptarights-basedapproachgroundedontherightofpoliticalparticipation. 190

CHAPTERSIXTHESUNFLOWERMOVEMENTINTAIWANANALYZEDANDCONCLUDINGTHOUGHTS.....................................................................................................................196

TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1: Types of Resistant Disobedience ................................................................. 13 Figure 2: The Comparison Among Forces Created by Disobedience ......................... 13

Figure 3: A Typology of Contexts and Reasons in Disobedience ............................... 15 Figure 4: A Typology of Violations of the Two Principles for Initiating Disobedience

..................................................................................................................... 28 Figure 5: Rawls’s Preliminary Conception of Civil Disobedience ............................. 29

Figure 6: The Two Components of Being Political ..................................................... 32 Figure 7: The Constitutive Elements in the Rawlsian Conception of Disobedience ... 42

Figure 8: The Comparison of the Violation of Equal Opportunity Between TJCD and TJ ................................................................................................................. 45

Figure 9: A Comparison Between TJCD and TJ in Terms of Civil Disobedience ..... 57 Figure 10: The Type of Disobedience in Terms of Collective Actions ....................... 74

Figure 11: Types of Resistant Disobedience ............................................................... 87 Figure 12: A Comparison of the Forces Created by Disobedience ............................. 92

Figure 13: Morreall's Idea of Violence and Corresponding Patterns of Actions ........ 95 Figure 14: Basic Components of A Violent Action .................................................... 96

Figure 15: A Preliminary Typology of Violent Actions in the Course of Disobedience ................................................................................................................... 97

Figure 16: Brian Tamanaha's Concept of the Rule of Law ...................................... 113 Figure 17: The Idea of Circumvention of Reasons .................................................... 128

Figure 18: The Comparison Between a Justification-Based and a Rights-Based Approach to Disobedience ....................................................................... 149

Figure 19: The Trees of Disobedience ...................................................................... 151 Figure 20: The Proportionality Test in Violent Disobedience .................................. 160

Figure 21: The Possible Results for the Prosecutor to Indict Violent Disobedience 161 Figure 22: Types of Resistant Disobedience ............................................................. 181

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CHAPTERONEIntroduction

1.Taiwan’sSunflowerMovementanditsInspirationforDisobedience

OnMarch17,2014,asmallgroupoflessthantwentypeopletookpartinasit-ininfrontoftheLegislativeYuan(equivalenttotheCongressoftheUnitedStates) concerning the ratification process of the Cross-Strait Agreement onTrade in Services (hereafter CSATS). The CSATS is based on the Cross-StraitsEconomicCooperationFrameworkAgreement(hereafterECFA), anagreementaimed at opening the free trade market between Taiwan and China. Thoseprotesters,comingfromvariedbackgrounds(e.g.,NGOsandstudents),sharedacommon purpose: to monitor the ratification process and demand that theLegislativeYuannotactasarubberstampfortheCSATS.

At 2:30 p.m., the temperature climbed to 34 degrees centigrade (93degrees Fahrenheit), and, inside the Legislative Yuan, the debate turned thechamber into a battlefield. The legislatorswere divided into two groups. TheKuomintangparty(KMTparty),themajoritypartyintheLegislativeYuanatthetime, supported ratification of CSATS. But the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP)—theminorityparty—opposedCSATSandadoptedablockingstrategytosuspendtheprocessofratification.TheChairmanoftheratificationcommittee,however,wasamemberoftheKMT;heturnedtheDDPaway,wentbacktohisprivateoffice,and“announced”thattheprocessofapprovalhadbeencompleted.It took the Chairman only 30 seconds from announcing the opening of theapprovalprocesstotheendofit.Thatabruptturnofevents—nowknownasthe“30-SecondIncident”—wasthesparkforfurtherprotestsandopenedthedoortocivildisobediencethatnoonecouldhaveexpectedatthetime.1

WhenprotestersoutsidetheLegislativeYuanlearnedwhattheChairmanhaddone,theywereshocked;theirreactionwasstunnedsilence.Theprocessofratifying the CSATS seemed ridiculous—a mere formality—because theChairmanhad circumvented theprocess of substantivedebate. In fact, the30-SecondIncidentdemonstrated that thepersonalwillofTaiwan’sPresident,MaYing-jeou,couldoverridetheconstitutionalprovisionsforchecksandbalances.The process bywhich the CSATAwas negotiated and signedwas not only nottransparent, but the government had neglected to even give members of thelegislature access to substantive information about the negotiations. What’smore, PresidentMa, the Chairman of theKMTparty, had demanded thatKMTlegislators support the CSATS. Ultimately, the Legislative Yuan essentiallyservedasarubberstampfortheactionoftheMagovernment.

1 See the entry of Sunflower Student Movement in the Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunflower_Student_Movement ); Last visit: 2016/12/10.

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Itwasinthiscontextthatactivistsdecidedtodosomethingdifferentfromprevious protests, something that would attract the public’s attention andexpresstheprotesters’strongdisagreementwiththeshamratificationprocess.OnMarch18,2014, a fewprotesters gathered in frontof theLegislativeYuan.Most members of society had not paidmuch attention to the impact that theCSATS might have on Taiwan’s economy; moreover, the general public wasunawareoftheproceduralproblemswiththeratificationprocess.Publicofficials,politicians, andmostmembers of society did not yet realize that a spark hadbeen ignited and that the whole community was about to be drawn into adramaticpoliticalconfrontationinvolvingcivildisobedience.

During the night ofMarch 18, the core group of protesters planned tooccupytheLegislativeYuan.First,inordertodistractthepolice,someprotestersassembled and generated chaotic situations; others held an assembly on thesouthsideof theLegislativeYuan.Onlya fewprotestersgatherednorthof theLegislative Yuan. While the police were engaged elsewhere, these protestersbrokeintotheLegislativeYuanbuildingandsuccessfullyoccupiedtheAssemblyHall.Soonafterthat,morethan200protesters(mostlystudents.)breachedthepolice blockade and stormed into the Legislative Yuan. At 9:30 p.m., theprotesters declared to the public that they had successfully occupied theLegislativeYuanandmadeashortstatementaboutthereasonsfortheirprotest.Theprotesterscomprisedwhatisnowcalledthe“318Movement”becauseofthedate,March18;themovementisalsocalledthe“SunflowerMovement.”2

Ironically, although the protesters now held the Legislative Yuan, theiractual targetwastheMagovernmentand itsabuseofpresidentialpower. TheprotestershadoccupiedtheAssemblyHallontheassumptionthatbecausetheLegislative Yuan was under the control of the KMT party, it was simply anextension of the Ma. However, the Ma government did not respond to theoccupationbecausetheAssemblyHallwasnotsubjecttopresidentialauthority.When it became apparent that the Ma government would not respond to theoccupation of the Assembly Hall, a group of protesters, dissatisfied by thegovernment’s lackof reaction, tookasignificant stepanddecided to target theExecutiveYuan.

On the evening of March 23, crowds of demonstrators succeeded inoccupying theExecutiveYuan. Their actions shocked theMaGovernment andled thePremierMinister, Yi-Huah Jiang, to take extrememeasures to evict thecrowds.Theprocessofevictionledtoone-sidedviolence;policeinflictedinjuriesondemonstrators. Inaddition,policeusedforcetoevictmembersofthepressbymeansthatincludedwatercannons.

Theseharshmeasureswere the straw that broke the camel’s back. Thecitizens of Taiwan had now witnessed how violent the State could be. Forexample,avideofromthatnightshowspolicedraggingafemalestudentontheroad out of the Executive Yuan. However, the brutal treatment of protestersgenerated sympathy for their movement. More and more people began toparticipate in various ways. For example, in order to protect the protesters

2 The complete introduction to this movement can be seen on the website, Democracy at 4 am. (http://4am.tw ).

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insidetheAssemblyHallfrombeingevicted,thousandsofpeoplestagedasit-inoutside the Legislative Yuan; these secondary demonstrators voluntarilyorganizedthemselvesasacheckagainstabusiveactionbythepolice.

According to a survey conducted by Professor Wan-Chi Chen of theDepartment of Sociology at National Taipei University, the backgrounds ofparticipants in the318Movementwerequitediverse.Theycame fromvariouseconomic, social, and cultural levels. While most of them were students, asubstantial percentage of those who joined the sit-in were members of theworkingclass.

The political significance of the Sunflower Movement is evinced by itsinclusiveness. Individuals from all walks of society provided various kinds ofassistance, and they efficiently created a division of labor among themselves.Importantly, these protesters realized the importance of connecting with theworld—something that had rarely occurred in previous protests. This protestwas no longer operating solely or primarily at the local level but instead hadcreatedaconnectionbetweenlocalparticipantsandinternationalcommunities.This emphasis on communicationwasmanifested by the fact that therewas ateam of professionals who provided translation services and press releasesdetailingthedailyeventsandmakingthecasefortherejectionofCSATS.

Implicationsof the318Movementarestilldebated todaybyacademics,butwhatisnotdisputedisthatthemovementhasproducedsignificantchangesin Taiwan’s politics. For example, in 2015 and 2016, the KMT Party lost themajority in the local and national elections. The rate of political participationamong young people has increased, and more young citizens have becomeinvolvedinthelegislativeprocess.Thismovementhasalsoinspiredagenerationofyoung lawstudents toexaminethebasicstructureofTaiwanesesocietyandfocus on constitutional reforms thatmight prevent the abusive use of politicalpower.

Even though the 318 Movement brought about positive changes inTaiwan’s politics, it also likely exposed the participants to legal proceedings,including both a prosecution phase and trial. Such proceedings could createseriousnegativeconsequencesfortheprotesters.

Taiwan's legal system lacks the conceptual tools necessary to dealwithprotesters'legalresponsibilitiesinawaythatfullyrespondstothecomplexitiesof civil disobedience in a transitional society. The absence of an adequatetheoreticalframeworkisreflectedinthedisagreementamongscholarsregardingthequestionofwhetherthe318Movementwasnonviolent,and,ifitdidcontainviolent elements, how that fact should figure into the legal treatment of theprotesters. For example, protesters used tools to break the windows of theLegislative Yuan and adopted a strategy of human waves in order to limittemporarily the movement of police. Scholars debated about whether theintentional action of breaking windows constitutes violence. Scholars alsodisagreeastowhethertheprotesters'actionswereinconsistentwiththeruleoflaw and whether they engaged in arbitrary civil disobedience based on theirmere dissatisfaction with the Ma government's China policy. Reactions to the318MovementarelikeamirrorinthattheyreflectthehighlydiversejudgmentsandpoliticaltensionswithinTaiwanesesociety.

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Forthesereasonsandothers,the318Movementprovidesavaluablecasestudy for scholars and jurists to reflect on issues of civil disobedience in thecontextofatransitionalsociety—thatis,asocietylikeTaiwanthatisinaprocessoftransitionfromanauthoritarianregimecharacterizedbysubstantialinjusticetoademocratic regimecharacterizedbya reasonably justbasic structure.The318Movementwasnotaparadigmcaseofnonviolentcivildisobedience:itwasnotawhollypeacefulprotestinwhichonlyminorandsymbolicviolationsofthelawtranspired.Law-breakingwasnotlimitedtoasmallorisolatedgroup.Someof the protesters in the 318Movement intentionally caused property damageandinterferedwithlawenforcementofficers.Countlessindividualsassistedthismovementthroughavarietyofmeans,manyofwhichmightbecountedastheaiding and abetting of criminal conduct. Furthermore, the occupation of theLegislativeYuanwasnotlimitedtoashortsymbolicperiod,suchasasingleday;it lasted over 20 days and involved more than twenty thousand participants.Thus, the 318Movement not only poses practical questions to Taiwan's legalsystemconcerningprotesters'legalresponsibilities,butitalsoposessignificanttheoreticalquestionstotheacademy.Isthisacaseofcivildisobedience?Howdowe characterize this Movement given that many individuals participated withdifferent intentions and purposes? Is it a single movement or several distinctmovements? Was the 318 Movement a form of civil disobedience or was itinstead an exercise of the right of resistance, which has its origin in GermanBasiclaw?

Anadequatetheoryofthecomplexsocialphenomenaexemplifiedbythe318Movementshouldattempttoclarifythecomplexrelationshipsbetweentheactionsandeventsdescribedabove.Atheoryofcivildisobediencecanprovideaclear insight into the complicated circumstances in which such disobedienceoccursintheworld.Thepurposeofthisdissertationistoprovideasignificantlynewaccountofdisobediencebyusingtheconceptualtoolsofspeechacttheoryto develop a typology of disobedience that reflects the different purposes thatcivildisobediencecanserve.Thisdissertationdoesnotfocusdirectlyonthe318Movement,butthehistoryofthatincidentinformsandshapesmythinkingaboutdisobedience. Instead of examining the 318Movement as a particular case ofcivil disobedience, and determining whether the movement was politicallyjustified, this dissertationmoves to a higher level of abstraction and developsthree conceptions of disobedience--expressive, communicative, and resistantdisobedience—that provide a descriptive and normative framework forunderstanding and evaluating particular cases of disobedience. The threeconceptionsarenotnecessarilyexhaustive—theremaybeothertypes—butthistypology provides crucial insights into some of the most important questionsabout disobedience such as the relationship between disobedients and othermembers of society, the communicative forces generatedbydisobedience, andthe permissible scope of actions that can be adopted in the course ofdisobedience.

2.TheStructureofthisDissertationThe thesis of this dissertation is that members of transitional societies

shouldacceptaconceptionofdisobediencethatpermitsthemtouseintenseandeven destructive means in order to address serious cases of injustice. This

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conceptionofdisobedienceincorporatesarighttodisobeythelaw,andcreatesacorrelative duty on the part of others not to interfere with the course ofdisobedience. This conception of disobedience (developed for the first time inthis dissertation) will be called the “resistant conception of disobedience” (or“resistant disobedience” for short). The right that protects civil disobediencefrominterferencefindsitsstrongestsupportinthefundamentalrightofpoliticalparticipation.Thecombinationofthesetwopointsclarifiesmythesis:membersof transitional societies should adopt a right to resistant disobedience whichallows themtousemeans that Iwill call “intense” inorder toexpress the ideathatresistantdisobediencecanincludemeasuresthataredestructiveorcoercive.Resistantdisobedienceisnotlimitedtopassiveresistance.

Moreover,resistantdisobediencewithharmfulresultsshouldprimafaciebe immune from interference by the political authority. If a political authorityaims to halt disobedience or interfere with disobedient actions, state officialsshouldbearaburdenofproof,whichrequiresthemtojustifytheirinterferencewithdisobedience.

The complete argument for this thesiswill takeplace in twoparts. Thefirstpartconcernstheoriesofdisobediencethatmembersofsocietymightadopttoguidetheiractions: thediscussioninthissectionappliestoallsocieties.Thesecondpart focusesondisobediencetheorieswithin thecontextof transitionalsocieties; this part shows that members of a transitional society possesssufficient reasons to adopt the resistant conception of disobedience during aperiod of transition from an unjust and authoritarian regime to a democraticsocietywithareasonablyjustbasicstructure.Thefirstpartofthedissertationiscalled“Theory”;thesecondpartiscalled“Implementation.”

Threetopicsorganizethefirstpartofthisdissertation.First,IreviewJohnRawls's philosophical investigation of civil disobedience. Rawls's theory is theparadigm of the liberal view of civil disobedience, and provides severalsignificant insights.WhileRawls's theoryhasattractedasubstantialamountofacademicattention,verylittleattentionhasbeenpaidtothedifferencebetweenhisargumentsin“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience,”ashorttextpublishedin1968,andATheoryofJustice,afull-lengthworkpublishedin1971.Bygivingaclose reading of Rawls's views in these two texts, we will be able to glean aclearer view of his mature theory of civil disobedience. In particular, thisexamination of the development of Rawls’s thought will illuminate one of hiscentral ideas—that themost significant function of disobedience iswhat I call“the communicative function of disobedience.” Chapter Two reviews Rawls’stheory of civil disobedience and explicates the idea of the communicativefunctionofdisobedience.

Thesecondtopicinthefirstpartofthisdissertationistheexplicationofthree conceptions of disobedience in order to provide answers to the corephilosophicalquestionsabout thenatureand justificationofcivildisobedience.The three conceptions are “expressive,” “communicative,” and “resistant”disobedience.ChapterThreeusesspeechacttheoryasthebasicmethodologicalapproach for developing the three conceptions of disobedience; the version ofspeech act theory is derived from the work of John Austin as laid out in hisimportant monograph How to Do Things with Words. Austin’s notions of

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illocutionaryforce,perlocutionaryeffect,andthesecuringofuptakearethekeyconceptualtoolsusedtobuildthethreedifferentconceptionsofdisobedience.

ChapterThreealsodevelopsasetofbasicquestionsthateachtheoryofcivildisobediencemustanswer.Therearefourcorequestions:

1. What is the Relationship Assumed Between Disobedients andAddressees?Sincedisobedienceisanactiondirectedtowardothers,each conceptionofdisobedience assumesa relationshipbetweendisobedients and addressees. This relationship draws a baselinethatdistinguishesdifferentconceptionsofcivildisobedience.

2. WhatForceIsIntentionallyCreatedbyDisobedience?Disobediencecangenerate intended force(in thesenseof “force” inspeechacttheory). Each conception of disobedience has an associatedprimaryintendedforceandaconcomitantprimaryeffectonothermembers of society. Therefore, explication of a conception ofdisobediencemustspecifywhatforcesitaimstogenerate.

3. What is the Scope of Permissible Action? Conceptions of civildisobedience specify patterns of permissible actions. Eachconception of disobedience must identify which actions arepermissible within the normative framework of the conception.The first question when considering the scope of permissibleactions concerns the role of the principle of nonviolence in eachconception:Istheprincipleofnonviolencemerelystrategicorisita “principled principle”—one adopted for a nonstrategic reason?The second question is, what actions are permitted given therelationship between disobedients and addressees assumed ineach conception? And in order to answer the second question, aprior issue needs to be resolved, that is, what are “violent” and“nonviolent”actions?

4. What Is the Justificatory Threshold of Disobedience? Eachconception of disobedience includes an explication of itsnormative commitments. In other words, each conception iscommitted to some understanding of values and to a stance onwhat wrongs are appropriate as justifications for initiatingdisobedience.Each conception alsohas todealwith the role andweight of normal political appeal as a precondition for initiatingdisobedience.

Each theory of disobedience provides a distinct set of answers to thesequestionsabouttherelationshipbetweendisobedientsandaddressees,theforcecreated by disobedience, and the normative commitment implicit in thejustificatorythresholdfordisobedience.

The third topic in the first part of this dissertation is a discussionconcerning how disobedience should be protected from interference by thepublicauthorities.Whilepoliticalauthoritieshaveprotantoreasonstoprosecuteor punish disobedients who have intentionally broken a law, disobedience isdistinguishable from harmful and self-interested law-breaking. This moraldifference opens the question as to how a legal system ought to treatdisobedients' legal liabilities and what principle disobedients can provide to

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oppose political authorities' interference with disobedience. Asking whatprinciples a legal system should adopt todealwithdisobedients’ legal liabilityleads to a closely related question, where there is a “protected reason” forengaging in disobedience: according to Joseph Raz a “protected reason” fordisobedience would be a reason that justifies disobedience combined with areason to exclude consideration of other reasons thatwould otherwise defeatthejustifyingreason.

ChapterFourexploresthisquestionbydistinguishingtwoapproachestodisobedience.BasedonJosephRaz’sexplicationoftheideaofaprotectedreason,there are two distinct answers to the question as to how disobedience issupported by protected reasons. The first approach is a justification-basedapproach and the second a rights-based approach. I explicate the meaning ofthese two approaches and how they function differently in situations wheredisobebedients are confronted with interference by the political authorities.ChapterFourconcludesthefirstpartofthedissertation.

Thesecondpartof thisdissertationconcerns the implementationof thetheoriesofdisobediencesetforthinChaptersTwo,Three,andFour.Sincetherearethreeconceptionsofdisobedienceandtwodistinctapproachestoprotectingdisobedients,wecanaskthequestionastowhichcombinationofconceptionandapproach best suits a set of social conditions. Thus, we might ask whichconception would be adopted in a society that has a reasonably just basicstructure,butsignificantproblemsofisolatedinjustice,andsoforth.

Thisdissertationasksthequestionfromtheperspectiveofthemembersof a transitional society: this approach uses ideas developed by Rawls in hiselaboration of the original position and the veil of ignorance. The mainconclusion of the dissertation is thatmembers of a transitional society shouldadopt the resistant conceptionofdisobedience anda rights-basedapproach totheprotectionofdisobedients.Thedistinctionbetweenajustification-basedanda rights-based approach will be discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Fiveelaboratesthenormativeargumentsthatmembersofatransitionalsocietyhaveforarights-basedapproachtodisobedience.

ChapterFivearguesforarighttoresistantdisobedienceinatransitionalsociety.Ifirstdefineatransitionalsocietybyidentifyingfoursignificantfeatures:(1) the Burdens of Judgment, (2) Existence of Opportunists, (3) Existence ofLegal Obstacles for Political Participation, and (4) Structural Injustice. Amongthese four features, the fourth, structural injustice, constitutes the necessaryconditionforselectingtheresistantconceptionofdisobedience.Thefirstfeature,theburdensof judgment,andthesecondfeature,theexistenceofopportunists,provide grounds to take a rights-based approach to protecting disobedience.ThethirdfeatureiswhatIcall“legalobstacles”:Iusethisphrasetorefertotheexistenceofavarietyoflegalrulesinthetransitionalperiodthataredesignedtoraisebarrierstomembers'effectivepoliticalparticipation.

Thewholestructureof thisDissertation is representedby the followingFigure:

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3.TheContributionofJohnRawls’sTheoryofCivilDisobedience—TheCommunicativeFunctionofDisobedience

ThesubstantivediscussionofthisdissertationstartsfromaclosereadingofRawls’stheoryofdisobedienceinChapterTwo.Iexaminehistwosignificanttexts on civil disobedience: his early formulation in “The Justification of CivilDisobedience”andhismatureexplicationinATheoryofJustice(fromSection55

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to Section 59). These two texts, while similar, are materially different in thesensethattheyimplicitlycontaintwodistinctconceptionsofdisobediencethatIwill develop inChapterThree.Rawlshimselfmightnot have fully realized thesignificanceofthedifferencesbetweenthetwotexts;aclosereadingshowsthatthe theory of disobedience developed in A Theory of Justice is more mature,robust, and theoretically coherent. The primary purpose of Chapter Two is toreviewRawls'saccountofwhatcivildisobedienceisandonwhatgroundsitcanbe justified. A secondary goal in Chapter Two is to investigate the normativeimplicationofRawls'smatureexplicationsofdisobedience.Themostsignificantimplicationofhistheoryisthat itconceivesofcivildisobedienceasameansofcommunicationfordisobedientsandothermembersofsociety.Inanutshell,theprimary function of disobedience in Rawls's theory is the communicativefunction.

Taking disobedience as a mode of address leads us to uncover thecommunicative function of disobedience in Rawls's theory. For Rawls civildisobedience performs its communicative function because of an asymmetricpowerrelationshipbetween themajorityand theminority;disobedienceseekstoovercomethisasymmetryinordertobringaboutachangeinlawandpolicy.Disobedienceisnotonlyanactionthatcreatesawarenessofsomebasicissueofjustice,butitisalsoanactionthataimstoengageitsaddresseesinadeliberativeprocessintendedtoresultinaction.Rawlscharacterizesdisobedienceasamodeofaddressand,implicitly,asaspeechact,theillocutionaryforceofwhichisacallforactionwiththeintendedperlocutionaryeffectofactuallyproducingpoliticalactionthatalleviatesinjustice.

The communicative function of disobedience creates theoreticalpotentialities.Insistenceonthecommunicativefunctionofdisobediencenotonlyexcludespossibleusageofviolentactions,butitalsoimpliesthatdisobedienceisakindofspeechactwithbothinformationalcontentandtheaimofelicitingorproducingemotions,beliefs,oractions.However,thecommunicativeconceptionof disobedience is not the only conception. There are two other alternativeconceptions that disobedients could adopt: these are the expressive andresistant conceptions. I believe that these three conceptions are basic in thesense that they provide a clear understanding of the possible purposes ofdisobedience and the relationship between disobedience and nonviolence.ChapterThreedevelopsthesethreeconceptionsintheory.

4.TheCoreQuestionsRegardingDisobedienceandaWayofAnalyzingThem

A conception of disobedience consists of normative arguments thataddressasetoffundamentalquestionsrelevanttodisobedience.Foreachtheoryofdisobediencefourfundamentalquestionsshouldbeanswered:(1)whatistherelationship between disobedients and addressees; (2) what is the forceintentionally created by disobedience; (3) what is the scope of permissibleactions;and(4)whatisthejustificatorythresholdofdisobedience?Ishallbrieflyexplainthesefourcorequestions.

The question of relationship concerns how disobedients set up theinteractionbetweenthemselvesandothermembersofsocietywhenperforming

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disobedience. Since disobedience is an action directed toward others, eachconception of disobedience assumes a relationship between disobedients andaddressees in a way that can draw a baseline that distinguishes differentconceptionsofcivildisobedience.

Thequestionofintentionallycreatedforceinvolvestheprimaryintendedforceandconcomitantprimaryeffectonothermembersofsocietythatiscreatedbydisobedients.Byinvestigatingsuchquestions,wegainaclearunderstandingofhowdisobedienceperformsasakindofspeechact.

The question of permissible action considers each conception of civildisobedience and identifies specific patterns of permissible actions that areconsistentwiththerelationshipbetweendisobedientsandaddresseesassumedineachconception.Eachconceptionofdisobediencemustidentifywhichactionsare permissible given the normative framework that forms part of theconception. The first subquestion regarding the scope of permissible actionsconcernstheroleoftheprincipleofnonviolence:Istheprincipleofnonviolencemerelystrategicorisita“principledprinciple”—oneadoptedforanonstrategicreason? The second subquestion is, what actions are permitted given therelationshipbetweendisobedientsandaddresseesassumedineachconception.Andinordertoanswerthesecondquestion,apriorissueneedstoberesolved,thatis,whatare“violent”and“nonviolent”actions?

The question of justificatory threshold investigates the normativecommitmentsineachconception.Inotherwords,eachconceptioniscommittedtosomeunderstandingofvaluesandtoastanceonwhatwrongsareappropriateasjustificationsforinitiatingdisobedience.Eachconceptionalsohastoconsiderthe role andweight of normal political appeal as a precondition for initiatingdisobedience.

ThemethodologyIadopt toanalyzethesetofcorequestionsexplicatedaboveisthetheoryofspeechactdevelopedbyJohnAustininHowtoDoThingsWith Words. According to my research, the existing literature has onlyinfrequently used the conceptual tools of speech act theory (e.g. illocutionaryforce, securing of the uptake, and the perlocutionary effect) to analyzedisobedience.However,disobedienceisbestunderstoodasakindaspeechact.That is, disobedience generates both illocutionary force and perlocutionaryeffects. Additionally, disobedience can also generate communicative content.Thusdisobedientscanusedisobediencetoconveycommunicativecontenttothepublic. Acceptance of the conceptual tools of speech act theory enables us tobuildatheoryofdisobediencethatadvancesabetterunderstandingofavarietyof cases of disobedience in the world. The complex social realities of civildisobediencearenot self-interpretingor self-organizing; rather,understandingdisobedience requires that we interpret using a theoretical framework. Thefundamental methodological premise of this dissertation is that speech acttheory provides the set of tools that are needed to develop an analyticframework and typology for understanding the diverse forms that civildisobediencecantake.

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5.ThreeConceptionsofDisobedience:Expressive,Communicative,andResistantDisobedience

One significant contribution of this dissertation is the development ofthree conceptions of disobedience, that is, expressive, communicative, andresistant disobedience. Chapter Three gives a detailed explanation of eachconception. In this introductory chapter, the aim is simply to provide a briefintroductiontothistypology.

Expressive disobedience takes disobedience as a means to express thedisobedients’ beliefs, emotions, opinions, and concerns in a broad sense.Therefore, acts of expressive disobedience have the function of informingaddressees of what is at stake for disobedients when they perform an act ofdisobedience.Onedistinctive feature of this conception is the assumption ofaunilateral relationship between the disobedients and the addressees ofdisobedience. This relationship is unilateral in the sense that disobedientsexpress their emotions, feelings, or ideas in a way that does not require anyresponse from others. This relationship is very different from a bilateralrelationship(inwhichthereisatwo-wayinteraction).Becauseoftheunilateralrelationship,expressivedisobedientsarenotrequiredtorevealtheiridentityorto perform disobedience in public. Expressive disobedience is consistent withsecrecy,whichcanbeaccomplishedeitherbydisobedientshidingtheiridentityorbytheirperformingdisobedienceinanon-publicplace.

Expressivedisobediencehasdisclosingforce.Disclosingforcereferstotheidea that expressive disobedients intentionally express their mental states toothers. Successful expressive disobedience refers to a situation in which theaddresseesclearlyunderstandtheemotions,attitudes,orbeliefsthatexpressivedisobedientsdisclose.Therefore,successfulexpressivedisobedientsmustsecureuptakeoftheirdisclosivespeechact,thatis,disobedientsmustmakeaddresseesunderstand the meaning and the force of their disobedience. Securing thisuptakerequiresthegenerationofanimpactingeffectthatshapestheaddressee’semotions and beliefs. For example, consider an unlawful demonstration thatincludesadisobedientholdingapicketsignwithaphotographofabloodyandviolent image while chanting the slogan, “No more war.” The disobedientdisclosesaninnerstate(horrorattheviolenceofwar)andthedisclosingforcethereby impacts thosewhowitness the demonstration. If the disobedients aresuccessful, then their addressees will come to share (or partially share) thedisobedients’feelingsandbeliefsaboutthewar.Theeffectcanbepersuasiveorcoercive, depending on the context in which expressive disobedience isperformed. For example, when a huge group of individuals hold picket signsshowing photos of bloody images that reveal the consequences of theirgovernment’s foreign policy, the impacting force generated by this group iscoerciveinthesensethattheirgovernmentcannotignorepressureprovidedbythese individuals and thus bears the consequences when tensions betweencrowdsandpublicofficersintensify.

The communicative conception of disobedience is inspired by Rawls’stheoryofcivildisobedience.RecallthatRawlsexplainsthatcivildisobedienceis“amodeofaddress,”which issupposedtobeperformed“in thepublic forum.”

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The basic feature of communicative disobedience is a bilateral relationshipbetween disobedients and audience. Communicative disobedience requires atwo-way relationship in the sense that the disobedients recognize the equalstatus of thosewhohave not decided to participate in disobedience; an activeaudience consists of autonomous subjects capable of making judgments andengaging inactions.Communicativedisobedientsdonottakethosewhohavenotdecidedtoparticipateindisobedienceasamerepassiveaudiencebutinsteadinvitethem to make their own decisions in response to disobedience. Therefore,communicativedisobediencedoesnotdeprivetheaudienceof thecapabilitytomakeafinal judgmentbut insteadtreatsthemasautonomousparticipants inadialogicprocess.

Communicative disobedience generates warning force. That is,communicative disobedience is a warning from disobedients to their fellowmembersofsociety.Thecomponentofsincerityhelpsusdistinguishdisclosureand warning. Unlike the disclosing force, the warning force generated bycommunicativedisobedienceoriginates from the fact that disobedients believethat some issues must be taken into account by other members of society toavoid the continuance of injustice. Communicative disobedience aims atdisclosing the existenceof injustice andcallingforactiontorepairoreliminatethewrongfulstateofaffairs.Warningforcecomesfromthefactthatperformanceof communicativedisobedience isa reminder fromthosewhohaverecognizedthesignificanceofsomeinjusticetothosewhohavenotrecognizedit:theactofwarningassumesthatitisnottoolatetotakeactiontointerveneandcorrectorameliorate the injustice. Communicative disobedience must invite a responsefromthosewhohavenotparticipated,butaresponseisnotinherentlyrequiredby expressive disobedience. The perlocutionary effect generated by successfulcommunicativedisobedienceisapersuasiveeffect(inotherwords,theeffectofconvincing members of the audience to change their beliefs or affectiveattitudes).Thepersuasiveeffectisnotproducedsolelybytheargumentsthatareadvanced; rather persuasion requires that communicative disobedientssuccessfully secure the uptake of their sincere beliefs. What makescommunicativedisobediencepersuasiveisnotjustreasoningandevidencethatshows the existence of injustice, but also the creation of a non-hostileconversational environment for those who have not decided to participate indisobediencebutwhomightacceptthedisobedients’argumentsinthefuture.

The distinctive feature in resistant disobedience is a two-layerrelationship betweendisobedients and two types of addressees: (1) a politicalregime that governs the society ofwhich resistant disobedients aremembers,and(2)peoplewhooccupypoliticalofficeswiththecapabilityofimplementingalaw or policy that has been called into question. With regard to the politicalregime, resistant disobedience treats the political regime as the responsibleagent towhom the resistant disobedients address their appeal. In addition totargeting thepolitical regimeas theprimary addressee, resistantdisobediencealso targets thosewhooccupypolitical offices as secondaryaddressees. I shallusethephrase“thepoliticallypowerful”torefertothisgroup.

The differentiation between the political regime and the politicallypowerful indicates one basic feature of resistant disobedience: resistantdisobedience involves a combination of unilateral and bilateral relationships.

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Therefore,thecategoryofresistantdisobedienceincludesavarietyofsubtypes,whicharenotexplicitlyexaminedinthisDissertationbutcouldbethesubjectoffuturework.ThefollowingFigureshowsthesubtypesofresistantdisobedience.

Figure1:TypesofResistantDisobedience

RelationshipwiththePoliticalRegimeUnilateral Bilateral

RelationshipwiththePoliticallyPowerful

Unilateral Unilateral/Unilateral Unilateral/Bilateral

Bilateral Bilateral/Unilateral Bilateral/Bilateral

Myanalysis indicates that the two-layerrelationshipmakes interactions

betweendisobedientsandaddresseesmorecomplicatedanddynamicinvariousways. Theories of collective action are required to develop a deeperunderstandingofhowresistantdisobedienceworksingeneralandhowittargetsthepoliticalregimeinparticular.

Imperative force is the main force intentionally generated by resistantdisobedience. Disobedients generate imperative force bymaking demands onaddressees that something be done and threatening that addressees’circumstanceswill growworse if thedemandsarenotmet.Although resistantdisobedientsandtheiraddresseesarenotsituatedinahierarchicalrelationshipin which the disobedients have explicit normative authority over theiraddressees,resistantdisobedientsintentionallyattempttooccupyanormativelysuperiorpositionsothattheycanissuean“order”totheiraddressees.Moreover,the imperative force of resistant disobedience is generated for the purpose ofinducing the addressees to perform thedemanded action. Securing the uptakerequired for successful resistant disobedience requires that the addresseesacceptthenormativeauthorityofthecommandexpressedbydisobedients.Theperlocutionary effect accompanied by resistant disobedience is coercive innature: for example, resistant disobedience might create fear that provides amotiveforcompliancebytargetedofficials.

Figure2showsacomparisonamongthreeconceptionsofdisobedienceintermsoftheforcesandeffectsthataregeneratedbyeachconception.

Figure2:TheComparisonAmongForcesCreatedbyDisobedience

ConceptionAssumed

RelationshipIllocutionary

ForceInvitationofaResponse Perlocutionary

Effect

NatureofPerlocutionary

Effect

ExpressiveDisobedience

UnilateralRelationship

DisclosingForce

NotNecessary

Ontheaddressee’sfeelings

CoerciveOR

Persuasive

CommunicativeDisobedience

BilateralRelationship

WarningForce Necessary

Ontheaddressee’sthoughts

Non-CoerciveAND

Persuasive

ResistantDisobedience

TwoLayersof

Relationship

ImperativeForce Necessary

Ontheaddressee’sactions

Coercive

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6.TwoApproachestoDisobedience:aJustification-BasedandaRights-BasedApproach

A discussion of conceptions of disobedience provides a framework tounderstandhowacaseofdisobediencecanbeunderstood,buttheconceptionsthemselves do not provide a justification for the protection of disobedienceagainst interferencebyothersandespeciallybythepoliticalauthority.ChapterFour takes up this question, distinguishes two approaches to protectingdisobedience, and then explicates the advantages and disadvantages of eachapproach.

In order to provide a clear understanding of the distinction between ajustification-based and a rights-based approach, we must first consider thepurposes (or contexts) for which disobedients deploy reasons to justifydisobedience.

Wecandistinguishtwokindsofcircumstancesinwhichdisobedientsusereasons. The first is the context of persuasion: in this context, disobedientsprovide reasons to convince other members of society to approve of theirdisobedience and, if possible, invite others to participate in the course ofdisobedience.Thepurposeinthecontextofpersuasionistoconvinceotherstoacceptthelegitimacyofdisobedience.Thesecondkindofcontextisthecontextofanti-intervention: this context involves circumstances in which disobedientsprovide reasons to suspend others’ legitimate intervention on the course ofdisobedience. The point of the second context is to negate others’ legitimateresponse todisobedience,not topersuadeothers toaccept the justification fordisobedience.

Inbothcontexts,disobedientsusereasonstosupporttheirclaims.Inthecontext of persuasion, disobedients provide reasons to claim that theirdisobedience is justified and to convince others to accept the legitimacy ofdisobedience. In the context of anti-intervention, disobedients use reasons toclaim thatothers’ interventionought tobesuspended. Thereare two typesofreasons that are relevant to these contexts: I will use the phrases “first-orderreason”and“second-orderreason”todescribethem.

First-orderreasonsarereasonsthatprovidejustificationforanactionbyan agent; in the context of civil disobedience, first-order reasons are thosereasons that provide a normative ground for performing disobedience. Thesereasonsmightbemoral,political,orreligious,buttotheextentthattheyprovideanormativeground forengaging inanactofdisobedience theyare first-orderreasons.

Second-order reasons ingeneral are reasons thatoperateon first-orderreasons;inthecontextofcivildisobedience,second-orderreasonsarereasonstoprotect performance of disobedience from interference by others—suchprotectionconstitutesanassignmentofjurisdictionoverthedecisionofwhetherornottodisobeytotheindividualdisobedientandtherebyremovesjurisdictionfromothers,includinglawenforcementofficials.

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The table below explains the possible types of circumstances in whichdisobedientsprovidefirst-orderandsecond-orderreasonsfordisobedience.

Figure3:ATypologyofContextsandReasonsinDisobedience

First-Order Reason Provided by

Disobedients Second-Order Reason (A rights-based

claim) Provided by Disobedients

Context of Persuasion

Using first-order reasons to persuade others to accept legitimacy of

disobedience （A）

Using a rights-based claim to persuade others to accept legitimacy of

disobedience （B）

Context of Anti-Intervention

Using first-order reasons to counter others’ interference

（C）

Using a rights-based claim to counter others’ interference

（D）

TypeAisthemostcommoncircumstancethatdisobedientsface.Thefactthat disobedients use first-order reasons to persuade others to accept thelegitimacy of disobedience also fits into the conventional understanding thatdisobedience must be justified. Type B is a possible circumstance althoughdisobedients might fail to persuade other members of society to acceptdisobedience’s legitimacy. This situation raises questions about theway that arighttodisobediencecanfunction.TypeC isalsoaverycommoncircumstancethat disobedients might face when their disobedience is challenged by othermembersofsociety,whodeny(ortendtodeny)thelegitimacyofdisobedience.It is common for disobedients to counter an attempt to interfere withdisobedience by making the argument that disobedience is justified by first-orderreasons.TypeDrepresentsthecircumstanceinwhichdisobedientsusearights-basedclaimtocounterothers’interferencewithdisobedience.TypeDfitsinto our conventional understanding of how a rights-based claim works, but,withrespecttocasesofdisobedience,itrevealsaveryimportantquestion,thatis,underwhatcircumstancesaremembersofsocietyentitledtoarighttodisobeythat counters theattemptsofothers to interferewith civildisobedience? Thisquestionisespeciallyimportantwhentheinterferencecomesfromthepoliticalauthority.

In the context of countering interference with disobedience, we candiscuss how a justification-based and a rights-based approach differ from oneanother.Iarguethatajustification-basedapproachtodisobediencesuffersfromseveral significant problems, including the problem of the “circumvention ofreasons” (2.3 in Chapter Four). A justification-based approach can enable thepoliticalauthoritytoavoidtheneedtofulfillaburdenofproofbeforeimposingliability on disobedients. In Chapter Four, I also argue that there is a moraldifferencebetweenactsofdisobedienceandordinarycriminalconductthatcanbe seen through the application of Mark Greenberg’s Moral Impact Theory ofLaw. Greenberg’s theory enables us to see the moral difference between theobligationtoobeythatlawinordinarycasesandtheobligationthatattendsthespecial circumstances found in civil disobedience. When political authoritiesinterfere with disobedience (by criminal prosecution of disobedients), theycompetewithdisobedientswithrespecttotheobligationtoobeythelaw.Thereisanimplicitconflictofmoralitybetweendisobedientsandpoliticalauthoritiesas to whether disobedients’ reasons for disobedience are sufficient to justifytheiractions.

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7.Canwehavearighttoresistantdisobedienceinatransitionalsociety?

The final topic addressed by this Dissertation is the application of thethree conceptions and the two approaches to a transitional society. Mysubstantive goal is to convince readers that members of transitional societiesshouldadopttheresistantconceptionofdisobediencewhentheychallengecasesofstructural injusticeandthattransitionalsocietiesshouldrecognizearighttodisobedience that imposes a burden of proof on the political authorities. In anutshell,Iargueforarighttoresistantdisobedienceinatransitionalsocietyinthecontextofcorrectingstructuralinjustice.

Theideaofatransitionalsocietyappliesinthecontextofpoliticalchangein which the government transitions from an authoritarian regime to ademocraticone.Moreprecisely,therearefourfeaturesofatransitionalsocietyas that phrase is used in this Dissertation: (1) The Burdens of Judgment, (2)Existence of Opportunists, (3) Existence of Legal Obstacles for PoliticalParticipation,and(4)StructuralInjustice.ForthepurposeofthisIntroduction,Ishallexplain themost fundamentalof these three features, structural injustice.TheremainingthreefeaturesarediscussedindetailinChapterFive.

Structural injustice is characteristically present in transitional societiesbecause of the way thatmoral wrongs arise from interactions among variousmembersofthesociety.IrisMarionYounghasprovidedatheoreticalaccountofthisidea,thecoreelementofwhichishernotionofthepositionofvulnerability.Shesays,“whenweconsidermembersofsocietyintermsofsocialpositions,wearelessconcernedwiththeirindividualizedpreferences,abilities,andattributes,andmore concernedwith the relation in which they stand to other persons.”(Young: 2013, 57) A social position is a place that an individual occupies inrelation to others. Individuals can occupy a position voluntarily and non-voluntarily. One factor that determines a position-holder’s set of availableactionsisafunctionofvariousnormtypes,i.e.,moral,legal,social,andreligiousrules.Thosenormsnotonlyshapehowaposition-holdershouldactandcanact,butalsoimposeconstraintsontheirchoiceofactionsbycreatingexpectationsinpersonswithwhomtheposition-holderinteracts.

Applyingthisaccountofsocialrolestotransitionalsocieties,Iarguethatsomemembersoftransitionalsocietiesareinavulnerablepositionwithrespectto their ability to participate equally in the political realm. Members oftransitionalsocietiesstandinapositionofvulnerabilitythatisfixedbyavarietyofnormsandsocialrelationstowardothers.Thisfixedpositionrendersitmoredifficultforthemtotakeadvantageofopportunitiesforpoliticalparticipation.

Chapter Five advances two reasons for the acceptance of the resistantconceptionofdisobedienceinatransitionalsociety.Thefirstreasonisthatbothexpressive and communicative forms of disobedience are incapable ofaddressingissuesofstructuralinjustice.Expressivedisobediencerarelyprovidessufficientforcetoprovideeffectivesupervisionoftheexerciseofpoliticalpowerandcannotprovideaneffectivereformagenda.Communicativedisobedienceistoonarrowinscopetoprovideeffectivecorrectionofstructuralinjusticeandhasanadditionaldrawbackofattractingopportunists.Thatis,whilecommunicative

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disobedientsviewstructural injusticeas adistinctmoralwrong thatoughtbecorrected, opportunists take advantage of addressing structural injustice tomaximize their own interests. The second reason is the flexibility of resistantdisobedience:resistantdisobediencehasfourpossibletypes,resultingfromthefactthattherearetwodistinctaudiencesforresistantdisobedience—thepublicand thosewho occupy political power. These two levels of addressees enableresistant disobedience to become more flexible and to effectively addressstructuralinjustice.

RegardingarighttodisobeyIfocusonhowtheproblemofjustificationofdisobediencebecomessignificant formembersof transitionalsocieties. Insuchsocieties,resistantdisobedientsmustbegrantedtherighttodisobeyinordertoimposetheburdenofproofonthepoliticalauthorities.

Theacceptanceofajustification-basedapproachtodisobedienceleadstothe result that disobedients' first-order reasonwould be directly evaluated bypoliticalauthoritieswithoutanyadditionalburdenstoprovidesufficientreasonsfor treating civil disobedience as ordinary crime. Given a justification-basedapproach,politicalauthoritiescouldignoredisobedients'first-orderreasonsforprotest and instead treat disobedience in the same way they treat ordinarycriminalconduct.Ortheymightconsiderdisobedients'first-orderreasonsfromthe perspective of law without taking the moral first-order reasons fordisobedience into account. One significant defect of a justification-basedapproach ina transitionalsociety is thedependenceof“acorrespondingforce”thatprovidesanormativewarrantforblockinginterferencewithdisobedience.For example, the fact that I believe that I have a reason to break a traffic lawsupportsmyactionofdisobedience frommyperspective, but this fact isnot areason foryou to takemysubjectivebelief intoaccountunlessyoubelievemysubjectivebeliefisreasonable.Thereareseriousproblemswiththejustification-based approach to civil disobedience in a transitional society and such issuesconstituteareasontotakearights-basedapproach.

A rights-based approach is preferable, not because it resolves theproblemof justification,but insteadbecause it imposesaburdenofpersuasionon the political authority and requires that the political authority give dueconsideration to theright tocivildisobediencewhen itconsiders theoptionofinterfering with the disobedience. The problem of justification remains, but arights-based approach appropriately distributes the burden of persuasion andtherebyrequiresnormativedeliberationbythepoliticalauthoritywhendealingwithacaseofdisobedience.

The acceptance of a rights-based approach to disobedience opens thediscussion about the underlying source of a right to disobey. There are twocandidatesforthesourceofarighttodisobey.ThefirstoneistherightofmoralconvictionillustratedbyKimberleyBrownlee;thesecondistherightofpoliticalparticipationdemonstratedbyDavidLefkowitz.

My arguments proceed as follows. Kimberley Brownlee’s moralconvictionargumentispowerfulbutherargumentignoresacommonfeatureincases of civil disobedience: civil disobedience is political in nature. Brownlee’smoral conviction argument is unable to explain how individuals’ moraljudgments are connected with their political ideals. Given this difficulty with

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Brownlee’sviews,IendorsetherightofpoliticalparticipationsetforthbyDavidLefkowitzbutinamodifiedform.Themodificationisbasedontheideathattheright to disobey is a general right in the sense that every member of atransitionalsocietyisentitledtotherighttocivildisobedience.

After discussing the possibility of implementing a right to resistantdisobedienceinatransitionalsociety,IshallreturntotheSunflowerMovementinChapterSix,thefinalchapterinthisDissertation.ChapterSixexplainswhytheSunflowerMovementwas an example of resistant disobedience and discusseswhyitcanbedefinedasnonviolent,althoughitinvolvespropertydamage.ThereisanimportantreasonthatthefinalChapterdiscussestheSunflowerMovement.Disobedience cannot be discussed in a purely theoretical way; the concept ofdisobediencemustdescribesocialreality.Itisimportanttoobservethepraxisofdisobedience. While this Dissertation does not investigate any case study indepth,itacknowledgestheimportanceofconductingempiricalresearchoncasesof disobedience; the investigation of disobedience in particular circumstancescanmake an important contribution to the normative investigation of humanactionsagainstinjustice.Butthisjobcannotbeaccomplishedwithoutdevelopingtheoreticaltoolsandthenapplyingthemtoparticularcases.InthisDissertation,Ifulfillthefirstofthesetasksandhopetoaccomplishthesecondinthefuture.

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CHAPTERTWORawlsonCivilDisobedience:The

EvolutionofHisConception1.Introduction:JohnRawls’sTwoTextsonCivilDisobedience

OneofthemostimportantcontributionstothephilosophicalliteratureoncivildisobedienceisfoundinRawls’sATheoryofJustice(TJ:§55-59,p.363-392).He devotes almost 30 pages to civil disobedience (including the idea ofconscientious refusal), from its definition to its role in a constitutionaldemocracy. His argument is a point of entry into my discussion of civildisobedience for two reasons. First, he has given a clear definition of civildisobedience and distinguishes this idea from other similar but different oneslike revolutionary action and conscientious refusal. His picture of civildisobedience is innovative and has the virtue of great analytic clarity. Withregard tohisdefinitionof civildisobedience,he insists thatnonviolence isonebasicfeatureandoffersasoundargumentforwhynonviolenceissignificantinthe course of action. Secondly Rawls distinguishes three basic topics whenconsidering disobedience. The first is the question of definition whereby heidentifies the distinctive features of civil disobedience. The second topic is thequestionofjustification:underwhatconditionsiscivildisobediencejustifiedinaconstitutionaldemocracy?Thethirdtopicinvolvestheroleofdisobedienceinaconstitutionaldemocracyinthesensethatcivildisobediencemay(ormaynot)benormativelydesirableinawell-orderedsociety.

BeforeATheoryofJusticewaspublished,Rawlspublishedanearliertextoncivildisobediencewhichcontains theembryo forhis laterarguments.Thus,thefirsttaskofthischapteristocomparehispreliminaryformulationwiththemature, laterversionandoutlinehisarguments in the twotexts.The first text,entitled “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” is a short article originallypublished inCivilDisobedience:TheoryandPractice editedbyHugoBedau andlater collected in John Rawls: Collected Papers edited by Samuel Freeman.3(Hereafter: TJCD) Although the article runs less than 16 pages, it contains thebasisofhislaterargumentsfordisobedience.Inthesecondtext,whichincludesSection 55 through Section 59 in TJ, Rawls not only discusses the idea of civildisobedience but also conscientious refusal, thus developing a morecomprehensivetheory.

3 See John Rawls, “The Justification of Civil Disobedience”, Civil Disobedience: Theory and Practice, edited by Hugo Adam Bedau, pp. 103-121 (Macmillan Pub Co: 1969) and John Rawls: Collected Papers, edited by Samuel Freeman, pp. 176-189 (Harvard University Press: 1999)

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InthefirstpartofthisChapter,IdemonstratehowRawlsarguesforcivildisobedienceinthesetwotexts.IfocusprimarilyonhisargumentsinTJbecausetheyaremorestructuredandwell-developedthanintheearliertext.Histheoryofcivildisobediencecanbedividedintotwoelements:theconstitutiveandthejustificatory. The first element deals with what constitutes civil disobediencewhilethesecondelementconsiderswhatconditionsneedtobesatisfiedfor itsjustification. The constitutive element canbedivided into twodimensions, thedimension of actions and the dimension of agents. The dimension of actionsconcernsthefeaturesofactionsinvolvedindisobedience,andthedimensionofagents focuses on the subjective condition for performing disobedience. Thejustificatory element includes three elements, which I shall explain in greaterdetailbelow.

In the second part of this Chapter, I compareRawls’s arguments in thetwo texts. This comparison reveals thatRawls adopts a narrowerdefinition ofdisobedience in TJ and expands the possibility of justifying disobedience. Inaddition,inTJ,histheoryofdisobedienceisorientedtowardthecommunicativefunctionwherebytheactionsofdisobedienceserveasavehiclefortransportingamessageandawaytocreatecommunicativeopportunitybetweenthemajorityand theminority. His arguments for nonviolence speak to this communicativefunctionofdisobedience.4

Thestructureofthischaptercanbedividedintothefollowingsections:

• Section1:ThisistheintroductionofthepurposeandstructureofChapterTwo.

• Section2:ThissectiondiscussesRawls’spreliminarytheoryofdisobedienceinTJCD.

• Section3:ThisisthemainsectioninChapterTwo.Idividehistheoryintotwoelements,theconstitutiveandthejustificatoryelementsandanalyzehisarguments.

• Section4:Section4talksabouttheimplicationsofRawlsiandisobediencebycomparinghisargumentsinTJCDandTJ.

I will argue that Rawls’s theory is best understood as a theory of

communicative disobedience. Its core idea is that disobedience has acommunicative function channeled by actions of disobedience. Thiscommunicativefunctionisnotonlyadescriptiveonebutalsoanormativeoneinthat it requires members to adopt nonviolent methods to communicate withothers.

4 Section 3.2.1.3 illustrates his arguments for the nonviolence of civil disobedience by providing two arguments: the argument of speech act and the sincerity argument. See my discussion in Section 3.2.1.3; my illustration of the implication of these arguments can be seen in Section 4.2.

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2.JohnRawls’sPreviousDemonstrationofCivilDisobediencein1969

2.1.Introduction:TheRoleof“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”intheExplicationofRawls’sMatureTheory“The Justification of Civil Disobedience” originally published in Civil

Disobedience:TheoryandPracticein1969(TJCD)isthefirstarticleinwhichJohnRawlsexpressedhisviewsoncivildisobedience.AlthoughhisargumentsinTJCDarelessstructuredthanthoseinTJ,thearticlecaptureshispreliminaryideas.

InSection2IfocusonhowRawlsillustrateshisideasinTJCDandmakeacomparisonbetweenTJCDandTJ.IdiscusshisdefinitionofcivildisobedienceinSection2.2andthejustificatoryelementsofcivildisobedienceinSection2.3.

ThemotivationforconsideringtheaccountofTJCDandcomparingitwiththe later account in TJ is that such a comparison reveals the focal points inmaturearguments.IfwewanttohaveabetterunderstandingofRawls’stheoryof disobedience, it would be best to understand what he has modified andemphasizedbeforeandafter.ToachievethisgoalrequiresaclosereadingofthetwotextstocomparehowRawlsexpresseshispointsofviewandwhattermsheusesforhisarguments.BycomparinghisargumentsinTJCDandTJ,IclaimthatRawlshasdevelopedafoundationforincorporatingtheprincipleofnonviolenceinto the idea of civil disobedience by making the communicative function ofdisobedience salient. His previous theory did not make the communicativefunction salient andwasmuch closer to the expressive function. (See 4.2 andChapter3)Thecommunicative functionofdisobediencemakestheprincipleofnonviolencenormativelydesirableinRawls’stheory.

TJCDfocusesontwomainquestions.First,itaskswhatcivildisobediencemeans,and,second,underwhatconditionsisitjustified.BeforeRawlsdealswiththesetwoquestionshefirstaskswhymembersofsocietyhaveanobligationtoobeythelawinawell-orderedsocietyandtowhatextenttheyareboundtoobeyunjust laws. In this Dissertation, we take the obligation to obey the law as agiven that can be accepted by members of society in both well-ordered andtransitionalsocieties.Thus,thediscussionthatfollowsinthissectionislimitedtothedefinitionandjustificationofcivildisobedienceinTJCD.

Beforegetting into thediscussionofdisobedience, Iwant toexplain thecontext in which Rawls’s theory of civil disobedience can be meaningfullydiscussed.Theobligationtoobeythelawisacoreissueinpoliticalphilosophy—thequestion is,whymembersof society arebound toobey the law in a givenpoliticalregime.Rawlsadoptedtheargumentthattherewouldbeanagreementontheprinciplesforassigningrightsandduties.Thereforemembersareboundto obey laws when laws assign rights and duties in accordance with theprinciples in the agreement. But this agreement does not deprive members’capability of making judgments on whether “an enactment of the majorityexceeds certainboundsof injustice.” (Rawls, 1999: 181)Aperson can “submit

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hisconducttothejudgmentofthedemocraticauthoritybutthisdoesnotimplythathealsosubmithisjudgmenttoit.”(Rawls,1999:181)

Based on the distinction between act and judgment, a citizen canrecognize the normative force generated by democratic procedure on the onehandand,ontheother,preservehisjudgmentonwhetheraproductofcollectivedecisionhasexceededcertainboundsof injustice.This is theplacewherecivildisobedience is situated. A member’s recognition of the legitimacy of ademocracy does not necessarily entail that he recognizes every democraticproductaslegitimate.And,therefore,acollectivedecisiondoesnotgenerateanabsoluteobligation forhim toobey.Recognitionof civil disobediencedoesnotnegatethevalueofdemocraticauthority.Whatfollowsisthatcivildisobedienceiscompatiblewithademocraticregime,thattheregime’sauthorityisgenerallyrecognizedbymembersofsocietyandthatishaslegitimatepowertolegislate.

Section2.2startsRawls’sdiscussionofthedefinitionofcivildisobedienceandSection2.3discusseshowcivildisobedienceisjustifiedunderademocraticregime.

2.2.JohnRawls’sPreviousDefinitionofCivilDisobediencein“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”In TJCD Rawls defines disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, and

conscientiousactcontrarytolawusuallydonewiththeintenttobringachangeinthepoliciesor lawsofthegovernment.”(Rawls,1999:181)InTJ,hefurtherdefinescivildisobedienceasbeingpolitical.Thefactthathefailedtospecificallymentionthepoliticalcomponentintheearlierdefinitiondoesnotmeanthatheexcluded it from his substantive analysis of civil disobedience. In fact, hisdiscussionof civildisobediencecovers itspoliticalaspect,butwedonotknowwhyhefailedtomentionitinhisdefinition.

For Rawls, civil disobedience is a political act in the sense that it isjustifiedby “moralprincipleswhichdefinea conceptionof civil societyand thepublicgood.”(Rawls,1999:181.Emphasisadded.)

InTJCD,heviews“beingpolitical”asnormative.Civildisobedienceisanactjustifiedbyprinciples.Therefore thedisobedientmust justifycivildisobedience.Furthermore, what justifies disobedience is not purely grounded on politicalprinciples but onmoralprinciples that “define thepublic good.” This approachoffersabroaderjustificationforbeingpoliticalbecauseamoralprinciplecanbepolitical or non-political. And what makes actions political is the fact that adisobedienthasa“politicalconviction”thatisnotbasedonself-interestorgroupinterests. This conviction is political because it “involves the conception ofjustice.” (Rawls: 1999, 181) In TJCD Rawls did not explicitly specify thatdisobediencecanonlybejustifiedbypoliticalprinciples.Forthisreason,thereisapossibility inTJCDthatasetofmoralprinciplescanjustifycivildisobedienceoncemembersofsocietyhavethesameconceptionofjustice.5

5 One possible interpretation is that at the time of writing TJCD Rawls did not believe that the quality of being political was a necessary feature for disobedience and instead thought that this feature could

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Comparing Rawls’s explanation in TJ with that in TJCD, we find twodifferences with respect to the political nature of civil disobedience. The firstdifference is thatTJCDoffersabroaderrangeof justifications fordisobediencebecauseitincludesmoralprinciplesamongthesourcesofjustification.Thereisno need to appeal to the political principles directly to justify acts of civildisobedience.ThefeatureofbeingpoliticalinTJCDisbestcharacterizedasbeingnon-self-interested. Justification viamoral principles opens the possibility thatdisobedience can be justified by normative reasons that have no politicalmeaning.TheseconddifferenceisthatinTJCD,Rawlsdidnotdiscussoridentifytheintendedaudiencefordisobedience. InTJ,ontheotherhand,heexplicitlyidentifiespersonswhoholdpoliticalpowerasdisobedients’intendedaudience.6

In TJCD civil disobedience has a public nature because it can be“understoodasaddressing thesenseof justiceof themajority inorder tourgereconsideration of the measures protested and to warn that, in the sincereopinion of the dissenters, the conditions of social cooperation are not beinghonored.” (Rawls, 1999: 181) This explanation of the public nature of civildisobedienceisunclearbecauseindistinguishingbetweenthemajorityandtheminority as the addressees of civil disobedience, Rawls does not track thedistinctionbetweenpublicandnonpubliccivildisobedience.InTJCDheindicatesthat disobedience addresses themajority, but in TJ he does not mention “themajority”inhisexplanationofthepubliccomponentofdisobedience.However,inTJhisdiscussionofhowdisobedienceispublicduetowhereitisperformedisclearerthaninTJCD..(Section3.2.1.2inChapterTwo)

There are two reasons for believing that Rawls’s explanation in TJ isbetter than that offered in TJCD with respect to the requirement that civildisobediencebepublic.The firstreason is that inTJCDRawlsdidnotexplicatetheconnectionbetweenbeingpublicandaddressingtothemajority.Thesecondreason is thatRawls strengthenshisargumentbyemphasizing the roleof civildisobedience as fair notice in TJ. One common element in TJ and TJCD is thatdisobediencecanbeconsideredtobeanexpressiveactionthat isaddressedtothe public (the majority in TJCD); the expressive action of civil disobediencesends fair notice that conditions of social cooperation have been violated. Theinterpretation of the expressive function of disobedience makes Rawls’sexplanationpersuasiveinawaythatdisobedienceexpressesacertainviewheldbytheminoritythattheywishtobeheardbythepublic.Afairnoticecarriesoutthe taskofgetting thepublic focusedon thedisobedients’message.AsRawls’sexplainswithsignificanceandclarity,“Weareappealingtootherstoreconsider,toputthemselvesinourposition,andtorecognizethattheycannotexpectustoacquiesceindefinitelyinthetermstheyimposeuponus.”(Rawls,1971:382)

be a corresponding feature when disobedients disobey laws based on reasons other than those of self interest. This interpretation implies that civil disobedience might be justified by moral principles or by a comprehensive doctrine of the good that is not politically distinctive. I discuss the relevant topics in Section 3.2.1.1 and Section 4.1.1 in Chapter Two. 6 Rawls says, “It should also be noted that civil disobedience is a political act not only in the sense that it is addressed to the majority that holds political power, but also because it is an act guided and justified by political principles, that is, by the principles of justice which regulate the constitution and social institutions generally.”(Rawls, 1971: 365)

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The third feature of civil disobedience is nonviolence. In TJCD, Rawlsbases his explanation of nonviolence on two reasons. First, he notes that civildisobedience is “a form of speech, an expression of conviction.” (Rawls, 1999:182)Disobedience isexpressivebecause itprovidesnoticethat themajorityofthedisobedientsbelievethatthetermsoffairsocialcooperationhavenotbeenrespected under the current circumstance. This picture of disobediencepresumesanaudiencethatreceivesthenotice.Therelationshipisunilateral,notbilateral; Rawls does not specifically mention an audience. Nor does RawlsmaintaininTJCDthatdisobedienceisakindofspeechactthatengagesothersinthinkingorperformingdisobedience.7

The second “reason” for the feature of nonviolence is the disobedients’acceptance of a legal penalty and their non-resistance to law enforcementagencies.(Rawls,1999:182)8RawlsdidnotmentionthesincereattitudeinTJCD.(Compare to Section3.2.1.3.2)Rawls changedhis explanation later inTJ. TJCDexplicitly argues that disobedients’ acceptance of a legal penalty is the reasonwhydisobedienceisnonviolent.ButinTJtheacceptanceofalegalpenaltyisnotnecessary because a disobedient’s expression of willingness to accept legalconsequences is sufficient to establish that disobedience is nonviolent. (Rawls,1971: 366)Nonviolence is amethodormechanismbywhich thedisobedientsdemonstrateasincereattitude.

So far I have explainedRawls’s definition of civil disobedience in TJCD.The viewoffered there is not fully satisfactory for the reasons outlined above.Therefore,afairevaluationofRawls’saccountofcivildisobediencerequiresthatweaddresshisargumentsinTJ.Thattopicwillbetakenupbelow.Atthispoint,weturntoconsiderRawls’sargumentsforjustifyingcivildisobedienceinTJCD.

2.3.Rawls’sArgumentsforJustifiedCivilDisobedienceBeforeaddressingthequestionofunderwhatconditionsdisobedienceis

justified,weneed toconsiderapreliminaryquestionabout thekindor typeofjustification that Rawls provides. What Rawls has in mind is not whether aparticularactionofdisobedienceisjustifiedorwhichkindsofdisobediencearejustified in a well-ordered society. Instead, his focus is on the conditions thatmust be satisfied for disobedience to be justified. In otherwords, what are thejustificatory conditions for disobeying a law? He clearly distinguishes thequestionofjustificationfromthequestionofwhetherparticularagentsoughttoperformactsofcivildisobedienceonparticularoccasions.Whetherdisobedienceshould be performed depends on contingent conditions and dynamic

7 I have illustrated why disobedience as a mode of address is connected with the feature of nonviolence. (Please see Section 3.2.1.3 of Chapter Two.) 8 Rawls mentions nonresistance in two passages in TJCD. Both of the passages are situated in the context of explaining the role of nonviolence. For him, civil disobedience is nonviolent when it is done in a situation where arrest and punishment are accepted without resistance. Civil disobedience is also nonviolent is the sense that resistance is not contemplated. Thus, Rawls writes, “… civil disobedience is also civil in another sense. Not only is it the outcome of a sincere conviction based on principles which regulate civil life, but it is public and nonviolent, that is, it is done in a situation where arrest and punishment are expected and accepted without resistance.” He also states, “Civil disobedience is nonviolent in the further sense that the legal penalty for one’s action is accepted and that resistance is not (at least for the moment) contemplated.” (Rawls, 1999: 182)

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relationships among social activists.9 The fact that the justification of civildisobedienceisgeneraldoesnottelluswhetherdisobedienceshouldbeinitiatednorindicateswhatactionsoughttobeperformedbydisobedients.

ThefirstjustificatoryconditionisconcernedwithwhatIcallthefailureofnormalpolitical appeal,referring to a fact that dissenters have tried the usual(normal) means to request (appeal) redress for grievances via democraticprocesses and these normal appeals have failed, either because the majorityintentionally ignores dissenters’ appeals or because the majority denies theappeal’s moral weight. Dissenters need to try normal political appeals firstbecause civil disobedience is performedwithin the limits of general fidelity tolaw. Thus, disobedience is a last resort after the exhaustion of democraticremediesforinjustice.Rawlsdoesnotexplicitlydefineineffectiveness,butfromhis explanation in TJCD this condition does not require that dissenters shouldexhaust every possible avenue of democratic change. The ineffectiveness ofdemocraticremedies isestablishedonce themajorityrefuses to fairlyconsidertheminority’sappealusingtheproceduresprovidedbydemocraticinstitutions.Forexample,themajoritycouldprovidefairconsiderationbygivingtheminorityan institutional role via public hearings to debate whether a given policy isconsistent with the principles of justice shared by the community. Or themajority could provide reasons for their refusal to accept the minority’sconcerns.Thebestpossibleavenueforensuringfairconsiderationwouldbeforthemajoritytoholdhearingsfollowedbyalegislativedebatewheretheminoritycanvoicetheirviews. Suchadebatecouldserveasamechanismtooverturnagiven policy (or legislation) that the minority opposes. The second-bestpossibility is that there is no such mechanism but only institutionalarrangementsfortheminoritytosharetheirviews.Forexampletheremightbenoproceduralrulefortheminoritytoholdhearings,buttheminoritymightbeable to circulate their ideas and arguments with a political authority’spermission, e.g.. the permission of assembly. The worst possibility is thatinstitutionalarrangementsblock theminority fromexpressing theirviews inawaythatcouldhaveanysignificantinfluence.

InTJCDandTJRawlstreatscivildisobedienceasalastresort,butinTJCD,he does not identify disobedience as a necessary resort.10In TJ he says, “Since

9 A common circumstance in the dynamic situation of disobedience is that two groups, recognizing that a law is unjust and that disobedience is the last resort to address the sense of justice to the public, disagree over which particular method of disobedience can advance their goal. The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan 2014 is a good example of this circumstance. The Sunflower Movement in Taiwan involved the occupation of the Legislative Yuan (the national legislature) by activists (mostly students). After they occupied the Legislative Yuan, the government’s response was passive and apathetic. There was a proposal within the core group of activists to escalate the intensity of their occupation by taking the Executive Yuan. Most of the activists were opposed to this proposal and asked occupants to wait until the Government responded. The dynamic relationship within this core group of the Sunflower Movement appeared in the interaction between the radical and moderate disobedients regarding whether to escalate the intensity by initiating another course of occupation. The radical disobedients were intentionally or subconsciously marginalized by the moderate disobedients. Those who were marginalized finally led the crowds to occupy the Executive Yuan; this escalation resulted in a brutal physical response by law enforcement at the behest of the government. 10 (While civil disobedience should be recognized, I think, as a form of political action within the limits of fidelity to the rule of law, at the same time it is a rather desperate act just within these limits, and

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civil disobedience is a last resort, we should be sure it is necessary.” (Rawls,1971:373)Thisaddendum is interestingbecausebeingnecessaryseemsnotavirtue of justifying disobedience but a virtue of constraining actions ofdisobedience. In termsofbeingnecessary,disobedientsneedtobecertainthatdisobedienceisanecessarymeanstoachievetheirgoal(whateveritmightbe).However, this is a kind of logic of action within the course of disobedience.Disobedientsshouldmakesurethatthemeanstheyadoptwouldbetheeffectivemeans.Being anecessary resort is not a condition toprovidea reasonofwhydisobedienceisjustifiedbutaconditiontoinitiatedisobedience.

In TJCD the second condition for justifying civil disobedience requiressubstantial and clear violations of justice. Rawls distinguishes two types ofinjustice of laws or policies; both types are connected to the twoprinciples ofjusticethatRawlsarticulatesanddefendsinTJ.(TJ:§11,pp.60-65)

In order to make Rawls’s position clear we need to examine the twoprinciplesofjusticebriefly.Myaimisnottoprovideafullexplicationofthetwoprinciples, but rather to provide a brief summary to pave the way for theunderstandingofhowhetreatsaviolationofjusticeasonejustificatoryelementto initiate disobedience. I only articulate the two principles as stated in theoriginaleditionofTJinordertoclarifywhatRawlsmeansbyviolationsofjustice.For this limited purpose, I will disregard the refined articulations of the twoprinciples in the revisededitionofTJbecause these revisionsdonotaffectmyexpositionofRawls’sviewsaboutcivildisobedienceinasignificantway.11

ThetwoprinciplesofjusticearefirstarticulatedinSection11ofTJ.12Thefirst principle is called the Equal Liberty Principlewhich regulates how socialarrangements distribute rights and duties. Liberties included in the firstprinciple are “political liberties (the right to vote and to be eligible for publicoffice)togetherwithfreedomofspeechandassembly,libertyofconscienceandfreedomofthought,freedomofthepersonalongwiththerighttohold(personal)property, and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by theconceptoftheruleoflaw.”13(TJ:§11,p.61)Thesecondprinciplehastwoparts.The first part of the second principle is called theDifferencePrinciple and thesecondpart is thePrincipleofEqual(Fair)Opportunity.Different from the firstprinciplethesecondprincipleappliesto“thedistributionofincomeandwealthandtothedesignoforganizationsthatmakeuseofdifferencesinauthorityandresponsibility,orchainsofcommand.”(TJ:§11,p.61)TheDifferencePrinciple(the first part) regulates the distribution of wealth and income while the

therefore it should, in general, be undertaken as a last resort when standard democratic processes have failed.) (Rawls, 1999: 183) 11 A brief explanation of Rawls’s revision of the two principles in the revised edition can be seen in Frank Lovett, Reader’s Guide: Rawls’s ‘A Theory of Justice’, pp.44-65 (Continuum International Publishing: 2010) 12 His final version of the two principles in the original edition can be seen in TJ: § 11, p. 61. 13 According to Samuel Freeman, the idea of equal liberties here is that basic liberties can be divided into five sets: 1). Liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, 2). Freedom of association, 3). Equal political liberties, 4). The rights and liberties that protect the integrity and freedom of the person, and 5). The rights and liberties covered by the rule of law. Freeman demonstrates the five sets by referring to Political Liberalism. See Samuel Freeman, RAWLS, p. 46. Rawls’s demonstration in TJ is similar to his articulation in Political Liberalism and I intentionally ignore the difference between these two texts.

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Principle of EqualOpportunity (the secondpart) holds that “citizenswith thesame talents and willingness to use them have the same educational andeconomic opportunities regardless ofwhether theywere born rich or poor.”14ThefollowingisRawls’sfirststatementofthetwoprinciplesofjusticeinTJ.

• FirstPrinciple:Eachperson is tohaveanequal right to themostextensivebasiclibertycompatiblewithasimilarlibertyforothers.

• Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to bearranged so that they are both: (a) reasonably expected to be toeveryone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and officesopentoall.(TJ:§11,p.60)

For the purposes of this Dissertation only a few points need to be

discussed.Thefirstpointisthatthesetwoprinciplesprimarilyapplytothebasicstructureofsocietyreferringto“theway inwhichthemajorsocial institutionsdistribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division ofadvantagesfromsocialcooperation.”(TJ:§2,p.7)Thesecondpointisthatthetwoprinciplesarerankedinlexicalorderwherethefirstprincipleispriortothesecondone.Wecanseethatthepriorityofthefirstprinciplealsoinfluencesthequestion of what wrongs are preferable to being protested through civildisobedience. The third point is that while a variety of means can distributerightsandduties(criminal law,torts,orcontract lawetc.),useof taxusually isthemainavenuefordistributingincomeandwealth.ButforRawlsthequestionofhowtodistribute incomeandwealthusually isdependenton theprocessofdemocratic deliberationwhich can providemore concrete information for theDifferencePrinciplebeingsatisfied.

Now the brief demonstration of the two principles has established thecornerstone of what kinds of violations of justice constitute the justificatoryelementforRawls’sconceptionofdisobedience.

The first type of wrongs that justify disobedience consists of lawsviolatingthe(basic)equal libertiesthatRawlsidentifiesinthefirstprincipleofjustice.(TJ:§11,p.61)Inordertotriggerdisobedience, thecontentof lawsorpolicies should contradict the first principle. But violations are not limited towritten laws or policies. Theymight include “recognizedpractice” too. (Rawls,1999:184) It isnot clearwhatRawlsmeansby “substantial andclear”;hedidnotdefinethisstandardinTJCD.However,accordingtothearticulationsinTJCDaviolationoftheEqualLibertyPrinciple ismoreappropriatefor initiatingcivildisobediencebecause“theequallibertiesaredefinedbythevisiblestructureofsocial institutions.” (Rawls, 1999: 184) Because of this feature, it is less likelythattheexistenceofviolationsoftheequallibertyprinciplewillbeindispute.

Thesecondtypeofviolationsof justiceconcernsthesecondprincipleofjustice, inparticular,violationsof thePrincipleofEqualOpportunity. (TJ:§14,pp. 83-90) When a law violates the Principle of Equal Opportunity, civildisobedienceaimingatthelawisjustified.AclosereadingofRawls’sexplication

14 , "John Rawls," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/rawls/>.

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makesitclearthatviolationsoftheEqualLibertyPrincipleandthePrincipleofEqualOpportunityareappropriatetargetsfor initiatingcivildisobedience.ThisisespeciallyobviouswhenRawlsmentions“theclearandsubstantialviolationsof justice” referring to the Equal Liberty Principle (the first principle) and thePrinciple of Equal Opportunity (the second part of the second principle). ButwhereistheDifferencePrinciple(thefirstpartofthesecondprinciple)andwhatisitsroleinthejustificationofcivildisobedience?

With regard to the question of whether a violation of the DifferencePrinciplecanbeprotestedviacivildisobedience,Rawls’sansweris“no”becauseof several problems. According to Rawls, determining the meaning of theDifferencePrincipleisdifficult.Butevenifthereisaconsensusonitsmeaning,there can be reasonable disagreement about whether the Difference Principlehasbeensatisfied. Inaddition to theproblemofdisagreement, another reasonforexcludingtheDifferencePrinciplefromservingasthebasisfordisobedienceisthatdisagreementabouttheimplementationoftheDifferencePrincipleshouldbe resolved via the political process. Therefore, for instance, a tax law, theprimarymeansofdistributingincomeandwealth,shouldnotbecomethetargetof disobedience. In TJCD the only possible situation in which disobedience oftaxation laws can be justified is when such a law is designed to attack equalliberties.(Rawls,1999:184)

Rawls’s explication of the second justificatory element is complex butconcise.ThefollowingFigureisasummaryofhisarguments.

Figure4:ATypologyofViolationsoftheTwoPrinciplesforInitiatingDisobedience

PrinciplesofJustice SubstantialandClearStandard

PriorityofBeingProtested

Self-StandingforBeingProtested

EqualLiberty(Thefirstprinciple) Applied Highest YES

DifferencePrinciple(Thefirstpartofthesecondprinciple)

Unknown LowestNO(neededtobedesignedtoattacktheequalliberties)

EqualOpportunity(Thesecondpartofthesecondprinciple)

Applied Intermediate YES

Compared to the position in TJ, this second condition in TJCD is morerestricted in the sense that while the requirement of substantial and clearviolationsofjusticeappliestotheEqualityLibertyPrincipleandthePrincipleofEqualOpportunity,sucharequirementdoesnotapplytotheDifferencePrinciple.Protests against social and economic policies through civil disobedience aredifficult to justify because the justification will be adequate only if it can beshownthatthepolicy inquestionwasdesignedtoattackequal liberties.RawlsmodifiesthispositioninTJbyallowingthatataxationlawcanbeanappropriatetarget of civil disobedience when either it is designed to attack or to abridgeequalliberty.(SeeSection3.3.1)

The third condition is themutual recognitionof a right todisobey.Thisconditionrequiresdissenterstorecognizethefactthatotherpeoplealsohavearight to perform disobedience in a similar situation. We can put aside themeaningofarighttodisobeyandfocusonthecontentof thiscondition.Rawls

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clearlyseesthisconditionfromthefirstpersonstandpoint.Thisconditionisnotabout justifyingtheactofdisobedienceitselfbutaboutadisobedient’sattitudetowards others’ reasons for disobeying laws. I call this condition the mutualrecognitionofdisobedients.

These three conditionsexplainwhen civil disobedience is justified.Thisleavesopen the furtherquestionas towhatRawlsmeansbysaying there is “arighttoengageincivildisobedience.”(Rawls,1999:186)Rawlsdoesnotseemtodistinguishconceptuallybetweena right todisobeyand justifieddisobedience.JosephRaz,ontheotherhand,takesonthisdistinctionanddevelopshisaccountof civil disobedience. I shall dealwith this topic later in the Dissertation. (SeeSection2.1inChapter4.)

The following Figure shows Rawls’s preliminary conception ofdisobediencein“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience.”

Figure5:Rawls’sPreliminaryConceptionofCivilDisobedience

Elements Concepts Explanations

DefinitionalElements

PoliticalAct Disobedienceisanactjustifiedbymoralprincipleandrestsonpoliticalconviction.

PublicAct Disobedienceisawayofaddressingthemajority’ssenseofjustice.

NonviolentActs Disobedienceisaformofspeech,anexpressionofconviction.

JustificatoryElements

FailureofNormalPoliticalAppeal

Itisalastresortwhenstandarddemocraticprocesseshavefailed.

SubstantialandClearViolationsofJustice

Violationsofequallibertiesareanappropriatejustificationfordisobedience.

MutualRecognitionofARighttoDisobey

Disobedienceshouldbelimitedtocasesinwhichdissentersarewillingtoaffirmthatothershavethegroundstoalsoengageindisobedience.

3.JohnRawls’sTheoryofCivilDisobedienceinATheoryofJustice

3.1.AGeneralRoadmapforRawls’sTheoryofCivilDisobedience—TheSocialContextIhaveillustratedRawls’sinitial ideaofcivildisobedienceoutlinedinhis

article, “The JustificationofCivilDisobedience.”This article covers a varietyoftopics ranging from the obligation to obey an unjust law to what civildisobedience is and what features define disobedience. Later in 1971 JohnRawls published A Theory of Justice in which he discussed topics of civildisobedience in greater detail. The theory of civil disobedience in TJ ismorecomprehensiveandcoherentthantheonehesetsforthinTJCD.

As usual, Rawls situates his theory of disobedience in the context of anearlyjustsociety.Hesays,“Thistheoryisdesignedonlyforthespecialcaseofanearlyjustsociety,onethatiswell-orderedforthemostpartbutinwhichsomeseriousviolationsofjusticeneverthelessdooccur.”(TJ:§55,p.363;italicadded)

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This sentence is important because it makes explicit that Rawls’s theory ofdisobediencedoesnotdirectlyapplytoanunjustsocietyorasocietywithoutademocraticregime.15Moreover,Rawlsassumesthatseriousviolationsofjusticecanalsohappeninanearlyjustsociety.

Rawls understands that members of society might use other types ofprotesttoexpresstheiropinionsinanon-democraticsocietysuchasamilitary-governed regime or authoritarian regime. But his theory should not beconsidered in that context. In a non-democratic regime, members of societymight need to rely on another theory to correct serious injustice. One implicitpremise in Rawls’s theory is that, in a nearly just society, the scope of civildisobedience excludes the option of overturning the government: there is noneedtooverthrowademocraticregimeinanearlyjustsociety.

Howeverweshouldnotover-and-underinterprettheapplicabilityofhistheory of disobedience. First, he does explicitly state that his theory ofdisobediencecanonlybeappliedinanearlyjustsociety.Anearlyjustsocietyistheone towhichheprimarilyapplies the theoryofdisobedience. Secondly,hedoesnot say thathis theorydoesnotapply inanunjust society.Hedoes statethat “the problem of civil disobedience arises only within a more or lessdemocratic state for those citizenswho recognize and accept the legitimacyoftheconstitution.”(TJ:§55,p.363)Thereforethereisapossibilitythathistheorycanbeappliedinanon-liberalsociety.

Now we turn to how Rawls structures his arguments for civil disobedience in TJ. His theory is divided into three parts: the definition of civil disobedience, the justification of disobedience, and its role in a constitutional democracy. The first part illustrates what civil disobedience is and the salient features of this concept. The second part demonstrates the grounds for disobedience and justificatory conditions of exercising disobedience. The third part explains the role of disobedience within a constitutional system and how civil disobedience is compatible with a constitutional democracy.

I should clarify the terminology I use in this Section. The constitutiveelement of disobedience is the phrase I use to designate Rawls’s discussion onwhat civil disobedience is and the justificatory element of disobedience is thephrase I use for Rawls’ discussion of the conditions under which civildisobedience is justified. The constitutive element is concerned with whatfeatures civil disobedience should have and the subjective intention ofdisobedients. The justificatory element is concerned with the question of thethreshold of initiating “justified” disobedience. When thinking about thejustificatory elements of civil disobedience, it is worth noting that the term“justificatory”meanstheconditionsthatcanjustifyactionsofdisobediencefromthefirst-personstandpoint.Itisadifferentquestiontothinkaboutwhethersuchan action should be protected by rights—that is, whether there is a right toengage in civil disobedience. Rawls sometimes explicitly mentions a right to

15 We should note that there is a connection between a nearly just society and its form of regime, a democratic regime in Rawls’s theory. In terms of appropriateness of civil disobedience, the suitable angle of thinking about disobedience is to figure out what the relation might be between civil disobedience and a legitimately established democratic regime.

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performdisobediencewithoutclarifyingwhathemeansbytheterm“right.”ThistopicwillbediscussedlaterintheDissertation.(SeeChapter4.)

This Section is divided into three parts. The first part, Section 3.1,providesageneralroadmapforRawls’sargumentinTJ.Thesecondpart(Section3.2) focuseson theconstitutiveelementbydistinguishing twodimensions: thedimensionofactionsandthedimensionofagents.IalsodemonstratehowRawlsarguesinTJfortheuseofnonviolenceindisobedience.ThethirdpartdiscussesRawls’sillustrationofthejustificatoryelements.

3.2.TheConstitutiveElementsofRawlsianCivilDisobedienceJohnRawlshasprovidedasophisticateddefinitionofcivildisobedience.

HedefinescivildisobedienceinTJinthefollowingpassage:[Civil disobedience is ] a public, nonviolent,

conscientious yet political act contrary to lawusuallydonewith the aim of bringing about a change in thelawandpolicyofthegovernment.Byactinginthiswayoneaddressesthesenseofjusticeofthemajorityofthecommunity and declares that in one’s consideredopiniontheprincipleofsocialcooperationamongfreeandequalmenarenotbeingrespected.(TJ:§55,p.364)

This definition can be analyzed from two perspectives. The firstperspectivefocusesonthefeaturesthatactionsmusthavetobeconsideredcivildisobedienceandthesecondiswhatfeaturesagentsshouldhaveforperformingcivil disobedience. The first perspective investigates the features of the actionitselfwhich I call thedimensionofaction. This dimensionof action reveals thefeaturesofdisobediencethatmakesuchactionsdistinguishablefromothertypesof conduct. The second perspective investigates the features of people whoperform disobedience, what I call the dimension of agents. The dimension ofagents focuseson the subjective elements that an agentmusthave inorder toengageincivildisobedience.

Section 3.2 illustrates the constitutive elements of civil disobedience inthesetwodimensions.Thefollowingisasummaryofitsstructure.

Subsection 3.2.1 elucidates the dimension of action and aims to showwhat Rawls means by describing disobedience as a political, public, andnonviolent action. Idiscuss these features inanorderlywaybyexploringhowRawlsconstruesthem.ThemostimportantargumentforRawlsistheonehesetsforthfortheuseofnonviolencebyprovidingtwonormativearguments:(1)thenormative requirements for disobedience as speech act and (2) the normativerequirementofsincerity.Thesetwoargumentsareexploredindepthbelow.(SeeSection3.2.1.3inChapterTwo.)

Subsection 3.2.2 explicates the dimension of agents, who performdisobedience.AccordingtoJohnRawlsanagentperformingdisobedienceneedstomeetthreesubjectiveelementsforperformingcivildisobedience:anintentiontochangealaworpolicies,sincereattitude,andmoralconviction.

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Finally Subsection 3.2.3 summarizes the constitutive elements of civildisobedience.

3.2.1.ThreeCharacteristicsofCivilDisobedience:Political,Public,andNonviolent

3.2.1.1.Civildisobedienceisapoliticalactionwithsociologicalandnormativecomponents.The first feature of action of disobedience is that disobedience is a

political action. This is a familiar idea, but what does Rawls mean by beingpolitical?TwocomponentsoftheideathatdisobedienceispoliticalcanbefoundinRawls’sillustrations.Thefirstcomponentofbeingpoliticalissociologicalandthesecondcomponentisprescriptive.

The sociological component of being political refers to the personstargetedbycivildisobedience.ForRawlsactionsofdisobedienceareaddressedtothose(usuallythemajorityindemocraticsocieties)whoholdpoliticalpower.Thissenseofbeingpoliticalissociologicalbecausedisobedienceaimstohaveanimpactonthosewhoexercisepower.Inadditiontothissociologicalcomponent,Rawls posits a prescriptive component of disobedience. The prescriptivecomponentrequiresthatdisobedients’actionsbeguidedandjustifiedbypoliticalprinciplesthatregulatethebasicstructureinanearlyjustsociety.

This prescriptive component of being political requires elaboration.Agents(thedisobedients)notonlyhavetofindouttheguidingprinciplefortheiractions but also justify their actions under the current circumstances byappealing to existing political principles. An implication of the prescriptivecomponent is that disobedience is never to be a rebellion, revolution, or a coupd’etat. These three radical forms of dissent aim to change basic politicalprinciples outside the scope of the existing constitutional structure but civildisobediencedoesnot.

Figure6:TheTwoComponentsofBeingPolitical

TheSociologicalComponent ThePrescriptiveComponent

CoreContent Disobedienceaddressespeoplewhoholdpoliticalpower.

Disobedienceshouldbeguidedandjustifiedbypoliticalprinciples.

Implication Disobediencedoesnottargetthosewhodonotholdpoliticalpower.

Rebellion,revolution,andcoupd’étatareexcludedfromRawlsian

disobedience.

ThereasonthatRawlsconceptualizesdisobedienceaspoliticalisthathetreatspoliticalprinciplesasthemostimportantsourceofjustificationforactionsinthepublicsphere.Forhimcivildisobediencecannotbe justifiedbypersonalmoralityorreligiousprinciples.(AlsoseeSection2.2inChapterThree.)Personalmorality and religious principles can support disobedience but they do notprovidesufficientreasons—theycannotbecompletejustifications.Thereforehe

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thinksdisobedientsmustprovidepoliticalprinciplesandnotpersonalmoralityastheirprimaryjustificationsforcivildisobedience.16(TJ:§55,p.365,368-371)

Rawls’s insistence on this prescriptive component of beingpolitical tiesintotheideaofpublicreasonwhichhelaterdevelopedinPoliticalLiberalism.17Tobesure,whenhewroteTJ,hehadnot clearlyarticulated the ideaofpublicreason.18Ashecontinuestodevelophistheoryof justiceinPoliticalLiberalism,he develops the idea of public reason as a distinctive idea that clarifies therelationship between a political conception of justice and comprehensiveconceptions of the good, such as those provided by the religious and moralbeliefsofindividuals.

Theintroductionoftheideaofpublicreasonandthedistinctionbetweenpoliticalconceptionsofjusticeandcomprehensiveconceptionsofthegoodraisethe following question: How does Rawls’s theory deal with a case ofdisobediencethatisprimarilymotivatedbythedisobedients’personalmoralityor religious beliefs? This question is important, because Rawls believes thatdisobedience must be justified by political principles that are supported bypublicreason.Theanswertothisquestionrequiresabasicdiscussionoftheideaof public reason and thedifferencebetweenpublic reason and comprehensivedoctrines. I shall deal with these questions in Section 4 in this Chapter, TheImplicationofRawlsianCivilDisobedience.

Rawls’sexclusionofpersonalmorality isnotuncontroversial.KimberleyBrownlee has argued that one basic feature of disobedience is the moralconvictionthatshecallsconscientiousconviction. She thinksRawlshas takenanunjustifiably narrow view of civil disobedience.19Brownlee hasmade a soundcasefortheclaimthatcivildisobediencecanbenon-politicalandsolelybasedonpersonalmorality inherbook,ConscienceandConviction.Brownlee’sargumentforcivildisobediencewillbeexplicatedinChapter4;atthisstage,Iwillhighlighttherelevantquestionsregardingthepoliticalnatureofcivildisobedience.

First, themostsignificantcasesofdisobediencetarget issuesrelevanttopoliticalpowerexercisedby thepolitical authority. For example, theAmericancivilrightsmovementledbyRev.MartinLutherKing,Jr.highlightedtheissueofracial inequality; the resistantmovement ledbyAungSanSuuKyiappealed tothe political transition from themilitant authoritarian regime to a democraticregimeinMyanmar;andGandhi’snonviolentmovementaimedtooverthrowtheBritish colonization of India. Recent cases include Hong Kong’s UmbrellaRevolution for theright togeneral suffrageandTaiwan’sSunflowerMovementprotestingthefreetradeagreementbetweenTaiwanandChina.20Basedonthis

16 If we compare this position to his preliminary argument in “The Justification of Civil Disobedience,” we find a narrower idea of disobedience, one not found in conventional thinking about civil disobedience. Henry Thoreau’s case, for Rawls, is not a case of civil disobedience. 17 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, 1993. 18 The idea of political conception of justice is an idea Rawls offers to distinguish this idea from other comprehensive doctrine. In Political Liberalism Rawls develops a freestanding theory of justice without grounding it in any comprehensive doctrine of morality, goods, and religion. 19 See Kimberley Brownlee’s interview by Richard Marshall at 3:AM, 2013/06/10. 20 See the entry of 2014 Hong Kong Protests in the Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Hong_Kong_protests ) and the entry of Sunflower Student Movement (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunflower_Student_Movement ). The website Democracy at

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phenomenonoftargetingthepoliticalauthority,theoriesofdisobedienceshoulddemonstrate the relationship between disobedience and the realm of thepolitical.Rawls’answer,asIhaveexplainedabove,istotakethepoliticalfeatureasadistinctivefeatureofdisobedience.

Second, a theory of disobedience like Rawls’s needs to explain how itdealswithcasesinwhichdisobedienceisjustifiedbythedisobedients’moralityor religious principles that are not commonly shared by most members ofsociety. Rawls conceptualize those cases by the idea of conscientious refusaldefinedasanactionof“noncompliancewithamoreorlessdirectlegalinjunctionor administrative order.” (TJ: § 56, p. 368) According to Rawls, “conscientiousrefusalisnotnecessarilybasedonpoliticalprinciples.”(TJ:§56,p.369)

Third,withregardtocasesofdisobediencejustifiedbypoliticalprinciples,thesignificantquestionis,whatisrequiredforcivildisobediencetobepoliticalin the relevant sense.Rawls’sanswer is thatdisobediencemustbe justifiedbypolitical principles in a public forum. (TJ: § 55, p. 366)21Thus, disobedientsfrequentlyclaimthattheywanttoprotecttheirrights,tochangeunjustlawsandpolicies,andtodemandthatthemajority listentotheminority’svoice.That is,disobedients raise issues as to how rights, duties, and resources should bedefinedanddistributedinaccordwiththepoliticalprinciplesharedbymembersofsociety.

Rawls’s conceptualization of being political invites a very fundamentalquestioninpoliticalphilosophy:whether it isnecessarilythecasethatpoliticalarguments are reasonable (that is, whether reason plays a distinct role) orwhethersuchargumentsaremerelyexpressionsof individualpreferences thatcannotbeobjectivelyjudgedbyreason.Situatingthisquestioninthecontextofcivil disobedience, the following question is both important and difficult: cancivil disobedience be seen as a form of exercising public reason in order tofacilitatecommunicationbetweenthedisobedientsandthemajority?Andunderwhat circumstancescandisobediencebe seen in thisway? InTJRawlsdidnotexplicitlydevelophispoliticalconceptioninawaythatanswersthesequestions,but his view in TJ is that disobedience should be constrained by politicalprinciples shared bymembers of society. Rawls’s later development of publicreasonprovidesaclueastohowhewouldviewthesequestions.IshalldealwiththistopicinSection4.1.1inthisChapterexplainingtheimplicationofhistheoryofdisobedience.

3.2.1.2.Civildisobedienceisapublicactionthatisdoneinthepublicsphereandprovidesfairnoticetothepublic.

The public dimension of civil disobedience is the second feature ofRawls’sdefinition,thatis,disobediencemustbeconductedinthepublicsphere.AsRawlssays,“Afurtherpointisthatcivildisobedienceisapublicact.Notonlyis it addressed topublicprinciples, it is done inpublic. It is engaged inopenlywithfairnotice;itisnotcovertorsecretive.”(TJ:§55,p.366)

4am provides very useful information for English readers about the background of the Sunflower Movement in Taiwan (http://4am.tw/). 21 (“One may compare it to public speech, and being a form of address, an expression of profound and conscientious political conviction, it takes place in the public forum.”)

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The location of disobedience is a critical factor. Rawls compares civildisobedience to a public speech taking place in a public forum. However, weshouldnotexaggeratetheimplicationsofthisfeature.Appearinginpublicdoesnot mean that disobedients need to reveal all information relevant todisobedience. Neither does it mean that disobedients need to reveal theiridentities.Whenweconsidertherequirementoffairnotice,themeaningofthepublicdimensionbecomesclearer.RawlsmentionsfairnoticetwiceinTJ.First,hementions it in the context of the requirement that disobedience be public.Then, later in the book, he mentions the role of civil disobedience in aconstitutionaldemocracy.Hesays,“byengagingincivildisobedienceoneintends,then,toaddressthesenseofjusticeandtoservefairnoticethatinone’ssincereand considered opinion the conditions of free cooperation are being violated.”(TJ:§59,p.382)

Ifwe take these twoparagraphsmentioning “fair notice” together, theyshedlightontherequirementthatdisobedienceoccurinpublic.Disobedienceisanactioncontrarytolawthat“carries”certainmessagesthatdisobedientswantto project to the majority. What messages are carried by disobedience? Theexplicit one is awarning to themajority that conditions of social cooperationhavebeenviolatedand the implicit one is awarning thatdisobediencewill bedone in a specific place so that people who might be harmed by civildisobediencecantakestepstoavoidinjury.Therefore,disobedientsarerequiredtoannouncewhenandwheresuchactionswillbeperformed.

Ibelievethatthisunderstandingilluminatesanothercorefeatureofcivildisobedience in Rawls’s conception, the requirement of nonviolence. It isimportanttonotethatRawlssays,“Onemaycompareittoapublicspeech,andbeing a formof address, an expressionofprofoundand conscientiouspoliticalconviction,ittakesplaceinthepublicforum.Forthisreason,amongothers,civildisobedience is nonviolent.” (TJ: §55, p. 366) To understand the connectionbetweentherequirementthatdisobediencebepublicandtherequirementthatitbenonviolent,weneedtoexaminethenatureofapublicspeech.

3.2.1.3.Civildisobedienceisnonviolentintermsofitspurposeofgettingpeopleengagedinacourseofaction.

Rawls’s explanation of why civil disobedience must be nonviolent hasseveral theoretical implications. He provides two arguments for requiringnonviolence without positively defining what nonviolence is. The failure todefine nonviolence raises important questions: how can Rawls justifynonviolencewithoutspecifyingitsnature?Rawlsaimstoshowthatnonviolenceisaninternalconstitutiveelementfortheconceptofcivildisobedienceandthereasonwhy this is so. I shall discuss how hemakes this argument via a closereviewoftherelevantpassages.

ThetransitionfromRawls’sdiscussionoftherequirementtooperateinthepublicspheretotherequirementofnonviolenceoccurswhenhesays, “Forthis reason, among others, civil disobedience is nonviolent.” (TJ: §55, p. 366)Whatis“thisreason”?Rawlsisreferringtohiscomparisonofcivildisobedienceandpublicspeech.Atthispoint,weneedtofocusonthe“speech”elementofthenotionof“publicspeech”—that focuswillunpackRawls’sunderstandingof thejustificationfortherequirementthatcivildisobediencebenonviolent.

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For Rawls, civil disobedience is amode of address. Disobedients try tocommunicate to the majority by performing actions contrary to law. Civildisobedienceisawaytodramatizecertainissuesthatsomemembersinagivensociety consider unjust. Its performance not only delivers the message to thepublicthatsomecasesofinjusticeexistbutalsoaddressesthepersuasiveforcetothe majority. Disobedients try to persuade the public to accept their point ofview.Theactionofbreakingaparticularlawitselfisamodeofaddressinsofarasit communicates amessage to themajority.Disobedient actions are consistentwith the conditions for communication to the extent that disobedients putthemselves in a status that is equal to that of themajority for the purpose ofcommunicating with them. To distinguish disobedience as communicative isimportant because it helps us understand how the communicative functionincorporates the requirement of nonviolence into the concept of civildisobedience. (SeeSection3.2.1.3.1andSection4.2 inChapterTwo.)Actionsofcivil disobedience can affect the attitudes and beliefs of others by moving themtowardsthebeliefsandattitudesthataredesiredbythedisobedient.Inanutshell,civil disobedience is an act conveying a message. The act says something bydoingsomething.

Civildisobedienceaspublicspeechisamodeofaddresstothepublicthataimstopersuadethemtoacceptthespeaker’spointofview.However,aspeakerdoes not use physical force to make an audience accept the message; rather,speakersseektoputtheaudience inapositionwheretheysharethespeakers’basis forbelief in theirmessage. In thescenarioofpublicspeech, theaudiencenot only receives the meaning of sentences which are constituted in words,structured by syntax, and vocalized by the speaker; in addition the audienceacquires a feeling about a speaker’s sincerity. The perception that a speakercreatesofhissinceritymayvarybutthepurposeisalwaystomaketheaudiencebelievethatthespeakertrulybelievesthatwhathecommunicatestohisaudienceistrueorcorrectandthatwhatthespeakerdoesisconsistentwithwhathehassaid.

A good speech is not only a speech in which a speaker articulates hisarguments comprehensively but also one in which the speaker appropriatelyinvitestheaudiencetothinkthewaythespeakerthinks.Agoodspeechinvitestheaudience to engage in thinking about issues and arguments addressed by thespeaker. And a good speech persuades audiences in an appropriate way, byallowing the audience to make the final decision on the issues in question.Therefore the persuasive force of the speech does not deprive an audience oftheirpowertomakeanindependentjudgmentbutinvitesthemtoengageinthesamereasoningasthespeakerwhileleavingthemtodecidewhattheythinkonthebasisoftheirindependentjudgment.

Civil disobedience is like a good public speech in the manner thatdissenters address issues and invite their audience to reconsider beliefs andattitudes challenged by the act of disobedience. And, most importantly,disobedientsleaveroomforthemajoritytomakeafinaljudgmentontheissuesaddressed by their acts. Like a speaker, disobedients want audiences to formtheirownbeliefsandtotaketheissuesinquestionseriously.ThisiswhyRawlssays, “[Disobedience] tries to avoid the use of violence, especially against

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persons,notfromtheabhorrenceoftheuseofviolenceinprinciple,butbecauseitisafinalexpressionofone’scase.”(Rawls,1971:366)

Thefactthatcivildisobedienceandapublicspeecharecomparabledoesnot necessarily mean that nonviolence is a constitutive element. Rather,nonviolence is a necessary background condition for making communicationssuccessful. Successful communication is one important purpose of civildisobedience and this purpose can only be achieved bymaking nonviolence aconstitutive element; communication in a violent environment is not truecommunication. In this context, it is useful to thinkofHabermas’s idea of the“unforced force of the better argument.” 22 Violence would deprive civildisobedience of the key feature of persuasion through reason and replacepersuasionwiththe“forcedforceofviolence.”

Rawlshasprovidedtwosubstantialargumentsfortheuseofnonviolenceincivildisobedience.Icallthefirstargumentthe“speechactargument”andthesecond the “sincerity argument.” The speech act argument focuses on whyactionsofdisobediencehavethepowertoinfluenceandpersuadethemajority’sattitudes towards issues of injustice. Civil disobedience is a kind of speech actthat says things by doing. The second argument emphasizes that members’attitudes regarding fidelity to the law is a condition for them to accept legalconsequences resulting from their actions that violate the law. Nonviolentdisobedienceisameansofhelpingthemajorityunderstandparticipants’sincereattitudes.Thesetwoargumentsarecomplexandneedfurtherexplication.Iwillexamineeachoftheminorder.3.2.1.3.1.TheSpeechActArgumentforNonviolence

The firstargumentprovidedby JohnRawls insupportofnonviolence iscalled the speech act argument. This argument refers to the fact that civildisobedience itself is a mode of address. Disobedients express theirdissatisfaction with certain policies or laws by acting contrary to the law.Disobedientsnotonlyexpress theirdissatisfactionbutalsoaddress the reasonwhy they are dissatisfied with certain issues about basic structure and socialcooperation. More importantly disobedience is a way for disobedients topersuade themajority to “accept” theirpointofview.Disobedience isnotonlyexpressive but also communicative—it aims to engage themajority in thoughtandaction.

The distinction between expressive disobedience and communicativedisobediencewillbeexplained fully in thenextChapter. At thispoint, abriefoverviewofthedifferencesissufficient.First,expressivedisobedienceassumesaunilateral relationship between the disobedients and the addressees whereascommunicative disobedience assumes a bilateral relationship. The seconddifference is that expressive disobedience generates impacting force andcommunicative disobedience persuasive force. Third, expressive disobediencedoesnot include theprincipleofnonviolenceas a constitutive component, butcommunicativedisobedience insists onnonviolence as abackground condition

22 Amy Allen, “ The Unforced Force of the Better Argument: Reason and Power in Habermas’ Political Theory,” in Constellations, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 353-368, 2012.

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for successful communication. (For explanations and detail, see Chapter 3,especiallySection2.)

Disobedients try tomakeadifference in twoways: (1) by changing themajority’sjudgmentontherelevantquestion,and(2)byinvitingthemajoritytojoin in the course of disobedience. This is the most salient feature of civildisobedienceasaspeechact.Disobedienceaimstoinvolvemembersofsocietyintheissuesinwhichjusticeisatstake.

ForRawls,civildisobedience isasortofspeechactbecausedisobedientactions express illocutionary force with the aim of gaining uptake from themajority. However, there is a slight difference between Rawls’s texts. In “TheJustification of Civil Disobedience,” he treats civil disobedience as a form ofspeechandinATheoryofJusticehesubstitutestheterm“address”for“speech.”Thissubstitutioncanbeinterpretedasarecognitionthatanutterance(oraluseoflanguage)istheordinaryformof“speech,”butcivildisobediencecanbeasortofspeechactthatcommunicatesmeaningfulcontentwithoutexplicitutterancesor verbal communications. Rawls uses the term “address” to express the ideathat disobedience can communicate without utterance. Even without explicitlinguisticcontent,theperformanceofcivildisobediencecantransmitamessagefromdisobedientstoaudiences.

3.2.1.3.2.TheSincerityArgumentforNonviolenceThesecondargumentfornonviolenceisbasedontheideaofsincerity.In

TJCD,Rawlshasprovidedaprimaryexplanationforthisargument.Hesays,“civildisobedience isnonviolent in the further sense that the legal penalty for one’saction is accepted and that resistance is not (at least for the moment)contemplated.” (Rawls, 1999: 182) He later refines this argument in TJ byconnectingdisobedients’attitudestotheideaofthefidelitytolaw.

In TJ, Rawls further develops his argument for sincerity and explicitlyarticulates the idea that fidelity to the law is an internal element of civildisobedience. Henotes thatone significant expressionof fidelity to the law isevidencedbydisobedients’acceptanceof legalconsequences,not“legalpenalty”ashestatesinhisearlierformulation.Sincecivildisobedience issupposedtobeperformed in a public sphere, disobedients’ acceptance of legal consequencessends a message to the public that civil disobedience does not aim to totallynegate the legitimacy of a legal system. Disobedients’ acceptance of legalconsequencesalsoshowstheirconducttobeboth“politicallyconscientiousandsincere.” Thus “to be completely open and nonviolent is to give bond of one’ssincerity,foritisnoteasytoconvinceanotherthatone’sactsareconscientious,oreventobesureofthisbeforeoneself.”(TJ:§55,p.367)

JohnRawls’ssincerityargumentcanbereconstructedinthreesteps:

1. Civil disobedience is a different category from revolution andconscientiousrefusal.Theaimofcivildisobedienceistochangeanunjust law or unjust policies, not the whole legal system. Thefoundationofpoliticallegitimacyisstillmaintainedandsupportedby dissenters even though they have different normativejudgmentsaboutlawsorpolicies.

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2. Disobedients do not totally negate the whole legal system andunderstandcivildisobedienceasamodeofaddressthatexpressestheir beliefs about the moral merit of certain laws. Therefore,disobedientsarewillingtoacceptthelegalconsequencesresultingfrom their actions and to consider an appropriate method toexpresstheirdissentingviews.

3. Since the fidelity to law is an internal element for civildisobedience, insistence on the principle of nonviolence isnecessarybecausenonviolentdisobedience“givesabondofone’ssincerity.” This bond enables the majority to understand thecommunicativecontentwithoutbeingdistractedbyaccompanyingviolence.

The disobedients’ sincere attitude requires fidelity to law, and thisattitude can be demonstrated by the disobedients’ acceptance of the legalconsequencesofdisobedience.Buthowcan thedisobedients,on theonehand,disobeyalawintentionallyand,ontheotherhand,provetheirsincereattitude?Theirinsistenceuponnonviolenceistheanswerbecauseitdemonstratestothemajority the fact that civil disobedience is undertaken conscientiously andsincerelyingoodfaith.

Thus,thereisaninstrumentalreasonfortheprincipleofnonviolence.Theinsistenceonnonviolenceisnotbecausenonviolenceitselfhasintrinsicvalue—although it might. Nonviolence is essential because it makes disobedients’sincere attitudes and their fidelity to law explicit and thereby enhances theeffectivenessoftheircommunicationtothemajority.

Disobedients’attitudeofsinceritycanbedemonstratedintwowaysthatRawls did not explicate: the first is the acceptance of legal penalties and thesecond is refraining from the contemplation of resistance. Refraining fromcontemplating resistance is troublesome because it is more ambiguous andpractically impossible.Ontheonehand,notcontemplatingresistanceseemstoask disobedients to not ever think about resistance and, on the other hand,absence of contemplation about resistance rarely can be found in real-lifeexamples of civil disobedience. In addition, there is no conceptual connectionbetweentheacceptanceof legalpenaltiesandrefrainingfromcontemplationofresistance. It is possible for someone to accept the legal penalty for hisdisobedientactionbutalsoadoptcontemplatedproportionateresistanceinthecourse of conducting civil disobedience. More precisely, someone can have asincere attitude toward the law but disapprove of legal enforcement whileperforming civil disobedience because the public authoritymight adopt harshandundulyseveremethodstosuppresscivildisobedience.Moreover,intheend,some contemplation of resistance may be necessary for self-protection. It ispossiblethatundersomeextremecondition,nonpeacefulresistanceisrequiredand justified when disobedients reasonably foresee and believe that legalenforcement would use extreme disproportionate methods to suppressdisobedients’ conduct. Therefore, Rawls’s requirement of sincerity seems toconflatefidelitytothelawandfidelitytolawenforcement.

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3.2.2.TheConstitutiveElements-TheDimensionofAgentThe previous discussion focuses on the action of civil disobedience.

Howeverdisobedience isperformedbydisobedients.There isnodisobediencewithoutassuminganagentwhoperformstheaction.Rawlsdidnotdistinguishthe subjective elements of disobedients clearly but looking at his definition ofcivil disobedience in detail reveals another dimension in its constitutiveelements,thatis,thesubjectivecharacteristicsoftheagents(“disobedients”).

Disobedience is performed by agents who have three subjectivecharacteristics. First they need to have an intention to change a lawor policy.Secondly, they must feel loyalty to the law. And third they must have aconscientiousconvictionthatalawisunjust.

First,because thepurposeofdisobedience is tobringaboutachange inlaw or policy, this purpose must be part of the subjective intention ofdisobedients.Rawlsconnectsthepurposeofchangingalawwiththefeatureofbeingpolitical:thepurposemustbejustifiedbypoliticalprinciplesacceptedinanearly just society. In terms of the purpose of bringing a change in law,disobedientsmust subjectivelybelieve that theirdisobedience is justifiedunderthepoliticalprinciplessharedbymembersofsociety.Iftheyhavenosuchbeliefthenitisdifficulttocallthemcivildisobedients.Thisrequirementofsubjectivebeliefinvitesacriticalquestioninthecontextofamistakenbelief.Thequestionis, if disobedients make an honest mistake concerning justification, isdisobediencestilljustified?Inotherwords,isjustificationsubjectiveorobjective?Rawls does not answer this question. And one plausible interpretation is thatRawlsbelieves justificationneeds tobeobjective in thesense that thepoliticalprinciples justifying the disobedients’ purposemust be shared bymembers ofsociety.23

Second,disobedientsneedtohaveaparticularattitudetowardslaw;thatis,theagentsofdisobediencemusthaveanattitudeoffidelitytolaw.Ifmemberslack this attitude, their action cannot be categorized as civil disobedience as aconceptualmatter.Theattitudeoffidelitytolawperformsanimportantfunction:the internal constraint function. This attitude leads disobedients to adoptnonviolentmethods to express their dissent. This attitude also draws the linebetween disobedience within a democratic constitution and unlawful actionsthataimtooverthrowademocraticconstitutionpeacefully.Theformercategoryiscivildisobedience,butthelattercategoryisnonviolentrevolution.

Third,themostessentialcharacteristicforagentsofcivildisobedienceisconscientious conviction. This element seems uncontroversial because mostpeoplewouldagreethatwhatacopycatdoesisnotcivildisobediencealthoughtheiractionsmightappeartobesimilar.Fordirectdisobedience,aconscientiousconviction requires agents to hold a certain normative belief that compliancewithalawisunacceptabletothembasedontheirmoraljudgments.Forindirect

23 The main support for this interpretation is that Rawls has committed to the ideas of public reason and a political conception of justice. He discussed the limit of public reason and how the disobedients who hold a comprehensive conception of justice can propose their argument in the public forum. So this interpretation fits his theory of a political conception of justice. I will discuss this topic in Section 4.1.1 in Chapter 2 and Section 2.4.3 in Chapter 4.

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disobedience a conviction requires the disobedients to not obey a just law inorder to highlight themoral impermissibility of an unjust law. In both cases,conscientiousconvictionisrequired.

Interestingly, John Rawls did not explicitly define “conscientiousconviction.” He uses the phrase “act conscientiously.” (TJ: § 59, p. 389)Explicationofwhat “conscientiousness” is andwhat role it playswould clarifyRawls’s notion of civil disobedience. Substantial work on this topic has beendonebyKimberleyBrownlee.(Brownlee,2012:15-50)

There are good reasons to doubt the proposition that conscientiousconviction isarequirement foreachandevery individualparticipant inagivencollective act of civil disobedience. Civil disobedience (as opposed toconscientiousrefusal)isusuallytheactionofagroup—thatis,“collectiveaction.”Itseemslikelyasanempiricalmatterthattheindividualmembersofthegroupwillhavedifferentattitudestowardsthelaw.Eveniftherearesomeindividualswhoopposethelawforself-interestedreasonsorwhoaremerely“goingalong”with other members of their social group, the absence of unanimousconscientious conviction should not be viewed as changing the status of thecollectiveactionfrom“civildisobedience”to“notcivildisobedience.”

Viewingcivildisobediencefromtheperspectiveofcollectiveactionandasa product of collective cooperation leads us to reevaluate the importance ofmoral conviction. I shall discuss the feature of collective action in civildisobedienceinthenextChapterwhenIdemonstratetheresistantconceptionofdisobedience. This conception focuses on the system effect and how collectiveactionscanbeefficientlyorganized.24

3.2.3.ASummaryofTheConstitutiveElementsintheRawlsianConceptionofCivilDisobedienceThe explication of Rawls’s theory on the nature of civil disobedience is

now complete. I have just clarified his definition of civil disobedience bydifferentiating between the dimension of actions and the dimension of agents.Thefollowingchartillustratestheseconstitutiveelements.

24 The idea of system effect comes from Adrian Vermeule’s explanation. See Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution, Ch. 1, Oxford University Press, 2011.

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Figure7:TheConstitutiveElementsintheRawlsianConceptionofDisobedience

3.3.TheJustificatoryElementsofRawlsianCivilDisobedienceJohnRawlshasbotha theoryof thenatureof civildisobedienceandan

account of the conditions under which civil disobedience is justified. We canbegin our investigation of the justificatory elements of Rawlsian civildisobediencebydistinguishingtwolevelsofjustification.Thefirstlevelfocusesonthejustificationofparticularactsofdisobedience;thesecondlevelfocusesonthejustificationofdisobedienceingeneral—thatis,onthecircumstancesunderwhichdisobedienceofsomekindisjustified.Eachlevelwillbeexaminedinturn.

The first level focuses on which particular acts of disobedience arejustified.Forexample,whenconsideringhowtoexpressone’smoralconvictionthat social cooperation has been ignored by the majority one can choose avarietyofactionstodisobeyinordertoinvokeothers’senseofjustice.Thereisan important question as to what action should be chosen under a concretecircumstance.Forexample,thedisobedientsmightbefacedwiththequestionofwhether to break a law protecting property or a law protecting collectivebenefitstoexpresstheirsenseofjustice.Itisalwaysaquestionofwhenandonwhat grounds such a choice can be justified. This level of justification isconcernedwithwhichactionisjustifiedinparticularcircumstances.

However, there isasecond levelof justification. Insteadofaskingwhichaction is justifiable, we can ask when performing disobedience is justifiedgenerally—inthesensethatonecaninitiatedisobediencewhensuchconditionsaremet.Rawls’sdiscussioninTJfocusesonthesecondlevelofjustificationandin particular on whether civil disobedience is compatible with constitutionaldemocracy. He leaves open the question of what actions should be chosen. Ihavealreadydescribedhispreviousviewofthejustificationofcivildisobedience

TheDimensionofActions• PUBLIC• Disobedienceisdoneinpublic.• Disobedienceisanopenlyfairnoticetothepublicandsimilartoapublicspeech.• POLITICAL• TheSociologicalMeaning:Disobedienceisaddressedtopeoplewhoholdpoliticalpower.• TheNormativeMeaning:Disobedienceshouldbeguidedandjustiqiedbypoliticalprinciple.

• NONVIOLENT• TheArgumentofSpeechAct:Disobedienceisaspeechactthatgetsthemajorityinvolvedinactions.• TheArgumentofSincerity:Nonviolentdisobedienceisawayofhelpingthemajoritytounderstanddisobedients'sincereattitudes.

TheDimensionofAgents• Anintentionofchangingalaworapolicy• Theattitudetowardstheqidelityoflaw• Aconscientiousconviction

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in Section2 (See2.1 to2.3).His explanation inTJ ismore comprehensive andcoherentandforthatreasonwillbeexaminedingreaterdetail.

TherearethreejustificatoryelementsintheRawlsianconceptionofcivildisobedience: (1) the applicable object of disobedience, (2) ineffectiveness ofnormalappealsthroughtheordinarypoliticalprocess,and(3)theextensivenessofdisobedience. Insummary,thefirsttwoelementshavebeenlightlymodifiedinTJascomparedtohispriorformulation.Butthethirdelementissubstantiallydifferentfromhispreviousarticulation.IshallexaminethischangeinSection4below.

3.3.1JustificatoryElement1:TheApplicableObjectofCivilDisobedienceIn termsof the applicable object of disobedienceRawls discusseswhat

wrongs can be considered as appropriate objects for disobedience. Hisillustration can be divided into two parts: the formal part and the substantialpart.Theformalpartqualifieswhatobjectscanbetargetedbydisobedientsandthe substantial is about to what degree wrongs are sufficient to initiatedisobedience.

Not every object whose content contradicts the principle of justiceconstitutesanappropriateobjectofdisobedience.Rawls limitsdisobediencetotwo types of objects: laws and policies. The idea of law refers to statutes,ordinances,andpositivelawswrittenonthebooksandtheideaofpolicyrefersto the normative commitment that has been recognized officially by thegovernment. The content of the normative commitment is not passed throughthe democratic procedure but is recognized by the government to be theguidanceabouttheexerciseofpoliticalpowers.Forexamplea foreignpolicy isnotalawthathasbeendebated,articulated,andpassedbyalegislativebranchbut a normative commitment recognized by the government providing a basicdirectionofguidance in foreignaffairs.Rawlsdidnotexplicitlystatethat lawsandpoliciesaretwodistincttypesofobjectsofdisobedience.Nonethelessthesetwotypescanbeinferredfromhisarticulationofthedefinitionofdisobedienceandhispositiononwhencivildisobedienceisappropriate.25

So, if there is no law or policy, there is no appropriate object ofdisobedience.Forexample,inawell-orderedsocietypeoplemighthavedifferentviewsofwhatjusticeisandsomepublicofficialsmightarticulateideasthatareoffensive to the minority and display the officials’ total ignorance of the justtermsofsocialcooperation.Evenifthecontentoftheofficials’speechiscontrarytosomegroup’ssenseofjustice,theofficials’speechitselfisnotanappropriateobject of civil disobedience—although such speech could appropriately be theobject of lawful dissent in the form of demonstrations or protests conducted

25 In the context of analyzing the duty to comply with an unjust law, Rawls recognizes that one circumstance in which civil disobedience can be considered is when laws and policies contradict with the principles of justice shared by members of society. [When laws and policies deviate from publicly recognized standards, an appeal to the society’s sense of justice is presumably possible to some extent. I argue below that this condition is presupposed in undertaking civil disobedience.] (TJ: §53, p. 352) And in the context of defining civil disobedience, Rawls explicitly states that the disobedients have the intention of bringing about a change in “the law or policies of the government.” (TJ: §55, p. 364)

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within the bounds of law. This formal part of the applicable object ofdisobedience plays a basic filtering function that ensures that the target ofdisobedienceisaproductofthepoliticalprocess,thatis,alaworpolicy.

Inmanycases,itwillnotbedifficulttosatisfythisformalrequirement—forexample,incasesinwhichthereisapositivelawthatdoesnotcomplywiththedisobedient’ssenseofjustice.ButasformulatedbyRawls,thisrequirementseems unnecessarily stringent. In addition to laws and policies, there are avarietyofofficialactionsthatmightbeappropriatetargetsofcivildisobedience.Oneexample is a coercive legal order suchas an injunction. Another examplemightbeaninformalofficialpracticeorcustomthatisnotembodiedinaformallaworpolicy.

The requirement that the object of disobedience be a law or policy issometimes articulated by contrasting civil disobedience with conscientiousrefusal.Theremaybecaseswhereacoerciveorderorinformalofficialpracticeswould trigger justifiedconscientiousrefusal,but thisdoesnotentail that theseactionsmaynotalsobeappropriateobjectsofcivildisobedience.

In addition to the formal part of Rawls’s account of the objects ofdisobedience, there is a substantive part. This component of his account is inmanywaysmoreinterestingandimportantthantheformalpart.Rawlstakesthepositionthatviolationsofjusticemustbesubstantialandclearinordertoserveas a justification for civil disobedience. Rawls differentiates the Equal LibertyPrinciple from the Principle of Fair Opportunity in terms of the degrees ofviolationsofjustice.FortheEqualLibertyPrinciple,violationsshouldbeseriousinfringementsofsuchliberties.ForthePrincipleofFairOpportunity,theyshouldbeblatantviolations.

The required degree of violation is higher for the Principle of FairOpportunitythanfortheEqualLibertyPrinciple.Thereasonisthatwhenequallibertiesarenothonoredbyalegalsystem,violationsarelikelytobeclear.Rawlsdoes not exclude a taxation law from being the object of disobedience but hethinks unless such a law is designed to attack or to abridge the Equal LibertyPrinciplesuchalawcannotbeanappropriateobjectofdisobedience.(TJ:§57,pp.372-373)

For Rawls determining infringements of equal liberties is not difficultbecause theEqual LibertyPrinciple imposes “strict requirements thatmustbevisiblyexpressedininstitutions.” (TJ:§57,p.372)Itisusuallyrelativelysimpletodecidewhether a lawviolates these strict requirements.Rawlsuses severalexamples to illustrate why infringements of equal liberties are obvious. Hementionstherighttovote,therighttomove,therightofreligion,andtherighttoownproperty.

ButRawlsseemstomakeaslightmodificationwhenhediscussesequalopportunity.HispositioninTJCDwaslimitedtoeconomicopportunities,buthedoesnot include this limitation inTJ.The following table shows thedifferencebetweenTJCDandTJ.

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Figure8:TheComparisonoftheViolationofEqualOpportunityBetweenTJCDandTJ

TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience ATheoryofJusticeWhenminoritiesaredeniedtherighttovoteorto hold certain political offices, when certainreligious groups are repressed and othersdeniedequalityofopportunityintheeconomy,thisisoftenobviousandthereisnodoubtthatjusticeisnotbeinggiven.

Thus when certain minorities are denied theright to vote or to hold office, or to ownproperty and tomove from place to place, orwhen certain religious groups are repressedandothersdeniedvariousopportunities,theseinjusticesmaybeobvioustoall.

*.Strikethrough=cannotbefoundinATheoryofJustice.**.Underline=addedinATheoryofJustice.

ItisnotclearwhyRawlsmadethischange,deletingthephraseof“inthe

economy.” He offered no explanation. One possible interpretation is that heexpandedtheapplicableobjectofequalopportunity fromtheeconomytonon-economic spheres of social life. This possibility is suggested by his use of thephrase“variousopportunities”inTJ.Thereforepoliticalopportunities,economicopportunities,andsocialopportunitieswouldbeincluded.

With respect to the Difference Principle, taxation legislation is not anappropriate object for disobedience. In other words, claims that a tax lawviolatestheDifferencePrincipledonotjustifydisobedience.Ifdisobedientswanttomaketaxationlawthetargetoftheirdisobedience,theynotonlyhavetoargueforviolationof theDifferencePrinciplebutalsoconnect thisviolationwiththeEqual Liberty Principle. Rawls says, “Thus unless tax laws, for example, areclearlydesignedtoattackortoabridgeabasicliberty,theyshouldnotnormallybe protested by civil disobedience.” (TJ: § 57, p. 372) The violation of theDifferencePrincipleshouldbeclearlyconnectedwiththeintentionofattackingorabridgingequalliberties.Rawlsinsistsonthisconnectionasapreconditionofinitiatingdisobediencetargetingtaxlaws.

Finally, let me summarize Rawls’s explanation of the first justificatoryelementofcivildisobedience.

The first justificatory element can be called the applicable object ofdisobedience and this element consists of two parts. The first part, the formalone, considerswhat exactly constitutes an appropriate object of disobedience.Rawlsmentionstwotypesofobjects:lawsandpolicies.Thisformalpartplaysabasic filtering function that ensures that the targetofdisobediencebe either aproduct of thedemocratic process (statutes andpositive laws) or a normativecommitmentrecognizedbyagovernmentforguidingtheiractions.Thereforeanofficial’sspeechdoesnotconstituteanappropriateobjectofdisobedience.

The second part considers whether the laws or policies violate theprinciples of justice.Rawls articulates the following standard for this part: theviolationof justicemustbeboth substantial and clear. (Also seeSection2.3 inChapter Two demonstrating Rawls’s two principles of justice.) He alsodifferentiatestheEqualLibertyPrinciplefromthePrincipleofFairOpportunitybyarticulatingdifferentdegreesofviolationsaspredicatesfordisobedience.FortheEqualLibertyPrinciple,aseriousinfringementoffreedomissufficienttobedeemedaviolationandfor thePrincipleofFairOpportunityaviolationshould

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be blatant. Importantly a violation of the Difference Principle cannot be a self-standingreasontoinitiatedisobedience.

Based on two observations I believe that Rawls makes the applicableobjectofdisobediencemoreinclusive inTJ thanhehadpreviouslyarticulated inTJCD.Thefirstreasonisthathedoesnotlimitaviolationoffairopportunitytothe economic field but emphasizes various fields of opportunity in TJ. Second,withrespecttohowinjusticecanbeestablished,Rawlssays,“They[unjustcasesofviolatingbasicliberties]arepublic,incorporatedintotherecognizedpractice,ifnot the letter,of social arrangements.Theestablishmentofthesewrongsdoesnotpresupposeaninformedexaminationofinstitutionaleffects.”(TJ:§57,p.372,emphasisadded).ThelastsentencedidnotappearinTJCDandexplicitlylowerstheburdenforestablishingaviolationofbasicliberties.

3.3.2.JustificatoryElement2-TheIneffectivenessofNormalPoliticalAppealsThesecondjustificatoryelementistheineffectivenessofnormalpolitical

appeals. This element does not require disobedients to exhaust all actualopportunities in order to initiate disobedience. The central idea is thatdisobedientshavetriednormalpoliticalappealsingoodfaithandthatexperienceshows that further normal appeal is unlikely to be effective. So ineffectivenessdoesnotmeanthatnoactualmeansisavailable;rather,therequirementisthatdisobedients first make a sincere effort to achieve their aims through normalpoliticalappealsandthatthefailureofsucheffortsprovidesgoodevidencethatconventionalmethodsareunavailing.

The second justificatory element should be seen as a rebuttablepresumption.Inanemergency,whereextremeinjusticerequiresanimmediateresponse,disobedientswouldbejustifiedinforgoingnormalpoliticalappeals—so long as they sincerely believe that such appeals would not provide anadequateresponsetoexigentcircumstancesofinjustice.

OnepointthatshouldbenotedisthatRawlsaddsoneconceptthathedidnotmentioninTJCD.Hesays,“Sincecivildisobedienceisalastresort,weshouldbe sure that it isnecessary. Note that it has not been said, however, that legalmeans have been exhausted.” (TJ: § 57, p. 373) Rawls’s introduction of theconceptofnecessityintroducesanelementofambiguityintohisviewbecausehedidnotprovidefurtherexplanationofthemeaningof“necessity.”Thisraisesthequestion of whether the necessity requirement implies that civil disobediencemustbealastresort.

My view is that the notion of “necessity” should be understood as anelementoftheinternalrelationshipwithindisobedienceasmeanstoanend.Fortheirdisobediencetobejustified,actorsmusthavegoodreasonstobelievethatacts of disobedience are rational means to appropriate ends. But thisrequirement of means-ends rationality should not be seen as requiring thatdisobedientsbelievethatactsofcivildisobediencearetheonlypossiblemeanstoachievetheirends. Onthisunderstanding,Rawlswasmistakentointroducethenotionofnecessityintothediscussionofnormalpoliticalappeals.

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3.3.3.JustificatoryElement3-TheExtensivenessofCivilDisobedienceThe third condition arises from the concern that the previous two

conditionsmightbetoopermissive,withtheresultthattheextensivenessofcivildisobedience would generate substantial social disorder. Such social disorderwouldundermine the efficacyof a just orpartially just constitution andhenceunderminetheultimategoalofdisobedienceitself.(TJ:§57,p.374)Inordertopreventtheperformanceofdisobediencefromdestroyingawell-orderedsociety,thereisathird justificatoryelement. Iwillcall thiselementtheextensivenessofcivildisobedience.

With regard to theextensivenessofdisobedienceRawls says, “I assumeherethatthereisalimitontheextenttowhichcivildisobediencecanbeengagedinwithout leading to abreakdown in the respect for lawand the constitution,therebysettinginmotionconsequencesunfortunateforall.”(TJ:§57,p.373)Itis worth noting that the third element does not restrict when disobedienceshouldbeperformedbutrather isalimitationonthenumberofagentswhoareentitled to perform civil disobedience and the number of occasions upon whichdisobedience canbe performed. In other words, extensiveness is a function ofboththenumberofdisobedientacts,whichinturnisaproductofthenumberofagentsandthefrequencywithwhicheachagentengagesindisobedience. Theextensiveness of justified disobedience must be consistent with the goal ofmaintainingawell-orderedsociety.Thisthirdelementrequiresequallyentitleddisobedients to coordinate their actions such that the overall level ofdisobedience communicates their opinions effectively but does not interferewithcivicorderinawaythatwouldunderminetheefficacyofajustorpartiallyjustconstitution.Suchcoordinationmaynotbeeasybutisnotimpossible.

The articulation of the third justificatory element in TJ is substantiallydifferent than that in TJCD. In TJCD Rawls does not articulate the scope ofdisobedienceasaprimaryfeatureofthethirdelement.Rather,whatconcernedRawls inhisearlierworkwas themutual recognitionofdisobedients.He says,“…civildisobedienceshouldbe restricted to thosecaseswhere thedissenter iswilling to affirm that everyone else similarly subjected to the same degree ofinjusticehastherighttoprotestinasimilarway.”(Rawls,1999:184;emphasisadded.) Thus, Rawls maintained that disobedients should be prepared toauthorize others to perform disobedience and articulated an optimistic viewabout the stability of disobedience. He says, “legitimate civil disobedienceproperly exercised is a stabilizingdevice in a constitutional regime, tending tomakeitmorefirmlyjust.”(Rawls,1999:185)

InTJ,hisviewislessoptimistic. Hesays,“ThethirdandlastconditionIshall discuss can be rather complicated. It arises from the fact thatwhile twoprecedingconditionsareoftensufficienttojustifycivildisobedience,thisisnotalwaysthecase.”(TJ:§57,p.373;emphasisadded)Afterexplainingwhytwoormoregroupscouldbeentitled toperformcivildisobedienceatanygiven time,Rawlsmentionstheproblemwithwhichheisconcerned:civildisobediencecanundermine theefficacyofa justorpartially just constitution. (TJ:§57,p.374)Insteadoftheearlieremphasisondisobedientsbeing“willingtoaffirmtherighttoprotest,”Rawlsdiscusses“thelimitontheextenttowhichcivildisobedience

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can be engaged in.” In fact in TJ Rawls no longer affirms the idea that civildisobedience is a stabilizing device and instead focuses on limits on theextensivenessofdisobedience.26

ItisnotclearwhyRawlschangedhispositioninthisway.Butsurelyheislessoptimisticthanbeforewithrespecttotheeffectofcivildisobedienceonthestabilityoftheconstitutionalorder.

4.TheImplicationsofRawlsianCivilDisobedienceTheprevioustwosectionsdiscussRawls’sanalysisofcivildisobedience.

In contrast to his arguments in TJCD, Rawls’s argument in TJ is both morestructured and provides greater depth of analysis. This section investigatesimplications by comparing his two texts and then showing howhis core ideasmakehistheorysalientanddistinctivefromothertheories.

This section is divided into two parts. The first part draws out thedifference between Rawls’s arguments in TJ and in TJCD. There are severaldifferences. Rawls’s later version ismore constrained in conjunction with hisdefinitionbutmoreinclusiveinthecontextofjustificationofdisobedience.Rawlsexcludes types of disobedience based on non-political principles like personalmoralityorreligiousprinciples.Thereforehisdefinitionofcivildisobedienceismoreconstrainedattheconceptuallevelbutthisentailsthatthereislessworktodoatthejustificatorylevel.

Ialsoarguethatthecommunicativefunctionofdisobediencebecomesanessentialelementofhismaturetheory.Thisroleofthecommunicativefunctionis apparent inRawls’s argument that civildisobediencemustbenonviolentonthebasisthatitisakindofspeechact.

The second part of my analysis demonstrates the importance of thecommunicativefunctionofdisobedienceindetail.Thecommunicativefunctionisthemostsalient featureofdisobedience inRawls’s theory.His theorydoesnottake disobedience as an action that expresses the sense of injustice but as anaction that opens a channel of communication between the majority and theminority. His focus on communication leads him to insist on the use ofnonviolence, a conceptual element thatmakes his theory of civil disobediencedistinctive.

My illustration of this communicative function is not comprehensive inthediscussionthatfollowshere.Inthenextchapter,Iinvestigatethreetypesofdisobedience. The purpose for the discussion here is to explicate howRawls’stheory can be understood in terms of the communicative function of civildisobedience.

26 This is not to say that Rawls gives up the idea of disobedience as a stabilizing device because Rawls mentions this stabilizing function in a latter discussion when considering the role of disobedience in a democratic constitution. See Rawls, 1971: 383.

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4.1.TheComparisonbetween“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”andATheoryofJusticeThissection(4.1)providesthreepointsofcomparisonbetweenTJCDand

TJ. The first point (Section 4.1.1) is that the political nature of disobediencebecomes much clearer in TJ and this clarification makes Rawlsian civildisobedience distinguishable from noncompliance based on personal moralityand religious beliefs. In TJCD Rawls seemed to endorse the justifiability ofdisobedience based on personal morality but in TJ he maintains that thejustificationof disobediencemust bebasedon a political principle. Moreover,hisarticulationofthisideaimpliesthatpublicreasonsaretheonlyappropriatereasons for justifyingdisobedience.Thus,hisaccountofacceptablereasons fordisobedienceinTJCDwasmoreinclusivethantheaccountofferedinTJ;inTJCD,nonpublic reasons are allowed e.g. personal morality and religious beliefs,whereasinTJ,theyareruled“outofbounds.”

Thesecondpoint (Section4.1.2) focuseson thecommunicative functionin TJ and how this function reshapes the conception of Rawlsian civildisobedience. The purpose of my investigation here is not to reconstruct theRawlsianconceptionbuttoidentifythemeaningofcommunicativefunctionandhowthisfunctionbecomesafocalpointinTJ.

The third point (Section 4.1.3) focuses on how Rawls loosens therequirement of justificatory elements in TJ. I provide three reasons for thischangeinRawls’sposition.ThefirstreasonisthatRawlsexpandstheapplicableobjects of civil disobedience. He does not change his basic argument but doesexpandtheobjectsofwrongsthatcanjustifydisobedience.Thesecondreasonisthattheineffectivenessofnormalpoliticalappealisconsideredasapresumptivereasonfortheinitiationofdisobedience.Bylooseningthefirsttwojustificatoryelements,thelastreasonisthatRawlsexpressesalessoptimisticviewabouttheresults of civil disobedience: he expresses concern about the effect ofdisobedience on the stability of social order and hence on the efficacy of theconstitution.

4.1.1.Politicalprinciplescanbetheonlylegitimatesourceforjustifyingandguidingcivildisobedience.Comparing the texts of TJ and TJCD, it is obvious that only political

principles constitute the appropriate normative grounds for justifying civildisobediencewhilepersonalmoralityandreligiousreasonsarenot.Rawls’stwoprinciplesofjusticearepoliticalprinciples.(AnintroductionoftheprinciplesofjusticewasprovidedinSection2.3inChapterTwo.)Thereforethetwoprinciplesofjusticeconstitutethenormativegroundsforjustifyingcivildisobedience.Butwhen looking at TJ itself, there remainsaquestionofwhethera comprehensivedoctrineofmorality can justify disobedience even if suchadoctrine is consistentwithRawls’stheoryofjustice.

Acomprehensivedoctrinecanbedefinedas“asetofbeliefsaffirmedbycitizens concerning a range of values, including moral, metaphysical, andreligious commitments, as well as beliefs about personal virtues, and political

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beliefs about theway society ought to be arranged.”27Rawls differentiates hispolitical conception of justice, later developed inPolitical Liberalism, from theidea of a comprehensive doctrine. Comprehensive doctrines can apply to allaspects of life and cover “all recognized values and virtues within one ratherprecisely articulated scheme of thought.” (Rawls, 1993: 173) He presents thepoliticalconceptionof justiceasa freestandingview.Therefore,the justificationfor accepting the political conception of justice is not derived from theacceptanceofaparticularcomprehensivedoctrine. Thepoliticalconceptionofjusticeislimitedtothebasicstructureofsocietyanddoesnotcovereveryaspectoflifeoreventhefullrangeofgovernmentaction.28

In TJ Rawls seems to assume that his articulation of justice can beaccepted by allmembers of society applying to all issues relevant to the basicstructureofsociety. In thissensehis theoryof justice isuniversal(reachingallcitizens)andprimary(ofhighestprioritywithinitsdomainofapplication).

However, as Samuel Freeman states, “the members of a well-orderedsociety of justice as fairness could not themselves reasonably agree upon thephilosophicaljustificationoftheprincipleofjustice.”29Nonetheless,membersofsocietycanreasonablyagree that justificationofdisobediencecanbebasedontheiracceptanceofpoliticalprinciplesofjustice.

Rawls’s development of the idea of public reason aims to resolve theproblemastohowapoliticalconceptionofjusticecanbesharedbyallmembersofsocietydespitethefactthattheyhavetheirowncomprehensivedoctrinesofmorality. His theory of public reason implicitly reveals one question for civildisobedience:mustcivildisobediencebejustifiedbypublicreasons?Ordoesthejustification of civil disobedience require (or allow) reasons based on acomprehensive conceptionof the good?30Iwill dealwith thisproblem stepbystepinlinewiththechronologicaldevelopmentofRawls’sthought.

InTJCDRawls seems to recognize thatmembersof society could share,communicate,andholdthesameconceptionofjustice;giventhat,therewouldbeno problem of disagreement when some members of society seek to justifydisobediencebybasingtheirsenseofjusticeontheirpoliticalconvictions.Rawlssays, “It rests, then, on political conviction as opposed to a search for self orgroup interest; and in the case of a constitutional democracy,wemay assumethatthisconvictioninvolvestheconceptionofjustice(saythatexpressedbythecontract doctrine).” (Rawls, 1999: 181; emphasis added) One plausible reasonfor him to rely on the conception of justice is that this conception is a fullydevelopedaccountofjusticethateverymemberofawell-orderedsocietyshouldacceptwhenthinkingabout issuesrelevanttothebasicstructureofsociety.So

27 Paul Voice, “Comprehensive Doctrine,” The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, edited by Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy, p. 126 (Cambridge University Press: 2015). 28 In PL, Rawls distinguishes several kinds of comprehensive doctrine like partially v. fully, and reasonable v. unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. For the purpose of this dissertation I will ignore these details because the point is to demonstrate the idea of comprehensive doctrine, not what a comprehensive doctrine might be. (PL: pp. 58-66, 175) 29 Samuel Freeman, Rawls, p. 325. (Routledge press, 2007) 30 I distinguish between “public reason” and “public reasons.” Samuel Freeman has explicated the distinction between these two concepts. (Freeman, p. 387)

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there is no need to make the political principle the only source for justifyingdisobedience.Membersofsocietycoulduseanymoralprincipleassociatedwiththeircomprehensiveconceptionsolongasthismoralprincipleisconnectedtoapolitical conviction that is part of the conception of justice shared with othermembersofsociety.

In TJ, Rawls does not use the term, “moral principle” as the source ofjustificationbut insteaduses “political principle.” It is relatively clear that thescopeofwhatkindsofprinciplesjustifydisobediencehasbecomenarrower.Thenewpicture isdifferentbecause theappropriatenormativesourcecanonlybepoliticalprincipleswithin theconceptionof justice.Rawlsalsomakesasecondslightchangeofterminologywhendescribingtheconceptionofjustice.InTJheuses the phrase “the commonly shared conception of justice” instead of “theconception of justice” in TJCD. (TJ: §55, p. 365) The idea of the conception ofjustice now must be “commonly shared.” Because Rawls excludes personalmoralityandreligiousreasonsfromtheroleof justifyingdisobedience,hethenneeds to re-characterize actions that he would have formerly called “civildisobedience” but which were based on reasons that form part of acomprehensivereligiousormoralconceptionofthegood.Hisstrategyistomovetheseactionsintoadifferentcategorythathecalls“conscientiousrefusal.”InthisDissertationIdonotinvestigatethiscategory,butRawls’sstrategyrevealsthathe is more concerned with the question of what principles can justify civildisobedience in awell-ordered society.Or in otherwords,what principles areappropriate formembersof society tousewhen justifyingdisobedience in thepublicforum?

Given thesechanges, itbecomesobvious thatRawls takes the featureofbeingpoliticalmoreseriouslyinTJthanhedidinTJCD.Thisfeaturerendershisaccount of disobediencemore constrained in the sense that personal moralityandreligiousprinciplesalone lack the justificatory force for civildisobedience.For Rawls personal morality and religious beliefs can “support” actions ofdisobediencebuttheyarenotreasonenoughtojustifytheseactions.

What’smore, in TJ, Rawls calls for political principles to domore thanserveasthejustificationfordisobedience;hegivesthemanadditionalfunction..Disobediencenotonlymustbejustifiedbutalsoguidedbypoliticalprinciples.InTJ the normative component of being political is articulated as a requirementthat disobedience “be guided and justified by political principle.” (See 3.2.1.1.)Political principles now have justificatory force and a guidance function foractionsofdisobedience.Thisopensthepossibilitythatthechoiceofwhichlawtodisobey is not a strategic question. It is also a question of principle for thedisobedients.

Rawls’sdiscussionofpublicreasonmakesthisdevelopmentclearer.Theidea of public reason is complex and here I focus only on the relationshipbetweenthisideaandcivildisobedience.ForRawlstheideaofpublicreasonis“characteristicof ademocraticpeople: it is the reasonof its citizens, of coursesharing the status of equal citizenship.” (PL: p. 213) Rawls articulates adistinctionbetweenpublic reasons andnonpublic reasons.Non-public reasonsare reasons available for “associations of all kinds: churches and universities,scientificsocietiesandprofessionalgroups.”(PL:p.220)Thereforenon-public

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reasonsarereasonsforaparticulargroup,notfor“apoliticalsocietyandcitizensgenerally.” (PL: p. 220) As such, they cannot be shared by citizens who, asindividuals,havemanydifferentcomprehensiveviews.

These nonpublic reasons raise a question for Rawls’s theory of civildisobedience:canthedisobedientsjustifytheirdisobediencebypresentingtheircomprehensive doctrine in a way that supports public reasons in the publicforum?Inotherwords,cannonpublicreasonsbeofferedsolongastheyplayasupporting role and are not themselves the primary justification fordisobedience? Rawls answers this question in Political Liberalism whendiscussingthelimitsofpublicreason.Hedistinguishestwoviews:theexclusiveviewandtheinclusiveview.Theexclusiveviewisthat“thepublicreasonssucha[comprehensive] doctrine supports may, of course, be given but not thesupportingdoctrineitself.”(PL:247)Theinclusiveviewistheviewthatallowscitizens,incertainsituations,topresentwhattheyregardasthebasisofpoliticalvalues rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in waysthatstrengthentheideaofpublicreasonitself.”(PL:247)InPL,Rawlsadoptstheinclusiveviewofpublicreason.

Rawls’s rationale for the inclusive view is developed through hisdiscussionofthreescenarios.Thefirsttwoaresituatedinawell-orderedsocietyand the third one in a non-ideal society with “a profound division aboutconstitutionalessentials.”(PL:249)HereImainlyfocusonthethirdscenario.

The third scenario Rawls provides is situated in a non-ideal society inwhich there is deep disagreement about the constitutionalessentials.31”Constitutional essentials” is the term coined by Rawls inPoliticalLiberalism for the purpose of identifying “a class of fundamental questions forwhich the conception’s political values yield reasonable answers.” (PL: p. 227)There are two kinds of constitutional essentials. The first kind concerns “thegeneralstructureofgovernmentandpoliticalprocess,”andthesecondincludes“equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislativemajorities are torespect.”(PL:p.227)

Thesetwokindsofconstitutionalessentialsarenotidenticalbutdifferintwo ways. The first difference is that specifications of the first kind ofconstitutionalessentialscanbevariedwhilethespecificationsofthesecondkindinvolve a relatively small variation. Therefore it could be the case that twopolitical regimeshavedifferent formsofgovernmentandasimilar listofbasicliberties.

Theseconddifferenceisrootedin“theprinciplesofjusticespecifyingtheequal basic rights and liberties and the principles regulating basic matters ofdistributivejustice.”(PL:p.228;emphasisadded)Rawlsdoesnotthinkthatallgoodsspecifiedinthetwoprinciplesofjusticebelongtoconstitutionalessentials.Heexcludes the “fairequalityofopportunity” fromconstitutionalessentialsbysaying “A principle specifying the basic rights and liberties covers the secondkind of constitutional essentials. But while some principle of opportunity is

31 He takes the case of abolitionists emancipating slaves and the civil rights movement led by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. as paradigms to illustrate the third scenario.

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surely such an essential, for example, a principle requiring at least freedomofmovement and free choice of occupation, fairequalityofopportunity(as Ihavespecifiedit)goesbeyondthatandisnotsuchanessential.“(PL:p.228;emphasisadded)32

ForRawls the secondkindof constitutional essential is specifiedby theprinciples of justice that grant members of society equal basic rights andliberties and the first kind by the political principles that regulate forms ofgovernment and distribution ofwealth and income. It is also clear that Rawlsusestheideaofconstitutionalessentialstorefertoaclassofbasicquestionsofsociety needed to achieve an agreement through public reasons in the publicforum.

The third scenario is premised on the fact thatmembers of a non-idealsocietymayhaveadeepdisagreementwithrespecttothecontentofthesecondkindof constitutionalessentials (the specificationof theequalbasic rightsandlibertiesofcitizens).Inthisthirdscenariosomemembersmightappealtotheircomprehensiveconceptionofmoralityorreligiousbeliefinthepublicforumandbelievethatpoliticalforcesupportedbytheircomprehensiveconceptionisone“amongthenecessaryhistoricalconditionstoestablishpoliticaljustice.”(PL:251)IsthisthirdscenarioinconsistentwithRawls’sexplanationofpublicreason?ForRawls,memberswhodisagreeaboutthesecondkindofconstitutionalessentialsin a non-ideal society remain capable of advocating public reason becausemembersofthenon-idealsocietycouldrelyontheircomprehensiveconceptionasthemeansbywhichtoprovide“sufficientstrengthtothepoliticalconceptiontobesubsequentlyrealized.”(PL:251)

Rawls’sillustrationofthethirdscenarioisimportanttothesubjectofthisDissertation for two reasons: first, this scenario is situated in a non-idealsociety—andhenceisrelevanttothecaseofcivildisobedienceinatransitionalsociety (the subject of this Dissertation as a whole). Secondly, the two caseswithin the third scenarioareabout theabolitionof slaveryand the civil rightsmovement. Rawls’s position is that in a non-ideal society members mightrecognize that their comprehensiveconceptionof justice (moralityor religiousbeliefs)couldsupportthepublicreasonand,therefore,advancetherealizationofpoliticaljustice.

Rawls’s discussion of the third scenario shows that the limits of publicreason depend on historical and social conditions. But his discussion assumesthatpublicreasonfunctionsinacertainwaydespiteitsdependenceonhistoricalconditions and implies the possibility that comprehensive reason can “justify”(notmerelysupport)disobedienceinarestrictedsense.Therefore,whatjustifies

32 David A. Reidy, “Constitution and Constitutional Essentials”, The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, edited by Jon Mandle and David A. Reidy, p. 142 (2015: Cambridge University Press). [This workable general structure of government and the political process is itself a constitutional essential, and while a constitution is just with respect to this essential only to the extent that the government structure and political process it specifies tends to yield legislation and policies consistent with both principles of justice, the second principle of justice is not itself embedded or entrenched as a constitutional essential. Though it sets out requirements of basic justice, it need not, and in Rawls’s view should not be built into the constitution itself in the way the first principle is.]

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disobedience is not the public reason accepted bymembers of society but thecomprehensivedoctrineheldbythedisobedients.

Justification of disobedience by the comprehensive doctrines of thedisobedients is restricted to cases such that the reasons provided by acomprehensive doctrine is the best argument that could be provided by thedisobedientstoestablishthepoliticalconceptionofjustice.Thepointhere isnothowacomprehensivedoctrinejustifiesdisobediencebutwhenacomprehensivedoctrine can justify disobedience in the public forum. Justification ofdisobedience by a comprehensive doctrine can be acceptable when suchjustification is the best argument that the disobedients have for the sake ofestablishing thepolitical conception of justice supportedbypublic reason in agiven historical condition. This point becomes clear when Rawls says, “Theabolitionists andKingwouldnothavebeenunreasonable in these conjecturedbeliefs if the political forces they led were among the necessary historicalconditions to establish political justice, as does indeed seem plausible in theirsituation.”(PL:251)

This illustration isconsistentwithRawls’sposition inTJwithrespect tothejustificationofcivildisobedience.Rawlsstilldoesnotallowacomprehensivedoctrine itself to be the necessary and sufficient reason for justifyingdisobedience but grants that it could be the necessary condition for a givensocietytorealizeapoliticalconceptionofjusticeinthefuture.

4.1.2.ThecommunicativefunctionofdisobediencebecomesmoreexplicitinATheoryofJustice.Inordertounderstandthecommunicativefunctionofdisobedience,itis

necessary to distinguish two senses in which disobedience can have acommunicativefunction.First,disobedienceitselfiscommunicativeinthesensethat it is a kindof speechact that transmits the communicative contentof thedisobedients and aims at engaging others in action. Second, disobedience is ameansforopeningacommunicativeopportunitybetweenthedisobedientsandtheiraddressees.Thediscussionthatfollowsfocusesonthefirstsense.

The communicative function of civil disobedience implies that civildisobedienceispartofarationaldialoguebetweentwosetsofpartieswhohavea significant disagreement about relevant issues. For this reason, performingdisobediencemightbeawayofexpressingonepointofview,awayofsignalingone’s sincere conviction, andawayof communicatingwith respect toan issuewithotherswhodisagree.Irrespectiveofthepurposeforwhichdisobedienceisperformed, the act of disobedience is a communicative act that assumes abackground condition of an equal relationship33between the disobedients andtheaddressee(oraudience).

InTJCD it isstillunclearwhetherdisobedience iscommunicativeornotalthoughRawlssaysinpassingthatdisobedienceisa“formofspeech.”(Rawls:1999,p.182)Thephrase“formofspeech”couldbeinterpretedinvariouswaysandthesemanticmeaningofthephraseencompassesawiderangeofactivities.

33 The relationship is equal with respect to communication, but of course could be unequal in other respects. For example, the disobedients might have less political power than those whom they address.

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A“formofspeech”couldrefertoaboringspeechgivenbyaspeakerwhoseonlyconcernisexpressionofhisbeliefsandwhohasnoempathywiththeaudience,butthesamephrasecouldencompassasincereattempttocommunicatebasedon an equal relationship between speaker and audience as the necessarycondition for having a successful speech. In TJCD civil disobedience might beconsideredeitherexpressiveorcommunicative.

ButtheideaofdisobediencebeingcommunicativeisnotobviousbecauseRawlsmentionsdisobedienceas“aformofspeech,anexpressionofconviction.”This seems to putmoreweight on the expressive function of disobedience toemphasizewhatdisobediencecanbeusedfor,notwhatdisobedienceis.34

The reason for interpreting Rawls’s conception of disobedience ascommunicative is that nonviolence cannot be a necessary component ofdisobedience if we take disobedience as merely expressive. For example,disobedientswhoareonlyconcernedwithexpressingtheirrageorangermightuse violent actions to express these strong emotions. This is a familiarphenomenon in ordinary communication, where the connection between theexpressionofangerandviolenceiswellknown.

Moreover,itispossiblefordisobedientstotakeintoaccountthewaythattheir actions are perceived by others in ways that are not sufficient fordisobedience to function as communication. Onlywhen the disobedients treatothers (their audience) as their equals does nonviolence become a necessarycomponentofcivildisobedience.

Based on this interpretation we can understand two sentences thatappearedinTJ,butnotinTJCD.Rawlsultimatelythinksthatcivildisobedienceisa“formofaddress,”notmerely“aformofspeech”anditisaformofaddressthatexpresses one’s “profound and conscientious political conviction.” Such anexpressionisalsofinalinthesensethatitleavestheaudiencetodecidewhetherornottoagreewiththedisobedients’appeal.Onlybytakingthecommunicativefunction of disobedience into account can we explain why nonviolence is anintrinsicfeatureofcivildisobedience.

ItakethecommunicativefunctionofdisobedienceasthemostimportantfeatureinRawls’stheoryofcivildisobedience.Rawls’sinsistenceonnonviolencecanbebestdefendedasrequiredbythecommunicativefunctionofdisobedience.Althoughhesituatesnonviolenceatthedefinitionallevel,thisshouldnotnegatetheroleofthecommunicativefunctionofdisobedienceinTJasanexplanationofandjustificationfortherequirementofnonviolence.Section4.2willexplaintheimplicationofthecommunicativefunctionofdisobedienceinmoredetail.

34 I explain the difference between communicative and expressive disobedience in the next chapter. One significant difference is that expressive disobedience does not necessarily embrace the principle of nonviolence but communicative does. Rawls may not have distinguished between the terms “communicative” and “expressive” in the same way.

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4.1.3.RawlshasrelaxedthejustificatoryelementsinATheoryofJustice.InTJ,Rawlsrelaxedseveralrequirementsforcivildisobediencefromthe

formulationhehadarticulatedinTJCD.Therearethreewaysinwhichherelaxedtheformulation.

First, inTJCD,violationsofequalopportunityareappropriateobjectsofdisobedienceonlywhensuchviolationshappenintheeconomicsphere.ButinTJ,Rawls explicitly mentions that various opportunities can also be appropriateobjects. This includes a wider range of opportunities for performing civildisobedience.

Second, with respect to the ineffectiveness of normal political appeal,Rawls does not require disobedients to exhaust all “actual opportunities” formaking an appeal. Instead, whether a valid appeal exists partly depends ondisobedients’ reasonablesubjective judgment.Andthisrequirementbecomesapresumption rather than a rule. Under exceptional circumstances, thisrequirementnolongerappliesatall.

Third,inTJRawlshaschangedhisviewwithrespecttotheextensivenessof disobedience. In TJCD he tookmutual recognition of others’ entitlement todisobedience in a similar circumstance as one important justificatory element.But inTJhebecomeslessoptimisticbecauseofthepossibilityofcausingsocialdisorderviadisobedience.

Thischange issignificantbecausecomparingRawls’s twotexts in termsof the third justificatory element (the extensiveness of civil disobedience)reveals the fact that the third element functions as a constraint for thedisobedients. (See Section 2.3 and Section 3.3.3) In TJ Rawls emphasizes thatdisobedients should rely on the efficacy of the constitution and avoid thecreationofsocialdisorder;hedoesnotrequirethemutualrecognitionofothers’entitlementtodisobedience.Itisunclearwhyhemadethischange.Onepossiblereason might be that he realizes that more and more cases would qualify asreasonable given that the first two justificatory elements had been relaxed;therefore,thethirdjustificatoryelementneededtoplayaconstrainingfunctionin order to avoid social disorder. Or Rawls might have come to realize thepotential for greater destructive force of civil disobedience if disobedientsspontaneouslyperformunlawfulactswithoutconsideringthecollateraldamagesproducedcollectivelybydisobedients’actions.35

4.1.4.AComparisonbetween“TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”andATheoryofJusticeInTermsofConstitutiveandJustificatoryElementsThefollowingFigurecompareshisargumentsinTheJustificationofCivil

DisobediencewiththoseinATheoryofJustice.

35 Although cooperation of political allies to initiate disobedience is highly difficult, Rawls still thinks it is not impossible. He says, “To be sure, an alliance of this sort is difficult to arrange; but with perceptive leadership, it does not appear impossible.” (Rawls, 1971: 374)

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Figure9:AComparisonBetweenTJCDandTJinTermsofCivilDisobedience

Rawls’sArguments ATheoryofJustice “TheJustificationofCivilDisobedience”

TheConstitutiveElem

ents

PoliticalActionsofdisobedienceneedtobejustifiedbypolitical

principles.

Actionsofdisobediencecanbejustifiedbymoralprinciplesanddisobedientsmusthavea

politicalconviction.

PublicDisobedienceisdonein

publicandisanalogoustoapublicspeech.

Disobedienceisawayofaddressingthesenseofjustice

ofthemajority.

Nonviolent

Disobedienceisaformofspeechanddisobedients’acceptanceoflegalpenaltyandofnonresistance.

Disobedienceisanalogoustoapublicspeechasamodeof

addressanddisobedientsmusthaveasincereattitude.

TheJustificatoryElements

ObjectsandWrongs

Aviolationofequallibertyshouldbeseriousanda

violationoffairopportunityblatant.Aviolationoffairopportunityisnotlimitedto

thefieldofeconomy.

Rawlsdoesnotexplicitlydistinguishdifferentstandards.Aviolationoffairopportunityislimitedtothefieldofeconomy.

NormalAppealNormalappealhasbeenprovedineffectiveandisa

presumption.

NormalappealhasbeenprovedineffectivebutRawlsdoesnotmentionnormalappealasa

presumption.

ScopeofDisobedience

Takesthedestructiveforceofdisobedienceintoaccountintermsofthestabilityofthe

constitution

Optimisticviewaboutthedestructiveforceof

disobediencefocusingonthemutualrecognitionof

disobedients

4.2.TheCommunicativeFunctionofRawlsianDisobedienceEvery theory of disobedience has as its core a set of ideas that

differentiate civil disobedience from other activities (especially ordinary lawbreaking).ThebestwaytocharacterizeRawls’saccountofthedistinctivenessofdisobedienceistofocusonhowdisobediencebecomesavehiclefortransportingdisobedients’messagesto thepublic, thepeoplewhohavepoliticalpower,andthemajority.ForRawls,civildisobedienceperformsacommunicativefunctioninanasymmetric relationshipbetween themajority and theminority inorder tobringaboutachange in lawandpolicy.Disobedience isnotonlyanactionthatmakes some basic issue of justice significant but also an action that engagesothersinactioninadeliberativeprocess.Fromthepreviousdiscussion,wecansee Rawls’s theory becoming more communication-focused in TJ. Hecharacterizesdisobedienceasamodeofaddressand,implicitly,asaspeechactthe illocutionary force of which is a call for action with the intendedperlocutionaryeffectofactuallyproducingpoliticalaction.

Every theory of disobedience alsoneeds to account for the relationshipbetweennonviolenceanddisobedience.Whethercivildisobedienceis(orshouldbe) nonviolent is of practical significance because an action of disobedience is

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the actual means by which messages are transmitted to and thereby impactothers. Nonviolence is also a commonly used criterion to judge whetherdisobedience is legitimate, acceptable, and morally permissible. To discusswhether disobedience is nonviolent is to clarify to what extent actions ofdisobedience can legitimately affect others’ legal rights, interests, andentitlements.

Therearetwoperspectivesontherelationshipbetweendisobedienceandnonviolence. The first perspective investigates the definitional or conceptuallevel thinkingas towhetherviolentcivildisobedience is conceptuallypossible.The second perspective focuses on a prescriptive question: whetherdisobedience ought to be nonviolent. From the second perspective, therelationship between disobedience and nonviolence is not conceptual ordefinitional but practical in the sense that disobedients have a reason fornonviolentdisobedience.

Ihaveexplainedhow JohnRawlsargues fornonviolenceasa featureofcivildisobediencebycrystalizingtworeasons:thespeech-actargumentandthesincerityargument.Rawls’sviewisthatcivildisobedienceiscommunicativeandassumes an equal and bilateral relationship between disobedients and theiraudience;thisviewleadstotheconclusionthatthereisanintrinsicrequirementof nonviolence for civil disobedience. The feature of nonviolence is not only adefinitional element of civil disobedience but also a background condition forcivildisobediencetofunctionascommunication.

4.2.1.Theprincipleofnonviolenceisabackgroundconditionmakingamutualconversationpossibleandvisible.ForRawls,civildisobedienceshouldbeunderstoodasakindofspeechact.

Disobedientssaythingsbyperformingactions.Moreprecisely,theycanexpresstheir points of view, communicate their ideals with others, and pressure themajority into acting in a certain way—all through the medium of civildisobedience. Thus, true civil disobedience is a speech act with a particularillocutionary force. But being a kind of speech act does not itself entail theconclusionthatcivildisobediencemustbenonviolent.

Whatmakes theprincipleofnonviolence intrinsic is the communicativefunction of disobedience. For Rawls civil disobedience is not merely a signexpressingcertainpointsofviewheldbytheminority.Anactionofdisobedienceis a vehicle for transporting a message from the minority to the majority.Therefore,whendisobedientsconsiderhowtoperformdisobediencetheyneedtopresumeapossibilitythatamutuallyunderstandableconversationisviableinwhichthespeaker(thedisobedients)takestheaudience’spossibleresponseintoaccountwhen consideringwhich action is compatiblewith the communicativefunctionoftheircommunicativeactions.

The speech act argument shows that the disobedients try to make adifference intwoways,(1)bychangingthemajority’sjudgmentontherelevantquestion,and(2)byinvitingthemajoritytojoininthecourseofdisobedience.Itaims to get members of society involved in the issues of justice to which thedisobedienceisaresponse.Fordisobediencetoplaythisrole,itmustrespecttheprincipleofnonviolence.Thisprincipleisnotonlyapragmaticprincipleforthe

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actionofdisobeyingbutalsoaconstitutiveelementoftheprocessofengagingina mutually understandable conversation. In other words, this principle is abackgroundconditionformakingamutualconversationpossibleandvisible.

Following thisunderstanding,Rawlssays, “Sometimes if theappeal failsinitspurpose,forcefulresistancemaylaterbeentertained.Yetcivildisobedienceisgivingvoicetoconscientiousanddeeplyheldconvictions;while itmaywarnand admonish, it is not itself a threat.” (TJ: § 55, p.366) The reason whydisobedience itself is not a threat is not because it is “civil” nor becausedisobedients think violence is wrong but because disobedience iscommunicationpremisedonanequal statusbetween thedisobedientsand theaudience.Thisisthereasonthatcivildisobedienceitselfisnotathreat.

4.2.2.TheImplicationofRawlsianDisobedienceinitsCommunicativeFunctionThenext step is todiscuss the implicationsofRawls’sdiscussionof the

communicativefunctionofcivildisobediencefortherelationshipofviolencetodisobedience. First, Rawls’s account of civil disobedience as speech act isimportant, not because it directly supports nonviolence but instead because itentails that disobediencemust have a certain “force.” Therefore, ifwewant tohaveabetterunderstandingofcivildisobedience,weshouldpayattentiontotheidea of the force created by performing disobedience and checkwhether suchforceiscompatiblewiththecommunicativefunctionofcivildisobedience.Ishallillustrate three different forces associated with three conceptions ofdisobedienceinthenextChapter.

Secondly, Rawls seems to adopt an intuitive idea of violence. He neverexplicitlydefineswhatviolenceisbuttakesitasacommonlyunderstoodidea.Ifwetakethenotionofcommunicativedisobedienceashismajorcontributiontothetheoryofcivildisobedience,then,hislackofdefinitionofnonviolenceisnotafataldefect.TheaimofRawls’stheoryisnottoprovideapreciseconceptionofviolence, but to address the question of whether, given our intuitiveunderstanding of violence, nonviolence is an essential feature of civildisobedience.

Byassertingthatcivildisobedienceisamodeofaddressandanalogizingdisobediencewithpublicspeech,Rawlsshowsthattheprincipleofnonviolenceisanintegralpartofthepracticeofcivildisobedience.Thequestionisnolongerwhetherdisobedienceshouldbenonviolentornot.FromRawls’sargumentcivildisobedienceitselfmustbenonviolent.

TheRawlsian theory of disobediencemight seem to be overly idealizedbecause, when looking at the history of the world, a complete embrace ofnonviolentdisobedienceisrarelyfound.EveninthecaseofGandhi’sprogramofdisobedienceaimedat theBritishgovernment, therewasstrongdissentwithinhisgroupabout themethodadvancedbyGandhi.36For this reason, itmightbeargued that the Rawlsian conception of civil disobedience lacks explanatorypowerwithrespecttoactualcasesthatareunderstoodasclearorparadigmaticcasesofcivildisobedience.

36 William L. Shirer, Gandhi: A Memoir, Ch. 9, Simon & Schuster Press, 1980.

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Criticizing JohnRawls’s theoryofdisobedience forhis failure todiscussactualcasesthatarecommonlyrecognizedascivildisobedienceisnotnew.ButIbelieve that Rawls “intentionally” distances himself from evaluating actualevents in the world. For example, he did notmention Gandhi’s case in TJ. HementionsDavidThoreauseveraltimesinfootnotes.37Whatismostsurprisingisthefactthatheneverexplainswhetherhistheoryofdisobedienceaccountsforrealworld instancesofcivildisobedience.But this isnotadefect inhis theory,onceweunderstandtherolethathisconceptionofcivildisobedienceisintendedtoplayinjusticeasfairness—thatis,inRawls’stheoryofjustice.

There are two ideas that are important to understanding the role thatRawls’sconceptionofdisobedienceplaysinhistheoryofjustice.First,histheoryis normative in the sense that his articulation of the principle of justice,fundamental ideas, and the theoryofdisobedience showshowa conceptionofjusticecanbeadopted inagivencircumstance.His theoryofdisobedience isapartofhisoveralltheoryofjusticeinawell-orderedsociety.Becausethattheoryisanidealtheory,thereisnotheoreticalrequirementtorefertoactualcasesandillustrate the applicability of his theory. Secondly, seeming “critics” of Rawls’sidealtheoryarebestunderstoodnotascriticsbutasfellowtheoristsopeningadoorforthefurtherworkthatconnectsRawls’sidealtheorytoanon-idealworld.Thisunderstandingof the roleofRawls’s criticsdoesnotentail theconclusionthat Rawls’s theory cannot be replaced by other theories (if they can bedemonstrated to offer amore attractive account of civil disobedience); rather,the point is that criticism of Rawls’s decision to advance an “ideal theory” ofdisobedienceisinsufficientbyitself,becausethiscriticismdoesnotandcannotshowthathisidealtheoryisinadequateonitsownterms.

TheaccountofthecommunicativefunctionofdisobedienceofferedinthisChapterconstitutesmyattempttomakeRawls’stheoryofdisobediencethebestitcanbeinawaythataccountsforwhatRawlshimselfsaysinbothTJCDandTJ.Thisaccountaimsto illuminateRawls’sargument fornonviolenceandtoshowthatthisargumentissound.Takingthecommunicativefunctionintoaccountnotonly demonstrateswhy disobedience is nonviolent but also helps us cast lightontothepossibleconditionsforhavingthiscommunicativefunction.Illustratingthis communicative function also helps disobedients understand what theguidingprinciplefortheiractionsgenerallyshouldbe.

The communicative conception of disobedience is one important view,but it is not the only conception. There are two other alternatives fordisobedientstoadoptwhenthinkingaboutdisobedience,thatis,theexpressiveandtheresistantconceptions.Ibelievethatthesethreeconceptionsarebasicinthe sense that they provide a clearer understanding of the purpose ofdisobedience and the relationshipbetweendisobedience andnonviolence. ThenextChapterismyefforttodevelopthesethreeconceptionsintheory.

37 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 364n, p. 368n, Harvard University Press, 1971.

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CHAPTERTHREEThreeConceptionsofDisobedience:Expressive,Communicative,and

ResistantConceptions

1.Introduction1.1.ARoadmapofThisChapter

Chapter Two reviewed Rawls’s theory of disobedience and argued thatthebest interpretationofhistheoryemphasizesthecommunicativefunctionofdisobedience. (See Section4.2 inChapterTwo.) ForRawls, disobediencehas acommunicative function thatpromotes thepossibilityofmutualunderstandingbetweenthemajorityandtheminorityonissuesofjustice.

ButRawls’stheoryisonlyastartingpoint.Disobediencecanhavevariousfunctions via the forces created by disobedients’ actions. For example,disobedience can function as a channel to expressdisobedients’ feelings aboutcontroversial policies, and unsatisfied anger at political corruption. 38Disobedience can also function as a strategy for the purpose of opening thefuturepossibilityofcommunicationbetweenthepowerfulandthepowerless.39In addition, disobedience can function as a demonstration of disobedients’sincere belief that injustice is occurring and should be remedied. Differentfunctions of disobedience intentionally create various types of forces: thisChapterwillinvestigatetheimpacting,persuasive,andimperativeforcesandthevarietyofeffectstheseforceshaveonthepublic.

This Chapter investigates three conceptions of disobedience: theexpressive, the communicative, and the resistant conceptions of disobedience.Eachconceptionhasitsownaccountofthesettingfortherelationshipbetweendisobedients and addressees, the force created by disobedience, and thenormativecommitmentimplicitinthejustificatorythresholdfordisobedience.Icharacterize Rawls’s theory of disobedience as communicative disobediencebecausehisdeepassumptionsabouttherelationshipbetweendisobedientsand

38 Protests against corruption can be called anti-corruption protests. For example, in Brazil more than one million people took part in a protest to demand Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff resign, and recently in South Korea, an ongoing protest is demanding President Park Geun-hye to resign for her scandal. See the entry of 2016 South Korean Protests on the Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2016_South_Korean_protests; Last visited: 2017/05/25) 39 In “Letter from Birmingham City Jail”, Dr. King noted that the purpose of direct action is to create crisis. He says, “So the purpose of the direct action is to create a situation so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open the door for negotiation,” See Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham City Jail”, Civil Disobedience in Focus (Edited by Hugo Adam Bedau), Routledge Press, 1991, p. 71.

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thosewhomtheyaddress fit the communicative conception.But thereare twoalternatives to communicative disobedience: expressive and resistantdisobedience.MytaskinthisChapteristooutlineallthreeconceptions.

In this Section I will make several points. First, I shall highlight thelimitationsonmyaccountandsketchthecontributionitmakestotheliterature.Second, I will lay out the core questions with which every conception ofdisobediencemustdeal inorder toprovidea foundationalperspectiveon civildisobedience. Those questions pave the way for understanding thedistinctiveness of each conception of disobedience. Third, I will preview thestructureofthisChapter.

One fear about disobedience is that it may cause social instability andtherebymake legal rules, ordinances, and social norms less effective. For thisreason, there can always be an objection to disobedience that emphasizes thevalue of social order and the importance of compliance with the law.Investigatingthevarietyof forcesgeneratedbydisobedienceenablesmembersof society to characterize disobedience and provides a framework for bothofficialsandscholarswhoareconcernedwithdisobedienceintheoryorpractice.And such a study contributes to a better understanding of the relationshipbetweendisobedients and their fellow citizens. So the first contribution ofmyexplication is to provide a theoretical framework for a variety of cases ofdisobedience. In addition, I use the conceptual tools developed in speech acttheory to identify the main force associated with each conception ofdisobedienceandtorevealthepossiblerelationshipsbetweendisobedienceandthe principle of nonviolence. So far as my research reveals, no prior workemploys this methodology. Therefore, the second contribution of theDissertationistoprovideanewlensforseeingdisobedienceasatypeofspeechact;thisperspectiveilluminatestheeffectscreatedbydisobedientsandimposedbythemuponfellowmembersofsociety.

Despite the two contributions mentioned above, my illustration ofconceptionsalsohaslimitations.Thefirstlimitationisthatthreeconceptionsare“ideal” types. The purpose of the three conceptions is notmainly to apply (orexplain)theactualcasesofdisobediencebuttoexplainhowdisobediencecanbeunderstood.Therefore,Iexplicatetheseconceptionsatarelativelyhighlevelofabstraction. The second limitation is that I do not assume that actual cases ofdisobedience must be categorized as fitting a single conception. Performingdisobedienceisdynamic;thedisobedientscanadoptoneconceptionwhentheybegintoengageincivildisobediencebutthenswitchtoadifferentconceptioninresponsetonewcircumstances.

Whiletheperformanceofdisobedienceisdynamic,thebasicstructuringoftheperformanceisnotamorphous.Mydevelopmentofthethreeconceptionsexplains how disobedience can be structured. The third limitation is that myillustrations are not comprehensive. I do not claim that the three conceptionscover all subjects in the field of disobedience. Instead of building acomprehensiveexplicationofdisobedience,mymethodologyofexplicatingeachconception is to target core issuesandexplainhoweachconception illustratesthosecoreissues.

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Therearefourcorequestionsthateachconceptionofdisobediencemustanswer. They are briefly listed below, while a detailed description of eachquestionisprovidedinSub-Section1.3:

1. The Relationship Assumed Between Disobedients and Addressees:Since disobedience is an action directed toward others, eachconception of disobedience assumes a relationship betweendisobedients and addressees. This relationship draws a baselinethatdistinguishesdifferentconceptionsofcivildisobedience.

2. TheForceIntentionallyCreatedbyDisobedience:Disobediencecangenerate intended force (in the sense of “force” in speech acttheory). Each conception of disobedience has an associatedprimaryintendedforceandaconcomitantprimaryeffectonothermembers of society. Therefore, explication of a conception ofdisobediencemust specifywhat forces it aims to generate in thecourseofaction.

3. TheScopeofPermissibleActions:Conceptionsofcivildisobediencespecify patterns of permissible actions. Each conception ofdisobediencemust identifywhich actions are permissiblewithinthenormativeframeworkoftheconception.Thefirstquestionforthe scope of permissible actions is to explicate the role of theprinciple of nonviolence in each conception: Is the principle ofnonviolencemerelystrategicorisita“principledprinciple”—oneadopted for a nonstrategic reason?The second question is,whatactionsarepermittedgiventherelationshipbetweendisobedientsand addressees assumed in each conception. And in order toanswer the second question, a prior issue needs to be resolved,thatis,whatare“violent”and“nonviolent”actions.

4. The justificatory threshold of disobedience: Each conception ofdisobedience includes an explication of its normativecommitments. In otherwords, each conception is committed tosomeunderstandingofvaluesandtoastanceonwhatwrongsareappropriate as justifications for initiating disobedience. Eachconception also has to deal with the role and weight of normalpoliticalappealasapreconditionforinitiatingdisobedience.

This Chapter is divided into the following sectionswhich answer thesecorequestionsinthefollowingsequence:

Section1, the Introduction, isdivided into threesubsections.Subsection1.1 provides the roadmap of this Chapter. Subsection 1.2 illustrates theconceptual tools I use in this Chapter, mainly conceptual tools developed inspeech act theory and the philosophy of action. Subsection 1.3 answers thesecond, third, and fourth questions identified above, by identifying the force,scope,andjustificatorythresholdassociatedwithcivildisobedience.

Section2explicatesthefirsttwocorequestions:theassumedrelationshipand the main force in each conception of disobedience. There are threeSubsections in Section 2. Subsection 2.1 explicates expressive disobedience,Subsection 2.2 communicative disobedience, and Subsection 2.3 resistantdisobedience.EachSubsectionisdividedintotwoparts.Thefirstpartdiscusses

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the assumed relationship between disobedients and addressees in eachconception and the second part focuses on what force is created by eachconceptionofdisobedience.

Section3focusesonthecorequestionregardingthescopeofpermissibleactions. In order tomake themeaning of violent actions clear, Subsection 3.1aimstoillustratetheideaofviolenceandthecomponentsofaviolentaction.AtypologyofviolentactionswillbeprovidedinthisSubsectionsoastoprovideaclear picture of permissible action in the following discussions. Subsection 3.2focusesoneachconception’sanswer to thescopeofpermissibleactionsand isdivided into three parts in accordance with the three conceptions ofdisobedience.

Section 4 deals with the fourth question, the justificatory threshold ofdisobedienceforeachconception.Iexplicatewhatnormativevalueiscommittedto each conception of disobedience and implications of their commitments byusingtheframeworkbuiltbyJohnRawlsinATheoryofJustice.(SeeSection3ofChapterTwo.)ThisSectionisdividedintothreeSubsectionsinaccordancewiththethreeconceptionsofdisobedience.

1.2.TheConceptualToolsUsedinThisChapterMybasicperspectiveforunderstandingcivildisobedienceisbasedonthe

ideathatdisobedienceisakindofspeechact. Ihaveillustratedthis ideaintheprevious Chapter in the course of explicating the communicative function ofRawls’s theoryof disobedience (see Section4.2. inChapterTwo)but havenotexplainedtheconceptualtoolsindetail.ThisSectionaimstofillthatgap.

ThisSubsectionisdividedintothreeparts.Part1.2.1introducesasetofconceptualtoolsinthetheoryofspeechact:theideasoflocution,illocution,andperlocution. I briefly explain John Austin’s illustrations of these three ideas inHowtoDoThingsWithWords,butfocusonlyonhisillustrationsofillocutionandperlocution,andapplythesetwoideas inthecontextofcivildisobedience.Theideasofillocutionandperlocutionhelptoexplainthedifferentforcesproducedbydisobedienceandhowtheseforcesimpactmembers’attitudes,thoughts,andactions. There is a rich, deep, and complex literature devoted to speech acttheory;itisimpossibleformetoprovideacomprehensivediscussionofitinthisDissertation. Instead, Iwill takeAustin’sexplicationsasgivenandintentionallypassoverphilosophicaldebatesunlessthereisadirectconnectionbetweenmyanalysisofdisobedienceandacontroversyaboutAustin’sversionofspeechacttheory.

Part 1.2.2 dealswith a conceptual distinctionwith respect to the effectcaused by disobedience. I distinguish two kinds of effects: intendedconsequences and unintended consequences. The purpose of making thisdistinctionistoshowthatadefiningelementofviolentdisobedienceishowitsagentsintentionallygenerateharms.

Part1.2.3 illustratestwotypesofdisobedience, individualandcollectivedisobedience,byusingtwovariables:thenumberofagentsandthequantityofdisobedient actions that each agent performs. Those two variables shape fourpossible forms of disobedience and identify ideas of individual and collectivedisobediencewithrespecttowhichthethreeconceptionsofdisobediencecanbe

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situated.Thesetwovariablesalsoexplaintheideaofcollectivityindisobedienceandtowhatextentconceptionsofdisobediencemustdealwithissuesrelevanttocollectiveactions.

1.2.1.TheIdeaofForceinSpeechActsIn How to Do Things With Words John Austin develops his theory of

speech acts; one of Austin’s important contributions is his clarification of thedistinctionbetweenlocution,illocution,andperlocution.40Thesethreetermsaretechnical terms that enable a description of how a speaker can intentionallycreateforceandeffectsuponhearers.

Locution refers to the actual words used by a speaker: a locution hassemantic content. Locutions have semantic content that (in a normal case) iscommunicatedtoandunderstoodbyothers.Inasimplifiedwaylocutionreferstoactualwordsutteredbyaspeaker.Forexample,ifaspeakeruttersthewords,“The weather today is very nice,” the locutionary act is the utterance of thesentence.41

The key insight of speech act theory is captured by Austin’s idea of“illocution”andtheassociatednotionsof“illocutionaryforce”and“illocutionaryuptake.”Austinusesthistechnicalvocabularytoexpresstheideathatspeakerscan “do thingswithwords” andhence that one can act through speech. Thus,speakerscanpromise,inform,argue,command,assert,andsoforth.

Theterm“illocution”isusedbyAustintoidentifytheforceintentionallycreated by a speaker through an utterance. As Austin puts it, “I explained theperformance of an act in this new and second sense as the performance of an‘illocutionary’act, i.e.,performanceofanact insayingsomethingasopposedtoperformanceofanactofsayingsomething.”(Austin:1997,100)

Letustakeanexampletodemonstratetheideaofillocutionaryacts.Johnand Mary are planning to have dinner together. After they decide to cook athome,theytrytoagreeonwhattoeatandwheretobuyfood.Theydecidetogotoasupermarket.However,Mary’scarisbrokensosheasksifJohncanpickherup. Johnsays, “Noproblem, Iwillpickyouupat7p.m.onTuesday.”AlthoughJohn did not say the word “promise,” his saying “I will pick you up” can beconsidered an implicit promise toMary. His saying this is an illocutionary actwhichgainsforcebyhisutteringtheobject,“Iwillpickyouup.”WhatJohnsaidcanbeparaphrasedinthefollowingstatement:“IherebypromiseyouthatIwillpickyouupat7p.m.onTuesday.”WhetherMarybelievesJohn’spromiseornotisaresultof theeffectof John’saction,notabout John’saction itself.However,whetherMaryunderstandsJohn’sactofpromisingisrelevanttoJohn’saction.Itisaboutsecuringtheuptake,atopicIshallreturntolater.

ItisalsopossibleforJohntomakeapromisetoMaryinlessdirectways,either verbally or through actions that communicate. Continue the example.

40 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, 2d edition, Harvard University Press, 1997. 41 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 109, 2d edition, Harvard University Press, 1997. (…”we summed up by saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in the traditional sense.”)

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Marylikesseafoodbuthasnoideaofhowtocookit.ShethinksJohnmightlikeseafood, too. When they are standing in front of the frozen seafood in thesupermarket,sheasksJohn,“Doyoulikeseafood?”AndJohnreplies,“Sure,”andasksMary,“Doyoulikeit?”Maryreplies,“Yes,alotandIespeciallylikesalmon.But Idonotknowhow to cook it.” John replies, “That’snot aproblem.Donotworryaboutthat.Theonlythingyouneedtoknowishowtoenjoythesalmon!”andJohnputsthesalmonintotheircart.John’sactofpickingupthesalmoncanbe considered an implicit promise in conjunctionwithhis saying “That’s not aproblem.” By saying those words and placing the salmon in the cart, he haspromisedtocooksalmonforMary.IfMarythenactsinawaythatreliesonthepromise—bydoing something else insteadof cookingdinner—her actionswillindicate that John’s illocutionary act secured “uptake”—she understood andacceptedtheimplicitpromise.

Inadditiontotheforcecreatedbyillocutionaryacts,“perlocution”refersto the effect of a speech act on a hearer. Austin uses the expression“consequentialeffects”torefertothecausalimpactofanutteranceonahearer’sfeelings, thoughts,oractions.UsingAustin’swords,aperlocutionaryact is “theachievingofcertaineffectsbysayingsomething.”(Austin:1995,121)Therefore,aperlocutionaryactcannotbesuccessfullyperformedifthereisnoconsequentialeffectuponahearer’sfeelings,thoughts,oractions.

Now letuschange thescenarioa littlebit todemonstratehowJohncanperformaperlocutionaryact.SupposethatMaryknowshowtocookseafoodandJohndoesnotlikeseafood.WhenMaryasksifJohnlikesseafood,hereplies,“Idonotlikeit.”UnfortunatelyMarystillwantstocooksalmonfordinner.Johnwantstostopherplan(cookingseafoodathome).So,Johnsays,“Ihearthatscientificresearch has found that salmon products contain varying amounts of heavymetalsand thismight cause serioushealthproblems.”Afterhearing this,Maryputs the salmon back in the frozen seafood case. It seems like John is simplymakinganassertionbysayingwhathehasread,but in fact theperlocutionaryeffectmaybetofrightenMaryandtherebyinducehertochangeherplansaboutcookingsalmon.

Thisexamplehighlightsthedifferencebetweenillocutionandperlocution.But this doesnotmean that illocutionary acts havenothing todowith effects.Rather,Austin thinks that illocutionaryactshavethree featuresrelevant to theeffectstheyproduce,andthatthesefeaturesdistinguishillocutionaryactsfromperlocutionaryacts.42

Thethreeeffects-relatedfeaturesofilluctionaryactsare:(1)Illocutionaryacts aim to secure uptake; (2) Illocutionary acts ‘take effect’ in certain ways,different from consequential effects produced by a perlocutionary act, and (3)Illocutionaryactsinvitearesponse.

42 In fact Austin distinguishes locution from perlocution and illocution in the first place by discussing whether an illocutionary act can be considered a consequence of a locutionary act (uttering certain words). His answer is no because he thinks that the uttering of noises may be a consequence of the movement of the vocal organs, but the uttering of a word is not a consequence of uttering of a noise. J. L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, p. 114-115, 2d edition, Harvard University Press, 1997.

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In order to perform an illocutionary act successfully, the uptake of themeaningofanutteranceand the forceof locutionmustbesecured. If ahearercannot grasp the illocutionary force of an utterance by a speaker, then theillocutionaryactfails.Ofcourse,illocutionaryuptakecanfailbecausethehearerfailstounderstandthesemanticmeaningofthewords. IfMaryis justlearningEnglishandfailstounderstandJohn’swordswhiletheyareshopping,thenshewilllikelyalsofailtograsphisimplicitpromisetocookseafood.Butshemightunderstand the semantic content of his utterance, but fail to grasp itsillocutionaryforce.SowhenJohnsays,“That’snotaproblem,”shemightgettheliteral meaning but not understand that by saying this he was intending tocommunicate apromise. Understanding thepromise iswhatAustinmeansbyillocutionaryuptake. This iswhyAustin says, “generally theeffect amounts tobringingabouttheunderstandingofthemeaningandoftheforceofthelocution.So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.”(Austin,1995:116)

Inordertosecureuptake,anillocutionaryactalsomustproducecertaineffects. But these effects are not necessarily the consequential effect imposedupon the hearer by the perlocutionary act. Rather, according to Austin, theeffects are different from the consequences. Austin calls effects produced by aperlocutionary act “consequential” effects. However, an effect produced by anillocutionary act is used to refer to the circumstance that, once performed, anillocutionaryactitselfhasexcludedsomeactsfromconsideration.Whethersuchaneffecthasbeenachieveddoesnotdependonwhetherthehearersuccessfullyreceives the meaning of utterance but on whether the speaker correctlyperforms an illocutionary act. For example, John’s act of making an implicitpromisetopickupMaryhasexcludedhimfrompromisingsomeotheractthatwouldcontradicthispromise.AnactofnamingistheexampleAustinprovides.When I name my second son “Ocean,” my act of naming has the effect ofpreventingmefromgivingmysonadifferentname.(Austin:1995,117)

ThethirdfeatureAustinmentionsintermsofanillocutionaryactisthatmany(butnotall)illocutionaryactsinvitearesponsebyconvention.Butsuchaninvitation indeedcanbe found inmany typesof illocutionaryacts likearguing,ordering, promising, and suggesting. For example, John’s explicit promise ofpickingupMaryandimplicitpromiseofcookingsalmoninviteJohntoperformthe promise and Mary to act in reliance on it.43Austin reminds us that theinvitation of a response is critical to understanding the difference betweenillocutionary acts and perlocutionary acts. For example, ordering someone toobeyisdifferentfrom“gettingsomeonetodosomething.”JohnmightgetMarytocook the salmon by making her feel guilty, but her response generated byfeelings of guilt is different than obeying an order. “Getting someone to dosomething” implies that othermeans, above and beyond the illocutionary act,

43 For Austin, an illocutionary act that invites one-way responses includes arguing, ordering, promising, suggesting, and asking to, etc. And an illocutionary act that invites two-way responses includes offering. What is at stake in the distinction between one-way and two-way responses is that, if an invitation invites a two-way response, then it requires a second act by the speaker or the third party which cannot be included in the initial stretch of action. (Austin: 1995, 117)

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wereemployed.Whileorderingsomeonetoobeyisanillocutionaryact,gettingsomeonetodosomethingisconsideredaperlocutionaryact.

Now that the framework of Austin’s theory of speech act has beendeveloped, we can consider its application to civil disobedience. Thisconsiderationwillfocusonthelattertwodimensionsofforces:theillocutionaryand perlocutionary forces because disobedience frequently does not have thesame explicit semantic content as a locutionary act.44 And even when civildisobedienceinvolvessemanticcontent(e.g.,intheformofasignorthechantingofslogans),thekeyelementofcivildisobedienceistheactofdisobedienceitself.It is the breaking of the law that distinguishes civil disobedience from otherformsofprotest,suchaslawfulmarching,distributionofleaflets,ortheholdingof a lawful mass demonstration in a park. Except in the special case wheredisobedience is aimed at a law forbidding the utterance of words and thosewords are uttered as an act of civil disobedience, the disobedient act is not alocution—evenifitdoescommunicate.45

Thisisnottosaythatdisobediencelackscommunicativecontentthatcanbeunderstoodby thosewhoarewitnesses.Actsofdisobedience lacksemanticcontentbecausesuchactsareusuallynot linguistic: inmostcases, theydonotinvolve the use of language. However, disobedience can have communicativecontent in one of two ways. The disobedient act itself could be a symbolicperformance—conveying content that could have been explicitly said. Inaddition, civil disobedience can be carried out via an utterance the content ofwhich is legally impermissible. Forexample, adisobedient couldviolatea lawforbiddingcriticismofahighofficialbyutteringacriticism.Puttingthesecasesaside,disobedienceitselfhasnosemanticcontent.Forexample,ifadisobedientprotestsadraftlawbyburningadraftcardorflag,theseactsdonotthemselveshave semantic content. For these reasons, I only focus on the latter twodimensionsofillocutionaryforce(andignorethefirstdimension)becausethosetwo dimensions are critical to explaining what forces can be generated bydisobedience.46

I shall use a hypothetical example to illustrate the illocutionary andperlocutionary forces in civil disobedience. Continue the example of John andMary.

44 The locutionary act in disobedience is the act of breaking a law itself. Usually such an action does not have semantic content. But there might be one case whereby the action of disobeying itself is a verbal act whose content is meaningful and prohibited by a law. For example, a law prohibiting members from using highly offensive words might be regarded by an individual as an infringement on one’s freedom of speech. So that individual begins to say more and more offensive words to test the scope of the law’s implementation and to contest its validity. In this case the action of disobedience is the action itself of saying offensive words having semantic content. 45 There is another special case. A nonverbal disobedient act could also be a locutionary act if the disobedients establish a conventional meaning. So if the disobedients make a public announcement saying, “When we smash windows during the WTO meeting, we are saying ‘disband the WTO.’” If someone who has heard the announcement witnesses the protesters smashing windows, they understand what it means; hence, the disobedient act might create locutionary content. It seems reasonable to assume that such cases are very rare, and in any event they are not discussed further in this Dissertation. 46 Austin’s discussion of these three parts of the locutionary act can be found on pp. 95-98.

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JohnandMaryforalongtimehaveprotestedavarietyofrestrictions on the exercise of a prisoner’s right to vote: ifprisoners want to exercise the right to vote, they must getpermission fromtheDepartmentofCorrections.However, it israreforprisonerstoreceivepermissiontovote.JohnandMaryhave protested the DOC’s wide discretion for a long time butalways fail to induce a change in policy. Both John and Maryconscientiously believe that the laws illegitimately restrictprisoners’ opportunities to vote despite the fact that theirentitlementtovotehasnotbeenlegallyterminated.Thenormalprocedure of appeal has been ineffective because thesemeasures (such as writing letters) have failed to grab theattentionofthepublic.Afterthinkingforawhile,JohnandMarydecidetoperformdisobedience.Theyprintbrochuresrevealingclassifiedinformationandcirculateasmanyofthebrochuresastheycan toget themajority’sattention.But they fail toattractthe public’s attention effectively. They then decide to hold ademonstrationinwhichtheyblocktrafficanddisplaysignswithgraphicimagesofthemistreatmentofprisoners.

Nowthisexampleisacaseofcivildisobedience.JohnandMaryengagedintwoactionsthatbrokethelaw:(1)Theactionofcirculatingclassifiedcontent,and(2)Theactionof“jamming”traffic.Thesetwoactionslacksemanticcontentbecausetheactionsthemselvesarenotutterances.However,inconjunctionwiththeir actions of holding signs and the content in the brochures, theirdisobedience communicates content to the public, creates certain forces, andachieves certaineffects.Theactionof circulating informationhasan informingforce that aims to generate public acknowledgement of the currentcircumstancesinprisonerregulations.Theactionofjammingtrafficalsohasaninforming force but creates effects different from the effects produced by theaction of circulating information. The action of jamming traffic produces theeffect in a more “coercive” way; passengers are physically prevented fromtraveling where they wish. While the action of circulating information is anillocutionaryact,theactionofjammingtrafficismorelikeaperlocutionaryact.

Whatshouldbenoticed is that the illocutionary forceofdisobedience isderivedfromdisobedients’ intentionofgivingacallforactiontothemajority.47Therefore, disobedients must also secure the uptake of the meaning ofdisobedienceinordertomaketheillocutionaryactsuccessful.Butdisobediencecanalsobeperformedasaperlocutionaryactthataimstocauseconsequentialeffects upon an audience. One can call for an action by provoking feelings ofsympathy for a particular issue as John and Mary did through the action ofshowing graphic images of brutal treatment. Or one can call for an actionthrough rational discourse to change public opinion, by writing letters orcirculatingbrochures.Sodisobedientscanaimatthreekindsoftargets:feelings,thoughts,andactions.

47 This idea is illustrated in Section 4.2. in Chapter Two.

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I illustrate how disobedience can be analyzed using the distinctionbetweenanillocutionaryactandperlocutionaryeffectinthefollowingSections.ThishypotheticalexampleaimstoexplainthebasicideasthatemergewhenweapplyAustin’sspeechacttheorytodisobedience.

1.2.2.TheDistinctionBetweenIntendedConsequenceandUnintendedConsequenceinDisobedienceIt is always difficult to determine what result disobedients intend to

create in an actual instance of disobedience because this requires sufficientinformationandacorrectanalysisoftheevidence. Membersofsocietyarenotonlyconcernedwiththecontentofdisobedients’appeal;theyarealsoconcernedwith the consequences that might be produced by disobedience. Thus, themembersmight characterize one case of disobedience as “violent” or “brutal”andemphasizehowtheactofdisobediencegenerateddamagingconsequences.Theintuitionseemstobethatwhetherdisobedienceisviolentorbrutaldependsonwhetheraconsequencecausedbysuchdisobedienceisdamaging.

Letusdistinguishbetweentheintendedandunintendedconsequencesofdisobedience. It is one thing when disobedients intend to achieve a certainconsequenceasadirectresultof theircourseofdisobedienceand it isanotherthingwhena consequence isnot intendedby thedisobedientsandhappens inconjunction with the contingent conditions that accompany disobedience.48Althoughit isnotaneasytasktodeterminewhatactual intentiondisobedientshold in terms of the consequence carried by their action, the existence of anintention to realize certain damaging consequences allows us to distinguishbetweenintendedconsequencesandunintendedconsequences.

Itisverycommontocharacterizedisobedienceas“violent”whenviolenceoccurs during the course of disobedience. But this equation betweendisobediencethat isaccompaniedbyviolenceand“violentdisobedience” is toosimple. In order to produce a conception of violent disobedience,we need toexplicate the idea of violence, which I will discuss in Section 3.1. One criticalfactorofdeterminingviolence is thesubjective intentionofanagent.Aviolentactionmustbeintentional.So,whetherdisobedienceisviolentalsodependsonanagent’sintentionswithrespecttotheconsequencesthattheagentintendstogeneratedirectlybyengagingintheactofdisobedience.Thequestionofwhetherdisobedience fallsunder theconceptionofviolentdisobediencedependssolelyorsimplyonwhetherthedisobedienceinvolvesdamagingconsequences.

48 Georg Henrik von Wright has a well-developed explication of the distinction between result and consequence. He says, “By the result of an act we can understand either the change corresponding to this act or, alternatively, the end-state of this change. Thus, by the result of the act of opening the window is opening (changes from closed to open) or the fact that it is open.” With regard to the concept of consequence, he says, “When the world changes in a certain respect it may happen that it also, by virtue of so-called causal or natural necessity, becomes transformed in a certain other respect. We then say that the second transformation is a consequence of the first. If the first transformation is effected through action, is the result of an act, then the second is a consequence of action, is a consequence of this act.” See Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Act, p. 39, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963. I do not distinguish result and consequence but Wright’s definition does influence my thinking.

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Asusedhere, thephrase “violentdisobedience”will beused to refer tointentionally violent disobedience. For example, a case of violent individualdisobedience occurs if an individual engages in an act of disobedience thatexpresses a protest against the WTO policy of free trade by breaking thewindows of shops while engaging in demonstration; in this example, thedisobedient intentionally damages the property of others in order to expressanger. There are cases of nonviolent and individual disobedience where noviolence occurs at all, but for the purposes of illustrating the conception ofviolent disobedience articulated here, the key examples are those in whichviolenceoccursbutisnotintendedbythedisobedience.Forexample,consideradisobedient who trespasses on property owned by the WTO and during thetrespass, thedisobedient isphysicallyattackedbyasecurityguardandshovedintoawindowwiththeconsequencethatitbreaks.Inbothcases,glassisbrokenand hence property is damaged. The conception of violent disobediencearticulated here would not classify the second example as one of violencedisobedience. Rather, the secondprotest is nonviolent, despite the fact that itwasabut-forcauseofdamage.49

SofarIhavecontendedthattheconceptofviolentdisobediencerequiresintentionality. Although the phrase “unintentionally violent disobedience” isconsistentwithordinarylanguageusage,Iarguethatviolentdisobediencemustbe intentional at a conceptual level. In addition, the equation betweendisobediencethat isaccompaniedbyviolenceand“violentdisobedience” is toosimplebecausethisequationmightleadtoaconclusionthatdisobedientsshouldberesponsibleforeverydamagingconsequencethatoccursduringthecourseofdisobedience. But disobedients should not be considered responsible forconsequencesthatwereneitherintendednorforeseeable.

Thereare twocases standing in thepenumbraof theconceptofviolentdisobedience.Damagingconsequencescouldbegeneratedbydisobedientswhocan foresee but have no intent to cause that consequence or damagingconsequences could be generated through the action of third parties whendisobedientsknowviolenceisverylikelytooccur.

Before I discuss these two penumbral cases I shall clarify my purposehere.Reasonabledisagreementsaboutthesetwocasesnormallyexistandsuchdisagreements are reasonable in the sense that opposing arguments could beacceptedbyreasonablepersons.Mypurposehereistoprovidetheanalysisandexplain how these twopenumbral cases can be classified using the distinctionbetweenintendedandunintendedconsequences.

ConsideravariationontheWTOprotestcase:supposethatadisobedientusesapicketsigntobeatwindows,withtheintentofmakingnoise,butknowingthat it is likely that some of the windows will break. Broken windows are aforeseenbutunintendedconsequence.

49 For the purposes of this investigation, I will bracket questions about the nature of causation. The text refers to “but-for” causation, but the nature of causation is itself disputed and a metaphysically robust theory of causation might distinguish between counterfactual conditions and cause. See Michael Moore, Causation and Responsibility (Oxford University Press 2009).

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Letusdistinguishtwovariationsofthescenariointhiscase.Assumethatthedisobedientdoesnotrealizethattheactionofbeatingwindowswouldleadto broken windows until a window breaks. The disobedient then stops theaction of beating windows. This scenario is the unintended consequence ofdisobedience which I categorize as nonviolent disobedience. However, therecould be another scenario such that, after the firstwindow breaks due to theaction of beating, the disobedient realizes that the action of beating breakswindows.Thedisobedientrepeatstheactionwithindifferencetothebreakage.In this second variation, broken windows can be considered to be the moralequivalent of the case in which the disobedient intended the breakage. Thissecondvariationshouldbeclassifiedasviolentdisobedience.

The reason for categorizing these two scenarios differently is that it isverydifficulttodrawaclearlinetodistinguishbetweenbeingable(orunable)toforesee certain consequences and intentionally producing these consequences.An intention to causedamagingconsequencesmust include threecomponents.First,thedisobedientmustacknowledgethattheperformedactioniscapableofcausingharmstoothers(beatingwindowscancausebrokenwindows).Second,the disobedient also acknowledges that certain damaging consequences willlikelyoccur throughactionsofdisobedience.Third, thedisobedientmustwantsuchharmtohappenorthedisobedientisindifferenttodamagingconsequences.The disobedient’s intention in the first scenario only includes the first twocomponentsbutlacksthethirdone.Theevidenceofhisdecisiontostopbeatingwindows implicitly shows the lack of the third attitude although damagingconsequences occurred. But in the second scenario the disobedient’s action ofcontinuing to beat the windows has the three components that constituteintentionallyviolentdisobedience.

Anotherpenumbralcaseisinterveningactionbyathirdparty.Thiscaseisillustratedbythefollowingsituation:Aprotesterchantstheslogan,“Thecopsare pigs,” knowing that the chanting of this slogan is very likely to enrage thepoliceandprovokeaviolentresponse.Thisprotesterdoesnotwantthecopstobeviolentbutknowsthatviolenceishighlylikely.Ultimately,theprotesterdoeschant the slogan and the cops, in fact, do beat him. Based on my illustrationabove, if theprotesterwas indifferent to the consequenceof gettingbeatenorinclined to the possibility of getting beaten for some purpose (getting thepublic’s sympathy), then thiswould be an intended consequence. But it is notclearwhetherornotthisactofdisobediencecanbeconsideredviolent judgingsolelyonthefactthathewaschantingasloganwithoffensivecontent.

TheanswertothequestionofwhetherdisobedienceshouldbeclassifiedasviolentdependsontheconceptofviolencethatIwilldiscussinSection3.1.Inaddition,itisalsoverydifficulttodeterminewhetheraprotester’sbeingbeatenshould characterize disobedience as violent. Getting beaten is violent but thisfactdoesnotmakedisobedienceitselfviolent.

From the above illustrationswe can seewhy the term “unintentionallyviolentdisobedience” sometimes is inaccuratebecausewhile theprotesterhadno intention of getting beaten by cops, this damaging consequence cannot beattributed to the protester’s action of holding an offensive sign. The protestermight intend to cause a damaging consequence via the action of holding the

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sloganwiththeoffensivecontent,butourinquiryfocusesonwhethertheactionofcommunicatingtheoffensivecontentoughttobeconsideredviolent,notaboutwhether the consequence of getting beaten realized by the intervention of thethirdparty’sactionisviolent.Anapproachtothisproblemthatreliesonlyontheviolence of the consequences would make the characterization of thedisobediencetoosimplistic.

The discussion of these scenarios shows that a full account of “violentdisobedience”willneed tobecomplexandwill requireavarietyof conceptualtools and normative theories. My position is that the notion of “unintentionalviolent disobedience” is misleading and fails to capture the morally salientdifferencesbetween“violentdisobedience”and “disobediencewithunintendedviolenceconsequences.”

When violent consequences are unintended, then they should not beattributed to the acts of disobedience for the purposes of legal and moralassessmentofthedisobedientacts.Thepropositionthatviolentactionsmustbeintentional does not exclude the fact that nonviolent disobedience can beaccompaniedbydamagingand“violent”consequences.

Thecircumstancebecomesmorecomplexwhendisobedienceiscollectivebecause of the issues involved in collective intentionality. My investigation ofcollectivedisobedience shall clarify someof thebasicquestions, but it isnot afullandcompleteaccountofthedifficultissuesraisedbycollectiveintentionality.IaddressthattopicnextinSection1.2.3.

1.2.3.TheIdeaofCollectiveDisobedienceInChapterTwoIexaminedRawls’stheoryofcivildisobedience(Section

3.3.3 in Chapter Two) and argued that Rawls was less optimistic about thedestructive potential of civil disobedience in A Theory of Justice than in “TheJustification of Civil Disobedience”; this change reflects Rawls’s belief thatdisobedience could destroy the efficacy of a state’s constitution and causesubstantialsocialdisorder.Myconclusionwas,“Inotherwords,extensivenessisafunctionofboththenumberofdisobedientacts,whichinturnisaproductofthe number of agents and the frequency with which each agent engages indisobedience.”(Section3.3.3ofChapterTwo)Thisanalysisisthestartingpointfor the development of a basic framework for understanding the nature ofcollectivedisobedience.

Let us take the number of agents (disobedients) and the number ofinstancesinwhicheachagentengagesinactionforaccomplishingdisobedienceastwovariablesthatidentifytheextentofcollectivedisobedience.Withrespecttothenumberofagentsdisobediencecouldbeperformedeitherbyoneagentorbymorethanoneagent.Withregardtothenumberof instancesinwhicheachagent engages in performing disobedience, we can distinguish cases in whicheffectivedisobediencerequiresonlyoneinstanceofengagementfromthosethatrequire more than one instance. Under these two variables we can have twotypesofdisobedience:individualandcollectivedisobedience.

TypeAisindividualdisobediencewhichincludestwosubtypes:TypeA(1)andA(2).InTypeA(1),onlyoneagentperformsoneinstanceofengagement.Inthistypeofindividualdisobedience,theagentdoesnothavetodealwithissues

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of collective action. In Type A (2), one agent performs a sequence ofmaterialactions forachievingdisobedience.This formofdisobedience isalso individualin the sense that, although the agent must consider how to coordinate thesequenceofactions,heneednotconsiderhowtocoordinatewithotheragents.

TypeBiscollectivedisobediencewhichincludestwosubtypes:TypeB(1)andB(2).TypeB(1)involvesmorethanoneagentperformingoneinstanceofactionforcreatingsignificanteffects.50Thistypeofcollectivedisobediencemightbeeitherspontaneousorplanned.And,ifitisplanned,thenperformanceofthiscollectivedisobediencerequiresagentstodealwithissuesofcollectivedecision-making and possible consequences created by collective actions. Type B (2)occurs when multiple agents perform multiple instances of actions foraccomplishingdisobedience.Oftenthistypeisakindofcollectivedisobediencerequiring a high degree of coordination in order to produce successfuldisobedience.ThenextFigureliststhefourkindsofdisobedience.

Figure10:TheTypeofDisobedienceinTermsofCollectiveActions

Agent=1 Agent>1

InstanceofAction=1 TypeA(1)IndividualDisobedience

TypeB(1)CollectiveDisobedience

InstanceofAction>1 TypeA(2)IndividualDisobedience

TypeB(2)CollectiveDisobedience

Agents who engage in disobedience of Type B must consider issues

related to collective actions such as who decides the main method ofdisobedience and how to assign a variety of actions to further the aims ofdisobediencewithin a complex network of participants—and similar issues aswell.TypeBinvitesoneimportantquestionindisobedience:doesdisobediencehavetobecollectiveinordertobeeffective?Andhowdoeseachconceptionofdisobediencedealwith issuesarisingfromcollectiveactions?Answerstothesequestions cannot be provided in this discussion. However, I would like tohighlight issuesrelevanttocollectivedisobediencethatmustbeconsideredforeachconception.

Thefirstissueconcernstheformandstructureofcollectivedisobedients.Disobedientsneedtodeterminewhatformofcollectivedecision-makingwillbeemployed by the group. For example, will the decision-making structure be adictatorshiporademocraticarrangement?Isitpossibletohaveadictatorshipasthedecision-makingstructurebutstillappealtodemocraticvalues?

50 One case of Type B (1) was the protest against illegitimate restriction on the right to assembly in Taiwan. In Taiwan peaceful assembly needs to be permitted by the police department. During the Sunflower Movement one group that supported Taiwan’s independence was denied permission by the political authority to engage in a peaceful assembly and was explicitly denied any future permission. One young student initiated a protest against this police decision by inviting individuals to be present in front of the district police department and to force the Commissioner to resign. On 11 April, 2014 hundreds of individuals gathered in front of the police department expressing their anger and shouting that the commissioner should resign. The commissioner did not resign but apologized for the decision. This is a case of Type B (1). It involved multiple individuals who performed the same action without any centralized plan to accomplish disobedience.

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Thesecondissuefocusesontheintentionofcollectivedisobedients:howcan we determine the main purpose and intention of collective disobediencegiven that disobedients have their own individual intentions and purposes?Some disobedientsmight have a clear understanding of the aims and goals ofdisobedience,while others know less (or even nothing). In that circumstancehowshouldwedetermine“thepurpose”ofcollectivedisobedience?Thissecondissueincludesmanysignificantaspects. Justas lhaveillustratedthedistinctionbetween intended consequence and unintended consequence in Section 1.2.2,there is a similar problem in determining whether collective disobedience isviolentornotwhenhighlyantagonisticintensityisforeseeablebutunintended.

Thethirdissuerelevanttothenormativestatusofcollectivedisobedienceis thequestionofwhetherparticipants in collectivedisobediencearemerely acollectionof individualdisobedientsorcan theybeconsideredan independentagent that assumes collective responsibility? Related to this issue is the legalliabilityofcollectivedisobedients.Canalegalsystempursue“thelegalliability”ofcollectivedisobedients?Orcanitonlyprosecuteeachdisobedientindividually?

1.3.QuestionsthatMatterinConceptionsofDisobedience

1.3.1.TheMainForceGeneratedbyDisobedienceEvery conception of disobedience must answer a basic question: How

does each conception of disobedience define thosewho do not participate, socalled“addressees,”inthecourseofdisobedience?Thisquestioncanbedividedinto twosetsof sub-questions.The first set concerns therelationshipassumedbetween disobedients and addressees by each conception. The second setconcernswhatforceisintentionallycreatedandwhateffectsareimposedupontheaddresseesineachconception.

The first sub-question distinguishes three conceptions of disobedience:the expressive, the communicative, and the resistant conception. Each oneassumes a specific account of the relationship between disobedients andaddressees.Andbydifferentiatingthreeconceptionsofdisobedience,itbecomespossible to describe how the assumed relationship dealswith the principle ofnonviolence.

The second sub-question turnson thenatureof the illocutionary forcesand perlocutionary effects that arise from each conception of disobedience.Disobediencecangenerateavarietyofforces;forexample,(1)disobediencecanmake a plea that others also become engaged in action, (2) disobedience caninform the public about hitherto unrevealed or unknown facts, or (3)disobediencecansignalthefactthatdisobedientsmightadoptfurtheractionstoprotest if certain cases of injustice are continuously ignored. In addition togenerating illocutionary force, disobedience can also cause perlocutionaryeffects. For example, disobedience can (1) convince others to accept certainprescriptivepositionsaboutapolicy,or(2)generatefearorperceptionsofriskinapoliticalauthorityandhencecausetheauthoritytoactinacertaindesiredway.Understandingwhat forces and effects canbe created in each conceptionenablesanunderstandingofhowaddresseesmightbeinfluencedbydisobedientacts.

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One implication in my analysis is that the question of whetherdisobedienceisviolentornot,althoughverysignificant,nolongeroccupiesthecenter of discussions about when such disobedience is justified. Nonviolentdisobediencecanalsocreatepowerfulorcoerciveeffectsuponthosewhohavethepowertomakeadifferenceonapolicyquestion,whileviolentdisobediencemightonlycausesecondaryperlocutionaryeffects(e.g., inducingfearoranger)but fail to effect action by the addressees. Conceptual tools developed in thetheoryofspeechactsallowdeeperinvestigationintohowdisobediencecreatesillocutionary force and causes perlocutionary effects. Therefore, investigatingthose two sub-questions enriches discussions of disobedience. And, since theprinciple of nonviolence does not occupy a decisive position, the issuesconcerningviolenceareputinanewcontext.ThisisthetopicinthenextPart.

1.3.2.TheScopeofPermissibleActionsEveryconceptionofdisobediencemustalsodealwiththequestionasto

whichactionsarepermissible(relativetotheconception)andwhichactionsareforbidden. Answering that question requires us to investigate the furtherquestion of whether the principle of nonviolence is intrinsic to an adequateconceptionofdisobedience. If it isnot, thentowhatextentcanaconceptionofdisobedience allow violent actions to be performed? In order to answer thisquestion,weneedfirsttodefineviolenceandviolentactions.

Actions make disobedience visible in the world. A conception ofdisobediencethatdidnotidentifythescopeofpermissibleactionswouldfailtoanswer many of the most important questions about civil disobedience. Forexample, a conception of disobedience that fails to specify permissibledisobedient acts cannot provide guidance for concrete action in the world.Disobedients must choose particular actions if they are to engage in civildisobedience. Civilauthoritiesmustmakedecisions inresponsetoactsofcivildisobedience, including decisions about the maintenance of order andprosecutionofoffenses.

1.3.3.TheJustificatoryThresholdofDisobedienceThe last question each conception must answer is the question of the

justificatorythresholdfordisobedience.Disobedience isanactionthatmustbejustified and each conception of disobedience has its own view onwhat value(normativecommitment)canbestjustifydisobedientacts.

The justificatory thresholdquestion canbeansweredbydiscussing twomore specific questions. First, I shall show what normative commitment iscontained in each conception and how this normative commitment justifiesdisobedience.Secondly,Iwilldemonstratethedegreeofimportanceof“normalpoliticalappeal”(thatis,theuseoftheregularchannelsofpoliticalpersuasion)as a perquisite for initiating disobedience. Explicating what actions would beaccepted in each conceptionofdisobedience isnot itself sufficientbecause thescope of permissible actions does not tell us when disobedience ought to bechosen as the means for dissent. Therefore, explicating the following twoquestions provides an account of the normative grounds associatedwith eachconceptionofdisobedience:

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• 1.What is thenormativecommitmentembracedbya conceptionofdisobedience?

• 2.What is the functionof normal political appeal as a perquisiteforinitiatingdisobedience?

A well-developed conception of disobedience answers these twoquestions:theanswersmakethethresholdofdisobedienceclear.Theanswertothe first question is also related to the question of what wrongs are mostappropriate as grounds for disobedience within each conception given thatconception’snormativecommitments.Itisimpossibleformetogiveadeepandcompleteaccountof these topicsbutevenan incompleteaccountofnormativecommitmentcanadvancethediscussion.

The second question considers what role and importance democraticprocedures like voting, public debate, holding hearings, and pursuing legalremediesshouldplaywithineachconceptionofdisobedience.Mydiscussionwillshow that each conception has its own stance on the question ofwhether themoralweightof thevaluesofnormaldemocraticparticipation shoulddisallowdisobedienceandinwhatcircumstancesthisisthecase.

BeforeIdealwiththosetwoquestions,Iwanttoclarifymyperspectiveona general issuewith respect to the justificationofdisobedience. Two relevantpositions regarding justificatory problems should be distinguished. The firstpositionisthatcivildisobediencecanbejustifiedbyclaimingthatsomewrongsaremorally (or politically) impermissible. And the second position is that civildisobedienceisaright(eitheramoralrightorapoliticalright)thatisprotectedfrom interference. The conceptions I discuss in this Chapter can be furtherdifferentiatedbyaskingwhethereachconceptionisjustification-basedorrights-based.ThenextChapterwilldealindepthwiththequestionofwhetherthereisarighttodisobey.

2.ThreeConceptionsofDisobedience:TheExpressive,theCommunicative,andtheResistantConceptionsofDisobedience

This Section lays out three conceptions of disobedience: the expressiveconception,thecommunicativeconception,andtheresistantconception.

Section 2.1 focuses on the expressive conception of disobedience. Iinvestigatetheideathatdisobedienceinvolvesaunilateralrelationshipbetweendisobedients and addressees and explicate the illocutionary force created bydisobedienceaccordingtotheexpressiveconception.Performanceofexpressivedisobedienceinvolvesthespeechactofinformingmembersofsocietyaboutthedisobedients’ideas,positions,oremotions.

One important condition for generating success in the expressiveconceptionistosecureuptakeoftheillocutionaryforcethatthedisobedientactaimstocreate.Thereisnosureandeasywaytoguaranteethatsuchuptakewillbesecured.Forexample,disobedientsinanillegalmarchmightwearaV-mask(or “Guy Fawkesmask,” popularized by the graphic novel andmotion pictureentitled “V for Vendetta”) as part of their disobedient performance. However,

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without additional context, it may be unclear to addressees whether thedisobedientsareprotestingananti-maskinglaworinsteadareusingtheV-maskasawaytoexpresstheirwillingnesstoengageinrevolutionaryaction(perhapssimilartotheactionsperformedinthegraphicnovelsorbyGuyFawkeshimself).There is no guarantee that the illocutionary force of disobedient action willsecure uptake: the addressees may misunderstand and if they do, then thespeechactmaymisfire.

Section 2.2 illustrates the communicative conception of disobedience.This section crystallizes the main ideas in the communicative conception ofdisobediencebyexplicatingthebilateralrelationshipbetweendisobedientsandthe audience, the idea of warning force generated by communicativedisobedience,andtheideathatpersuasionisthedesiredperlocutionaryeffectofcivil disobedience. Compared to expressive disobedience, communicativedisobedienceplacesgreateremphasisonthecreationofperlocutionaryeffectsintheformofachangeinbeliefsbyaddressees.Forthisreason,thecommunicativeconception emphasizes non-coercive acts of disobedience and the persuasiveforcegeneratedbysuchacts.

Section2.3explicatestheresistantconceptionofdisobedience.Unliketheprevious two conceptions, resistant disobedience assumes a two-layerrelationship betweendisobedients and addresseeswhich includes the politicalregimeandpublicofficials.Themainforcecreatedbyresistantdisobedience isimperativeforceinthesensethatdisobedientscommandtheiraddresseestodocertain actions and the perlocutionary effect generated by this form ofdisobedienceiscoercive.

2.1.ExpressiveDisobedience2.1.1.TheAssumptionofAUnilateralandOne-WayRelationship

betweentheDisobedientsandAddresseesThe expressive conception of disobedience (hereinafter expressive

disobedience)takesdisobedienceasameanstoexpressthedisobedients’beliefs,emotions, opinions, and concerns in a broad sense. Therefore, actions ofdisobediencehave the functionof informingaddresseesofwhat is at stake fordisobedientswhentheyperformanactofdisobedience.51Onedistinctivefeatureof this conception is the assumption of a unilateral relationship between thedisobedientsandtheaddresseesofdisobedience.Thisrelationshipisunilateral inthe sense that disobedients express their emotions, feelings, or ideas in awaythatdoesnotrequirearesponsefromothers.Thisrelationshipisdifferentfroma bilateral relationship (in which there is a two-way interaction). Expressivedisobedientsdonotnecessarilyexpectaresponsefromtheaddressee.Inavery

51 Cass Sunstein and Edward Glaeser distinguish two types of signals. In the first type, disobedients express that they are displeased with the governing authority. And in the second type, disobedients seek to provoke the authority to signal its own bad character. Sunstein and Glaeser’s article focuses on the second type of signaling effect and so they aim at building a model to explain how disobedients find “the sweet spot” in a way that actions of disobedience can cause damaging effects to “elicit a forceful response” and yet not so damaging as to make authority’s forceful response justified. See Edward Glaeser and Cass Sunstein, “A Theory of Civil Disobedience,” in the SSRN Database (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2625273; Last visit: 2016/12/16).

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narrow sense, the addressee assumed in expressive disobedience stands in apassivepositiontothedisobedients:anaddresseeissomeonewhoiscapableofreceivingmessagesfromdisobedients. Thisaspectoftherelationshipbetweenthe disobedient and the addressee is similar to the relationship between aperformer and the performer’s audience: in a traditional theater performance,forexample,theplayersdonotinteractdirectlywiththeaudience.

The following questions focus our attention on the factors that makeexpressive disobedience unilateral. Is there really a unilateral relationshipbetween expressive disobedients and the addressee?Or could it be a bilateralrelationship? For example, expressive disobedience aims at self-disclosure,making internalmental states of the disobedient visible to the others. If so, itseemstheassumptionof“others”isnecessaryinexpressivedisobediencewhichmakes this relationshipbilateral,at least inaweaksense.Theanswer to thesequestionsisthattheunilateralrelationshipbetweenexpressivedisobedientsandtheir addressees focuses on one-way expressionby thedisobedients that doesnot require a response from the addressees. We can specify a distinctionbetweentwokindsofaudiencestomakethisclear.Apassiveaudiencewitnessesaperformancebutdoesnotparticipate. Anactiveaudience alsowitnesses theperformance but, in addition, engages in interaction with the performers. Anactiveaudienceinthecontextofcivildisobedienceisagroupofpeoplewhoareinadialogicprocesswiththedisobedients.Expressivedisobedienceisunilateralbecause it involves one-way communication between disobedients andaddressees.

Expressivedisobediencedoesnotnecessarilyassumeaninter-subjectiverelationship between disobedients and addressees because interactive ordialogic communication is not the main purpose in expressive disobedience.However,theunilateralrelationshipdoesrequirethatdisobedientspredicthowtheirdisobediencemightbeperceivedbyaddresseesand thisprediction takesinto account the means of expression. The perception of disobedience can beaffected by which forms of disobedience are chosen. What makes thisrelationship unilateral is that the consideration of the addressee’s role issecondary. Expressive disobedience is concerned with the appropriateness ofthe act for expressing the views, ideas, and opinions of the disobedient. Theexpressivefunctioncanbeobtainedwithoutenteringintoarelationshipwiththeperson to whom the expressive speech act is directed. For example, one canexpressone’sbelieforfeelingswithasignedpublicstatement,orthewearingofsymbols;actionslikethesearecommonmeanstoexpressivedisobedience.52Inthecaseofsigningapublicstatement,theunilateralnatureoftheexpressionismadeclearbythefactthatthepersonwhosignsdoesnotneedtoknowwhowillread the statement and the reading can occur at a place and time so removedfromthesigningthatnointeractionispossible.

Based on this unilateral relationship, another implication of expressivedisobedienceisthatdisobedientsarenotrequiredtorevealtheir identityortoperform disobedience in public. Expressive disobedience is consistent with

52 Gene Sharp has provided a very useful map for using various types of disobedience. See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action Part Two: The Methods of Nonviolent Action, Porter Sargent Publishers, 1973.

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secrecy,eitherbyhidingdisobedients’identitiesorbyperformingdisobediencein a non-public place. For example, graffiti on public property is a way ofexpressingone’sviewsandideas.Butanexpressivedisobedientdoesnothavetoreveal his identity in order for the addressee to see graffiti. For example,disobedientsmight“tag”(creategraffiti)lateatnightandtherebycreategraffitiwithoutdisclosingtheiridentities. Expressivedisobediencecouldbelikeaone-waymirror:disobedientsseehowtheaddresseereactswhiletheaddresseedoesnotknowwhoiswatchingthem. It ischaracteristicofexpressivedisobediencethatitcanbeperformedwithoutdisclosureoftheidentityofthedisobedients.

2.1.2.TheDisclosingForceCreatedbyExpressiveDisobedienceAs analyzed above, expressive disobedience aims to express the

disobedients’ emotions, ideas, positions, or disapproval of policies or laws;expressive disobedience functions to inform addressees of the disobedients’internalmental states. The force created by expressive disobedience could becharacterized as “informational” but a more accurate description would bedisclosingforce.

Disclosing force refers to the idea that expressive disobedientsintentionallyexpresstheirmentalstatestoothers. Ihaveexplainedthatsuchadisclosure assumes the existence of others without inviting a response fromthem. The effect intentionally created by this disclosing force is to make animpact on the addressees’ mental states (or feelings), thoughts, or actions. Inordertosuccessfullycreatetheimpactingeffect,expressivedisobedientshavetosecure the uptake of their disclosive speech act. This requires that theaddressees grasp that the disobedient acts express the mental states of thedisobedients. For example, if the witnesses to an unlawful protest marchperceivethemarchtobeareligiouscelebration,thedisclosiveforceofthemarchwouldnothavesecureduptakeandtheexpressiveactwouldhavemisfired.

What is the perlocutionary effect at which expressive disobedientscharacteristicallyaim? Letususethephrase“impactingeffect” todescribethereactionthatexpressivedisobedienceseekstoelicit.Theetymologyof“impact”illuminates this characteristic. The word ‘impact’ as a verb literally means tobring one object into contact with another. It originally comes from Latin“impactus,” meaning to push into, dash against, or thrust at and usuallyaccompanies an antagonistic relationship.53Successful expressive disobediencecreatesanimpactingeffectthatshapestheaddressee’semotionsandbeliefs.Forexample, consider an unlawful demonstration that includes a disobedientholding a picket sign with a photograph of a bloody and violent image whilechanting the slogan, “No more war.” The disobedient discloses an inner state(horror at the violence ofwar) and thedisclosing force thereby impacts thosewho witness the demonstration. If the disobedients are successful, then their

53 See the entry for ‘impact’ in the Online Etymology Dictionary which gives the etymology as "press closely into something," from Latin impactus, past participle of impingere "to push into, dash against, thrust at." The etymological explanation of impact should not be confused with the definition of the word. To understand its etymological source is to understand where this word comes from, not how it is defined. (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=impact&allowed_in_frame=0); Last visit: 12/21/2015.

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addresseeswillcometoshare(orpartiallyshare)thedisobedients'feelingsandbeliefsaboutthewar.

Expressivedisobedientsaimat impacting theaddressees’mental states,but how can this aim be achieved? Successful expressive disobedience mustsecure the uptake of communicative content intended to be conveyed by theperformance of disobedience. There are several ways for expressivedisobedience to secure uptake, including (1) symbolic action, and (2) explicitsymboliccontent.

First,expressivedisobediencemightbeperformedsymbolicallyinsuchaway that themeaningwithin the symbolic action is securedby a conventionalunderstanding of an action. For example, a particular color might be used tosymbolizeone’spoliticalpositionand throughrepetition thisassociationcouldbecomeconventional.Forexample,thecolor“orange”wasusedbydisobedientsinthe“orangerevolution”intheUkraine.54Themassactionofwearingthesamecolor in the course of an unlawful assembly can communicate the beliefs andemotionsofthosewhodisobey.

Second,expressivedisobediencecanbeperformedinconjunctionwithanexplicit verbal action whose content itself is legally impermissible. Whenexpressive disobedience is accompanied by semantic content conveyed byactions like holding a sign or circulating brochures or posters, the securing ofuptakemaybemorereliable:theintendeddisclosureismadeexplicitinwords.When expressive disobedience is accomplished by symbolic actions anddisconnected from semantic content, then securing the uptake may be moredifficult, because the addressees are required to infer the nature of thedisclosure. For example a “Black Lives Matter” protest might includedisobedientssimulatingdeathbylyingdowninapublicplace:ifthisactionisnotaccompanied by explicit semantic content (in the form of signs or chantedslogans), witnesses of the protest might not understand what message theprotestersintendtoconvey.

Whilesecuringuptakeisanimportanttask,expressivedisobediencedoesnot have to invite a response or performance from others. This fact seems tocontradicttheideathatthepurposeofperformingdisobedienceistobringaboutachangeinlawsorpolicies.Tobeclearaboutthis,expressivedisobedientscanhave an intention of changing the lawbut this ultimate aim is not identical totheir immediate intention to create an impact on their audience. Laws can bechanged via the impacting effect created by disobedience but the effect itselfresultsfromtargetingtheaddressee’semotions,feelings,orbeliefs.

Wecannowfocusontheimpactingeffectimposedupontheaddresseeinmoredetail.Theimpactingforcecanbeconvincingorcoercive,dependingonthecontextofperformingexpressivedisobedience.Forexample,whenahugegroupofindividualsholdpicketsignsshowingphotoswithimagesofbloodaspartofaprotestagainsttheirgovernment’sforeignpolicy,theimpactingforcegeneratedbythisgroup iscoercive in thesensethat theirgovernmentcannotreasonably

54 See the entry, Orange Revolution, in Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orange_Revolution); Last visit: 2016/12/10.

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ignore theappealprovidedby these individuals.However, the impactingeffectcan be convincing. For example,when a group of reliable professionals sign apublic statementagainsta constructionplan foranuclearplant, theiraction islikelytobeconvincingandnon-coercive.55

Given this understanding of the illocutionary force and perlocutionaryeffect associated with expressive disobedience, we can make an importantobservationabouttherelationshipbetweenthisconceptionofdisobediencewithviolentactionsanddamagingconsequences.Whileexpressivedisobediencehasthe disclosing force, it does not necessarily make the perlocutionary effectcoercive.Theperlocutionaryeffectinexpressivedisobediencecanbeconvincingor coercive depending on the specific context of expressive disobedience. Andwhenexpressivedisobedienceisperformedviaanoffensiveorviolentaction,wecan assume that it creates coercive force. Violent actions are likely to beperceivedasthreatening,andtheeffectofthethreatmaybecoercive.

2.2.CommunicativeDisobedience2.2.1.TheBilateralRelationshipbetweenDisobedientsand

Audience,andItsImplicationThe communicative conception of disobedience is inspired by Rawls’s

theoryofcivildisobedience.RecallthatRawlsexplainsthatcivildisobedienceis“amodeofaddress,”which issupposedtobeperformed“in thepublic forum.”And,Rawlscontinues,“caremustbetakentoseethatitisunderstood.”(TJ:§57,p.376)

The basic feature for communicative disobedience is a bilateralrelationship between disobedients and the audience. Communicativedisobedience is situated in a two-way relationship in the sense that thedisobedients recognize the equal status of those who have decided not toparticipateindisobedience;anactiveaudienceconsistsofautonomoussubjectscapableofmaking judgmentsandengaging inactions.Membersofsocietywhoare addressed not only receive information passively but also are capable ofactivelyparticipatinginthecourseofcommunication.Thisbilateralrelationshipentailsthatcertainreactionsofthosewhoarenotinvolvedindisobediencearerequired for disobedience to succeed; this provides a decisive reason fordisobedientstoadoptaprincipleofnonviolence.(IshallanalyzetheconnectionbetweencommunicativedisobedienceandnonviolenceinSubsection3.2.1.)

Thisbilateralrelationshipalsoindicatesthefactthatmutualrecognitionisa critical conditionof communication.Communicative disobedients do not takethose who have not decided to participate in disobedience as a mere passive

55 This case usually would be considered a lawful form of protest in the United States. However, in other contexts the action of signing up could be illegal. For example, in Taiwan there is an Act of Administrative Neutrality the aim of which is to regulate the exercise of administrative power and to prohibit certain patterns of conduct that might result in an unfair competition favoring one political party. Those who are subjected to the Act of Administrative Neutrality include professors, who work in an academic institute sponsored by the government. Therefore, when academic professionals sign a declaration of their support or opposition, their actions could be subjected to penalty. For this reason, an action that would be considered a normal political appeal in the United States could be an act of civil disobedience in Taiwan.

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audience but instead invite them to make their own decisions in response todisobedience. Therefore, communicative disobedience does not deprive theaudienceof the capability tomakea final judgmentbut instead treats themasautonomousparticipantsinadialogicprocess.

In expressive disobedience, participants consider how disobediencewould be perceived by the addressee. By contrast, in communicativedisobedience,participantstakeupthequestionastowhetheraperformancewillcreate a future possibility of mutual understanding between communicativedisobedients and their audience. This bilateral relationship assumes that theaudience iscapableofunderstandingthepointofdisobedience.Theroleof theaudience is not secondary; instead, the audience is primary in the sense thatinteractionbetweendisobedientsandaddresseesisthepointofcommunicativedisobedience. For this reason, communicative disobedients must consider thefollowingtwofactorstoassurethattheirdisobediencewillbeunderstood:first,communicativedisobedientsmustrecognizehowthepointofdisobediencewillbeunderstoodbytheaudience,andsecond,thedisobedientsmustconsiderhowtheirdisobediencewillenable futurecommunicationbetweenthedisobedientsandtheaudience.

Howthepointofcommunicativedisobediencecanberecognizedrelatesto thequestionofhowcommunicativedisobedienceasan illocutionaryactcansecuretheuptakeofactionandcreateanappropriateperlocutionaryeffectinanaudience.IshalldealwiththisquestioninthenextSection.

Andthequestionofhowcommunicativedisobediencecanpavethewayfor future possibility of communication is related to the scope of permissibleaction,atopicIdealwithinSection3.2.2inChapterThree.Buthereweshouldunderstand that communicative disobedience itself is communicative and canalso be used for opening further communication. While its performance canfacilitate the possibility of future communication, communicative disobedienceitselfmustbecommunicative inconjunctionwith themaintenanceofanactiveaudience’sparticipation inadialogueandwithan insistenceon theaudience’sautonomy of final judgments. Following this understanding, communicativedisobedienceasanillocutionaryactconstitutesaninvitationforaresponsefromtheaudience.IshallalsodealwiththisquestioninthenextSection.

2.2.2.WarningForceandPersuasiveEffectGeneratedbyCommunicativeDisobedienceCommunicative disobedience as an illocutionary act generates warning

force. That is, communicative disobedience is a warning from disobedients totheir fellow members of society. Sometimes the distinction between thedisclosing force and warning force blurs because in particular cases,disobedientsmayintentionallyengageinmultipleillocutionaryacts.

Thecomponentofsincerityhelpsusdistinguishdisclosureandwarning.Unlike the disclosing force, the warning force generated by communicativedisobedienceoriginatesfromthefactthatdisobedientsbelievethatsomeissuesmustbetakenintoaccountbyothermembersofsocietytoavoidthecontinuanceofinjustice.It isnotsufficientmerelytodisclosetheexistenceofsomecasesofinjusticeandtomakeanimpactuponothers’feelingsorbeliefs.Communicative

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disobedienceaimsatdisclosingtheexistenceofinjusticeandcallingforactiontorepairoreliminate thewrongful stateofaffairs. Thewarning force comes fromthe fact that performance of communicative disobedience is a reminder fromthosewhohaverecognizedthesignificanceofsomeinjusticetothosewhohavenotrecognizedit:theactofwarningassumesthatitisnottoolatetotakeactiontointerveneandcorrectoramelioratetheinjustice.

Communicative disobedience is a warning but not a threat. Of course,unlawfulbehaviorcancommunicateathreat,eitherimplicitlyorexplicitly.Butifthe speech act is a threat and not awarning, then the behavior is outside thecategory of communicative civil disobedience. The difference between awarninganda threat is thata threat functionsasanotice to theaudience thatcertaincircumstanceswouldlikelyoccurifonedoesnotfollowwhatoneistoldtodo.Athreatisinconsistentwithcommunicativedisobediencebecauseathreatnegativelyinfluencestheaudience’sautonomousstatusandcausesanimpactonan individual’sactions regardlessof the individual’sattitudeor thoughts, allofwhich contradict the assumption of a bilateral relationship in communicativedisobedience. In a nutshell a threat is used to force or coerce certain action,whileawarningisnot.

While the disclosing force aims to provoke certain emotions, ideas,messages,or images intheaddressee, thewarningforceaimstoexemplifyanddemonstrate the disobedient’s sincere attitude to make the possible effectcarriedoutbycommunicativedisobediencenoncoercive.Insistenceonasincereattitudefacilitatesrealizationbytheaudiencethatthewarningforcecomesfromthe disobedient’s considered judgments, secures the uptake of communicativedisobedience, and assures that the means adopted by communicativedisobedienceminimizesunexpectedcoerciveeffects.Onewaytodemonstrateadisobedient’ssincereattitudeistheself-disclosureofidentityandanotherwayistoexplicitlycommunicatetheacceptanceofpossiblepunishments.

The “free the nipple” movement is an example of communicativedisobedience.Whenthesupportersofthismovementuploadandpublicizetheirphotographs of women participating in disobedience of laws forbidding thedisplay of women’s breasts, they communicate their viewpoint to others whomay reject or have failed to consider the issue of bodily equality; thesedisobedientsexpresstheirbeliefthattheseactionsareunjustbyrevealingtheiridentities. This act of self-revelation does not require the members of theaudiencetoknowtheprecise identitiesofparticulardisobedients.Thepointofthe campaign is not to shock the audience but to communicate a messageconcerning gender equality via showing the body in a way that challengesconventionally accepted social interactions. This movement might beunderstoodasexpressive,butactuallyitshouldbeseenascommunicative.Thekey to the difference is the aim of the disobedients—to express inner feelingsandbeliefs(expressive)ortoconvincetheaudienceof injusticeandtherebytoeffectsocialchange(communicative).

Communicative disobedience must invite a response from those whohave not participated in the disobedience while a response is not inherentlynecessaryinexpressivedisobedience.Recallthattheinvitationofaresponseisdistinct from perlocutionary effect. The response invited by communicative

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disobedienceistheactionthatoughttobetakentostoptheinjusticeinquestion,but the perlocutionary effect brought about by communicative disobedience isthepersuasionoftheaudiencetoacceptthedisobedients’stanceontheissuesathand.

Communicativedisobediencecanbeunderstoodas involving foursteps:(1) Communicative disobedience sends a message that creates warning force,alertingthepublic to theexistenceof injustice;(2)Thewarning forcedoesnotconstituteathreat;thewarningsecuresuptakebymakingtheaudienceawareofinjustice and not by creating fear of harmful consequences should there befurther acts of disobedience; (3) Communicative disobedience invites itsaudience to respond by taking actions to ameliorate the existence of injustice;and (4) The audience’s response is triggered through a perlocutionary effect,persuasionthatpromptsachangeintheaudience’sbeliefsoraffectiveattitudes.

The perlocutionary effect generated by communicative disobedience ispersuasive effect (in other words, the effect of convincing members of theaudiencetochangetheirbeliefsoraffectiveattitudes).Persuasiveeffectnotonlycomesfromargumentsthatarewell-organizedandexplainedbutalsoreliesonsuccessfullysecuringuptakeinconjunctionwithdisobedients’sincereattitudes.Whatmakescommunicativedisobedienceeffectiveisnotjustthestrengthofthereasonsoffered foropposingan injustice,butalsothecreationofanon-hostileconversationalenvironmentthatinvitesfutureinteractionbetweendisobedientsandthoseaddresseeswhoarenotyetconvincedbutwhomightbepersuadedinthefuture.

We should understand that the desired persuasive effect cannot beachieved through threatsmade by disobedients. Intentional coercion plays nopart in true communicative disobedience. Communicative disobediencemainlyaims at changing audience’s thoughts (in particular their judgments aboutinjustice)butdoesnotaimdirectlyatachangeintheiremotionsortheiractions.The response invited by communicative disobedience would be the result ofsuccessfulachievementofthepersuasiveeffectupontheaudience’sbeliefs.Iamnotsayingthatcommunicativedisobediencecannotaimatpromptinganaudiencetoact or at changing a law or policy. Rather, I am saying that theway to triggerthesechangesmustbethroughapersuasiveeffect.Inanutshell,communicativedisobedientsaimtoengageothersinactionsviathespeechactofwarningoftheexistence of injustice, which, in conjunction with the sincere attitude of thedisobedients,hasapersuasiveeffectupontheaudience’sthoughts.

2.3.ResistantDisobedienceThere is a third conception distinctive from expressive and

communicative conceptionsof disobedience: this is the resistant conceptionofdisobedience(hereinafter“resistantdisobedience”).ThisSectionshall illustrateonlytheessentialpointsofresistantdisobedience.Mypurposeistooutlinetheidea of resistant disobedience so that we can more clearly contrast thisconceptionwiththeothertwoconceptionsofdisobedience.

2.3.1.TheTwo-LayerRelationshipinResistantDisobedienceThe distinctive feature of resistant disobedience is a two-layer

relationship that distinguishes two types of addressees: (1) a political regime

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that governs the society ofwhich resistantdisobedients aremembers, and (2)peoplewhooccupypoliticalofficeswiththecapabilityofimplementingalaworpolicy in question. The political regime is the primary addressee in resistantdisobedienceandpoliticalofficialsstandinasecondaryrole.Ishallillustratethistwo-layerrelationshipbelow.

With regard to the political regime, resistant disobedience treats thepolitical regime as the responsible agent to whom the resistant disobedientsaddresstheirappeal.Apoliticalregimeisasetofpoliticalinstitutionsshapedbya variety of rules (formal and informal) that assign individual agents roles inrealizingthegoalsof the institution.Theserulesalsostructurethe interactionsbetweenindividualsandtheinstitution(viaitsagents)intermsofdistributionofrightsandduties.Thepoliticalregime(andtheindividualswhocompriseit)arethetargetofthemessagessentbyresistantdisobedients.

Thepoliticalregimeisnotlikeanaturalpersonwhophysicallyexistsandhas cognitive abilities that enablemoral reasoning. Characterizing thepoliticalregimeastherecipientseemstobeametaphorthatresistantdisobedientsusetoappeal to thosewhooccupyapositionorofficethatgivesthemthecapacitytochangeanunjustlaworpolicy.However,thisisnottheanalysisthatispresentedhere.Whilethereisstilldisputeaboutthenatureofastate(orpoliticalregime),it is undeniable that a collective group can act and bear the responsibility forwhathasbeenwrongfullydoneinthepast.Torepresentthepoliticalregimeasthe addressee is not based on the assumption that political regimes have thesame capacities as actual people but is instead based on the claim that acollectivegroupcanbeartheresponsibilityforwrongsthatcannotbeattributedto individual actions and that such regimes have the capability to performactions.

In addition to taking the political regime as the primary addressee,resistantdisobediencealsotakesthosewhooccupypoliticalofficesassecondaryaddressees.Ishallusetheterm‘thepoliticallypowerful’torefertothisgroup.Itis not clear in the abstract whether disobedients should treat the politicallypowerfulasapassiveaudience(liketheaddressee inexpressivedisobedience)oranactiveaudience(liketheaudienceincommunicativedisobedience).Thereis no definite answer to this question in the abstract because it requiresbackgroundinformationaboutthenatureofthepoliticallypowerfulinparticularcircumstances.

The differentiation between the political regime and the politicallypowerful indicates one basic feature of resistant disobedience: resistantdisobedience itself includessetsof combinations in termsof theunilateralandbilateralrelationship Ihavearticulated.Therefore,under thenameofresistantdisobedience,theremightbeavarietyofsubtypeswhichIdonotinvestigateinthisDissertation.

Severaladditionalfeaturesofresistantdisobedienceshouldbementioned.First, identifying to what degree the political regime has the capability torespondtodisobedients’concernsandinwhatwayitmightrespondisessentialfor resistant disobedience because this determines the degree to which theattitudetowardsthepoliticalregimebyresistantdisobedientsisantagonistic.Ifthe capability of responding to fundamental disagreement within the political

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regime ishigher, then the antagonistic attitude shouldbe less strong, andviceversa.Therefore,wecansaythatthispoliticalcapabilitydeterminesthedegreetowhich the attitude towards the political regime by resistant disobedients isantagonistic. The disobedients’ attitude also determines whether therelationshipbetweenresistantdisobedientsandthepoliticalregimeisbilateralorunilateral. Thus,thecapacitytorespondandtheresultantactiondeterminewhether resistant disobedients should treat the political regime as anautonomousandresponsibleagent.

Second, the relationship between disobedients and the politicallypowerfulmight be either unilateral or bilateral. Decidingwhich it is creates adecision point within resistant disobedience with respect to how to treat thepolitically powerful in society. As with the previous discussion of theantagonistic attitude towards the political regime, resistant disobedients mayalso hold the same attitude towards the politically powerful. An antagonisticattitude towards the politically powerful involves a complex combination offactors. I cannot address this topic now but can only indicate that such anattitude would determine, at least partly, how cooperation between thepoliticallypowerfulandresistantdisobedientswoulddevelopintermsofdealingwithinjustice.Forexample,ifthepoliticallypowerfularedeemedtobecapableof sincere communication, the resistant disobedients would rule out someintensivemethodsofdisobediencebecausetheuseofsuchmethodscouldblockfuture conversational possibilities; similarly, regarding officials as potentialpartners in future communications would result in constraints on the use ofpotentially destructive forces by resistant disobedients. On the other hand,takingupaunilateral relationshipcould lead toa radical formofdisobedienceand unleash destructive forces. When discussing the role of the principle ofnonviolence,thisdecisionpointwillbecomemoresignificant.

Thirdly, resistant disobedients do not necessarily communicate withothermembersofsocietywhoarepoliticallypowerful.Thismeansthatresistantdisobediencecanbeorganizedandperformedbyasmall,eliteandclosedgroup.Thisisverycommonwhenresistanceisorganizedinaquasi-militantformorasasecretrebellion.

Byexamining the two-layer relationshipbetween resistantdisobedientsand the addressees, we can conceptualize four subtypes of resistantdisobedience.

Figure11:TypesofResistantDisobedience

RelationshipwithThePoliticalRegimeUnilateral Bilateral

RelationshipwithThePoliticallyPowerful

Unilateral Unilateral/Unilateral Unilateral/Bilateral

Bilateral Bilateral/Unilateral Bilateral/Bilateral

Withthistypologyinplace,Ishallexplicatetheconceptualdifferencebetweenresistantandcommunicativedisobedience.

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Communicative disobedience assumes onlyone layerof audience in thebilateral relationship including all members of society, but resistantdisobedienceassumestwolayersofaudienceintherelationship,makingitmorecomplicatedinnature.(SeethetableaboveinFigure2.)56

A bilateral relationship assumes equality between the disobedients andtheaudienceincommunicativedisobedience,whiletherelationshipinresistantdisobedience isasymmetric in the sense that the political regime oversees thecoercive mechanisms of social control, including the police, law enforcement,and military force, whereas disobedients usually have no control of similarcoercivemechanisms. This asymmetric relationship shapes theways inwhichresistantactionscanbeadoptedbyresistantdisobedientsandalsoplaysaroleinsituatingtheprincipleofnonviolenceintheresistantconception.

Communicative disobedience is not necessarily collective (see Section1.2.3 inChapterThree)butresistantdisobediencemustbecollective.Thetwo-layerrelationshipmakesresistantdisobediencefacethequestionofhowtoviewthe political regime as a collective agent that is responsible for injustice. Thisquestionalsotriggerstheneedfororganizingmultipleactionsandagentswithinresistantdisobedience.Communicativedisobedienceneednottakeintoaccountissuesrelevanttocollectiveactions(suchasthedecisionmakingprocessandtheproblemofcoordination),butresistantdisobediencemustconsidertheseissues.Thecollectivenatureofresistantdisobedienceisoneofitskeyfeatures.

Two dimensions of the collective nature of resistant disobedience arementionedhere.Thefirstdimensionofcollectivity is that thetwo layersof therelationshipposeaquestionforresistantdisobedients:howshoulddisobedientsinteract with thosewho occupy offices in the political regime but are distinctfrom the regime itself? Resistant disobediencemust deal with the problem ofcollectivity within the political regime: resistant disobedients considerinteraction between the individual and collective levels of the regime. Theseconddimensionofcollectivityemergeswithinthegroupofdisobedients.Whenresistant disobedience appears as a social movement, as it usually does,attractingincreasingnumbersofmembersofsocietytoparticipate,theproblemof collectivity becomes urgent; this urgency arises because large numbers ofdisobedientscreateproblemsofcooperationandcoordination.

Thetwo-layerrelationshipmakesinteractionsbetweendisobedientsandaddressees more complicated and dynamic in various ways. Theories ofcollective action are required to develop a deeper understanding of howresistantdisobedienceworksingeneralandhowittargetsthepoliticalregimeinparticular.Inadditiontothis,myanalysisalsopavesthewayforbuildingfurtherconceptual tools to understand how resistant disobedience might transformfromonesubtypetoanother.Forexample,inaverysimplifiedworlditmightbereasonabletoassumethatdisobedientscouldadoptabilateralrelationshipwiththepoliticalregimeandabilateralrelationshipwiththepoliticallypowerful.We

56 The fact that all members of society are communicative disobedience’s audience entails the impossibility of a limited version of a communicative conception of disobedience. Such a conception must be general in the sense that disobedients do not distinguish between the audience and non-audience.

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could test whether this assumption is empirically correct or not. Myconceptualizationoftypesofresistantdisobediencecanprovideabasictheoryofthe relationship between expectations of political stability and mutual trustamongmembersofsociety.

Taking the political regime as the primary addressee raises variousquestionsofcollectivity.Isthepoliticalregimemerelyacollectionofindividuals,whoactivelyparticipate ingovernance?Orcansucharegimebeconsideredasan independent agent? Positing a two-layer relationship facilitates theinvestigation of collective action in the field of disobedience. Theories ofdisobediencehavenot investigatedthistopic,but JohnRawls’sdiscussioninTJcanserveasabridgebetweenpoliticalphilosophyandphilosophyofaction.Inthatdiscussion,Rawlsconsidersthedestructiveforceofcivildisobedience.

Unlike communicative disobedience, which embraces the principle ofnonviolence as the background condition for having a genuine and successfulcommunication, resistant disobedience takes a pragmatic view toward theprinciple of nonviolence. (See 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 in Chapter Three.) The politicalcapabilityoftheregimetoabsorbdissentdetermineshowresistantdisobedientstreatthepoliticalregimeoftheirsociety.

Resistant disobedience also has the potential to transform into moreradical forms of action that would overthrow the political regime. Whetherresistantdisobediencewill becomeanextreme formofpolitical action suchasrevolutiondependsonthedisobedients’attitudetowardsthelegalandpoliticalsystemandthepoliticalcapabilitytorespondtofundamentaldisagreements inthepoliticalcommunity.

2.3.2.TheImperativeForceGeneratedbyResistantDisobedienceImperative force is the main force intentionally generated by resistant

disobedience. The term ‘imperative’ should be understood to be the idea thatdisobedientscommandtheiraddressees toact inacertainway.Whatresistantdisobedients express is neithermerely a request nor awish but instead is anorderbackedbyathreat.57Disobedientsthreatentotakeactionsthatwillmakethings worse for their addressees. Although resistant disobedients and theiraddresseesarenotsituatedinahierarchicalrelationship,resistantdisobedientsintentionallyattempttooccupyanormativelysuperiorpositioninordertoissueanordertotheiraddressees.Forexample,disobedientsengagedinmassprotestcan claim to express popular sovereignty and hence the moral authority torequirethepoliticalregimeorofficialstoactinacertaindirection.

Another point about imperative force is that disobedience is for thepurpose of inducing the addressees to perform a certain action. Successfulperformance of the disobedient action results in uptake of the commandexpressed by resistant disobedience. So, achieving successful resistant

57 (“As a first formulation, let us say that whether someone makes a threat against Q’s doing an action or an offer to Q to do the action depends on how the consequence he says he will bring about changes the consequences of Q’s action from what they would have been in the normal or natural or expected course of events. If it makes the consequences of Q’s action worse than they would have been in the normal and expected course of events, it is a threat; if it makes the consequences better, it is an offer.”) See Robert Nozick, “Coercion,” p. 447.

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disobediencerequiresthatthedisobedientssecuretheuptakeoftheircommandthrough expression of the undesirable consequence that will occur absentcompliance.Astrike isonemechanismthatcangenerate imperative force.Thepointhereisnotaboutwhichformofdisobediencecangeneratetheimperativeforce but how resistant disobedience can secure uptake and convey thethreatenedconsequenceinordertoinfluencetheaddressees’actions.

The perlocutionary effect accompanied by resistant disobedience iscoercive in nature: for example, resistant disobedience might create fear thatprovidesamotiveforcompliancebytargetedofficials.Althoughperlocutionaryeffect might not be successfully achieved, resistant disobedience aims tomotivate addressees to obey by performing disobedience that puts theaddresseesonnoticeofathreat.

The commanding force and coercive nature of perlocutionary effect inresistantdisobediencecanbeillustratedbythreeexamples:(1)themovieSelma,(2) the caseof “TankMan” in the1989protest inChina, and (3)Gandhi’s SaltMarchinIndia.

InthefictionalizedversionofhistoricaleventsinthemovieSelma,Rev.Dr.MartinLutherKing,Jr.learnsthatawhiteman,ReverendJamesReeb,waskilledby white supremacists, and initiates a telephone conversation with PresidentLyndonJohnson.58Inthemovie,Dr.Kingsays,“NowIamgladtohearthatyoucalledReverendReeb’swidow, sir.That isvery fineand it is right. I onlywishJimmieLee Jackson’s familywouldhave received the same consideration fromtheirPresident.Wewon’tsitidlewhileyouwaitanotheryearortwotosendthisbill [TheVotingRightAct]upatyour leisure.Thatshouldbeclearbynow.Wewillcontinuetodemonstrateuntilyoutakeaction,Sir.AndifourPresidentwon’tprotectourrights,wewilltakethisfighttocourt.” WhileDr.Kingadoptedthepeaceful march to protest the denial of black people’s voting rights, hisconversation conveyed imperative force: the President must make the VotingRights Act an immediate priority.What is implied in this conversation is thatundesirable consequenceswould follow if thePresident refuses to take action.ThedesiredperlocutionaryeffectinthiscaseisthatthePresidenttakesactionstoensurethepassageoftheVotingRightsAct.

Thecaseof“TankMan”providesanotherexampleofcommandingforce.When citizens gathered in Tiananmen Square in China to protest in favor ofdemocracy,theChineseCommunistPartybroughtinarowoftankstodisperseacrowdofangryprotesters.Onemansteppedoutinfrontofthetanksinordertostopthem.Thismanwasunidentifiedandtherefore,theWesternmediasimply

58 To be clear the movie Selma is criticized for incorrectly representing President Johnson as not wanting to advance the Civil Rights Act and implicitly agreeing to wiretap Dr. King’s personal conversations. See Joseph A. Califano Jr., “The Movie ‘Selma’ has a glaring flaw,” The Washington Post, 2014/12/26. (https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-movie-selma-has-a-glaring-historical-inaccuracy/2014/12/26/70ad3ea2-8aa4-11e4-a085-34e9b9f09a58_story.html?utm_term=.82ce795e8676) and David Kaiser, “Why You Should Care That Selma Gets LBJ Wrong,” in Time, 2015/01/09 (http://time.com/3658593/selma-lbj-history/). But Scott Calonico in the Atlantic provides a different view. See Scott Calonico, “What LBJ Really Said About Selma”, in The Atlantic, 2015/03/05. (http://www.theatlantic.com/video/index/386962/what-lbj-really-said-about-selma/)

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called him “Tank Man.” The Tank Man’s action, standing alone, was purelynonviolent and in the context of protesting the tanks’ movement, his actioncreatedanimperativeforceforthetankdrivers—tostoptheirtanks—withtheintended perlocutionary effect of inducing this behavior via the tank drivers’realizationthatthetankscannotmovewithoutrunningoverTankMan.

(Source:Wikipedia.PhotobyJeffWideneroftheAssociatedPress)59

ThefinalexampleisthecaseoftheSaltMarchledbyMohandasGandhi.TheSaltMarchwasanonviolentprotestagainst theBritishsaltmonopolyandsalttax.Gandhiinitiateda24-day,240mileslongmarchfromhisashramtothecoastal town of Dandi along with a group of specially-chosen followers. UponreachingDandi,Gandhibrokethesaltlawsbymakingsalt,therebysettingoffanation-wide salt-making civil disobedience campaign. Themarch was a directactionagainstthesalttaxandthelawprohibitingtheproductionofsaltoutsideofBritish-authorizedsalt-makingoperations.ThepointoftheSaltMarchandthesubsequent civildisobediencecampaignwasnotonly to communicate that thesalt tax andmonopolywere unfair but also to inspire the people of India andexemplifytheirwilltogainindependencefromGreatBritain.Theforcecreatedby the Salt March was a command—stop the tax and monopoly—and theperlocutionary effect was generated by demonstrating the willingness of thecountlessnumberoffollowerswhosupportedtheSaltMarchandparticipatedinthesubsequentcivildisobediencecampaign.60

These three cases show that the illocutionary force createdby resistantdisobedience is imperative; resistantdisobedience is addressed to thepoliticalregimeorthepoliticallypowerfulandrequiresthemtoactinacertainway.

Imperative forceandperlocutionaryeffect are connected in threeways.First, the imperative forceof resistantdisobedience aims toproduce actionbytheaddressees.Unlikeexpressivedisobediencewhich involvesdisclosingone’s

59 Jeff Widener’s biography can be found in Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeff_Widener ). This digitalized picture is taken from Wikipedia. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Tianasquare.jpg ) 60 See William L. Shirer, Gandhi: A Memoir, Ch. 7, Simon & Schuster Press, 1980.

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mentalstates,emotions,orfeelings,resistantdisobedienceneednotdisclosetheinner states of the disobedient. Nor does resistant disobedience require non-coercivecommunication.

Second, the performance of disobedience is not by itself sufficient tosecure the action-inducing perlocutionary effect. In order to induce theaddressee to perform some action, resistant disobedience must ensure thatdamaging consequences would follow if the content of the command is notsatisfied.Resistantdisobedientsmustsecureuptakeof the likelyconsequencesoffailuretosatisfythecommandconveyedbydisobedience.

Third, resistant disobedience intentionally affects addressee’s actions.Resistantdisobediencemaysuccessfully invokecertainemotional responses inaddressees or change the addressees’ beliefs, but this is not the mainperlocutionaryeffectsoughtbyresistantdisobedients.Themaindesiredeffectistosuccessfullydirect theaddressee’sactions.Affecting theaddressees’ feelingsor thoughts can be the means to secure compliance but it is not a necessarycomponentoftheperlocutionaryeffectthatistheaimofresistantdisobedience.

2.4.AComparisonoftheThreeConceptionsofDisobedienceNow that the picture of these three conceptions of disobedience is

complete,acomparisoncanbefoundinFigure12.Whilethiscomparisonisnotcomprehensive, it provides a basic framework for understanding howdisobedience can vary, for instance, in the relationship between disobedientsand addressees, the type of force disobedients intentionally create, and theeffectsimposedupontheaddressees.

Figure12:AComparisonoftheForcesCreatedbyDisobedience

Conception AssumedRelationship

IllocutionaryForce

InvitationofaResponse

PerlocutionaryEffect

NatureofPerlocutionary

Effect

ExpressiveDisobedience

UnilateralRelationship

DisclosingForce

NotNecessary

Ontheaddressee’sfeelings

CoerciveOR

Persuasive

CommunicativeDisobedience

BilateralRelationship

WarningForce Necessary

Ontheaddressee’sthoughts

Non-CoerciveAND

Persuasive

ResistantDisobedience

TwoLayersof

Relationship

ImperativeForce Necessary

Ontheaddressee’sactions

Coercive

My illustration of the three conceptions of disobedience creates a newlens for analyzing thenatureof civil disobedience. For instance, looking at theassumed relationship in conjunctionwith the force generated by disobediencerevealshowdisobedientsframetherelationshipbetweenthemselvesandthoseto whom they express, communicate, and resist. This new lens enables us tounderstandthat thewaythatdisobedientsconceiveof their treatmentofothermembersofsocietyisacriticalfactorindeterminingthenatureofdisobedience.Italsoopensupanewcontext inwhich tostudydisobediencebyapplying theconceptualtoolsofspeechacttheorytocivildisobedience.

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Whetheractionsarepeacefulandnonviolentorviolentandchaoticisnottheonlyfactorthatdeterminesthenatureofcivildisobedience;evenapeacefulmarchcanbeacaseofresistantdisobediencebecauseoftheforceitgenerates.Forexample,ItaketheSelma-MontgomeryMarchledbyDr.Kingtobeacaseofresistantdisobediencebecausethisactofdisobediencehasaverycleargoal,thatis, to pressure President Lyndon B. Johnson to obtain passage of the VotingRights Act. Although nonviolence is of critical importance in disobedience,analyzing the relationship and force generated by disobedience gives usconceptualtoolstoexplaindisobedienceinamoredynamicway.

Oneimplicationofmyanalysisisthattheprincipleofnonviolenceisnotanecessary element of the concept of civil disobedience. Only communicativedisobediencetakestheprincipleofnonviolenceasanintrinsiccomponent.Oncetheconceptualconnectionbetweennonviolenceandcivildisobediencehasbeensevered, the role of the principle of nonviolence can be re-situated andcontextualized. My analysis situates the principle of nonviolence in thediscussionof thescopeofpermissibleactions.ThenextSectiondealswith thisissue.

3.TheScopeofPermissibleActionsWithinThreeConceptions

This Section focuses on the scope of permissible actions—that is, whatactionsarepermitted in thecourseofdisobedience.Todealwith thisquestionappropriately,IshallexplaintheideaofviolentactionandprovideatypologyofviolentdisobedienceinSubsection3.1.ThenIwillillustratehoweachconceptionofdisobediencespecifiesthescopeofpermissibleactionsinSubsection3.2.

3.1.ANoteontheIdeaofNonviolencebeforeInvestigatingthePermissibleActionswithinThreeConceptionsofDisobedienceThequestionofpermissibleactionsrequiresapreliminaryunderstanding

ofviolentactions.Theideaofnonviolenceisusedinvariouswaysinthecontextof civil disobedience. For example John Rawls in TJ made a significantcontribution to understanding the relationshipbetween civil disobedience andnonviolence. (See Section 3.1 in Chapter Two.) Some scholars havementioned“restrained” disobedience, identifying civil disobedience as an action of self-governancewithoutaggression.61Andsometheoristsarguethatviolence isnotconceptuallyincompatiblewithcivildisobedience.Giventherangeofpositions,there is conceptual space for “violent disobedience” but an open question of

61 Both David Lefkowitz and Kimberley Brownlee have this tendency. Brownlee refutes Rawls’s strategy of making nonviolence part of the definition of civil disobedience and sees the principle of nonviolence more as a practically preferable form of action. See Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction- The Case for Civil Disobedience, pp. 21-24 (Oxford University Press).

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whether violent disobedience is ever justifiable and if it is, under whatcircumstances.62

The position I take is that the question of whether violence isincompatiblewithcivildisobedienceisonewhichoughttobesituatedwithintheconception of disobedience itself. Therefore, the question becomes: whichconception or conceptions of civil disobedience embraces the principle ofnonviolenceasaninherentfeatureoftheconception?Apriorquestionconcernsthenatureofviolenceandviolentactions.Oncewehaveanaccountofviolence,wecananalyzewhatpositionviolenceholdsineachofthethreeconceptions.

Myaimistogiveatypologyofviolentaction.Byprovidingthistypologyofviolence, Ibelieve thatapictureaboutviolenceandnonviolence comes intosharper focus. I use John Morreall’s account of violence to identify the corefeature of violent actions as an intentional effort of “getting at persons”—aphrase that is explainedbelow. Then, Iwill demonstrate the components thatconstitute a violent action. Finally, regarding civil disobedience, I drawabasictypologyofviolentactionsthatcanbeusedinthecourseofdisobedience.

3.1.1.JohnMorreall’sDefinitionofViolenceIn The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience, John Morreall explores

thenatureofviolencebydifferentiating“todoviolencetoaperson”and“todoviolencetoathing.”63(Morreall,1976:37)Thefundamentalnatureofviolenceisthat“actsofviolencearealwaysactswhich‘getat’persons.”(Morreall,1976:37)Actions can get at persons by creating physical force directly against them. Aclassic example is to cause bodily injury by striking the personwith a fist. Inadditiontophysical force,violencecanalsobedonebycreatinganon-physicalforce to diminish someone’s autonomy, to coerce someone’s action, or todisrespectsomeone’srighttoownandcontrolproperty.(Morreall,1976:38)

BasedonMorreall’saccountofthenatureofviolencewehavethreekindsof violent actions that ‘get at’ persons. The first kind is actions that causeimmediatebodilyinjuryordeath.The secondkind is actions thatdiminishone’sautonomythroughcoercion.Thethirdkindisactionsthatdisrespectone’srighttoown and control property. These three kinds of violent actions could beconsideredastheconceptofviolenceinabroadsense,buttheydonot includeactionsthatdegrade(orundermine)one’sdignity.Forexample,hatespeechandhumiliating a specific person or a particular group is also conventionallyconsideredakindofverbalviolence,butisnotincludedinthethreetypes.

ThefollowingFigureexplainsMorreall’sideaofviolence.

62 John Morreal, “The Justifiability of Violent Civil Disobedience,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 35-47 (1976). 63 Id.

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Figure13:Morreall'sIdeaofViolenceandCorrespondingPatternsofActions

TypesofViolence

Type1:CausedBodily

Injures

Type2:DiminishedAutonomy

Type3:DisrespectedProperty

UnexplainedType:Deteriorating

PatternsofActions Killing/assaulting

Kidnapping/ex-tortion/

blackmailing/threats

Damagingprivate(orpublic)property/trespassing/

Theft

Humiliating/cursing/

disgracing/verbalabuse/bullying

3.1.2.TheComponentsofAViolentAction

Morreall’sworkleadstoseveralpointswithintheideaofviolence.First, violence must be done via action. For this reason, I do not

distinguish the violence from violent actions inmy discussion. Furthermore, Itake the categories of violent actions and nonviolent actions as mutuallyexclusiveandexhaustive:allactionsareviolentornonviolentandnoactionsareboth.Hence,byidentifyingthecharacteristicsofviolentactions,wealsoidentifythecharacteristicsthatnonviolentactionslack.

Second,violentactionscangenerateforceagainstindividualpersonsandproperty directly via physical contact or indirectly by non-physical contact.Regardingtheforceagainstsomeone’sbody,thereisacloseconnectionbetweenviolentactionandcoerciveaction.Whileviolenceandcoercionareconceptuallydifferent,theyoverlapinmanycases.Forexample,theactofkidnappingisbothviolent and coercive, but the act of damaging someone’s property neednot becoercive. Coercion aims at diminishing someone’s freedom and responsibility.Therefore,Type2violenceinFigure13overlapswithcoercion.64

Third, violent actionsmust be intentional in the sense that a harm to apersonorpropertymustbepartofanagent’sactualintention.Apersonnotonlyhasthe intentionofdoinganaction,X,butalsoapurposeofcreatingan injuryvia X-ing. So identifying X as a violent action entails that an agent intends aharmfulresultcausedbyX-ing.Whilethispointmaybedebatable,itexcludesthepossibilitythatanactionthatinadvertentlycausesharmcanbeaviolentaction.

Therefore,anagent’sintentiontocauseharmisaconstituentelementofaviolent action. For the purpose of this discussion, I will ignore discussions inphilosophyofactionaboutthenatureofintentionalityitself.However,thereisasignificant controversy in civil disobedience: should actionswhich foreseeablycause collateral damage be treated as the equivalent of violent action for thepurposes of analyzing justifiable civil disobedience? For example, a sit-in isusuallyconsiderednonviolent.Butifasit-inforeseeablypreventstheprovision

64 The modern articulation of coercion can be traced back to Robert Nozick’s discussion of coercion. He provides a list of necessary and sufficient conditions to judge the proposition that one coerces another. I shall ignore the complicated discussion of the idea and components of coercion because it is not relevant to the current topic in this Dissertation. Robert Nozick, “Coercion,” in Philosophy, Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton White (eds.), New York: St. Martin's Press, 440–472.

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ofambulanceservicetoasickorinjuredperson,thequestionariseswhetherthesit-inshouldbetreatedasnonviolent.Theideaofintentionalityisdistinctfromthenotionofforeseeability;foreseeabilitydoesnotentailintentionality.Iargue,the intentionality of violence includes three types of subjective attitudes. Firstagentsmustbelievethattheiractioniscapableofharmingothers.Second,agentsmustbelievethatharmwillprobablyresultfromtheiraction.Third,agentsmustwant or desire the harm to occur. The idea of foreseeability lacks the thirdattitude,whichdistinguishesforeseeabilityfromintentionality.

Based on these points, we can provide an operational definition of“violentaction.”AviolentactionisanintentionalactionperformedbyanagentwhoseintentionistodoXandtocreateaforce,eitheragainstanotherpersonorpropertybelonging to someoneelse for thepurposeof causingbodily injuries,damaging property, or depriving someone of a moral entitlement includingautonomyordignity.

Figure14explainsthisdefinition.Figure14:BasicComponentsofAViolentAction

3.1.3.ATypologyofViolentActionsThatMightbeAdoptedinthe

CourseofDisobedienceBasedonmyideaofviolentaction,wecanprovideatypologyofviolent

disobedience.Violentdisobediencecanbeclassifiedasoneofthefollowingfivetypes.

TypeA involvesusing lethalactionthataimstocausedeath.Oneclassicpattern is assassination. Type A usually takes the form of an action directlycausinglossoflifeorunrecoverablebodilyinjuries.Itshouldbenotedthatself-immolationisanotherkindofviolentdisobedienceunderthiscategorybecausesuchanactionalsocausesthelossoflifebut“thevictim”isnotanothermemberof societybut is instead thedisobedient. Suicidebombingaimsat thedeathorinjuryofotherswith the foreseeableor intended consequence that the suicidebomberwillalsoperish.TypeAalsoincludestwootherpatternsofactions.Oneis actions that are intended to cause death but fail to do so. The actions of

AViolentAction

Intentionality

Actionshavingresultsor

consequences

Creatingforces

Physical

Causingbodlyharm

Coercingone'sphysicalmove

Non-Physical

Diminishingone'sautonomy

Deteriorateone'smoralentitlement

Againstpersonsorproperty

Persons

Naturalpersons

Legalpersons

Properties

Privatelyowned

Publicfacilities

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actuallycausingdeathandintendingtocausedeatharebothincludedinTypeA.Another pattern of action in Type A ismayhem—actions that aim at grievousbodilyinjurythatmightresultindeath.

I shallexplicateeachconception’spositionconnectedwithTypeA.Onlyexpressive disobedience allows for Type A violence and it does this in verylimitedcircumstances.TheothertwoconceptionsexcludeTypeAascomponentsof justifiabledisobedience. Thereasons for theseconclusionsarepresented inthenextsection.TypeAcanbecoerciveornon-coercive,dependingonthewayinwhichdisobedienceisactuallyperformed.

TypeB isnon-lethal action that causesbodily injuries.FormsofTypeBincludehittingandotherformsofbatterythatfallshortofmayhem.UnlikeTypeA, Type B is usually accompanied by some degree of coercion although thedegreemightbemild.

TypeCisactionthatcancauseharmstointangibleinterests.Forexampledefamation andhumiliation are formsofTypeC. This type also includes someforms of “electronic disobedience.” The term electronic disobedience refers toanytypeofdisobedienceinwhichthedisobedientsuseelectronictechnologyasawaytoperformdisobedience.OnefamiliarformofelectronicdisobedienceisaDenial-of-Serviceattack(DoS),makingcomputersorInternetserviceunavailableto users.While DoS is more like Type D, damaging property, some electronicdisobedience is more like Type C. For example to humiliate someone on theInternet is relevantly similar to in-person humiliation. Another example ofcategoryCiswebsitedefacement.

TypeDisactionthatcausessomedamagetoproperty.VandalismwouldbeanexampleofTypeD.

Type E is the violation of autonomy through coercion. Threats,blackmailing,andextortionareexamplesofTypeE.

The following Figure illustrates these five types of violent actions indisobedience.

Figure15:APreliminaryTypologyofViolentActionsintheCourseofDisobedience

TypesLethalActions

A

Non-LethalActions

B

HarmstoOne’sIntangibleInterests

C

DamagestoOne’s

PropertyD

DiminishOne’sAutono-myE

CoreElements

Causinglossoflifeorseriousinjuries

Causingbodyinjuries(serious/mild)

InfringementofOne’snon-physical

interestsorentitlements

CausingDamageto

One’sPropertyormakeitmalfunction-

ing

InfluenceonOne’sAutonomyinMakingaDecision

PossiblePatterns

Killing,assassination,manslaughter

Assault,hitting

Libel,slander,humiliation

Vandalizedactions,graffiti,malfunctioningone’spropertye.g.cyberattack

Threats,blackmail,extortion

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3.2.ThePermissibleActionsThatCouldbeAdoptedinEachConceptionSection3.1providedtheframeworkforunderstandingtheideaofviolent

disobedience. Now I examine the scope of permissible actions for eachconception of disobedience. This question of scope can be broken down intothree subquestionsThe first subquestion asks whether violent actions areconsistentwiththerelationshipthatexistsbetweendisobedientsandaddressee.Thesecondsubquestionconcernstheroleoftheprincipleofnonviolencewithineachconception,andthethirdsubquestionfocusesonthescopeofviolentactionthatispermittedbyeachconception.

3.2.1.TheScopeofPermissibleActioninExpressiveDisobedienceTo consider the scope of permissible action in expressive disobedience,

onestartingpointistotakeintoaccounttheunilateralrelationshipbetweenthedisobedientsandtheaddresseetoseewhetheritwouldexcludeviolentactions

AsIhaveexplained,expressionisnotidenticaltocommunicationinthatexpressiondoesnothavetotaketheaddresseeintoaccount,exceptasawitnesstoanexpressiveact.Peoplecanexpresstheirpointsofviewinavarietyofwaysbyusingverbalexpressions,gesturing,andphysicalactionswithoutconsideringwhethertheaddresseeiscapableofresponding.Itisnotuncommonforpeopletousevariousformsofviolencetoexpresstheiranger,emotions,andideas.Themain force generated by such expression is to make an impact on others’perceptionsincludingtheirattitudes,normativecommitments,oremotionsandso forth. Expressive disobedience permits the conceptual possibility of violentactions because such actions can express disobedients’ feelings, attitudes, andideas.

The unilateral relationship that characterizes expressive disobediencefunctions as a filter determining which types of action are acceptable. Thisunilateral relationship does not allow all types of violent actions to beconsideredappropriatemeansinthecourseofdisobediencebecausetheaimofdisobedientsistocreateasuccessfulexpression.

Success in expression assumes that what is expressed can be correctlyperceived (whether or not the correct perception actually occurs) and thisfurther requires that expressive disobedients consider how the addresseeperceivesdisobedience.Expressivedisobedientsmustconsidertheiraddressee’scapabilitytounderstandtheirexpressionandtheyneedtomaintainconditionsthat enable recipients to perceive what is expressed. These assumptionsconstitute the minimal condition for conducting successful expressivedisobedience,whichIcalltheconditionofaddressee’sperception.

Thisconditionfiltersoutthetypesofviolentactionsthatareinconsistentwith expressive disobedience. First, it filters out Type A, the lethal actions,because this typewill notmeet the condition of addressee’s perception. Usinglethalactionandintentionallycausingdeathbyperformingdisobedienceentailsdestroyingtheaddresseeasapersoncapableofreceivingandunderstandingthemessage.Whenthedisobedientsadoptlethalactions,theynolongertakethosewhoarekilledorseriouslyinjuredastheaddresseebuttreatthemasthemeans

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to express their feelings.This is inconsistentwith the conditionof addressee’sperception.65Solethalactionsareinconsistentwithexpressivedisobedience.

While expressive disobedience rejects lethal actions as permissible, itdoesallowTypeB,non-lethalbutintentionalactsthatcausephysicalharms,aspermissibleinsofarastheconditionoftheaddressee’sperceptionisnotviolatedbythenon-lethalact.Tobeclear,Iamnotsayingthatnon-lethalactionsshouldbe considered as available methods for expressive disobedients, all thingsconsidered.Iamsayingthataddressescancorrectlyperceivewhatdisobedientsaimtoexpressthroughtheiruseofviolentbutnon-lethalactions.Thisdoesnotentail that all non-lethal actions are justifiable, but it reveals the fact thatexpressivedisobediencecanleadtobrutalconflictifthereisnootherconstraintcondition for choosing the forms of disobedience. The imposition of anadditionalconstraintconditionisthenexttopicthatIdiscuss.

Expressivedisobediencemightadoptnon-lethalactionsintwoways.Thefirstwayfocusesonusingsomemembersofsocietyasthemeansofexpressiondirectedatothers.Thesecondwayaimsatcausingsufferingbytheaddresseesofdisobedience.Iexamineeachofthetwowaysinturn.

First, expressive disobediencemight treat somemembers of society asthe means for expressing disobedients’ message to others. This version ofexpressivedisobediencedoesnottakeallmembersofsocietyastheaddresseeofdisobedience,but insteadaddressessomemembers.Thisversionofexpressivedisobediencecanleadtopolarizationamongmembersbecauseitdistinguishesbetweenmembersasaddresseesandmembersusedforexpression,resultinginthedenigrationordisrespectofsomeofthem

Second,expressivedisobediencemight treat theaddresseeas the targetof non-lethal actions with the aim of inflicting suffering on the addressee forexpressive reasons.Forexample theexpressivedisobedientsmightbelieve theaddressee should feel the same pain as those who have suffered from unjustactionsbythecurrentregime.Letustakeonehypotheticalexample.Assumethecountry X maintains whipping as a punishment and members of societychallengethispunishmentonthegroundsthatitviolateshumandignity.Thesemembersofsocietyhadappealedtothemajoritybutthemajorityintentionallyignoredthisissue,andthepoliticalpartieschoosenottocorrecttheviolationofhumanrightsforpoliticalreasons.Disobedients,aimingtocommunicatetothosein power that whipping is dehumanizing, whip a political official who hasauthoritytoabolishthecaninglawbutwholackssympathyforthosewhohavebeenwhippedandwho fails tounderstand theviolationofhumandignity thatwhippingcreates.Inthisscenariothewhippedofficialisboththeaddresseeandalsothetargetofnon-lethalforce.Thepointofthisexampleisnottojustifytheuse of non-lethal actions but instead to explain why the nature of expressivedisobedience is consistent with non-lethal actions. Whether such actions aremorallypermissible,allthingsconsidered,isaseparatequestion.

65 There is one exception in lethal actions. An action of self-immolation can be allowed to be adopted in expressive disobedience because such an action does not aim to get other persons seriously injured.

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Theanalysisaboveshowsthatexpressivedisobedienceisconsistentwithnon-lethalforce.Thisraisesaquestionwithrespecttotheroleoftheprincipleofnonviolenceforexpressivedisobedience.This formofdisobediencecan leadtoviolence unless the fully-specified conception of expressive disobedienceexplicitlyincorporatesnormativeprinciplesthatdefinethescopeofpermissibleactions. For example, the conception might incorporate a principle ofproportionality that would rule out non-lethal force unless such force was areasonableresponsetoagraveevil.Ortheconceptionmightincludeaprincipleof equality that rules out treating somemembers of society as themeans forcommunicatingtoothermembers.

The same analysis also applies to three other types of violent actions:injurytointangibleinterestssuchasprivacyorreputation;injuriestoproperty;and violations of autonomy. The condition of the addressee’s perception onlyexcludes the permissibility of lethal actions which render expression to theaddresseeimpossible.

Whileviolenceisnotexcludedbythenatureofexpressivedisobedience,nonviolent disobedience usually is practically preferable for tactical reasons.Nonviolent expressive disobedience is more likely to be effective than violentexpression.

EricaChenoweth’srecentworkinpoliticalscienceaddressesthequestionofwhethernonviolenceismoreeffectivethanviolence.66Thisworksuggeststhatusingnonviolentmethodsismoreeffectivethanusingviolentmethodsbecausenonviolentmethodsareassociatedwithlower“barriers”todisobedientaction.Inthiscontext,a“barrier”isanobstacletoorcostofdisobedience.Onekindofbarrierisphysical.Forexample,violentdisobediencemayimposeacostintheformofriskofseriousinjurybythedisobedient.67Similarly,nonviolentdisobediencemayfacelowercognitivebarriersthanviolentdisobediencebecause“theparticipantsinnonviolentactiondonothavetooverridethemanycognitiveinhibitorstherearetooffenseofviolenceinthetypicalhumanbrain.”68

These two reasons are plausible but they do not establish a necessaryconnectionbetweendisobedienceandnonviolence. Instead, thesearepracticalconsiderations for disobedients. Such considerations are especially salient tocollective disobedient action. Because nonviolent disobedience faces lowerbarriers,itismorelikelytoattractgreaternumbersofmembersofsocietytojoina disobedience movement. Expressive disobedience can be performed via anindividual agent or via a group of agents. In the case of group expressivedisobedience, it may be the case that physical barriers only apply to somedisobedients.Forexample,inthepreviouscaseofwhipping,thephysicalbarrierofusingawhiponlyapplies tosomedisobedientswhileothersmightbear thecognitivecostassociatedwithcausingphysicalharmtoanotherhumanbeing.If

66 See Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict, Columbia University Press, 2011. 67 Chenoweth mentions four kinds of barriers: (1) physical, (2) commitment, (3) informational, and (4) cognitive. See Erica Chenoweth’s speech at Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 2015/09/09. (http://fordschool.umich.edu/video/2015/erica-chenoweth-why-civil-nonviolent-resistance-works ) 68 Id.

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expressivedisobediencetakestheformofcollectivedisobedience(seeSectionof1.2.3 in Chapter Three), these barriers become significant considerations fordisobedients’ determination as to which tactics will achieve successfuldisobedience.For this reason, the lowerbarrierofphysical trainingandmoralcognition associated with nonviolent disobedience becomes practicallyimportant only when disobedience requires extensive actions or numerousparticipants.

These reasons for preferring nonviolence to violence do not create anecessaryconnectionbetweendisobedienceandnonviolence.However,theydoreveal that nonviolence can be adopted as a basic pragmatic principle fordisobedience:nonviolentdisobedienceusually(butnotalways)providesamoreeffectivemeanstotheendsofexpressivedisobedience.

3.2.2.CommunicativeDisobedienceandtheScopeofPermissibleActionNowwe turn to thequestionof the scopeofpermissible actionswithin

thecontextofcommunicativedisobedience.AsIhavealreadydiscussed(Section2.2 in Chapter Three), communicative disobedients take their addressees aspersons to be persuaded by reasons and treat them as the disobedientsthemselves would want to be treated if their roles were reversed. Therelationship between disobedients and audience is bilateral in the sense thatdisobedienceisakindofcommunicationbetweenthem.

One important feature in communicative disobedience is thatdisobedientsseetheaudienceasresponsibleagentswhoarecapableofmakingtheir own final judgments in terms of issues raised by disobedients. Based onthis feature and the bilateral relationship, the principle of nonviolence is aninternalcomponentincommunicativedisobedienceduetoitsfunctionofmakingrealcommunicationpossible.

Whereasexpressivedisobedienceincludesaconditionoftheaddressee’sperception,thecommunicativeconceptionofdisobedienceincludestheconditionof the audience’s equal status. Communicative disobedients not only have toconsider how an audience perceives the meaning of communicativedisobediencebutalsomustmaintaintheaudience’scapabilitytomaketheirownjudgments.Therefore,communicativedisobedientscannotengageinactionsthatinjure or harm their audience but insteadmust act in away that is consistentwith an equal relationship between disobedients and audience, treating theaudience as the disobedients would want to be treated. This condition of theaudience’s equal status requires communicative disobedients to adopt theprinciple of nonviolence as a conceptual component of their understanding oftheirroleascommunicativedisobedients.

Undertheconditionoftheaudience’sequalstatus,wecanexaminehowcommunicativedisobedience filtersoutsome typesofviolentactionbut leavesthestatusofotheractiontypesundeterminedorindefinite.

TypeA violent action is undoubtedly excluded from the communicativeconception because adopting such actions will defeat the condition of theaudience’s equal status. And Type B is also excluded from communicativedisobediencebecausenon-lethalactionsdegradetheaudience’sequalstatusby

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makingthosewhoarethetargetofnon-lethalactionsatoolfortheachievementofthedisobedients’communicativeends.

Type E is also excluded from communicative disobedience because anymeansthataimtoeliminateone’sautonomydeprivetheaudience’scapabilityofmakingtheirownfinaljudgments.Inthiscontext,physicalcoercionisprohibitedand non-physical coercion that significantly influences one’s autonomy is alsoprohibited. There is a profound reason for excluding Type E actions. Theconditionoftheaudience’sequalstatusoccupiesthecentralplaceinthebilateralrelationshipbetweencommunicativedisobedientsandaudience.Communicativedisobedients treat the addressee as a responsible and sincere personwho canmake his (or her) independent judgment in terms of the issues at hand. Anyactionthataimsatdiminishingtheautonomyoftheaddresseeshouldthereforeberuledout,irrespectiveofwhethertheactionwillcausesubsequentharmsasaconsequenceoftheintendedviolationofautonomy.

WhileTypesA,B,andEareexcludedfromcommunicativedisobedience,TypesCandDarenot.ThereisroomforcommunicativedisobediencetoadoptTypeCincaseswhereTypeCactionsdonotnecessarilyentailtheinfringementofaudienceautonomy.

Consideranexample.Onemight takeanimal rightsasabasic issue inagiven society. Suppose there are personswhowant animals to be treated in arespectful way and they believe that each consumer is entitled to know howmeatproductsaremadeandthatbackgroundinformationaboutsuchproductsshouldbe listedon their labels. Suppose there isa companyXproducingmeatproducts and that X ismistreating the animals used tomake the products. Inorder to change X’smistreatment, a disobedient decides to reveal informationshowingthatanimalsweretreatedwrongfullyandinhumanely.Thisdisobedientholds a poster showing the slogan, “Stop abusing and killing animals!” on thepropertyofthecompanywithoutpermission.Thedisobedientaimstoconvincecustomers not to purchase the company’s products, and the unlawful protestdoes in fact dissuademany customers thereby causing a significant economiclosstothecompany. Insuchacase, theTypeCactiondamagesthecompany’sintangible interests, but the action is not ruled out by the communicativeconception of disobedience because aiming to create economic injury to thecompanyisconsistentwithtreatingthecustomers(theaudience)asequalswhoaretobepersuadedandnotcoerced.

Whetheractionsliketheexampleoftheanimalrightsprotestviolatetheconditionoftheaudience’sequalstatuscanbeconsideredfromtwoperspectives:first, does such an action injure the consumer’s status as autonomous, andsecond, does it injure the company’s status? The unlawful protest does notdepriveconsumersoftheircapacitytomakeanautonomousdecisionwhethertobuy the company’s products or not because the protest provides consumersbackgroundinformationthathelpsformthebasisformakingtheirowndecision.For the company that suffers an economic loss, whether the company (or thepersonswhoownandmanagethecompany)isdeniedequalstatusisdependentoncircumstances.Itcouldbethecasethattheeconomiclossissominorthatitdoes not materially affect the company’s interests. Therefore, there is nocoercive effect from the boycott. However it could also be the case that the

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boycottleadstothecompanylosingsubstantialprofitsandtherebycoercesthecompanytoimproveitstreatmentofanimals.

AlthoughTypeCactionsarenotalwaysinconsistentwithcommunicativedisobedience,therearesituationsinwhichtheycouldbeinconsistent.IfaTypeC action has both the purpose and effect of diminishing the autonomy of anaudience member, then such an action is inconsistent with communicativedisobedience.ThecaseoftheboycottIexplainedpreviouslyshowsthatdecidingwhether Type C is inconsistent with communicative disobedience requiresconsiderationof thepurposeof initiating theboycott, thescopeof theboycott,the actual economic loss suffered by the company, and how the company’sdecision process is affected. Type C is not conceptually excluded fromcommunicative disobedience; instead Type C is excludedwhen it intentionallyinfringesontheequalstatusof theaddressee.WhetherrealworldexamplesofTypeCdisobediencedohavesuchpurposesandeffectsisanempiricalquestionthatisbeyondthescopeofthisDissertation.

TypeDisalsonotnecessarilyprohibitedbycommunicativedisobedienceif such an action does not have the effect of diminishing one’s autonomousdecisions and degrading one’s equal status. Whether Type D creates coerciveeffectsisalsodependentonthecircumstances.OneexampleofTypeDistagging(graffiti). This method of damaging property usually does not create coerciveeffectsupon the addressee.However, if the contentof the tag communicates athreatorcurseandtherebyelicitsfear,thentaggingwouldbeinconsistentwithcommunicativedisobedience.LikeTypeC,whetherrealworldexamplesofTypeDdohavethepurposeandeffectofdiminishingone’sautonomyisanempiricalquestionthatisbeyondthescopeofthisDissertation.

The finalpoint Iwant tomake is thatsuperficiallysimilaractionsmightbeclassifieddifferentlysuchthatcommunicativedisobedienceisconsistentwithone but not the other. An action that damages propertymight also have thepurposeandeffectofinfringingautonomyandcoercingaction.Classificationofparticularactionswillrequirecontextualdetailandempiricalinformationabouttheconsequencesoftheaction.

3.2.3.ResistantDisobedienceandtheScopeofPermissibleActionThenexttopicisresistantdisobedience.BeforeIexplicatewhichtypesof

violentactionsarepermittedfortheresistantconceptionofdisobedience,Iwillsituatetheprincipleofnonviolenceandtheideaofviolencewithrespecttothenatureof resistantdisobediencebyexamining three topics.First, Iwill explainhowresistantdisobediencesituates theprincipleofnonviolence.Second, Iwillexplicatewhatthemeaningofviolentactionisforresistantdisobedience.Third,I will outline which types of violent actions are permitted by the resistantconception.

Resistantdisobediencedoesnot take theprinciple of nonviolence as aninternalcomponentwithintherelationshipbetweendisobedientsandaddressee.Unlikecommunicativedisobediencewhichtakestheprincipleofnonviolenceasa background condition for performing disobedience, resistant disobediencetreatsthisprincipleinstrumentallyandtakesthestancethatapoliticalregime’scapacitytorespondtodissentisafunctionoftheweightofthisprinciple.

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Theremightbetwooppositecasesofhowapoliticalregimerespondstodissent expressed by resistant disobedience. Consider the first response: apoliticalregimemightcompletelyignoreresistantdisobedients’appeal,warning,and demands to rectify an unjust case. And this political regime might alsorespond to resistant disobedients’ mild protest violently, for example, byforcefullydispersinganunlawfulbutpeacefulmarch.Underthesecircumstances,the principle of nonviolence has lessweight in resistant disobedience becausethe political regime’s responses show its unwillingness to take the dissentinggroup’sappealintoaccount.

Considerthesecondresponse:apoliticalregimemightcompletelyacceptresistantdisobedients’appealandasaresultchangeitsunjustlawsorpolicies.Insuchacase theprincipleofnonviolencewouldhavesignificantweight.Realworldexamplesusuallyaredistributedbetweenthesetwoopposingpoles.Whenapoliticalregimeiscapableofrespondingappropriatelytodissentbyresistantdisobedients, the principle of nonviolence has more weight and therebymoderates the interactions between disobedients and the political authorities.Butifapoliticalregimerespondstodisobedients’actionswithbrutality,thentheprincipleofnonviolencemaynolongerhold.

The perspective for understanding the principle of nonviolence inresistantdisobedienceisthatitisnotabackgroundconditionbutanexpressionofdisobedients’goodwill. Nonviolenceshowsthatresistancecanbecontainedtoa certaindegree,and thatapolitical regimehasa final chance to rectify theinjustice that provoked resistant disobedience. The use of nonviolence isinstrumental in the sense that its performance conveys the message fromdisobedients to thepolitical authority that both the resistant disobedients andthepolitical regimestill canresolveapresented issue together and there isnoneed for a zero-sum situation. Therefore, the principle of nonviolence forresistantdisobedientsdoesnotconveyasincereattitudeofrespecttowardthelawsomuchasitsignalsthatthedisobedientsvalueapoliticalregime’scapacitytorectifyinjustice.

Since the principle of nonviolence is not an internal component ofperforming resistant disobedience, some types of violent actions may beappropriate. This leads to the next question: how does resistant disobedienceview violent actions? I have explained the idea of collective disobedience (seeSection1.2.3inChapterThree)andarguedthatresistantdisobedienceshouldbeunderstood as collective disobedience—because the aims of resistantdisobedience can only be achieved through collective action. This perspectiveinvites the question as to what is the meaning of violent actions from theperspectiveofresistantdisobedients.Theanalysisoftheideaofviolentactionsabove (Section 3.1 in Chapter Three) takes the following as a given: a violentactionisabehaviorintentionallyperformedbyanagent.Thereforetheanalysismust take into account the viewpoint of individuals. But because resistantdisobedience involves collective action, the determination of the meaning ofviolentactionismorecomplicatedinthecaseofresistantcollectivedisobediencethanitisforotherformsofdisobedience.

Determiningwhether resistant disobedience is violent requires thatweconsider theories of collective action and group intentionality. Here I only

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propose basic criteria for determining whether actions are violent in thecollective context. There are two types of collective disobedience (see Section1.2.3inChapterThree):

• TypeB(1):Disobedienceisperformedbymorethanoneagentinasingleinstance.

• TypeB(2):Disobedienceisperformedbymorethanoneagentonmultipleoccasions.

BothTypeB(1)andTypeB(2)implythatacertainsharedintentionexistsamongdisobedients. Thereforedeterminingwhether collectivedisobedience isviolent does not depend solely on whether individual violent actions areperformed in the courseofdisobedience; in addition, theviolenceof collectivedisobedience depends on the question ofwhether the violent character of theaction is within the shared intention of the disobedients who participate incollective action. A shared intention to perform violent actions is the firstcriterionfordeterminingwhethercollectivedisobedienceisviolent.

Whileasharedintentionisthefirstcriterion,itisinsufficientasgroundsfordetermining if a caseof collectivedisobedience canbe categorizedasTypeB(2) because Type B(2) does not require that every disobedient performs thesame violent action. Therefore, with Type B(2) it is possible that somedisobedientsperformviolentactionswhileothersdonot.Classifyingthesecasesrequiresasecondcriterion.

The second criterion for determining whether Type B(2) actions areviolentrequiresthatthesharedintentionofperformingviolentactionshasbeencommunicatedforthepurposeoffacilitatingdisobedience.Ifsuchanintentioniscommunicated,thenaTypeB(2)actionwillbecountedasaviolentactionbythegroup.Suchactionscanbecalled“violentcollectivedisobedience.”

The two criteria exclude certain types of collective disobedience frombeing violent disobedience. For example, the contingent individual actions ofbreakingwindowsduringanillegalmarchdoesnotmakethemarchitself(thatis,the collective action) violent. But planned individual actions of breakingwindows for the purpose of occupying an official building would be violentcollective action. The contingent action by individuals of blocking a hospitalentranceduring aprotestwouldnotbe violent collective actionbut aplannedgroup action of blocking a hospital entrance for the purpose of disobediencewould be classified as violent collective action. These two criteria may notprovide a sufficient or exclusive basis for determining whether collectivedisobedienceisviolentornot,butthetwocriteriaarethemostimportantfactors.

Oncethemeaningofadoptingviolentactionsincollectivedisobedienceisclear, it becomes easier to dealwith the question as towhich types of violentactionscanbeadoptedinresistantdisobedience.Weneedtorecallthetwo-layerrelationshipintermsofaddresseesinresistantdisobedience.

• Layer1:Thepoliticalregimeitselfastheaddressee• Layer2:Thosewhooccupypoliticaloffices

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With regard to Layer 1, two kinds of violent actions will be excludedbecauseofalogicalassumption:TypeAandTypeBareunavailableforresistantdisobediencebecause it is conceptually impossible fordisobedients to addressthepoliticalregimebylethalforce:aregimeisaninstitutionandcannotitselfbethe targetof lethal force. This isbecauseregimescannotbekilledormaimed;onlynaturalpersonscansuffertheseconsequences.However,TypesCandDareconsistentwith Layer 1 disobedience, because a regime can have tangible andintangibleinterests.

Another question ariseswith respect to Type E, diminishing autonomy,when a political regime is the target of resistant disobedience. How can apoliticalregimehaveautonomywhenit isnotanaturalpersonbutis insteadacombination of individuals, groups, and institutions pursuing certain commongoals?

To say a political regime’s autonomy can be influenced by resistantdisobedients isnot to say thatapolitical regimehas freewill, thecapabilityofengaging in moral reasoning, and the ability of compliance with moralrequirements. A political regime consists of groups of individuals, institutions,and interactions among individuals and between individuals and institutions,andamong institutions.Apolitical regimedoesnothaveamindand thereforecannot engage in moral reasoning. Therefore, the institution cannot haveautonomyintheKantiansenseofasetofmoralcapabilities.

Sayingthatapoliticalregimehasautonomycanbeseenasametaphoricalexpression of the idea that a political regime can make decisions withoutillegitimate interference by those who should not play a role in the decision-making process. One extreme example of such interference occurs when apoliticalregime’spoliticalofficialsareunderaforeignregime’scontrol;inthesecircumstances, we might say, “the foreign regime has violated the domesticregime’sautonomy”—understandingthatwearenotusingtheword“autonomy”in the Kantian sense. In this context, it is reasonable to say that the regime’sautonomy has been compromised while its form and structure remainunchanged.

Indeed there is an importantdebateover thequestionofwhat thebestconceptionofautonomyis,butthisdebateneednotberesolved.Theimportantpointisthatapoliticalregime’sdecision-makingprocesscanbeinterferedwithinawaythatissimilartoviolationsofindividualautonomy.Thisbringsustothequestion of what actions can be considered to diminish a political regime’sautonomy for the purposes of Type E. The most radical way to diminish apoliticalregime’sautonomyistodestroytheregimebychangingelementsthatareessentialtoitsnature.Forexample,revolutionaryactionsthatcauseashiftin the legitimate basis of government are one example of regime destruction.Treasonous actions are another example. Subversion of governmentwould beanotherexample.ThekeypointofTypeEinresistantdisobedienceaimedatthepoliticalregimeisthatadoptingTypeEasthemeansofdisobedienceinvolvesalikelihoodofoverthrowingagivenregime.

WithregardtoLayer2,thosewhooccupypoliticaloffices,TypeAisalsoprohibitedand so isTypeB.Those two types treatpolitical officials as ameremeans for the purpose of disobedience, not as the person addressed or

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communicated with. While Type A and B are inconsistent with resistantdisobedience,TypesC,D,andEmaybeconsistentwithresistantdisobedience.

4.TheJustificatoryThresholdofDisobedience:TheNormativeCommitmentandtheWeightofNormalDemocraticParticipation

I shall examine two questions in Section 4: (1) the normativecommitments of each conception and (2) the weight of normal democraticparticipation.The following is a summaryof theanswers for eachof the threeconceptions.Eachconceptionhasitsownnormativecommitmentanddistinctiveviewoftheweightofnormaldemocraticparticipation.Expressivedisobediencecommits itself to the freedom of expression. Communicative disobediencecommits itself to equal dialogue among members of society. Resistantdisobedience is committed to the idea of defense of democracy—the phrase“democraticdefense”willbeusedtorefertothisidea.

Expressivedisobediencetakes freedomofexpressionasthegroundsforjustifyingdisobedience. Exercising freedomofexpressioncultivatesone’s self-identity and respect for one’s independent status as a member of society.Expressive disobedience must shows one’s considered and non-arbitraryjudgment. One implication of this normative commitment of expressivedisobedience is that disobedience is individualistic and does not assume theneedforcollectiveaction.

Communicative disobedience takes the equal relationship of dialogueamong members of society as its normative commitment. This normativecommitmentpositsrationaldialogueasthe fundamentalpointofdisobedience.Communicativedisobediencecanbejustifiedbyshowingthattherelationshipofequality between citizenswith respect to communication no longer holds andhence that communicative disobedience is necessary to restore meaningfulcommunications.69Communicativedisobediencerecognizesthe“subjectivity”(inthe sense of being an agent) of all members of society and is based on theassumption that members are capable of rationally communicating with oneanother. Based on this normative commitment, communicative disobedienceaccepts that the availability of normal political appeal through democraticprocedureisacriticalfactortojustifydisobedience.Thisisbecausethefactthatnormal political appeals are ineffective demonstrates the need to restore theequalityofcommunicationamongmembersofsociety.

Resistant disobedience is committed to the defense of democracy; ittargetsthosewrongsthatcannotbeattributedtopersonalactionsandparticularpolicies or laws, but result from interaction among political institutions.Therefore, a case of injustice can emerge even if just policies and laws aresincerely executed by political institutions. Democratic defense targets“structuralinjustice,”asthatideaisdevelopedbyIrisMarionYounginherbook

69 For similar ideas, see Daniel Markovits, “Democratic Disobedience,” The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 140 No. 8, pp. 1897-1952, 2005.

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Responsibility for Justice. There are two key pointswith respect to the idea ofdemocratic defense. First, this commitment takes the rule of law as thefundamental value legitimizing the exercise of political authority and theexistenceofapoliticalregime.Second,thestructuralinjusticeisaspecifickindofwrongthatcanonlybecorrectedbyrectifyingamalfunctionof thedemocraticprocess.

4.1.ExpressiveDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment—TheFreedomofExpression

Freedom of expression is the fundamental normative commitment forexpressivedisobedience.Domesticlawsandinternationallawshaverecognizedthisfreedomasabasichumanright.70Itslegalmeaninginasimpleformisthateveryone is legally entitled to express their views, opinions, and judgmentswithout undue interference. In the context of this investigation of civildisobedience,however,thefreedomofexpressionoperatesasamoralprinciplethat acts as a justificatory ground for disobedience. The moral content of thefreedomofexpressionisthateveryonehasamoralrighttoexpresstheirideas,opinions,andemotionsbasedontheirsincerebelief thatsuchanexpression istheresultofwell-consideredjudgments.Onehasamoralrighttoexpresswhatonesincerelybelievestobetruebecausesuchanexpressionbothcontributestothe value of discourse and builds the speaker’s self-identity, personality, andWeltanschauung(comprehensiveconceptionoftheworld).71

Although controversies exist regarding the scope of the content of thefreedom of expression, its strength, and how this freedom should beimplemented in different societies, one undeniable fact is that its moralsignificance has been recognized by domestic and international law. In thisSection, I discuss the role of the freedom of expression in the normativecommitmentspresupposedbyexpressivedisobedience.

When agents decide to express their views by disobeying a law, suchactions are not irrational responses to political authorities but are insteadperformancesthatexhibittheagents’consideredjudgmentsabouttheirattitudesandbeliefswithrespecttoasetof issues.72Theseattitudescouldbeemotionaland express anger or a normative judgment.Whatever the attitudesmight be,theyareembeddedintheexpressiveactionofdisobedienceandarenotproperly

70 For example, Article 19 (2) in the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) holds that everyone has the right of freedom to expression. (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.” (ICCPR, Article 19 (2)) Articles 10 (1) and (2) in the European Convention on Human Rights has similar language regarding freedom of expression. And the American Convention on Human Rights also has similar language to declare that freedom of expression ought to be protected. (See American Convention on Human Rights Article 13. (http://www.hrcr.org/docs/American_Convention/oashr4.html )) 71 The German term “Weltanschauung” means one’s comprehensive conception of the world from a particular perspective; a worldview. See the Merriam-Webster dictionary (http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/weltanschauung ). 72 Of course, in a particular case, disobedience could be irrational. The claim in this text is that disobedience is not irrational per se.

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viewed as a mere emotional outburst of dissatisfaction. The best form ofexpressive disobedience reveals the agents’ considered judgments. Therefore,sincerityandasubjectivebelief thatwhatone isdoing ismorally rightare thenecessaryconditionsforjustifyingexpressivedisobedience.Sincerityandbeliefin the rightness of one’s action are evidence that the moral freedom ofdisobedientshasbeen conscientiously exercised.Therefore, disobedience is anextensionofexercisingamoralfreedom(thefreedomofexpression)bymakingone’sinnerthoughtsexplicit.

Why does expressive disobedience assume its strongest form inconjunctionwiththefreedomofexpression?Thereasonissimple:emotionswillbe communicated most effectively and extensively if they are based on one’sconscientiousbeliefthatone’sviewsarerightandhencethatitisworthbearingthecostofdisobediencebyexpressing thebeliefwith the intendedoutcomeofmakinganimpactonfellowmembersofsociety.ThisexplainswhythepictureofTank Man standing in front of the tank in Tiananmen Square in 1989 is socompelling. Itwasnot thehugeasymmetryof forcesbetweenthe tankandthemanthatmadethepicturepowerfulbutthatTankManwaswillingtobearthecostoflosinghislifeinordertoexpresshisopinions;eventhoughtherewasonlyoneman,hisexpressionshockedandaffectedothersinaverypowerfulway.Thesamereasonalsoappliestothecaseofself-immolationperformedbythosewhohaveprotestedtheChinesegovernment’soccupationofTibet.

Expressivedisobediencecanresultinthecommunicationofamessagetoa verywide audience and attract others to join a programof disobedience, sothat it becomes collective disobedience. If expressive disobedience results incollectiveaction,itcanleadtodestructiveconsequences—theriskofviolenceisespecially great in the context of mass protest in which the disobedients areexpressingtheemotionofangeratinjustice.Thisfactexplainswhygovernmentofficialsmaybeapprehensivewhenexpressivedisobedientsgather together toexpressnegativeemotionssuchasangerormourning. Theexpressionoftheseemotions can create enormous pressure on the government because they canactivatemasscollectiveactionagainstthegovernmentanditsofficials.

The exhaustion of the channels of normal political appeal is not acondition for initiating expressive disobedience, because normal politicalprocedure is “communicative” and not primarily “expressive” in the specialsenseinwhichthatwordisusedhere.Thefunctionofexpressivedisobedienceis not served by normal political participation in the form of voting, filing aformalgrievance,orinitiatingalegalaction.Thesemethodsarenotwellsuitedtothetaskofexpressingemotioninapowerfulway.

4.2.CommunicativeDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment:anEqualRelationshipamongMembersofSocietyWhereas expressive disobedience is committed to the freedom of

expression, communicativedisobedience is committed to anequal relationshipamongmembersofsocietywithrespecttocommunication.

Beginwiththedifferencebetween“expression”and“communication”asthose terms are used here. Although “expression” and “communication” are

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sometimes used interchangeably, for present purposes they refer to differentactivitieswithdifferentaimsthatentaildifferentassumptions.

Expression(orself-expression)doesnotassumethatone’svoicewillbeheardoracceptedbyanaudience.Forexample,expressioncanoccurwhenonewrites a private journal or diary that will never be read by others. And onemightengageinself-expressionbywritingapoemwithoutanyexpectationthatthepoemwillbeunderstoodbythosewhoreadit.

Communication is different. Engaging in communication does assumethat the speakermust have a reasonable expectation thatwhat is saidwill beheard and understood. This is the core component of communication: it is a“processbywhichpeopleexchange information.”73Therefore it is conceptuallyimpossibletosaysomeoneiscommunicatingifnooneelsehearswhattheysay.(Arelatedpointisthebilateralrelationshipofcommunicativedisobedience.SeeSection2.2 inChapterThree.)Sowhenwesayapersoniscommunicating, thisentails that theperson’svoicecanbereasonablyheardbyothers,althoughtheidentityofthelistenerneednotbeknowninadvance.

What does it mean to say that the speaker must have a reasonableexpectation thatwhat is saidwill be heard andunderstood?The example of aformal political debate illustrates the importance of being heard. Debate onpolitical issues highlights the idea of an equal relationship amongmembers ofsociety; in a public debate, there will be rules structuring the format of thedebate. First, debate is a form of communication that aims to discoveragreementsanddisagreementsamongparticipants.Secondly,therulesofpublicdebatesaimtostructuretheinteractionamongparticipantsinawaythatmakestheparticipantscapableofreachingagreementandunderstandingthenatureoftheir disagreement. Although there may be variations in the rules of publicdebates, one common element is that such rules create an equal relationshipamong participants. Typically, each side has equal time or an opportunity forequaltime.Eachsidewillhaveanequalrighttomakepoints,askquestions,andengageinrebuttal.Suchrulesdonotensurethatagreementwillbereached,buttheydoprovideequalityofcommunicativeopportunity.74

The rules of formal public political debates illustrate the idea thatcommunicationpresupposesboththatone’sspeechwillbeheardandthattheremustbearelationshipofequalityamongthepartiestosuchadebate.Asincereparticipantinsuchadebateiscommittedtoinsuringthatalltheparticipantswillhaveanopportunitytounderstandthepositionofothers,toadvanceandrefutearguments,toraisequestions,andsoforth.

Despite the similarities between political debate and communicativedisobedience, there are differences as well. Participants in a formal debating

73 See the entry for communication in the Longman English Dictionary (http://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/communication ). The etymological source of communication is Latin, meaning “to share and divide out.” ( http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=communication&allowed_in_frame=0 ) 74 For more on the idea of equality of communicative opportunity, see Lawrence B. Solum, “Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech,” Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 83, p. 112 (1989).

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contest are not required to believe what they say but communicativedisobedients must hold a sincere belief that some wrong has occurred andshouldbecorrected.Soinordertocommunicatewithothermembersofsocietysuccessfully communicative disobedientsmust hold a sincere attitude towardsthem and embrace the feature of publicity as one component of theirdisobedience. Additionally communicative disobedience also must maintain anon-hostile atmosphere that preserves the opportunity of thosewho have notparticipatedintheprocessofcommunicationtojointhecourseofdisobedience.

Given thisnormative commitment, thepurposeof the legal system is tobuildaframeworkforfurtheringsocialcooperationbetweenmembersofsocietyandmaintaininganequalrelationshipamongthemembers.Therefore,thebestjustification for initiating communicative disobedience is a showing that theequalrelationshipamongmembersofsocietyhasbeeninterruptedorcorrupted.Communicativedisobedientsmust first showthat theirvoicewillnotbeheardthrough normal political appeal because such appeals preserve the equalityamongtheparticipantsinpoliticallife.

Thus, communicativedisobedienceplacesgreatweighton theconditionof the ineffectivenessofnormalpoliticalappeal.Showing the ineffectivenessofnormalpolitical appealprovides evidenceofhowanequal relationship amongmembers of society has been broken or ignored. And such evidence not onlyshowsthatdisobedience isa lastresortbutalsoshowsthatdisobedience isanalternativetonormalpoliticalappeal.

Socommunicativedisobedience takes theconditionof ineffectivenessofnormal political appeal as a critical factor in determining whether to initiatedisobedience.Arelatedpointisthatthereisacloseinternalconnectionbetweencommunicativedisobedienceandthemodernconceptionofdemocracybecausethemodernconceptionofdemocracyisbasedonthebeliefthateveryoneshouldhave an equal opportunity to influence political affairs, for example, via equalvotingrights.

4.3.ResistantDisobedience’sNormativeCommitment:DemocraticDefenseMy purpose in this Section is to highlight the most fundamental ideas

aboutthenormativecommitmentofresistantdisobedienceandtoexplainhowresistantdisobedientscanbestjustifytheirdisobedience.Thus,Ishallarguethatthenormativecommitment for resistantdisobedience iswhat I calldemocraticdefense,inwhichtheideaoftheruleoflawplaysacentralrole.75

The idea of democratic defense is defined as a normative commitmentthatinsiststhatdemocracyfunctionsasadeepgroundingforpoliticalauthorityandthatdemocracyisessentialforthelegitimacyofsuchauthority.Theideaofdemocracy is not easy to define because this concept is a thick concept that

75 My illustration of democratic defense comes from a variety of theories. First, Howard Zinn’s book, Disobedience and Democracy, inspired me to connect disobedience with the idea of democracy. Second, Taiwanese legal philosopher Chueh-An Yen’s theory of democratic resistance provided the substantive ideas on which my concept of resistant disobedience is based. His paper, “On Democratic Resistance and the Rule of Law,” provided key insights.

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combines with descriptive and evaluative components such as fair elections,generalsuffrage,freedomofspeech, institutionalmechanismsofaccountability,andsoforth.Itispossiblethatdemocracyisacontestedconcept,withdifferentmembers of society having different conceptions of democracy (with differentdescriptive and evaluative components within each conception); if this is so,there could well bemany disputes and disagreements about what democracyreally isandwhat itentails.Butthepossibilityof thesekindsofdisagreementsdoes not negate democracy as a normatively attractive concept; rather, suchdisagreements help identify how the concept of democracy occupies a centralroleindebatesaboutthelegitimacyofpoliticalauthority.

In order to narrow the idea of democratic defense I shall illustrate thisideainthreeways:(1)byidentifyingitstarget,(2)showingitsconnectiontothevalueoftheruleoflaw,and(3)byexplicatingitsdistinctivenessascomparedtotwoothernormativecommitments.

First, democratic defense has a very specific target, which is structuralinjustice.Thephrase“structuralinjustice”isusedinthesensearticulatedbyIrisMarionYoungin“PoliticalResponsibilityandStructuralInjustice.”Shegivesthistermawell-developeddefinitionthatisadoptedinthisDissertation.

According toYoung, structural injustice refers to a specificharm that isgenerated“asaresultofstructuralprocessesinwhichmanypeopleparticipate.”(Young,2003:7)First,structuralinjusticeisakindofharmcausedbytheactionsof many persons, either intentionally or unintentionally. Some of the personswho cause structural injustice might realize that their actions could lead toinjusticeandsomeofthemmightnot.Therefore,thecharacteristicofstructuralinjustice is that its wrongfulness is the result of a process or occurrence thatcannot be reduced to individual actions. Second, Young defines “structure” as“the relation of social positions that condition the opportunities and lifeprospects of the persons located in those positions. This positioning occursbecause of the way that actions and interactions reinforce the rules andresourcesavailable forotheractionsand interactions involvingpeople inotherstructuralpositions.”(Young,2003:6)

Thus, structural injustice occurs in circumstances such that an injusticeemergesasaresultofactionsbytheinstitutionsofgovernmentandinteractionsamongsuchinstitutions.Structuralinjusticeisunlikeordinaryinjusticeinthatitoriginatesfromlegalnormsthatproduceoutcomesthatareunjustinthesensethat they are inconsistent with the principle of justice shared bymembers ofsociety.Structuralinjusticefocusesonhowtheoperationofapoliticalandlegalsystem that embraces the values of democracy, individual rights, and equality,nonetheless generates systematic consequences that undermine those veryvalues.Therefore, structural injustice isdifferent fromanunjust laworpolicy;structuralinjusticeoccurswhenpoliticalinstitutionsacttoerodethenormativefoundationofpoliticalauthority.Forexample,disproportionateincarcerationofa group of citizensmight be the unintended consequence of systematic biasesthat exist in various component parts of criminal procedure, includinginvestigation,prosecution,trial,andsentencing.

Itisrarelypossibletoseewhetheracaseofstructuralinjusticeiscreatedintentionally or not because of complex interactions among the various

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institutionsofgovernment.Suchinteractionsmakeitpossibletohavestructuralinjustice that isunintentional.Structural injustice isnot limited towrongs thatviolateindividuallibertiesorequalrelationsamongmembersofsociety.Ratherstructural injustice extends to thosewrongs that are created by the economicdomination of theminority groups by themajority. For example, while Rawlsdenies that a violation of the Difference Principle constitutes an appropriatereason for disobedience, the principle of democratic defense treats such aviolation as a form of structural injustice and hence as grounds for resistantdisobedience.

Second, what values are defended in democratic defense?This is a hardquestion because democracy is a thick concept that embraces a variety ofarticulations; moreover, there are various ways to achieve the values ofdemocracy. For example, it is possible to have a procedural conception ofdemocracy that takes fair elections and proportionate representation as twoimportantvalues.Anotherconceptionofdemocracymightprioritizethevalueoftheruleoflaw.

HereItaketheruleoflawasthemostbasicvaluethatcanbeembracedbyallresistantdisobedients.Whilethecontentoftheruleoflawiscontestable,Brian Tamanaha’s work provides a clear frame of reference. According toTamanaha,thecontentoftheruleoflawcanbeviewedfromtwoperspectives:oneformalandtheothersubstantive.

The formal perspective has three formulations: (1) rule-by-law, (2)formallegality,and(3)democracyandlegality.Thesubstantiveperspectivealsohas three formulations: (4) individualrights, (5)rightofdignity,and(6)socialwelfare.ThefollowingfigurebyBrianTamanahaclearlyoutlineshowtheruleoflawcanbeunderstood.

Figure16:BrianTamanaha'sConceptoftheRuleofLaw

ALTERNATIVERULEOFLAWFORMULATIONSThinner……………………………………………………………………………….….Thicker

FORMALVERSIONS

(1)Rule-by-Law-lawasinstrumentofgovernmentaction

(2)FormalLegality-general,prospective,

clear,certain

(3)Democracy+Legality-consentdetermines

contentoflaw

SUBSTANTIVEVERSIONS

(4)IndividualRights-property,contract,privacy,autonomy

(5)RightofDignityand/orJustice

(6)SocialWelfare-substantiveequality,welfare,preservationof

community

BasedonTamanaha’sunderstanding,Iconceptualizetheruleoflawasanormativevaluethatshouldberealizedbyalegalsystemtoachievethevalueofformal legality and justice. Taking this concept of the rule of law as a given,democratic defense insists on two types of values.One type is connectedwithformal legality: the realizationof this typecanenhance themoralmeritof lawand enablemembers of society to have stable expectations of the actions andinstitutional arrangements that are undertaken by the political authorities.Values like the generality of legislation, the requirement of prospectivelegislation, and clear articulation of legal content are important to the stablefunctioningofdemocratic institutionsandtoestablishingasustainablerelationbetweenthepoliticalauthorityandmembersofsociety.Anothertypeofvalueis

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substantiveequalityamongmembersofsociety(ornon-suppression).Thistypeof value treats democracy as a form of life, such thatmembers of society canenjoytheirlibertiesandparticipateinthepoliticalspherewheretheirrightsanddutiesareassignedthroughcollectiveprocedureswiththeaimofdecreasingthedegreeofinfluencebyone’sluckorcontingentfactorsasmuchaspossible.

Democracyisaformofself-governance.Withoutminimizingtherolethatluckplaysinthedeliberateprocessandcontingentconditions,itisimpossibletohave robust democratic institutions. Substantive equality not only focuses onwhateverymemberofsocietyislegallyentitledtodo(individualliberty)butalsoon whether everymember’s voice is equally considered by political authoritieswhensuchauthoritiesdistributerightsanddutiesamongmembersofsociety.Sodemocraticdefenseshouldnotonlybeunderstoodasawaytodefendindividualliberties; such liberties are subject to revision by democratic procedures.Democratic defense can best be understood as a way to eliminate unequal,repressive, and dominating relations among members of society. In order torealizethissubstantiveconceptionofequality,wemustexaminetheproblemofequalitydeficitsthataregeneratedbythewholepolitical/legalsystem.

Nowconsider thedistinctive featuresofdemocraticdefense, thecentralaimof resistantdisobedience.The first featureofdemocraticdefense,perhapsthemostsignificantfeature,isitscloserelationshipwithrevolutionaryacts.Thepurposeofresistantactionsistoestablishanewregimewithanewbasisforitslegitimacy. Therefore, there is always a possibility that resistant disobediencemightbetransformedintothemoreradicalformofrevolutionaryaction.Butthemove to revolutionary action is not a necessary one, because resistantdisobediencecanaimtopreserveasharedformofpoliticallifeforthemembersof society. Revolution involves a radical breakbetweenold andnew formsofpoliticallife;resistantdisobediencecanaimforatransformationthatpreservesthecontinuityofpolitics.

The second feature is that democratic defense is not away to cure themalfunctioning of democracy in a particular case but serves as a weapon todefenddemocracyagainstvariousformsofoppressionimplementedbypoliticalandlegalsystems.So,by itsverynature,resistantdisobediencecombinedwithdemocraticdefensehasdestructivepotentialinextremeconditions.Thisisverydifferent from communicative and expressive disobedience. The latter twoconceptionsaremoderateandaimtocurelimiteddeviationsfromtheprincipleofjustice.Butresistantdisobedienceisnotamerecurebutisinsteadaweaponused by the multitudes to counteract a regime characterized by structuralinjustice.

Thethirdfeatureisthatresistantdisobediencedoesnotassumetheunityofmembersofsocietybycallingthema“people”butinsteadtakesmembersofsocietyasmultitudeswhoarenotunifiedonthebasisofacceptingacommonidentitybutwhohaveheterogeneousinterests.76Resistantdisobediencedoesnotassumethatmembersofsocietysharethesameconceptionofgoodorthattheyareunitedintheir aims, purposes, or normative values. This implies that resistant

76 The idea of multitude can be seen in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in The Age of Empire, Penguin Press, 2004.

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disobedienceisnotonlycapableofturningintorevolutionaryactionbutisalsocapableoftriggeringcivilwaramongmembersofsociety.

These features imply that resistant disobedience views the basicstructure of society in a very different way from the view implied bycommunicativedisobedience.Communicativedisobedience,asunderstoodusingJohn Rawls’s theory, takes the basic structure of society as regulated by theprinciple of justice and stabilized by cooperative activities of members. Incontrasttothisview,resistantdisobedienceviewsthebasicstructureofsocietyasaformofmodusvivendi thatshouldbeconstantlychallengedbymembersofsociety to avoid structural injustice. This difference between two views of thebasic structure of society differentiates resistant disobedience from the othertwoconceptionsofdisobedience.

Howdoesresistantdisobedienceviewtherequirementofnormalpoliticalappeal?Itseemsobviousthatresistantdisobediencedoesnotplacegreatweightonthevalueofexhaustingtheregularmeansofpoliticalappeal.Therearetworeasonsforthis.

First, normal political appeal is organized by a variety of rules andpositionswithinthepoliticalandlegalsystems.Therefore,fromthepointofviewofresistantdisobedience,thechannelsofnormalpoliticalappealarepartofthestructureofoppressionthat foreclosesopportunities formembersofsocietytoaddress theirconcerns.Resistantdisobediencetakesnormalpoliticalappealasan instrument for the purpose of defending democracy, but the resistantconception recognizes that normal political appealsmaynot be effective if theruleoflawhasbeencompromised.Whenthechannelsofnormalpoliticalappealare ineffective, requiring their exhaustion would undermine the fundamentalpurposesofresistantdisobedience.

Second,whilecommunicativedisobedience takesdisobedients’attemptstousenormalproceduresasawayofexemplifyingone’ssincereattitudetowardthefidelitytolaw,resistantdisobediencedoesnotembracethisidea.Insteadofrequiringasincereattitude,resistantdisobedienceallowsthatresistancecanbeperformedbyagentswhohaveavarietyofattitudes. It is importanttoseethisdifferentiation of sincerity as one of the distinctive features in resistantdisobedience. Resistant disobedience does not require every agent to have anattitudeofrespecttowardsthelawandfidelitytothelaw.Thisisnottosaythatresistantdisobedientscandoastheypleaseinanunconstrainedway.Nordoesit imply that resistantdisobedience is immune from interference, interruption,orchallenge.Howone’sdisobediencecanbenormativelyevaluatedisadifferentquestion.(SeeChapterFour.)

ThisChapterhasexaminedthreeconceptionsofdisobedience(expressive,communicative, and resistant disobedience) with respect to the relationshipeach conceptionassumesbetweendisobedients andothermembersof society,the scope of permissible actions each conception can take, and the normativecommitments upon which each conception is grounded. While this Chapterprovides a theoretical account of the nature of civil disobedience, it does notexaminetheissueofhowtodeterminedisobedients’legalliabilitiesandonwhatgrounds disobedients can be immune from bearing the costs of legalpunishments.ThisisthetopicofChapterFour,whichexplicatestwoapproaches

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to disobedience--a justification-based approach and a rights-based approach.TheaimofChapterFour is todevelopa justification forcivildisobediencethatwillgroundarighttodisobediencethatlimitsinterferencewithdisobediencebythepoliticalauthorities.

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CHAPTERFOURTheRighttoDisobey:ItsSourceand

Foundation1.Introduction

Sanctionsforviolationsofthelawimposedbypoliticalauthoritiesusuallyare supported by good reasons because political authorities have: (1) anobligationtoenforcethe law;(2)anobligationtopreventsocialandindividualharmscausedbyprivatelaw-breaking;and(3)adutytomaintaintheefficacyoflaw. These obligations constitute pro tanto reasons for political authorities toprosecute disobedients for the obvious reason that disobedients haveintentionally broken a law. But civil disobedience is distinguishable fromharmfulandself-interestedconduct.Forthisreason,oneimportantissueraisedbycivildisobedienceisthequestionastohowalegalsystemshoulddeterminedisobedients’ legal liabilities in the context of potential criminal prosecution.Morefundamentally,whatbasicprinciplesshouldsocietyadopttoavoidunduelimitations on civil disobedience?These questions cannot be answeredmerelyby reference to the question ofwhether disobedience is justified andwhethersuchdisobedience is nonviolent. Justification andnonviolencemay answer thequestion as to whether disobedients have sufficient normative grounds todisobey,butthatquestionisnotthesameaswhetherandtowhatextentalegalsystemshouldmitigatetheirlegalliabilities. It isatleastpossiblethatjustifiedcivildisobedienceshouldnonethelessbeprosecutedandpunished.

To ask what principles a legal system should adopt to deal withdisobedients’ legal liability is to ask whether there is a protected reason fordisobedience:followingJosephRaz,a“protectedreason”fordisobediencewouldbe a reason that justifies disobedience combined with a reason to excludeconsiderationofotherreasonsthatwoulddefeatthejustifyingreason.

ThisChapterexploresthisquestionbydistinguishingtwoapproachestodisobedience.Theoriesofdisobediencevarywith respect to thepositions theytake about whether there are protected reasons for disobedience and withrespect towhat thoseprotected reasons are.BasedonRaz’s explicationof theidea of a protected reason there could be two views of how disobedience issupportedbyprotectedreasons.Thefirstapproachiscalledajustification-basedapproachandthesecondarights-basedapproach.

When describing the two approaches, I use the phrases “a justification-basedapproach”and“arights-basedapproach.”Thesephrasesusetheword“a”(andnot“the”)toindicatethatthesubstantialcontentof‘justification’and‘right’isnotdefinite.Eachapproachcanbeviewedasamodulethatcanbecombinedwithoneofthespecificconceptionsofdisobediencethatwereexplicatedintheprior Chapter. The combination would constitute a comprehensive theory ofdisobedience. In addition, there are reasonable disagreements about thecircumstancesthatjustifydisobedienceandaboutwhatkindofright(therightofexpression, therightofmoralconviction,or therightofpoliticalparticipation)

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providesadequategroundsfortherighttodisobey.ThisChapteralsodealswithwhichunderlyingpoliticalormoralrightscanbestgroundtherighttodisobeyinatransitionalsociety.

ThisChaptercanbedivided into twoparts.The firstpart is conceptual;this part explains the distinction between a justification-based and a rights-basedapproachtodisobedience.Thefirstpartincludesthreesections.Thefirstsection reviews Joseph Raz’s distinction between justified disobedience and aright to disobedience. His theory informsmy own development of the rights-basedapproachtodisobedience.Thesecondsectionprovidesaconceptualtool(the distinction between a first-order reason and a second-order reason) inorder toexplain thecoredifferencebetweena justification-basedandarights-based approach to disobedience. The third section explains the idea of acountervailingreason;politicalauthoritiesmightattempttoprovideareasonforprosecuting disobedients that accepts that the disobedients have provided alegitimatebasisfortheiractsofdisobediencebutseekstoshowthatsomeotherconsideration defeats that justification. And I also explain why countervailingreasonsshouldnotbeallowedonceweunderstandthatdisobedienceisawayofshaping members’ moral profile with respect to the general obligation ofobediencetothelaw.

The secondpart of this Chapter explores themeaning of a rights-basedapproachtodisobedience.Thereare twosections in thispart.The firstsectiondemonstratestherightofmoralconvictiondevelopedbyKimberleyBrownleeinhersignificantbook,ConscienceandConviction.ThesecondsectionexplainstherightofpoliticalparticipationdevelopedbyDavidLefkowitz.Bothoftheserightscanserveasthenormativegroundfortherighttodisobey,butIarguethattheright of political participation provides the better basis in the context of atransitionalsociety.ThisargumentwillbeprovidedinChapterFive.(SeeSection4inChapterFive.)

This Chapter serves to clarify the distinction between a justification-based and a rights-based approach to disobedience. Once this distinction is inplace, it allows us to see why disobedience should be protected despite thegovernment’s general duty to maintain social order and to punish harmfulconduct.Thenormative justifications fora rights-basedconceptionof resistantdisobedienceareofferedinChapterFive.

2.TheDistinctionBetweenaJustification-BasedandaRights-BasedApproachtoCivilDisobedience

Whenandunderwhichconditionsdisobedienceisjustifiedareimportantquestions.Answerstothesequestionsarevariousandtherelationshipbetweendisobedience and nonviolencemay be caught in the crossfire. In the previouschapter I distinguished three conceptions of disobedience (the expressive, thecommunicative,andtheresistantconceptions)byexplicatingfourcorequestionsindisobedience (the relationshipbetween thedisobedients and the addressee,theforcescreatedbydisobedience,theroleoftheprincipleofnonviolence,andthejustificatorythreshold).Conceptuallythethreeconceptionsaredifferentbut

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inpracticetheyareoftenconflatedbecauseindividualsandgroupsmayrelyonreasonsthatarenotfullycoherentordevelopedattheleveloftheory.

Italsoisimportanttounderstandwhydisobedienceshouldbeprotectedagainstsuppressionbypoliticalauthorities.Thefactthatdisobedienceismorallyjustified does not mean that the justifying reason for disobedience should beconsideredalegaljustification(thatis,ajustificationthatwouldprovidealegaldefense thatwoulddefeatacriminalprosecutionandhencewouldbe takenasdecisivebya legal system).Although it is intuitively correct to think that legalliability of disobedients should be mitigated once their actions are justified(Rawls, 1971: 387), the question we are asking now is different because ourcurrent question requires us to determine how much weight the reason todisobeyshouldbegiven inaparticular legal systemandhow lawenforcementofficialsshouldevaluatesuchdisobedience.

There are two approaches to the issue of the legal treatment ofdisobedience.Thefirstapproachiscalledajustification-basedapproachandthesecondiscalledarights-basedapproach.Thesetwoapproachestodisobediencesharesomecommitmentsandtheirargumentsarecompatibleinmanyaspects.Butthereisonecrucialdifferencebetweentheminfacingthequestionastohowdisobedience should be protected. This Section aims to develop anunderstanding of the impact these two approaches have on determining thedisobedients’legalliabilities.

Section2.1discussesJosephRaz’sapproachtojustifieddisobedienceanda right to disobedience; Raz’s theory provides the foundation for the viewdevelopedhere.IacceptRaz’sdemonstrationofthedifferencebetweenjustifieddisobedience and a right to disobedience and adopt the view that a right todisobediencefunctionsasasecond-orderreasontoprotectdisobedience,notafirst-order reason to justify it. Section 2.2 makes an important distinctionbetweenfirst-orderreasonsandsecond-orderreasons.Thisdistinctionbetweentwo types of reasons helps us to understand the main difference between ajustification-based and a rights-based approach. Section 2.3 demonstrates theformal structure of reasons in deliberations about disobedience bydistinguishingtwokindsofdisobedience,directandindirect.ThemainpurposeofSection2.3istoexplaintheideaofcircumventionofreasoninajustification-basedapproach.

2.1.JosephRaz’sDistinctionBetweenJustifiedDisobedienceandaRighttoDisobeyMy illustration of the distinction between a justification-based and a

rights-based approach to disobedience is based on Joseph Raz’s explication inThe Authority of Law . 77 This explication provides Raz’s conception ofdisobedienceanditsfoundationinaliberalstate.

BeforeIsummarizeRaz’sdiscussion,Ishallbrieflyexplainthenatureofaright to disobey as I see it. I take a right to disobey as a political right that

77 Joseph Raz, “A Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience”, The Authority of Law, pp. 262-275, Oxford University Press, 2009.

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protectsmembers’actionsinthepoliticalfield—actionsthatwouldotherwiseebe prohibited onmoral grounds. Therefore, an action protected by a politicalrightcouldbeprohibitedbymoralconsiderations.Apoliticalrightisparticularbecauseitisnotgrantedtoeveryone,butonlytothosewhobelongtothesamepoliticalcommunity.What’smore,politicalrightsformasub-setofmoralrightsbecausemostmorallypermissibleactionswouldbepermittedwithintheterrainofpoliticalrights.

A political right is different from a moral right because politicallypermissibleactionscanbemorallyimpermissible.Forexample,humiliationisamorallyprohibitedactionbutmightbepoliticallypermissibleinthecontextofapolitical debate. It is also true that morally permissible actions might bepolitically impermissible because of special concerns relating to the publicinterest.Forexample,theactionofkeepingone’shealthinformationconfidentialismorallypermissible,butsuchanactionmightbepoliticallyimpermissibleforapresidentialcandidate.

If a right to disobey is a political right, then a right-holder could bepoliticallypermittedtoperformdisobedienceundercertaincircumstanceswhilesuch disobedience might be morally impermissible and vice versa. Politicalrights are not necessarily universal in terms of their content. It is possible fortwo countries to adopt the same right but construe it very differently. Forexample,a right to freeexpressionhasdifferentmeanings in theUnitedStatesandGermany. If thesedifferences canbe justified, itwould show that politicalrightsareatleastpartlysensitivetocontext.

According to Raz, most philosophers ignore the distinction between aright to disobedience and justified disobedience when discussing civildisobedience.78Thefailuretoacknowledgethisdistinctioncanbe illustratedasfollows. That one has a right to X entails that one can do something morallywrongbecause“oneneedsnorighttobeentitledtodotherightthing”and“Oneneedsarighttodowhatheshouldnotdootherwise.”(Raz,2009:266)Applyingthisargumenttocivildisobedience,thereisadifferencebetweenthepropositionthatcivildisobedienceisright(justified)andthepropositionthatonehasarighttoengageincivildisobedience.

Afterexplainingthedifferencebetweenjustifieddisobedienceandarighttodisobey,Razbasestherighttodisobeyontherightofpoliticalparticipation.IshalldiscussthisaspectofRaz’sviewinthesecondpartofthisChapter.Atthispoint Iwant to focuson the implications raisedbydistinguishingbetween thephrases“isright”and“rightto”asthesephrasesareusedbyRaz.

First, Raz’s position is that the underlying justification for a right toengageinsomeaction,X, istoprotectanagent’sautonomy.ArighttoXentailsthe fact thataright-holdershouldbeable toperformXwithoutinterferencebyothers and this right-holder can make his decision between right and wrongindependently.Thus,holdinga right toX isequivalent toa liberty.Therefore,a

78 (Many authors do tend to favour a stronger view which they often fail clearly to separate from this one, namely that one has, under certain conditions, a right to civil disobedience. It is, therefore, necessary to clarify the difference between these claims.) Joseph Raz, “A Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience”, The Authority of Law, p.266, Oxford University Press, 2009.

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right todisobeymeans that a right-holder lacks a duty either todisobeyor toobey. A right-holder can decide whether or not to disobey by himself,independentfrominterferencebyothers.

But Raz denies that in a liberal society, where the right of politicalparticipationiscompletelyprotected,membersofsocietyhavearighttodisobey.A liberal state with full protection of political participation creates conditionssuch that members’ political opinions can be fully channeled into politicaldeliberationbytheirparticipation in thenormalpoliticalprocess(e.g., throughpublic debate and discussion, voting, lobbying, and through lawful means ofprotest).Soinaliberalstatemembers’politicalparticipationcanbetransformedintolaw-makingthroughcollectivedeliberationbymembersofsociety.Ifthereis a right to disobey, this means that members of a society can performdisobedience in a circumstance in which individuals’ opinions are completelychanneled intopoliticaldeliberation. If one claimsa right todisobey, then thisimpliesthatonedoesnotliveinaliberalsociety.Razsays,“However,subjecttothis reservation, members of the illiberal state do have a right to civildisobedience which is roughly that part of their moral right to politicalparticipationwhichisnotrecognizedinlaw.”Hecontinues,startingfromanewparagraph,“thecaseisreversedinaliberalstate.Heretherecanbenorighttocivil disobediencewhichderives froma general right topolitical participation.One’srighttopoliticalactivityis,byhypothesis,adequatelyprotectedbylaw.Itcanneverjustifybreakingit.”79

Theseideasrequiresomefurtherexplanation.FollowingRaz’sdistinctionbetween justified disobedience and a right to disobey, members of a liberalsociety might perform disobedience under either justified disobedience orunjustified disobedience which requires a right to disobey. In the formercircumstance, there isnoneed formembers tobeentitled to “a right”becausethey already have substantial reasons for moral permissibility. In the lattercircumstance, insistingon a right todisobey contradictsRaz’s assumptionof aliberalstate.Membersofaliberalsocietymightarguethatthegivenprocedureisunable to channel their opinions into political participation completely. ThisargumentisinconsistentwithRaz’sassumptionthataliberalstateprovidesfullprotection of political participation. Therefore, for Raz, in a liberal state,membersofsocietyhavenoright todisobeybecause there isnoneedtograntthemthisright.Razsays, “Everyclaimthatone’sright topoliticalparticipationentitles one to take a certain action in support of one’s political aims (be theywhattheymay),eventhoughitisagainstthelaw,isipsofactoacriticismofthelaw for outlawing this action.” (Raz, 2009: 274) However, Raz admits thatoccasionally members of a liberal state can be justified in engaging in civildisobediencewhen theyhaveasubstantial first-orderreason todisobeya law.(Raz,2009:274)

Second, Raz’s distinction opens a further discussionwith respect to thequestionofthefunctionofhavingarighttoX.Mypositionisthatthefunctionofa right toX is toprovideaprotectedreason fora right-holder to rebutothers’

79 Joseph Raz, “A Right to Dissent? I. Civil Disobedience,” The Authority of Law, p. 273, Oxford University Press, 2009.

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challenge todoingX. Claiming a right toX opens a sphereof autonomy for anagenttomakeadecision:onehastodecidewhatistherightthingtodoonthebasis of one’s own deliberations. However, there is less need to protect thissphereofautonomywhensuchadecisionhasnotbeenchallenged,suspended,orinterferedwithbyothers.TakingarighttoXintoaccountshowsanimportantcontextofexercisingit:arighttoXprotectsone’sautonomyinthecircumstanceinwhichonefacesachallenge.Identifyingthiscontextimpliesapossibilitythattheright-holdercanbeprotectedfrombeingchallengedbyclaimingarighttoXimposingadutyonothersnottointervenetheperformanceofarighttoXevenifX is morally wrong. And therefore, it follows that a right to X is a protectedreasonforaright-holder’sperformanceofX.TherighttoXfunctionstopreemptreasonsthatotherwisewoulddefeatthejustificationforXing.

Third,itisstillanopenquestionwhetherarighttoXcanonlybealibertyin theHohfeldian sense (in the contextof the rightofdisobedienceas amoralandpoliticalright).80

WesleyNewcombHohfeld defines a “liberty” as a “privilege,” stating “aprivilegeistheoppositeofaduty,andthecorrelativeofa ‘no-right.’”(Hohfeld:1913,32)WhenonehasaprivilegeofdoingX,thismeansthatonedoesnothaveadutynottodoX.Hohfeldtakesthepropertyrightofowninglandasanexample.Havingaprivilegeofenteringone’sownlandistheoppositeofhavingadutytostay off. (Hohfeld: 1913, 32) The correlative of a privilege is that “no-right,”whichisatechnicaltermcreatedbyHohfeldidentifyingthataright-bearerisinapositionof “no-right” thatprohibitsaprivilege-holder toX.BasedonHohfeld’sexplanation,aprivilegecanbedefinedbythefollowingstatement:

• Privilege:AhasaprivilegetoXifandonlyifAhasnodutynottoX.81Thereisanotherlegalrelationintermsofhavingaright,thatis,aclaim.A

claim-right is a right such that the right-holder can create a duty upon others(right-bearer)whenoneclaimssucharight.Hohfelddefinesthisclaim-rightasthe following: “Inotherwords,XhasarightagainstY thatheshallstayoff theformer’sland,thecorrelative(andequivalent)isthatYisunderadutytowardXtostayofftheplace.”(Hohfeld:1913,32)AndbasedonHohfeld’sexplanation,aclaim-rightcanbedefinedbythefollowingstatement:

• Claim-Right:AhasaclaimthatBXifandonlyifBhasadutytoAtoX.82Arighttodisobeyfunctionsasaliberty-rightandaclaim-right.Ifonehas

arighttodisobey,onehasnodutynottodisobeyandonehasaclaimonothersnottointerferewithone’sdisobedience.

80 Hohfeld treats “liberty” and “privilege” synonymously in terms of having the same meaning in a legal relation. He says, “A ‘liberty’ considered as a legal relation (or ‘right’ in the loose and generic sense of that term) must mean, if it have any definite content at all, precisely the same thing as privilege, and certainly that is the fair connotation of the term as used the first three times in the passage quoted.” Wesley Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning,” 23 Yale Law Journal 16, 36 1913-1914. 81 Leif Wenar, Rights, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/ ); Last visit: 2017/04/10. 82 Leif Wenar, Rights, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/rights/ ); Last visit: 2016/04/10.

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Raz treated first-order reasons for disobedience and second-orderreasons for protecting disobedience as ways of convincing others to approvedisobedience. He says, “Generally two kinds of arguments are relevant forjudging another person’s action, two kinds of argument that aman can use toconvinceanother rationally thathe is entitled toperforma certainact.He canshowthattheactisright(orthatthereisreasontothinkthatitis)orhecanshowthathehas(orthatthereisreasontothinkthathehas)arighttoperformit.”(Raz,2009:274)Theproblemisthatthereisadifferencebetweenconvincingotherstoapproveone’sdisobedienceanddefendingothers’suspension(orinterference)of one’s disobedience.Waldron provides one example showing this difference.He says, “…if somebody asks me, ‘Why did you vote for the National Frontcandidate?’or‘Whydidyouspendallthatmoneyonracehorsesandchampagne?’or‘Whydidyoumarrysomeoneyouloathed?’theanswer, ‘Iwasexercisingmymoralrights,’isnotanappropriatereply.”83Waldronhastheviewthatrightsdonotprovidereasonsforacting.Thisiscorrectsofarasitgoes.Butinthecaseofdisobedience, the function of a right to disobey is not to convince others thatone’s disobedience was justified, but instead serves to rebut challenges todisobedience.(SeeSection6inChapterOne.)

RazthinksthatonecandosomethingmorallywrongbyclaimingarighttoX.ButasRazsays,onedoesnotneedtoclaimarighttoXifthereisasufficientreason toX. If a right todisobey can shielddisobedience from interventionbyothers, then this right to disobey functions as a second-order reason fordisobedients to defeat challenges and not as a first order reason for others toapprovedisobedience.Ifthisanalysisiscorrect,thentherighttodisobedienceisa second-order reason that protects disobedience from interference and not afirst-orderreasonthatjustifiesdisobedience.

Furthermore,toclaimarighttodisobeydoesnotcanceltherequirementfor justification of disobedience in the first place. That requirement remains,especially when the disobedients aim to induce others to engage in action.Justifyingdisobediencebyclaimingarighttodisobeycannotprovideotherswitha reason to act. This becomes clear once we realize that a right to disobeyimpliesasimilarrightnottodisobey.Therightallowsthepotentialdisobedientto make the choice. The function of a right to disobey is to protect an act ofdisobedience from being challenged, not to persuade others to accept a first-orderreasontodoingsomeaction.

Razalsodeniesthatmembersofsocietyinaliberalstatehavearighttodisobedience. Raz’s argument is not convincing because members in such asociety still need this right to protect themselves from unjust treatment thathappensoccasionallyeven ina liberal state.This issue is important,but itwillnot be addressed further in thisDissertation,which is limited to the case of atransitional society.Myview is thateven ina liberal state,membersof societystillhavearighttodisobedience.

83 Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong,” Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, p. 72, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

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2.2.FirstandSecondOrdersReasonsandtheDistinctionBetweenaJustification-BasedandaRights-BasedApproachtoDisobedienceBased on Raz’s explication we can differentiate two approaches to

disobedience:ajustification-basedapproachandarights-basedapproach.Thesetwo approaches share certain normative commitments but they diverge withrespecttohowdisobedienceshouldbeprotected.Mypurposeinthissectionistoexplicate thedistinctionbetween first-orderreasonsandsecond-orderreasonsasthebasisforunderstandinghowsuchdivergencehappens.

Civildisobedience isakindofactionthatdisobedientsmust justify.Andfrom the disobedients’ perspective a reason to disobey is necessary becausewithout justification disobedience would lose its persuasive force.84 In otherwords, if the disobedients purport to create a persuasive effect, they mustperform communicative disobedience that is based on reasons, which couldpersuadethemajorityregardingtheissuesathand.(SeeSection2.2.inChapterThree.)However,expressiveandresistantdisobediencedonotnecessarilyhavethesameneedforjustification,becausepersuasiveeffectisnotthemainpurposeforperformingexpressiveorresistantdisobedience.

Two types of reasons are relevant to the justification of disobedience:first-order reasons and second-order reasons. First-order reasons are reasonsthat provide justification for an action by an agent; in the context of civildisobedience, first order reasons are those reasons that provide a normativegroundforperformingdisobedience.Thesereasonsmightbemoral,political,orreligious,buttotheextentthattheyprovideanormativegroundforengaginginan act of disobedience they are first-order reasons. Second-order reasons ingeneral are reasons that operate on first-order reasons; in the context of civildisobedience, second-order reasons are reasons to protect performance ofdisobedience from interference by others—such protection constitutes anassignment of jurisdiction over the decision of whether or not to disobey theindividual disobedient and removing jurisdiction from others, including lawenforcementofficials.85

This distinction between first and second-order reasons provides thebasis foradynamicpictureofdisobedience.Disobedience isusuallychallengedatthetimewhendisobedienceoccurs,orwhenaplantoengageindisobediencehasbeenmadepublic.Takeahypotheticalexample:

John, living inasociety inwhichaviolentganggroup ispopular,affirms the freedom of expression and does not trust his government

84 I take disobedience as a kind of action based on practical reasoning. more exactly speaking , it is a sub-kind of moral reasoning. See Henry S. Richardson, “Moral Reasoning,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/reasoning-moral/); Last visit: 2016/01/09. (“moral reasoning…as a type of reasoning directed towards deciding what to do and, when successful, issuing in an intention.”) 85 According to Raz, a second-order reason is “a reason to act on or refrain from acting on a reason.” (Raz, 2009: 39) This is a commonly shared understanding of a second-order reason. My definition of a second-order reason is limited to it being a reason to protect an action.

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because the government has suppressed the freedom of speech for asubstantialperiodoftime.Nowthecoloryellowhasbeenrecognizedforsome time as the symbol of the gang group and this group forcesmembers towear this color toshowtheir support. Inorder tostop thisforcefuldisclosure,John’sgovernmentprohibitsthewearingofyellowinpublic. John disapproves of this gang group but he also thinks the lawinfringes on the freedom of expressionwithout sufficient reason. OthermembersofJohn’ssocietybelievethatsuchalawisjustifiedbecausethiskind of prohibition can preempt the possibility of forceful disclosure ofone’s position. John disagrees, because he thinks the freedom ofexpression is superior. Therefore, he takes protecting the freedom ofexpression as his first-order reason to disobey the law prohibiting thewearing of yellowgarments.After disobeying the law individually, Johnrealizesthathemustpersuadeotherstodisobeyaswell ifhewantsthegovernment to change the law. So he begins to persuade others not toobeythelaw.Inordertoremindothersoftheimportanceofthefreedomof expression, John starts to persuade others to join the course ofdisobedienceandprovidesasreasonstherighttochoosecoloredapparelasameansofprotest.Johnaimstoconvinceotherstoaccepthisreasontodisobey.Johninvitesotherstojoinhisprotest,leadingthegovernmenttoinstitutelegalproceedingsinordertopunishJohn.

This is a simplified hypothetical example, but there is a similar case inSingapore.86We can see John has a first-order reason to disobey the law (theprohibitiononwearingyellowclothes): Johnbelieves that the law infringesonthefreedomofexpression.Thisreasonjustifieshisaction,i.e.,persuadingothersto oppose the law. Assume that in the hypothetical example, John’s first-orderreasons for disobedience are subject to challenge by others with thecountervailing first-order reason of maintaining the government’s authority.Second-orderreasonswouldbearonthequestionofhowtheagentandothersshould act when the government decides to intervene (to punish John’sdisobedience),whentheirfirst-orderreasons(toenforcethelaw)areinconflict.

This hypothetical case illustrates the issues that divide a justification-basedandarights-basedapproachtodisobedience:

1. A justification-based and a rights-based approach share a normativecommitment: the disobedient must justify his disobedience withsubstantialandsufficient first-orderreasons todisobey. Inotherwords,bothofthempermitnoarbitrarydisobedience.87

86 The only public place for lawful protests in Singapore is the Speaker’s Corner in the Hong Ling Park. But after Lee, Kuan-Yew’s death, the government indefinitely closed the Speaker’s Corner which led to any protest being illegal. See Mary-Ann Russon, “Lee Kuan Yew Death: Singapore’s Speakers’ Corner Shut Down During National Mourning Period,” in International Business Time, published on March 25, 2015. (http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/lee-kuan-yew-death-singapores-speakers-corner-shut-down-during-national-mourning-period-1493554 ); Last visit: 2016/01/09/. 87 One misunderstanding is that only a justification-based approach requires disobedients to justify, but a rights-based approach does not because the disobedients have a right to disobey. This is incorrect because the question of to what extent disobedience is justified belongs to the question of which conception of disobedience should be adopted, not to the distinction between a justification-based and a rights-based approach.

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2. Bothapproachesagreethatfirst-orderreasonsarethekeytopersuadingotherstodisobey.

3. The two approaches disagree on the question of whether the right todisobeyprovidesagroundforrebuttingchallengestodisobedienceandareasonagainstinterventionsthatseektointerferewithdisobedience.

Ajustification-basedapproachinsiststhatJohn’sfirst-orderreasonisthesoleground forprotectinghisdisobedienceagainst interference,whilearights-basedapproachdeniesthisisthesoleground—becausearighttodisobeyisanindependent source of protection of disobedience and imposes normativerequirements on the opponent of disobedience. Therefore, a rights-basedapproach takes a right to disobey as a second-order reason protectingdisobediencebutajustification-basedapproachtreatsthefirst-orderreasonfordisobedience as a second-order reason to protect disobedience againstinterference.

Now there may be doubt about whether a first-order reason can alsofunctionasasecond-orderreason.But indaily lifepeopleoftenuse their first-orderreasonsassecond-orderreasonsthatprotecttheiractionsfromchallenge.Forexample,a fatherwhohadpromised to tellhis sona storybeforebedtimewas too tired to do this after work and breached his promise. His son mightchallenge (or keep asking) his father to keep the promise of telling a story bysaying that keeping a promise is important because thismaintains trust. Thisfathermight respond tohis son’s challengeby saying thathe isexhaustedandtherefore has a good reason not to keep his promise. The father’s first-orderreasonfunctionsasasecond-orderreasontoprotecthisnoncompliancewithhispromise.Ofcoursetheremightbeanotherscenario,e.g.,thisfatherwasinabadmood afterwork, told the son “I amyour father, you shouldnot challengemydecision, and that’s it.” In this second scenario the second-order reason isdifferentfromthefirst-orderreason.Themostsalientfeatureinajustification-basedapproach is that itassigns thiskindofdouble function to thereason fordisobedience and hence denies that a mistaken belief that disobedience isjustifiedcanprotectdisobediencefrominterference.

We can illuminate the difference between a justification-based and arights-based approach to disobedience by examining a scenario involvingmistakenbelief.AssumethatJohnmakesafactualmistake.Infactthereisnolawprohibitingthewearingofyellowclothing.Itfollowsthatdisobedienceofsuchalaw is not possible. John mistakenly believes the prohibition exists, and heescalateshisactionbyviolatingother laws toget thepublic’sattention. In thisscenario, a justification-based approach denies that John’s disobedience isprotected against interference, but a rights-based approach supports suchprotection.Arights-basedapproachdoesnotrequirethatone’ssubjectivebeliefbe correct in order to protect disobedience because disobedience itself is theexercise of a right to disobey in conjunction with a first-order reason fordisobedience. Thus, a right to disobey protects disobedience from beingchallengedeveninacaseofmistakenbelief.

Thedistinctionbetweenajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachmatters for another reason. A justification-based approach permits political

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authorities to suspend or prohibit disobedience without fulfilling theappropriateburdenofproofthatrequiresashowingthatthereisarealneedtosuspenddisobedience.Thejustificationbasedapproachallowstheauthoritiestocircumvent the reasons that justify disobedience: because there is no right todisobedience, the authorities can prohibit disobedience without any showingthat the reasons justifying disobedience are invalid. This constitutes a“circumvention”ofthereasonsfordisobedience.

SofarIhaveillustratedthedifferencebetweenajustification-basedandarights-based approach to disobedience by using the conceptual distinctionbetweenfirst-orderandsecond-orderreasons.ThenextSectionwillexploretheideaofcircumventionofreasonsbyexplicatingaformalframeworkofreasonsindirectandindirectdisobedience.

2.3.TheIdeaofCircumventionofReasonsinaJustification-BasedApproachAjustification-basedapproachcreatestheproblemofthecircumvention

of reasons. This problem arises because the political authorities can adopt areasonforsuspendingdisobediencethatdoesnotrebutdisobedients’first-orderreason to disobey. This Section explains how the circumvention of reasonshappensbyapplyinga justification-basedapproachboth in casesofdirect andindirectdisobedience.

Thebasic ideaof the circumventionof reasons canbe illustrated in thefollowingFigure.Thedisobedients’ first-orderreasonseithercanbe taken intoaccount by the political authority or excluded from consideration. Thecircumvention of reason can be seen via the manner in which the politicalauthorities can exclude the disobedients’ first-order reasons and ignore theirlegitimate claims by solely emphasizing the disobedients’ reason to obey. Thefollowing twoSectionsprovide the illustrationof thecircumventionof reasonsincasesofdirectandindirectdisobedience.

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Figure17:TheIdeaofCircumventionofReasons

2.3.1.TheCircumventionofReasonsinDirectDisobedience

“Direct disobedience” refers to disobedience in circumstances such thatthecontentofthedisobeyedlawismorallyimpermissiblefromthepointofviewof thedisobedients.88Fromtheirpointofview, theybelieve that thecontentofthelawdoesnotconstituteareasonforthemtoobeyand,becausethatcontentisinconsistentwiththeirmoralconvictions,theydohaveareasontodisobey.

Wecanabbreviatea “reason todisobey”as “RD.” DisobedientshaveanRDiftheybelievethatthecontentofalawismorallyimpermissible(ormorallyunjustifiable). In direct disobedience, disobedience is justified by showing thatthelegalcontentinquestionismorallyimpermissible.Thereforejustificationofdisobediencerequiresashowingthatlegalcontentisinconsistentwithmoralorpolitical principles. However this legal content is not the only factor that thedisobedients should consider. The protested lawmight be enacted by fair andjustdemocraticprocedures.Thefactthattheprotestedlawwaspassedbyafaircollectiveprocedure constitutes a reason to obey the law.This reason to obey

88 Direct disobedience was defined by Rawls as a civilly disobedient act that breaches the law that is the object of protest. (TJ, §55: 364) The definition of direct disobedience adopted by the court can be seen in United States v. Schoon, 939 F.2d 826 (1991). (Indirect civil disobedience involves violating a law or interfering with a government policy that is not, itself, the object of protest. Direct civil disobedience, on the other hand, involves protesting the existence of a law by breaking that law or by preventing the execution of that law in a specific instance in which a particularized harm would otherwise follow. See Note, Applying the Necessity Defense to Civil Disobedience Cases, 64 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 79, 79-80 & n. 5 (1989).)]

ReasontoObeyFirst-OrderReasontoDisobey

FreedomofExpression

Theimportanceofpoli;calexpression

FairProcedure

TheExerciseofPoli;calPower(LawEnforcement)

Plainfactofviola;nglaws

Firstorderreason

CausedHarms

TheCircumven;onofReasons

TheExerciseofPoli;calPower

(LawEnforcement)

TheObliga;ontoEnforcetheLaw

Firstorderreason

CausedHarms

Path1

Path2

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mightnotbedecisivebutshouldbeconsideredbythedisobedients. Letuscallthisreason“democraticlegitimacy.”Letusabbreviatea“reasontoobey”as“RO.”Democratic legitimacy is an RO for all laws that are in fact enacted by fairdemocraticprocedures.

This framework can be applied to the example of John’s protest of theprohibitionagainstwearingyellowattire. Johnbelieves that the contentof theyellow-attireprohibitionismorallyimpermissibleandhisactionofdisobediencedirectly violates the legal content of the law. His RD is that the law violatesfreedomofexpression.WhileJohnhasanRD,healsohasanRO,thedemocraticlegitimacyofthelaw. SupposethatinthiscaseJohn’sRDoutweighsortrumpshisRO.

John’s RO (democratic legitimacy) is also a reason for his opponents tochallengeJohn’sdisobedience.TheopponentsmightnotdirectlycounterJohn’sRD(violationofthefreedomofexpression). Rather,theycouldrelyonthefactthat Johnhas ignoredthe importantvalueofobeyingadecisionmadebya fairand democratic procedure. Whatever the specific reason, the opponents ofdisobediencecanbasetheirattackonROwithoutdenyingJohn’sRD.

Inordertorebutthechallengefromtheopponents,Johnhastwopossiblestrategies. The first strategy is to emphasize John’s RD, that is, the moralimpermissibility of the protested law. The second strategy is to question thevalue of democratic participation by showing that democratic legitimacy doesnotprovideadecisivereasontoobey.

Consider the first strategy. The opponents could challenge John’sdisobediencebyarguingthattheprohibitionofyellowclothingitselfispoliticallycontestedandhencethatthepropermethodofchallengingthestatuteisnormalpolitical appeal and not direct disobedience. Or, more antagonistically, theopponents might contend that the protested law is morally acceptable andthereby negate John’s justification for disobedience. Both of these rebuttals toJohn’sreasontodisobeytargethisfirst-orderreason.

Now consider the second strategy. Instead of targeting the reason todisobey, opponentsmight emphasize the importance of the reason to obey byfocusing on the significance of complying with democratically legitimatecollective decisions. Thus, the opponents might argue that many politicalquestionsarecontroversial.Ifeverycontroversialdecisionweretoleadtocivildisobedience, the result would be social disorder with substantial harmfuleffects. Therefore,theROprovidedbythedemocraticlegitimacyofacollectivedecisionisaveryweightyreason.

The picture I have drawn is a simplified picture of direct disobediencethatillustratesseveralpossibilitiesforchallengingdirectdisobedience.Nowwecan consider the implications of a justification-based approach to directdisobedience.

John’s opponents have two ways to challenge his disobedience: (1)challenge his argument about the freedom of expression; and (2) target hisignorance of the reason to obey. With a justification-based approach, theopponent is free to choose theway to rebut disobedience because there is noindependentreasonthatlimitsthebasisforopposingdisobedience.John’sfirst-

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orderreasoncannotbindtheopponentunlesstheopponentsalsoadmit John’sfirstorderreason:John’sreasontodisobeyisthereasontheopponentsshouldrebut (if they disagree with it), not the reason they that should be bound tononinterference with John’s disobedience. Therefore, in a justification-basedapproach the opponents can simply circumvent the first-order reasons fordisobedience.

The role that opponents occupy makes a difference in cases wherecircumvention of the reasons for disobedience occurs. Governments have anobligationtoenforcethelawandadutytomaintainsocialorder.Incontrasttoordinarymembersof society,officialsalsohavea first-order reason toenforcethe law.Whentheopponentsofdisobedienceholdapoliticaloffice thatmakesthemcapableof intervening,suspending,prosecuting,or judgingthe legalityofthedisobedient’saction,thecircumventionofreasonscreatesanopportunityforthemtochallengedisobedienceinawaythatignoresthequestionofwhetherthedisobedientshavesufficientreasontodisobey.

Ajustification-basedapproachdoesnotimposeamoralobligationforthegovernment to consider whether the disobedient’s first-order reason fordisobeying the lawcounterbalances the government’s obligation to enforce thelaw. Reasons to challenge direct disobedience can always be re-routed to theopponent’s obligation to enforce the law and disobedient’s duty to respectdemocratically legitimate collective decisions. For this reason, a justification-basedapproachhastheeffectoflocatingapublicofficial’sdecisiontochallengedisobedienceinasphereofdiscretion.

2.3.2.TheCircumventionofReasonsinIndirectDisobedienceNowletusturntoacaseof indirectdisobedience.Indirectdisobedience

referstothecircumstanceinwhichthereisnomeanstodirectlydisobeyalawthat is deemed to be immoral. This can occur because themembers of societywho believe that law is immoral are not themselves the target of this law orbecausetheimmorallegalcontentispartofapolicythatregulatesgovernmentactionandnottheconductofordinarymembersofsociety. Incasesof indirectdisobedience,membersofsocietymustviolateotherlawsinordertoengageincivil disobedience. But the legal content of these other laws will (usually) bemorallyjustifiedoratleastnotdirectlycontrarytotherequirementsofmorality.Forexample,apeacefulprotestviaasit-inmightviolatetrafficregulationsthataremorally justified. Disobedience is indirect in the sense that the law that isdisobeyedisnotthelawthatthedisobedientsfindobjectionable.

John’sdisobedienceisacaseofdirectdisobediencebutwecanmodifythedetails so that it becomes indirect. Suppose John now protests a law thatprohibits votingbypersons inprison.There isnoway for John todisobey thelawinquestionbecauseheisnotaprisoner.Sohedecidestoviolateotherlawsas a means of protest. This scenario is more complex in the sense that Johnshould be concerned with two types of laws in conjunction with reasons todisobeyandobey.Supposethat Johnintendstoviolatetraffic lawstoprotest. Icalltheselawsthedisobeyednorm(DNhereinafter).Andthelawofrestrictingprisoners’righttovoteisthetargetednorm(TNhereinafter).AssumeboththeDNandtheTNwereenactedthroughafairanddemocraticprocedureandhence

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possessdemocraticlegitimacy.JohnhasareasontoobeyDNfortworeasons:(1)itscontentismorallyjustified,and(2)theDNisdemocraticallylegitimate.

WhatmakesJohn’scasecomplexisthatthemoralimpermissibilityofTN(restrictingprisoners’righttovote)isinsufficientbyitselftobethegroundsofJohn’sdisobedience. ThisisbecausethemoralimpermissibilityofTNdoesnottell John which laws he should disobey. In order to justify John’s “indirect”disobedience, Johnmustbeable toexplainwhyhechose todisobey the trafficlaws.

ThusJohnneedsasupplementaryreasontojustifywhichDNhedisobeysas ameans of protesting the TN. For example, hemight claim that violating acarefully-chosenlawcanachievehispurposeofaddressingtheunjustrestrictiononprisoners’votingrights,e.g.,violatingtrafficlawsinalocationnearaprison(by conducting a sit-in that blocks traffic)might be an effectiveway of callingattentiontohiscause.

John also must consider how much moral weight to assign to thejustifications for the DN. The DN’s moral weight must be outweighed by thesupplementary reason for disobedience to be justified. Therefore, in order tojustify indirectdisobedience, twokindsofreasonsarerequired.Bothkindsarefirst-order reasons.The firstkind is a reason to criticize theTNby illustratingthe fact that the TN’s content is morally impermissible. The second kind is asupplementaryreasontodemonstratetherelationbetweentheDNandtheTN,andtooverridethereasontoobeytheDN.

Fromtheperspectiveoftheopponentsofdisobedience,theymayjustifytheir opposition in two ways: they can challenge either the first first-orderreasons uponwhich the disobedient relies or they can provide a second first-orderreasonthatdefeatsthesefirst-orderreasons.Forexample,theopponentsofJohn’ssit-incouldeitherarguethattherestrictionofprisoners’votingrightsismorally permissible (a first-order reason) or they could emphasize thesignificanceof the fact that the traffic lawswereproducedbyademocraticallylegitimatecollectivedecision(thatis,asecond-orderreason).

When the opponents of disobedience are private actors, the distinctionbetweenajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachtodisobedienceislesssignificant because private actors lack political power over decisions tointervene and suspend the course of disobedience, and they are not in anormativeposition toenforce the lawandmaintainsocialorder.Butwhen theopponents occupy a public office that is authorized by law to intervene or tosuspendthecourseofdisobedience,thisdistinctiondoesmatter.Asinthecaseofdirectdisobedience,politicalauthoritiescaneitherchallengethelegitimacyofadisobedient’sfirst-orderreasonorovercometheforceofthedisobedient’sfirst-orderreasonbyemphasizingtheimportanceoftheobligationtoenforcethelawefficiently.

When considering John’s case, the circumvention of reasons becomesmoreexplicit.Johnmustjustifyhisdisobediencebyidentifyingtwotypesoffirst-order reasons with respect to the disobeyed norms and targeted norms.Therefore,inordertorebuttheopponents’challenge,Johnmustsatisfyahigherstandard for justification. Johnmust justify his action of disobedience, but thepoliticalauthoritiescanchoosetorelyonasecond-orderreasontoattackJohn’s

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disobedience. A justification-based approach might claim that politicalauthoritiesoughttoconsiderJohn’sfirst-orderreasonbeforetheyconcludethatthesereasonsareoverriddenbysecondorderconsiderations.Normatively, thepolitical authorityhas theoptionnot to challenge John’s first-order reasonbutinsteadtorelysolelyontheimportanceofJohn’sobligationtoobeythelaw.Asina case of direct disobedience, the reason to suspend indirect disobedience canalwaysbere-routedtocriticizethedisobedients’inappropriatechoiceofDNandtheirdutytorespectaDNthatwasenactedthroughafairprocedure.

2.4.TheMoralDifferenceBetweenDisobedienceandOrdinaryCriminalConduct--TheFunctionofMoralProfilingIhaveshownhowa justification-basedapproachtodisobedienceallows

thecircumventionofreasonsbothindirectandindirectdisobedience,butIhavenot yet explained why this circumvention of reason is undesirable. My basicargument is the following. First, actions of civil disobedience are conceptuallydifferentfromsimplelaw-breakingactionsduetothecontextualconditionsthatconstitute disobedience. Allowing the circumvention of reasons implies that apolitical authority would be morally justified in ignoring these contextualconditions and hence that the authorities would be justified in treating thedisobedientsthesamewaytheytreatedordinarycriminals.Ifthereisnoextranormative ground to support the moral difference between actions ofdisobedience and ordinary law-breaking, then one imlication is that civildisobedience shouldbeevaluated the sameway thatordinary criminal actionsareevaluated.

Second,therearetwolevelsofconflictbetweenthereasonstoengageincivildisobedienceand thereasons toobey the law.The first level iswithin thedisobedients’deliberationsthatweighthereasontodisobeyagainstthereasontoobeyfromthefirst-personperspective. Thesecondlevelexistsbetweenthedisobedients’ reason todisobeyand thepoliticalauthority’s reason to suspenddisobedience.Toleranceof thecircumventionof reasonconceals theconflictatthe second level because such tolerance ignores the fact that the exercise ofpolitical power to challenge and suspend disobedience can change members’moralprofilewithrespecttotheobligationtoobeythelaw.Ishallfocusonthesecondargumentinthefollowingsection.

One failure that arises from adopting a justification-based approach isthatsuchanapproachcannotrevealtheconflictofpoliticalmoralitybetweenthedisobedients and political authority. I useMark Greenberg’s theory, themoralimpacttheoryoflaw,toillustratethisconflict.

In terms of political morality, there are two levels of conflict indisobedience.Thefirstlevelexistswithinthedisobedients’reasonstoobeyanddisobey. This level of conflict occurs whenmembers of society consider whattheyoughttodofromthefirstpersonperspectivewhentheyappealtotheirownsense of justice and seek to invoke the sense of justice of other members ofsociety through disobedience. They must consider reasons for and againstdisobedience in order to determine whether they ought to disobey, and they

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mustalsoconsiderwhat reasonconstitutes their first-order reason todisobey,andhowthisreasonoutweighscountervailingreasonsforobedience.

Gandhi’sspeechin1922illustratesthefirstlevelofconflict.Hesays,“Thefirst shock came in the shape of the Rowlatt Act--a law designed to rob thepeopleofallrealfreedom.Ifeltcalledupontoleadanintensiveagitationagainstit.”89 The Rowlatt Act allowed some cases to be tried without a jury andpermittedthedetentionofsuspectswithouttrial.

Gandhi’s disobedience was duty-driven, but he was required to decidewhether disobediencewas unavoidablewhenhe encountered theRowlattAct.Thestructureofthefirstlevelofconflictisimportant,andinvestigatingthislevelof conflict can provide a better understanding of howmoral reason works interms of civil disobedience. But the second level of conflict has received lessattentionintheliteratureoncivildisobedience.

Thissecondlevelofconflictinvolvesaclashofpoliticalmoralitybetweenthe disobedients and political authorities. I shall illustrate how this conflicthappens in the following discussion. Once again, I will use Mark Greenberg’smoral impact theory of law in order to explain how the action of a legalinstitution can have an impact on themoral profile ofmembers’ obligation toobey the law. Understanding this impactwillenableus toseehowthesecondlevelofconflictoccurs.

Themoral impact theory of law is a general theory byMarkGreenbergwhich posits that the content of the law results from the effect that legalinstitutionshaveonmoralobligation.90His theorymaintains, “legalobligationsare a subset of moral obligations” and “the law is the moral impact of therelevantactionsoflegalinstitutions.”(Greenberg,2014:1290)MypurposehereisnottoevaluateGreenberg’stheory;instead,Iwilladopthisapproachinordertoexplicateandilluminatethesecondlevelofconflictincivildisobedience.

Thefirsttaskistoidentifythekeyelementsofthemoralimpacttheoryoflaw.Therearethreekeyelements,eachofwhichIwillexamineinturn.

First, Greenberg posits that legal obligations as a subset of moralobligations.Andmoralobligationshavethreecharacteristics:theyarepractical,all-things-considered, and genuine. One implication in his definition of moralobligationisthatamoralobligationultimatelydetermineswhatoneoughttodobecause moral obligation are not pro tanto obligations: because they are all-things-consideredobligations,theyarenecessarilydecisive.91

Second,theterm‘moralprofile’iscoinedbyGreenbergtorepresentallofthe obligations one has. Greenberg understands the content of law as thechangeinthemoralprofileofeachindividualthatresultsfromlegalinstitutions

89 See, Statement in The Great Trial of 1922 (http://www.gandhimanibhavan.org/gandhicomesalive/speech3.htm); Last visit: 2015/06/10. 90 Mark Greenberg, “The Moral Impact Theory of Law,” The Yale Law Journal, 123: 1288-1342. 91 Greenberg uses a case of promising to pick up a friend at the airport to say this obligation might be trumped by the fact that a promisor’s mother was ill at the promised time. In such a case this promissory obligation is pro tanto. (Greenberg, 2014: 1307)

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andactions.Thus,thecontentofastatuteisthechangethatthestatutemakesinthemoralprofileofpersonsgovernedbythestatute.

Third, Greenberg’s theory is different from what he calls the StandardPicture. The standard picture, according to Greenberg, is that legal content isdeterminedbythecommunicativecontentoflegaltexts.Thus,thelegalcontentofastatutecorrespondstowhatthestatutesays.Greenberg’sideaisthat“legalinstitutions change our moral obligations by changing the relevantcircumstances (and not by doing so via changes in the content of law).”(Greenberg,2014:1310)Forexample,thechangeproducedbyastatuteinthemoral profile of persons subject to the statutemight be significantly differentthanwhatthestatutesays,becausethemoralprofileofindividualsistheresultof an all-things-considered judgment that necessarily takes into accountmoralreasonsotherthanthestatuteitself.

The second task is to explicate Greenberg’s arguments for the moralimpacttheory.Hisargumentbeginswiththeideathatafundamentalpurposeforestablishingalegalsystemistomaketheuseofviolencemorallyimpermissible.Punishing wrongdoings is a significant way to draw a line between morallypermissibleactionsandmorallyimpermissibleactions.Withregardtopunishingwrongdoing, “theactionsof legal institutionsareable tomakedeterminateandknowableaspectsofmorality that areotherwise either relatively indeterminateoruncertain.”(Greenberg,2014:1311;emphasisadded)Thisfunctionofmakingaspects of morality determinate and knowable is true both for actions of thejudiciary and the legislature. Why can legal institutions justifiably change themoral landscape? Greenberg offers the answer that “to the extent that peoplehave the ability to participate equally in governance, legal institutions canharness democratic considerations to alter the moral landscape.” (Greenberg,2014:1312)

Greenberg’s democratic considerations argument explicitly admits thatdemocraticarrangementsconstituteareasonformembersofsociety,whohavethe ability to participate equally, to abide by those arrangements. Greenberg’s‘democratic consideration’ touches the core issueof theobligation to obey thelaw, and I assume that Greenberg is right in the sense thatmembers’ politicalparticipation provides the reason for them to obey the law. Since equalparticipation is a reason to obey the law, “legal institutions can create moralobligationstoparticipateinspecificschemesforthepublicgood,suchaspayingtaxes.”(Greenberg,2014:1314)ThiselementofGreenberg’stheorywillenableustounderstandhowmoralconflictoccursincivildisobedienceand,therefore,Iwillexplainthisaspectofhistheoryinmoredetail.

Withoutalegalsystemthereisapracticalgapbetweenthegeneralmoralobligationtohelpothersandspecificactionsthatwillfulfillthisobligation.Legalinstitutionscanprovidespecificmechanismsthatenablemembersofsocietytosatisfy their general obligation to help others. A scheme of taxation is oneexample of such a mechanism. As Greenberg says, “by specifying a particularscheme and making it salient, creating the mechanism for everyone toparticipate in that scheme, and ensuring the others will not free-ride, legalinstitutionscanchannelthepre-existing,relativelyopen-ended,moralobligation

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into amoral obligation topay a specified amountofmoney into that scheme.”(Greenberg,2014:1314-1315)

Much could be said about Greenberg’s theory, but I now focus only onhow his theory can explain the second level of conflict in disobedience. Thesecondlevelsdefinedasfollows:thereisaconflictofpoliticalmoralitybetweenthe disobedients and the exercise of political authority. Both disobedients andauthoritiesaimatchangingthemoralprofileofmembersofsociety;bothofthemaddress their actions to thepublic.On the onehand, thedisobedientswant topersuade the public to recognize that a specific obligation to obey the law nolongerexistsundercurrentcircumstancesandthereforethattheirdisobedienceof the lawis justified.Ontheotherhand, theexerciseofpoliticalauthority likelaw enforcement, prosecution, or a trial aims to maintain (or reinforce) theobligationtoobeythelawbyshowingthroughlegalactionthatdisobedienceisnot morally permissible. There is a conflict as to whether there is a genuinemoralobligationtoobeythelawandwhetherthereasonstodisobeyheldbythedisobedientstrumpthegeneralconsiderationsthatfavorcompliancewithlegalrequirements.

Let me take the case of criminalizing disobedience as the example. Acriminal code makes certain patterns of conduct morally impermissible bydeclaring that such conduct is unlawful and by punishing the conduct. Ajudgment of conviction changes themoral profile of the convicted person andothers (suchasprisonofficials). Butwhat ismore important in thecontextofcivil disobedience is that the decision to prosecute itself changes the moralprofileofpersonswhodisobeythelaw.Prosecutingviolationsofthelawisawayto tell members of society what kind of conduct is legally impermissible andought to be blameworthy. Therefore, prosecuting action X tells members ofsociety that X itself is legally impermissible in a particular circumstanceidentifiedbytheprosecutor.Prosecutionofparticularactsofcivildisobedienceis an expression by the political authorities of the view that these acts ofdisobedience are morally wrong and a signal that the authorities will punishsimilarcasesinthefuture.Butfromtheperspectiveofthedisobedientsthemostessentialthingisthatthereisnospecificobligationtoobeythelawasagenuine(all-things-considered) moral obligation given that the disobedients have asubstantialfirst-orderreasonthatjustifiestheirdisobedience.

Such conflict can be seen when law enforcement authorities suspenddisobedience by breaking up a march and detaining the disobedients, andsubsequently prosecute themarchers and impose sanctions against them. Thekey point is that legal institutions’ actions show a certain attitude towardsdisobedienceandclaim tohavean impacton themoralprofileofdisobedientsandotherswithrespecttotheirobligationtoobeythelaw.Theremightbeacasewhere disobedients were detained but then released by a court’s decisionbecause the detention lacked sufficient legal ground. But this example onlydemonstratesthatalegalinstitutionhasthefinalword;institutionalfinalitydoesnotdenythatthesecondlevelofconflictexists.

A more radical understanding of the nature of this conflict is thatdisobedienceaimstooverturncertainlegalinstitutionsaltogether.Insuchacasethe disobedients and political authority are fighting over who can shape the

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moral profile of the members of society; both the disobedients and theauthorities hope to persuade the public to accept their moral view and itsimplications.Thedisobedientsarenotonly fighting for their ideasbutalso forclarificationof the conditionsunderwhich they arebound (andnotbound) toobey the law. They try to shape the moral profile of members of society byperformingdisobedience.Ontheotherside,theauthoritiesimposesanctionsondisobedients in order to tell othermembers of society that they are bound toobeythelawevenwhenthelawexceedsthelimitsoftheirmoraltolerance.

Once we understand the function of disobedience with respect to themoralprofileofmembersofsociety,itbecomesclearerthatajustification-basedapproachfailstoprotectthesecondlevelofconflictofpoliticalmoralitybetweenthe disobedients and the political authority. Because a justification-basedapproachallowsthecircumventionofreasons,itpermitsthepoliticalauthoritiestoenjoyawidescopeofdiscretiontodeterminewhetherandtowhatextentthesecondlevelofconflictshouldberevealedtothepublic.Weshouldalwayskeepinmind that the first levelof conflict (the reason todisobeyand the reason toobey the law) is always one critical factor for the political authorities in theirevaluation of the disobedients’ wrongdoing, but only by revealing the secondlevelof conflictofpoliticalmorality canwedeterminewhatevaluative criteriathe political authorities are using when they prosecute and sanction civildisobedience.

A rights-based approach obligates political authorities to reveal thesecondlevelofconflict.ThisrequirementresultsfromtheeffectoftheburdenofproofthatIwillexploreandjustifyinSection3.2.ThenextSectionwillfocusonthe ideaofa rights-basedapproach, thesourceof theright todisobey,and theeffectsafteradoptingthisapproachasawaytoprotectdisobedience.

3.ARights-BasedApproachtoDisobedience:ItsSourceandEffect

This Section focuses on the idea of a rights-based approach todisobediencebyexplicatingthemeaningandsourceoftherighttodisobey;theSectionthendescribestheeffectsoftherights-basedapproachontheprotectionofdisobediencefrominterventionandinterferencebythelegalauthorities.

This Section is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on themeaningofthetwosourcesoftherighttodisobey:therightofmoralconvictionand the right of political participation. Two scholars, Kimberley Brownlee andDavidLefkowitz,havecontributedtoadeepunderstandingofthesetwosources.Therefore,thefirstpartisasummaryoftheirtheories.Thesecondpartexplorestheeffectofhavingarighttodisobeyintermsoftheburdenofproofimposedonpoliticalauthorities.Iarguethatarighttodisobeycreatesaburdenofproofonthepolitical authoritieswhen they try to suspenddisobedience. I illustrate thefundamentalcontentoftheburdenofproofbydifferentiatingfoursub-typesoftheburdenofproof.

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3.1.TwoSourcesoftheRighttoDisobey:TheRightofMoralConvictionandtheRightofPoliticalParticipationThis section illustrates two sources of the right to disobey. Before I

continue, though, Iwould like to clarify severalpoints.The firstpoint involvesthemeaningandcontentoftherighttodisobey.Therighttodisobeyentailsthefactthataright-holdercanclaimthisrightinawaythatimposesacertainkindofobligationonthoseobligatedbytheright.WhenIrefertotherighttodisobeyIrefertothisrightasasecond-orderreasontoprotectdisobedienceinacertainway.Thesecondpoint is themeaningof the “source”of the right.The right todisobeyisderivedfromanunderlyingsource,whichisitselfaright:Iwillrefertothisasthe“sourceright.”Thecontentoftherighttodisobeyisdependentonits source right. The source demarcates the frontier of exercising the right todisobey. In other words, the source right determines whether an action isundertakeninordertoprotecttherighttodisobey.

Arights-basedapproachtodisobedienceinsiststhatmembersofsocietyhavearighttodisobeywhentheysubjectivelyandreasonablybelievethatalawis unjust. This right is a second-order reason to protect their actions ofdisobedience from being challenged by others or suspended by politicalauthorities.

Therearetwopossiblesourcesoftherighttodisobey:therightofmoralconvictionandtherightofpoliticalparticipation.Ishallexploreeachinturn.

3.1.1TheRightofMoralConvictionDespite scholarly disagreement about the content of civil disobedience,

one undisputed fact is that disobedience is a type of conscientious action.However, this fact had rarely been discussed theoretically until KimberleyBrownlee’s work, Conscience and Conviction- The Case for Civil Disobedience.92Herbookprovidesasophisticatedexplorationofthequestionastohowtherighttodisobeycanbegroundedoneithermoralconvictionorconscience.93

Brownleearguesthatmembersofawell-orderedsocietyhavetherighttodisobey based on their conscientious moral convictions (moral conviction orconscientious conviction) or on their conscience.My exploration of her theoryfocuseson the conceptofmoral conviction thatpaves theway for the right todisobey.

ForBrownlee, the rightofmoral conviction isbasedon theprincipleofhumanism. According to Brownlee, the principle of humanism says, “first thatsocietyhas aduty tohonour the fact thatweare reasoningand feelingbeingscapable of forming deepmoral commitments, and second, that genuinemoralconviction is essentially non-evasive and communicative.” (Brownlee, 2012: 7)

92 Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction- The Case for Civil Disobedience, Oxford University Press, 2012. 93 Kimberley Brownlee distinguishes moral conviction from conscience. Sometimes she uses conscientiousness referring to the former. I only discuss the right of moral conviction in this Dissertation and ignore her discussions of conscience.

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Therefore,asocietyshouldencouragemembers to formtheirmoralconvictionandact inaccordancewiththem.Societyshouldalsoprotect itsmembersfromillegitimateinterferencebyothermembers.Basedonthisprincipletherearetwoarguments for the right to disobey. The first argument is called the convictionargumentand thesecondone is theconscienceargument.94Only theargumentbasedonmoralconvictionwillbediscussedhere.

ForBrownlee,onesalientfeatureofconscientiousmoralconvictionisthecommunicative principle of conscientiousness. (Brownlee, 2012: 29-47) Truemoralconvictionexistswhenfourconditionsaresatisfied:

1. The Consistency Condition: This condition requires consistencybetween judgments,motivations, and conduct to the extent suchconsistencyispossible.(Brownlee,2012:30)

2. TheUniversalityCondition:Thisisarequirementformemberstomake a universal judgment that the actwe deem to bewrong iswrong not only when we do it, but also when others in similarcircumstancesdoit.(Brownlee,2012:34)

3. TheNon-Evasion Condition: This condition is a practical test forconscientiousnessrequiringmembersofsocietyto“beartherisksof honouring” theirmoral judgments. This conditionmeans thatmembers of society should not seek to “evade the consequences[of] and, in some cases, take positive action to support” theirconvictions.(Brownlee,2012:37)

4. The Dialogic Condition: This condition requires that conviction-holdersmustbewillingtocommunicatetheirconvictiontoothersand toengagewithothers in reasonabledeliberation. (Brownlee,2012:42)

Atruemoralconvictionmustsatisfythesefourconditions.Thenextstepintheargumentconnectsmoralconvictionwiththerightto

disobey. Brownlee’s position is that if disobedience is the reflection of one’smoralconviction,onehas theright todisobey.Why is thisso?Theprincipleofhumanismprotectstherightofmoralconviction,butthereisagapbetweentheright of moral conviction and the right to disobey. How does the principle ofhumanism fill this gap? According to Brownlee’s explanation, the principle ofhumanismprotects the right ofmembers of society to act based on their trueconscientious judgment and this right to act includes a moral right to civildisobedience(therighttodisobey).

Therighttoactincludesarighttoexpressone’smoralconvictions.Thisright includes the right to express one’s moral disapproval of a law. If

94 For Brownlee, conscientiousness (moral conviction) and conscience are categorically different. Brownlee maintains that either someone has a moral conviction or they do not have one. Therefore, conscientiousness is all-or-nothing. But conscience is a different concept. Kimberley shows that conscience is a property that not everyone has. In order to have a conscience, an agent needs to cultivate his sense of responsibility. Secondly, conscience is a matter of degree, not all-or-nothing. See, Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction- The Case for Civil Disobedience, pp. 16-17, Oxford University Press, 2012.

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disobedienceisacommunicativeactionthatexpressesone’smoralcommitment,such action falls under the protection of the right ofmoral conviction, that isbasedontheprincipleofhumanism.Whenapersontrulybelievesthatalawisunjust and iswilling to communicate hismoral judgmentwith others throughdisobedience that could result in punishment, Brownlee argues that thisexpressionofone’sconscientiousnessshouldbeprotectedfrominterventionbyothers. Inotherwords, thisrighttodisobeyprotects“asphereofconductwithwhich,ingeneral,othersmaynotjustifiablyinterfere.”(Brownlee,2012:7-8)

AccordingtoBrownlee’sprincipleofhumanism,insteadofpunishingcivildisobedience, society should protect disobedience from interference by othersandshouldpraisethedisobedientsforcommunicatingtheirmoralconvictionstothepublic.95

Considerapossible criticofBrownlee’s argument for a right todisobeybasedonmoralconviction.Thiscriticsaysthatrecognizingthemoralconvictionargumentdoesnotassurethatthereisarighttodisobeybecause,ifdisobedienceiscommunicative,thentherighttodisobeyshouldbetracedbacktotherighttofreeexpression.Unliketherightofmoralconviction,therighttofreeexpressionexplicitly protects actions that can be considered a vessel that transportscommunicativecontent.

Brownleedeniesthattherighttofreeexpressionisthesourceoftherighttodisobey;shearguesthat,althoughtherighttoactconscientiously includesaright to expression, the right to expression does not entail a right tocommunicate.

Brownleesays,“expressionisthemanifestationofthought,emotion,andopinion. It can take innumerable forms.” (Brownlee, 2012:140)ForBrownlee,expressionisabroadcategorythatincludesverbalandnon-verbalspeechesthatconveyunderstandablecontent,andactions.Nonethelesstheideaofexpressionisdifferentfromtheideaofcommunication.Shesays,“whatexpressionisnotisacommunication.Theright to freeexpression isnotaright tocommunicate thatexpressiontoothers,Conceptually, this isbecauseexpression isnot,bynature,another-directedactivity.Wecanexpressourselvesaloneandinisolationfromothersandinformsthatareunintelligibletoothers.”(Brownlee,2012:140)Thereason for distinguishing expression from communication is the fact that anactionofexpression isnotnecessarilyanaction that isdirected toothers. It isnotan“other-directedactivity”becauseonecanexpresstheirthoughts,feelings,andopinionsbyoneself.(Brownlee,2012:140)Therefore,onecanexpressone’sideas, emotions, and opinions without assuming that their expression will bereceivedbyothers.

Building on the distinction between expression and communication,Brownlee further notes that, “the right to free expression is not a right tocommunicate that expression to others.” (Brownlee, 2012: 140) Brownlee’sconceptionoftherighttoexpressionisnarrowerthanthelegalmeaningofthe

95 Based on Brownlee’s argument civil disobedience is not distinguishable from conscientious refusal but the moral conviction is the key concept to understand civil disobedience.

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First Amendment right to free speech. But the legal meaning is not her focalpoint.Rather,thepointofherargumentisthat,whenviewingcivildisobedienceasanactionthatisbasedonanindividual’sconscientiousandmoralconviction,the right to expression cannot serve as the foundation of this type of action.Performing disobedience is an action that tries to communicate one’sconscientious convictionwith others and this characteristic cannot be coveredby the right to expression. Given that Brownlee’s communicative principle ofconscientiousness forms the core of her argument regardingmoral conviction,her conclusion that disobedience is not grounded in free expression isreasonable.

Takingtherightofmoralconvictionasthesourceoftherighttodisobeyleads to the conclusion that the right to disobey is general in the sense thateveryonewhohasatruemoralconvictionhasthisright.Buttherighttodisobeyis not absolute in the sense that interference with the right could never bejustified.Thisrighttodisobeyislimitedbecausetherighttoactconscientiouslyislimited.Andtherighttoactconscientiouslyislimitedbecausetheprincipleofhumanism also respects themoral rights of others to act based on their ownmoral convictions. (Brownlee, 2012: 140-141) One implication of this right todisobey is that disobedients should respect others’ right of moral conviction,whichconstitutesaninnerlimitationonthechoiceofdisobedience.

BeforeIturntoevaluatingBrownlee’sargumentinawaythatsituateshertheoryinatransitionalsociety,asummaryishelpful.

1. The right to disobey is derived from the right to actconscientiously. And this right to act conscientiously is derivedfrom the right of moral conviction, which entails thecommunicativeprincipleofconscientiousness.

2. Therightofmoralconvictionisgroundedontheprincipleofhumanismthatencouragesmembersofsocietytousetheircapabilityofmoralreasoningandmaketruemoralcommitments.

3. Takingtheprincipleofhumanismasasharedprinciple inawell-orderedsocietyleadstotheconclusionthatsocietyisresponsibleforprotectingitsmembersfrominterferencebyothers,solongasthememberstobeprotectedactfrommoralconviction.Thereforedisobedience should be protected by society when thedisobedientsholdtruemoralconvictionsasdefinedbyBrownlee’sexplicationofthecommunicativeprincipleofconscientiousness.

4. But this right to disobey is limited in the sense that its ultimatefoundation, theprincipleofhumanism,alsorespectsothers'rightof moral conviction. This limitation would be activated ifopponents of disobedience were to hold that their true moralconviction required them to interfere with disobedience.Therefore the right to disobey is limited. However, this right isgeneralinthesensethateveryoneisentitledtohavethisrighttodisobey when they hold a true moral conviction and actconscientiously.

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3.1.2.TheRightofPoliticalParticipationThethirdsourceoftherighttodisobeyistherightofpoliticalparticipation.The

philosophical foundation of the right of political participation can be traced back toDavid Lefkowitz’s article, “On A Moral Right to Civil Disobedience.”96Joseph Raz alsobasestherighttodisobeyontherightofpoliticalparticipationalthoughhedeniesthatmembersofaliberalsocietyareentitledtoarighttodisobey.Lefkowitzasksthesamequestion as Raz does but reaches a different conclusion: Lefkowitz maintains thatmembersofa liberalsocietyhave theright todisobeyevenwhentherightofpoliticalparticipation has been protected by the institutional arrangements of democracy.(Lefkowitz,2007:203)RazandLefkowitzbothgroundtherighttodisobeyontherightofpoliticalparticipationbuttheydifferwithrespecttothequestionofwhethertherightextendstomembersofasocietythatqualifiesas“liberal.”

My purpose in this Section is to crystalize Lefkowitz’s argument byfocusingonthreeofhisideas:(1)themeaningofademocraticdecisionprocess;(2) the argument of the minority; and (3) the argument regarding bad luck.Thesethreeideaswillthenbeusedtoshowhowtherighttodisobeyisgroundedontherightofpoliticalparticipation.

Lefkowitz’s strategy starts with criticism of Raz’s mistaken claim that“every claim that one’s right to political participation entitles one to take acertainaction in supportofone’spolitical aims (be theywant theymay), eventhoughitisagainstthelaw,isipsofactoacriticismofthelawforoutlawingthisaction.”97Lefkowitz’s argument for the right of political participation beginsfrom situating the idea of a democratic decision procedure. A democraticdecisionprocedureisaninstitutionalresponsetotwocompetingmoraldemands.In such a democratic society two kinds of claims are possible. First, there are“justified claims of those whose proper moral treatment requires collectiveaction, whichmake up (one of) the ends of a justifiedmodern state.” Second,“there are the reasonable claims of various individuals regarding thespecificationofthoseendsandthemorallybestormostefficientmeanstotheirrealization.”(Lefkowitz,2007:213)

Whentwo justifiedmoralclaimscompetewitheachother, this invitesademocratic decision procedure, for example, decision by majority vote. Andtime-basedrestrictionsareacommonconditionofhowademocraticinstitutionresponds to two competingmoral claims. Lefkowvitz says, “responding to theformer [two competing moral claims] in a timely manner may require thatofficialdeliberationcometoaclose,say,withthetakingofavote,sothatsomecollectiveactioncantakeplace.”(Lefkowitz,2007:213)AccordingtoLefkowitz,in order tomake collective actions possible, official deliberation of competingmoralclaimsneedstocometoanendthroughavotingprocedure.Butonecanbe intheminorityatthetimeofvotingandstillhavea justifiedcomplaintthatone’s view might win the majority’s support if there were more time fordeliberation.

96 David Lefkowitz, “On A Moral Right to Civil Disobedience,” Ethics Vol. 117, No. 2, (January 2007), pp.202-233. 97 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, p. 273, Oxford University Press.

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So Lefkowitz says, “yet oftentimes those who find themselves in theminoritywhensuchavoteoccursmayjustifiablycomplainthat,hadtherebeenfurthertimefordebateanddeliberation,orhadtheyenjoyedgreaterresourcesfor the dissemination of their arguments, their own (reasonable) viewsmighthavewonmajoritysupport.”(Lefkowitz,2007:213)

Thispictureof how two competingmoral demands aredecided impliesthattherightofpoliticalparticipationincludestwomorespecificrights:

1. Arighttoparticipateinthedecision-makingprocessitself.2. Arighttocontinuetocontestthedecisionreachedbysucha

process.

This second specific right emerges from the fact that any collectivedecisionmade in a timelymannerwill be subject to challenge on the groundsthat a different decision would also have been reasonable and gained themajority’ssupportifcontingentconditionshadchanged.Thereforemembersareentitled to contest the decision continuously. When contingent conditionschange,theresultofcollectivedeliberationcouldbedifferent.

Inconjunctionwiththeideaoftheminority(examinedbelow),Lefkowitz

argues for a right to constrained civil disobedience. This right to disobey isderivedfromthesecondspecificrightofpoliticalparticipation,thatis,therighttocontestcollectivedecisionscontinuously.

One criticism of this derivationmight be that even if we recognize theright to continuously contest the decision itself, this should not preclude theright to disobey given the alternativewhich is to contest a collective decisionthroughavarietyof legalmeans. Lefkowitz replies to this criticism by arguingthat disobedience is the most effective way for the minority to express theiropinionbyexposingthemselvestotheriskofbeingprosecutedandinvitingthemajority’smoralreaction.Disobedientscan“oftencommunicatethestrengthsoftheir convictions and preferences in ways that legal means for politicalparticipations cannot.” (Lefkowitz, 2007: 214) A democratic decision processalways makes the distinction between the majority and the minority. Themajority wins the decision and the minority loses. The right to disobey is anentitlementofthoseintheminority.

There might be another criticism of the right to disobey. Even if acollectivedecisionhasbeenreachedasaconsequenceoftime-boundcontingentconditions,itcouldbearguedthatmembersoftheminorityshouldwaitforthenext decision-making opportunity to attempt to gain the majority’s support.Theyhadbad luckon thisoccasion,butgiven fairprocedures, theycouldhavebetterluckthenexttime.

This criticism is significant because bad luck is an unavoidable risk foranydemocraticdecision-makingprocess.Inawell-orderedsociety,badluckforthe minority today might become bad luck for the majority tomorrow.Lefkowitz’sreply,whichIendorse,isbasedontheideathattherightofpoliticalparticipation is best understood as a right to reduce “asmuch as possible the

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degreetowhichitisamatterofluckwhetheroneattractsmajoritysupportforone’s reasonable views regarding what justice requires, consistent with theabilityofthestatetoachievetheseendsthatprovideamoraljustificationforitsexistenceandauthority.”(Lefkowitz,2007:215)

Therefore the right to disobey can be seen as an entitlement of theminority in a well-ordered society to correct the contingent influences oncollective decisions. Disobedience can reduce contingent influences by callingtheattentionof themajority to theviewsof theminority inaway that isbothmore immediate andmore powerful thanwaiting for the next opportunity forchangevianormalpoliticalprocesses.

3.2.TheEffectoftheRighttoDisobey:TheAffirmativeAttitudeandtheBurdensofProofI have examined two possible justifications of the right to disobey: the

moralconvictionargumentandthepoliticalparticipationargument.NowIturnto the question of what effect the right to disobey generates. I argue that theright todisobeycreatesashiftof theburdenofproof fromthedisobedients topoliticalauthoritiessuchaslawenforcementofficials,criminalprosecutors,andthejudiciary.Thieburdenofproofshiftsbecausetherighttodisobeyisaclaim-right, that is, when the disobedient claims the right, others—the politicalauthorities—areobligednottointerferewiththedisobedient’scourseofactions.Inanutshell,oncethedisobedientsclaimtherighttodisobey,theclaimcreatesan obligation on the political authority to justify suspension of or interferencewiththerighttodisobey.Theburdenofproofrestswiththepoliticalauthorities.

3.2.1.TheImplicationoftheRighttoDisobey(1):TheAffirmativeAttitudetowardsDisobedienceGenerally speaking, a legal system can take three attitudes toward

disobedients’ legal liabilities. First, it can take a harsh attitudeby arguing thatdisobedienceismoreseriousthanordinarycriminalconductduetothefactthatdisobedients break the law intentionally. Such intentions reveal thatdisobedients,withtheirhostileattitudetowardthelaw,mightknowinglycausesocial disorder and general disobedience. Prevention of these harmful effectsmightjustifystrictenforcementagainstcivildisobedients.

Secondly, the law can take an indifferent attitude toward disobedients’liability by treating disobedience as one subtype of ordinary law-breakingconduct. The main reason for supporting an indifferent attitude is therequirementof formalequality. The ideaof formalequality(in thiscontext) isthatalegalsystemshouldtreatallviolationsofalawinthesamewayinordertoavoidprejudiceandevaluativebias.A thirdattitude is theaffirmativeattitude,thatalegalsystemshouldtreatdisobediencemorefavorablythanordinarylaw-breaking,becausedisobedienceismorallydifferentfromordinarylaw-breakingin a way that suggests that more favorable treatment is appropriate.Disobedients’ first-order reasons to disobey along with their sincere attitudeprovidethereasonsforalegalsystemtoadopttheaffirmativeattitude.

The first attitude, theharshone, seems implausiblebecause there is nogoodreasonforespeciallyseveretreatmentofcivildisobedience.It istruethat

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civil disobedience involves an intention to disobey the law, but most lawsrequire a showing that the defendant acted intentionally. Civil disobedienceinvolves characteristic motives, but these motives intuitively support morelenienttreatment. Disobedientsdonotaimtoharmothers;quitethecontrary,thefundamentalpurposesofdisobedienceareconsistentwithconcernforone’sfellowmembersofsociety.

The second attitude, indifference, is intuitively acceptable because thereasoning behind it rests on the principle of formal equality, i.e., treating likecases alike. But actions of disobedience, although they resemble ordinary law-breakingconduct,aredifferentwithrespecttotheirmoralityandwithrespecttothedisobedients’attitudetowardlaw.Thismoraldifferenceconstitutesaprimafacie reason for a legal system to treat disobedience differently. Although themoral difference cannot ultimately determinedisobedients’ liabilities, it showsthatcivildisobediencehascertainvirtues.Civildisobedienceisnotmotivatedbyselfish concernsbutbymoral considerations.A legal systemshould take thesecharacteristicsintoaccount.Therefore,whiletheindifferentattitudeisbasedontheprincipleofformalequality,themoraldifferenceillustrateswhythevalueofformalequalitycanbeoutweighedbyotherconsiderations.

Thethirdattitude,theaffirmativeone,isembracedbothbyajustification-based and a rights-based approach to disobedience. These approaches bothimply that a legal system ought to adopt an affirmative attitude towarddisobedience. The meaning of this “ought” is provided by the followingarguments: While disobedience is an action of law-breaking and may causedamaging results, it is an action that may be morally justified on normativegroundsthatshouldbeconsideredbypoliticalauthorities.

Whenalegalsystemdealswithdisobedients’legalliabilities,missingthedistinctive features of disobediencewould entail a loss of appreciation for thecontributions that civil disobedience provides society. Adopting an affirmativeattitudedoesnoteraseallpossible liabilities thatdisobedientsshouldbearbutrecognizesthatalegalsystemhasareasonnottoincarceratedisobedientsuntilafterthevalueoftheirdissenthasbeenassessed.

While both a justification-based and a rights-based approach todisobedience take the affirmative attitude, they differwith respect towhetherthisaffirmativeattitudeisconditionalornot.Thetwoapproachesdivergewhenitcomestotheconditionalityoftheaffirmativeattitude.

Ajustification-basedapproachtakesaconditionalposition:alegalsystemshouldhaveanaffirmativeattitudetowarddisobedienceonlywhendisobedientssincerelybelievethattheyhavemoralpermissiontodisobeyalaw,andthatthisbelief is actually justified by the evidence they have. Although disobedients’justification of disobedience is not conclusive, their attitude of sinceritydemonstrates their non-hostility toward thewhole legal system towhich theybelong. This non-hostile inclination toward a legal system and the associateddifference from ordinary criminal conduct, constitutes the grounds for theaffirmativeattitudetowarddisobedience.

But a rights-based approach does not take this conditional position.Rather, it takes an unconditional one whereby a legal system should take anaffirmativeattitudewithout regard to thedisobedients’ subjective reasonsand

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beliefs. It is the right to disobey that grounds this affirmative attitude, notdisobedients’subjectivebeliefsandjustificatoryreasons.

From the perspective of practice, no significant difference follows fromthe answer to the question of whether an affirmative attitude towardsdisobedienceisconditionalornot.Politicalauthoritieswillcontinuetoexercisetheir power to decide whether to interfere with disobedience whether or notofficials have an affirmative attitude towards disobedience. But, once a legalsystem accepts this attitude, it leads to a conclusion that lenient judgment ondisobedience is normatively possible. An affirmative attitude also opens thefurtherpossibilityof thinkinghowapproaches todisobediencemight influencetheexerciseofpolitical authoritywhendisobedience is challenged, suspended,andinterrupted.

3.2.2.TheImplicationoftheRighttoDisobey(2):TheBurdenofProof

3.2.2.1.ThePhaseofLawEnforcement

Therighttodisobeyasaliberty-rightgrantsmembersofsocietyasphereof action in which one can freely decide whether or not to obey the law.Regarding law enforcement, this right imposes two sub-obligations on theexerciseofpoliticalauthorityinnonviolentcasesofdisobedience.

The first sub-obligation is the obligation not to order disobedients todisperseexceptasa last resort.Theauthorities shouldnot takeactions toendpeaceful disobedience, unless there is a substantial reason for believing thatdamage would result from the course of disobedience. This obligation comesfrom theneed tobalancebetweenrespect for the functionof lawenforcementand respect for the sphere of action granted by the right to disobey. Thisobligationisnotabsolutebutisinsteadaprimafacieobligation,whichrequireslawenforcementnottousedispersalmethodsastheprimarymeanstosuspenddisobedience.Thus,evenifapeacefulmarchisillegal,itmaynotbenecessarytodissolvethemarchmerelybecauseitviolatestrafficrules.

The second sub-obligation is the obligation of minimal exclusion. Thissub-obligation requires that even when dispersal is necessary, the scope ofdispersionshouldbeminimizedunlessacountervailingreasonfordissolvingtheentiretyoftheactofdisobedienceispresent.Forexample,itisverycommontoseesomedisobedientsuseviolentactionstoprotest;suchactionsmightincludethrowing a rock with the intention of hurting others. In a case where thedisobedientactionasawhole ispeaceful, lawenforcementshould intervenetostop only those persons who engage in violent actions. For example, theauthoritiescouldallowamarchthatismostlypeacefultocontinue,butarrestasmallnumberofmarcherswhothrowrocksatthepolice.Themoredrasticstepofdispersingallofthemarchersshouldonlybetakenifitistrulynecessary.

Let me provide several examples to demonstrate how these twoobligations can be realized. The United Nations Congress has adopted severalprinciples to dealwith cases of peaceful and non-peaceful association inBasicPrinciplesontheUseofForceandFirearmsbyLawEnforcementOfficials.Intermsof policing unlawful assemblies, Article 12 restricts the use of force againstpeacefulbutillegalassembliesonthebasisthatsuchforceisunnecessary.This

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corresponds to the obligation of dispersal as the last resort. Andwhen facingviolent assemblies, law enforcement should obey the principle of minimalexclusion, whichwithholds from law enforcement unconstrained discretion todissolveassembliesforcefully.

People might challenge the appropriateness of these principles on thegrounds that theyarenotexamplesof theright todisobey itself. Indeed, thesebasicprinciplescanbeconsideredpartof theright toassemblyor theright toassociate. Butthekeypointisthatunlawfulassembliesbythemselvescanalsobe a formof disobedience andbeused to exemplify the forceof disobedience.Forexample,aprotestinwhichdisobedientslieonthestreetwiththeintentionof jamming traffic while holding signs expressing their ideas is a case ofdisobedience and also a form of assembly. Lying on the street might beconsidered beyond the scope of the right to assembly due to public safetyconcerns,butstillbecoveredbytheprinciplesgoverningcivildisobedience.

There is another obligation that attaches to political authorities whenthey engage in law enforcement: this obligation concerns the burden of proof.The right to disobey can also function as a claim-right. This claim right is notabsolute,buthastheeffectofcreatingtheburdenonlawenforcementtoprovideadequatereasonsforenforcementagainstdisobedients.Lawenforcementhastojustify their interveningactionsby fulfilling several sub-typesof theburdenofproof. I shall demonstrate this in the next Part, which is highly related to theexercise of prosecutorial authority as themeans to suspend or interfere withdisobedience.3.2.2.2.ThePhaseofCriminalProsecution-TheMainBattlefieldofthe

BurdenofProofIhavebrieflymentionedthat inthephaseof lawenforcement, thethird

obligation, the burden of proof, also plays a role in the exercise of politicalauthority.However,theroleofthisburdenislessimportantinthephaseoflawenforcement than in the phase of criminal prosecution, because when lawenforcementchallengesthecourseofdisobediencelikeamassunlawfulmarch,avariety of contingent factors are involved and immediate reactions from lawenforcement areusually expected for the sakeofmaintaining social order andpreventingpotentialharms.Insuchacomplexsituation,thesphereforengaginginlegaldiscourseisnotveryextensive.Butthesituationisdifferentinthecaseofcriminal prosecution, because prosecutions occur in the course of judicialproceedingsinwhichtheproceduraldeviceofaburdenofproofcanbeusedtotestthejustificationsforprosecutingdisobedients.

Criminalprosecutioncanserveasaprocessforevaluatingthenormativegrounds of disobedience from the perspective of law. The prosecutor mustdecidewhether or not to pursue disobedients’ legal liabilities stemming fromtheirunlawfulactions.But topursuecriminalprosecution forunlawfulactionsrelated to disobedience is not the same as prosecuting ordinary law-breakingconduct. I have examined the moral difference between disobedience andordinarylaw-breakingconduct.Thisdifferenceprovidesthenormativegroundsforcarefulexaminationofthedecisiontoprosecute.Criminalprosecutionitselfshapes thenormativeprofile of those affectedby theprosecution. Potentially,

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prosecutioncanconflictwiththerighttodisobey.Thisconflictcanbemanagedviatheproceduraldeviceoftheburdenofproof.

Theshiftingoftheburdenofproofisthecoreconsequenceofrecognizingtherighttodisobeyasaclaim-right.Whenoneclaimstobeentitledtotherightto disobey, such a claim plays an important role in terms of the normativerelationship between a right-holder and an obligation-bearer. The right todisobeyasaclaimrighthighlights theduty tonot interveneandthus interferewiththecourseofcivildisobedience.But thisrightand itscorrelativedutyarenotabsolute.Rather,theyarebutprimafacieinthesensethatthisrightcanbetrumped by countervailing reasons that outweigh the duty to not intervene indisobedience.

The burden of proof is themeans bywhich the normative relationshipbetweenaright-holderandaduty-bearercanbechanged.Theprosecutioncanberequiredtofulfilltheburdenofproofasaperquisiteforcontinuingwiththecaseagainst thedisobedient.Tobeclear, the functionof theburdenofproof isnottoprohibitprosecutorsfromchargingdisobedientswithacrime,butrathertosetathresholdforjustifyingtheexerciseofprosecution.

The functionof theburdenofproof is tohighlight thepotential conflictbetween the exercise of prosecution and the justificatory reason fordisobedience.Prosecutionisanactionperformedbyalegalinstitutiontoshapethe obligation to obey the law and to determine how a particular action isevaluatedbylaw.Theprosecutorassertsthatthemoralprofileofthedefendantincludesanobligationtoobeythelaw.Disobedience,asIhavedemonstrated,isalsoanactionthataimstoshapethemoralprofile,but intheoppositeway,byattemptingtoshowthatthemoralprofiledoesnotincludeanobligationtoobeythelaw.Withouttheburdenofproof,itwouldbetooeasyfortheprosecutortoignore thepotentialconflictbetween theexerciseofpoliticalauthorityand thedisobedients’reasontodisobey.Theburdenofproofaimsto“force”thepoliticalauthority to face this potential conflict and provide reasonswhy disobedienceshouldbelegallysanctioned.

Theburdenofproof canbedivided into fourparts.The firstpart is theburdentodeterminewhethertheactionsinquestionareactionsofdisobedience.Thesecondpartistheburdenofidentifyingtheharmscausedbydisobedience.The third part is the burden of considering the reason for disobedience. Thefourthistheburdenofexplainingthecriteriaforprosecution.Thesefourpartsdonotexhaustallcontentoftheburdenofproof,buttheyoutlinetheessentialpointsregardinghowprosecutionofdisobediencemightbejustifiedorrebutted.

• TheBurdenofDifferentiation:Theprosecutorshoulddeterminewhetheracaseinquestionisconsideredtobedisobedienceoranordinarycaseoflaw-breaking. If the case is not one of civil disobedience, then theprosecutormayproceedtotreatthecaseintheusualway.However,ifthecase involves civil disobedience, then the prosecutor should fulfill thefollowing three burdens. This burden assumes that the prosecutor cantakeabroadviewtoexamineaparticularcaseusingresourcesfromotherintellectual fields like moral and political philosophy, consultingappropriateexpertsifthatisrequired.

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• The Burden of Identification of Harms: The prosecutor should identifywhatactualharmswerecausedbythedisobedients.Theprosecutormustidentify the harms as accurately as is feasible. Although actions ofdisobedience are likely against the law, that fact does not necessarilymean that the actions cause harms that should be criminalized.Identifyingtheactualharmscausedbythedisobedientsalsoadvancesanevaluation of the disobedience. While some harms might be attributedboth to individuals and the disobedients as a collective group, otherharmsmight be attributed only to individuals, not to the entire group.Therefore,theprosecutorhasadutytomakeallharmsexplicitsothattheprosecution’sevaluationofthedisobedienceisclearandprecise.

• The Burden of Depicting the Moral Profile of Disobedience: Sincedisobedience ismorally distinctive from ordinary law-breaking conductandisinitiatedtoshapethemoralprofileoftheobligationtoobeythelaw,the disobedients’ reason to disobey (the first-order reason held by thedisobedients) should be identified by the prosecuting power and takeninto account. The prosecutor should decide whether such first-orderreasons provide a legally cognizable justification and should furtherdemonstrate the existence of any reasons that rebut the reasons todisobey.Tobeclear,thisburdendoesnotrequiretheprosecutortoadoptthe reasons provided by the disobedients but demands that theprosecutor evaluate the disobedients’ first-order reasons fordisobedience.

• TheBurdenofExplicatingtheProsecutorialCriteria:Theprosecutormustexplainhowheorsheweighedtheharmscausedbydisobedienceagainstdisobedients’justificatoryreasonsandexplainthecriteriausedtodecidewhethertoproceedwiththecase.Theprosecutorshouldalsoconsiderifthere are alternativemeans by which the prosecutor can vindicate theobligationtoobeythelaw.Tobeclear,thesefourburdensarenot legalduties,whichconstitutethe

pre-emptive reason for the prosecutor not to indict the disobedients’ legalliabilities.Theseburdensaregroundedon thenormative requirement that theexercise of political authority should consider the moral distinctiveness ofdisobedience(thefunctionofshapingthemoralprofileoftheobligationtoobeythe law). Once we recognize the moral distinctiveness of disobedience, weshouldconsiderhowsuchdisobedientschallengethedutytoobeybyprovidingsubstantial reasons to disobey. If a legal system cannot address reasons todisobey and evaluate them fairly, these failures will encourage more radicalformsofdisobedience.Theseburdens aim toprovide a general framework forhowtheprosecutorshoulddealwithacaseofdisobedience.Theresultmightbethatthedisobedientsstillwouldbeindicted,butthebasisforlegalevaluationofdisobediencewouldbeclearer.

Moreover,byexplicatingthesefourburdensofproofwecanunderstandhow a rights-based approach to disobedience can be differentiated from ajustification-based approach. A case of mistaken belief is one divergent pointbetweenajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachtodisobedience.Theburdenofproofisanotherone.

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Thedifferencebetweenajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachfromthepointofviewoftheprosecutorisillustratedinthefollowingFigure.Figure18:TheComparisonBetweenaJustification-BasedandaRights-

BasedApproachtoDisobedience

Justification-Based Rights-BasedAFFIRMATIVEATTITUDE Yes Yes

MISTAKENBELIEFCASE Justification(No)Protection(No)

Justification(No)Protection(Yes)

BURDENSOFPROOF

Differentiation NotRequired RequiredIllustratedHarms NotRequired Required

JustificatoryReasons WeakDemand StrongDemandCriteriaofProsecution NotRequired Required

3.3.TheSubstantiveImpactonProsecutorialDiscretionandJudicialRoleTheburdensofproof giveus thebasic framework forunderstanding to

what extent the exercise of prosecutorial power has to meet with proceduralrequirements and what kinds of justification are required for the exercise ofprosecutorial power. While the burdens of proof provide the proceduralelements toevaluate thedisobedients’ legal liability, Ihavenot touchedon thesubstantive question: Should disobedients be indicted or punished after theburdens of proof have beenmet? And towhat extent can the disobedients belegallyimmunizedfrombeingpunished?ThisSectiondealswiththesubstantiveimplicationsofarights-basedapproachtodisobedience.

Severalstartingpoints formydiscussionshouldbeexplicated. Iassumethat a legal system accepts a case of justified disobedience (the acceptance ofdisobedience)and,basedontheacceptance,alegalsystemwillnotprosecutethedisobedientsmerelyforpunishment.Giventhisassumption,aprosecutorinsuchalegalsystemperformstheirjobingoodfaithanddoesnotholdanantagonisticattitudetowardsdisobedience.

Whentheprosecutionmeetswiththeburdensofproof,Ialsoassumethatthe prosecutor sincerely believes that the disobedients deserve punishment.Undertheassumptionof theacceptanceofdisobedience, theprosecutormight,ontheonehand,believethatdisobedienceismorallyjustifiedand,ontheotherhand,believethatthesatisfactionoftheburdensofproofprovidesagoodreasonfortheprosecutiontoindictthedisobedients.

In addition to the acceptanceof disobedience, I also assume the ideaofprosecutorial discretion that allows the prosecutor not to prosecutedisobedientsevenwhentheburdensofproofhavebeenmet.Somelegalsystemsmightgrantprosecutorsgeneraldiscretion,andthereforedeterminingwhetheracaseinvolvesdisobediencemaynotbenecessaryfortheprosecutortodeclineto pursue the case.However, I assume a legal systemwhere the prosecutor islegallybound to indictdisobedientswhenmaterial factsareclearandrelevantfactsfittheelementsofacriminaloffense.Iassumethatwhenacasebelongstothecategoryofdisobedience,theprosecutorshouldbegranteddiscretionnottoindict.

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The idea of prosecutorial discretion refers to a “space” that allows aprosecutor to reachadifferentdecision thanhewould inanordinarycriminalcasethatleadstoindictment.Forexample,therearetwocases(CaandCb)thatinvolvebreakingatransportationsafetylaw.InCa,disobedients,whoholdagoodreasontoprotestabadpolicy, lieonthetracksofatrainsystemwhileholdingsignsexpressingtheirprotest.InCb,thesamenumberofparticipantslieonthetracksjustforfun.AssumethatCaisconsideredacaseofdisobedienceandCbacase of ordinary law-breaking conduct. These two cases have similar relevantlegal facts that apply to the same criminal statute. However, prosecutorialdiscretion creates spacenot to chargeCa (the caseof civil disobedience)whilenecessarilychargingCbwith therelevantcriminaloffense.Thisspacemightbevery smallwhenCa is considered tobevery similar toCb.Or the space canbewiderwhenCaandCbcanbedistinguishedbysalientfactors.

In terms of prosecutorial discretion,whatmakes the cases of Ca andCbdistinguishable? We have four elements that presumably can determine howthey are alike (or how they are not alike) and clarify how extensive theprosecutorial discretion can be. The four elements are: (1) the disobedient’ssubjective attitude (sincerity v. insincerity); (2) the disobedient’s belief in thereason to perform disobedience (true v. false); (3) the means of performingdisobedience (violent v. nonviolent); and the alleged harms caused by thedisobedient(actualharmsv.potentialharms).

Thesefourelementscreatesixteenpossiblescenarios. ThisDissertationcannot discuss all of them. Instead, I examine simple scenarios that illustratehowtheprosecutorandthejudgeshoulddealwithcasesofdisobedience.

ThesixteenresultsaregroupedverticallyinthefollowingFigure.

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Figure19:TheTreesofDisobedience

Sincere, justified-belief, nonviolent, no-harm disobedience is the

paradigm case of civil disobedience. This type of disobedience usually has noproblem finding normative grounds for mitigating the disobedients’ legalliabilities because its performance is nonviolent, sincere, and causes nosignificant harms. The complete opposite of the paradigm case of civildisobedience is insincere, unjustified-belief, violent, harmful disobedience.Indeed,thereisaquestionaboutwhetherthiscategorycanreallybecalled“civildisobedience” and cases that fall into this category are very close to ordinarycriminalconduct.Inordertosimplifymydiscussion,Ishallonlyfocusonafewoftheremainingcategoriesindetail.

Anotherpoint is that the threeconceptionsofdisobedience (expressive,communicative, and resistant disobedience) that I explicated in Chapter Threedifferwith respect to their implications for the categoriesofdisobedience thatare classified in the chart above. For example, communicative disobedienceexcludes violent disobedience and, therefore, it will be inconsistent when anindividual uses violence to advance communicative disobedience. However,expressive and resistant disobedience tolerate certain kinds of violence andthereforeaccommodate thepossibilityof violentdisobedience. Since IproposeresistantdisobedienceinthisDissertation,Ishalltaketheconceptionofresistantdisobedienceasthebasicstartingpointforthefollowingdiscussion.

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The discussion that follows simplifies the tree of disobedience bybracketing the question of whether disobedience actually creates harms andfocusesinsteadonviolentversusnonviolentdisobedience.

NowIshallspecifywhichtypesofdisobedienceIwilldiscuss.Regardingnonviolentdisobedience, Idiscuss threescenarios: (1)Thedisobedientsholdasincere attitude that they are performing disobedience and their beliefs that alawisunjustarejustified.(2)Thedisobedientsholdasincereattitudethattheyareperformingdisobediencebuttheirbeliefsthatalawisunjustarenotjustified.(3)Thedisobedientsholdaninsincereattitudeinthattheyarenotsureiftheyare performing disobedience andnonetheless their beliefs that a law is unjustare justified. As readers can see, a rights-based approach affects scenarios (2)and (3) because a right to disobey provides an independent reason for theprosecutornottoindictthedisobedients’legalliabilitiesinthosescenarios.

Regarding violent disobedience, I discuss only the general requirementfor the prosecutor to indict violent disobedience. The prosecutor should use aproportionality test in two steps to determine whether there is a reason tomitigate the disobedients’ punishment and to what extent the prosecutor canchoose light punishment. These two steps are called the internal and externalsteps. The internal step requires the prosecutor to evaluate whether thedisobedients’actionspasstheproportionalitytestandtheexternalsteprequiresthe prosecutor to considerwhat degree of punishment fits the proportionalitytest.Ialsoillustratefourpossibleresultsofindictments.

ThelastthingIshallmentionisthatIignorethedistinctionbetweentwoevaluativejudgmentsofanactionincriminallaw:justificationandexcuse.98Bothmoralphilosophyandjurisprudencedistinguishthepropositionthatanactionisjustifiedfromthepropositionthatanaction isexcusable.Fromtheperspectiveoflawbothjustifiedactionandexcusableactionareentitledtonotbeprosecutedandpunishedbut theyhavedifferentevaluativeproperties.For thepurposeofthisDissertationIshallignorethisdistinctionandthevariousquestionsitraises.

3.3.1.Theprosecutorshouldnotindictdisobedientswhendisobedienceisnonviolent.Nonviolent disobedience has several features. The disobedients do not

intentionallycreateindividualharmsandtheyusuallyusenonviolenceasawayofdemonstratingtheiropennesstofuturecommunicationwithotherswhohavenot agreed or have disagreed with them. Even when nonviolent disobediencecauses damage, it usually creates insignificant harms. (See my discussion inSection3.1inChapterThree.)

98 There is a distinction between justification and excuse in criminal law. Joshua Dressler provides a concise explanation of the difference between them. He says, “In its simplest form, and subject to substantial complexity and debate as to its precise contours, justified conduct is conduct that is ‘a good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do.’……..An excuse is in the nature of a claim that although the actor has harmed society, she should not be blamed or punished for causing that harm…Whereas a justification negates the social harm of an offense, an excuse negates the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.” See Joshua Dressler, “Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of The Concepts and The Literature,” in Wayne Law Review, Vol 33, p. 1161 (1987).

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Iwilldiscussthreescenariosinvolvingnonviolentdisobedience.Thefirstscenario involves the category of sincerity and justified belief. This scenarioshows that the disobedients sincerely believe they are performing civildisobedienceand that their reason todisobey is justified.This scenario canbeseenastheclassiccaseofnonviolentdisobedience.Thesecondscenarioisthatthedisobedientshaveasincereattitudetowardsdisobediencebuttheirreasontodisobey lacks justification.The third scenario is that thedisobedients lack asincereattitudeanddonotthinkoftheirperformanceasdisobediencebuttheirdisobediencehappenstobejustified.

3.1.1.1.TheFirstScenarioinNonviolentDisobedience:Thedisobedientssincerelybelievethattheyareperformingdisobedienceandtheirreasontodisobeyisjustified.Assumethatthedisobedientshaveasincereattitudetowardstheaction

of disobedience in the sense that they think they are performing civildisobedienceandtheiractionisconsistentwiththeirunderstandingofwhatcivildisobedienceis.ThisiswhatIcallthesincereattitudetowardsdisobedience.99Inaddition to this sincere attitude towards disobedience, I also assume thatdisobedienceisactuallyjustified,whichmeansthatthedisobedientshaveagoodreasonnot to obey the law. In this scenario thedisobedients form theirmoraljudgmentaboutalawwithgoodreasondeterminingwhethertodisobeyornotandtheysincerelybelievethattheyarenotboundtoobeyanunjustlaw.

A legal system that respects an individual’s capacity to form a moralcommitmentshouldalsorecognizetheimportanceofholdingasincereattitudetowardsone’smoralcommitmentbecausethesincerity isone important factorformembersofsocietytocommunicateamongeachanddeliberatebasicissuesofsociety.Onceapersonholdsasincereattitudetowardsdisobedienceandhasajustifiedbeliefabouttheiraction,theirperformanceofdisobedienceisnotonlyawayofexpressingtheirjudgmentbutalsoaresultofhowthedisobedienttrulyadopts their inner voice and connects theirmoral judgmentwith theworld inwhichtheylive.Therefore,alegalsystemshouldencouragemembersofsocietyto express, communicate, and act in accordancewith themoral principle theytrulybelieve.

Toprosecutedisobedients involved innonviolentdisobediencenotonlydiscouragesmembersofsociety fromformingtheirownevaluationsof the lawbutalsoimpliesthatobediencetothelawtakespriorityoveranindividual’sownmoral judgment. However, a society has a duty to encourage and respectindividuals’well-consideredjudgmentsandactionsespeciallywhentheiractionsarenonviolentandmotivatedbydeepmoralcommitment.

Canwehaveareasonthatmightberecognizedbylawfornotprosecutingnonviolentdisobedients?Obviously, a specificdemonstration isdifficult in thisSection because it depends on how a particular legal system treats sincere,justifiedandnonviolentdisobedience.Butwecansketchouthowtheprosecutor

99 Of course, it is very difficult to determine whether one has this attitude or not because an attitude is an inner state of affairs held by an individual and there is no direct way to determine one’s sincerity. But this is not the problem that I am concerned with now.

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cantreatthenonviolentdisobedientswhentheyholdasincereattitudeandtheirdisobedienceisbasedonajustifiedbelief.

Whenthedisobedientsholdasincereattitudeandhaveajustifiedbelief,theyusuallyfaceacircumstanceanalogoustoself-defense.Thedisobedientsusenonviolentmethodstodemonstratetheirsettledbeliefthatalawisunjust.Theydo not completely negate the legitimacy of the whole legal system but adoptdisobedienceasaway toexpress their firmconvictions. Sincere, justified,andnonviolent disobedience is similar to self-defense in the sense that thedisobedients truly defend their moral commitments through consciouslychoosinganappropriatewaytodisobeylawsinordertopreventinfringementoftheirmoraldutybylaw.Thereisaconflictbetweenwhatone’smoralityrequiresandwhatalawrequiresandalegalsystemshouldadoptanappropriatewaytoresolvethisconflictinsteadofusingcriminalproceduresthatforcedisobedients’compliance. Indicting an individual for civil disobedience that is driven by theindividual’smoralitydoesnotreconcilethisconflict.

There is another pragmatic reason supporting the position that theprosecutorshouldnotindictsincere,justified,andnonviolentdisobedience:thatthe indictment is not likely to have a deterrent effect because disobedientsfrequently foresee the possibility of indictment and punishment but choose todisobey nonetheless. Would prosecuting the disobedients have a generaldeterrenteffectonothers?Possiblyyes,butprosecutingthedisobedientsmightalsoinviteadditionalmembersofsocietytojoinfuturedisobediencebecausetheindictment itselfcouldbeseenasanofficialexpressionofanormativeattitudethatnegatesthelegitimacyofsincere,justified,andnonviolentdisobedience.

3.1.1.2.TheSecondScenarioinNonviolentDisobedience:Thedisobedientshaveasincereattitudeabouttheirperformanceofdisobedienceandsubjectivelybelievethatdisobediencecanbejustifiedbuttheirbeliefismistaken.Thesecondscenarioisthatthedisobedientssubjectivelybelievethatthey

are performingdisobedience andhave reason to disobey, but it turns out thattheyholdamistakenbeliefthatalawisunjust.Thismistakenbeliefcanbecalleda “mistake in law.”Thismistakecanbediscussedwith respect to twopossiblecircumstances.

In a case of direct disobedience involving a mistake in law, thedisobedients believe that their action of direct disobedience is impermissibleunder the law but in fact it is legally permissible because no law exists thatprohibitsthe actionattherootoftheirdirectdisobedience.Sincetheactionislegally permissible, strictly speaking no “disobedience” exists. For example,peoplemightbelieve that there is a lawprohibitingprotesters fromwearingamask while marching or assembling. So they decide to perform directdisobedience andwearmasks in a lawfulmarch. But, in fact, there is no suchlegalprohibition;theactofwearingamaskislegallypermissibleinanymarch.Therefore,noviolationoflawexistsandthereisnodisobedience.Sincethereisnodisobediencethereisnoneedfortheprosecutortointervene.

A case of indirect disobedience invites more interesting questions. Inindirect disobedience, the disobedients intentionally breach some laws, thecontentofwhichismorallyjustified,toprotestanotherlawwhichisconsidered

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unjust. When a mistake in law occurs in indirect disobedience, we shouldunderstand which law has been perceived mistakenly. If the method ofdisobedienceislegallypermissible,thenthecaseislikedirectdisobedience.Theothercaseinvolvesamistakeregardingthelawthatthedisobedientsbelieveisunjust:inthiscase,thedisobedientshavenoreasonablegroundstodisobey.ThisisthecasethatIwillnowconsider.

Two arguments support the conclusion that the prosecutor should notindictthedisobedientsinacaseofamistakeinlaw.Thefirstargumentisbasedonpubliccondemnation.Theprosecutoroccupiesanofficethathasaccesstothemedia and can thereby articulate official opinion. Rather than prosecute, theprosecutorcanaddressdisobediencebasedonamistakeinlawbylayingoutthecase that disobedience should be condemned by public opinion. This publiccondemnationcanservethefunctionofmaintainingpublicconfidenceinthelawand avoid the problem that the failure to indictmight express tolerance of ananarchic attitude towards law. Furthermore, public condemnation would alsosendthemessagethatthepoliticalauthoritywillnottoleratedisobediencebasedonmistakenbeliefsaboutthesamelaw(orsimilarlaws)inthefuture.

The secondargument is theargumentof the right todisobey.As IhaveillustratedinthepreviousSection,therighttodisobeyisanindependentsourceof justification formembersof society toperformdisobedience.Whenwe taketherightofpoliticalparticipationasthesourceoftherighttodisobey,thereasonbecomes clearer as to why the prosecutor should not indict sincere butunjustifieddisobedience.

A well-functioning democratic process is not limited to voting andelectioneering; rather, a robust democratic process encourages members ofsociety to continuously participate in public affairs and to engage in publicpoliticaldebate.Awell-functioningdemocraticregimealsoencouragesmembersof society to express their well-considered opinions about issues of publicconcern.Ademocraticregimeshouldencourage itsmemberstocriticizepublicpolicy in order to provide the regime with information that will enable itsongoing progress. It is important to see that the value of participating in ademocratic regime exists not only in the substantive content of opinions,positions,andjudgmentsbutalsointheprocessofparticipationitself.

Therefore, when disobedience involving a mistake in law occurs, thedisobedients’ effort is not without value. Rather, even mistaken disobedienceprovides an example of sincere dissent. The effort to raise critical issues andprovide arguments about an unjust law, even if mistaken, provides anopportunityforthewholesocietytoappreciatethevalueofdissent.Evenifthereis a mistake in law, their sincere disobedience and use of nonviolencedemonstratesthattheyembracethedemocraticprocessandthattheyareabletosincerelyexpressdissentinamorallytolerablemanner.Oncewetaketherightof political participation as the source of the right to disobeywe can seewhydisobedience makes an important contribution to society even when it is notfullyjustified.

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3.1.1.3.TheThirdScenarioinNonviolentDisobedience:Thedisobedientshaveaninsincereattitudeinthattheydonotthink(ortheyarenotsureif)theyareperformingdisobediencebutnonethelessthedisobediencecanbejustified.Disobediencecanbeperformedeitherbyanindividualoragroup.When

disobedience is performed collectively, it is not realistic to require all thedisobedients to have the same attitude, intentions, and judgments about thereasonfordisobedience.Incollectivedisobediencethedisobedients’motivationscan be varied. Somemembers of the groupmay have a sincere attitude, butothers may not sincerely believe that they are engaging in justified civildisobedience. For example, some members of the group may have joinedbecause they are drawn to the excitement of a demonstration or for otherreasons.InthisthirdscenarioIwillfocusonindividualdisobedienceratherthancollective disobedience and its attendant complicated issues. A theory ofcollective disobedience needs to be developed in order to give a completeanalysisofthethirdscenario,butthedevelopmentofsuchatheorywillnotbeundertakenhere.

Therearetwotypesofinsinceredisobedience.Inthefirst,individualsdonot sincerely believe that they are performing civil disobedience. A paradigmcase is thatof the copycat.The second typeof insinceredisobedience involvesuncertainty: the disobedients are not sure whether they are engaged in civildisobedience or not. Insincere disobedience poses serious challenges becausethe failure to indict insincere disobedients may send a signal to members ofsociety that being an opportunist is permissible. The following diagramillustratesthetwocasesofinsinceredisobedience:

Prosecutorsshoulddifferentiatethetwotypesofinsinceredisobedience.

The first type of insincere disobedience involves cases in which the“disobedients” completely lack the sincere attitude towards disobedience and,therefore, do not believe that they are performing civil disobedience.Prosecutorsshould indict thefirst typeofdisobedience, including, forexample,

InsincereDisobedience

TypeOne:CompleteLackof

SincerityACopycat

TypeTwo:UncertainSincerity

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copycatlawbreaking.Thereasontoindictisthatconceptuallyitisimpossiblefora case of lawbreaking to be civil disobedience if participants lack a sincereattitude towards their action. This conclusion relates to themoral reasons formitigatingtheliabilityofdisobedients.Forexample,acopycatfailstoqualifyformitigationintwoways.First,thecopycatsimplycannotbesaidtohaveengagedincivildisobedience:lawbreakingisnotcivildisobedienceifthelawbreakersdonothavea sincereattitude towards theiraction. Second, thecopycatdoesnotqualifyformitigationbasedonthemoralqualityofsinceredisobedience.Intruecivil disobedience (as opposed to mere lawbreaking), disobedients’ subjectiveattitudesprovideanexampleforhowmembersofsocietycandefendtheirmoralconvictions.Copycatsdonothave therelevantmoralconvictions. Theright toengage in civil disobedience is not a right to copy the actions of sinceredisobedients.

Now consider the second type of insincere disobedience, the case inwhichdisobedientsarenotcertainwhethertheiractionsarereallydisobedience.The prosecutor should not indict insincere, justified, and nonviolentdisobedience when the disobedients are not certain that they are performingdisobedience.Thereasonsforthisconclusionfollow.

First, although the disobedients are uncertain if they are performingdisobedience,thisdoesnotmeanthattheynegatethepossibilityofperformingdisobedience.When theyhavemore informationabout the reasons toperformdisobedience, their uncertain attitude could become firm. Therefore, there isroomforthisgroupof insinceredisobedientsto“growup”andacquireamorematureandreflectiveattitude towards theiractions, transforming lawbreakingintocivildisobedience.

Second, both the right of moral conviction and the right of politicalparticipation provide reasons for members of society to “cultivate” their ownmoral judgments andpoliticalparticipation in a comprehensiveanddeliberateway. Membersofsocietycanclaimarightevenwhentheyarenotsureof theexactscope,content,orelementsofthisright.Therefore,membersofsocietycanclaim a right to disobey even when they are uncertain whether their actionsfulfillalloftherequirementsforcivildisobedience.

Isthereanormativereasonfortheprosecutornottoindictthosewhoareuncertain if their actions are disobedience? There are three argumentssupporting a decision not to indict. Each of the three arguments providesnecessaryreasonsforsuchadecision.

The first argument concerns cultivation of one’s own conscientiousjudgments. People usually do not act based on a well formulated andcomprehensive judgment. Rather, it is usually the case that individuals reachevenimportantdecisionsonthebasisofincompleteinformationandincompletedeliberation. Because disobedience is not the usual way of expressing ones’judgments,positions,andopinions,wecanassumethatdisobedientswillneedtoengage in ongoing internal deliberation reflectingwith uncertainty about boththe moral nature of civil disobedience in general and the facts relevant to aparticular case. The disobedients may ask themselves if the action is reallycorrect and if the strategy is really appropriate. A legal system should respectand give thedisobedients a space that toleratesmistakes and encourages self-

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correction. And the whole society will benefit from the granting of this spacebecause it will allow the disobedients to form more stable and intelligibleattitudesandbeliefsabouttheissuesthatarethebasisfortheiractions.

Thesecondargument is thepragmaticargument that Iexplicated in thescenario of sincere, unjustified, and nonviolent disobedience. This argument isbased on the possibility of public condemnation. The prosecutor can publiclycondemn the disobedients’ uncertain attitude about their disobedience. Publiccondemnation is a less restrictive means for maintaining public order whencomparedtothealternative,indictmentofthedisobedients.

The thirdargument fornot indictinguncertaindisobedients isbasedonthe idea of preventing a greater evil. Not every act of disobedience aims topreventagreaterevil.Forexample,expressivedisobediencemightbeperformedto expressone’s emotionsandpositionswithoutpreventinga greater evil.Butresistant disobedience can prevent greater evils: in particular, resistantdisobedience defends democratic processes against usurpation. It follows thatnot every case of insincere, justified, and nonviolent disobedience warrants adecisionnottoindictonthebasisofthethirdargument.Theapplicabilityofthethird argument must be evaluated on a case by case basis. However, whendisobedience isperformedtopreventgreaterevilanditactuallypreventssuchevil,itsperformanceproducespositiveeffectsthatbenefitthewholesociety.Andtheprosecutorshouldconsiderthispossibility.Theactualpreventionofgreaterevilshouldbeareasonfortheprosecutornottoindict.

When any one of the three arguments applies, the prosecutor has alegitimatereasontodeclineto indict. Instead,adecisionofnot to indictshowshow the political authority evaluates the prevention of greater harm bydisobedience and how the legal system respects the space of cultivating one’sownmoralcommitmentandconsideredjudgment.

3.3.2.Theprosecutorcanprosecuteviolentdisobediencewhenitsperformancefailsthetestofproportionality.The previous section examines three scenarios involving peaceful

(nonviolent) protest. The more troublesome scenario involves violentdisobedience.IhavediscussedthedefinitionandtypesofviolentdisobedienceinChapter Three (see Section 3.1 in Chapter Three) and argued that the idea ofviolent disobedience should be seen more broadly than the conventionalunderstandingofviolencethattakesbodilyinjuriesastheparadigmcase.Violentdisobedience includes property damage, infringement of intangible interests,and interference with autonomous decision-making. As defined, violentdisobediencerequiresthatthedisobedientsintendtocauseharmstoothers.

When disobedience is violent, the prosecutor faces a circumstance thatdoes not exist in nonviolent disobedience, that is, the intentional and harmfulconsequences provide a good reason for the prosecutor to indict thedisobedientsinordertosendamessageabouthowmembersofsocietyshouldexpress their dissent from the legal point of view. Therefore, when violentdisobedienceresultsinactualdamage,theprosecutorhasagoodreasontoindictthedisobedients.

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Violentdisobedienceshouldnarrowprosecutorialdiscretionnottoindictfor two reasons. First, violent disobedience entails that disobedients haveignored a collective decision to prevent certain harms. When legislators usecriminalsanctionstopreventharm,theiractionisanexerciseofthe legislativepowervestedinthembymembersofsociety.Violentdisobedienceelevatesthedisobedient’s reason to disobey over the interests of those whose legallyprotectedinterestsareinjuredbythedisobedient’sviolentactions.Second,evenrecklessconductcanbepunishedif theharmscausedbysuchrecklessnessaresevere and a duty of care has been breached. For example, expressivedisobedientsmightinjuresomeonetoexpresstheiranger.If“recklessassault”islegallysubjecttopunishment,thenthereisnoreasontorefrainfrompunishingtheexpressivedisobedient’sconduct.Therefore,toindictviolentdisobedienceispermissiblewhendisobedienceintentionallyinflictsinjury.

Prosecutorialdiscretionisnotextensiveincasesofviolentdisobedience.But this does not mean that the prosecutor should pursue the harshestpunishmentwithout considerationof the fact that theviolenceoccurred in thecourse of civil disobedience. Since disobedience is not like ordinary criminalconductwhich lacks a legitimate end, the prosecutor should considerwhetherthe harmful consequence created by the disobedients is proportionate to thelegitimate purpose pursued by the disobedients. If the violence employed bydisobedients is proportionate to the legitimate end of disobedience, then theprosecutorshouldmitigatethedegreeofpunishmenttoreflectthisfact.

This Section will not investigate the idea of proportionality in detail.Instead,itwillillustratethemannerinwhichaproportionalitytestcanbeusedinacaseofviolentdisobedience.TheideaofaproportionalitytestraisesmanyinterestingquestionsbutforthepurposeofthisDissertationIshallignoretheseissuesunlesstheyareconnectedwithmyarguments.100

Theformalstructurefortheprosecutortousetheproportionalitytestinacaseofviolentdisobedience isconstitutedbyareviewprocess includingtwosteps. I call the first step “internal evaluation” and the second step “externalevaluation.” The content of this two-step process is explained in the followingtable.

100 The idea of proportionality is a rich concept and there are many articles discussing it. One recent book is Proportionality and the Rule of Law- Rights, Justification, Reasoning, edited by Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, and Gregoire Webber. My idea of proportionality comes from Robert Alexy’s explanation in his famous book, A Theory of Constitutional Rights. See Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, translated by Julian Rivers, pp. 66-69, Oxford University Press, 2010.

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Figure20:TheProportionalityTestinViolentDisobedience

Topic InternalEvaluation ExternalEvaluation

ContentJudgewhethertheproportionalitytestisusedintheinternalprocess

ofdisobedience.

Judgewhethertheindictmentfitstheproportionalitytest

EvaluativeFactorTheSubstantiveGoal

v.TheIntentionalDamage

ProposedSanctionsv.

TheSubstantiveGoalAJustification-BasedApproach NoAdditionalFunction NoAdditionalFunction

ARights-BasedApproach

TheProsecutorshouldconsidertheweightoftherighttodisobeyinadditiontothesubstantivegoal.

TheProsecutorshouldconsidertheweightoftherighttodisobeyinadditiontothesubstantivegoal.

Therequirementofusingtheproportionalitytestisgeneralinthesensethat it applies to every case of violent disobedience. The first step in theproportionality test is the internal step whereby the prosecutor shall reviewwhetherthedisobedientsusedtheproportionalitytesttochoosethemethodofprotest. The core evaluative process in the internal step is balancing thesubstantive goal proposed by the disobedients and the damage intentionallycaused by their disobedience. Aswe can see in the table, there is a differencebetweenajustification-basedapproachandarights-basedapproachintermsoftheinternalevaluationoftheproportionalitytest.Ajustification-basedapproachis limitedtothesetwosteps,butarights-basedapproach isdifferent. Becausethe rights-based approach insists that the right to disobey is an independentreasonprotectingdisobedience,itrequirestheprosecutortogiveweighttotherighttodisobeywhenmakingprosecutorialdecisions

Thefunctionoftheinternalevaluationistohelptheprosecutorfindoutwhether there is a reason to mitigate the punishment imposed on thedisobedients.AsIhaveillustrated,violentdisobedienceitselfseemstoprovidea reason for the prosecutor to indict, but this does not mean that theprosecutorial power is limitless. Using the proportionality test in the internalevaluationcanprovideaclearerframeworktodemonstratewhytheprosecutorhas(ordoesnothave)areasontomitigatethedisobedients’legalliabilities.

The second step is external evaluation. After conducting the internalevaluation, theprosecutorought then todecide thedegreeofpunishment thatthe political authority should impose on the disobedients. The externalevaluationprovidesastructurefordeterminingthedegreeofpunishment.Whattheprosecutorshouldconsiderintheexternalevaluationisthebalancebetweentheseverityofpossiblepunishmentsandthesubstantivegoalsproposedbythedisobedients.Andaswealreadyhaveseen,thereisstilladifferencebetweenajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachintermsofhowtheprosecutorshoulddeterminethedegreeofpunishment.

After illustrating the two-step process (internal and external) ofevaluation,we can sketch out thepossible results for theprosecutor to reach incases of violent disobedience. For the purpose of simplicity, the prosecutor’sjudgmentsabouttheinternalandexternalevaluationswillyieldabinaryresult.Fortheinternalevaluationtheresultiseitherapassintheproportionalitytest

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orfailure,andfortheexternalevaluationthepunishmentiseithersevereorlight.Based on these presumptions there are four possibilities that the prosecutormightreach.Ishowtheminthefollowingtable.

Figure21:ThePossibleResultsfortheProsecutortoIndictViolentDisobedience

AfterExternalEvaluation-SeverePunishment

AfterExternalEvaluation-LightPunishment

AfterInternalEvaluation-FailtheProportionalityTest

(A)SeverePunishment+

FailtheTest

(B)LightPunishment+

FailtheTestAfterInternal

Evaluation-PasstheProportionalitytest

(C)SeverePunishment+

Passthetest

(D)LightPunishment+

PasstheTest

A full analysis would include a richer description of each of these four

situations. However, my purpose is to outline the basic framework for futurediscussions.Thepointofthistypologyistoprovideaframeworkforevaluatingprosecutorial decisions regarding violent disobedience. By distinguishinginternal and external evaluations, we can see whether the disobedients’ first-orderreasonandarighttodisobeycanberecognizedbytheexerciseofpoliticalauthority(theprosecutor)andhowthepoliticalauthorityevaluatesandjudgestheir first-order reason to disobey. Application of this framework in the realworld would require empirical studies of the disobedients’ strategies, andreasonsforengagingincivildisobedience.

3.3.3.AJudge’sDutytoResolvetheConflictofObligations--AnAnalogytoSelf-DefenseUp to this point, I have investigated several types of disobedience and

provided frameworks for prosecutorial decision-making for each type of case.Recall that I argue that violence is not conceptually excluded from the idea ofcivil disobedience, and the question of whether violence is incompatible withcivil disobedience depends on the conception of disobedience that thedisobedientsadopt.(SeeChapterThree.)Butviolenceindeedplaysasignificantroleindeterminingwhetherornottheprosecutorshouldindictthedisobedients.Generally speaking, when disobedience is nonviolent, the prosecutor shouldenjoywiderprosecutorialdiscretionnot to indict thedisobedients. Recall thatthisanalysisisintendedtoapplytosystemswhereprosecutorsordinarilyhaveanobligation toprosecutewhen theybelieve thatacrimehasbeencommittedandthattheycanfulfilltheirburdenofproofattrial.

But discussing whether disobedience should be indicted is not enoughbecause it is a judge’s job to decide whether the disobedients are reallypunishable andwhat their sentencewill be. After the prosecutor’s indictment,thenextstepintheprocessinvolvesjudicialdecision-making.

In this Section I will not deal with specific questions about thedisobedients’ legal responsibilities but focus only on a general argument thatjudges should resolve the conflict of obligations in cases involving civildisobedience.The firststage inmyanalysis is the identificationof therelevant

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judicialobligations.Iwilluseanactualcaseofself-defenseinTaiwantoillustratea conflict of obligations in disobedience. The second stage in my analysisconcernstheroleofthejudgeonceaconflictofobligationshasbeenidentified.My analysis of judicial resolution of a conflict of obligations will use a set ofarguments introduced by Leslie Green.101I will not discuss Green’s theory indetail,butrelyinsteadonaverybriefoutlineofhistheoryofajudge’sobligationinthefollowingparagraph.

ForLeslieGreen,ajudge’sdutycanbeclassifiedintothreetypes:(1)law-applying obligations, (2) law-improving obligations, and (3) law-protectingobligations. Especially relevant here are the law-improving obligations; suchobligations require a judge “to keep the law in legally good shape.”102Law-improvingobligationsimposeadutyofclarityonajudgewhenthelawisunclear.Formydiscussionajudge’sobligationtoresolvetheconflictofobligationsfallsin thegeneral typeof law-improvingobligations.Theremightbesomedisputeabout this,but I take this as the startingpoint inmydiscussion.Basedon thisassumptionthedutyof judges isnotmerely toapply the lawandtoproduceacorrect interpretation of the law but also to make their decisions morallyjustifiable. One way to make a decision morally justifiable is to resolve theconflictofobligationsinacase.

The following case of self-defense illustrates the nature of conflicts ofobligations and the role of judges in resolving such conflicts. The example isextendedtocivildisobediencebyanalogizingbetweenacaseofexcessiveuseofforceinself-defenseandfeaturesofcivildisobedience.Theexampleisasfollows:

A thief broke into a house searching for articles of value onSaturdaynight.Theownerscamebackandrealized thatsomethingwaswrongwhenthey(ahusbandandwife)sawthatthelightinthebathroomwason.After lookingaround, theywereuncertainwhetherthe intruderwasstillinthehouseandwhethertheintruderwasarmedornot.Whenthewife (whowas pregnant) turned on the living room light, the thiefattempted to escape, but the husband, a well-trained military fighter,caughtthethiefandusedacombatstrangulationtechniquetodisablethethief.Hecontinuedtousethetechniqueuntilthepolicearrived.Thethiefdiedasaresult.

Thehusbandwas indicted formanslaughterwithnegligence andpleaded self-defense to justify his action. The judge accepted that thedisablingstrangulationholdwasjustifiablebutconcludedthattheowneruseddisproportionateforceofdefense.Thedecisivereasonforthejudgetoreachthisjudgmentwasthattheownerdidnotdiscontinueuseofthehold until the police had arrived, even though the thief had lostconsciousness before then. In the end, the owner was found guilty ofmanslaughterandwassentencedto threemonthsof imprisonment.Thejudgealsosentencedthedefendanttotwoyearsofprobation.

101 Leslie Green, “Law and The Role of A Judge,” in Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S. Moore, pp. 323-342, Edited by Kimberly Kessler Ferzan and Stephen J. Moore, Oxford University Press, 2016. 102 Id., p. 334-335.

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Different legal systems would handle this case in different ways,dependingonthedetailsofthelegalrulesgoverningself-defenseandsentencing.The point here is that there was a conflict of obligation on the side of thedefendant. On the one hand, the defendant had a moral obligation to protecthimselfandhispregnantwifeandalegalrighttoprotecttheirproperty,andonthe other handhehad an obligationnot to use excessive force in self-defense.Whilethejudgefeltsympathyforthedefendant’ssituation,thejudgewasboundtoapplythelaw.

Whileajudgeappliesthelawofself-defenseandmitigatesthesentence,itis unclear how such a conflict of obligations can be resolved. For example, ajudgemightmitigatethesentenceinaccordancewiththesentencingguidelineswithout explaining anything. Or the judge could apply the law of self-defense,mitigate the sentence, recognize the conflict on the side of the defendant, andchoose a lighter sentence to mitigate the conflict of obligations. When judgeschoose a specific resolution to a conflict, theymay enable themembers of thepublictounderstandhowtheyoughttoactinasimilarsituation.Judicialactioninthiscontextmayalsoenablethepublictounderstandthatjudgesconsiderthedefendants’ relevantmoral reasons (the obligation to protect the family) andthat judges evaluate such reasons from the perspective of law. Judicialexplanation regarding the resolutionof the conflict of obligationsmayprovidethepublicwithaclearerpictureabouthowtoactincompliancewiththelaw.

Disobedients face a similar conflict of obligations. On the one hand, thedisobedientfeelsobligednottoobeythelawbecauseobediencecontradictstheirmoral convictions. On the other hand, a legal system that is based on justprincipleandlegitimategroundsconstitutesareasonforthedisobedienttoobeyand,ifthelegalsystemislegitimate,disobedientsareobligednottounderminethe legal system.Disobedience can result indamaging consequences toothers,andsothedisobedienthasaconflictbetweentheobligationnottoobeythelawand the obligation not to use excessive force of disobedience in a way thatunderminesalegitimatelegalsystem.

Whenjudgesfacecasesofdisobedience,theycanchoosevariouswaysofdetermining the disobedients’ legal liabilities. But merely giving a correctapplication of law is not enough because legal correctness does not suffice toresolve theconflictofmoralobligations.Furthermore,disobediencemay invitecollective action. So when a judge intentionally ignores the conflict that thedisobedientfacesandmerelyappliesthelawwithoutshowinghowthisconflictshould be viewed from the perspective of law, this may invite further civildisobedience to test the law’s resolution of the conflict. For these reasons, thebettercourseofactionisforjudgestodirectlyconsiderandresolvetheconflictofobligationsincasesofcivildisobedience.

4.ConcludingRemarksThisChapter’s centralpurposewas toexplain thedistinctionbetweena

justification-based and a rights-based approach to disobedience. In order tocarry out this task, I explored the issues raised by critics of Joseph Raz’sinfluentialviewsoncivildisobedience. Ialsoexplored themeaningofa rights-basedapproachtodisobedienceandthefunctionofhavingarighttodisobeyasa

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protected reason for disobedience, with the consequence that the politicalauthoritymustconsiderthisreasonbeforeitinterfereswithcivildisobedience.

I thenexplicatedtwosourcesfortherighttodisobey:therightofmoralconvictionandtherightofpoliticalparticipation.WhatIhavenotyetconsideredis thequestionas towhichof thesetworightsshouldserveasgrounds for therighttodisobedience.ItakeupthisquestioninthenextChapterwhichfocusesontheimplementationofthegeneralframeworkinthecontextofatransitionalsociety. In thatChapter, I shallprovidenormative justifications for the rightofpoliticalparticipationas theappropriate conceptionof the right todisobey formembersofatransitionalsociety.

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CHAPTERFIVEImplementation:ARighttoResistantDisobedienceinATransitionalSociety

1.TheStructureofThisChapterThisChapterevaluates theconceptionof resistantdisobedienceand the

righttodisobeyinthecontextofwhatIshallcalla“transitionalsociety."Iarguethatitisnormativelydesirabletoaccepttheresistantconceptionofdisobedienceand the associated right to disobey in transitional societies. I call this position“the rightof resistantdisobedience.” I shall show thatmembersof transitionalsocieties would accept the following proposition: the resistant conception ofdisobedience isacceptableunderspecifiedcircumstancesand theperformanceofresistantdisobedienceshouldbeprotectedbyarighttodisobeygroundedontherighttopoliticalparticipation.

This Chapter has the following position in the structure of theDissertation. The Dissertation is divided into two general parts: theory andimplementation. My illustrations of three conceptions of disobedience(expressive, communicative, and resistant conceptions) and twoapproaches todisobedience (a justification-based and a rights-based approach) comprise thetheoretical part. The analysis of conceptions focuses on the structure ofdisobedienceitself,andtheanalysisofapproachesconcentratesonthequestionastowhydisobedienceshould(orshouldnot)besubjecttoofficialinterferenceor challenge. The second general part of the Dissertation concernsimplementationandfocusesonthequestionoftheapplicabilityofthetheoryofdisobedience developed in the first part to transitional societies. The basicpurpose of the second general part is not to apply the theory to all possiblecircumstancesbutinsteadtoidentifythebackgroundconditionsthatdeterminethedomaintowhichthetheoryapplies.

This Chapter concerns implementation and describes howmembers oftransitional societies can adopt the conception of resistant disobedience andaffirmstherighttodisobeyasaprotectedreasonforresistantdisobedience.Myargument can be summarized as follows: members of a transitional societywould consider resistant disobedience, which permits them to use intensivemethods of protest when structural injustice exists, because members oftransitionalsocietiesoccupyavulnerableposition,thenegativeeffectsofwhicharenotobviousintheshortterm.Myargumentdoesnotexcludethepossibilitythat the other two conceptions (expressive and communicative) could also beconsidered in transitional societies, but emphasizes that the resistantdisobediencehasaspecificgoalwhichtheothertwoconceptionsofdisobedienceareincapableofachieving.Additionally,membersoftransitionalsocietieswouldendorsetherights-basedapproachasthemeanstoprotecttheirperformanceofdisobediencefromofficialinterference.

NexttheChapterfocusesontheideaofatransitionalsociety.Thisideaisnot new; there is an abundant literature on the subject. My aim here is to

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illustrate the fundamental features of a transitional society that serve asthebackground for exploring resistantdisobedience.Therefore, I donotprovideageneral account of such a society but limit my discussion to those aspects oftransitional societies that are necessary for exploring the argument in thisChapter.

This Chapter has four Sections. This Section, Section 1, previews theargumentsandprovidesa roadmap to the structureof the remaining sections.Section2explicatesfourfeaturesofatransitionalsocietyincludingtheburdensofjudgment,theexistenceofopportunists,the“legalobstacle”hinderingpoliticalparticipation,andstructuralinjustice.

Section3arguesthatresistantdisobedienceisanoptionformembersofatransitional society in the struggle against structural injustice. There are twopointsinthisSection.Thefirstpointdemonstrateswhystructuralinjusticeisthemaintargetofresistantdisobedienceandthesecondpoint isanexplanationofthe initiating conditions and justificatory grounds for resistant disobedience.Therearethreenecessaryconditionsfortheinitiationofresistantdisobedience,including, first, the identification of structural injustice; second, theineffectiveness of normal political appeal; and third, the failure of democraticgovernance.These threeconditionssetageneral threshold for the initiationofresistant disobedience. In addition to the conditions for initiating resistantdisobedience, I also explain the principle of proportionality and how thisprinciplecanfunctionasajustifyingprincipleforresistantdisobedience.

Section4explainswhymembersofatransitionalsocietywouldchoosearights-based approach todisobedience.My arguments canbedivided into twoparts.Thefirstpartfocusesonreasonstorefusea justification-basedapproachunder the conditions that prevail in a transitional society. The second partexplicatestheadvantageofgroundingarighttodisobeyontherightofpoliticalparticipation as opposed to grounding the right to disobedience on a right ofmoralconviction.

2.TheIdeaandFeaturesoftheTransitionalSocietyinThisDissertation

BeforeIexplicatethefeaturesofatransitionalsociety,Ishallexplaintheassumptions that ground these features. I assume thatmembers’ deliberationsaboutwhichconceptionofdisobedienceshouldbeadoptedwillbeinfluencedbythecontextofthesocietytowhichtheybelong.Therefore,thetypeofsocietyinwhichtheyliveisonefactorthatmembersofsocietywouldconsiderindecidingwhether to initiate andwhat kind of disobedience is acceptable. The idea of a“nearlyjustsociety”contextualizedtheRawlsiantheoryofcivildisobedience,butthediscussionhereassumestheverydifferentcontextofatransitionalsociety,whichbydefinitionisnot“nearlyjust.”Ialsoassumethatatransitionalsocietyisanon-idealsociety;unlikeanidealsociety,therearesubstantialdeparturesfromthe requirements of justice, creating unforeseen, contingent, and historicalconditions that play an important role inmembers’ normative judgments andchoices of policies. Members of a transitional society make decisions, moraljudgments,andformtheirbeliefsandattitudesinlightoftheirexperienceofpastinjustice. Put somewhat differently, the discussion that follows is not part of

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“ideal theory” in the Rawlsian sense, but is instead an exercise in “nonidealtheory.”

Theideaofatransitionalsocietyissometimesassociatedwiththephrase“transitional justice”butas Iuse thesephrases,103theyaredifferent in severalaspects.

First, transitional justice takes place in a society in which the rights-violatingregimeisinthepastandthenewregimemustcopewiththelegacyofinjusticeinthepresent.Forthisreason,theoriesoftransitionaljusticefocusonhowtodesignalegalmechanismtocopewithpastinfringementofhumanrights,including the compensation of victims and remedies for past violations. Forexample, discussion of “truth commissions” as a substitute for criminalprosecutions is one topic raised by a study of transitional justice. In thisDissertation,Iwillusethephrase“transitionalsociety”torefertocircumstancesin which a transition from a nondemocratic regime to a democratic one isunderway:theexistenceofahistoryofhumanrightsviolationsisnotpartofthisstipulateddefinitionofthephrase“transitionalsociety.”

Forthisreason,theissuesthatariseinatransitionalsocietyarebroaderthanthosethatariseintransitionaljustice.Transitionalsocietiesmustconfrontchallenging circumstances involving interactions between individuals when asocietyfacesvariousfundamentalchangesinitspolitical,economic,andculturalfields. So not every transitional society must deal with issues of transitionaljustice because it is conceptually possible to imagine a transitional society inwhichremedyingviolationsofhumanrightsisnotapressingissue.Forexample,imagine that Hong Kong has started her political transition from a politicalregimewithoutdemocraticlegitimacy(lackingtherightofgeneralsuffrage)toagovernmentembracingdemocraticlegitimacy,governmentbythecitizens.HongKongwouldbeatransitionalsocietybutwouldnotnecessarilyhaveaproblemoftransitionaljustice,becauseHongKongdoesnothaveahistoryofsystematicandwidespreadviolationsofhumanrightscomparabletothoseinasocietylikeSouthAfrica.104

Second, it is possible that some societies inwhich issues of transitionaljustice arise arenot themselves transitional societies. It is at least possible toimagine a society with democratically legitimate institutions that nonethelessonceengagedinsubstantialhumanrightsviolations.Morelikelyisthescenarioin which the basic structure remains authoritarian, but the new authoritarianregimeitselfdecidestoprosecutehumanrightsviolationscommittedbyapriorset of officials. If the basic structure remains the same, the society is not

103 Transitional justice aims to compensate those who suffered from past unjust infringements of human rights and determine legal liabilities of those who enforced unjust policies. It also emphasizes how a current regime should seek justice for those who were wrongfully treated by past regimes (usually authoritarian regimes). Transitional justice also focuses on how a legal institution can be designed to compensate victims’ loss and punish offenders’ wrong doings. 104 I should make this clear, although disputable, that Hong Kong is not a transitional society in my opinion because there is no transition to general suffrage. Hong Kong may be engaged in cultural transition but this is not the type of transition discussed in this Dissertation. It is possible to have a political transition triggered by policies that are non-direct political. For example, the official language policy could result in significant effects for a long time.

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transitional—even if the level of human rights violations has dramaticallydeclinedandthelevelofhumanrightsenforcementhasdramaticallyincreased.

Forthepurposeofinvestigatingcivildisobedience,Isituatetheideaofatransitional society in the context of political changewith an emphasis on thecase in which the government transitions from an authoritarian regime to ademocratic one. I shall bracket discussion of other subjects relevant totransitionalsocieties,includinghowthebasicstructureofsocietychanges,whatforcesmovethesocietytowardthetransitionalstage,andhowsuchatransitionimpactsmembers’socialactionsandinteractionsamongthemselves.

Anauthoritarianregimeprimarily refers toasetofpolitical institutionsthatrestrictsmembers’rightsofpoliticalparticipationsuchastherighttovote,the freedom of speech, and the right to criticize the political regime. Such aregime suppresses the competition between political parties and a variety ofpolitical rights are either limited or limited to a small group of members. Ademocratic regime refers to a set of political institutions that, at a minimum,grantsallthecompetent105membersofsocietytherighttovotetofunctionasachannel for collective decisions and provides members broad protection forexerciseoftheirrights.Sowhenatransitionalsocietybeginsapoliticalchange,thismeansthatmembersacquirerightstopoliticalparticipationwhichresultsinasignificantincreaseintheabilityofmembersofsocietytoshapetheirformofgovernment.

NowIshallexplicatethefeaturesofatransitionalsocietyingreaterdetail.For me there are four features of a transitional society: (1) The Burdens ofJudgment; (2) Existence of Opportunists; (3) Existence of a Legal Obstacle forPoliticalParticipation;and(4)StructuralInjustice.Iwillexplicatethesefeaturesinorder.

2.1.Burdensofjudgmentarisefromvariousperspectivesandgeneratedisagreementsaboutwhatthepastinjusticewasandwhatoughttobedonetocompensatevictimsinatransitionalsociety.Theburdensofjudgmentarethefirstcharacteristicfeatureoftransitional

societies. This feature refers to circumstances such that the realization of anagreement on how to deal with past injustice is obstructed by normativedisagreements.Theideaoftheburdensof judgmentisdrawnfromtheworkofJohn Rawls, who uses this idea to explain the fact of reasonable pluralism inmoderndemocraticsocieties. Theburdensofjudgmentarisefromthefactthatdifferent members of society will have different belief systems, includingdifferent religious and moral beliefs about the nature of the good. My

105 I assume that minimum age requirements are consistent with democratic legitimacy because citizens below a certain age threshold generally do not possess the functional competencies required to exercise the franchise.

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developmentofRawls’sideawillspecifythenatureoftheburdensofjudgmentinatransitionalsociety.106

The burdens of judgment in a transitional society come from manysources, but I shallmention only two. Themost commonmanifestation of theburdens of judgment is disagreement regarding the existence of past injustice.Members of transitional societies are likely tohave conflicted viewsof historyleadingtodisagreementabouttheexistenceofunjustincidents.Somemembersofsocietymayacknowledgehistoricalinjusticewhileotherssincerelydenythatalleged incidents of injustice even occurred. Such disagreements may persistbecauseofa lackofaccesstoreliable informationaboutpastevents,combinedwithdifferentbeliefsaboutwhichwitnessesaretrustworthy.Somemembersofsocietymaybeinclinedtocreditthereportsoftheregime,whileothersmaybeinclinedtobelievethetestimonyoftheallegedvictimsofinjustice.

Thesecondsourceoftheburdensofjudgmentinatransitionalsocietyisdisagreementoverthemoralassessmentofpastinjustice.Whilesomemembersconsider various incidents, policies, or practices to be morally impermissible,othersmightadmitthatsuchincidentswerecollateralharmsthatresultedfromtheneedtomaintainthesecurityofsocialorderandtherefore,unjustincidentsshould be tolerated. One cause of this disagreement comes from the fact thatmembers hold different conceptions of the right and the good (e.g., differentviewsabout thepriorityof socialneedand individual liberties)which leads todisagreement about how to evaluate a past case of injustice. Some membersmightholdautilitariantheorythatassertsthat“unjust”casesarethoseinwhichthegovernmentactedinawaythatfailedtomaximizepreferencesatisfactionorhappinesswhile othersmight hold a deontological theory that insists that thecriterionforinjusticeisprovidedbyasystemofmoralrulesorasetofpoliticalobligations that a just government must fulfill. Therefore, even if there issufficient evidence supporting the existence of the act or practice at issue,membersofatransitionalsocietymaystillstronglydisagreeaboutwhethertheactorpracticeconstitutesaseriousinjustice.107

Such disagreements may also affect beliefs about the appropriateremedies for victims of injustice perpetrated by the political authority: somemembers might strongly insist that remedial measures are morally necessarybutothersmightdenythisneed.Somemightdenystateculpability,whileothersmightbelievethatsuchculpabilityexistsandentailsarighttocompensationandafurtherdutytoholdofficialsresponsiblefortheirroleintheinjustice.

ThefollowingisanexamplefromTaiwanthatillustrateshowtheburdensof judgment can create disagreement about past injustice and appropriateremedies. The example is drawn from political debate about the February 28incidentinTaiwan.108TheFebruary28Incidentinvolvedtheunwarranteduseofmilitary force during the “authoritarian period” in Taiwan. While there are

106 About Rawls’s explications of the burdens of judgment see John Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 56-58. 107 One example is the death penalty in the martial law period and whether the miscarriage of justice can be tolerated in such a period. 108 A brief background of this incident can be found on Wikipedia’. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/February_28_Incident ); Last Visit: 2017/02/02.

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disagreements about the incident, oneundisputablepoint is that, afterTaiwanstartedherdemocratictransition,thedemocraticgovernmenthadconsidereditappropriate to compensate thevictimsofmistreatmentby thegovernment ledby Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang Party; KMT). During the legislativeprocess, there was a political debate about how to grant the victims anappropriate legal remedy for the harms they suffered as a consequence of theFebruary 28 incident.Whilemost legislators agreedwith the proposition thatthe victims should have a legal entitlement to an appropriate remedy, theystrongly disagreed about the foundation or justification for the entitlement.Somelegislatorsadmittedwrongdoingbytheoldgovernmentbutsomedenieditandrefused toevaluate themoralmeritof theoldgovernment’sactions.Somebelieved compensationwas required as a remedy for injustice perpetuated bythe old regime, while others argued for compensation on the grounds ofcompassion for the injured parties. During the debate about the appropriateremedytocompensatethe228victims,onesignificantdisagreementwasabouthowtonametheActinquestion.AmajorissuearoseaboutwhetherthenameoftheAct should includea term implying that theauthoritariangovernmentwasthe wrongdoer or a term that indicated that victims’ legal entitlements werebasedon the current government’smercy.TheKMTgovernment chosea termthatdidnot identify the authoritarian government as awrongdoer in order toadvance peace and harmony. As a result, more and more people resistedacceptingthelegitimacyofthisActforitsfailuretorecognizetheauthoritariangovernment’spoliticalresponsibility. Intheend, in2007, legislatorsrespondedtothisresistancebychangingthenameoftheAct.

ThepoliticaldebateabouttheremedyforthevictimsintheFebruary28incident illustrates the ways in which the burdens of judgment influence thebeliefsofmembersofatransitionalsociety.Theirbeliefsaboutthemoralmeritofthepreviousinjustice,theirideasaboutthefuture,andtheirviewsabouthowthetransitionalgovernmentshouldtakeresponsibilityarediverseinsignificantways.

A full account of the burdens of judgment in a transitional society isbeyond the scope of this Dissertation. Instead, the account offered hereillustrates someof theways inwhich theburdens of judgment operate in thiscontext.

2.2.Opportunistswhogainedsignificantbenefitsduringthepre-transitionalperiodexploitgapsinthelawtomaintaintheiradvantages.The term “opportunists” refers to individualswho have gained benefits

from the pre-transitional society by complying with legal rules with dubiouscontent. Such legal norms could include those that discriminate againstparticular groups and restrict opportunities of access to political offices, rulesthatauthorizethetakingofprivatepropertywithoutdueprocess,andrulesthatgrantprivilegestoasmallgroupofmemberstoaccessconfidentialinformationabout importantpoliciesofsocial reform.Opportunistsuse those legalrules tocreateandmaintainpositionsofundeservedadvantage.

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ConsidertheexampleofopportunismprovidedbytheKMTparty. AfterWorld War Two the Japanese government left many public facilities andproperties to thegovernment leadby theKMT: although thepropertieswouldordinarily have been transferred to the Republic of China (R.O.C.), the KMTgovernment tookadvantageof the failure toestablishchecksandbalancesandtheweaknessof itspolitical opposition to transferproperties to theparty andnotthestate.Asaconsequence,theKMTpartyhasbecometherichestpoliticalpartyintheworld.109

Another category of opportunism concerns rewards for denunciation. Arepressive political authority can establish a system of denunciation with asystemof rewards to encouragemembersof society to reportpolitical crimes.Sucha systemrewards immoral conduct, because the categoriesofdenouncedactions include actions that aremorally impermissible. For example, the KMTgovernmentusedthissystemofdenunciationtoencouragepoliticalprisonerstoreporttheirfriendsandrelativesinexchangeforlesserpunishmentsandotherrewards.

The KMT government also encouraged individuals in Taiwan to reportthosewhohad any connectionwithMarxism and, if thosewhowere reportedwereconvicted,thesnitch(personwhoreported)wasgivenapercentageofthevalue of the property owned by those who were convicted. This system ofdenunciationresulted inopportunism—financialgain fromtheperpetuationofinjustice.

Opportunistsmayseektoprotecttheirill-gottenrewardsduringthepre-transitionalperiod:onewaytodothisistopasslawsthatinsulatethefruitsofopportunismfrompost-transitionrecoverybythevictimsofdenunciation.Suchlawsmightbejustifiedbyappealstotheimportanceof'therulebylaw'forthepurpose of social stability. The opportunists could also appeal the democraticproceduresbywhichtheinsulatinglawswereestablishedasarhetoricalshieldagainstchallenges fromopponents.However, in thepre-transitionalphaseofatransitional society, democratic processes are compromised: for example,legislativeprocessesmightbemonopolizedbyopportunistswhooccupypoliticaloffices. In this context, the mere fact that democratic forms were observedshouldnotcountasareasonforinsulatingopportunismfromlegalredress.

Opportunists in a transitional society can have several characteristics.First, theymay seek to gain disproportionate advantage and resources during(orat thebeginningof) the transitionalperiod inanticipationof thechange inregimesthatwilloccurasthetransitiontoajustdemocraticorderiscompleted.These enormous resources can become political capital enabling theopportunists to exercise influence over the democratic procedure in the post-transitional society. Secondly, opportunists may participate in the democraticprocessduring theperiodof transition. Usingresourcesplundered in thepre-transitionphase,theymaybeabletowielddisproportionateinfluenceoverthedemocratic processes—in a way that might be indistinguishable from truly

109 See Chung Li-hua and Jason Pan, “KMT is again ‘world’s richest party,’” in Taipei Times, 2014/07/24 (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2014/07/24/2003595820 ); Last visit: 2017/02/02.

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legitimatelawmaking.Thisproblemiscompoundedbythepossibilitythatsuchinfluencemay be exercised in secret; such secrecymight be provided by lawsthatprovidethatpoliticaldonationsdonotneedtobedisclosedtothepublic.

To be clear, every society has opportunists. And it is possible thatopportunismisnomoreprevalentinatransitionalsocietythaninotherpoliticalcircumstances.However,thekindofopportunismidentifiedabove(insulationofill-gotten resources that create political capital and hence influence overdemocratic processes) creates significant barriers to a successful politicaltransition. For political transition to be successful, conditions like faircompetitionbetweenpoliticalpartiesandequalopportunitiesamongindividualsshould be maintained. But undue influence by opportunists hinders this goal,especially if the opportunists are able to accumulate a decisive advantage inpolitical capital. If that occurs, then itmay be very difficult to build a robustenvironmentfordemocraticprocedureandcompetition.

Taiwan’s democratic transition provides an example of the role thatopportunistscanplayinhinderingasuccessfuldemocratictransition.OneissueregardingdemocraticdevelopmentinTaiwanconcernsthefinancialresourcesofpolitical parties. The ruling party, the Kuomintang Party, is estimated to haveproperties valued at almost a trillion dollars ($936,000,000). Most of thesepropertieswereacquiredduringtheperiodofMartialLawatthetimewhentheKuomintang Party took over from the Japanese government and secretlytransferredstate-ownedpropertiesandprivatepropertiestothepartyitself;thismassivewealthresultedinunequalcompetitionbetweentheKuomintangPartyand its opponents. This issue of resource imbalance still influences Taiwan’sdemocratic development. While the opposition parties must compete forpolitical donations, the Kuomintang Party has no worries about its financialcircumstances.

As opportunists gainmore andmore influence in a transitional societyandmonopolizepoliticalcapitalinthedemocraticprocess,membersfindthatatransitional regime resists making the process of political competition fairer.This circumstanceaffectsmembers’ attitudes towarda transitional regimeandtheir conceptions of disobedience.Membersmay have a general awareness oftheexistenceofopportunistsbutnotknowwhotheyare,whattheydid,andhowthey translate their economic gains into political capital. Given these limits onthepoliticalknowledgeofmostmembersofsociety,theymayrationallyhaveacautious attitude about the transitional regime; this caution reflects thepossibilitythatopportunistshavecoopteddemocraticinstitutionsandareusingthem to advance their own interests without respecting the goal of politicaltransitiontoatrulyjustanddemocraticregime.

2.3.Legalobstaclestopoliticalparticipationarethemajorproblemformembersoftransitionalsocietieswhowishtoexercisetheirpoliticalrights.“Legalobstacle”isthephraseIusetorefertoavarietyoflegalrulesthat

aredesignedtoraisebarrierstomembers'effectivepoliticalparticipationduringthetransitionalperiod. These legalobstaclesarebumpsontheroadtoa trulyjustanddemocraticsystem.

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Legal obstacles exist in various forms. First, laws with morallyquestionableorunjustcontentthatarepassedbyapre-transitionalregimemaycontinue to exist in the transitional period given the practical difficulties ofsystematic legal reform throughdemocraticprocedureunder the conditionsoftransition.Eveniftheoldregimeisnolongerformallyinpower,unjustlawsmaynonetheless influenceexecutiveconductorgoverncasesdecidedbythecourts.Second, lawswithmorally questionable or unjust contentmight be enacted inthe transitionalperiodby theLegislativebranchdue to the fact that therulingpartyinthepre-transitionalperiodcancontinuetobethemajoritypartyinthetransitionalperiod.Taiwan’s case is illustrative.TheKMTpartywas the rulingpartyintheauthoritarianperiodinTaiwanandcontinuestomaintainamajorityin the Legislative branch more than thirty years after Taiwan’s democratictransitionbegan.

UsingH.L.A.Hart’s distinctionbetweenduty-imposing rules andpower-conferringrules,wecanidentifytwomethodsforcreatinglegalobstaclesinthetransitionalperiod.Aduty-imposingrule isarulethatrequiresmemberstodoorrefrainfromsomeactionviatheimpositionoflegalsanctions.110Criminallawis the classic exampleof a set of duty-imposing rules.Apower-conferring rulegrantsmembers the legal authority to create duty-imposing rules that governtheir social interactions. Contract law is the classic exampleof a set of power-conferringrules.

Thefirstwaytocreatelegalobstaclesistouseaduty-imposingrule.Forexample,aduty-imposingrulemightrequirethatparticipantsinanassemblyforpolitical purposes must first obtain formal permission from the politicalauthority for “the sake of social order” and that assemblies without suchpermission will be deemed unlawful and subject the participants to penalsanctions.

The secondway of producing a legal obstacle is to increase the cost ofexercisingthelegalcapacitiescreatedbypower-conferringrules.Forexample,inorder to be entitled to vote, members of society might be required to obtaincertification fromthepublicauthority throughadifficultandcostlyprocedure.Another example is provided by laws that interfere with the use of power-conferring rules by newly formed political organizations. For example, a newpolitical party might be required to seek official permission before opening abank account or leasing property: if official permission is subject to lengthydelays ormade prohibitively expensive, the formal right to form a new partymightbeillusory.

Legal obstacles canmake it difficult or impossible for the opponents ofthe political regime tomake effective use of democratic processes. Moreover,theexistenceoflegalobstaclesmaymakethemembersofatransitionalsocietypessimistic about the successful political transition absent the elimination oftheseobstacles.Undersomecircumstances,legalobstaclescouldcreatethefearthat active participation in political affairs would lead to negative personalconsequences.

110 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Ch. 5, 2th Edition, Oxford University Press.

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ExistenceoflegalobstaclestopoliticalparticipationalsocancreatewhatIwillcall“structuralinjustice”bymakingitdifficultorimpossibleforvulnerablemembers of society to engage in meaningful participation in the democraticprocess.Suchinjusticeisstructuraltotheextentthatitcannotbeattributedtoparticularindividualactionsbyidentifiablewrongdoers.IshallillustratetheideaofstructuralinjusticeinthenextPart.

2.4.Transitionalsocietiesarecharacterizedbystructuralinjusticeconsistingofmoralwrongsthatcannotbeattributedtoindividualactions.The ideaof structural injusticecomes from IrisMarionYoung,an idea I

introduced inChapterThree,Section4.Structural injustice is characteristicallypresentintransitionalsocietiesbecauseofthewaythatmoralwrongsarisefrominteractionsamongvariousmembersofsociety.

Youngexplainsstructuralinjusticeasfollows:“Structural injustice, then, exists when social processes

put large groups of persons under systematic threat ofdominationordeprivationofthemeanstodevelopandexercisetheir capacities, at the same time that these processes enableotherstodominateortohaveawiderangeofopportunitiesfordeveloping and exercising capacities available to them.Structural injustice is a kind ofmoralwrong distinct from thewrongfulactionofanindividualagentortherepressivepoliciesofastate.Structuralinjusticeoccursasaconsequenceofmanyindividuals and institutions acting to pursue their particulargoals and interests, for the most part within the limits ofaccepted rules and norms.” (IrisMarion Young, ResponsibilityforJustice,52)Young’s idea of structural injustice includes three characteristics. First,

structural injustice is a distinct moral wrong that cannot be attributed toindividualactionsorthatisnotanintendedconsequenceofsuchactions.Second,structural injusticecanshapethesocialstructuresthatdeterminetheabilityofmembersofsocietytoachieveself-realization.Thirdly,structuralinjusticerefersto the moral wrong that is incurred by vulnerable persons who suffer fromwrongdoing that is not due to bad faith or malice. Structural injustice resultsfrominteractionsamongmultipleagentseventhoughnosingleagentmayhaveengagedinconductthatiswrongfulwhenconsideredinisolation.

Youngprovidesanexampleofstructuralinjusticeinthecontextofrentalhousing,whichcanbesummarizedasfollows:

Sandy, a singlemother, has two children.Her apartmentwill be remodeled by a newdeveloper and as a result, shewillneedto look foranotherplace to live.Sheneeds tobalance twocritical factors: the commuting time and childcare. She couldchoose a distant location at a lower cost but substantially lesstime for childcare. She cannot afford any apartment near herworkplace.Tofulfillherobligationtocareforchildren,sheplans

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tobuyacar,butshecannotaffordtodothisandsimultaneouslyputdownadeposit of threemonths rent. Sandy endsup facingtheprospectofhomelessness.111

Young characterizes Sandy's case as structural injustice because shesuffersfromamoralwrongnthatshedoesnotdeserve.Sandyisahardworkingmomraisinghertwokidsandlookingforhousingthatshecanaffordandthatisina location thatallowsher tospendadequate timewithherchildren.Nooneintentionallydeprivedherofadequatehousing.Thedeveloperwasunawareofhersituationwhen it committed to theproject. Theunaffordabilityofhousingnear her work is the consequence of market forces and not deliberatewrongdoing.While no one intentionallywronged Sandy, Young concludes thatthe moral wrong Sandy suffered is a function of the social position Sandyoccupies, that is, "A position of being vulnerable to homelessness or housingdeprived."112

The idea of position is the key concept for understanding structuralinjusticeinYoung’stheory.Shesays,“whenweconsidermembersofsocietyinterms of social positions, we are less concerned with their individualizedpreferences, abilities, and attributes, andmore concernedwith the relation inwhichtheystandtootherpersons.”(Young:2013,57)Toillustratethisidea,sheusesKarlMarx’s illustrationsof thedifferencebetweenmoneyasamediumofexchange andmoney as capital. Money functions as themeans for those whohave commodities to exchange with those who already have the samecommodities. If taking the process of exchange, a commodity owner sells hiscommodityformoney,buyscommoditieswithmoney,andthenendsuphavingmoremoney.Thisistheprocessofaccumulationofcapital.Youngconcludesthat,“What makes money capital, Marx demonstrates, is the fact that the moneyowneris inapositiontobringtogetherrawmaterialsandpeoplewhosellhimtheir laborpower.Theprocessofproducingthenewthingsthat investorownsenableshimtorecoupmorethanheinvestedinthemarket.Thesocialpositionofownerofcapitalandownerofnothingbutlaborpowerarekeytoexplainingtheoutcomesofthisseriesofexchanges.”(Young:2013,58)

Thediscussion that followsconnectsYoung’s ideaof structural injusticearisingfromsocialpositiontotheideaofatransitionalsociety.

Asocialpositionisaplaceinasocialspacethatanindividualoccupiesinrelation to others. Individuals can occupy a position voluntarily and non-voluntarily.Forexample,Icanrunforpresidentofastudentorganizationand,ifIamelected,Ivoluntarilyoccupythepositionofpresident.ButImightbesuedforlibelandtherebyoccupythepositionofdefendantinthelegalprocedure—aninvoluntary social position. Social positions define relationships betweenpositionholders andothers, identify a set of relationshipsbetweenaposition-holderandothers,andconstituteasetofopportunitiesthatthepositionholdercanchoosetorealize.

111 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice, p. 43-44, Oxford University Press, 2013. 112 Id., p. 45.

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Onefactorthatdeterminesaposition-holder’ssetofavailableactionsisafunctionofvariousnormtypes,i.e.,moral,legal,social,andreligiousrules.Thosenorms not only shape how a position-holder should act and can act, but alsoimposeconstraintsontheirchoiceofactionsbycreatingexpectationsinpersonswithwhomthepositionholderinteracts.Theavailabilityofindividualactionsisnot solely determined by one’s personal choice or preference but is partlydependentonasetofnormsthatshapeexpectations.

Applying this account of social roles to transitional societies, we canexplainwhymembersoftransitionalsocietiesareinavulnerablepositionwithrespecttoequalopportunityofpoliticalparticipation.

Members of a transitional society are supposed to enjoy equalopportunities for political participation in the democratic process and forexpressing their opinions. These opportunitiesmight be protected by grantingthem legal rights to vote and to participate in public deliberative democraticprocesses(i.e.,tospeakatpublichearings,tovote,andtoparticipateinpoliticaldebate). Normatively, every member should have an equal opportunity toparticipateinpublicaffairsandlaw-makingprocesses.Thisequalityofpoliticalopportunity is a precondition for the legitimate authority of democraticinstitutionstobindthemembersofatransitionalsociety.

Whileequalopportunityofpoliticalparticipationhassignificantvaluefora democracy, the decisions made by democratic processes are not made in avacuum but in circumstances whereby contingent factors usually influencemembers’ judgments of political affairs. Such contingent factors include theburdens of judgment (discussed in Section of 2.1) and the scope of availableactionswhichpartlydependsonthesocialandeconomicclassoftheactor.Somecontingentfactorsarereasonablebutsomearearbitrary.

Robustdemocracyaimstodecreasetheinfluenceofarbitrarycontingentfactorsonan individual’sexerciseofpoliticalparticipation.Forexample,whiledecidingwhoissuitablefortheofficeofPresident,ideallymembersofasocietyshouldformawell-consideredjudgmentandexpresstheiropinions,ratherthanflipping a coin and silently voting for a randomcandidate.However, the equalopportunityofpoliticalparticipationisnotonlyamatterofhowindividualsformtheirjudgments,butalsoonwhatgroundstheyjustifytheirbeliefs,andwhethertheir judgments are well-considered. Somemembers of society are stuck in apositionthatrendersitmoredifficultforthemtoexercisetheirrighttopoliticalparticipation. In addition, equality may be thwarted by obstacles that hinderexerciseofpoliticalparticipation.And finally,political equalitymaydependonhowvariousnormsconstituteanindividual’sgeneralpositionandwhetherthatpositionmakesthemmorevulnerablethanothers.

Take voting rights as an example. In a transitional society the relationsbetween members usually have been preliminarily fixed by social norms andeconomic status in a way that influences members’ rights of politicalparticipation.Forexample,evenwhen theright tovote isexplicitlygrantedbylaw,an individual’sexerciseof therighttovotemightprimarilydependontheindividual’seconomic relationshipwith theiremployers.Theymightbeunabletoobtain timeoff for exercising their right tovotewithout running the riskoflosing their job. Or theymight be in dire economic circumstances that would

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require them to work additional hours instead of seeking time off to vote.Comparedtoothermembersofsociety,thosewhooccupyapositionofeconomicdependencystand inamorevulnerablepositionandhencemaynotbeable toexercisetheirvotingrights.113

ThisDissertationcannotprovideafullaccountoftheissuesofstructuralinjustice in transitional societies. Such an account would require thedevelopmentofatheoryofpoliticalparticipationandempiricalresearchontheeffects of various social structures on voting rights and rights of politicalexpression. Nonetheless structural injustice should not be ignored. A robustdemocracy requires more than formal recognition of members’ political andlegalrights. Rather,thepathtorobustdemocracyrequirestheidentificationofstructural injusticeandthe formulationofmeasures toeliminateorreducetheeffectsofstructuralinjusticeonpoliticalparticipation.

3.ReasonstoAcceptResistantDisobedienceintheTransitionalSociety

I have explicated the idea of a transitional society and its four features(burdensofjudgment,opportunists,legalobstacles,andstructuralinjustice)andnowmytaskistoexplainwhymembersofatransitionalsocietywouldchoosetoengage in resistant disobedience. In this Section I argue that resistantdisobediencecanbeusedtocorrectstructuralinjusticeinatransitionalsociety.TherearethreegeneralpointsthatIwanttomake.

The first point is to explain why expressive and communicativedisobediencecannoteffectivelyaddressissuesofstructuralinjustice.Expressivedisobediencerarelyprovidessufficientforcetoeffectivelyinfluencetheexerciseof political power and cannot provide an effective reform agenda.Communicative disobedience is too narrow in scope to provide effectivecorrectionofstructuralinjusticeandhasanadditionaldifficultyintheproblemofopportunists.

The second point I make is to identify the flexibility of resistantdisobedience.Resistantdisobediencehasfourpossibletypes,resultingfromthefactthattherearetwodistinctaudiencesforresistancedisobedience--thepublicand those who occupy political power. The two levels of addressees enableresistant disobedience to become more flexible and to effectively addressstructuralinjustice.

The third point is identifying the initiating conditions for resistantdisobedience. I sketch four conditionsof initiation: (1) the identificationof theexistence of structural injustice; (2) the ineffectiveness of normal politicalappeals;(3)thesymptomsofdemocraticgovernance;and(4)theacceptanceoftheprincipleofproportionality.

113 In the real world, circumstances become more brutal. The exercise of voting rights is a matter of life and death. For example, several episoodes of political violence happened in the Philippines. See AI’s report (https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/05/philippines-election-marred-political-killings/) and Wiki’s entry (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_killings_in_the_Philippines_(2001–10) )

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This Section is divided into two parts. The first part explains whyexpressiveandcommunicativedisobedience is insufficient tocorrectstructuralinjustice and the second part demonstrates the two levels of resistantdisobedienceanditsinitiatingconditions.

To be clear, resistant disobedients must understand the purpose ofdisobedience, the effects they purport to produce, the force they want tointentionallycreate,andthedamagescausedbytheiractionsinordertochooseanappropriateconceptionofcivildisobedience.Therefore,thecorrectquestionis not, “Which conception is the only option for members of a transitionalsociety?”,butrather,“Underwhatcircumstancesiseachconceptionappropriate?”

My argument shows that communicative disobedience is incapable ofdealingwithissuesofstructuralinjusticeandthatexpressivedisobediencedoesnotdirectmembers’willintonormaldemocraticprocess.

The last point is that resistant disobedience is not as threatening as itmightatfirstappear.Resistantdisobediencedoesnotnecessarilyleadtochaosor anarchy. Rather, experience suggests that members of society can performresistantdisobediencewithoutgeneratinguncontrollabledamageorunbearableconsequences. This is not to say that resistant disobedience has never led tonegative consequences. The goal should be to understand how and whydisobediencehasledtonegativeconsequencesandtherebyidentifythemeanstoavoidsuchpossiblenegativeeffects.

3.1.ReasonsWhyExpressiveandCommunicativeDisobedienceCannotCorrectStructuralInjusticeThebasicreasonforadoptingresistantdisobedienceisbasedonthefact

that structural injustice exists in transitional societies—as explored in the lastSection.Now Iwould like to explainwhy its existence constitutes a reason formembersofatransitionalsocietytoacceptresistantdisobedience.

Focusing on the functions of the three conceptions of disobedience,wecanseethateachconceptionfunctionstoremindmembersofsocietyaboutcasesof injustice. Expressive disobedience aims to express disobedients’ innerthoughts to others. The function of performing expressive disobedience is todisclose thoughts, feelings, emotions, or opinions held by expressivedisobedients. By appropriately performing expressive disobedience, thedisobedientshelpthepublicunderstanddissentingviewpoints.Whileexpressivedisobedience can address a case of structural injustice, it is very difficult toachieve effective results, that is, the correction of injustice. Expressivedisobedience rarely can provide a consistent message with respect to howstructural injustice emerges and how to address its effects. Expressivedisobediencemightexposeacaseofstructuralinjusticewhenalargenumberofdisobedients are concerned with that case. However, to correct structuralinjustice requires more than identification of the existence of injustice;correctionrequiresactiontoimprovethevulnerablepositionsofthevictimsofstructural injustice.Remedyingthesevulnerablepositionswillrequirecomplexcooperativeworkwhichgoesbeyondexpressivedisobedience’stask.

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With respect to communicative disobedience, recall that this form ofdisobedience targets themutual understanding of members of society and itsperformanceaimstocreatepersuasiveforcethatinducesthepublictoacceptthedisobedients’pointofview.Ideally,communicativedisobediencecanfunctiontocorrect structural injustice when communicative disobedience successfullyidentifies the existence of structural injustice and advances the mutualunderstanding between communicative disobedients and those who disagreewiththem.Whenusedproperly,communicativedisobediencecanaddresshowavulnerablepositionisformedandinviteothermembersofsocietytothinkabouthow to fix a case of structural injustice. And because the purpose ofcommunicative disobedience is to advance the mutual understanding amongmembersof society, communicativedisobediencecancreate the conditions forfurthercommunicationsabouttheremedyforstructuralinjustice.

Buttheproblemthatcommunicativedisobediencehaswhendealingwithstructuralinjusticeisthatitcannotsucceedwithouttheopportunitytoachievesincere communicationwithpolitical officials.Theexistenceof opportunists inthetransitionalsocietyplaysacriticalrolewhenanalyzingtheproblemsfacingcommunicative disobedience. The audience that communicative disobedientsaddress comprises all members of society including political officials andordinarymembersofsociety.Curingstructural injusticerequiresvariouslevelsand stages of coordination, such as initiation of dialog, advancing proposals,offeringareformagenda,anddevelopmentofaviablealternativetothesystemofnormsthatcontributetostructural injustice.Mostof thesetasksrequirethepoliticalauthorities tocooperate insomewayand,ataminimum, tonotblockmeasuresthataddressstructuralinjustice.

However,withoutopportunities forsincerecommunicationbetweenthedisobedients and political officials, it is unreasonable to expect thatcommunicativedisobediencewill,infact,successfullypersuadepoliticalofficials.Thedisobedientsmightadoptmoreradicalmethodstocommandtheattentionofpoliticalofficialsandinsistthattheyaddresstheconcernsofthedisobedients.But if the disobedients do choose more extreme forms of protest, they moveoutside the parameters of communicative disobedience—which, by definition,aimstopersuadebytheunforcedforceofthebetterargument.Inanutshell,wecan say that communicative disobedience applies narrowly in dealing withstructuralinjustice.Structuralinjusticecreatesconditionsthatmakeitunlikelythatmere rationalpersuasion can succeed: individualofficials are likely to seethe causes of structural injustice as beyond their control precisely becausestructural injustice isnotaproductof intentionalactsof injusticebyparticularofficials.

There is another practical reason to explain why communicativedisobedience applies narrowly in transitional societies. The harms caused bystructural injustice usually are difficult to detect because members of societyneedto identifywhyaposition isvulnerableandhowsuchapositionmakesacertaingroupofmemberslessadvantaged.Unlikelawsandpoliciesthatdirectlyorindirectlycauseharmstomembers,theharmcausedbyavulnerablepositionisrelativelydifficulttoidentifyanddiagnose.Thisdifficultycreatesabarrierforcommunicativedisobedience:theactsofprotestmustcommunicatecomplexandsubtle ideas in order to persuade others to accept the communicative

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disobedients’ point of view. Under these circumstances, the problem ofcoordination may be insurmountable: it will be difficult to coordinate massactionthatconveysacomplexmessage.

In addition, structural injustice itselfmay create incentives for politicalofficialstooppose(ornotsupport)themeasuresthatarenecessarytodealwithstructural injustice.Politicalofficialswith limited resources subject tomultipledemandsmayhaveincentivestoallocatethoseresourcestoprojectsotherthanthecorrectionofstructuralinjustice.Evenifthereissincerecommunicationwithpoliticalofficials,structuralinjusticemightpersistforaverylongperiodoftime.Indeed,evensocietiesthatarenot“transitional”mayhavepersistentproblemsofstructuralinjusticebecauseofresourceallocationissues.

While expressive and communicative disobedience are not theappropriatemethodsforthecorrectionofstructuralinjustice,theystillcanmakeacontribution.Expressivedisobediencecancommandthepublic’sattentionandthereby alert the public to the fact that injustice exists and thereby efficientlyincrease public consciousness of issues relevant to structural injustice.Communicative disobedience can enable sincere communication betweenmembers of society and advance mutual understanding between thedisadvantagedandadvantaged.

But the main purpose of expressive disobedience is to address thedisobedients’ emotions, positions, ideas, or opinions and not to advance aprogrammatic solution. The case of Edward Snowden’s leaking confidentialinformation about government surveillance exemplifies this point. While hesuccessfullyattractedthepublic’sattention,hisactiondidnotprovideapositiveplan of action to prevent the political authorities from wrongfully infringingcitizen’sprivacy.Hisactofdisobediencesuccessfullyidentifiedtheproblembutfailedtoadvanceaprogrammaticsolution.

Communicative disobedience likewise has a narrow scope of actionbecauseof itsnature.Onceweconsiderthe featuresofa transitionalsociety, itsoonbecomesclearthatcommunicativedisobediencewillrarelybesufficienttocorrectstructuralinjustice.Communicativedisobediencecanbeseenastheidealtypeofdisobediencebecauseofitsfocusonrationalpersuasionofthepublictocorrect structural injustice. However, communicative disobedience is notregime-targetedandemphasizesthedynamicdialoguebetweenthedisobedientsand the public. It seeks public support for the ideas of the disobedients. Butpublic support may not be sufficient, because of the obstacles created byopportunistswithinalegalregimethatsustainsstructuralinjustice.

Thecomplexsystemofcollaborationintheauthoritarianandtransitionalperiodsmakes the correction of structural injusticemore difficult because thewholestructureiscomplexandnontransparent.Thelackoftransparencymakesstructural injustice difficult to detect, identify, express, communicate, andresolve.Evenifstructuralinjusticecanbecommunicatedtomembersofsociety,suchcommunicationalonedoesnotprovideasolutionbecausetheopportunistswho occupy the advantaged positions and public offices have powerfulincentivestoresistmeasuresthatwoulddismantletheirownprivileges.

Compared to expressive and communicative disobedience, resistantdisobedienceisamoreeffectivewaytocontinuouslyshockthepoliticalregime

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and thereby todealwith theproblemof structural injustice. This isespeciallytruewhennormalpoliticalprocedureshaveresulted in indifferencetocasesofstructuralinjusticeforanextendedperiod.Tobeclear,resistantdisobedienceisnotitselfamethodforcompensatingvictimsofinjustice.Instead,itisaweaponfor those who are in vulnerable positions that enables them to fight againststructural corruption. We should not overestimate the function of resistantdisobediencebutshouldnotunderestimateitscontributiontopoliticaltransitioneither.Theargumentfordemonstratingtheadvantageofresistantdisobediencewillfocusonitsflexibilityindealingwithboththepublicandofficials.

3.2.FourTypesofResistantDisobedienceandItsInitiatingConditionsThe main reason to adopt resistant disobedience as the means of

correcting structural injustice lies in its flexibility in addressing two levels ofaddressees.This flexibilityenablesresistantdisobedientstochoosemethodsofdisobedience that are appropriate to the various circumstances in whichstructuralinjusticeisfound.Thefirstideaisadistinctionbetweenthepoliticallypowerful and the political regime. The phrase “politically powerful” refers toindividualswhooccupypoliticalofficeswiththecapabilitytoimplementalaworpolicy. The regime is the system of offices and institutions and not theindividualswho occupy them. Both the politically powerful as individuals andthepoliticalregimeasaninstitutioncanbetargetedbyresistantdisobedience.

The second idea is a distinction between unilateral and bilateralrelationships. Aunilateral relationship isarelationshipsuch thatdisobedientsexpresstheiremotions,feelings,ideasinawaythatdoesnotrequireresponsesfromothers,whereasabilateralrelationshipisoneinwhichdisobedientsexpectresponses from others that create a two-way interaction. The interactionbetweenthetwogroupsandthetwokindsofrelationshipsresultsinfourtypesofresistantdisobedience.

ThesefourtypescanbeseeninthefollowingFigure.

Figure22:TypesofResistantDisobedience

RelationshipwithThePoliticalRegimeUnilateral Bilateral

RelationshipwithThePoliticallyPowerful

Unilateral TypeAUnilateral/Unilateral

TypeBUnilateral/Bilateral

Bilateral TypeCBilateral/Unilateral

TypeDBilateral/Bilateral

(OriginalfromSection2.3.inChapterThree)TypeAandDaretwooppositepoints.Membersofatransitionalsociety

would adopt Type Dwhen they have a relatively high belief that institutionalrectification of injustice is reliable and that political officials are inclined toinitiate a reform policy. This double bilateral relationship leads resistantdisobediencetobethemildestform;forexample,violentactionsoughtnottobeadoptedinmostcasesofdisobedienceundertheconditionsspecifiedbyTypeD.Type A is the most radical form of resistant disobedience because thedisobedientsbelievethatneitherthepoliticalregimenorthepoliticallypowerful

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will act voluntarily to rectify structural injustice. Type A therefore permits acertainscopeofviolentactioneventhoughsuchviolencecouldnegativelyeffectfuturecooperationbetweenmembersofatransitionalsocietyandthepoliticallypowerful.

TypeCrevealsasituationinwhichtheresistantdisobedientsidentifythepolitically powerful as the group that they can successfully target in theircommunication and therefore the group thatwill not block the rectification ofstructural injustice. However, under the conditions identified by Type C,disobedientsdonottrustthepoliticalregime’scapabilitytodealeffectivelywithstructuralinjustice.Therefore,thedisobedientschooseaunilateralrelationshipwiththepoliticalregime,permittingawidescopeofviolentactionstargetingtheregime.

TypeBistheoppositeofTypeC.UndertheconditionsidentifiedbyTypeB, the disobedients see the politically powerful as opportunists. Under theseconditions,abilateralrelationshipwiththepoliticalpowerfulisimpossibleanddisobedients will treat the political regime as a responsible agent capable ofrespondingtothedisobedients’appeal.UndertheconditionsspecifiedbyTypeB,disobedientsmightuseviolentactionstargetedatthepoliticallypowerful(e.g.humiliation, disgrace, verbal abuse, disrespect of property, or diminishedautonomyofthepoliticallypowerful.)

The discussion offered here is really only a conceptual sketch of therelationshipbetweenresistantdisobedience,ontheonehand,andthepoliticallypowerful and the political regime, on the other hand. Further theoretical andempiricalworkwouldberequiredtotranslatethesketchintoacompletetheorywithempiricalvalidation.Mypointhereistooutlinethebasicstartingpointsothatwecanusethesefourtypestooutlinehowdisobediencemightproceedinthetransitionalsociety.

While these four types show the possible relationships between thedisobedients and the political regime and the politically powerful, I have notexaminedtheinitiatingconditionsforresistantdisobedience.AsIhavediscussedbefore (see Section 2.3 in Chapter Three), resistant disobedience involves theuseofdestructiveforceandcreatesrisksthatarenotinvolvedinexpressiveandcommunicative disobedience. So there must be a threshold for initiatingresistant disobedience. And resistant disobedience should only be employedwhen there is a consensus among the relevant actors (“resistant members ofsociety”) that this threshold has been met. I outline four conditions for thisthreshold as the general conditions to be taken into account by resistantdisobedients.

The first condition is the identification of the existence of structuralinjustice. This condition requires resistant disobedients to recognize theexistenceofstructural injustice,to identifythepositionofvulnerabilitycreatedby structural injustice, and to outline possible corrective measures. Whiledisobedients are required to provide support for the existence of structuralinjustice,suchademonstrationneedstobesufficientlywell-arguedsothepublicand the powerful can recognize the nature of structural injustice. A sufficientcaseforthispurposemightbemuchlesselaboratethanwouldberequiredinthecontextofacademicdiscourse.

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The second condition is the ineffectiveness of normal political appeal.Resistant disobedience is different from revolutionary action which aims atoverthrowing thewhole regime. This difference leads to the requirement thatpotential disobedients consider whether structural injustice can be correctedthroughnormalpoliticalappeals. Recallthatnormalpoliticalappealincludesavariety ofmeasures short of disobedience for influencing the political system.Suchmeasuresmightincludearequesttoholdhearingsanddeveloplegislation,or applying for a legal injunction to stop infringement of rights. Resistantdisobedients are not required to exhaust every possible avenue of correctingstructural injustice, but they should pursue the means that are feasible giventheir capabilities and a realistic assessment of the possibility of success. Therequirement toexhaust reasonableavenuesofnormalpoliticalappealmaynotapplyinallcircumstances.Structuralinjusticemaycausesevere,immediate,andirreversible damage to members of a transitional society: in such cases, it isreasonabletoproceedimmediatelytoresistantdisobedience.

The third condition is to identify the symptoms of the incapacity ofdemocratic governance. This is a crucial condition for initiating resistantdisobedience because compliance with this requirement will show why thedemocratic process cannot cure the negative effects of structural injustice onthose in vulnerable positions and thereby demonstrates why resistantdisobedienceisneeded.

Thesymptomsofthe incapacityofdemocraticgovernancecouldincludethecontinuousorrepeatedviolationsofconstitutionalprinciplesbythecurrenttransitional regime, affiliation between political officials and gang groups orprivatemilitias, the frequentuseofusing force todispersepeaceful,yet illegal,protests,andsecrecyorconcealmentwithrespecttopastcasesofinjustice.Thislist of symptoms isnot complete, and it doesnot constitute a list of necessaryand sufficient conditions to initiate resistant disobedience. Rather, this is apartial catalog of circumstances that do establish the incapacity of democraticgovernance. 114 The circumstances listed in the catalog provide models forresistantdisobedientstogaugetheseverityofothersymptoms.

Thesethreeconditionsareconnectedwiththepoliticalregime’scapacitytodealwithstructural injustice.Satisfactionof theseconditionsconstitutes thejustification for resistant disobedience. When the conditions are satisfied andresistantdisobedienceisjustified,therearestilllimitsonlawbreaking:resistantdisobedients arenot entitled todo anything theyplease.Thisbringsus toournext topic—the normative principle that limits and controls resistantdisobedience.

The basic normative principle that should limit and control resistantdisobedience is the principle of proportionality. Resistant disobedients shouldevaluatetheharmful impactofresistantaction in lightof thegoal that justifiestheir disobedience. A full account of the application of the principle ofproportionality to various scenarios involving various goals and the range ofdisobedientactionswould involveawide-ranging investigationandcould itselffill a lengthy monograph. In this Dissertation, I will put this important set of

114 Gideon Parchomovsky and Alex Stein, “Catalogs,” Columbia Law Review, Vol. 115: 165-210, 2015.

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questionstotheside.Inanutshelltheprincipleofproportionalitywouldbethebasiccriterionofjudgingwhetherparticularformsofresistantdisobediencearejustifiedinparticularcircumstances.

4.ReasonstoAcceptaRighttoDisobeyBasedonTheRightofPoliticalParticipation

ThisSectionhastwogoals.Thefirstgoalistoexplainwhyarights-basedapproach would be accepted by members of a transitional society. I willdemonstrate that the problem of justification is significant in the context ofassessing the legal liabilities of disobedients. My account of the problem ofjustification begins with the features of a transitional society sketched in thebeginningofthisChapter.Afterarguingforarights-basedapproach,Ishallalsodemonstrate that the right of political participation provides a betterjustificationforresistantdisobediencethandoesarightofmoralconviction.Thechoice between the right of political participation and the right of moralconviction as the foundation of a right to disobey should be seen as primarilypragmaticandnotasamatterofabstractmoralprinciple.

Section4.1aimstoexplainwhyarights-basedapproachispreferabletoajustification-basedapproach.ThisSectionmainlyfocusesonhowtheproblemofjustificationofdisobediencebecomesanissueinatransitionalsocietyandshowsthat a justification-based approach does not provide sufficient protection fordisobedients.

Section4.2demonstratesthatarighttodisobeycanbegroundedontheright of political participation.While members of a transitional society wouldpreferarights-basedapproachtoajustification-basedone,thesourceofarightto disobey should be identified as clearly as possible so that members of thetransitional society have a better understanding of the content of the right todisobeyandcorrespondingissuesthatprotecteddisobedientactioncantarget.

4.1.Membersofatransitionalsocietywouldnotchooseajustification-basedapproachbecausewhetherdisobedienceisjustifiedisitselfhighlydisputable.Thissectionprovides threearguments forrejectinga justification-based

approachtodisobedience in transitionalsocieties. Inanutshell thequestionofwhetherdisobedienceisjustifiedisalwaysthesubjectofdisputeand,therefore,takingthedisobedients’ justificatoryreasontodisobeyasthereasontoprotecttheir actions from interference can not provide sufficient protection fordisobedience:thisisbecausethejustificationforparticularactsofdisobediencearethemselvesdisputed.Threeargumentsexplaintheproblemofjustification.

The firstargumentexplainshow justificationbecomes the focalpoint intransitionalsocietieswhenmembersofthesocietyholddifferentconceptionsofjustice and their judgments are influenced by the burdens of judgments. Ianalyzewhichstandardofjustification(objectivev.subjective)shouldbetakentodeterminewhetherdisobedienceisjustified.Inordertoprotectdisobediencea justification-based approach must utilize the subjective standard ofjustification.However,thisleadstomysecondargument.Mysecondargumentis

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thatwhileadoptingthesubjectivestandardof justification,membersofsocietyalsoneed some institutionalmechanism todeterminewhetherdisobedience islegally justified. The most plausible alternative is for courts to serve as theinstitution that makes this judgment. But courts cannot directly review thelegitimacy of disobedience; rather the role of courts would be indirect,determining whether the disobedients’ subjective justifications are consistentwith the jurisprudential assumptions of the legal system. This indirect roleresults from a problem of institutional capacity. The third argument explainswhyajustification-basedapproachfailswhenexpostjudgmentsaboutallegedlyunjust incidents are likely to be diverse and inconsistent in the context of atransitionalsociety.

4.1.1.Justificationbecomesthefocalpointofdisputewhenmembersofatransitionalsocietyholdavarietyofconceptionsofjusticeandareinfluencedbytheirburdensofjudgment.Theproblemofdisagreementonthequestionofwhetherdisobedienceis

justifiedornotislikelytooccurfrequentlyintransitionalsocieties.Forexample,some members of society are likely to take the position that disobedience israrely justified, because disobedience escalates social disorder and insecuritywhich these members believe are very high priorities. Therefore, for somemembers, unlawful forms of dissent themselves are presumptively unjustified;thesemembersofsocietyhaveaconceptionofsocialgoodthatvaluesordersohighly that the space for justifying disobedience is extremely restricted. Forthese members of society, compliance with legal rules that passed through ademocratic procedure is the essential condition of maintaining an orderlydemocratic society. But othermembersmight hold a different index of valuesthat leadsthemtothinkthatthebenefitsofcompliancewith legalrulescanbeoutweighed in awider range of circumstances and hence that there is amoreexpansivesphereofjustifieddisobedience.

Inadditiontothefactthatmembersofsocietyhavedifferentviewsaboutthe relative priority of the values that support law abidance, there is anotherdimension of the problem of justification created by disagreement over theproper standard of justification. Members of society may disagree over thequestion as to which standard should be adopted in determining whether apurported justification for disobedience is sound. One important aspect ofdisagreement over the standards for justification stems from the potentialdivergence between objective and subjective standards. Some members ofsocietymaybelievethattheproperstandardissubjective: justificationsshouldbe judged from the point of view of the disobedients themselves, taking intoaccounttheirviewpointsandcircumstances.Othermembersofsocietymaytakethe position that disobedience is justified if and only if the law targeted bydisobedienceisobjectivelyunjust.

Now consider the two standards that might be adopted to determinedisobedience’s justification.One is thesubjectivestandard, and the other is theobjectivestandard.Thesubjectivestandardacceptsthatjustificationismetifandonly if a reason to disobey is justified by disobedient’s subjective judgments.Therefore, the judgment of moral disapproval of a law is dependent on the

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subjective belief that the disobedient has in the sense that one holds areasonablebeliefthatalawinquestionisunjust.

The alternative is the objective standard of justification which requiresjustificationsofdisobediencetosatisfyasharedconceptionof justification.Themeaning of this “shared conception” is ambiguous. There are three possiblemeanings: “shared conception” could refer to the intelligibility, accessibility orshareabilityofthereasonsthatjustifydisobedience.115AccordingtoKevinVallierandFredD’Agostino,intelligibility,accessibility,andshareabilitycanbedefinedinthefollowingway.

• Intelligibility:A’sreasonRAisintelligibletomembersofthepublicifandonlyifmembersofthepublicregardRAasjustifiedforAaccordingtoA’sevaluativestandards.

• Accessibility: A’s reason RA is accessible to the public if and only if allmembersofthepublicregardRAas justifiedforAaccordingtocommonevaluativestandards.

• Shareability: A’s reason RA is sharable with the public if and only ifmembers of the public regard RA as justified for each member of thepublic,includingA,accordingtocommonstandards.116Consider first the shareability conception of objective justification. The

problem with this version of an objective standard is that it creates anunreasonably high threshold for justification of disobedience for members oftransitional societies who are likely to be divided on the political and moralquestions involved in the evaluation of the reasons for disobedience.Shareability requires that eachmember of the public regard the reason as anadequate reason toengage indisobedienceon thebasis of commonstandards,butintransitionalsocietiesbothadequacyandthestandardsarelikelytobethesubjectofdisagreement.

Theaccessibilityconceptionofobjectivejustificationsharestheproblemthat disagreement in a transitional society is likely to result in an absence ofcommonstandards,butbecauseitfocusesontheadequacyofthereasonforthedisobedientsthemselves, theaccessibilityconceptionsuffers froma lesssevereproblemthandoestheshareabilityconception.

This brings us to the intelligibility standard. Intelligibility relaxes therequirement that the adequacy of disobedients’ reasons for engaging in civildisobediencebe judgedbyapublic standard. Instead, thequestion iswhetherthepubliccanregardtheactionasjustifiedbythestandardsofthedisobedientsthemselves. Thus, the intelligibility standard imposes a very weak objectiverequirement. Thepublicdoesnotneedtoregardthedisobedients’reasonasagoodenoughreason forallmembersof society. Nordoes thepublic judge thereason by a common standard. Instead, intelligibility requires only that thereason that adisobedienthas forbreaking the lawbeagood reasongiven thedisobedient’sownstandards.

115 Vallier, Kevin and D'Agostino, Fred, "Public Justification," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/justification-public/>. 116 Id.

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Intelligibilityisnotidenticaltoasubjectiveapproach.Apurelysubjectiveapproachtodisobediencerequiresonlythatthedisobedientsthemselvesregardtheir actions as justified. This requirement can, in theory, be satisfied even iftheir reasons are unintelligible to everyone other than the disobedientsthemselves. But as a practical matter, it seems likely that most reasons thatsatisfy the subjective standardwill also satisfy the intelligibility conception ofobjective justification. This convergence results from the fact that mostdisobedients are likely to have reasons that are intelligible to their fellowcitizens.

A purely subjective standard faces a significant problem. A purelysubjective standard of justification cannot explain why the disobedients’subjectivebeliefhas“acorrespondingforce”thatprovidesanormativewarrantforblockinginterferencewithdisobedience.Forexample,thefactthatIbelievethat I have a reason to break a traffic law supportsmy action of disobediencefrommyperspective,butthisfact isnotareasonforyoutotakemysubjectivebelief into account unless you believe my subjective belief is reasonable.Therefore, if a justification-based approach has a function of protectingdisobedience via disobedients’ first-order reasons, theminimal requirement isthatthisreasontodisobeyisdeemedtobereasonablebyothersmembersofthetransitionalsociety,andmeetingthisrequirementwillbeadifficult taskundertheconditionsofpervasivedisagreementthatcharacterizetransitionalsocieties.

4.1.2.Thesubjectivestandardofdeterminingdisobedience’sjustificationleavesthefinaljudgmenttothecourt.Evenifweaccepttheintelligibilityconceptionoftheobjectivestandardor

the more latitudinarian subjective standard, a second challenge for ajustification-based approach emerges. Under the circumstance of reasonablepluralism, thedisobedients’ reasontodisobey is intelligible forothermembersbut nonetheless non-sharable. In order to determine whether disobedience isfinallyjustified,membersofsocietyneedsomeoneoraninstitutiontoadjudicatethe dispute that arises because of conflicting views about the justifiability ofdisobedience.Ofcourse,thedisobedientsthemselveshavealreadyresolvedthisdispute in favorof their ownpoint of view. But in a society that recognizes arighttodisobey,theremustbesomewaytosettledisputesoverthequestionofwhethertherighthasbeenproperlyexercised.Simplyallowingall lawbreakingisnotaviablesolutiontothisproblem.Presumablyitwillbeuptothecourtstoresolve this issue, and the courts will have the last word when they decidewhetherdisobedienceisjustifiedincasesinwhichtherightofdisobedienceisatissue.

Butgrantingthepowerofdeterminingwhetherdisobedienceis justifiedto the court opens the question of the capacity of the judiciary to determinewhether disobedience is justified. When members of society introduce aninstitution to settle the issue of justification, the issue is no longer whetherdisobedienceisjustified;ratherthequestionbecomeswho(orwhichinstitution)canproperlydealwiththeproblemofjustificationandwhethertheyarecapableofresolvingtheproblemofjustificationforparticularactsofdisobedience.

Onemain concern about a judge's capacity to dealwith the problemofjustification of disobedience is that a judgemust decide a case from the legal

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perspective.117 Judges should not directly decide whether disobedience ismorallyjustified;rather,theroleofthejudgeistodeterminewhetherthereisalegallyadequatejustificationandwhetherthatjustificationdefeatsanyopposingargumentagainstdisobedience.

Onepossiblesolutiontothisproblemwouldbetorequirejudgestomakeasubjective inquiry intothequestionofwhetherthedisobedienthadasincerebelief thatdisobediencewas justified,butthisapproachfacessevereproblems.Judges lack direct access to the mental states of disobedients and hence arerequired to evaluate external indicia of sincerity. But this creates a furtherproblem. Inextremecases, thedisobedientsmaycreateevidenceof theirowninsincerity—for example, by confessing that they did not believe in their ownjustifications. But many insincere disobedients may profess sincerity. Facedwithprofessionsofsincerityjudgesarelikelytoinquireintothesubstanceoftheproffered justification, but this inquiry will lead the judge from a purelysubjectiveapproachbacktoanobjectivestandard.

Thegeneralproblemistheabsenceoflegalstandardsbywhichthejudgecan evaluate the justifications offered by disobedients. Either a judge usesconventional legal arguments (for example legal justification or excuse) tomitigatethedisobedients’liabilityorhetreatsacaseofdisobedienceasthesameas an ordinary law-breaking case. Neither of these alternatives providessufficient protection of disobedience. Mitigation does not fully reflect theprotectionthatshouldbeaffordedtodisobedience,andtreatingdisobedientsasordinarylaw-breakersprovidesthemwithnoprotectionatall.

4.1.3.Ajustification-basedapproachfailswhenmembers’evaluationoftheexpostunjustincidentsareinfluencedbytheirburdensofjudgments.Ihaveshownthatajustification-basedapproachresultsinanassignment

of responsibility for evaluating the adequacy of justification to the courts andthat this leads to the question of whether the courts have the capacity todeterminateadequacygiven theabsenceof legal standards.Whenweconsiderthe feature of burdens of judgments in transitional societies, the fact that ajustification-based approach provides insufficient protection is even moreapparent. In a nutshell, a justification-based approach will fail to perform thefunctionofprotectingdisobediencewhenmembersofatransitionalsocietynotonly have different conceptions of justice but also have different ex postevaluationsofincidentsofinjusticeduetotheburdensofjudgment.

Let me take an example in Taiwan to illustrate how the burdens ofjudgmentcaninfluencetheprotectionofdisobedience.

During the period of Taiwan’s authoritarian regime (that is, the regimeledbyKai-ShekChiangor“ChiangKai-shek”), thegovernment initiatedwhat iscalledthe“WhiteTerror.”DuringtheWhiteTerror,people(theexactnumberis

117 The claim that judges should decide from a legal perspective and may not decide on the basis of their moral beliefs may be controversial. Some theorists may deny the existence of a distinct legal perspective and others might believe that moral judgments can be sources of law. These issues are bracketed for the purpose of this Dissertation.

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unknown) were secretly arrested, interrogated, and executed by a covertgovernmentagencyonthegroundsthattheymighthavesomeconnectionwithKarlMarx’stheoriesorideas.Thepurposeofthecovertgovernmentagencywasto identifypersonswhoposedadanger tonationalsecurity; thecovertagencyhadwidediscretionwithrespecttoadjudicativepowerbecausetheConstitutionofR.O.C.wassuspendedafter1948.TheWhiteTerroroccurredduringaperiodinwhichMartialLawallowedthepracticeof “disappearing”personssuspectedofbeingsympathetictoMarxism.

Nowadays the people of Taiwan rarely think that the government’sactionsduringtheWhiteTerrorwerejust(oracceptable),buttheydodisagreeabout whether the horrific actions of the authoritarian regime were morallypermissible given the fact that Taiwan was under the shadow of invasion bymainlandChina.

Regardingthemoralpermissibilityofhorrificactions,somepeoplearguethatincidentsoftheWhiteTerrorwereclearlyunjustandthatasaconsequencevarious forms of disobedience (peaceful and non-peaceful) were justified,especially given that theWhite Terrorwas literally amatter of life and death.SomearguethatdespitetheexistenceoftheextrememoralwrongssufferedbythevictimsoftheWhiteTerror,Chiang’sregimenonethelessshouldbeexcusedfor these incidentsbecauseat that time thenational securitywasproperly thefirst priority of the state. Some even argue that the authoritarian regime andhorrific actions during the White Terror were necessary for constructing thebasisofarobustdemocracy.

TheaftermathoftheWhiteTerrorincludeddiscussionsofcompensationfor the victims. When Martial Law was revoked in 1987, there was somemovement topursue thepastgovernment’s legal liability for theabusesof theWhiteTerror.At that timemanypeople admitted that thepast incidentsweremorally impermissible but they disputed whether the government wasresponsible for these incidents. Consider one dispute that arose during thelegislative process regarding victims’ legal remedies. There was disagreementoverthequestionofwhethertheword“compensation”wasthecorrecttermforthe legal remedy. 118 The word “compensation” implies that the victims’entitlement to a payment is based on the past government’s wrongdoing. Inorder to avoid this implication, and hence blaming Kai-Shek Chiang for usingcruelmeasures,somelegislatorsarguedfortheword”reparation”astheproperterm for a legal remedy rooted in the government’s good will.119They alsobelieved that such a usage could avoid a conflict between the victims and thegovernmentandachieveaharmonious society.Themajority in theLegislatureconsistedofproKMTmembers;theyadoptedtheword”reparation”asthetermforthelegalentitlementforvictimsoftheWhiteTerror.

Thedisputeoverwhichnameshouldbegiventotheremedyprovidedtovictims of the White Terror is suggestive; even members of society whorecognized that the past incident was seriously unjust and morally

118 In Chinese, the dispute was over the word “賠償 translated as “compensation.” 119 In Chinese, the dispute was over the word “補償 translated as “reparation.”

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impermissible could strongly disagree about the precise evaluative judgmentthatshouldbeappliedtothisinstanceofpastinjustice.

Whenmembersprotestseriousinjusticeinatransitionalsociety,conflictsofevaluativejudgmentscanbecomeseverebecausethemembersofsocietymayholdmutuallyincompatibleconceptionsofjusticeleadingtodisagreementaboutwhether the justificatory reasons for disobedience are adequate Even ifmembersofsocietyrecognizethatdisobedienceisjustified,theymightdisagreetowhatextentthisjustifieddisobedienceshouldbeprotected.

4.2.Membersofatransitionalsocietyshouldadoptarights-basedapproachgroundedontherightofpoliticalparticipation.ThepreviousSectionargues thata justification-basedapproach leads to

problemsof justification, including thestandard for judgment, thecapabilityofthecourt,andexpostdisagreementsaboutinstancesofinjustice.Theseproblemsshow thata justification-basedapproach is insufficient toprotectdisobedienceinatransitionalsociety.

A rights-based approach is preferable, not because it resolves theproblemof justification,but insteadbecause it imposesaburdenofpersuasionon the political authority and requires the political authority to give dueconsiderationtotherighttocivildisobediencewhenitinterfereswithunlawfulprotest. The problem of justification remains, but a rights-based approachappropriately allocates the burden of persuasion and thereby requiresnormative deliberation by the political authority when dealing with a case ofdisobedience.

However,thisargumentforarights-basedapproachdoesnotaddressthequestionoftheunderlyingnormativejustificationoftheright.ThelastChapterillustrated two underlying sources for a right to disobey: the right of moralconvictionandtherightofpoliticalparticipation. Inowturnto thequestionofwhichoftheseissuperior.

My arguments proceed as follows. Kimberley Brownlee’s moralconvictionargumentispowerful,butherargumentignoresacommonfeatureincases of civil disobedience: civil disobedience is political in nature. Brownlee’smoral conviction argument is unable to explain how individuals’ moraljudgments are connected with their political ideals. Given this difficulty withBrownlee’s views, I endorse the right of political participation explicated byDavidLefkowitzbut inamodified form. Themodification isbasedonthe ideathat theright todisobey isageneralright inthesensethateverymemberofatransitionalsocietyisentitledtotherighttocivildisobedience.

4.2.1.TheIssueinTheRightofMoralConviction:DisconnectionwithPoliticalRelevanceofDisobedienceKimberleyBrownlee’smoral-conviction argument is persuasivebecause

it incorporates the principle of humanity in a well-ordered society: a societyshould respect members’ communication with others regarding theirconscientiousjudgments.(ForherargumentseeSection3.1.1inChapterFour.)

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For Brownlee, disobedience is an action expressing one’s sincere moraljudgments. A society that accepts the principle of humanity should grant theright to disobey by those members who have a sincere and conscientiousjudgmentonmoralissuesthatisexpressedbytheactofdisobedience.

WhileBrownlee’sbasicargumentisconvincing,membersofatransitionalsocietywouldbereluctanttoaccepttherightofmoralconvictionasthesourceoftherighttodisobeyforthefollowingreasons.

First, thepossibility that amoral conviction is not apolitical convictionimplies that political relevance is not a necessary component of civildisobedience.Butactualcasesofcivildisobediencedohaveapoliticaldimension:this is one of the features that differentiates civil disobedience fromconscientiousrefusal toobey the law.Thus, ignoring thepoliticaldimensionofdisobedience leaves an important characteristic of civil disobedienceunexplained.

Second, Brownlee’s exclusion of the political features of disobediencecreatesanotherdifficulty:aconvictionthatisactuallyimmoralcanbeheldbyanindividualwhodoesnotrecognizetheimmoralityoftheconviction.Brownlee’sviewimpliesthatifthisimmoralbeliefissincereandconscientiousthatitgivesrise to a right to disobey. But the notion that there is a right to engage indisobedienceinordertoexpressanimmoralbeliefseemsimplausible.

The firstweakness inKimberleyBrownlee’s arguments is the failure torecognize the political dimension of disobedience. She does not discuss thequestion of whether a political dimension is a necessary component ofdisobedience.However, themost importanthistorical casesofdisobediencealldisplayapoliticaldimension.GandhicampaignedforradicalchangeinIndiaandaimedtooverthrowtheBritishcolonialgovernment.TheArabSpringuprisinginTunisia had a redistribution of political power as its primary goal. Dr. MartinLuther King required that Congress pass the Voting Rights Act among otherpoliticalgoals.Acompletesurveyof thehistoryofcivildisobedience isoutsidethescopeofthisDissertation,butitseemsplausiblethatmostoralmostalloftheimportant or paradigmatic cases of civil disobedience were performed in thecontext of challenging political authorities. This aspect of civil disobedienceshould be explained and justified by a theory of the right to engage in civildisobedience.

Excluding the political dimension of disobedience results in an accountthat fails to explain why disobedience is powerful: disobedience becomespowerful when it is a means of resistance to the brutal exercise of politicalauthority.Without taking thepolitical dimensionofdisobedience into account,weareledtotheconclusionthatdisobediencenecessarilyaimstocommunicateamoralbelieftoallmembersofsociety.Butresistantdisobedienceneednotaimits message at all members of society: the primary target of resistantdisobedienceisthepoliticalauthorityitself.

Theideathatdisobedienceisbasedonamoralconvictionandthenotionthat disobedience has a political dimension are not mutually exclusive. Forexample,noonedoubtsthatDr.Kinghadasinceremoralconvictionthatplayedaroleinhiscampaignofcivildisobedience.ButthepowerofKing’scampaignofcivildisobediencedidnotcomefromthesincerityofhismoralbeliefs. Rather,

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thepowerofKing’smessagecamefromhispoliticalappealtothepowerlessnessof a repressed minority; this powerlessness resulted in their extremevulnerabilitytoexploitationandharm.

Inreply to thispoint,Brownleemightargue thatpoliticalbeliefs formapartofmoralbelief.Therefore,shemightarguethattherightofmoralconvictioncan still explain the political nature of disobedience. For example, she mightargue that Dr. King’smoral convictions against the brutal exercise of politicalauthority and unfair deprivation of the right to votewere responsible for thepowerful effect of his campaign of civil disobedience. For the purposes of thisDissertation,Iwillsettheontologyofmoralitytothesideandfocusonwhatwewouldmissifweadoptedthemoralconvictionargument.

Of course, political morality is a part of morality. But failure toacknowledge the political dimension of disobedience is not a mere matter oftypologybutinsteadshouldbeviewedinlightoftherolethatpersonalmoralityandpoliticalmorality canplay in a transitional society.Thispoint leads to thesecond weakness in attempting to apply Brownlee’s theory to transitionalsocieties.

Grounding the right to civil disobedience on the right to express one’smoral convictions leads to further problems in the context of transitionalsocieties. This grounding of the right has implications for groups that areespeciallydangerousorproblematicinthecontextofatransitionalsociety.Suchgroupsincludeopportunists,extremists,andfundamentalists.Membersofthesegroupswouldbeentitledtoappealtotheirmoralconvictions.

For this reason, members of a transitional society would not onlyconsidertheimplicationsoftheirownrightofmoralconviction,butwouldalsoconsidertheimplicationsofgivingopportunists,extremists,andfundamentalistsa right to disobey laws that violate their moral and religious beliefs. Theseimplicationscouldbegrave.Opportunistscouldutilizethisrighttopreserveanunjust distribution of political power. Extremists might employ the right todisobey tounderminesocialorder. Fundamentalistscouldemploy theright toadvance an agenda of authoritarianism thatwould, in the end, be inconsistentwithfreedomofconscienceitself.

Therefore,membersofsocietywouldnotbeinclinedtogroundtherightto disobey on the right of moral conviction unless there was a preexistingconsensuson issuesof politicalmorality that set a baseline for the exercise ofpolitical authority. In a transitional society, it seems unlikely that such aconsensusexists.

Tobeclear,Iamrejectingarightofmoralconvictionastheprimarybasisforarighttoengageincivildisobedience.Anditmightbepossibleformembersof a transitional society to view the right of moral conviction as providing asupplemental support for the right to disobey. But taking the right of moralconviction as theprimary source of the right todisobeywouldundermine thedistinctionbetweenpersonalmoralityandpoliticalmoralitythatisnecessaryintransitional societies. In Chapter Two, I explained howRawls uses the idea ofpublicreasontoexplicatetherelationshipbetweenpersonalmoralityandpublicmorality with respect to the justification of civil disobedience. (See Section3.2.1.1 in Chapter Two.) While members of a transitional society might not

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completelyacceptRawls’s theoryofpublicreason,hisargument foran idealofpublic reason explains why a purely personal conception of morality cannotprovideanadequatefoundationforcivildisobedienceasapoliticalphenomenon.

4.2.2.ArgumentsfortheRightofPoliticalParticipationastheSourceoftheRighttoDisobeyLefkowitz’s argument for a right of political participation is more

appropriateformembersofatransitionalsocietytoadoptasthefoundationoftherighttodisobey.Buthisargumentdoesnotfullysucceedinitsoriginalform.I will illustrate the advantage of the political participation approach first andthenadapthis“badluck”argumenttothecontextofatransitionalsociety.

The political participation approach rests on two important facts aboutcivildisobedience.Oneisthatdisobedienceisapoliticalactionandtheotheristhatdisobedienceisaformofparticipationinthedemocraticprocess.

Disobedience as a political action shows how disobedience should besituated with respect to the distribution of rights, powers, and resources.Disobedienceisrelevanttohowpoliticalauthoritytreatsmembersofsocietyasagents inagivenpoliticalcommunityandhowdisobedientsperceivetheirroleas participants in a political transition from systematic injustice towards amature democracy. Therefore, Lefkowitz’s theory can either be connected to aradical conception of democracy or to a moderate conception of democracy,which focuses on how procedural defects might defeat democratic transition.Transitional societies should debate which theory of democracy is the mostappropriatefortheirowncircumstancesandtheireffortstomovetowardmoresuccessful democraticparticipation.There is noone-size-fits-all answer to thisquestion.

Seeing disobedience as a form of participation in political affairshighlightsthecollectivenatureofcivildisobedience.Democracyasaninstitutionaimsistoachievecollectivedecisionundercertaincontingentlimitationssuchaslimitationsontime,constraintsonthesizeofdeliberativebodies,practicallimitsonthescopeofparticipation,andsoforth.Whenweviewcivildisobedienceasaform of democratic politics, we are reminded that disobedience should beconductedinsuchawayastofacilitate(andnottoblock)democraticprocessesinthefuture.Civildisobedienceisaformofcollectiveactionfortheachievementofpoliticalgoals.

While I endorse Lefkowitz’s argument for the right of politicalparticipation, there isonedifficultywithhisargument. Thisproblemconcernshisstanceonwhathecalls“badluck.”Lefkowitz’streatmentofbadluckisbasedon the idea that political outcomes often reflect the influence of contingentconditions within society. These contingencies are undeserved and henceconstitute bad luck for those who lose out through the operation of normaldemocraticprocesses.Therighttodisobeyisrequiredinordertogivealosingminorityanadequatealternativeavenueofpoliticalexpression.

Theproblemwiththeargumentaboutbadluckisthatitimpliesthattheright to disobey is not a general right but is instead limited tominorities thathave lost out in the normal political process because of bad luck. For everypolitical decision, members can be divided into supporters and opponents.

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Ideally speaking, laws reflect the will of the majority of citizens. Those whooppose the laws that are enacted are the minority; the right to disobey istherefore limited to theminority. This limitation on the right to disobey is adistinctivefeatureofLefkowitz’saccount.

4.2.3.TheArgumentofBadLuck2.0One virtue in David Lefkowitz’s account of civil disobedience is that it

focusesourattentionontheroleofbadluckindemocraticresolutionsofmoraldisagreements. For him, a collective decision can only be made under thelimitationofcontingentconditionsandnotallreasonablemoraldemandscanbeadequatelymet by democratic processes. Therefore, theremust be amajorityand a minority when two competing moral demands exist. Because thedemocraticprocessisinfluencedbycontingentconditions,includinglimitationson the time and scope of deliberation, there is no good reason for losingminoritiestoacceptthefinalityofthedemocraticprocess. Theyareentitledtoattempttooverturnthedecisionbyengagingincivildisobedience.

Lefkowitz’sversionoftheargumentfordisobediencebasedonthefactofbadluckimpliesthattherighttodisobeyisa limitedrightthatbelongsonlytotheminority.Therightislimitedtotheminoritybecauseonlytheminorityhasaneedtocontestagivencollectivedecisionbyappealing to theirmoraldemand(whichwas rejected by themajority). Majorities do not need to be protectedfrom bad luck by a right to disobedience; majorities can protect themselvesthroughdemocraticprocedures.

This conception of the democratic process could be accurate in someconditions, but it does not provide an adequate representation of the role ofmajorities and minorities in transitional societies. Lefkowitz’s argumentassumesthatthereisasimplequantitativemethodfordeterminingwhoisinthemajoritywithrespecttoagivenmoralquestion. Butundertheconditionsofatransitionalsociety,thissimplequantitativeideaofmajorityandminoritystatusbreaks down. In transitional societies, the majority may be powerless andvulnerable. If this is the case, then the right to disobedience should not belimitedtothelosingminority.

Ihavearticulated the ideaofstructural injustice in thepreviousSectionandnowIshallusethisfeatureoftransitionalsocietiesinordertoarticulatethecaseforthepropositionthattherighttodisobeyshouldbegeneral,notlimited.Ishalltaketherighttovoteasacasestudythatdemonstrateshowthemajorityofmembersofatransitionalsocietycouldbeinavulnerablepositionandthereforewouldaffirmageneralrighttodisobey.

One goal of the right of political participation is toprovide ameans fortransforming an individual will into a public will (or consensus). One way tofurther thisgoal is toprotect theright tovote,grantingallmembersofsocietyrightstoanequalvoteandtoexpresstheiropinions.Arighttoanequalvoteisaminimum condition for the protection of the right of political participation. Aright to vote protects the ability of members of society to make their owndecisionsregardingpoliticalparticipation,includingthedecisionwhetherornotto vote and forwhom theywill vote if they chose to do so. The right to voteshouldbeconsideredprimaryandoughttobeextendedasearlyaspossible in

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the process of political transition from an authoritarian regime to a just anddemocraticsystem.

However, the existence of legal obstacles can operate to restrict theexercise of the right to vote. Recall that “legal obstacle” is the phrase I use torefertothesituationinwhichthetransitionalperiodincludesavarietyoflegalrules that are designed to raise barriers to members' effective politicalparticipation. There are several ways to create legal obstacles that constrainmembers’ right to vote. (See Section 2.3 in Chapter 5.) When members of atransitional society find that their right to votewould be hindered and expectthat such obstacles won’t disappear soon, the right to vote is malfunctioning.Thislegalobstaclepreventstheactualwillofindividualmembersofsocietyfromcontributingtoatrulydemocraticprocessofcollectivedecision-making.

Itmaybepossibletoremovelegalobstaclesbyrecoursetolegalremedies.Thosewhoopposelegalobstaclesmaybeabletogeneratelegalargumentsthatwillleadthecourtstoprovideeffectiverelief.Butgeneratinganddeployinglegalarguments may not be easy in a transitional society. In some cases, simplymakinglegalargumentsrequiressomedegreeofself-sacrifice;inextremecases,theadvocatesmayputtheirlivesortheirfreedomatrisk.Forexample,lawyersin China are at risk of being incarcerated by the authorities if their legalargumentsoffendtheChineseCommunistParty. Insomelessextremecases,tosimply raise legal arguments may create a risk of harassment or financialsacrifice.

Members of vulnerable groups may not have effective access to legalredress. The ability to go to court may depend on economic status, socialposition, or political affiliation. For this reason, members of the numericalmajority may not be able to circumvent legal obstacles that block access toeffectivepoliticalparticipation.

Thus,itmaybethecasethatconditionsinatransitionalsocietyaresuchthat the numerical majority is functionally in the position occupied by theminority in a fully democratic society. Like theminority in a fully democraticsociety, themajority in a transitional societymay be unable to translate theirconvictions into law through normal democratic processes. For this reason,membersofatransitionalsocietywouldadoptageneralrighttodisobey.Underthese conditions, the right of political participation provides the appropriatejustificationforarightofdisobedience.

InthisChapterIhaveexplainedhowmyanalysisofthreeconceptionsofdisobediencecanbeimplementedinatransitionalsocietyandonwhatgroundsmembers of a transitional society would adopt a rights-based approach todisobedience toprotectdisobedients from interferenceby thepolitical regime.In addition, this Chapter made the case that resistant disobedience isnormativelydesirableandexplainedwhygivingdisobedientsarighttodisobeyisofparticular importance.Finally, theChapterdemonstratedthat thisright todisobeyisbestgroundedontherightofpoliticalparticipation.Thenextchapter,theconclusion,returnstothediscussionoftheSunflowerMovementfirstfoundin Chapter One. In Chapter Six, I shall describe the nature of the SunflowerMovement,theforceandeffectsitcreated,andwhyitwasacaseofnonviolent,resistantdisobedience.

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CHAPTERSIXTheSunflowerMovementinTaiwanAnalyzedandConcludingThoughtsThis aim of this Dissertation has been to develop a theory of civil

disobedienceandthentoapplythattheoryinthecontextofatransitionalsociety.Thus,theDissertationhasdevelopedsystematicanswerstoaseriesofquestions:

• Whatisthenatureofcivildisobedience?• Underwhatcircumstancesiscivildisobediencejustified?• Istherearighttoengageincivildisobedience?Andifso,howcan

thatrightbejustified?• What is thenatureof a transitional society? What conceptionof

civildisobedienceisappropriateforsuchasociety?

Thischapterreviewsandsynthesizestheanswerstothesequestionsandthen reflects on the implications of the theory for events in Taiwan. TheSunflower Movement and associated events illustrate the role of civildisobedience in a transitional society. Reflection on the political regime’sresponse to the Sunflower Movement provides a concrete context thatilluminatesthecasefortherighttocivildisobedience:thecaseforsucharightisthecentralnormativeclaimofthisDissertation.

The first part of the Dissertation was theoretical and conceptual. Theconceptual investigation began in Chapter Two, which reviewed John Rawls’stheoryofcivildisobedienceandexplicatedhismaturepositiononthenatureofcivil disobedience and its justification. Chapter Three then developed threeconceptionsofdisobedienceusingspeechacttheoryasitwasdevelopedbyJohnAustin. These three conceptions are expressive, communicative, and resistantdisobedience—each conception includes a distinctive account of the aim ofdisobedienceandtherebyanswersquestionsabout thecircumstances inwhichdisobedience is warranted and what limits on disobedient actions areappropriate. Chapter Three investigated the relationship assumed betweendisobedients and other members of society in each conception, the force andintended effects generated by disobedience, the role of the principle ofnonviolence, and the justificatory threshold for initiating disobedience. Theresults of this investigation led to a further question, “To what extent shoulddisobedience be protected from interference by the political authorities,includingpoliceandcriminalprosecution?”ChapterFouransweredthisquestionby distinguishing two approaches to disobedience: a justification-based and arights-based approach. The chapter explicated the meaning and differencebetween these two approaches and demonstrated that a justification-basedapproachprovidesdisobedientsinadequateprotection,becausethejustificationof disobedience itself becomes the center of dispute. Finally, Chapter FiveappliedthetheoreticalargumentframeworkdevelopedinChaptersTwo,Three,and Four to transitional societies. This chapter argued that members of atransitional society should have a right to resistant disobedience when theiractionstargetstructuralinjustice.

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This sixth and final Chapter concludes the discussion by applying thetheoretical framework to the case of the Sunflower Movement, which wasintroduced in Chapter One. The first question is, “Which conception ofdisobedience (expressive, communicative, or resistant) was implicit in theSunflowerMovement?”

Without question the Sunflower Movement was a case of large-scaledisobedience.Althoughintheverybeginningofthismovement,therewereonlyafewparticipants,moreandmoreindividualsvoluntarilyjoinedthismovementasitbecameprominentonsocialmedia.Themovementlastedforover23daysand by 30March 2014, there were over 500,000 people gathered outside theOfficeofPresidentcallingonPresidentMatorevokeCSATS.The targetsof theSunflowerMovementweretheLegislativeYuanandthePresident.ParticipantsandoccupantsnotonlyexpressedtheirconcernaboutCSATS; thedisobedientsinsisted that the political authority must comply with their demands. TheSunflower Movement targeted the political regime and those who have thepoliticalpowertotakeactionandrepealCSATS.Thus,theSunflowerMovementwasclearlyacaseofresistantdisobedience.Membersofthemovementwerenotmerelyexpressingtheirbeliefsandfeelings.Theirgoalwasnotmerelytoengagein a rational dialogue with the public. This was a mass movement thatthreatenedthepoliticalregimeanddemandedcompliance.

The Sunflower Movement was connected with the phenomenon ofglobalization.Participantswereworriedthat theendresultofCSATSwouldbean open market that would damage Taiwan’s domestic market. People alsoworried about the impact of Chinese influence on Taiwan’s process ofdemocratization and inparticular on thepossibility of interferencebyChinesebusiness associations. Protesters did not believe that free trade with ChinawouldimproveTaiwan’seconomicperformance;rather,theyfearedthatitcouldcause irreversible damage to all sectors of society, discourage politicalparticipation,anddisrupteconomicstability.Participantsalsoworriedthat themonopolyofpoliticalandeconomiccapitalbythepoliticallypowerfulinTaiwanhad created structural injustice and damaged Taiwan’s democracy. ForparticipantsoftheSunflowerMovement,occupyingtheLegislativeYuanwasthemeans to pressure the Ma government to stop negotiating with Chinagovernment.

Protesters targeted two audiences in the course of their disobedience.The first audience included thePresident and Speaker of the Legislative Yuan.And the second audience was the constitutional-political regime that heldpoliticalpowertodeterminetheeconomicandpoliticalarrangementsbetweenTaiwanandChina.Withrespecttothefirsttargetaudience,theprotestersaimedatpressuringthePresidentandtheSpeakerof theLegislativeYuan tostopthenegotiationprocesswith theauthoritiesof thePRC. Theprotestersdemandedthat theMagovernment suspend the free tradeprovisionsofCSATSuntil theyweresubstantivelyreviewedbytheLegislativeYuan.ThisgoalwasagreeduponattheoutsetoftheSunflowerMovement.

However, protesters did not at first realize that the Constitution of theROC (Republic of China) conferred substantial unilateral authority on theExecutive, with the consequence that the separation of powers could not

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function effectively in terms of checks and balances. One reason that theunilateralauthoritywasgrantedtotheexecutiveisthattheideologyofChinesereunification supports giving the executive extensive power regarding Cross-Straitissues.AstheyounggenerationofTaiwanesepeoplebegantoquestionthecommitment to reunification, more and more voices called for constitutionalchangetoreflecttheemergingsupportforTaiwaneseautonomy.Themovementbegan to experience fractures when more radical participants becamedissatisfied with certain political compromises between the leaders of theSunflowerMovement and the political authorities. The radicals challenged thelegitimacy of the political regime, but the leaders of the SunflowerMovementtookadvantageoftheregime’slegitimacytofurthertheirowngoals.

The illocutionary force generated by the Sunflower Movement wasimperative force; the disobedients demanded that the Ma government revokeCSATS, conduct research on the domestic impact analysis, and pass laws thatcould provide social welfare to persons harmed by CSATS. Protesters alsoengaged in public discourse explaining why the agreement was harmful toTaiwan.Althoughtheseeffortsmightnothavebeeneffective inpersuadingthepublic, the primary aim was to coerce the Ma government into accepting themovement’spolicydemands.TheSunflowerMovementwasnotameresymbolicprotest but instead was a weapon to force compliance by the government ofTaiwan.WhiletheleadersoftheSunflowerMovementdidnotengageinviolentaction,theydidintentionallycreateacoerciveeffectviamassprotests.

There have been two disputes in Taiwan with respect to the coerciveeffects of the SunflowerMovement. The first dispute concerns the question ofwhether the movement was violent: this dispute arose because someparticipantsbrokewindowsandobstructedjusticebyassaultingandhumiliatinglaw enforcement officers. The second issue is whether this movement wasjustified.

With respect to the first dispute, one position is that a movement isviolent if a significant number of participants use violent actions—such asbreaking windows. This position leads to the conclusion that the SunflowerMovement was. But this conclusion is too simple to provide useful analysis.Fromthe fact thatviolence isemployedasameans, itdoesnot followthat themovement was violent; nor does it follow that the limited violence that wasemployedwasnotjustified.

What we should ask is whether a conception of disobedience permitsviolentactionsand,ifitdoes,whatthescopeofpermissibleactionswouldbe.Myanalysis of resistant disobedience shows that limited violent actions likepropertydamage,injurytointangibleinterests,andhumiliationarepermissible.It is reasonable to use thesemethods in the course of disobedience, given theunderlying aim of resistant disobedience which is the defense of democracygiven conditions of structural injustice. Therefore, we cannot say that onceviolent actions are used that disobedience is therefore without justification.Insteadofthisover-simplifiedreasoning,thefactorsthatshouldbeconsideredto determine the legitimacy of disobedience ought to include the purpose, thescope,andthecontextoftheviolentactions.TheviolentactionsintheSunflowerMovement were mostly property damage and humiliation; these tactics were

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employed in order to occupy the Legislative Yuan with the ultimate aim ofrestoring a democractic process. In context, the limited acts of restrainedviolencewereunderstoodasessentialmeanstoaccomplishtheendsofresistantdisobedience.Itisreasonabletosaythattheseviolentactionswererationalandreasonable; the Sunflower Movement considered as a whole should not becharacterizedasengagedinsystematicallyviolentdisobedience.

The second dispute was over the question whether the SunflowerMovementwasjustified.Toanswerthisquestionweneedtodeterminewhetherthe conditions for initiating the defense of democracy were satisfied in theSunflowerMovement.AsarguedinChapterThree,thereareseveralconditions.InthecaseoftheSunflowerMovement,opponentsofthemovementarguedthatTaiwan’sdemocracywasstillingoodconditionandtherewasnoneedtoinitiatedisobedience because alternative means (normal political appeal) was stillavailable. Supporters of the Sunflower Movement argued that the LegislativeYuan had become the rubber stamp for the President and there was no legalstanding forprotesters to challenge the constitutionalityofCSATS through thejudicial process. Thus, proponents of the Sunflower Movement argue that theinstitutionalmechanisms for lawful challenge had been exhausted. Moreover,thenextelectionwasstillmorethanoneyearaway.Finally,giventhedominantrole of the KMP Party, there was no legislative mechanism to effectivelychallengethePresident.Asignificantmalfunctionofdemocraticinstitutionsandthelackofadequatechecksandbalancessatisfiedthepreconditionsforinitiatingresistantdisobedience.

The disagreement about the justification of the Sunflower Movementraises an important point. Conceptual analysis of disobedience can provide aclearandstructuredunderstandingofthenatureofdisobedience,butnormativetheoriesofdisobedienceinparticularanddemocraticinstitutionsingeneralarerequired to evaluate whether a particular case of disobedience is justified.Continued disagreement about the Sunflower Movement demonstrates thatthere are two competing conceptions of democracy in Taiwan. Those whosupport and opposite the Sunflower Movement appeal to the concept ofdemocracy, but they have completely different ideas about what democracyrequires.

Yi-Ting Wang (王奕婷) used data collected by the Asian BarometerSurveyofDemocracy,GovernanceandDevelopmenttoinvestigatethenotionsofdemocracythatrespondentsheld.ShefoundthatrespondentswhoareproKMTpartyhaveadifferentconceptionofdemocracyfromthosewhoareopposedtotheKMTparty.Almost fortypercentof respondentswhosupport the theKMTparty consider governance and law and order to be the core element in ademocracy,whilelessthantwentypercentofthememphasizethevaluesofthefreedomof expressionand fairpolitical competitions.Her researchalso showsthat the younger generation (ranging fromage20 to 29) places a significantlyhighervalueonthefreedomtoprotestthandoothergenerations.120

120 See Yi-Ting Wang, “Two Notions of Democracy- Law and Order v. Human Rights,” in 巷口仔社會學 (https://twstreetcorner.org/2014/04/14/wangyiting/ ); Last visit: 2017/02/03. The data collected

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Continued disagreement about the question of whether the SunflowerMovementwas justified illustrates the importance of providing adequate legalprotection for disobedients under conditions where the justifiability ofdisobedience can become a focal point of dispute. Treating the SunflowerMovementasaninstanceofjustifiedresistantdisobediencedoesnotimplythatTaiwan’s legal system must tolerate lawbreaking in general or that ordinarylawbreakersshouldnotbesubjectto legalsanctions.TheSunflowerMovementinvolvedactionsofcriminalwrong-doingsuchasobstructionofjustice,propertydamage, and trespass. Taiwanese law enforcement officials had prima faciereasons to intervene in ways that would disrupt the movement and result inprosecution of disobedients. To determine whether these prima facie reasonswereovercomeinthecaseoftheSunflowerMovement,weneedtoconsidertheimplicationsofajustification-basedandarights-basedapproachtodisobedience.ThisDissertationarguesforarights-basedapproach;suchanapproachimposesthe burden of proof upon the side of political authorities. This means thatprosecutorsandthecourtsshouldconsiderthepositiveeffectbroughtaboutbythe Sunflower Movement and the reason that protesters engaged indisobedience.Legalauthoritiesshouldtaketheprincipleofproportionalityintoaccountwhendecidingtheappropriateresponsetodisobedience;thus,decisionsregardingtheoffensetobechargedandtheseverityofsentencetobeimposedshould consider the proportionality of the disobedient acts to the injusticetargetedbythedisobedients.Legalauthoritieshavenotyettakenarights-basedapproachinthecaseofSunflowerMovement;decisionsweremadeon31March2017. The court ruled in favor of the defendants by explicitly accepting civildisobedienceasajustification.Thecourtadoptedajustification-basedapproachin a very limited way. It does not generally recognize that disobedients withjustified reasons can be immunized from the political authority’s interventionbut only allows a very thin possibility of using justified disobedience asjustification.Nonetheless,thisdecisionisthefirstdecisionthatexplicitlyadoptscivildisobedienceasalegaldefenseinTaiwan.

InpoliticaldiscourseinTaiwan,thequestionofwhetherthereisarighttodisobediencehasnotbeenthefocusofsubstantialdiscussionanddebate.Totheextent that a right to disobey is mentioned, the use of this idea is frequentlyvagueandunderdeveloped. Sometimesthenotionofarighttodisobedienceisusedtoconveyaclaimaboutthelegitimacyofdisobedience.Onotheroccasions,a right to obey is in connectionwith thepossibility that disobedience leads tosocialdisorder.Butthisdiscussionisbasedonaninadequateunderstandingoftherighttodisobey.AsthisDissertationhasdemonstrated,arighttodisobeyisa second-order reason that protects performance of disobedience frominterference by others—such protection constitutes an assignment ofjurisdiction over the decision whether or not to disobey to the individualdisobedient and removes jurisdiction from others, including law enforcementofficials.Mydiscussionprovidesacleararticulationaboutthemeaningofarighttodisobeyanditseffectsupontheexerciseofpoliticalauthorities.Althoughthepeople of Taiwan have not generally accepted a right to disobey, the ideas

by the Asian Barometer can be found on its website (http://www.asianbarometer.org/data); Last visit: 2017/02/03.

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advanced in this Dissertation can serve as the basis for further normativediscussionsaboutwhethersucharightshouldbeacceptedinTaiwanesesociety.

Thefinalpointtobeconsideredinthisconcludingchapteristhevalueofdisobedience.While the ideas explored in theDissertation are intellectual andabstract, the case for a right to disobedience matters and should not bedismissedasmerelyacademic.Disobediencemattersbecauseithasthepotentialto change the world in ways that are not full predictable. The content of theconceptofdisobediencecanonlyberealizedthroughpraxis.Plato’sCritoshowsthispointclearly:thequestionpresentedtoSocratesintheCritowasapracticalquestion,whetherheshouldfleeAthenstoevadecapitalpunishment.Theideaspresented by Socrates in the Crito reflected his determined conscientiousnessandprovidedthemoralreasonsforhisdecisiontoremaininAthens.ThecaseofSocrates is similar to a case of disobedience because sincere disobedientsdemonstratetheirconscientiousjudgmentbyprovidingreasonsfortheiractsofdisobedience and by accepting moral responsibility for those actions. Theirsincerity and conscientiousness are something that can only be demonstratedthroughpraxis.Disobedienceisnotanabstracttheoreticalidea,butisinsteadanidea the potential of which to change the world can only be realized throughactions. Civil disobediencematters in the world. Resistant disobedience is ofparticularimportancebecauseitistheformofdisobediencethatisdistinctiveinthat it provides the means for the defense of democracy when politicalinstitutionsfail.Andthisisparticularlyimportantintransitionalsocietieswhereauthoritarian regimes and opportunists can thwart the arrival of trulydemocraticinstitutions.

This Dissertation focuses on the conceptual investigation of differenttypesofdisobediencebuttheDissertationhasbeeninformedfrombeginningtoend by the reason that civil disobedience matters as praxis. Thus, thisDissertationis likeatelescopethathelpsusviewdisobediencefromadistanceandenablesustoseethegeneralandabstract featuresthatareobscuredfromthe view of participants in the messy and complicated experience of real-lifeprotests,marches,anddemonstrations.Butitisimportanttorememberthatthelong range view alone is insufficient because thepraxis of disobedience is notsomething abstract but rather concrete and particular. Connecting theory andpracticewill require further investigation.Case studiesof civildisobedience inconjunction with further development of the theoretical account can provideindividualswitharicherunderstandingofthechoicestheyfacewhenstructuralinjusticecreatestheconditionsthatjustifyresistantdisobedience.

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