erv,fioiii& the California Redwood Lumber Companies

S&rah$eirn

California redwood timber companies in the early twentiethcentury resisted fire protection and reforestation, thecentral tenets of forest conservation during the 191 Os and

l92Os. Charged with protecting the nation’s forests to ensure a constantsupply of timber for the American public, state foresters and the newlyformed California Conservation Commission worked to convince theredwood companies that it was in their economic interest to practiceconservation or “scientific forestry” However, timber companies of theredtvood belt, unlike other American forestry companies and associationsthroughout the nation, resisted conservation. Ironically, in an age whenthe West sought federal money to exploit the region’s natural resourcesfor economic gain, California redwood lumber companies resisted government intervention in their lands, citing federal studies that promotedconservation forestry for the nation’s economic viability.’ Due to strongcompetition in the national wood products industry, the redwood companies opposed the added expense of fire protection and reforestation ontheir lands. The heads of redwood timber companies cited Forest ServiceBulletin No. 38 as proof that redwood forests, with their “peculiar” resistance to fire and amazing ability to regenerate naturally from the stump,did not need protective scientific forestry techniques to ensure a continualsupply of lumber.

Forestry and timber management gained prominence in the latenineteenth and early twentieth centuries due to a dramatic rise inAmerican industrial growth. The scars of industrial expansion, whichstretched across the western wilderness, created fear in the hearts of manyAmericans concerned about a loss of natural resources needed for futureeconomic growth, In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt and GiffordPinchot created the first Federal Forest Service in an effort to manageforests for future generations Out of the belief that government, rather

46than industry, would operate for the public good. Conservationists likeGifford Pinchot also believed that science and technology could not onlyrepair devastated forests hut could improve nature’s efficiency. UnderPinchot’s forestry plans, though trees would be felled for lumbei propermanagement would ensure that forests would continue to produce timberfor eternity. Scientists, the federal government decided, would determinehow to develop or manage the nation’s resources efficiently. Althoughthe federal government held its own forest reserves, the California StateBoard of Forestry did not immediately gain its own forestland. Instead,the Board worked with the timber companies in an effort to cooperativelyintroduce forest management through the latest scientific federal forestryinformation. Although many timber companies found that governmentcooperation and scientific forestry served their interests, California Redwood companies were unique in their resistance to conservation forestry.

Historical studies of American lumber companies focus on thetransformation of the industry from its budding pioneer days of rugged individualist timber owners to modern-day, concentrated corporateownership. Politically and economically, some timber companies wereable to resist government pressure to adhere to scientific forestry andconservation. Others manipulated the cooperative relationship with theForest Service in order to assure that forestry legislation would serve theirinterests. Lynwood Carranco, William G. Robbins, and Daniel Cornfordexplore the timber industry’s rise to economic and political dominancethrough technolog labor exploitation, and cooperation with the federalgovernment from the late nineteenth century to the present era as wellas the subsequent environmental impact. Although these works providethe historical background of the timber industry’s interactions with thegovernment and response to scientific forestry, they do not offer an explanation for the redwood lumbermen’s opposition to conservation in theearly twentieth century

Lynwood Carranco’s study of Humboldt County, California, entitled Redwood Lumber Indusiry, explains the growth of the redwood timberindustry from a small and technologically simple enterprise into a highlymechanized industry of large international corporations.2 The study ofHumboldt County logging operations traces the history of the lumberindustry through technological advances in the Felling, transportation andmanufacture of lumber. Carranco romanticizes the early pioneering daysof the lumber industry, emphasizing the grueling labor and skills of earlyloggers, or “old timers,” who used axes and crosscut saws to fell the giantsof the woods.

Carranco asserts that the loss of the giant trees signaled the endof the booming era in the timber-dependent Humboldt Count) andhe praises companies that attempted to incorporate conservation efforts:“Faced with mounting criticism of their forest management practices

SARAH STERN

ePE 47by the general public, however, some of the more far-sighted ownersbegan seriously considering the possibilities for reproduction.”3 However,Carranco fails to explain the historic opposition to scientific forestry inHumboldt Counts; nor does he discuss the reasons behind the shift toconservation practices. As conservation theory stipulated in the twentiethcentury, reforestation could provide the nation with a healthy forest products industry into the future. Carranco supports this opinion and criticizesthe early actions of the redwood timber corporations of Mendocino andHumboldt counties for failing to produce a future supply of timber. Thus,Carranco argues that the same technological ingenuity that allowed thepioneering lumbermen of Humboldt to dominate and profit from naturein the nineteenth centur can also be used to renew the struggling timberdependent communities of the present day.

While Carranco’s study focuses on the advancing methods of timberharvest, William C. Robbins explores the political clout of the national timber industry and the history of cooperation between the US forest Service,the forest products industry and the states in American Forestry: A History ofJs[ajional, Slate, and Private Cooperation.4 Robbins contends that the forest industry’s historic ability to shape federal and state forest policies resulted fromtheir practice of promoting programs that used public funding to supportthe industry’s economic interests, forming powerful industry associations atthe advice of the Forest Service, timber corporations organized to opposeor promote national and state forest policies if deemed economically favorable.

The Forest Service, which understood that the timber industry wouldnot foUow its recommendations regarding proper harvest procedures unlessthey were profitable, allowed the industry’s economic needs to dictate policyRobbins writes, “government programs that ran counter to the industry’seconomic needs were doomed to failure. The requirements of the forestproducts trade would be the essential feature of federal cooperation withprivate timberland owners.”

The Weeks Law of 1911 and the Clarke-McNary Act of 1924 Robbinsclaims, continued and legislated the cooperative relationship between thefederal forest Service and the timber industry He demonstrates that theseActs advocated for public funding to protect the industry, contending that astrong timber industry was in the public’s interest. As Robbins states, “Forest products leaders had assured that the Clarke-McNary Act prescribed nosilvicultural practices for private timberlands, nor did it limit lumber businessactivity.”’ Thus, as short-term profit dictated federal policy, long-term conservation programs to protect forests for the future fell to the wayside due tothe industry’s then-cooperative political relationship with the federal ForestService. Robbins illustrates that many industry associations were interestedin cooperating with the government in conservation and scientific forestryinsofar as they were able to alter government policies to serve their interests.

Conservation & the Ca%/irnia Redwood Lumber Companies

4$American Forestry deals only sparsely with California timber corporations

and the California State Board of forestr) Robbins states that E. T. Allen,the first California State Forestet shaped cooperative policies with fire protection as the keystone of the state’s forestry agenda.7 As Robbins notes, “theconcern for fire led directly to the creation of an official forestry agency andthe entry of the state into forest and watershed protection.” Although manyindustry groups outside of California took advantage of the government’scooperative efforts and worked to shape forest policy in light of their owninterests this paper will argue that further research indicates a lack of industry cooperation in the California redwood belt.

Whereas Robbins explores the industry’s political clout in the formulation of national conservation policy, Daniel Cornford investigates the stateand local political power of the Humboldt redwood companies. In hisstudy of timber workers and the lumber industry entitled I+brkers and DLcsentin the Redwood Empire, Cornford claims that a bipartisan political traditionencouraged dissent and labor movements in Humboldt County in opposition to the powerful lumber company leaders.” In Humboldt County, asthe community was almost entirely dependent upon the timber industry foremployment and economic stability, the timber corporations held economicand political power in local and state government. Nevertheless, Cornfordargues, the labor movements of the early pioneer era constituted a significant challenge to the emerging forest industry.

Cornford’s work follows the historical development of the timbercompanies in the county and their efforts to maintain control of labor, localpolitics, and gain profits. He maintains that timber industry leaders’ politicalpower in the county was able to stifle the labor movement, and that industryleaders formed professional associations to combat labor demands. Corn-ford writes that although the timber industry of Humboldt County was anarray of small pioneering lumber enterprises in the late nineteenth century,concentrated timber holdings and therefore political and economic power- became the norm at the turn of the century. The Hammond LumberCompany, Pacific Lumber Company, and Northern Redwood Company,also known as The Big Three, could claim ownership of sixty-four percentof Humboldt County timberlands and nearly sixty percent of local millingcapacityO These companies dominated the actions of the Humboldt Lumber Manufacturers Association (HLMA) that worked to advance the political and economic interests of the redwood companies of the region.”

Cornford’s study is useful as an inquiry into the redwood companiessuccessful opposition to conservation policy in the state of California. Workers and Dissent in the Redwood Empire illustrates the economic and politicalpower of the Humboldt redwood companies on the local and state level.Although his study does not deal with timber harvest practices and environmental problems associated with logging, Cornford clearly indicates theindustry’s ability to sway state conservation policies.

SARAH STERN

ePE 49These studies help us understand the history of redwood timber

companies in California. Carranco’s work focuses on Mendocino andHumboldt county corporations and their growth from small pioneercompanies to large corporations and his study illustrates the power of thelarge Humboldt County timber companies in both politics and economics; this power undoubtedly affected company interactions with the stateforesters. William Robbins addresses the cooperative nature of government and timber interests throughout the nation, yet he does not mentionthe struggle foresters of California faced in advancing conservation withthe companies of the redwood belt. While other states were able to gainsupport for many conservation-based forest practices, California’s timbercorporations especially those of the redwood belt resisted regulationsand insisted that fire protection and reforestation were unnecessary andunprofitable, using government information to advance their case.

In 1903, under the leadership of Gifford Pinchot, the newly formedUnited States Bureau of forestry later the United States Departmentof Forestry published Bulletin No. 38. Entitled The Redwood, the studyexplored the economic and scientific viability of cultivating secondgrowth redwood forests on cutover lands. The central question was, in theBulletin’s words: “Does the Coast Redwood reproduce itself well enough,grow fast enough, and can it be protected cheaply enough to make itprofitable to hold the [cut-over] lands?”2 The report, in accordance withconservation ideology; framed its message in economic terms, as its aimwas to encourage private redwood logging companies to adopt conservation practices.

The Redwood reached conclusions that timber companies restatedthtoughout the next two decades in debates with the State Board ofForestry as well as in documents aimed at the public and industry associations. The study claimed that:

The Redwood reproduces hse]f abundantly by sprouts oncutover lands, and occasionally by seed, that in thirty years, in afair soil and a dense stand, it will produce trees of 16 inches diameter, 80 feet high, yielding 2,000 fret board measure per acre;and that after careful lumbering under favorable conditions itdoes pay to hold cut-over Redwood lands for future crops.’3

Furthermore, the bulletin asserted that the redwood forests perpetuatedthemselves through “suckers” that sprouted direciiy from the stumps oflogged virgin trees, noting that the redwood also reproduced itself veryquickly as new growths sprouted from stumps “the first few months afterthe slashing was logged and burned.”4 As for fire--— an enemy that foresters wished to eradicate completely from the forests----the study claimedthat it did not easily damage the redwood forests: “In the damp northernpart of the Redwood belt, the forest is too wet to burn.”0 Even in drierareas in the hot summer season, The Redwood claimed that fires were “seldom dangerous.” Though young timber often succumbed to fire, “the

Conseroation & the CatJbrnia Redwood Lumber Companies

50

large Rethvoods [would] sprout again from their stumps.”’7 Finally, Bulletin No. 38 claimed that as old-growth timber became increasingly scarcedue to logging, second-growth redwood, though inferior in quality, wouldbe in demand.’9 In conclusion, The Redwood offered an example of onetimber company that practiced responsible and inexpensive forest management in order to protect a second crop of timber. By simply loggingcarefully to not injure young growth and felling only the trees over twentyinches in diameter, the Mendocino Lumber Company “at little expense,and trouble . . assured itself of future crops of timber.”19 Ironically, thegovernment’s Bulletin No. 38, though intended to encourage companiesto adopt conservative forestry practices, gave Humboldt timber ownersgovernment-sanctioned evidence to support their own logging proceduresthat Board of forestry deemed destructive.

The redwood men consistently argued that the “peculiarities of theredwood trees” made conservation fire protection and reforestationunnecessary in redwood country Allied with the pine timber companiesin industry organizations, redwood companies were staunchly opposed toconservation. Organized opposition to the State Board of Forestry beganin 1909 as the timbermen of the state met in San Francisco to createthe California Forest Protection Association (CFPA), comprised of pineand redwood timber companies. As public support for forest protectionincreased, timber corporations created industry associations to assurethe people of California that forests would be protected both from forestfire and destructive logging practices. Industry associations, they argued,could regulate logging operations without government legislation. TheSan Francisco Chronicle reported on October 9, 1909, that the CFPA wascreated in a significant “step toward a solution of some of the problemsof conservation by the owners themselves, rather than by the State orNational Government. . . enacted on the principle of the public interestin the privately owned forests.”2° An article in the San Francisco Morning Callstated that neatly all redwood and sugar pine interests participated in themeeting.2’ Although this meeting indicated the industry’s interest in working together to combat government legislation, these articles also pointout the redwood belt’s independence. Even at this publicized event, whichsought to assure the public that the timber interests were cooperating toprotect forests, the redwood companies held a separate meeting, “for thepurpose of discussing questions pertaining to that branch of the lumberindustry.”22 This meeting emphasized the redwood men’s belief that theircompanies held peculiar and particular interests.

Due to Bulletin No. 38’s claim that redwood forests were virtually immune to fire, redwood timbermen refused to adopt one of the central tenets of forestry- fire protection. The redwood men ultimately convincedthe state to exempt the region from fire protection in the 1923 Compulsory Fire Patrol Act.23 In 1912, the California Conservation Commissionmet with representatives from the redwood and pine timber companies in

SARAH STERN

ePF 5Ian effort to come to an agreement on conservation practices. Both the pineand redwood corporations were not interested in government legislation,yet the redwood companies were the most outspoken and organized in theiropposition, using information from Bulletin No. 38 to back their position.Mr. Wendling, representing the Pacific Coast White Pine Association statedthat although he understood the redwood belt may have faced less dangerfrom fire due to fog, he did not feel that only the redwood companies shouldbe exempt from state regulations: “there is some danger of fire [in drierportions of the redwood belt] . . . that is natural. So, it occurs to me thatwhat would be sauce for us ought to be sauce for the gander too.”21

Redwood interests used the State and Federal foresters’ argumentsto justify their position that they should be exempt from fire protection.Mr. Johnson, a representative of Union Lumber Company in MendocinoCounty stated that redwood timber be it green, standing timber or manufactured lumber was virtually impervious to flame: “We think sometimesthat the fire in San Francisco, after burning up the brick and steel buildings,stopped at the buildings covered with redwood.”25 He cited Bulletin No. 38and the 3Td Biennial Report of the Ca%fornia State forester to support his claims.26IVIr. Burnett of the Hammond Lumber Company, the largest timber company in Humboldt County, argued that the peculiarities of the redwoodforests necessitated exemption from government fire regulations: “Theredwood industiw in California has been recognized by prior legislation asbeing something peculiar in itself . . . that is to say, in reference to the factthat standing green timber is not annihilated or destroyed by forest fire.”27Ahhiough Tvlendocino County lumbermen created a preventive forest fireassociation, the Redwood Protective Association (RPA), they too opposedfurther government legislation in the redwood region citing their organization’s efforts as sufficient. Mr. Muir of a Mendocino County redwoodcompany claimed that his territory, located west of the Humboldt Countytimber interests, required only minimal fire protection. He stated that theRPA capably controlled without the hindrance of government oversight.28After hearing the testimony of the redwood timber interests, the Chairman of the Commission asked all redwood timbermen whether they werein favor of enacting a state fire law and if they felt the redwood countryshould be exempt. Miles Standish of Standish & Hickey Timber Companyreplied that the present laws were sufficient and that no laws compelling firepatrols were necessary in the redwood region.79 Clearly the pine interestsof the state disapproved of government regulation, yet they did concedeto the foresters’ desires that they voluntarily protect their forests from fire.The majority of the redwood interests, however, citing government studies,claimed their forests were immune to fire, and therefore even voluntary fireprotection was unnecessary.

In response to the fire discussion, the State Board of forestry lambasted the timber interests in its fJlh Biennial Report of the State Forester:“We cannot extensively accomplish forest protection until the lumbermen

Conservation & the Catfbrnia Redwood Lumber Companies

52

become thoroughly awakened to the practical necessity of the worksome of the lumbermen are distrustful of any agency directed towardforest regulation ...‘ The report further cited an industry report of forestfires from the California Forest Protective Association that noted, “Lessthan three ten thousandths of one percent (.0003°/o) of the 4,603,713acres of merchantable forests of California suffered by fire during the dryseason of 19l3.” Claiming these figures were incorrect and misleading,the State Forester instead stressed that “one half of one percent” of themerchantable acres burned over in the same year outside of the nationalforests, according to firewardens of the State Forester.32

In addition to fire protection, state foresters wished to adopt measures that would ensure a second crop of timber for the benefit of theAmerican public. With the rate of logging on the increase, conservationideology held that as the nation needed lumber for economic prosperity,logging operations should be followed by reforestation. Reforestation, thestate suggested, could be accomplished by protecting young growth fromfire, leaving seed trees behind on logged over forest lands, and plantingnew seedlings. Redwood companies, however, used government studiesto claim that reforestation efforts could be accomplished on their landsby simply letting nature take its course; thus, government regulation orpotentially expensive reforestation efforts were completely unnecessary inthe redwood belt. California pine companies, on the other hand, thoughresistant, did not offer the strong opposition of the redwood companies.

In the eyes of the State Forester, the need for fire protection inold-growth forests in the redwood region extended to the young, second-growth seedlings and sprouts that the forest service sought to guard in itsefforts to ensure a second crop. Mr. Burnett of the Hammond LumberCompany explained the redwood timber companies’ view that as theredwood trees regenerated almost entirely out of cutover stumps ratherthan from seedlings, even if an unlikely fire were to spread in the redwoodregion “there [was] still the source of further reforestation from the sameold stump.”33 Mr. Johnson of the Union Lumber company added to thisargument, expressing strong contempt for government regulations andstressing that nature itself would offer the best reforestation methods:

Tn the first place, if it means anything at all, it would meancertain regulations, and the question, what regulations? If wehad perfect men, if we had gods to make the laws and makethese regulations, they might get something And it seemsto me that it is better to leave that somewhat to nature and tonatural laws.34

California pine interests also felt that proposed government reforestation programs were oppressive and unnecessary on private lands. Mr.Wendling, representing the Pacific Coast Sugar White Pine Association,argued that if the government wished to practice conservation on forestlands that it should do so on its own property. Wending spoke extensively

SARAH STERN

©PF 53at the 1912 Conservation Commission meeting on this subject: “If thepresent law were so amended that the State would permanently acquirethat land [cut-over lands] and through that medium acquire a forest of herown, belonging to the people of the State of California, I think the Statewould have a great mission in conservation instead of somewhat nebulousand hazy one of trying to conserve something that she does not own.”35

Redtvood companies also claimed that there was no economic incentive in reforestation, again citing the “peculiarities” of the redwoodtrees as evidence that the proposed private investment in reforestationwas too costly and unnecessary Mr. Johnson not only used the argumentthat redwood trees sprouted directly from the stump, he also claimed thatlogged redwood lands continued to produce new growth after it had beenconverted to agricultural land. The timberman stated that the convertedforestland continued to produce sprouts that grew stubbornly among grazing cattle.36

Although the pine interests did not argue that regeneration occurrednaturally on their lands after logging, all of the companies complainedthat tax laws made providing for second growth forests on cut-over landsan economic burden to the timber interests of the state. Mr. Standishunderscored the Union Lumber Company argument and asserted thatit was inconceivable that the state could require timber companies toprovide for a second crop when it was not economically sound for themto do so. Standish suggested that the State purchase cutover lands if itwished to provide for second growth stands, as the most common methodin Humboldt County at the time was to sell the cutover lands for agricultural purposes. Both redwood and pine timber companies argued that taxlaws discouraged reforestation; deforested lands were valued at a lowerrate than forested lands, thus creating a lower tax burden for the timberowner. Mr. Johnson rejected Standish’s view and claimed that the publicwould get more value from the lands if they remained in private hands. Hestated, “private owners [would] put that land to the highest use to which it[could] be put quicker than the public ownership [would] do it.”37Johnsonagain used the argument that the public would obtain the same amountof timber whether in public or private hands as the redwood forests regenerated naturally from the stump. Thus, Johnson felt that the expenseto reforest lands was unnecessary in the redwood region and furthermore,that government intervention was altogether needless.

The pine interests also claimed that they did not wish to pursuereforestation efforts due to tax burdens. However, rather than argue - asthe redwood interests did that regeneration occurred naturally, the pineinterests pushed for a revamping of the tax system. Redwood interestswere also interested in this proposition, presumably hoping to be relievedof high taxes and remain competitive. Mr. Walker explained his positionof complete opposition to reforestation for economic reasons:

Conservation & the Ca%Jbrnia Redwood Lumber Gompanies

54At the present time, and under present conditions, there is nomoney in reforesting the land . . . [it is wrong For] the peopleof the State to single out the man engaged in the lumberindustry and expect him to come in and become a philanthropist for the benefit of the dear people. They ought to bringabout a condition that will make it a business venture, make itworth while. The matter of taxes seems to be the most feasiblemethod of subsidizing..

Clearly, the California forest products industries stood squarely inopposition to government regulation of forest practices. Yet it was theredwood industry alone that could use State and Federal Governmentstudies to promote its case that conservation forestry was unnecessary.

Just as they refuted to cooperate with state foresters on conservation policy, California timber interests did not collaborate with industrygroups throughout the nation, rejecting the idea that cooperation withthe government would be beneficial for business. Redwood companieswere slow to join national efforts to organize and work with federal andstate forest agencies, unlike other regional.corporations. Redwood timhermen explained the lack of cooperative action on the part of theircompanies by stating that redwood forests did not require conservationforestry. Miles Standish, in a presentation to a West Coast timber industry conference, reiterated the arguments he made before the CaliforniaConservation Commission: fire protection was unnecessary in California. He claimed that fire damage was slight in the state, and emphasizedthat redwood trees in particular were not damaged from fire.39 Standishcriticized “radical” state legislation that compelled timber owners toburn and clear debris from their lands.4’

In 1915, at another industry conference, western timbermen opposed the uncooperative nature of the California timbermen. A. L.flewelling, the President of the Western forest Conservation Association (WFCA), an industry organization, reprimanded the Californiatimber companies at a convention in San Francisco. To the Californiatimber companies attending the meeting he proclaimed,

[Uhe State of] California sought to improve [its] forestcode. Nothing was accomplished. To the States where forestinterests are best organized and harmonious this seems significant. It looks to us like a lack of complete organization,for we find it hard to believe that timber owners, State andGovernment, pulling together in those matters in which theyhave identical aims, can not accomplish these aims.°

During the same conference Fred C. Knapp, an Oregon timbermanufacturer, “earnestly urged the lumber and timbermen of California to give its support [to the WfCA].”2 The California timber companies stood in contrast to lumber companies in the rest of the nation intheir staunch opposition to the conservation measures of fire protectionand reforestation.

SARAH STERN

Pf 55Perhaps in an effort to persuade others that the redwood forests

required no legislation and therefore should be exempt from conservationefforts, the redwood companies invited West Coast timber corporations toHumboldt and Mendocino counties to view redwood logging operations.The American Lumberman reported that during this visit, H. D. Langille,a “good Oregon timberman deprecated . . the cutting of thesenatural resources [the redwood trees] without a profitable return for thework and investment, and urged cooperation that a better result mightobtain.”3 Timber corporations operating in the American West felt thatcooperation with State and Federal governments aided their operations.Yet California companies, especially those in the redwood region, resistedgovernment intervention.

Besides arguments that redwood forests would regenerate on theirown, redwood companies resisted conservation due to a competitive forest products market. California timber companies held that they facedproblems marketing and distributing forest products in the lucrativeeastern markets of the United States. Competition may have encouragedopposition to conservation foresuy due to a possible increase in lumbering costs associated with forest management. Advertising campaigns andarticles in industry journals clearly articulated the problems of Californiatimber companies in transportation and taxation issues. In a hearing inSan Francisco on August 17, 1915, lumber companies reported their difficulties competing in foreign and domestic markets and asked permissionto form co-operative selling agencies in accordance with Sherman AntiTrust Act.44 An American Lumberman article reporting on the hearing cited adepression in the California timber industry and problems with shippingdue to the “deplorable state” of the merchant marine, as well as difficulties with import and export trade along the Pacific CoasL’5 Redwoodcompanies pointed to intense competition among mills and a relianceupon foreign markets as the leading causes of hardship. C. R.Johnson,the Union Lumber Company representative, noted his company’s dependence upon the Australian markets and stated that his company alone soldeighty percent of the redwood in that nation.’6 He also claimed that thesmall operator was able to secure sales more easily than the larger redwood timber companies as they could deal directly with the export company rather than working through a brokei:4’ State foresters and redwoodcompanies alike acknowledged a low demand for redwood products in theeastern markets, thus lowering the opportunity for profits in the redwoodproducts industry. In 1903, the US Forest Service wrote that the marketfor redwood was “uncertain and limited. It would appear that so useful awood should find a ready sale in the East; but at present Eastern buyersdo not appreciate its good qualities, and high freight rates have helped tokeep it out of Eastern markets.” The situation did not change throughout the l9lOs and 1920s. In 1921, the advertising plan for the CaliforniaRedwood Association articulated a strategy in which it would market to

Conseivation & the Cat/brnia Redwood Lumber Companies

L56 e]Pf]the East with a direct mail campaign.49 Considering that redwoods areendemic to California and that fir and pine were more readily availablein eastern markets, it seems intuitive that redwood companies would finddifficulty selling lumber in these areas. Lumber purchasers outside ofCalifornia were unfamiliar with redwood and presumably preferred towork with woods that could be obtained cheaply and quickly and thatcustomers would recognize.

Redwood lumber advertisements of the 191 Os and I 920s, in an effortto gain a foothold in eastern markets, educated the target audience aboutthe qualities of the wood. Ads also emphasized the ease with which anEasterner could obtain the lumber. “It’s so easy to work, carpenters unconsciously do nearly twice the amount of work in a day with Redwood,”read one ad appearing in American Lumberman in July l915.°

We want to prove to you our redwood is a good buy and showyou how hundreds of dealers in the central and eastern stateshave made it a leader in their yards e can bring Redwoodto your yard even more promptly than you have been accustomed to getting lumber manufactured nearer home; and toacquaint you with its universal fitness to most every use forwhich wood is applicable.5’

On August 28, 1915, Pacific Lumber Company announced a newservice depot for Eastern trade: “Rush orders will be handled with outdelay,” the ad proclaimed, and “we hope with this added service to makeRedwood as easily obtainable to our eastern buyers as any other wood.”52

Redwood companies educated their customers on the qualities oftheir product, and also, perhaps disingenuously, used the ideology of conservation to market redwood. Thus, redwood companies not only utilizedgovernment studies to oppose federal regulations, but they also used thesearguments in marketing campaigns to sell wood directly to consumers andlumber yards throughout the nation. In a competitive market, redwoodcompanies used the characteristics of redwood as outlined in Bulletin No.38 in order to increase sales. The California Redwood Association’s marketing plan of 1921 outlined a new ad campaign as well as “services to thepublic” outside of advertising.53 A flow chart in the pamphlet submitted tomembers of the association noted “conservation of supply of redwood”as a top priority in services offered to the public. Along with “encouragingintensive utilization of forest products,” the association claimed it would“encourage renewal of redwood forests by cooperation with governmentofficials and public policy without placing an unusual or unfair penaltyon Redwood owners.”54 Though the industry intended to promote theexistence of a cooperative relationship between redwood interests and thegovernment, redwood companies clearly opposed government regulationand therefore resisted conservation measures. The company’s advertising promotion marketed the regenerative and fire resistant nature of theredwood trees in its advertising materials, maintaining its position that noregulations were needed to perpetuate redwood forests.

SARAH STERN

ePF S7iOn each of the sample advertisements presented in the proposal, text

boxes appeared to promote this idea: “Redwood has no equal for the specialuses to which it is adapted, and for these uses the available supply is adequatefor generations. Meanwhile according to the US forest Service Bulletin 38,merchantable second growth redwood is procured in less than 60 years bynatural grovih from the stump.”55 In response to growing public concern forforest conservations, the redwood companies used government informationto prove to the public that the unique redwood forests were adapted to naturally regenerate and resist forest fires.

Without strong sales in eastern markets, redwood companies clearlyfaced hardships in maintaining profits, which may have influenced the redwood industry’s decision to resist Conservation. In die discussion of forestryproblems in California, Mr. Johnson of the Union Lumber Company statedthat any increase in price of redwood lumber would cease to be competitive:

ft is the law of supply and demand that fixes the price, andthe price of redwood anyway in California is controlled by theprice of Oregon fir, Douglas fir, that is manufactured in Oregonand Washington. There are at least five feet of fir consumed inCalilbmia to one foot of redwood, and for every purpose thatredwood is consumed fir can be used. While, of course, we get alittle higher price for our redwood.., if we push that price a littlehigher. . . fir would take its place.’

Clearly, redwood timber companies resisted conservation forestrymeasures in California in the l9lOs and 1920s. Several factors contributedto the sentiment that letting nature take its course was more advantageousto the lumber company than the State’s forest management plans were.Early studies of the federal and State Foresters supported the redwoodlumbermen’s position against conservation forestry in the realm of reforestation and fire prevention. California pine companies also resistedgovernment intervention, yet it was the “peculiarities” of the redwoodsthat dominated opposition to these measures. Although the pine and redwood companies worked together to oppose government regulations, theredwood men argued that redwood interests alone, due to the miraculousregenerative and fire resistant qualities of redwood trees, deserved exemption from conservation forestry. Industry forest products associationsthroughout the nation complained about the California timbermen’s lackof cooperation. Competition in the American lumber market presumablyalso had an effect on the redwood timber industry, With a product that wasunfamiliar to Eastern consumers, more expensive, and not easily obtained,redwood companies sought to obtain an edge in the East through advertising campaigns. Ad campaigns also used Bulletin No. 38 to sell lumber andconvince the public that conservation took place naturally in the redwoodforests without government intervention. Ironically, government publications that announced the fire resistance and regenerative properties ofthese trees furthered the timber industry’s arguments that conservationwas not only unprofitable, but also unnecessary in the redwood region.

Conservation & the Ca%.fbrnia Redwood Lumber Companies

58

SARAH STERN

Sarah Stern is pursuing a graduate degree in American history with a minoremphasis in Environmental history She is interested in pursuing a Ph.D. aftercompleting her MA.

NOTES

Gerald Nash, The ffideral Landscape: An Economic History of the Twentieth-Century lI’est(Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999).

Lynwood Carranco, Redwood bomber Industry (Golden Vest Books: San Marino, Cattfornia, 1982).

itjisi, 40.William G. Robbins, American forestry: A Jfutory of .?‘fatisna4 Stat and Private Cooperation

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985).5lbid.,6.6 Ibid., 94.Ibid., 42.Ibid., 43.Daniel Cornford, Workers and Dissent is the Redwood Empire (Philadelphia: ‘Temple

University Press, 1987).‘° Ibid., 153.Ibid.

17 U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Forestry, The Redwood. (Bulletin No. 38,Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Ollice, 1903). 7.13 Ibid.‘ Ibid., 8, 14.‘° Ibid., 15.16 Ibid.17 Ibid., 16.‘ Ibid., 21.9 Ibid., 28.25 San Francisco Chronicle, October 9, I909, p. 2, col. 2.21 San Francisco Adorning Call, October 9, 1909, p. 1, col. 3.22 Ibid.23 Raymond Clar, C’ahiforma Government and Forestry, (Sacramento: Division of forestry

Department of Natural Resources, 1959). 345.24 State Conservation Commission of California, Thococstons on Forestry in Golifornia (Sacramento: California State Printing Office, 1912), 13. All state records cited in this paper use

only the last names of the timbermen who spoke at the meetings. Therefore I will refer to themby last name only, as they are in the primary sources.

Ibid., 4.

SARAH STERN

ePE 5926 Ibid., 5.27 Itjid.° Ibid., 10.29 Itsid., 11.California Stats Board of Forestry Mnth Biennial RepoTi of the State Forester (Sacramento:

California State I’rindng Office, 1914), 140.153.

Ibid.State Consen’ation Commission of California, Discussions on Forest cv in Calforma, 13.Ibid., 52.Ibid., 19.

36 Ibid.. 54.Ibid., 58.

° Ibid., 76-77.The 7imberntan, December 1911, 24.

40 Ibid.41 “The Forestry Banquet,” American bmtbemman. October 30, 1915, 43.42 Ibid.

“Vs’est Coast Loggers in Annual.” American bambernian, October 30, 1915, 49..14 “San Francisco lumbermen INI of Conditions,” American Lumberman, August 28,

1915. 33.Ibid.

46 Ibid.‘ Ibid.40 Bulletin No. 38, Tlte Redwood, 19.Evans and Bamhifl, Inc., “California Redwood: ‘1’rade Extension Manual, 1921,”

(Evans & Barnhill. Inc.. 1921).° American Lumberman,]uly 3, 1915, 42.

American Lumberman, july 31, 1915, 14.52 American Lumberman, August 28, 1915, 14.Evans and BarnIsill, Inc., “California Redwood: Trade Extension Manual, 1921.”

s Ibid.Ibid.

56 State Conservation Commission of Calllbrnia, Discussions on Forestry in California, 13.

Conserzation & the Ca1iJrnia Redwood Lumber Companies