Background/Introduction

The management of our company have requested a set of guidelines to work by to ensure all future projects they invest in are a success. This report details six separate projects all within the same field of study, with the exception of the Eden project.

The projects that were studied are as follows:

Piper Alpha Disaster (1976) BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster (2010) Montara Oil Spill (2009) Brent Spar Decommissioning (1995) Eden Project (1995) Clair Oilfield (1997-present)

Three of these are examples of unsuccessful projects (in this case all disasters) and three are successful which exemplify  good project organisation and management. The BP Deepwater Horizon, Montara oil spill and Piper alpha disaster are the three unsuccessful cases. Each of these separate case studies will be analysed in depth, and comparisons and differences will be drawn from them to allow the main causes of project failure to be identified, and what practices result in success.

A successful project is difficult to define as the aims of various projects differ and can be hard to measure with respect to a scale of success or failure. It may take many years before a project can be deemed as a success as the eventual benefits may take a long time to offset initial capital input. Successful project management however can be defined  as an undertaking where three of the main project constraints of cost, time and quality meet the required standards set by the involved organisation.

Analysis of Selected Projects:

Piper Alpha was an oil production platform which was operated by the company known as Occidental Petroleum ltd. It was situated in the North Sea and at the peak of its operations, accounted for 10% of all North Sea oil income. It originally began in 1976 as strictly an oil platform, before later being converted to also produce gas. The disaster which occurred was clearly down to  poor health and safety management, as well as poor project management by Occidental.

Quite simply, this project can only be described in one way based on the circumstances, a complete failure. This is due to the fact 167 people died after an explosion which resulted in oil and gas fires that blazed for weeks. Had there been no incident and the platform was still running, this report could be  about the massive success and amount of income that Piper Alpha has brought to not only our economy, but the whole world. Instead, tragically, this is not the case. A number of factors contributed to the severity of the incident:

• lack of communication between day and night shift workers;• most or all senior employees or ‘decision makers’ were killed in the first explosion, leaving nobody in charge to make the vital impending decisions;• the lack of blast walls - the firewalls in place had been installed prior to the upgrade to gas conversion and were not designed to withstand gaseous explosions;

• the continual pumping of oil and gas by the two other platforms Claymore and Tartan, which were not shut down due to a lack of authority. Even though personnel could see the Piper Alpha rig burning down, they didn’t want to halt production from their platforms which would cost the company massive losses.

To prevent this type of failure in our company’s projects, we should ensure all staff members are trained in health and safety regulations and would know exactly what to do in the case of an emergency such as this one. Another improvement could have been the communication between the workers on the Piper Alpha rig, and also between the surrounding rigs on the oilfield. The magnitude of the disaster was worsened by the continual pumping of crude oil to the Piper Alpha platform from the surrounding rigs, and it actually caused a second explosion which took down the whole platform.  It showed a complete lack of communication, and we can draw from the disaster that communication is a vital part of any project, whether it be in the initial development, or the actual operation of it.

22 years on from the Piper Alpha tragedy, you would think that lessons had been learned about safe practice on oil platforms, however the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010 suggests that there is still a long way to go with successful safety protocol offshore.

An inquest after the oil spill disaster revealed that an initial explosion on the platform was caused by rig workers cutting corners and not following set safety procedures. The initial explosion caused an uncontrollable surge in hydrostatic pressure within the well which a blowout valve was unable to deal with. This resulted in the crude oil from the reservoir to flow unstoppably into the ocean.

The quality of the work executed by the rig workers was unsatisfactory from the organisation's point of view as their lack of adherence to safety procedures resulted in catastrophe. The cost associated with the cleanup effort has almost crippled BP and to this day, they are still paying compensation to all those affected. The failure of the project has cost the company billions, and it all stemmed from poor decisions made by the workers on the rig.

After the blowout, BP were responsible for the cleanup of the spill, and here is where they failed with the time constraint of their project. They under exaggerated the rate of the leakage into the ocean at a value of 1000 barrels per day, when in actual fact the real figure was between 30,000 and 60,000 barrels per day. The cleanup method they adopted involved around 2,500 miles of boom to contain or absorb some of the spillage, chemical dispersants, burning the oil and multiple barges which skimmed the oil from the surface of the sea. After about 75 days, they had managed to recover just over half of the amount they pledged to recover daily.  4 years on from the initial explosion, BP claimed that the cleanup operation was complete. The prolonged amount of time for the cleanup to be completed allowed the oil to spread further afar, and this affected nearby ecologically sensitive marshlands in Louisiana, and tarnished waters in which local fishermen caught shrimp which was their livelihood and only source of significant income. The failure to clean up the spillage in a reasonable time period significantly increased the impact of the disaster.

This is the second example  where emphasis is on the importance of working safely. Again the whole situation could have been avoided had the rig workers behaved in a professional manner, but they did not and ended up jeopardizing the lives of all those on the platform. The disaster is well known because of the large scale oil spill, but it should be noted that had the initial explosion on the rig not occurred, the platform would probably still be in operation

today and would be considered a pioneering development in offshore operations, as a reservoir was being tapped into at water depths greater than any other previous explorations. The outcome of the disaster exemplifies both a failed project, and failed project management, and it is seen as such an iconic failure because of the amount of time it took for the spillage cleanup to be completed.

Something similar to BP Deepwater Horizon disaster had happened just one year before, in the Timor Sea, off the coast of Western Australia in the Montara Oil Field. The field was operated by PTTEP Australasia, a company which belongs to Thai state oil. There was continual leakage for 72 days where an estimated value of  2,000 barrels of crude oil per day was lost.

The Montara project is remembered as a total engineering failure as none of the standards in the industry were met. Even the PTTEP internal standards were not respected. Basic requirements failed to be satisfied and the disaster could be classified as a failure of ‘sensible oilfield practice 101’.

The Australian Court brought 4 charges for PTTEP Australasia and the company pleaded guilty to breaching the Offshore Petroleum Act. The company admitted it had failed in taking all the required steps for preventing the disaster and had placed the workers on the rig in danger. Also, after the incident, the company tried to sensitize the public by getting involved in funding environmental NGO’s and stating that they are looking forward for possible compensations for the affected fishermen.

When assessed, it was discovered that the cemented casing shoe had not been pressure tested in accordance with the company’s construction standards. This is more concerning because major problems occurred when the cementing job was done and these were recorded in the Daily Drilling Report but nothing had been done to fix them. Moreover, the pressure containing anti-corrosion caps (PCCC) have never been installed. Their absence resulted in corrosion of the threads of the casing which meant the caps had to be removed in order to clean the threads. The well was exposed to air without any secondary well control barrier when this was done. When the well was suspended, none of the control barriers were verified nor tested, one barrier was actually missing. This meant that the well was suspended without consideration of PTTEP’s Well Construction standards or the normal practice in the industry.

What happened with the Montara project should be an example for every future project. It clearly shows the consequences of failing to work to industrial standards. The leakage has nothing to do with bad luck, nor was it not an unfortunate accident. The PTTEP’s staff showed a complete lack of competence and the company’s processes and systems proved to be deficient. Shockingly, it was discovered that all the 5 rigs in the Montara field were not complying with the company’s standards, it was not just a single isolated mistake, corners had been cut on each of the platforms operated by the company.

Conversely to the previous unsuccessful projects where procedures were not adhered to, the Brent Spar decommissioning followed all required practices yet still threatened to be derailed by the views of some stakeholders.

Brent Spar was an oil storage structure located in the Shell/Esso Brent oil field in the North Sea. It ceased operating in September 1991 and the best options regarding its decommissioning were investigated. The initial option was to sink the rig in the deep Atlantic

as this was considered the safest and cheapest method as well as having minimal impact on the environment. In the end this was not the chosen method for decommissioning however the project as a whole can be viewed as a success from the reasons outlined in this study.

After Shell announced their plan, Greenpeace activists voiced strong opinions against the deep sea disposal as they believed that it would cause worse effects to the environment than the analysis suggested. The project was backed by the UK government and was continued after removing Greenpeace protesters from the rig itself. But Shell abandoned the deep sea disposal idea in June 1995 after service stations across Germany were attacked and public perception of the company was very poor over northern Europe.

In stopping the deep sea disposal, Shell risked spending more money and time developing a new plan for the decommissioning of the rig, but this time the views of the stakeholders involved were given more consideration. A search was initiated for a plan which would allow Brent Spar to be recycled in a safe and cost effective manner and a great deal of time passed until a solution was found. This shows that Shell wanted to guarantee the quality of the studies carried out in search of another idea.

The cost involved in the project was at Shell’s expense and the final figures are in the tens of millions for the overall decommissioning. The overall cost was more than ten times greater than the initial expectations due to the fact the deep sea disposal project was analysed, initiated and then had to be scrapped meaning essentially, the process of determining the best way to remove the vessel had to begin again. Although the cost was significant, it was not detrimental to the company and further shows that the project being successful was more important.

Similarly, the time elapsed for the decommissioning was years but the only stakeholders affected were Shell themselves. This additionally adds to the evidence that the quality of the final solution was the dominant factor as well as the company image being promoted in a positive way.

The decommissioning project was a success due to how the problems were handled throughout. Initially, communication with all involved stakeholders could have been better and this would have saved time and money because the deep sea disposal idea would not have been instigated. However, the views of those affected were taken into consideration when searching for a better option. This shows the project management team considered the quality of the project and how the company's actions would be seen by the public, and this subsequently lead to its overall success.

Another fine example of the successful operation of a project is the Clair oilfield, which is an offshore exploration and extraction project west of the Shetland Islands. It was discovered in 1977 but due to technical difficulties with the retrieval of oil, the development of the platforms didn’t start until 2001. The site is estimated to contain 5 billion barrels of oil and there is also development going on to extend the site which is called the Clair Ridge Project. This is estimated to contain 5 billion barrels of crude product, and the field will be able to produce 120, 000 barrels a day at peak performance. The Clair Ridge is estimated to extend the life of the site until 2050. The site has been recognized as the most underdeveloped site in the UK continental shelf , which therefore makes it a great place to expand business for BP and other part owners.

The field is very innovative in its geographical location, being the first site with a full metal steel jacket in the sea west of Shetland. It is not easy to measure the extent of success of this project at the moment as the expected life of the oilfield is so long, however with the

estimations of the amount of oil in that area, it looks very promising, assuming the oil prices start to rise again.

The potential this project has is enormous, and it illustrates how choosing the right project can be incredibly lucrative. The fact that BP were willing to wait 24 years between finding the field and then tapping into it suggests they knew that it would be worth the wait, and based on the predicted amount of oil the Clair and Clair Ridge fields contain, our group of project analysts would have to agree.

Our final investigation into previous projects is of the Eden Project, which is a visitor attraction located in Cornwall, England. It is a project focused on research facilities, education resources and environmental responsibilities, with thousands of plant species from all over the world. Besides, concerts and theatre performances, there are many others events which take place under the giant bubble domes which characterizes its architecture.

The project began in 1995, when a clay pit came to the end of its economic life. Mining has become a necessity to human life as it yields such a vast array of ores and minerals which have uses in foods, medicines and vehicles. For instance, from clay it is possible to obtain kaolinite, which is used to manufacture ceramic, porcelain and even paper. However, since the mining pit opened, the landscape around the site was scarred and deemed unsightly by locals. An enthusiastic architect knows as Tim Smit’s who had previously restored the Lost Gardens of Heligan started to sketch a structure to minimize the effects that this big hole in the ground brought. Giant dome "bubbles" seemed to be the perfect shape to mask the scarred landscape as they were able to fully cover the irregular clay pits. It took about six years for Eden to open their doors to visitors, and throughout it's history, many changes and new developments have been added to the original project.

It is unquestionable that Eden can be considered a successful project and it sets a good example to other mining industries around the world. However, like all projects, even with a well-planned idea, some flaws did exist within the construction process, and after Eden was concluded. It rained almost every day in the first few months of construction in October 1998. It is obvious that the rain could not be forecast for months. However, the rain definitely made the construction process harder, and caused some structural damages. To avoid cases like this, the team involved had to compare the weather forecasts from previous years, and start the construction in months with good predicted weather conditions.

Although the attraction has been visited by more than one million people each year, the business case and budget were based on realistic assessments of visitor number and income projections, making the project relatively self-contained. Besides, it was procured with a guaranteed maximum price, with the design team working very closely with the contractors. Even with a realistic budget, when funds proved to be insufficient, the scope was reduced at an early-stage, without significant disruption to the project. The initial project did not have direct precedent in business proposition, design or construction. Therefore, efforts were directed on active risk management to reduce the uncertainty associated with the project.

The project was design behind a visionary leadership and a clear project management structure. Key points, like management of stakeholders, were included in the project plan. Therefore, the team were integrated and focused on technical challenge and, in consequence, on its success.

With innovative architecture, the design was defined effectively, focusing on quality and sustainability, using materials with known origin. For instance, the copper in the structures under the domes were from mining industries with high environmental and social standards from around the world. A risk management process was followed, with registers updated regularly which integrated them into the contract. Thus, the liability of risk was clear and actions were taken to mitigate potential risk exposure. As a result of a realistic and flexible programme, the project was delivered two months early.

The successful regeneration of an expired mining pit into an innovative tourist attraction makes the Eden project stand out as an incredibly successful project. The whole concept of turning a mine pitted landscape into an attractive tourist attraction was brilliant, and the standards which were worked to during the construction stage were admirable. In the end, the development was unveiled ahead of schedule, it was achieved within the set out budget, and the overall quality of the development was of the highest standard.

Conclusions

To ensure our future projects do not go down in history as colossal failures, we have devised a list of considerations which need to be acknowledged before and during our projects. Based on the main causes of failure in the projects discussed above, it should be noted that high quality training for workers should be implemented to ensure safety protocol is strictly adhered to. The safe operation of a project is absolutely paramount to success, and failure to acknowledge this will most likely result in catastrophe. It is important to realise that human error cannot be completely mitigated from our projects, but it can be minimised by implementing safe and effective procedures and protocols. It is also vital that we work within recognised codes and standards of practice. Cutting corners and working below the adequate level of standard could leave the company vulnerable to lawsuits and fines from governments or disgruntled stakeholders.

Also, it is of vast importance to ensure all stakeholders in our projects are considered before taking action. In the case of the Brent Spar project the backlash from Greenpeace and other stakeholders derailed the original project plans. Had all stakeholders been considered in the initial evaluation of the project, the company's reputation would not have been tarnished and the responsible company would not have had to waste time abandoning and restarting the project.

In terms of maximising success with our projects, we first need to ensure that the projects we look at taking on are going to be beneficial to us. The Clair project had a lot of time and money invested in it, but the financial potential it had clearly highlighted that BP had identified the right project to get involved in. Similarly with the Eden project, the architect identified a problem and came up with an innovative idea which was hugely successful. Before investing time and resources, we should be absolutely certain that the project will be advantageous to us, or to our invested stakeholders.

Pages: 6

Words: 3484

bibliography/references

Case study 1: Piper Alpha -

Home.versatel.nl, (2015). Piper Alpha Platform Fire - Oil Rig Disasters - Offshore Drilling Accidents. [online] Available at: http://home.versatel.nl/the_sims/rig/pipera.htm [Accessed 1 Mar. 2015].

Sm.britsafe.org, (2015). Management failure in the offshore industry: From Piper Alpha to Deepwater Horizon | Safety Management. [online] Available at: https://sm.britsafe.org/management-failure-offshore-industry-piper-alpha-deepwater-horizon [Accessed 28 Feb. 2015].

Case study 2:- BP Deepwater Horizon:

Freudenburg, W. Grambling, R. (2010) Blowout in the Gulf: The BP Oil Spill Disaster and the Future of Energy in America [online] MIT Press. Available at: http://site.ebrary.com/lib/aberdeenuniv/detail.action?docID=10424680&p00=bp+oil+spill [Accessed 22 Feb.2015]

Case study 3: Montara oil spill

Wikipedia, (2015). Montara oil spill. [online] Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montara_oil_spill [Accessed 27 Feb. 2015].

Theoildrum.com, (2015). The Oil Drum | Montara Oil Spill: "A failure of sensible oilfield practice". [online] Available at: http://www.theoildrum.com/node/7193 [Accessed 2 Mar. 2015].

Case study 4: Brent Spar

Shell Internation Ltd., (2008). Brent Spar Dossier. 1st ed. [ebook] Visual Media Services. Available at: http://s02.static-shell.com/content/dam/shell-new/local/country/gbr/downloads/e-and-p/brent-spar-dossier.pdf [Accessed 25 Feb. 2015].

News.bbc.co.uk, (1998). BBC News | Europe | Brent Spar gets chop. [online] Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/221508.stm [Accessed 2 Mar. 2015].

Case study 5: The Eden Project

Cornwalls.co.uk, (n.d.). The China Clay Industry | Cornwall Guide. [online] Available at: http://www.cornwalls.co.uk/history/industrial/china_clay.htm [Accessed 3 Mar. 2015].

Edenproject.com, (n.d.). Top eco visitor attraction - rainforest, gardens & educational charity - Eden Project Cornwall UK. [online] Available at: http://www.edenproject.com/ [Accessed 1 Mar. 2015].

Mineral Products Industry. (n.d.). 1st ed. [ebook] Available at: http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/ap42/ch11/final/c11s25.pdf [Accessed 26 Feb. 2015].

Visitcornwall.com, (n.d.). Eden Project, St Austell, Cornwall. [online] Available at: https://www.visitcornwall.com/things-to-do/south-cornwall/st-austell/eden-project#.VPYYB_msWH4 [Accessed 2 Mar. 2015].

Group Members:

Name: Matt Stroud Student ID: 51229306

Name: Andrei FitaStudent ID: 51229266

Name: Maisa Oliveira AlvesStudent ID: 51445028

Name: Kieran LockhartStudent ID: 51227277

Name: Alan ThompsonStudent ID: 51227647

Name: Petter Grellson

Student ID: 51448315