exploring the prospects for russian-turkish cooperation in a turbulent neighborhood

8/9/2019 Exploring the Prospects for Russian-Turkish Cooperation in a Turbulent Neighborhood

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EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS

FOR RUSSIAN-TURKISH

COOPERATION INA TURBULENT NEIGHBORHOOD

GRF–Carnegie Moscow Center Working GroupMemduh Karakullukçu and Dmitri Trenin, Editors

EP T EMBER 2 014


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EXPLORING THE PROSPECTS

FOR RUSSIAN-TURKISH

COOPERATION INA TURBULENT NEIGHBORHOO

GRF–Carnegie Moscow Center Working GroupMemduh Karakullukçu and Dmitri Trenin, Editors


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Tis is a joint report prepared by Carnegie Moscow Center and Global Relations Forum (GRF) but the final text is published by the two institutions in their respective

formats.

© 2014 Carnegie Endowment or International Peace and Global Relations Forum.All rights reserved.

Te Carnegie Moscow Center and the Carnegie Endowment do not takeinstitutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented here arethe author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views о the Endowment, itsstaff, or its trustees.

No part о this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or byany means without permission in writing rom the Carnegie Moscow Center orCarnegie Endowment.

Please direct inquiries to Carnegie Moscow Center 16/2 verskaya Moscow,125009, Russia el. +7 495 935 8904 Fax: +7 495 935 8906 [email protected]

Tis publication can be downloaded at no cost at Carnegie.ru and gi.org.tr

mailto:[email protected]://www.carnegieendowment.org/pubshttp://www.carnegieendowment.org/pubsmailto:[email protected]


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Working Group on Russian-Turkish Cooperation v

Summary 1

Prologue 3

Introduction 5

The Arab Spring and the Rise of Regional Instability,

Including Terrorist Activities 7

Engaging in the Middle East Peace Process 9

Iran and Nuclear Nonproliferation 9

Afghanistan and Regional Stability 12

Central Asia and Regional Development 13

Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus 15

Conclusion and Recommendations 17

Carnegie Moscow Center and GRF 21

Contents


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v

In 2013, Global Relations Forum in Istanbul and the Carnegie Moscow Centerestablished a Working Group dedicated to exploring the potential or regionalcooperation between urkey and Russia. Te Working Group was tasked with

generating new thinking on how cooperation between the two countries couldbe practically advanced. It aims to acilitate a better understanding o the mutualinterests in bilateral relations and to help build a more practical working relation-ship. Te Working Group includes ormer senior government officials, diplomats,military officers, and leading experts rom both countries. From the outset, mem-bers o the group have been working as one team. Tis paper is a product o theircooperation.

Project Leaders

Memduh Karakullukçu, vice chairman and president, Global Relations Forum

(GRF), IstanbulDmitri Trenin, director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Working Group Members

Anatoly Adamishin , ormer deputy oreign minister o the Russian Federation

Nigar Ağaoğulları, GRF director o studies

Ertuğrul Apakan, (group member until February 2014), ambassador (Ret.); or-mer undersecretary o the Ministry o Foreign Affairs o the Republic o urkey;ormer permanent representative o the Republic o urkey to the United

Nations; GRF memberMustafa Aydın, rector o Kadir Has University; GR F member

Evgeny Buzinsky , lieutenant general (Ret.); ormer chie, External RelationsDirectorate, Russian Ministry o Deense

Salim Dervişoğlu, admiral (Ret.); ormer commander in chie o the urkishNaval Forces; GRF member

Sönmez Köksal, ambassador (Ret.); ormer undersecretary o the urkishNational Intelligence Organization; GRF member

Working Group on Russian-Turkish

Cooperation


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vi | Exploring the Prospects for Russian-Turkish Cooperation in a Turbulent Neighborhood

Alexey Malashenko, scholar-in-residence, Carnegie Moscow Center

Ümit Pamir, ambassador (Ret.); ormer permanent representative o the Republico urkey to the United Nations; ormer permanent representative o urkey

to NAO; GRF memberPavel Shlykov , senior research ellow, Institute o Asian and Arican Studies,Moscow State University

İlter Türkmen, ambassador (Ret.); ormer minister o oreign affairso the Republic o urkey; ormer commissioner general o UNRWA (UnitedNations Relie and Works Agency); GRF member

Adnan Vatansever, rapporteur and associate expert or GRF “urkey-Russia” projects; senior lecturer at King’s College London; nonresident senior ellow atAtlantic Council’s Eurasian Energy Futures Initiative

Yaşar Yakış, ambassador (Ret.); ormer minister o oreign affairs o the Republic

o urkey; president o SR AİM (Center or Strategic Communication); GRFmember

Irina Zvyagelskaya, leading scholar, Institute o Oriental Studies, RussianAcademy o Sciences, Moscow


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1

Summary

Even though tensions over Ukraine wil l inevitably cast a shadow over the bilateralrelationship, Russia and urkey—a NAO member—continue to share a rangeo important interests. Indeed, there are a number o areas in which the two can

work together in their common neighborhood, which stretches rom the SouthCaucasus and the Levant to Central Asia and Aghanistan. A high-level workinggroup on Russian-urkish regional cooperation has sketched a orward-lookingapproach or Russia and urkey in tackling regional challenges.

Key Issues

• Russia and urkey’s vast common neighborhood is a source o multiple threats,including terrorism, extremism, and drug trafficking, which can affect bothcountries.

• Both countries have compelling reasons to work together to promote geopo-

litical and social stability and economic prosperity in their overlapping neigh-borhoods, particularly in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

• Moscow and Ankara have their differences on regional issues, rooted in theirrespective national interests, outlooks, and perceptions. Yet, they can manage thosedifferences with a modicum o goodwill, shared respect or the tenets o interna-tional law and states’ territorial integrity, regular and open dialogue between their political leaderships, and support rom both countries’ elites and societies.

Next Steps for Russia and Turkey

• Russia and urkey should work together to enhance stability in the SouthCaucasus, particularly on issues related to the conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia.

• Moscow and Ankara should strive to find a political solution to the conflictin Syria. Such a solution would help lay the oundation or uture stabilityin the region.

• Russia and urkey need to work to prevent the prolieration o nuclear weap-ons in the Middle East and to help bring about an acceptable final agreement


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2 | Exploring the Prospects for Russian-Turkish Cooperation in a Turbulent Neighborhood

on Iran’s nuclear program between ehran and its international negotiating partners.

• In Aghanistan and Iraq, both urkish and Russian interests demand that

the two cooperate to combat extremism and help to create political stability.• Central Asia would benefit rom Russia and urkey working together, rather

than at cross-purposes, to enhance the economic well-being o countriesin the region and prevent radicalism rom undermining regional stability.


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3

Prologue

Te crisis over Ukraine, which entered an acute phase in February 2014, has greatlyaffected Russia’s relations with the West. It effectively ended a quarter-centuryo generally cooperative relations and periodic attempts to integrate Russia into

an expanded West. It also opened a new period o antagonistic rivalry and con-rontation, particularly between Washington and Moscow. Although the uturecannot be oreseen with any certainty, Russia is now likely to ocus on itsel; itsrelations with the ormer Soviet Republics; and its outreach to China and Asia.Tis has important implications or Russia’s neighbors, including urkey.

Committed to the principle o territorial integrity o states, urkey has notrecognized the Russian Federation’s recent incorporation o Crimea, whichhas altered the geopolitics o the entire Black Sea region. urkey has been par-ticularly interested in the situation o Crimean atars, a sizable minorityin the peninsula. urkey also believes that the security and stability o Ukraine iscritical to the region. urkey has taken due note o the ormation o the EurasianEconomic Union o Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, to which Armenia andKyrgyzstan are due to accede soon. urkey is a U.S. ally, a member o the NorthAtlantic reaty Organization (NAO), and a partner o the European Union(EU), negotiating ull membership. Te United States and these institutions aresignificantly hardening their positions vis-à-vis Russia.

Prior to the Ukraine crisis, bilateral relations between urkey and Russia hadgained significant momentum. Te two countries had reaffirmed their desireto expand their bilateral trade to $100 billion within a ew years. Russian-urkishenergy cooperation had been proceeding, rom the Blue Stream gas pipeline andthe South Stream project to the nuclear power station. Economic cooperation

in other areas, such as construction, has been moving orward, as is humanitar-ian, cultural, and intellectual contact. Political dialogue continues all the way upto the top level. Maintaining this momentum in the new environment is a chal-lenge aced by authorities on both sides.

urkish-Russian relations had thrived in the broad context o cooperativerelations between Russia and the West. Reversion to such a cooperative contextremains the first-best and thus aspirational scenario or the bilateral relationship.In the absence o that benign trajectory, the two countries will need to reimagineand reshape their present positive relations within a new set o constraints.


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Given the breadth o recent cooperation and the wide range o regional con-cerns shared by the two sides, the underlying dynamic o the bilateral relationsis likely to orce imaginative steps to sustain its effectiveness as a constructiveinfluence in addressing the broader tensions. In the recent past, both countrieshave successully shielded the issues o agreement rom the issues o divergence;the coming years may require a skillul extension o that strategy.

In this context, it is encouraging to note that compartmentalization mayalso be taking place between Russia and the United States. Despite the severityo the U.S.-Russian conflict over Ukraine, a air amount o Russian-Americancollaboration—in particular, as it relates to the geographical area closeto urkey—has so ar survived this crisis. Te P5+1 (the United States, Russia,China, the United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany) nuclear talks with Irancontinue with Moscow’s position unchanged; the Syrian chemical disarmamentis virtually complete, even i the United States and Russia stick to their positions

as to the way orward or Syria; in Aghanistan, Americans and Russians supportthe constitutional process; and in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, Moscow agreesto Washington’s role as a peace broker.

In this complex set o moving parts in an unsettled part o the world, webring to the attention o interested audiences, in urkey, Russia, and elsewhere,the joint report on the potential or Russo-urkish cooperation in the regiono Western Asia where Moscow and Ankara have a range o partially overlappinginterests. Addressing those interests in the context o shared respect or the tenetso international law will remain the sine qua non or ulfilling that potential. We hope that such cooperation, in turn, will strengthen regional stability and

enhance prosperity.


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5

Introduction

urkey and Russia share an extensive neighborhood, interacting with each otheron a vast swath o geography stretching between the Black Sea and Central Asia,and between the Persian Gul and the Mediterranean. As two important players,

they have the opportunity to positively shape the uture o these regions by con-tributing to their peace, stability, and growing prosperity.Tis opportunity comes at a time when the two countries have taken remark-

able steps to reconcile their historical adversity. Having ought more than a dozen wars over five centuries, and despite having been in opposite camps duringthe Cold War, Russia and urkey have been able to undamentally transormtheir relations in the past twenty-five years. In doing so, they built on the ele-ments o cooperation that existed in their shared history, including in the twen-tieth century.

Since the mid-1990s, Russo-urkish political cooperation has been on the rise,driven by close interaction at the very top level. Te establishment o the urkey-Russia High Level Cooperation Council in May 2010 has been a major insti-tutional development that can serve as the prime engine o wider collaborationoutside o the strictly bilateral relationship.

Tis intense diplomacy rests on a solid oundation o extensive commercial andsocial exchanges between the two countries. Te phenomenal growth in thoseexchanges has resulted rom the undamental changes initiated in the past twodecades in each country’s economy and society. With urkey continuing to striveor a more balanced economic interdependence, Russia has become urkey’ssecond-largest trade partner. In 2013, bilateral trade reached $32.8 billion.Reciprocal investments have reached $10 billion. One-fifh o all Russians who

vacation abroad—more than 3 million in 2013—go to urkey. Te visa-reetravel regime introduced in 2010 has also led to a marked increase o urkish visitors to Russia, although their number (about 100,000 in 2012) is still com- paratively small.

Energy cooperation, going back to the mid-1980s, has served as the backboneor the intensified bilateral exchange. Russia remains urkey’s largest energysupplier, though the one-sided nature o the energy exchange—Russia sells gasand urkey buys it—has caused some anxiety in urkey, understandably result-ing in attempts to reduce dependence on its principal supplier. In the meantime,


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Russia has taken a leading role in the planned construction o urkey’s firstnuclear power plant. I this undertaking succeeds in addressing urkey’s needor know-how and technology transer, it has the potential to add another soliddimension to the Moscow-Ankara energy partnership.

Te transormed bilateral relationship suggests that urkey and Russianow have a basis to move to the next stage: regional cooperation with a viewto improving security and advancing development in their shared neighborhood.Tis is a daunting task: the national interests o Russia and urkey are obviouslydifferent, and in part competitive; their leaderships’ worldviews do not coin-cide on some undamental issues; and the rich memories o past rivalries weighin palpably on urkish and Russian decisionmaking when it comes to geopoli-tics. Despite all the welcome improvements o recent times, urther trust betweenthe two governments is needed.

Yet, the only way to enhance trust lies through practical cooperation. urkey

and Russia may sometimes hold different positions. But, given political will, itshould be possible to narrow the gap between their perceptions. Furthermore,both countries share interests in a range o areas: preventing interstate wars andbringing civil conflicts to closure; avoiding nuclear prolieration; rehabilitating postwar societies; and ensuring political transitions without destabilizing vio-lence. Moscow and Ankara both have to fight terrorism, extremism, and drugtrafficking. I they manage to find a way to collaborate on the wide range o issues where their interests intersect, they can not only enhance their own security, butalso ensure a more stable and livable neighborhood.

In 2013 Global Relations Forum in Istanbul and the Carnegie Moscow Center

established a Working Group dedicated to exploring the potential or urkish-Russian regional cooperation. Te Working Group identified six themes touch-ing on a set o issues in the neighborhood: the Arab Spring and the rise o regionalinstability, including terrorist activities; the Arab-Israeli conflict; Iran and nuclearnonprolieration; Aghanistan and regional stability; Central Asia and regionaldevelopment; and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. In-depth exchangeson these issues would help generate more practical steps through which Russiaand urkey can enhance their contribution to regional stability and prosperity.


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GRF–Carnegie Moscow Center Working Group | 7

The Arab Spring and the Rise of Regional

Instability, Including Terrorist Activities

Te largely unexpected movements or greater political opening in the MiddleEast and North Arica, known as the Arab Spring or the Arab Awakening, havehad inevitable consequences or both urkey and Russia.

For urkey, the dramatic events leading to the rise o new regimes in unisia,Egypt, and Libya in 2011 coincided with the country’s increasingly proactiveoreign policy in its neighborhood. Boosted by a notable economic perormanceand a growing perception about Ankara’s role as an increasingly importantregional power, the urkish leadership had become more open to engage withneighbors and more eager to resolve regional problems in the Middle East evenbeore the onset o the Arab Spring. Deep historical ties, an intensified economicexchange with regional countries, and attempts to raise international supportor the Palestinians had accorded urkey with significant “sof power” amongthe Arab nations in the region.

Russia, by contrast, has de acto withdrawn rom geopolitical competitionin the Middle East since the early 1990s. Moscow did maintain close ties withseveral key countries as a Soviet legacy, including a naval resupply acility atSyria’s port city o artus. Also, Russia had started to step up its political pres-ence in the Middle East in the afermath o the second Gul War. However,it was not beore the onset o turbulent movements in the Middle East andNorth Arica at the end o 2010 that Moscow reemerged as an active par-ticipant in regional politics. Unlike urkey, which as an immediate neigh-

bor to the conflicts has been significantly more involved in the developmentsin the Arab world rom the early days, Russia has had to adjust to the new reali-ties in the Middle East and North Arica region and has gradually intensifiedits involvement.

With the immense turbulence and growing uncertainty about the region’sregimes, the Arab Spring has not surprisingly highlighted some differencesbetween Ankara’s regional approach and Moscow’s. o some extent, these di-erences reflect the disparate worldviews prevalent in the two capitals aboutthe nature and direction o the developments in the region.

For the urkish leadership, demonstrations against decades-old authoritar-

ian regimes represented an opportunity or the region to transition to democ-racy. urkey was quick to respond to the upheaval in the region—Prime MinisterRecep ayyip Erdoğan was the first state leader to call or Hosni Mubarak’sresignation in response to street protests in February 2011. Despite its ini-tially somewhat more cautious approach in Libya and Syria, urkey eventu-ally became an active proponent or a solution or the crises, including throughsupport or their respective opposition movements. In Syria, where urkey hasdisproportionately elt the impact o the crisis in the orm o a massive waveo reugees and multiple border incidents, Ankara has led intense diplomatic


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efforts aimed at resolving the predicament. From the outset o the crisis, urkeyhas consistently supported Syria’s territorial and national integrity, while call-ing or measures toward encouraging a more inclusionary regime and endingthe humanitarian crisis.

Russian leaders have approached the change in the Arab world with muchmore caution. From the very beginning, their view has been that the ArabSpring was an Islamist revolution, rather than an Eastern European–style dem-ocratic revolution. Te collapse o Mubarak’s regime was perceived in Moscowlargely as a breakthrough or political Islam and raised the risk o urtherexpansion into the neighboring regions. Te ouster o Muammar Qaddafi plunged Libya into chaos, leading to prolieration o weapons and radicalfighters. In the Syrian conflict, Russia has vehemently opposed external mili-tary intervention against the Bashar al-Assad regime, though its mil itary assis-tance to the Syrian government has been at odds with the position o North

Atlantic reaty Organization (NAO) members, including urkey, and hasbeen regarded in Ankara as a actor delaying resolution o the crisis. Overall,however, Moscow’s stance on Syria has been in support o a world order basedon the primacy o the United Nations Security Council in all matters relatedto international peace and security.

Yet, despite their differences, Moscow and Ankara have demonstrated an abil-ity to maintain a regular and respectul dialogue. Tey avoided a war o wordsover Syria, and they kept the diplomatic channel open at all levels. Tey havelargely managed to compartmentalize their relations by not allowing their differ-ences on the Syria crisis to cause long-lasting damage to their bilateral relations.

In the midst o the Syrian crisis, they convened the High Level CooperationCouncil, attended by both countries’ leaders.

Now it is time to step up Russo-urkish cooperation on Syria. Tis can beachieved on the basis o shared interests in the uture o the region. Both Moscowand Ankara are concerned that the spreading violence is destroying Syria, deci-mating its population, and destabilizing the neighborhood. Both urkish andRussian leaders are concerned that the rise in extremism within Syria can posea threat to their own countries.

At the Geneva conerence on Syria, Russia and urkey should work togetherto support Syria’s sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity. Achieving

a cease-fire in Syria and providing humanitarian relie to the Syrian people shouldbe the immediate priorities o both Ankara and Moscow. Russia and urkeyshould also promote participation in the Geneva conerence o Iran, SaudiArabia, and other key regional powers.

Te Geneva process is likely to take much time. Acting in unison, and in coop-eration with their allies and partners, Ankara and Moscow could seek out andempower those elements on all sides in Syria that are amenable to dialogue, lead-ing to a sustainable political settlement based on power sharing and eventualnational reconciliation and economic recovery. Tis pattern, i successul, could


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be deployed in other situations in the Middle East and North Arica, shouldthere be any destabilizing violence that threatens regional security.

As the Arab Spring progresses toward an uncertain uture, urkey and Russiamust consult closely to develop common approaches based on their shared inter-est in containing the spread o terrorism and extremism, bolstering regional secu-rity, and enhancing economic cooperation as a means or ostering prosperity andstability. Despite their differences, an active dialogue on Syria’s transition and postconflict order could make a valuable contribution to international effortsto bring peace. Furthermore, it will help to minimize mutual misunderstandingsin the midst o rapidly evolving events.

Engaging in the Middle East Peace Process

Historically, Ankara and Moscow have approached the Arab-Israeli conflictrom different angles. By now, however, these differences have substantially nar-rowed. Russia is a member o the Middle East uartet (other members beingthe United States, United Nations, and European Union), where it basically supports U.S. efforts to bring peace to the area. It also maintains cordial relations withthe Palestinians and has built strong ties with Israel. urkey’s historically strong ties with the Jewish state have rayed in the wake o Israel’s 2008 Gaza Strip offensiveand its 2010 naval raid on a Gaza-bound flotilla, which killed several urkish citi-zens. Ankara’s engagement with the Palestinians has increased significantly.

Essentially, both urkey and Russia support an Israeli-Palestinian dialogueleading to a lasting peace settlement. Both countries have maintained officialchannels o communication with the Hamas leadership. Russia also has contacts with the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. Tis situation allows or urkeyand Russia to play a useul role in helping the Palestinian Arabs and the Israelisto come to terms with each other. Ankara and Moscow will benefit by regularlyexchanging views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict specifically and the overallMiddle East peace process in general.

However, Moscow and Ankara should be realistic about the prospect oran Israeli-Palestinian settlement; their relative influence and role vis-à-vis other players, such as the United States, which has been playing a central role in con-flict resolution there, and the Middle East uartet; and their leverage with either

the Israeli government or the Palestinians, in particular the Hamas leadershipin Gaza. With this caveat, Russia should promote ways or urkey to cooperate within the Middle East peace process.

Iran and Nuclear Nonproliferation

For both urkey and Russia, relations with Iran have historically waveredbetween cooperation and competition. In the past ew years, Iran has emerged


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as particularly important in urkish-Russian relations, ampliying differencesbetween Ankara and Moscow on some occasions and bringing their positionscloser on others. Now that the P5+1 group o world powers (the United States,Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France, plus Germany) have signedan interim accord with ehran in November 2013 opening the way to resolvingthe Iranian nuclear issue, Russo-urkish cooperation is particularly importantin ensuring that this interim accord is ollowed by a final agreement.

For Iran, commercial relations with Russia and urkey have been an impor-tant part o its attempt to break its international isolation in the ace o evermore stringent economic sanctions. urkey, while complying with internationalsanctions, has substantially expanded its economic ties with Iran, includingin the area o gas imports. Te volume o trade has grown remarkably, rom $1 bil-lion in 2000 to $22 bil lion in 2012, transorming Iran into one o urkey’s majoreconomic partners. Additionally, Iran and urkey are members o the Economic

Cooperation Organization, which has provided a platorm or deepening the eco-nomic exchange.

Russia, in the meantime, has also maintained substantial commercial ties withIran, though their similar economic structure—energy exports are key or bothcountries—has somewhat limited the extent o their economic relations. Russia’simportance has stemmed rom its ability to supply military technology to Iranand assist the country in building its first nuclear power plant.

Both Ankara and Moscow have repeatedly expressed their reservations abouturther tightening sanctions on Iran, which until Hassan Rouhani’s election as president in 2013 remained high on the international agenda. Both countries, but

especially urkey, are likely to benefit rom a relaxation and eventual terminationo the sanctions. urkish leaders have repeatedly underlined the extent o lossesdue to over a decade o turbulence in neighboring Iraq and have been cautiousabout the impact o ongoing sanctions on Iran.

Te main issue where Ankara and Moscow have demonstrated their commoninterest, and adopted a airly consistent approach with each other, is on the needor Iran to commit to nuclear nonprolieration. Neither country wishes to see Iranacquire nuclear weapons. Likewise, neither o them would welcome a militarysolution in the orm o a preemptive attack on Iran by Israel and/or the UnitedStates. Both Ankara and Moscow argue that when dealing with a country such as

Iran, non-coercive measures have a greater chance to succeed.For urkey, a nuclear Iran could lead to a nuclear race in the region, danger-

ously undermining regional stability. Ankara has been particularly cognizant oa country’s right to pursue peaceul nuclear technology—a right it is planningto exercise by developing its first nuclear power plant with Russian partnership.

Tis has prompted a proactive approach by urkish diplomats to ensurethat Iran addresses international concerns about its nuclear program, while preventing toughening o international sanctions. In 2010, urkey and Brazil,both o them non-permanent members o the UN Security Council that year,


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mediated an agreement with Iran or a nuclear uel swap. But as progress ailedto materialize, the two countries voted against the draf resolution o the SecurityCouncil to impose new sanctions. At the time, this proactive diplomatic maneu- ver by urkey came at the cost o questioning its commitment to its alliance with Western powers. Ankara considered this reaction in the West to be unjustified, asthe differences over Iran’s nuclear program were largely over tactics or addressinga brewing conflict rather than strategic goals.

For Russia, which sees itsel as a guardian o global strategic stability,a nuclear-armed Iran is also unacceptable. Moscow has been an active participantin the P5+1 talks with Iran on its nuclear program. Like urkey, it has sought,and also ailed, to mediate between ehran and the West. Yet, Russia man-aged to play a positive role in encouraging direct U.S.-Iranian contacts that ledto the interim agreement. An additional actor in Russia’s diplomacy has been itsrole in building Iran’s first nuclear power plant. Moscow, while helping Iran in its

endeavor, has insisted that all spent uel be transerred back to Russia in an effortto decrease prolieration concerns.

Te Syrian crisis, however, has created some discord between Ankara andehran, while helping to solidiy Russia’s ties with the Iranian leadership. Iranis the staunchest supporter o Assad’s regime, while urkey has been outspokenin its backing or the opposition orces. When Ankara decided in September 2011to host a radar system with its NAO allies to track missiles, ehran perceivedthe move as directed at Iran. Iraq, in the meantime, has also become an arena orgrowing competition between Ankara and ehran.

However, with the new leadership in Iran, the interim accord between ehran

and the international community, and signs o hope or a rapprochement withthe United States, urkey and Russia should be actively seeking a final resolutionto the Iranian nuclear issue that would allow Iran to develop a peaceul nuclear program while ensuring that it does not become a nuclear weapon state. Shouldsuch a solution be reached, urkey and Russia would be important or Iran’suture reintegration into the global economy and or creating a stable strategicenvironment around it.

Te chances or a positive and long-lasting contribution by urkey and Russia wil l be greater i they channel their efforts or the establishment o a reliablenonprolieration regime in the Middle East as a whole. In conjunction with

governments in the region, UN Security Council members, and internationalstakeholders, Ankara and Moscow should spearhead the process o developinga comprehensive set o measures or peaceul development o national nuclear programs. Tis should include clear-cut proposals or monitoring nuclear programs, in conjunction with confidence-building mechanisms throughoutthe Middle East and North Arica region that would curb any potential incen-tives or countries to make a transition toward developing nuclear programs ormilitary purposes.


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Afghanistan and Regional Stability

Te withdrawal o the International Security Assistance Force rom Aghanistan,scheduled to take place by the end o 2014, subjects regional security to anotherserious trial. Coming as it does during a period o high uncertainty in Aghanistan,the stability o the government in Kabul and the nature o the uture Aghanregime are in question.

o steer the situation within and around Aghanistan away rom more dan-gerous scenarios and to help Aghanistan achieve stability through peace and prosperity, it is imperative that the countries in the region work jointly towarda common cause. At stake is not only a decade o efforts aimed at buildinga regime that could withstand attacks rom aliban orces and al-Qaeda. AnAghanistan that plunges into instability similar to the 1990s would have inev-itable repercussions or security in the wider region, stretching rom Central

Asia to Pakistan to India.Although urkey and Russia are not among Aghanistan’s direct neighbors,

they are near enough to eel the impact o developments there. In this region,their interests are very much aligned and lack any significant potential sourcesor discord. Both countries have a stake, as well as potential capability, in helpingAghanistan on its way to recovery.

Historically, urkey has been a model or Aghanistan as a Muslim coun-try that is successully modernizing. Tis sof power potential continuesto this day. Recently, in its role as a NAO member, urkey has maintainedan active role in Aghanistan’s security, twice leading the International

Security Assistance Force. It has helped train members o the Aghan NationalArmy and Aghan National Police. urkey has also been involved in rebuild-ing war-torn inrastructure in Aghanistan. From 2004 to 2012, the urkishInternational Cooperation and Development Agency ulfil led more than 80 0 projects, helping Aghanistan to develop health, education, and economicinrastructure. Overall, urkey maintains a high degree o credibility andrespect in Aghanistan and has the potential to help rebuild the country andits institutions.

Additionally, urkey has had a positive role in the region in acilitating a dia-logue between Pakistan and Aghanistan, thanks to its close ties with the two

nations. Te leadership in Ankara enjoys a relatively high degree o credibilityin both countries, which has helped it to host numerous trilateral meetings andsummits. Finally, urkey has close relations with Aghanistan’s northern neigh-bors in Central Asia.

Russia has rich historical experience with Aghanistan, having learneda number o useul, i painul, lessons during its war there in the 1980s. In morerecent times, Russia played a key role in assuring the success o the U.S. opera-tion to deeat al-Qaeda and its aliban hosts in Aghanistan in 2001. Sincethen, it has been a crucial element o the Northern Distribution Network


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to ensure sae transit o material being shipped into Aghanistan by the UnitedStates and NAO.

With respect to Aghanistan’s uture, Russia is most concerned about twothings: the potential spillover o terrorist activities and religious extremism intoCentral Asia, and increased drug trafficking to Russia. Moscow has been main-taining regular contacts with the government in Kabul, both bilaterally andin multinational platorms, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organizationand the so-called uad countries o Aghanistan, Pakistan, Russia, andajikistan.

Russia has been giving Aghanistan security assistance by providing militaryhardware (through the United States) and officer training. Moscow has declaredits intention to expand its economic involvement in Aghanistan. Any economicassistance and investment in various inrastructure projects could enhanceRussia’s positive role in Aghanistan and the region.

As developments in Aghanistan become more uncertain, urkey andRussia should consult each other more closely and more ofen. In particular,they need to explore the potential or counterterrorism and counternarcoticscooperation among themselves and Aghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and CentralAsia, with a v iew toward establishing a regional ramework or stemming drugtrafficking.

urkey and Russia should also cooperate in rebuilding the Aghan economy,strengthening its institutions, and ostering stability. Teir assistance projectsthus ar have lacked coordination. o enhance the impact o their efforts, devel-oping joint projects, such as those related to training o personnel or inrastruc-

ture development, should become a priority.As Central Asian countries also eel the impact o developments in Aghanistan,

urkey and Russia should consider incorporating them into their dialogueon Aghanistan, and possibly bring them, along with Iran, into joint projects,such as counternarcotics, that span the whole region.

Given urkey’s interest in expanding its involvement in the ShanghaiCooperation Organization, Russia should help upgrade urkey’s participationin the organization rom dialogue partner to observer.

Central Asia and Regional DevelopmentFor several years afer the breakup o the Soviet Union, competition domi-nated urkish-Russian relations with respect to Central Asia. At the very out-set, urkey hoped to emerge as a possible model or development in CentralAsia. Remarkably, all o the countries in Central Asia, except or ajikistan, areurkic-speaking. Ankara pioneered in establishing diplomatic relations withthem right afer their independence. Economic and cultural ties expanded rap-idly with urkish companies gaining a significant role in construction, lightmanuacturing, retail, and other key sectors. For Moscow, this constituted


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a source o concern as the extent o the appeal o the urkish model was notimmediately clear to Russian officials.

Over time, however, Russian leaders have largely overcome their concerns aboutgrowing urkish involvement in Central Asia. Tey soon realized that a pan-ur-kic ideology lacked sufficient appeal both in Central Asia and in urkey. Also,some setbacks in urkey’s policy in the region eased Russia’s anxiety. Ankara’srelations with Uzbekistan suffered corrosion, or example, while its economicactivism did not transorm into gaining a major oothold in the most strategicsectors o Central Asia—oil and gas. Notably, urkey’s increasingly proactive or-eign policy with its neighbors in the past ew years has not coincided with a grow-ing activism in Central Asia.

Stability in Central Asia is at risk as several developments occur simultane-ously. First, the political stability o the post-Soviet republics in the region is underchallenge as the old generation o leaders continues to pass the scene. Particularly,

Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s biggest country, and Uzbekistan, its most populousnation, are acing likely departures o their ounding presidents, who accededto power a quarter century ago. Second, stability and security in Central Asia maybe challenged by what happens in Aghanistan afer the International SecurityAssistance Force is withdrawn. Tird, the impact o political Islam on the domes-tic political transitions in the region remains unclear.

Now that Russian concerns about urkey’s role in the region have aded,an opportunity exists to collaborate in enhancing the region’s law-based politi-cal stability. Both countries share interest in opposing terrorism and extrem-ism in the region, and both have denounced drug trafficking. Te two countries

should also consider expanding joint projects or promoting the region’s develop-ment. Since both Ankara and Moscow are already donors in various capacitiesin the Central Asian states, coordinating their efforts could help achieve moreeffective results. Likewise, they should attempt to jointly mediate to help CentralAsian republics resolve the long-standing problem o water supply.

In the meantime, both urkey and Russia need to acknowledge that the or-eign policy o Central Asian countries is becoming increasingly dynamic, result-ing in more contacts with external players. Tus, Central Asian countries havediversified their oreign political, economic, and security relations. China hasbecome a very significant player in the region, especially in the energy and raw

materials sectors, but also in trade and inrastructure. Te United States is repre-sented by its major oil companies and—or the time being—the Pentagon-rentedacilities. Iran, India, Europe, and Japan are also showing interest. Te place isbecoming more crowded.

Among all players, Russia could probably be expected to maintain some advan-tages, providing it with continued sof power. Tis includes substantial labormigration to Russia, Russian-speaking elites, and the presence o Russian minori-ties in the region. Also, Russia has special ties with many o the region’s republicsthrough the Collective Security reaty Organization and the Customs Union/


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Eurasian Union initiative. Yet, Moscow should ensure that its regional initiativesare based on equal ooting among their members and do not come undamentallyat the expense o other stakeholders in the region.

Conflict Resolution in the South Caucasus

In the nineteenth century, the South Caucasus was historically one o the mainbattlefields between urkey and Russia (the other one being the Balkans).In the early 1990s, this remained the region where tensions between Ankara andMoscow persisted or some time.

oday, urkey and Russia maintain significant differences in the SouthCaucasus, though they have learned to live with them without causing a majordent to bilateral relations. One area where interests have diverged has been

in energy development, over rival pipelines to eed Europe’s energy demand.urkey’s extensive trade and intensified energy relations with Russia, however,has helped to partly sofen Moscow’s approach toward Ankara.

Te main differences have been the product o several protracted territorialconflicts: over Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. While dor-mant now, these conflicts are not close to being resolved.

In particular, the Azeri-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakhthreatens to disrupt peace in the entire region and draw in both Russia andurkey. For more than twenty years, the conflict has been “rozen,” whileNagorno-Karabakh and a large swath o Azerbaijani lands outside it remainin Armenian hands. Despite all the attempts by international mediators romthe Organization or Security and Cooperation in Europe Minsk Group, whereRussia is a co-chair, progress toward peace between Armenia and Azerbaijanremains stalled.

Moscow and Ankara take considerably different views on the Azeri-Armenian dispute. Moscow is a ormal ally o Yerevan and maintains a militarybase in Armenia’s territory, though Russia also sells arms and military equip-ment to Azerbaijan. In 2013, Yerevan opted to join the Moscow-led CustomsUnion. Ankara maintains a strategic relationship with Baku. urkey, or its part , launched an effort several years ago or a rapprochement with Yerevan,though the initiative soon stal led. While the effort enjoyed Russia’s official sup-

port, some in Ankara elt that Moscow ailed to use its leverage with Yerevan aseffectively as it could have.

Te stalemate in the rapprochement between Ankara and Yerevan has raisedthe possibility o new tensions. Te gap in the economic and military capabil-ity o Azerbaijan and Armenia keeps growing. In the meantime, the leadershipboth in Baku and Yerevan continues to resort to rhetoric calling or a militar ysolution.

Russia and urkey need to pool their diplomatic efforts in promoting peaceand prosperity in this region. Russia maintains significant leverage over Armenia,


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and urkey has significant leverage over Azerbaijan. I this is not enough to estab-lish peace in the area, it should at least be sufficient to prevent a new outbreako hostilities. In the near term, both Moscow and Ankara need to work togetherto prevent a militar y conrontation.

Georgia’s territorial integrity has been another area where Moscow and Ankaraare divided by significant differences. In 2008, Russia recognized South Ossetiaand Abkhazia as independent states. urkey, while expanding economic ties withAbkhazia, supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, preerring thatconflicts be resolved through peaceul means within internationally recognizedborders. Likewise, Ankara, at odds with Moscow, supports the European Union’sEastern Partnership policy, whose objective is to oster economic and social inte-gration between the EU and the South Caucasus republics.

Yet, on another note, urkey’s approach in the South Caucasus has been well received in Moscow. Tus, in the afermath o the Russo-Georgian war

o 2008, Ankara cal led or resolving regional issues with less intervention romexternal players. Also, the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platorm, initi-ated by the urkish leadership in 2008, can be revived and updated to osterdialogue in the region. It could even be transormed into a joint urkish-Russian initiative.

As the region’s neighbors—the South Caucasus physically links Russia andurkey—Moscow and Ankara bear a special responsibility or conflict preven-tion and resolution there, as well as or promoting economic cooperation thathelps build understanding and, eventually, trust. Ankara and Moscow wouldboth benefit rom a more stable and prosperous South Caucasus region and

should develop joint initiatives promoting that goal. Tese initiatives may include joint energy and transportation projects, inrastructure development, and cul-tural exchanges and other human contacts.

Moscow and Ankara should also consider cooperation in the SouthCaucasus as part o their shared interest to ensure stability, peace, and prosper-ity in the region. For more than two decades, the Organization o the Black SeaEconomic Cooperation, which includes the three South Caucasus republicsamong others, has provided a multilateral platorm or deepening cooperation.As an organization established to oster regional cooperation, it could potentially play a unique role in bringing the region’s countries together in setting and real-

izing their shared objectives or the new century. In that respect, urkey andRussia, as the two leading members o the organization, should work on ulfill-ing its promise. Developing joint projects or the South Caucasus countries wouldbe a good start in revitalizing this institution’s place in the international arena.

It is time that urkey and Russia developed a joint plan to bolster stability andenhance cooperation in the South Caucasus. Such an initiative could help miti-gate the hardships elt by the people o the region as a result o the protracted con-flicts; restore economic links, build transportation corridors connecting Europeand Asia along both east-west and north-south axes, and spur growth; promote


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inormal dialogue; create stakeholders or conflict resolution; and isolate extrem-ists and weaken radicals across the region.

Conclusion and RecommendationsHaving transormed their relations in the past two decades, urkey and Russia nowhave the opportunity to urther enhance their dialogue. At the same time, theycould start contributing to prosperity and peace in their shared geography.

With the Cold War’s ideological divide gone and some o the misperceptionso the early 1990s largely buried in the past, Ankara and Moscow could striveto build urther trust in their relations and to explore pathways or a more unc-tional uture.

Te regular political dialogue that has been established between Moscow and

Ankara could be enhanced by deepening its intellectual oundations. Bilateralrelations could gain urther momentum through growing input rom civil soci-ety institutions, universities, and interparliamentary and cultural exchanges. Tis would contribute to overcoming the burden o history, while cultivating newthinking, and even a new language in this process o a growing exchange betweenthe two societies. Deepening such interactions will also help to generate a morerobust and vibrant rationale or political cooperation. More empathy is needed atthe ormal level, as well as at the level o cultural and people-to-people exchangesbetween the two nations.

Fundamentally, Russia and urkey have some significant commonality o inter-ests that provide a setting conducive to urther strengthening their dialogue andcooperation. Tey have common interests in enhancing economic revival and political stability in their shared geography. Both have reservations about or-eign intervention, especially a military one, on this geography. Furthermore, it would not be an overstatement to say that they also hold common ears and evenhistorical traumas. Opposing the spread o terrorism and extremism as a poten-tial threat to their own stability and integrity is an essential part o their or-eign engagements. For their neighboring regions, ensuring a secular uture basedon international rule o law remains crucial.

In a rapidly changing world with new emerging sources o threats and tensions,urkey and Russia should put orth a major contribution to stability, peace, and

prosperity in a wide geography spanning between the Balkans and Central Asiaand Aghanistan and between North Arica and the Middle East and the SouthCaucasus. Tis vast geography is still embroiled in regional conflicts, upheavals, wars, revolutions, and political and economic turmoil.

What urther necessitates the cooperation o Russia and urkey is that theyare two o the leading powers in this shared geography with significant resources.Both possess historical, cultural, and economic ties with parts o this geography.Both should make use o their comparative advantages in the pursuit o resolvingkey issues in their neighborhood.


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Importantly, through bilateral and multilateral efforts, urkey and Russia

have the capacity and the opportunity to contribute to multilateral initiatives

to manage conflicts, bring peace, and enhance prosperity in a broad geography.

As two regional powers, their joint efforts could be pivotal for addressing twenty-

first century shocks, based on enhancing shared norms and values embodied by

the UN Charter.

Joint efforts to contribute to regional prosperity could help minimize mutual

misconceptions, establish realistic expectations, and build trust between

the two nations. It could also enhance the resilience of bilateral relations

to tackle future shocks both in the neighboring regions and internationally.

Admittedly, this will not be a quick and easy process. It will require continuing

the current political dia logue, while also deepening it to address new potential

issues in the future.

Tis Working Group proposes the following set of policies and actions for

urkey and Russia to further their constructive role in their neighboring geography. Broken down by region, urkey and Russia need to:

Te Middle East (to include the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,

and Iran)

• Continue to insulate their bilateral relations with respect to emerging tensions

by not allowing their differences on, for example, Syria or Egypt, to damage

their wider relationship.

• Resolutely oppose extremism and radicalism and seek to empower moder-

ate forces interested in political modernization rather than conservation

of the status quo.

• Recognize the urgent need to mitigate the humanitarian crisis in Syria, secure

a cease-fire agreement, and provide relief services to all affected parties.

• Provide continued support for the sovereignty, national unity, and territorial

integrity of Syria as the Geneva process unfolds, while encouraging the parties

amenable to a political settlement through power sharing.

• Start developing practical proposals for international collaboration

in the reconstruction of postconflict Syria.

• Coordinate their efforts aimed at countering the spread of terrorism and

extremism through regular consultations, intelligence sharing, and economicmeans, cultivating secular development and prosperity in the region.

• Engage third parties in preventive diplomacy and conflict management

in the region. Such initiatives could be developed for a range of issues, namely

Iran and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

• Engage each other more regularly in individual and multilateral efforts aimed

at facilitating the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Russia should

promote urkey’s inclusion in the activities of the Middle East uartet.


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• Continue their pursuit o a final resolution on Iran’s nuclear issue wherebyIran maintains its right to develop a peaceul nuclear program but does notbecome a nuclear weapon state.

• Lead international efforts to establish a reliable nonprolieration regimein the Middle East beyond Iran and come up with comprehensive proposalsor the peaceul development o nuclear energy programs in the region.

• Be prepared to play a constructive role in the reintegration o Iran intothe world economy, should the nuclear stalemate be finally overcome.

• Find a way to collaborate in Iraq. Tey also need to consider holding consulta-tions on the geopolitical landscape o the Middle East.

Afghanistan and Central Asia

• Cooperate in rebuilding Aghanistan by providing assistance in strengthening

its institutions, personnel training, and joint inrastructure projects to ensureits uture stability.

• Use their leverage in a constructive manner or the prosperity and stabilityo the countries in Central Asia and Aghanistan, as the long-term inter-ests o both urkey and Russia will benefit rom the growing integrationo the region with the rest o the world (including their increasingly diversifiedrelations with external powers).Consult more regularly and enhance their cooperation in the region through

multilateral and well-coordinated efforts with Aghanistan, Iran, and the CentralAsian republics to counter extremism, terrorist threats, and drug trafficking

in the region.Te South Caucasus

• Utilize their leverage over Azerbaijan and Armenia to ensure that a new out-break o hostilities does not occur.

• Recognize that maintaining the status quo over Nagorno-Karabakh withregard to the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict has a detrimental impact orbuilding a prosperous and stable region.

• Coordinate their efforts to move Baku and Yerevan toward reciprocal andgradual steps leading to reducing their deep mistrust and offering a path

to eventual conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh.• Use their influence to help maintain regular top-level contacts between

Armenia and Azerbaijan and increase their productiveness.

• Initiate steps toward multilateral security and stability dialogue acrossthe entire South Caucasus region, including through existing initiatives thatappear promising, such as the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platorm.

• ranslate their economic power into joint projects in areas such as rail- ways, roads, and other inrastructure development o adjoining countries


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in the South Caucasus to build a more prosperous and stable region, and linkRussia and urkey via that region.

• Play leading roles in reenergizing the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, which

remains a potentially useul platorm or multilateral cooperation. As twomajor economic, political, and security players in the area, Russia and urkeycan do a lot to enhance stability, prosperity, and security in the region where,historically, they used to be rivals.


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Carnegie Moscow Center

Established in 1994 by the Carnegie Endowment or International Peace,the Carnegie Moscow Center brings together senior researchers rom across

the Russian political spectrum and Carnegie’s global centers to provide a ree andopen orum or the discussion and debate o critical national, regional, and globalissues.

Global Relations Forum

Global Relations Forum (GRF), ounded in 2009 with the support o 40 promi-nent urkish men and women, is an independent, nonprofit membership asso-ciation committed to being a platorm or engaging, inorming, and stimulatingits members and all interested individuals in all matters related to international

affairs and global issues.

GRF intends to advance a culture that rewards the ertile tension between passionor intellectual diversity and dedication to innovative and objective synthesis. Itnurtures uninhibited curiosity, analytic inquiry, rational debate, and construc-tive demeanor as the elemental constituents in all its endeavors. It contributesto the shared understanding o and aspiration or humanity’s path to peace, prosperity, and progress as an accessible, inclusive, and air process or all.


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exploring the prospects for russian-turkish cooperation in a turbulent neighborhood

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