For civpro

Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Ninth Congress

1. Republic Act No. 7691             March 25, 1994

AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE

BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980", is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.

"(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

"(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;

"(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);

"(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

"(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;

"(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law; and

"(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00)."

Section 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof."

Section 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

"(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

"(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession; and

"(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots."

Section 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts."

Section 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).

Section 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions of this Act shall be considered amended or modified accordingly.

Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative procedure of transferring the cases affected by the

redefinition of jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: March 25, 1994

2. RA 7975ACT No. 7975

AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS

AMENDED

Section 1. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Executive Order No. 184, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 3. Division of the Court; Quorum. - The Sandiganbayan shall sit in five (5) divisions of three justices each. The five (5) may sit at the same time.

"The first three divisions shall be stationed in the Metro Manila area, the fourth division shall be in Cebu City for cases coming from the Visayas region, and the fifth division shall be in Cagayan de Oro City for cases coming from the Mindanao region.

"Three Justices shall constitute a quorum for sessions in divisions: Provided, That when the required quorum for the particular division cannot be had due to the legal disqualification or temporary disability of a Justice or of a vacancy occurring therein, the Presiding Justice may designate an Associate Justice of the Court, to be determined by strict rotation on the basis of the reverse order of precedence, to sit as a special member of said division with all the rights and prerogatives of a regular member of said division in the trial and determination of a case or cases assigned thereto, unless the operation of the court will be prejudiced thereby, in which case, the President shall, upon the recommendation of the Presiding Justice, designate any Justice or Justices of the Court of Appeals to sit temporarily therein."

Section 2. Section 4 of the same Decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27", or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunction, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the people of the Philippines except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 3. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandiganbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days

from submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court. In case the penalty imposed is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not the accused filed an appeal.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.

"Decisions and final orders of other courts, in cases cognizable by said courts under this Act shall be appealable to the Sandiganbayan within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice to the parties."

Section 4. Section 9 of the same Decree is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 9. Rules of Procedure. - The Rules of Court promulgated by the Supreme Court shall apply to all cases and proceedings filed with the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan shall have no power to promulgate its own rules of procedure, except to adopt internal rules governing the allotment of cases among the divisions, the rotation of justices among them, and other matters relating to the internal operations of the court which shall be inforced until repealed or modified by the Supreme Court."

Section 5. Section 10 of the same Decree is hereby repealed.

Section 6. Presidential Decrees Nos. 1486, 1606 and 1861, Executive Orders Nos. 101 and 184 and all other laws, decrees, orders and rules of which are inconsistent therewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Section 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 30 March 1995

3. RA 8249Republic of the PhilippinesCongress of the PhilippinesMetro Manila

Tenth Congress

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-third day of July, two thousand seven.

Republic Act No. 8249             February 5, 1997

AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR,

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure; Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who shall be appointed by the President."

Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon, Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided, further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan."

Section 3. The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is hereby deleted.

Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;

"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;

"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as

provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:

'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in deciding the case.

"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.

"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner prescribed in the Rules of Court.

"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and enforced in the manner provided by law.

"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule 122 of the Rules of the Court.

"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal."

Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.

Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof

Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.

Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved:

(Sgd.) ERNESTO M. MACEDAPresident of the Senate

(Sgd.) JOSE DE VENECIA, JR.Speaker of the House of Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5323 and Senate Bill No. 844 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on January 28,1997 and January 29, 1997, respectively.

(Sgd.) LORENZO E. LEYNES, JR.Secretary of Senate

(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENOSecretary General

House of Represenatives

Approved: February 5, 1997

(Sgd.) FIDEL V. RAMOSPresident of the Philippines

4. RA ra 8369

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8369 

AN ACT ESTABLISHING FAMILY COURTS, GRANTING THEM EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER CHILD

AND FAMILY  CASES, AMENDING BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129,AS AMENDED,  OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ACT OF 1980, APPROPRIATING FUNDS   THEREFOR AND FOR

OTHER PURPOSES.

  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:  

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997".   Sec. 2. Statement of National Policies. - The State  shall protect the rights and promote the welfare of children in keeping with the mandate of the Constitution and the precepts of the United Nations Convention on the rights of the Child. The State shall provide a system of adjudication for youthful offenders which takes into account their peculiar circumstances.   The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. The courts shall preserve the solidarity of the family, provide procedures for the reconciliation of spouses and the amicable settlement of family controversy.   Sec. 3. Establishment of Family Courts. - There shall be established a Family Court in every province and city in the country. In case where the city is the capital of the  province, the Family Court shall be established in the municipality which has the highest population.   Sec. 4. Qualification and Training of Family  Court Judges. - Sec. 15 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 15. (a) Qualification. - No person shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge or Presiding Judge of the Family Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five (35) years of age, and, for at least ten (10) years, has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as indispensable requisite.

"(b) Training of Family Court Judges. - The Presiding Judge, as well as the court personnel of the Family Courts, shall undergo training and must have the experience and demonstrated ability in dealing with child and family cases.   "The Supreme Court shall provide a continuing education program on child and family laws, procedure and other related disciplines to judges and personnel of such courts." 

  

Sec. 5. Jurisdiction offamily Courts. - The Family Courts shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:   

a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age or where  one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the

accused may have incurred.

The sentence, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to Ptesidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the "Child and Youth Welfare Code"; b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines"; g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent o neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority and other cases cognizable under Presidential Decree No. 603, Executive Order No. 56, (Series of 1986), and other related laws;h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home;i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended;j) Violations of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," as amended by Republic Act No. 7658; and 

k) Cases of domestic violence against:1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and   2) Children - which include the commission of all forms  of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development.If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties.

If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court.

Sec. 6. Use of Income. - All Family Courts shall be allowed the use of ten per cent (10%) of their income derived from filing and other court fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court for research and other operating expenses including capital outlay: Provided, That this benefit shall likewise be enjoyed by all courts of justice. 

The Supreme Court shall promulgate the necessary guidelines to effectively implement the provisions of this Sec.

Sec. 7. Special Provisional Remedies. - In cases of violence among immediate family members living in the same domicile or household, the Family Court may issue a restraining order against the accused of defendant upon verified application by the complainant or the victim for relief from abuse.

The court may order the temporary custody of children in all civil actions for their custody. The court may also order support pendente lite, including deduction from the salary and use of conjugal home and other properties in all civil actions for support.

Sec. 8. Supervision of Youth Detention Homes. -  The judge of the Family Court shall have direct control and supervision of the youth detention home which the local government unit shall establish to separate the youth offenders from adult criminals: Provided, however, That alternatives to detention and institutional care shall be made available to the accused including counseling, recognizance, bail, community continuum, or diversions from the justice system: Provided, further, That the human rights of the accused are fully respected in a manner appropriate to their well-being.

Sec. 9. Social Services and Counseling Division. -  Under the guidance ofthe Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), a Social Services and Counseling Division (SSCD) shall be established in each judicial region as the Supreme Court shall deem necessary based on the number of juvenile and family cases existing in such jurisdiction. It shall provide appropriate social services to all juvenile and family cases filed with the court and recommend the proper social action. It shall also develop programs, formulate uniform policies and procedures, and provide technical supervision and monitoring of all SSCD in  coordination with the judge. 

Sec. 10. Social Services and Counseling Division Staff. - The SSCD shall have a staff composed of qualified social workers and other personnel with academic preparation in behavioral sciences to carry out the duties'of conducting intake assessment, social case studies, casework and counseling, and othersocial services that may be needed in connection with cases filed with the court: Provided, however, That in adoption cases and in petitions for declaration of abandonment, the case studies may be prepared by social workers of duly

licensed child caring or child placement agencies, or the DSWD. When warranted, the division shall recommend that the court avail itself of consultative services of psychiatrists, psychologists, and other qualified specialists presently employed in other departments of the  government in connection with its cases. 

The position of Social Work Adviser shall be created under the Office of the Court Administrator, who shall monitor and supervise the SSCD ofthe Regional Trial Court.

Sec. 11. Alternative Social Services. - In accordance with Sec. 17 of this Act, in areas where no Family Court has been established or no Regional Trial Court was designated by the Supreme Court due to the limited number of cases, the DSWD shall designate and assign qualified, trained, and DSWD accredited social workers of the local government units to handle juvenile and family cases filed in the designated Regional Trial Court of the place.

Sec. 12. Privacy and Confidentiality of Proceedings. - All hearings and conciliation of the child and family cases shall be treated in a manner consistent with the  promotion of the child's and the family's dignity and worth, and shall respect their privacy at all stages of the proceedings. Records of the cases shall be dealt with utmost confidentiality and the identity of parties shall not be divulged   unless necessary and with authority of the judge.

Sec. 13. Special Rules of Procedure. - The Supreme Court shall promulgate special rules of procedure for the transfer of cases to the new courts during the transition period and for the disposition of family cases with the best interests of the child and the protection of the family as primary consideration taking into account the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. 

Sec. 14. Appeals. - Decisions and orders of the court shall be appealed in the same manner and subject to the same conditions as appeals from the ordinary Regional Trial Courts.

Sec. 15. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act shall be included in the General Appropriations Act of the year following in its enactment into law and thereafter. 

Sec. 16. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -  The Supreme Court, in coordination with the DSWD, shall formulate the necessary rules and regulations for the effective implementation of the social aspects of this Act.   Sec. 17. Transitory Provisions. - Pending the establishment of such Family Courts, the Supreme Court shall designate from among the branches ofthe Regional Trial Court at least one Family Court in each of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Muntinlupa, Laoag, Baguio, Santiago,

Dagupan, Olongapo, Cabanatuan, San Jose, Angeles, Cavite, Batangas, Lucena, Naga, Iriga, Legazpi, Roxas, Iloilo, Bacolod, Dumaguete, Tacloban, Cebu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, Surigao, Butuan, Cagayan de Oro, Davao, General Santos, Oroquieta, Ozamis,   Dipolog, Zamboanga, Pagadian, Iligan, and in such other places as the Supreme Court may deem necessary.

Additional cases other than those provided in Sec. 5  may be assigned to the Family Courts when their dockets permit: Provided, That such additional cases shall not be heard on the same day family cases are heard.   In areas where there are no Family Courts, the cases referred to in Sec. 5 of this Act shall be adjudicated by the Regional Trial Court.   Sec. 18. Separability Clause. - In case any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the other provisions shall remain in effect.   Sec. 19. Repealing Clause. - All other laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed, amended or modified accordingly. 

Sec. 20. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.

Approved October 28, 1997.

5.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167702               March 20, 2009

LOURDES L. ERISTINGCOL, Petitioner, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and RANDOLPH C. LIMJOCO, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 dismissing Civil Case No. 99-297 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts, as narrated by the CA, are simple.

[Petitioner Lourdes] Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or "village"), Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On the other hand, [respondent Randolph] Limjoco, [Lorenzo] Tan and [June] Vilvestre were the former president and chairman of the board of governors (or "board"), construction committee chairman and village manager of [Urdaneta Village Association Inc.] UVAI, respectively. UVAI is an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.

[Eristingcol’s] action [against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] is founded on the allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after UVAI’s approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction bond and architect’s fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot with "concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway"; that for alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or "CRR") on "Set Back Line" vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on "Set Back Line," is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.

On February 9, 1999, or a day after the filing of the complaint, the parties reached a temporary settlement whereby UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre executed an undertaking which allowed Eristingcol’s workers, contractors and suppliers to leave and enter the village, subject only to normal security regulations of UVAI.

On February 26, 1999, UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre filed a motion to dismiss on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action. They argued that it is the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (or "HIGC")2 which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 535, Series of 1979, as amended by Exec. Order No. 90, Series of 1986.

Opposing the motion, Eristingcol alleged, among others, that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre did not comply with the mandatory provisions of Secs. 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the [RTC] after they voluntarily appeared therein "and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an Undertaking."

On May 20, 1999, Eristingcol filed an amended complaint by (i) impleading Manuel Carmona (or "Carmona") and Rene Cristobal (or "Cristobal"), UVAI’s newly-elected president and chairman of the board and newly-designated construction committee chairman, respectively, as additional defendants and (ii) increasing her claim for moral damages against each petitioner from P500,000.00 to P1,000,000.00.

On May 25, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion for production and inspection of documents, which UVAI, Limjoco, Tan, Vilvestre, Carmona and Cristobal opposed. The motion sought to compel [UVAI and its officers] to produce the documents used by UVAI as basis for the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol as well as letters and documents showing that UVAI had informed the other homeowners of their violations of the CRR.

On May 26, 1999, the [RTC] issued an order which pertinently reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, for lack of merit, the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Denied, and plaintiff’s motion to declare defendants in default and for contempt are also Denied."

The [RTC] ratiocinated that [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] may not assail its jurisdiction "after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to desist from prohibiting (Eristingcol’s) workers from entering the village." In so ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

On June 7, 1999, Eristingcol filed a motion reiterating her earlier motion for production and inspection of documents.

On June 8, 1999, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] moved for partial reconsideration of the order dated May 26, 1999. Eristingcol opposed the motion.

On March 24, 2001, the [RTC] issued an order granting Eristingcol’s motion for production and inspection of documents, while on March 26, 2001, it issued an order denying [UVAI’s, Limjoco’s, Tan’s and Vilvestre’s] motion for partial reconsideration.

On May 10, 2001, [UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre] elevated the dispute before [the CA] via [a] petition for certiorari alleging that the [RTC] acted without jurisdiction in issuing the orders of May 26, 1999 and March 24 and 26, 2001.3

The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order4 and dismissing Eristingcol’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Hence, this appeal positing a sole issue for our resolution:

Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcol’s complaint.

Before anything else, we note that the instant petition impleads only Limjoco as private respondent. The rest of the defendants sued by Eristingcol before the RTC, who then collectively filed the petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the RTC’s Order, were, curiously, not included as private respondents in this particular petition.

Eristingcol explains that only respondent Limjoco was retained in the instant petition as her discussions with UVAI and the other defendants revealed their lack of participation in the work-stoppage order which was supposedly single-handedly thought of and implemented by Limjoco.

The foregoing clarification notwithstanding, the rest of the defendants should have been impleaded as respondents in this petition considering that the complaint before the RTC, where the petition before the CA and the instant petition originated, has yet to be amended. Furthermore, the present petition maintains that it was serious error for the CA to have ruled that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over a complaint for declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. Clearly, UVAI and the rest of the defendants should have been impleaded herein as respondents.

Section 4(a), Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, requires that the petition shall "state the full name of the appealing party as petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents." As the losing party in defendants’ petition for certiorari before the CA, Eristingcol should have impleaded all petitioners, the winning and adverse parties therein.

On this score alone, the present petition could have been dismissed outright.5 However, to settle the issue of jurisdiction, we have opted to dispose of this case on the merits.

Despite her having dropped UVAI, Lorenzo Tan (Tan) and June Vilvestre (Vilvestre) from this suit, Eristingcol insists that her complaint against UVAI and the defendants was properly filed before the RTC as it prays for the declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules and asks that damages be paid by Limjoco and the other UVAI officers who had inflicted injury upon her. Eristingcol asseverates that since the case before the RTC is one for declaration of nullity, the nature of the question that is the subject of controversy, not just the status or relationship of the parties, should determine which body has jurisdiction. In any event, Eristingcol submits that the RTC’s jurisdiction over the

case was foreclosed by the prayer of UVAI and its officers, including Limjoco, for affirmative relief from that court.

Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy.6 To determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.7 Thus, we examine the pertinent allegations in Eristingcol’s complaint, specifically her amended complaint, to wit:

Allegations Common to All Causes of Action

3. In 1958 and upon its incorporation, [UVAI] adopted a set of By-laws and Rules and Regulations, x x x. Item 5 of [UVAI’s] Construction Rules pertinently provides:

"Set back line: All Buildings, including garage servants’ quarters, or parts thereof (covered terraces, portes cocheres) must be constructed at a distance of not less than three (3) meters from the boundary fronting a street and not less than four (4) meters fronting the drainage creek or underground culvert and two (2) meters from other boundaries of a lot. Distance will be measured from the vertical projection of the roof nearest the property line. Completely open and unroofed terraces are not included in these restrictions."

Suffice it to state that there is nothing in the same By-laws which deals explicitly with canopies or marquees which extend outward from the main building.

4. [Eristingcol] has been a resident of Urdaneta Village for eleven (11) years. In February 1997, she purchased a parcel of land in the Village, located at the corner of Urdaneta Avenue and Cerrada Street. x x x.

5. In considering the design for the house (the "Cerrada property") which she intended to construct on Cerrada Street, [Eristingcol] referred to the National Building Code of the Philippines. After assuring herself that the said law does not expressly provide any restrictions in respect thereof, and after noting that other houses owned by prominent families had similar structures without being cited by the Village’s Construction Committee, [Eristingcol] decided that the Cerrada property would have a concrete canopy directly above the main door and driveway.

6. In compliance with [UVAI’s] rules, [Eristingcol] submitted to [UVAI] copies of her building plans in respect of the Cerrada property and the building plans were duly approved by [UVAI]. x x x.

7. [Eristingcol] submitted and/or paid the "cash bond/construction bond deposit and architect’s inspection fee" of P200,000.00 and the architect’s inspection fee of P500.00 as required under Construction Rules x x x.

8. In the latter part of 1997, and while the construction of the Cerrada property was ongoing, [Eristingcol] received a notice from [UVAI], charging her with alleged violations of the Construction Rules, i.e., those on the height restriction of eleven (11.0) meters, and the canopy extension into the easement. On 22nd January 1998, [Eristingcol] (through her representatives) met with, among others, defendant Limjoco. In said meeting, and after deliberation on the definition of the phrase "original ground elevation" as a reference point, [Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to revise the building plan by removing what was intended to be a parapet or roof railing, and thereby reduce the height of the structure by 40 centimeters, which proposal was accepted by the Board through defendant Limjoco, Gov. Catalino Macaraig Jr. ([UVAI’s] Construction Committee chairman), and the Village’s Architect. However, the issue of the alleged violation in respect of the canopy/extension remained unresolved.

x x x x

9. In compliance with the agreement reached at the 22nd January 1998 meeting, [Eristingcol] caused the

revision of her building plans such that, as it now stands, the Cerrada property has a vertical height of 10.96 meters and, thus, was within the Village’s allowed maximum height of 11 meters.

10. Sometime in June 1998, [Eristingcol] was surprised to receive another letter from [UVAI], this time from the Construction Committee chairman (defendant Tan), again calling her attention to alleged violations of the Construction Rules. On 15th June 1998, [UVAI] barred [Eristingcol’s] construction workers from entering the Village. Thus, [Eristingcol’s] Construction Manager (Mr. Jaime M. Hidalgo) wrote defendant Tan to explain her position, and attached photographs of similar "violations" by other property owners which have not merited the same scrutiny and sanction from [UVAI].

x x x x

11. On 26th October 1998, and for reasons known only to him, defendant Vilvestre sent a letter to Mr. Geronimo delos Reyes, demanding for an "idea of how [Mr. delos Reyes] can demonstrate in concrete terms [his] good faith as a quid pro quo for compromise to" [UVAI’s] continued insistence that [Eristingcol] had violated [UVAI’s] Construction Rules. x x x.

x x x x

12. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo sent a letter dated 24th November 1998 to defendant Tan, copies of which were furnished defendants Limjoco, Vilvestre and the Board, reiterating that, among others: (i) the alleged height restriction violation is untrue, since the Cerrada property now has a height within the limits imposed by [UVAI]; and (ii) the demand to reduce the canopy by ninety (90) centimeters is without basis, in light of the existence of thirty-five (35) similar "violations" of the same nature by other homeowners. [Eristingcol] through Mr. Hidalgo further mentioned that she had done nothing to deserve the crude and coercive Village letters and the Board’s threats of work stoppage, and she cited instances when she dealt with [UVAI] and her fellow homeowners in good faith and goodwill such as in 1997, when she very discreetly spent substantial amounts to landscape the entire Village Park, concrete the Park track oval which was being used as a jogging path, and donate to the Association molave benches used as Park benches.

x x x x

13. On the same date (24th November 1998), defendant Vilvestre sent another letter addressed to [Eristingcol’s] construction manager Hidalgo, again threatening to enjoin all construction activity on the Cerrada property as well as ban entry of all workers and construction deliveries effective 1st December 1998 unless Mr. delos Reyes met with defendants. x x x.

x x x x

14. On 2nd December 1998, [Eristingcol’s] representatives met with defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre. During that meeting, defendants were shown copies of the architectural plans for the Cerrada property. [Eristingcol’s] representatives agreed to allow [UVAI’s] Construction Committee’s architect to validate the measurements given. However, on the issue of the canopy extension, the defendants informed [Eristingcol’s] representatives that the Board would impose a penalty of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) for violation of [UVAI’s] "set back" or easement rule. Defendants cited the Board’s imposition of similar fines to previous homeowners who had violated the same rule, and they undertook to furnish [Eristingcol] with a list of past penalties imposed and paid by homeowners found by the Board to have violated the Village’s "set back" provision.

15. On 22nd December 1998, defendant Vilvestre sent [Eristingcol] a letter dated 18th December 1998 formally imposing a penalty of P400,000.00 for the "canopy easement violation." x x x.

16. On 29th December 1998, x x x, Vilvestre sent a letter to [Eristingcol], stating that "as far as [his]

administration is concerned, there has been no past penalties executed by [UVAI], similar to the one we are presently demanding on your on going construction. x x x

17. On 4th January 1999, [Eristingcol’s] representative sent a letter to the Board, asking for a reconsideration of the imposition of the P400,000.00 penalty on the ground that the same is unwarranted and excessive. On 6th January 1999, [Eristingcol] herself sent a letter to the Board, expounding on the reasons for opposing the Board’s action. On 18th January 1999, [Eristingcol] sent another letter in compliance with defendants’ request for a breakdown of her expenditures in respect of her donations relative to the Village park.

18. On 3rd February 1999, [Eristingcol] through her lawyers sent defendants a letter, requesting that her letters of 4th and 6th January 1999 be acted upon.

19. On 4th February 1999, x x x, defendant Limjoco gave a verbal order to [UVAI’s] guards to bar the entry of workers working on the Cerrada property.

20. In the morning of 5th February 1999, defendants physically barred [Eristingcol’s] workers and contractors from entering the Village and working at the Cerrada property.8

Eristingcol then lists the following causes of action:

1. Item 5 of UVAI’s Construction Rules constitutes an illegal and unwarranted intrusion upon Eristingcol’s proprietary rights as it imposes a set-back or horizontal easement of 3.0 meters from the property line greater than the specification in Section 1005(b) of the Building Code that "the horizontal clearance between the outermost edge of the marquee and the curb line shall be not less than 300 millimeters." As such, Eristingcol prays for the declaration of nullity of this provision in UVAI’s Construction Rules insofar as she is concerned.

2. UVAI’s imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty on Eristingcol has no factual basis, is arbitrary, whimsical and capricious as rampant violations of the set-back rule by other homeowners in the Village were not penalized by UVAI. Eristingcol prays to put a stop to defendants’ arbitrary exercise of power pursuant to UVAI’s by-laws.

3. Absent any factual or legal bases for the imposition of a P400,000.00 penalty, defendants and all persons working under their control should be permanently barred or restrained from imposing and/or enforcing any penalty upon Eristingcol for an alleged violation of UVAI’s Construction Rules, specifically the provision on set-back.

4. Defendants Limjoco, Tan, and Vilvestre, in violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code, demonstrated bias against Eristingcol by zeroing in on her alone and her supposed violation, while other homeowners, who had likewise violated UVAI’s Construction Rules, were not cited or penalized therefor. Defendants’ actuations were in clear violation of their duty to give all homeowners, including Eristingcol, their due.

5. Defendants’ actuations have seriously affected Eristingcol’s mental disposition and have caused her to suffer sleepless nights, mental anguish and serious anxiety. Eristingcol’s reputation has likewise been besmirched by UVAI’s and defendants’ arbitrary charge that she had violated UVAI’s Construction Rules. In this regard, individual defendants should each pay Eristingcol moral damages in the amount ofP1,000,000.00.

6. Lastly, defendants should pay Eristingcol P1,000.000.00 for litigation expenses she incurred in instituting this suit and for attorney’s fees.

At the outset, we note that the relationship between the parties is not in dispute and is, in fact, admitted by Eristingcol in her complaint. Nonetheless, Eristingcol is adamant that the subject matter of her complaint is properly cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed before a specialized body or commission.

Eristingcol’s contention is wrong.

Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration of nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the nature of the action.9

A scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper interpretation and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction Rules. Significantly, Eristingcol does not assail the height restriction of UVAI’s Construction Rules, as she has readily complied therewith.

Distinctly in point is China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals,10 which upheld the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) over the suit and recognized its special competence to interpret and apply Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc.’s (VGCCI’s) by-laws. We ruled, thus:

Applying the foregoing principles in the case at bar, to ascertain which tribunal has jurisdiction we have to determine therefore whether or not petitioner is a stockholder of VGCCI and whether or not the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation is intra-corporate.

As to the first query, there is no question that the purchase of the subject share or membership certificate at public auction by petitioner (and the issuance to it of the corresponding Certificate of Sale) transferred ownership of the same to the latter and thus entitled petitioner to have the said share registered in its name as a member of VGCCI. x x x.

By virtue of the aforementioned sale, petitioner became a bona fide stockholder of VGCCI and, therefore, the conflict that arose between petitioner and VGCCI aptly exemplifies an intra-corporate controversy between a corporation and its stockholder under Sec. 5(b) of P.D. 902-A.

An important consideration, moreover, is the nature of the controversy between petitioner and private respondent corporation. VGCCI claims a prior right over the subject share anchored mainly on Sec. 3, Art. VIII of its by-laws which provides that "after a member shall have been posted as delinquent, the Board may order his/her/its share sold to satisfy the claims of the Club…" It is pursuant to this provision that VGCCI also sold the subject share at public auction, of which it was the highest bidder. VGCCI caps its argument by asserting that its corporate by-laws should prevail. The bone of contention, thus, is the proper interpretation and application of VGCCI’s aforequoted by-laws, a subject which irrefutably calls for the special competence of the SEC.

We reiterate herein the sound policy enunciated by the Court in Abejo v. De la Cruz:

6. In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and public utilities) ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court’s intervention in the resolution of labor-management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction … the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered.

x x x x

In this case, the need for the SEC’s technical expertise cannot be over-emphasized involving as it does the meticulous analysis and correct interpretation of a corporation’s by-laws as well as the applicable provisions of the Corporation Code in order to determine the validity of VGCCI’s claims. The SEC, therefore, took proper cognizance of the instant case.11

Likewise in point is our illuminating ruling in Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association v. Sps. Gaston,12 although it ultimately held that the question of subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint of respondent- spouses Gaston for declaration of nullity of a board resolution issued by Sta. Clara Homeowners’ Association (SCHA) was vested in the regular courts. In Sta. Clara, the main issue raised by SCHA reads: "Whether [the CA] erred in upholding the jurisdiction of the [RTC], ‘to declare as null and void the resolution of the Board of SCHA, decreeing that only members [in] good standing of the said association were to be issued stickers for use in their vehicles.’" In holding that the regular courts had jurisdiction over respondent-spouses Gaston’s complaint for declaration of nullity, we stressed the absence of relationship and the consequent lack of privity of contract between the parties, thus:

Are [Respondent-Spouses Gaston] SCHA Members?

In order to determine if the HIGC has jurisdiction over the dispute, it is necessary to resolve preliminarily—on the basis of the allegations in the Complaint—whether [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA.

[SCHA] contend[s] that because the Complaint arose from intra-corporate relations between the SCHA and its members, the HIGC therefore has jurisdiction over the dispute. To support their contention that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the association, [SCHA] cite[s] the SCHA’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws which provide that all landowners of the Sta. Clara Subdivision are automatically members of the SCHA.

We are not persuaded. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. The right to choose with whom one will associate oneself is the very foundation and essence of that partnership. It should be noted that the provision guarantees the right to form an association. It does not include the right to compel others to form or join one.

More to the point, [respondent-spouses Gaston] cannot be compelled to become members of the SCHA by the simple expedient of including them in its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws without their express or implied consent. x x x. In the present case, however, other than the said Articles of Incorporation and By-laws, there is no showing that [respondent-spouses Gaston] have agreed to be SCHA members.

x x x x

No privity of Contract

Clearly then, no privity of contract exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston]. As a general rule, a contract is a meeting of minds between two persons. The Civil Code upholds the spirit over the form; thus, it deems an agreement to exist, provided the essential requisites are present. x x x. From the moment there is a meeting of minds between the parties, it is perfected.

As already adverted to, there are cases in which a party who enters into a contract of sale is also bound by a lien annotated on the certificate of title. We recognized this in Bel Air Village Association, Inc. v. Dionisio, in which we ruled:

There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136 covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not disputed that the provision on automatic membership was expressly annotated on the petitioner’s Transfer Certificate of Title and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.

The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner is bound by such annotation.

Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:

Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes a certificate of title for value in good faith shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate x x x. (Italics supplied)

The above ruling, however, does not apply to the case at bar. When [respondent-spouses Gaston] purchased their property in 1974 and obtained Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-126542 and T-127462 for Lots 11 and 12 of Block 37 along San Jose Avenue in Sta. Clara Subdivision, there was no annotation showing their automatic membership in the SCHA. Thus, no privity of contract arising from the title certificate exists between [SCHA] and [respondent-spouses Gaston].

Further, the records are bereft of any evidence that would indicate that private respondents intended to become members of the SCHA. Prior to the implementation of the aforesaid Resolution, they and the other homeowners who were not members of the association were issued non-member gate pass stickers for their vehicles. This fact has not been disputed by [SCHA]. Thus, the SCHA recognized that there were subdivision landowners who were not members thereof, notwithstanding the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and By-laws.

Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Complaint

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

The Complaint does not allege that [respondent-spouses Gaston] are members of the SCHA. In point of fact, they deny such membership. Thus, the HIGC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.13

In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latter’s deft phraseology of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAI’s Construction Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcol’s complaint is UVAI’s supposed arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a member thereof.

Moreover, as in Sta. Clara (had respondent-spouses Gaston been members of SCHA), the controversy which arose between the parties in this case partook of the nature of an intra-corporate dispute. Executive Order (E.O.) No. 535,14 which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative functions over homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC. Section 2 of E.O. No. 535 provides in pertinent part:

2. In addition to the powers and functions vested under the Home Financing Act, the Corporation, shall have among others, the following additional powers:

(a) x x x; and exercise all the powers, authorities and responsibilities that are vested on the Securities and Exchange Commission with respect to home owners association, the provision of Act 1459, as amended by P.D. 902-A, to the contrary notwithstanding;

(b) To regulate and supervise the activities and operations of all houseowners association registered in accordance therewith.

By virtue thereof, the HIGC likewise assumed the SEC’s original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership relations.15 Thereafter, with the advent of Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’ associations, were transferred to the HLURB.

As regards the defendants’ supposed embrace of the RTC’s jurisdiction by appearing thereat and undertaking to desist from prohibiting Eristingcol’s workers from entering the village, suffice it to state that the invocation of the doctrine in Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al.16 is quite a long stretch.

The factual milieu obtaining in Tijam and in the case at bench are worlds apart. As found by the CA, defendants’ appearance before the RTC was pursuant to, and in compliance with, a subpoena issued by that court in connection with Eristingcol’s application for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO). On defendants’ supposed agreement to sign the Undertaking allowing Eristingcol’s workers, contractors, and suppliers to enter and exit the village, this temporary settlement cannot be equated with full acceptance of the RTC’s authority, as what actually transpired in Tijam. 1avvphi1.zw+

The landmark case of Tijam is, in fact, only an exception to the general rule that an objection to the court’s jurisdiction over a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, as the lack of jurisdiction affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of a case.17 In that case, the Surety filed a Motion to Dismiss before the CA, raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time—fifteen years after the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu. Indeed, in several stages of the proceedings in the CFI, as well as in the CA, the Surety invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief, and even submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. Consequently, it was barred by laches from invoking the CFI’s lack of jurisdiction.

To further highlight the distinction in this case, the TRO hearing was held on February 9, 1999, a day after the filing of the complaint. On even date, the parties reached a temporary settlement reflected in the Undertaking. Fifteen days thereafter, defendants, including Limjoco, filed a Motion to Dismiss. Certainly, this successive and continuous chain of events cannot be characterized as laches as would bar defendants from questioning the RTC’s jurisdiction.

In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcol’s complaint, it is the HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64642 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURAAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate Justice

Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZAssociate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA*Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGOAssociate JusticeChairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice

2. G.R. No. 131282           January 4, 2002GABRIEL L. DUERO, petitioner, vs.HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A. ERADEL, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari assails the Decisionl dated September 17, 1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP No.. 2340- UDK, entitled Bernardo Eradel vs. Non. Ermelino G. Andal, setting aside all proceedings in Civil Case No.1075, Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, before the Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur .

The pertinent facts are as follow.

Sometime in 1988, according to petitioner, private respondent Bemardo Eradel2 entered and occupied petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration No. A-16-13-302, located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del Sur. As shown in the tax declaration, the land had an assessed value of P5,240. When petitioner politely informed private respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private respondent refused, but instead threatened him with bodily harm. Despite repeated demands, private respondent remained steadfast in his refusal to leave the land.

On June 16, 1995, petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against private respondent and two others, namely, Apolinario and Inocencio Ruena. Petitioner appended to the complaint the aforementioned tax declaration. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the, Ruenas executed a

compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a partial judgment rendered on January 12, 1996. In this agreement, the Ruenas through their counsel, Atty. Eusebio Avila, entered into a Compromise Agreement with herein petitioner, Gabriel Duero. Inter alia, the agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.3 Herein private respondent Eradel was not a party to the agreement, and he was declared in default for failure to file his answer to the complaint.4

Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte on February 13, 1996. On May 8, 1996, judgment was rendered in his favor, and private respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over Lot No.1065 Cad. 537-D to petitioner; pay petitioner P2,000 annual rental from 1988 up the time he vacates the land, and P5,000 as attorney's fees and the cost of the suit.5 Private respondent received a copy of the decision on May 25, 1996.

On June 10, 1996, private respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it. However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial. 1âwphi1.nêt

Meanwhile, RED Conflict Case No.1029, an administrative case between petitioner and applicant-contestants Romeo, Artemio and Jury Laurente, remained pending with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in Davao City. Eventually, it was forwarded to the DENR Regional Office in Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur .

On July 24, 1996, private respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. He averred that unless there is a determination on who owned the land, he could not be made to vacate the land. He also averred that the judgment of the trial court was void inasmuch as the heirs of Artemio Laurente, Sr., who are indispensable parties, were not impleaded.

On September 24, 1996, Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia, all surnamed Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.

On October 8, 1996, the trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. On November 22, 1996, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.

On January 22, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted on January 28. On February 18, 1997, Entry of Judgment was made of record and a writ of execution was issued by the RTC on February 27,1997. On March 12,1997, private respondent filed his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals gave due course to the petition, maintaining that private respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27 in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment. The Court of Appeals decreed as follows:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. All proceedings in "Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, et. al. Civil Case 1075" filed in the Court a quo, including its Decision,  Annex "E" of the petition, and its Orders and Writ of Execution and the turn over of the property to the Private Respondent by the Sheriff of the Court a quo, are declared null and void and hereby SET ASIDE, No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner now comes before this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it held that:

I.

...THE LOWER COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MA TTER OF THE CASE.

II

...PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT THEREBY ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT EVEN AFTER IT SUCCESSFULLY SOUGHT AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF THEREFROM.

III

...THE FAlLURE OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO FILE HIS ANSWER IS JUSTIFIED. 7

The main issue before us is whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and that private respondent was not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions before it. The secondary issue is whether the Court of appeals erred in holding that private respondent's failure to file an answer to the complaint was justified.

At the outset, however, we note that petitioner through counsel submitted to this Court pleadings that contain inaccurate statements. Thus, on page 5 of his petition,8 we find that to bolster the claim that the appellate court erred in holding that the RTC had no jurisdiction, petitioner pointed to Annex E9 of his petition which supposedly is the Certification issued by the Municipal Treasurer of San Miguel, Surigao, specifically containing the notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." But it appears that Annex E of his petition is not a Certification but a xerox copy of a Declaration of Real Property. Nowhere does the document contain a notation, "Note: Subject for General Revision Effective 1994." Petitioner also asked this Court to refer to Annex F,10 where he said the zonal value of the disputed land was P1.40 per sq.m., thus placing the computed value of the land at the time the complaint was filed before the RTC at P57,113.98, hence beyond the jurisdiction of the municipal court and within the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. However, we find that these annexes are both merely xerox copies. They are obviously without evidentiary weight or value.

Coming now to the principal issue, petitioner contends that respondent appellate court acted with grave abuse of discretion. By "grave abuse of discretion" is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 11 But here we find that in its decision holding that the municipal court has jurisdiction over the case and that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, respondent Court of Appeals discussed the facts on which its decision is grounded as well as the law and jurisprudence on the matter.12 Its action was neither whimsical nor capricious.

Was private respondent estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC? In this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals that he was not. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction,13 we note that estoppel has become an equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement.14Hence, estoppel ought to be applied with caution. For estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.15

In the present case, private respondent questions the jurisdiction of RTC in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, on legal grounds. Recall that it was petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties before the said court,16 believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But by then, Republic Act 769117 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long, continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land.18But his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for entry of judgment and a writ of execution.

Under these circumstances, we could not fault the Court of Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the parties, or even cured by their silence,

acquiescence or even by their express consent.19 Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal.20 The appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.21Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.22 Also, neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.23 The Court of Appeals found support for its ruling in our decision in Javier vs. Court of Appeals, thus:

x x x The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake, or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an action 'whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter.' (Sec. 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the finality of the same. [Emphasis ours.]24

Indeed, "...the trial court was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction and its failure to do so, makes its decision a 'lawless' thing."25

Since a decision of a court without jurisdiction is null and void, it could logically never become final and executory, hence appeal therefrom by writ of error would be out of the question. Resort by private respondent to a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was in order .

In holding that estoppel did not prevent private respondent from questioning the RTC's jurisdiction, the appellate court reiterated the doctrine that estoppel must be applied only in exceptional cases, as its misapplication could result in a miscarriage of justice. Here, we find that petitioner, who claims ownership of a parcel of land, filed his complaint before a court without appropriate jurisdiction. Defendant, a farmer whose tenancy status is still pending before the proper administrative agency concerned, could have moved for dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds. But the farmer as defendant therein could not be expected to know the nuances of jurisdiction and related issues. This farmer, who is now the private respondent, ought not to be penalized when he claims that he made an honest mistake when he initially submitted his motions before the RTC, before he realized that the controversy was outside the RTC's cognizance but within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial court. To hold him in estoppel as the RTC did would amount to foreclosing his avenue to obtain a proper resolution of his case. Furthermore, if the RTC's order were to be sustained, he would be evicted from the land prematurely, while RED Conflict Case No.1029 would remain unresolved. Such eviction on a technicality if allowed could result in an injustice, if it is later found that he has a legal right to till the land he now occupies as tenant-lessee. 1âwphi1.nêt

Having determined that there was no grave abuse of discretion by the appellate court in ruling that private respondent was not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC, we need not tarry to consider in detail the second issue. Suffice it to say that, given the circumstances in this case, no error was committed on this score by respondent appellate court. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, private respondent had justifiable reason in law not to file an answer, aside from the fact that he believed the suit was properly his landlord's concern.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.1075 entitled Gabriel L. Duero vs. Bernardo Eradel, its Order that private respondent turn over the disputed land to petitioner, and the Writ of Execution it issued, areANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Costs against petitioner .

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Buena, J., on official leave.

3.

rule 1-5

1. EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati[1] alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for respondent.[2] Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.[3] Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated premium reserves amounting to P500,000.00.  In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent.[4] On 23 August 1989, respondent filed a “Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default” because petitioner’s answer was allegedly filed out of time.[5] However, the trial court denied the motion on 25 August 1989 and similarly rejected respondent’s motion for reconsideration on 12 March 1990.[6] A few weeks later, on 11 April 1990, respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner.[7] In response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer such counterclaim.[8]

In its 18 September 1990 Order, the trial court[9] granted respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim and consequently, denied petitioner’s motion.  The court found petitioner’s counterclaim to be merely permissive in nature and held that petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees

prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same.[10] The trial court similarly denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on 28 February 1991.

On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals[11] sustained the trial court, finding that petitioner’s own admissions, as contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is merely permissive.  The relevant portion of the appellate court’s decision[12] is quoted herewith –

Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the allegations in the answer a quo will readily show that her counterclaim can in no way be compulsory.  Take note of the following numbered paragraphs in her answer:“(14) That, indeed, FGU’s cause of action which is not supported by any document other than the self-serving ‘Statement of Account’ dated March 28, 1988 x x x(15) That it should be noted that the cause of action of FGU is not the enforcement of the Special Agent’s Contract but the alleged ‘cash accountabilities which are not based on written agreement x x x.

x      x                                           x                                           x

(19) x x x A careful analysis of FGU’s three-page complaint will show that its cause of action is not for specific performance or enforcement of the Special Agent’s Contract rather, it is for the payment of the alleged cash accountabilities incurred by defendant during the period form [sic] 1975 to 1986 which claim is executory and has not been ratified.  It is the established rule that unenforceable contracts, like this purported money claim of FGU, cannot be sued upon or enforced unless ratified, thus it is as if they have no effect. x x x.”To support the heading “Compulsory Counterclaim” in her answer and give the impression that the counterclaim is compulsory appellant alleged that “FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s Contract x x x.” The reference to said contract was included purposely to mislead. While on one hand appellant alleged that appellee’s cause of action had nothing to do with the Special Agent’s Contract, on the other hand, she claim that FGU violated said contract which gives rise of [sic] her cause of action. Clearly, appellant’s cash accountabilities cannot be the offshoot of appellee’s alleged violation of the aforesaid contract.

On 19 May 1999, the appellate court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration,[13] giving rise to the present petition.

Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters raised by the parties.  Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from questioning her non-payment of docket fees because it did not raise this particular issue when it filed its first motion - the “Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default” – with the trial court; rather, it was only nine months after receiving petitioner’s answer that respondent assailed the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaims based on the latter’s failure to pay

docket fees.[14] Petitioner’s position is unmeritorious.  Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.[15] In the case at bar, respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself – the body where the action is pending - even before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by the trial court.

Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 orders of the trial court.  It is significant to note that this objection to the appellate court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue before the appellate court.  Although the lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is adverse to him.[16] In this case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief with the same.[17] Its participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the appellate court’s jurisdiction during the entire duration of the proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of Appeals’ assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner’s appeal.[18]

The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive in nature.  A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.[19]

In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,[20] this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:

1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the same?2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule?3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as well as defendant’s counterclaim?4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals,[21] is the “compelling test of compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.”

As contained in her answer, petitioner’s counterclaims are as follows:

(20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by reference all the foregoing allegations as may be material to her Counterclaim against FGU.

(21) That FGU is liable to pay the following just, valid and legitimate claims of defendant:(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest thereon representing, among others, direct commissions, profit commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to defendant; and(b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum allowable interest representing defendant’s accumulated premium reserve for 1985 and previous years,which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s Contract and in contravention of the principle of law that “every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”(22) That as a result of the filing of this patently baseless, malicious and unjustified Complaint, and FGU’s unlawful, illegal and vindictive termination of their Special Agent’s Contract, defendant was unnecessarily dragged into this litigation and to defense [sic] her side and assert her rights and claims against FGU, she was compelled to hire the services of counsel with whom she agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees and stands to incur litigation expenses in the amount estimated to at least P20,000.00 and for which FGU should be assessed and made liable to pay defendant.(23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted action of defendant in filing this grossly unfounded action, defendant has suffered and continues to suffer from serious anxiety, mental anguish, fright and humiliation.  In addition to this, defendant’s name, good reputation and business standing in the insurance business as well as in the community have been besmirched and for which FGU should be adjudged and made liable to pay moral damages to defendant in the amount of P300,000.00 as minimum.(24) That in order to discourage the filing of groundless and malicious suits like FGU’s Complaint, and by way of serving [as] an example for the public good, FGU should be penalized and assessed exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 or such amount as the Honorable Court may deem warranted under the circumstances.[22]

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely permissive.  The evidence required to prove petitioner’s claims differs from that needed to establish  respondent’s demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of respondent’s claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioner’s counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties.  One would search the records in vain for a logical connection between the parties’ claims.  This conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner’s own admissions since she declared in her answer that respondent’s cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agent’s Contract.[23] However, petitioner’s claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.[24]

There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory counterclaim.[25] On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.[26] The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion[27]-

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action.  Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.  The court may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.  It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.

The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals.[28] In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.  Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.  As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer her counterclaim.[29] However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s counterclaim.  Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for having failed to answer her counterclaim.[30] Insofar as the permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.[31] Meanwhile, the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not be answered since it is inseparable from the claims of respondent.  If respondent were to answer the compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.[32]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 23 December 1998 and its 19 May 1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory counterclaim of petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case No. 89-3816 is ordered REINSTATED.  Meanwhile, the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to require petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her permissive counterclaim (direct commissions, profit commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated premium reserves), after ascertaining that the applicable prescriptive period has not yet set in.[33]

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

2.