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99-34876 (E) 271199

United Nations A/54/549

General Assembly Distr.: General15 November 1999

Original: English

Fifty-fourth session

Agenda item 42The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General

Assembly resolution 53/35

The fall of Srebrenica

ContentsParagraphs Page

I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 6

II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1040 8

A. Break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and theestablishment of the United Nations Protection Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1014 8

B. Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the outbreak of war . . . . . 1519 9

C. Humanitarian activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2023 9

D. Proposals for a peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . . . . . 2428 10

E. The peace process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2932 11

F. Srebrenica prior to the safe area resolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3340 13

III. Adoption of Security Council resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993) and 836(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

41102 16

A. Minimal consensus within the Security Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4144 16

B. The concept of safe areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4551 16C. Security Council resolution 819 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5258 18

D. Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of 18 April 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5962 19

E. Security Council mission to Srebrenica and further demilitarizationagreement of 8 May 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6365 19


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F. Security Council resolution 824 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6669 20

G. End of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; moves to strengthen the safe arearegime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7077 21

H. Security Council resolution 836 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7879 22

I. Positions of Security Council members on resolution 836 (1993) . . . . . . 8092 23

J. Reluctance to use force to deter attacks on safe areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9395 25

K. Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 836 (1993)(S/25939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9698 26

L. Efforts to lift the arms embargo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99102 26

IV. Evolution of the safe area policy: June 1993-December 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103174 29

A. Initial implementation of the safe area policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103105 29

B. Mount Igman crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106113 29

C. Proposals to exchange Srebrenica and epa for Serb-held territory around

Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114116 30

D. Markale massacre and disagreements on the use of air power . . . . . . . . . 117123 31

E. United Nations assessment of the safe area policy as of March 1994 . . . 124130 32

F. Attack on Gora de: March-April 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131145 34

G. Report of the Secretary-General of 9 May 1994 (S/1994/555) . . . . . . . . . 146152 36

H. Contact Group peace plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153156 37

I. Serb assault on the safe area of Biha A : October-December 1994 . . . . . . . 157163 38

J. Repor t of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1994 (S/1994/1389) . . . 164174 39

V. Events of January-June 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175225 44

A. Cessation of hostilities agreement and its collapse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175184 44

B. Air strikes around Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185189 45

C. United Nations Protection Force hostage crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190200 46

D. Report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995 (S/1995/444) . . . . . . . . 201209 48

E. Bosniac attempt to break the siege of Sarajevo and its consequences forthe United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210212 49

F. Rapid reaction force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213220 49

G. Fighting around Srebrenica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221225 51

VI. Overview of deployment in Srebrenica: February-July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226238 53VII. Fall of Srebrenica: 6-11 July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239317 57

A. 6 July: attack on observation post Foxtrot; request for close air suppor t . 239245 57

B. 7 July: pause in Serb attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246249 58

C. 8 July: request for close air support discouraged; Bosnian Serb Armyoverruns observation post Foxtrot; ARBiH kill Dutchbat soldier . . . . . . . 250261 59


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D. 9 July: events leading to blocking position and warning to Serbs . . . . . . 262276 61

E. 10 July: Bosnian Serb Army violates warning; use of close air supportdeferred . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277296 63

F. 11 July: initial confusion over air support; Srebrenica falls . . . . . . . . . . 297317 67

VIII. Aftermath of the fall of Srebrenica: 12-20 July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318393 72

A. 12 July: meetings with Mladi A ; deportation commences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 318328 72

B. 12 July: Security Council resolution 1004 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329339 75

C. Night of 12 July: sporadic killing begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340345 76

D. 13 July: killing of hundreds of unarmed men and boys begins . . . . . . . . 346360 77

E. 14 July: mass executions commence; European Union negotiator meetsMiloeviA and Mladi A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361374 80

F. 15 July: massacres continue; agreement reached between Mladi A and theUnited Nations Protection Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375382 82

G. 16-18 July: reports of atrocities begin to surface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383390 83

H. 19 July: Mladi A and United Nations Protection Force Commander meetagain and conclude agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391393 85

IX. Fall of epa and the new safe area policy: July-October 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394464 87

A. Preparations for the attack on epa: 11-14 July 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 394396 87

B. Attack, resistance and negotiations in epa: 14-20 July 1995 . . . . . . . . 397402 87

C. First formal reports of atrocities from Srebrenica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403404 88

D. London meeting and changes in the approach to the use of air strikes . . 405410 89

E. Operational arrangements resulting from the London meeting . . . . . . . . . 411414 90

F. Fall of epa and the flight to Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415431 90

G. Operation Storm and the United States-led peace initiative . . . . . . . . . . . 432437 93

H. Attack on Markale marketplace in Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 438441 94

I. Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442445 95

J. Serb assessment of Operation Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446447 95

K. Pause; a new peace map; opening a road into Sarajevo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 448450 96

L. Resumption of air and ground attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451455 97

M. United States-led peace initiative; concerns about the mandate . . . . . . . . 456459 98

N. Croatian offensive and the end of hostilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460464 99X. Peacekeeping and the Peace Agreement: October-December 1995 . . . . . . . . . . 465466 100

XI. The fall of Srebrenica: an assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 467506 102

A. Role of the United Nations Protection Force in Srebrenica . . . . . . . . . . . . 470474 102

B. Role of Bosniac forces on the ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475479 103


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C. Role of air power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480483 104

D. Unanswered questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 484487 104

E. Role of the Security Council and Member States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 488493 105

F. Failure to fully comprehend the Serb war aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 494497 106

G. Lessons for the future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 498506 107

Annexes

I. Senior United Nations personnel in the former Yugoslavia referred to in the report by theirtitles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

II. Individuals interviewed in the preparation of the report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

Maps

The former Yugoslavia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Vance-Owen Peace Plan (January 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Safe areas designated under Secur ity Council resolution 824 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Union of three republics plan (August 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Contact Group peace plan (July 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Dutchbat deployment around Srebrenica (June 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56

Bosnian Serb Army attack on Srebrenica (July 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Execution sites and mass graves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Inter-enti ty boundary l ine established by the Dayton Peace Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101


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I. Introduction

1. This report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 18 ofGeneral Assembly resolution 53/35 of 30 November 1998.In that paragraph, the General Assembly requested:

a comprehensive report, including an assessment,on the events dating from the establishment of thesafe area of Srebrenica on 16 April 1993 underSecurity Council resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April1993, which was followed by the establishment ofother safe areas, until the endorsement of the PeaceAgreement by the Security Council under resolution1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995, bearing in mindthe relevant decisions of the Security Council and theproceedings of the International Tribunal in thisrespect,

and encourages Member States and others concerned toprovide relevant information.

* * *

2. On 16 November 1995, the International Tribunal forthe Former Yugoslavia indicted Radovan Karad i A(President of the Republika Srpska) and Ratko Mladi A(Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army) for their allegeddirect responsibility for the atrocities committed in July1995 against the Bosnian Muslim population of the UnitedNations-designated safe area of Srebrenica. After a reviewof the evidence submitted by the Prosecutor, Judge Riadconfirmed the indictment, stating that:

After Srebrenica fell to besieging Serbian forces inJuly 1995, a truly terrible massacre of the Muslimpopulation appears to have taken place. The evidencetendered by the Prosecutor describes scenes ofunimaginable savagery: thousands of men executedand buried in mass grave s, hundreds of men buriedalive, men and women mutilated and slaughtered,children killed before their mothers eyes, agrandfather forced to eat the liver of his owngrandson. These are truly scenes from hell, writtenon the darkest pages of human history.1

3. The United Nations had a mandate to deter attackson Srebrenica and five other safe areas in Bosnia andHerzegovina. Despite that mandate, up to 20,000 people,overwhelmingly from the Bosnian Muslim community,were killed in and around the safe areas. In addition, amajority of the 117 members of the United NationsProtection Force (UNPROFOR) who lost their lives inBosnia and Herzegovina died in or around the safe areas.In requesting the submission of the present report, the

General Assembly has afforded me the opportunity toexplain why the United Nations failed to deter the Serbattack on Srebrenica and the appalling events that

followed.

4. In my effort to get closer to the truth, I have returnedto the origins of the safe area policy, discussing theevolution of that policy over a period of several years. Ihave drawn the attention of the reader to the resolutionsof the Security Council and to the resources made availableto implement those resolutions; I have reviewed how thepolicy was implemented on the ground, as well as theattacks that took place on other safe areas: Sarajevo,Gora de, Biha A . I have reviewed the debate that took placewithin the international community on the use of force and,in part icular, on the use of air power by the North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO). I have also reviewed the roleof UNPROFOR in the fall of Srebrenica, and in the almost-forgotten case of epa. Finally, I recall how, having failedto act decisively during all of these events, theinternational community found a new will after the fall ofSrebrenica and how, after the last Serb attack on the safearea of Sarajevo, a concerted military operation waslaunched to ensure that no such attacks would take placeagain.

5. In reviewing these events, I have in no way soughtto deflect criticism directed at the United NationsSecretariat. Having served as Under-Secretary-General for

Peacekeeping Operations during much of the period underreview, I am fully cognizant of the mandate entrusted tothe United Nations and only too painfully aware of theOrganizations failures in implementing that mandate.Rather, my purpose in going over the background of thefailure of the safe area policy has been to illuminate theprocess by which the United Nations found itself, in July1995, confronted with these shocking events. There is anissue of responsibility, and we in the United Nations sharein that responsibility, as the assessment at the end of thisreport records. Equally important, there are lessons to bedrawn by all of those involved in the formulation andimplementation of international responses to events such

as the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are lessonsfor the Secretariat, and there are lessons for the MemberStates that shaped the internat ional response to the collapseof the former Yugoslavia.

6. Before beginning the account of the events inquestion, it is important to recall that much of the historyof the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina will not be touched


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upon at all in the body of this report. The war began on 6April 1992. Most of the terr itory captured by the Serbs wassecured by them within the first 60 days of the war, beforeUNPROFOR had any significant presence in Bosnia andHerzegovina. During those 60 days, approximately 1

million people were displaced from their homes. Severaltens of thousands of people, most of them BosnianMuslims, were killed. The accompanying scenes ofbarbarity were, in general, not witnessed by UNPROFORor by other representatives of the international community,and do not form a part of this report. In addition, the warin Bosnia and Herzegovina included nine months of openwarfare between the mainly Muslim forces of the BosnianGovernment and the mainly Croat forces of the CroatianDefence Council. This fighting, although important tounderstanding the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, didnot generally involve the sa fe areas that are the centralfocus of this report. The record of that conflict, therefore,

does not appear in this document.7. At the outset, I wish to point out that certain sectionsof this report may bear similarity to accounts of the fall ofSrebrenica that have already appeared in a number ofincisive books, journal ar ticles, and press reports on thesubject. Those secondary accounts were not used as asource of information for this report. The questions andaccount of events which they present, however, wereindependently revisited and examined from the UnitedNations perspective. I hope that the confirmation orclarification of those accounts contributes to the historicalrecord on this subject. I also wish to point out that I have

not been able to answer all the hitherto unansweredquestions about the fall of Srebrenica, despite a sincereeffort to do so.

8. This report has been prepared on the basis of archivalresearch within the United Nations system, as well as onthe basis of interviews with individuals who, in onecapacity or another, participated in or had knowledge ofthe events in question. In the interest of gaining a clearerunderstanding of these events, I have taken the exceptionalstep of entering into the public record information from theclassified files of the United Nations. In addition, I wouldlike to record my thanks to those Member States,

organizations and individuals who provided informationfor this report. A list of persons interviewed in thisconnection is attached as annex 1. While that list is fairlyextensive, time, as well as budgetary and other constraints,precluded interviewing many other individuals who wouldbe in a position to offer important perspectives on thesubject at hand. In most cases, the interviews wereconducted on a non-attribution basis to encourage as

candid a disclosure as possible. I have also honoured therequest of those individuals who provided information forthis report on the condition that they not be identified.

9. All of these exceptional measures that I have takenin preparing this report reflect the importance which Iattach to shedding light on what Judge Riad described asthe darkest pages of human history.


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II. Background

A. Break-up of the Socialist Federal Republicof Yugoslavia and the establishment of the

United Nations Protection Force

10. The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia accelerated in 1991, with declarations ofindependence by the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia on25 June 1991. The then Secretary-General of the UnitedNations, Javier Prez de Cullar, was generally measuredin his reaction to those events, as he later expressed theconcern that early, selective recognition could widen the[ongoing] conflict and fuel an explosive situation,especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina(S/23280, annexIV). The one principal cause for caution was an awarenessthat recognizing the independence of the Yugoslav

republics would leave substantial communities of Serbs andothers as vulnerable minorities in Croatia, the formerYugoslav Republic of Macedonia and, in particular, inBosnia and Herzegovina. This concern was initially sharedby the States members of the European Community, whichestablished a Commission to examine whether Yugoslavrepublics seeking international recognition met a numberof criteria, particularly regarding the constitutionalprotection of minorities. Later, however, these Statesproceeded with recognition of all three Republics despitea concern that only Slovenia and the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia had met the established criteria.

11. Following the declaration of independence bySlovenia, fighting broke out between Slovenian forces andthe predominantly Serb forces of the Yugoslav PeoplesArmy (JNA). The fighting, however, lasted for only 10days, with light casualties on both sides. The conflict endedwith the Brioni agreement of 7 July 1991, and wasfollowed, over the coming months, by the withdrawal ofJNA forces and de facto independence for Slovenia. InCroatia, the fighting was much more serious. Thedeclarat ion of independence led to an increase in the armedclashes which had been taking place for several months,pitting Croatian forces against both the JNA and CroatianSerb militias. These clashes descended into full-scale

warfare in August 1991 and continued until 2 January1992, when a ceasefire was signed in Sarajevo under theauspices of the United Nations. Shortly thereafter, theparties to the conflict in Croatia fully andunconditionally accepted the concept for a UnitedNations peacekeeping operation in Yugoslavia presentedby the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, CyrusVance (the Vance Plan). At the end of this phase of the

fighting in Croatia, Serb forces remained in de factocontrol of approximately one third of the Republic ofCroatia.

12. On 25 September 1991, when the fighting in Croatiawas at its height, the Security Council, by its resolution713 (1991), decided that all States shall, for purposes ofestablishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediatelyimplement a general and complete embargo on alldeliveries of weapons and military equipment toYugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise.The resolution was adopted unanimously, though severalobservers noted at the time that the major effect of theembargo would be to freeze the military holdings of eachof the parties a move which would overwhelminglybenefit the Serbs, who were dominant both in the Yugoslav

military and, to a lesser extent, in the arms industry.13. On 15 February 1992, the then Secretary-General,Boutros Boutros-Ghali (who served in this position from1 January 1992 to 31 December 1996), submitted a reportto the Security Council proposing the establishment of apeacekeeping force to implement the Vance Plan. He madethe following observation:

If it is only now that I am proposing such a force,it [is] because of the complexities and dangers of theYugoslav situation and the consequent need to be assure as possible that a United Nations force wouldsucceed in consolidating the ceasefire and thus

facilitate the negotiation of an overall politicalsettlement. As has been repeatedly stated, thisrequires not only a working ceasefire but also clearand unconditional acceptance of the plan by allconcerned, with equally clear assurances of theirreadiness to cooperate in its implementation ... I havecome to the conclusion that the danger that a UnitedNations peace operation will fail because of lack ofcooperation of the parties is less grievous than thedanger that delay in its dispatch will lead to abreakdown of the ceasefire and to a newconflagration in Yugoslavia. (S/23592, para. 28)

14. The Security Council approved the Secretary-Generals report and, on 21 February, decided, byresolution 743 (1992), to establish a United NationsProtection Force to assist in the implementation of theVance Plan. UNPROFOR headquarters was established inSarajevo on 13 March 1992. Sarajevo was seen, at thattime, as a neutral location, and it was hoped that thepresence of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina would


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prove a stabilizing factor amid the increasing tensions inthe country. Although resolution 743 (1992) provided forUnited Nations military observers to patrol certain limitedareas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, t his was to take placeafter the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected

Areas in Croatia, which did not occur. Until June 1992, theForce had no other mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. Independence of Bosnia and Herzegovinaand the outbreak of war

15. The independence of the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina was recognized by the European Communityon 6 April 1992 and by the United States of America thefollowing day. At the same time, the sporadic fightingwhich had taken place in a number of areas began tointensify. This was exacerbated by the JNA withdrawalfrom Croatia under the terms of the Vance Plan, which hadinvolved the relocation of substantial amounts ofmatriel,particularly heavy weapons, into Bosnia and Herzegovina.Much of this matriel later passed into the hands of theBosnian Serbs.

16. The International Committee of the Red Cross(ICRC) viewed the conflict that had erupted in Bosnia andHerzegovina as having elements both of an internationalarmed conflict (invasion of that country by the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia) and of an internal armed conflict.In its international aspect, the conflict represented a warbetween the JNA (later known as the Army of Yugoslavia,

or VJ) on one side, against both the Army of the Republicof Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the CroatianDefence Council (HVO) on the other. Later in the conflict,another foreign force, the Croatian Army (HV), was alsoinvolved in the fighting. In its internal aspect, the warrepresented a conflict between armed forces associated withthe major nationalities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

17. Bosniacs (known until 1993 as Muslims orBosnian Muslims), who represented 44 per cent ofBosnia and Herzegovinas population of 4.4 million, weredominant in the Army of the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina. The ARBiH, officially established on 15

April 1992, was made up, ab initio, of a number ofelements: territorial defence units, police forces,paramilitary forces and criminal elements. It enjoyed anadvantage in manpower over the other forces in theconflict, but was poorly equipped and largely untrained.Prior to April 1993, when fighting broke out betweenBosniacs and Croats, the ARBiH was able to secure alimited amount of military matriel from foreign

supporters via Croatia. The Croats, who constituted 17 percent of the population, were dominant in the HVO. Thisforce also brought together territorial defence units, policeforces, paramilitaries and certain prominent criminals.Unlike the ARBiH, however, the HVO enjoyed the backing

of the Republic of Croatia, which provided a broad rangeof support.

18. Ranged against these forces were the rump JNA (theregular army of the Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia), the Army of Republika Srpska, known tothe international community as the Bosnian Serb Army(BSA), and their paramilitary associates. All of these forceswere dominated by Serbs, who constituted 31 per cent ofthe population of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The JNAofficially withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina to theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia under internationalpressure on 10 May 1992. In fact, however, the withdrawal

was largely cosmetic since the JNA left behind thoseunits whose members were nationals of Bosnia andHerzegovina. General Mladi A , Commander of JNA forcesin Bosnia and Herzegovina, was restyled Commander ofthe BSA. Throughout the war that was to follow, the BSAremained closely associated with the JNA/VJ and with theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, on which the BSA reliedformatriel, intel ligence, funds and other forms of support.The Serb paramilitary groups, which included a substantialcriminal element, often operated in close cooperation withthe regular armies of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs.

19. The conflict between these forces differed fromconventional warfare in important ways. First, much of thefighting was local, involving regular and irregular fightersoperating close to their homes. Second, a central objectiveof the conflict was the use of military means to terrorizecivilian populations, often with the goal of forcing theirflight in a process that came to be known as ethniccleansing. Third, although several hundred thousand menwere engaged for three and a half years, and althoughseveral tens of thousands of combatants were killed, theconflict was more often one of attr ition, terror, gangsterismand negotiation than it was of high-intensity warfare.

C. Humanitarian activities

20. The Office of the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees (UNHCR) was the lead agency forinternational humanitarian activities in Bosnia andHerzegovina, establishing a significant presence in thecountry almost as soon as the conflict erupted. UNHCRconvoys distributed food aid, shelter materials and


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winterization supplies, seeds, clothing and otherhumanitarian goods to the authorities of all threecommunities. The local authorities then distributed thosegoods to the local populations (inevitably diverting acertain amount to the various military forces and to the

black market).21. From the outset, the Serbs restricted the flow ofhumanitarian aid to Srebrenica and to other isolatedBosniac communities. Humanitarian convoys weresubjected to onerous clearance procedures and to otherforms of harassment and obstruction. The Serbs did not,apparently, intend to starve the Bosniac enclavesaltogether, but rather to reduce them to conditions ofextreme privation. From this regime of privation the Serbsconsolidated their control over the enclaves. They (andsome counterparts in the other communit ies) also derivedeconomic advantage from this system by initiating black

market trade with the surrounded Bosniacs.22. UNHCR delivered an average of approximately 750tons of humanitarian aid per day to Bosnia andHerzegovina for the durat ion of the war, but much of thiswent to areas to which the Serbs did not control access. Inthe Bosniac enclaves, UNHCR was rarely able to meet theneeds of the population. Even when basic food suppliescould be delivered to those places, other items required tosupport the humanitarian needs of the population,including medical equipment and emergency sheltermaterials, were often blocked altogether. Althoughstarvation was almost unknown in the war in Bosnia andHerzegovina, the Bosniac enclaves did endure sustainedperiods of material deprivation and psychologicalsuffering.

23. In July 1992, UNHCR, building on the airportagreement brokered by UNPROFOR on 5 June (see para.27 below), began a humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo. TheSerbs, however, controlled the use of Sarajevo airport, andthus the restrictions which applied to road convoys alsoapplied, in considerable measure, to the Sarajevo airlift.In February 1993 the relief supplies brought by UNHCRroad convoys and airlift began to be supplemented by aprogramme of air drops. French, German and United Statestransport aircraft flew 2,735 sorties, dropping

humanitarian aid to BihaA

, Gora de, Srebrenica, epaand other isolated areas to which convoy access wasrestricted. Threats to the security of the aircraft ended theprogramme in August 1994, by which time almost 18,000tons of aid had been delivered in this way, providing adegree of relief to the most vulnerable communities.

D. Proposals for a peacekeeping mission inBosnia and Herzegovina

24. When fighting broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina,the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to

explore the feasibility of a United Nations peacekeepingoperation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General accordingly dispatched to the region his thenUnder-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations,Marrack Goulding, who remained in the region from 4 to10 May 1992. Referring to the situation in Sarajevo afterMr. Gouldings visit, the Secretary-General reported to theCouncil, on 12 May 1992, as follows:

The city suffers regular heavy shelling and sniperfire nightly, and intermittent shelling at other times,often on a random basis, from Serb irregulars in thesurrounding hills, who use mortars and light artillery

allegedly made available to them by JNA .... Even ona day when the shelling is light there is no publictransport, few people go to work and the streets arelargely deserted. The citys civilian airport is closed.Economic life is at a standstill and there are growingshortages of food and other essential supplies owingto the blockade imposed on the city by Serb forces ... .Intense hostilities are taking place elsewhere in theRepublic, notably in Mostar and the Neretva valley...; in Bosanska Krupa ...; and in eastern Bosnia.

All international observers agree that what ishappening is a concerted effort by the Serbs of

Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the acquiescence of,and at least some support from, JNA, to createethnically pure regions in the context ofnegotiations on the cantonization of the Republic.... The techniques used are the seizure of territoryby military force and the int imidation of the non-Serbpopulation. The conclusion of a ceasefire agreementbetween Croat and Serb leaders on 6 May 1992 hasrevived suspicions of a Croat-Serb carve-up of Bosniaand Herzegovina, leaving minimal territory to theMuslim community, which accounts for a pluralityof the population. Further concern has been causedby the decision of the Belgrade authorities to

withdraw from Bosnia and Herzegovina by 18 Mayall JNA personnel who are not citizens of thatRepublic. This will leave in Bosnia and Herzegovina,without effective political control, as many as 50,000mostly Serb troops and their weapons. They are l ikelyto be taken over by the Serb party.


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The fighting and intimidation have led to massivedisplacement of civilians .... The internationalcommunitys efforts to bring succour to thesesuffering people are greatly obstructed by the warringparties whose demographic objectives they may

frustrate. Freedom of movement is virtually non-existent: a recent UNHCR convoy had to negotiateits way through 90 roadblocks between Zagreb andSarajevo, many of them manned by undisciplined anddrunken soldiers of undetermined political affiliat ionand not responsible to any identifiable centralauthority. Relief supplies are stolen, vehicleshijacked and international aid workers threatenedand abused.(S/23900, paras. 3-6)

25. The Secretary-General noted that Mr. Goulding hadconsulted with representatives of the different communitiesand found that President Alija Izetbegovi A and Fikret

AbdiA

(both Bosnian Muslims) and Mariofil LjubiA

(aBosnian Croat) had supported an immediate UnitedNations intervention. President IzetbegoviA had supporteda peace-enforcement operation, to restore order. Mr.Goulding had also met with Radovan Karad i A and otherSerb leaders, who saw no role for a United Nationspeacekeeping force at the time, though he and PresidentFranjo Tudjman of Croatia had not excluded a possiblerole for United Nations peacekeepers in helping toimplement the constitutional agreement which [was]expected to emerge from the peace process sponsored bythe European Community (S/23900, para. 17).

26. The Secretary-General concluded as follows:

The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is tragic,dangerous, violent and confused. I do not believe thatin its present phase this conflict is susceptible to theUnited Nations peacekeeping treatment. Anysuccessful peacekeeping operat ion has to be based onsome agreement between the hostile parties. Such anagreement can range from a simple ceasefire to acomprehensive settlement of their dispute. Withoutan agreement of some sort, a workable mandatecannot be defined and peacekeeping is impossible ....

It also has to be observed that a successfulpeacekeeping operation requires the parties to respectthe United Nations, its personnel and its mandate.One of the more distressing features of the currentsituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is that, for alltheir fair words, none of the parties there can claimto satisfy that condition .... These are not theconditions which permit a United Nations

peacekeeping operation to make an effectivecontribution. (S/23900, paras. 25-26)

27. The Security Council then asked the Secretary-General to take on some limited functions in the Sarajevo

area. In resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, by whichit also imposed sweeping economic sanctions on theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council requested theSecretary-General to continue to use his good offices inorder to achieve the conditions for unimpeded delivery ofhumanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and elsewhere,including the establishment of a security zoneencompassing Sarajevo and its airport. The Secretary-General reported to the Security Council on 6 June thatUNPROFOR had negotiated an agreement, the previousday, on the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarianpurposes. Under the terms of the agreement, UNPROFORwas asked to take on full operational responsibili ty for thefunctioning and security of Sarajevo airport. The Secretary-General expressed the view that the agreement representeda significant breakthrough in the tragic conflict inBosnia and Herzegovina, although it was only a first step,and added:

It is my view that the opportunity afforded by thewillingness of the parties to conclude the presentagreement should be seized .... Given that heavyweapons will remain in the hills overlookingSarajevo and its airport, albeit supervised byUNPROFOR, the viability of the agreement willdepend on the good faith of the parties, and

especially the Bosnian Serb party, in scrupulouslyhonouring their commitments ....

I accordingly recommend to the Security Councilthat it take the necessary decision to enlarge themandate and strength of UNPROFOR, as proposedin the present report. It is to be hoped that this willbe the first stage of a process that will restore peaceto the long-suffering Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina. (S/24075, paras. 11 and 13)

28. The Secretary-General proposed the immediatedeployment of United Nations military observers to theairport, to be followed by an UNPROFOR infantry

battalion. This was approved by the Security Council in itsresolution 758 (1992) of 8 June, marking the formalbeginning of the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia andHerzegovina.

E. The peace process


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29. For much of the war in the former Yugoslavia theeffort to negotiate a political settlement to the conflict wasconducted under the auspices of the InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavia, established by theConference on the Former Socialist Federal Republic of

Yugoslavia, held in London on 26 and 27 August 1992(hereinafter referred to as the London Conference). TheSecretary-General, in November 1992, described theInternational Conference as:

an innovative enterprise combining the efforts of theUnited Nations and the European Community (EC),as well as other international organizations such asthe Conference on Security and Cooperation inEurope (CSCE) and the Organization of the IslamicConference (OIC) .. .. [It] combines active preventivediplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and also hasa potential peace enforcement component. (S/24795,

para. 1)The Steering Committee of the International Conferenceon the Former Yugoslavia was ini tially chaired jointly byCyrus Vance, representing the Secretary-General of theUnited Nations, and David Lord Owen, representing thePresidency of the European Community.

30. Building on the Statement of Principles adopted bythe London Conference, the International Conferencedeveloped the basis for a political settlement to the conflict :

The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina isinextricably intermingled. Thus there appears to beno viable way to create three territorially distinct

States based on ethnic or confessional principles.Any plan to do so would involve incorporating a verylarge number of the members of the otherethnic/confessional groups, or consist of a numberof separate enclaves of each ethnic/confessionalgroup. Such a plan could achieve homogeneity andcoherent boundaries only by a process of enforcedpopulation transfer which has already beencondemned .... Consequently, the Co-Chairmen havedeemed it necessary to reject any model based onthree separate, ethnic/confederally based States.Furthermore, a confederation formed of three suchStates would be inherently unstable, for at least twowould surely forge immediate and strongerconnections with neighbouring States ....

The Co-Chairmen also recognized ... that acentralized state would not be accepted by at leasttwo of the principal ethnic/confessional groups inBosnia and Herzegovina, since it would not protect

thei r interests in the wake of the bloody strife thatnow sunders the country.

Consequently, the Co-Chairmen believe that theonly viable and stable solution that does notacquiesce in already accomplished ethnic cleansing,and in further internationally unacceptable practices,appears to be the establishment of a decentralizedstate.(S/24795, paras. 36-38)

31. The Co-Chairmen unveiled their draft plan to end theconflict, which became known as the Vance-Owen PeacePlan, on 2 January 1993. That plan consisted of three parts:a set of constitutional principles which would haveestablished a decentralized state of Bosnia andHerzegovina; military provisions, which provided for aceasefire and the eventual demilitarization of the wholecountry; and a map delineating 10 provinces. (See the mapat the end of this chapter.) The 10 provinces were drawn

largely to reflect the areas in which the three communit ieshad lived before the war, thus substantially reversing theprocess of ethnic cleansing. Each community would haveconstituted a majority in three provinces, with Sarajevo,the tenth province, having no majority. None of thecommunities would have had a compact territory, and theSerbs would have been divided in to five unconnected areas,effectively ending their hopes of seceding from Bosnia andHerzegovina. The objections of Serb leaders werereportedly focused on Province 5, which would have hada Bosniac majority. That province included not onlySrebrenica and epa but also most of the areas of easternBosnia recently ethnical ly cleansed by the JNA, the BSAand their paramilitary associates. When the Vance-OwenPeace Plan was presented, the BSA was in control ofroughly 70 per cent of the country. The land area of theprovinces with Serb majorities proposed under the PeacePlan would have represented 43 per cent of the terri tory ofBosnia and Herzegovina, requiring the Serbs to withdrawfrom over one third of the land they then held. This planwas strongly criticized by the United States and thereforenever explicitly endorsed by the Security Council, whichgave guarded encouragement to the Vance-Owen peaceprocess instead.

32. Representatives of the Croat community accepted the

Vance-Owen Peace Plan immediately. However,representatives of the other two communities were notsatisfied, and some negotiated adjustments were made overthe following months. Representatives of the threecommunities met at United Nations Headquarters in NewYork from 16 to 25 March 1993, just as the first crisis inSrebrenica was coming to a head. The Bosniac and Croatrepresentatives signed the modified version of the plan on


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25 March. The Serb representatives did not sign. Followingconcerted international pressure on President Miloevi Aof Serbia, Mr. Karad i A was induced to sign on behalf ofthe Bosnian Serbs at a meeting held in Athens on 2 May.Mr. Karad i A s signature, however, was affixed subject

to approval by the National Assembly of RepublikaSrpska, which, at a session held at Pale on 5 and 6 May1993, rejected the Plan.

F. Srebrenica prior to the safe arearesolutions

33. Srebrenica lies in a mountain valley in easternBosnia, close to the border with Serbia. At the time of the1991 census, the municipali ty had a population of 37,000,of which 73 per cent were Bosniacs and 25 per cent wereSerbs. Despite the preponderance of Bosniacs in the pre-war population, Serb paramilitaries from Srebrenica, andfrom other parts of eastern Bosnia, held Srebrenica forseveral weeks at the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia andHerzegovina. During this period, Bosniacs from thegeneral area of Srebrenica were not only expelled fromtheir homes in many areas, but were also subjected to stillmore serious abuses. In Bratunac, a Bosniac-majority townsome 10 km north of Srebrenica, for example, severalhundred Bosniacs were detained in a local school, wherea large number, including a local imam, were subjected toinhumane treatment and killed. Armed Bosniacs fled to thesurrounding hills during this period.

34. By 6 May 1992 those Bosniacs had regrouped andbegun to contest Serb control of Srebrenica. Goran Zeki A ,a leader of the Serb community in Srebrenica, was killedin an ambush on 8 May, and soon thereafter Serbs beganto flee the town or were driven out. The town was securedby the Bosniacs on 9 May. The Bosniac forces which tookcontrol of Srebrenica comprised several groups of fighterswithout any definite military structure. The most powerfulof these groups was that under the command of Naser Ori Aof PotoC ari. Other groups continued to operate with adegree of independence, however, and violent rivalrybetween different factions within the Bosniac communitybecame a feature of Srebrenica life until its fall in 1995.

35. The Bosniac enclave which centred on Srebrenicawas then expanded under Ori A s leadership over a periodof several months into the surrounding areas. For the mostpart, the fighting that took place during this period was notregular warfare, but rather a series of raids and counter-raids by armed groups of one or the other community. Asthe Bosniacs advanced, they used techniques of ethnic

cleansing similar to those used by the Serbs in other areas,burning houses and terrorizing the civilian population.Serb sources claim that over 1,300 people were killed byBosniac fighters as they expanded out of Srebrenica, withmuch larger numbers being displaced from their homes.

Serb sources and international human rights observers havereported incidents in which Serbs were apparently torturedand mutilated.2 At the same time, much larger numbers ofBosniacs were suffering similar fates in areas whichremained under Serb control.

36. Bosniac forces from Srebrenica linked up with thoseof epa, a small Bosniac-held village in the denselywooded area to the south of Srebrenica, in September 1992.The Srebrenica enclave reached its greatest extent inJanuary 1993, when it was joined to the nearby Bosniacenclave of Cerska, to the west of Srebrenica. At its greatestextent the Srebrenica enclave covered almost 900 km2 of

territory in eastern Bosnia. Despite this expansion, theenclave was never joined to the main body of Government-held ter ritory further west, leaving it vulnerable to isolationand at tack by Serb forces.3

37. Bosniac forces attacked out of the enclave against theSerb-inhabited village of Kravica on 7 January 1993. Serbsources claimed that over 40 Serb civilians were killed inthe attack. Soon after the attack on Kravica, Serb forcesbegan to prepare a counter-offensive. By March 1993, Serbforces were advancing rapidly, killing and burning as theydid so. The villages of Konjevi A Polje and Cerska weresoon overrun, and ultimately the population of thosevillages, together with the remaining pre-war inhabitantsof Srebrenica, numbering 50,000 to 60,000 in total, wascompressed into a mountainous area of approximately150 km2 centred on the town of Srebrenica. During thesame offensive epa was separated from Srebrenica by anarrow corridor of Serb-held land, becoming an isolatedenclave of its own. epa remained isolated until it wasoverrun by the Serbs after the fall of Srebrenica in July1995.

38. A number of people, Bosniacs and foreign journalistsalike, carr ied news of the desperate situation in Srebrenicato Sarajevo and the outside world, prompting theCommander of UNPROFOR forces in Bosnia and

Herzegovina to travel there with a small UNPROFOR partyon 11 March 1993. By the time he arrived in Srebrenica,the town was already enduring siege conditions. There wasalmost no running water, the Serbs having destroyed thetowns water supply as they advanced. Likewise, there wasno electricity, other than that produced by a number ofhand-crafted water wheels. Overcrowding was a majorproblem, with schools, office buildings and all other


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structures having been emptied to make way for successivewaves of displaced persons fleeing before the Serb advance.There was no starvation, but food was in short supply andpublic hygiene was rapidly deteriorating. An atmosphereof panic was endemic. The UNPROFOR Commander was

initially prevented by the local inhabitants from leaving,but was allowed to do so on 13 March. Prior to depart ing,he addressed a public gathering in Srebrenica, telling themthat they were under United Nations protection and that hewould not abandon them.4

39. During the weeks that followed, UNHCR succeededin bringing a number of humanitarian aid convoys intoSrebrenica and in evacuating large numbers of vulnerablepeople to the relative safety of the Government-held cityof Tuzla. These evacuations were, in general, opposed,sometimes forcibly, by the Bosnian Government authoritiesin Sarajevo who felt that they contributed to the ethnic

cleansing of the terri tory. The evacuations were supportedby the Bosnian Serbs, who were willing to allow UNHCRto send empty trucks to Srebrenica to collect evacuees, butwho were reluctant to allow humanitarian aid into theenclave. The Special Envoy of the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees stated that he supported theevacuations as a measure of last resort to save lives.

40. The first UNHCR convoy entered the town on 19March 1993, just as Bosniac, Croat and Serb leaders weremeeting in New York to discuss the Vance-Owen PeacePlan, and returned to Tuzla the next day with over 600Bosniac civilians. A second convoy reached Srebrenica on28 March. Six people died as an estimated 1,600 peoplescrambled on to the trucks as they prepared to return toTuzla on 29 March; seven more died in the overcrowdedvehicles as they made their way to Tuzla. A similar sceneof mass panic and death occurred following the arr ival inSrebrenica of a th ird UNHCR convoy on 31 March. Nearly3,000 women and children, as well as old men, wereevacuated in 14 trucks, with six deaths caused either byovercrowding or by exposure to the elements. On 2 April,the Bosniac authorities in Srebrenica announced that nomore evacuations would be permitted. Despite objectionand obstruction by the authorities, some further UNHCRevacuations did take place, albeit on a restricted scale. On

8 April, two days after the Serbs had cut the main freshwater supply to Srebrenica, approximately 2,100 peopledefied the local authorities, forcing their way on to 14trucks. On 13 April , a further 800 people were evacuated.By the time the evacuations stopped altogether, at the endof April 1993, some 8,000 to 9,000 people had beentransported to safety in Tuzla. Interviewed in connectionwith this report, President Izetbegovi A stated that, with the

benefit of hindsight, the policy of his Government torestr ict evacuations from the Srebrenica enclave had beenmistaken.


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III. Adoption of Security Council resolutions 819 (1993), 824 (1993)and 836 (1993)

A. Minimal consensus within the Security

Council

41. As the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovinadeteriorated, the activity of the Security Council increased.During the 18-month period from the opening of full-scalehostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 April 1992 to5 October 1993, 47 Security Council resolutions wereadopted and 42 statements of the President of the Councilwere issued on matters relating to the conflict in the formerYugoslavia. The majority of them dealt directly with theconflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. To this date, no issuein the history of the Security Council has engendered moreresolutions and statements over a comparable period.

42. Despite this unprecedented flow of resolutions andstatements, however, consensus within the SecurityCouncil was limited. There was general agreement on theneed for action, but less agreement as to what action wasappropriate. The Secretary-General under stood that theCouncil was able to reach consensus on three broad areas,namely, the need to alleviate the consequences of the war;the need to contain the conflict; and the need to promotethe prospects for a negotiated peace settlement. Until thattime, the following measures had been taken to addressthese three needs:

(a) Efforts to alleviate the human suffering caused

by the conflict included a progressive expansion of theUNPROFOR mandate to support the delivery ofhumanitarian assistance to people in need, by land and air;

(b) Efforts to contain the conflict and mitigate itsconsequences included the imposition of an arms embargoon all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.(Security Council resolution 713 (1991), imposing the armsembargo, was adopted unanimously on 25 September1991.) This policy was later expanded, by Councilresolution 781 (1992), to include a ban on military flightsin the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(c) Efforts to promote the prospects for a negotiated

peace settlement included the negotiation of localceasefires and other arrangements to stabilize the situationon the ground while peace talks continued under theauspices of the International Conference on the FormerYugoslavia.

43. Relatively early in the conflict, a discernible patternof decision-making emerged in the Security Council. Those

countries which opposed lifting the arms embargo

committed increasing numbers of troops to UNPROFOR,but resisted efforts to expand the UNPROFOR mandate insuch a way as to bring the Force into direct militaryconfrontation with the Bosnian Serbs. Those countrieswhich favoured more robust action, but which did not havetroops on the ground, sought progressively to expand theUNPROFOR mandate and to use the Force directly toconfront the Serbs. The result was the deployment byFrance, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and NorthernIreland and others of forces which were largely configuredand equipped for traditional peacekeeping duties ratherthan enforcement action. At the same time, in an effort tofind some consensus in the Council, resolutions were

adopted in which some of the more robust languagefavoured by non-troop-contributing nations wasaccommodated. Chapter VII of the Charter was invokedwith increasing frequency, though often without specifyingwhat that implied in terms of UNPROFOR operations. Inthis way, the efforts of Member States to find compromisebetween divergent positions led to the UNPROFORmandate becoming rhetorical ly more robust than the Forceitself. During the 18-month period of maximum SecurityCouncil activity on this issue, Bosnian Serb forces operatedalmost unchecked; by the time the confrontation linestabilized, in mid-1993, approximately 2 million people,or one half of the total population of Bosnia and

Herzegovina, had fled their homes or been expelled.44. Yasushi Akashi, who was appointed SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General in January 1994,later wrote:

With a consensus absent in the Council, lacking astrategy, and burdened by an unclear mandate,UNPROFOR was forced to chart its own course.There was only limited support for a robustenforcement policy by UNPROFOR. UNPROFORthus chose to pursue a policy of relatively passiveenforcement, the lowest common denominator onwhich all Council members more or less agreed. 5

B. The concept of safe areas

45. One of the proposals which emerged during thissearch for compromise within the Security Council was toestablish security zones, safe havens and protected


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areas for the Bosniac population. In his remarks to theLondon Conference of 26 and 27 August 1992, thePresident of the International Committee of the Red Cross,Cornelio Sommaruga, stated that the internationalcommunity had a vital role to play. Forced transfers,

harassment, arrests and killings must cease at once, hestated. He added that a haven would have to be found forsome 10,000 detainees already visited by ICRC in northernand eastern Bosnia. He then asked delegates whether or notthey would consider establishing protected zones as oneof several options for addressing the humanitarian crisisin Bosnia and Herzegovina. In October 1992 ICRC issueda paper in which it stated: The present situation calls forthe creation of zones ... which need internationalprotection. ICRC spoke of the need to protect threatenedcommunities in their places of residence. For thisprotection to be effective, the parties to the conflict mustfacilitate the deployment of UNPROFOR contingents, and

the United Nations forces mandate must be expanded.6

46. Some representatives of the United Nations were alsosupportive at this early stage. In his report on the situationof human rights in the terr itory of the former Yugoslavia,dated 27 October 1992, the Special Rapporteur on humanrights in the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki,concluded that a large number of displaced persons wouldnot have to seek refuge abroad if their security could beguaranteed and if they could be provided with bothsufficient food supplies and adequate medical care. In thiscontext the concept of security zones within the territoryof Bosnia and Herzegovina should be actively pursued

(E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10, para. 25 (b)).47. Austria, which was then serving as a non-permanentmember of the Security Council, was the first MemberState to pursue actively the possibility of establishing safeareas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In general, thepermanent members of the Security Council were notsupportive, and the first set of discussions on this issue ledonly to a carefully worded paragraph in resolution 787(1992) of 16 November 1992, inviting the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Office of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees and otherrelevant international humanitar ian agencies, to study the

possibility of and the requirements for the promotion ofsafe areas for humanitarian purposes.

48. Almost immediately, a number of problems becameapparent. First , if they were to function effectively, the safeareas would have to be established with the consent of theparties; that consent, however, might not be forthcoming.Second, the concept advanced by the humanitarianagencies was of zones occupied entirely by civilians, open

to all ethn ic groups and free of any military activity. Suchzones would by definition have to be demilitarized, but nodemilitarized zones of this nature existed in the country.Third, whether or not the safe areas were demilitarized,UNPROFOR would likely have to protect them, requir ing

substantial new troop contributions, which might also notbe forthcoming. Fourth, the establishment of safe areasimplied that other areas would not be safe, and not beprotected, inviting Serb attacks on them. The co-Chairmenof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,Lord Owen and Mr. Vance, began to air these problemspublicly. Lord Owen stated, towards the end of November1992, that he felt the proposals for the establishment ofsafe areas were flawed in concept. Repeating a similarmessage the following month, Mr. Vance told the SecurityCouncil that, in his view, the establishment of safe areaswould encourage further ethnic cleansing.

49. The United Nations High Commissioner forRefugees, Sadako Ogata, expressed caution on the subjectin her letter to the Secretary-General dated 17 December1992. She supported the general principle that securityshould be provided in situ, and that peacekeepers shouldbe deployed to provide mil itary protection for persecutedgroups. She believed, however, that the safe area conceptshould only be a last option. She voiced particularconcern about the possible reaction of the parties to theconflict, which were either opposed to the concept, orwanted to use it to further their own military objectives.She also noted that some capacity for enforcement actionby the international community would be required, and

even then the complete preservation of security would bedoubtful. She concluded by saying that in the absence ofa political settlement, protracted camp-like situationswould risk being perpetuated.

50. The Secretariat agreed that, for the safe areas to beviable, the United Nations would have to exercise somepolitical control over the local authorities, to ensure thatthey took no action (such as using the zones as bases fromwhich to launch military operations) which would increasethe risk of attacks against them. The Secretariatanticipated, however, that it would be very difficult toexercise such control. It also questioned whether

traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement would besufficient to discourage any violations of the safe areas.

51. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR opposed theconcept of establishing safe areas other than by agreementbetween the belligerents. He was concerned that the natureof the safe area mandate which was being proposed wouldbe inherently incompatible with peacekeeping. He did notoppose the principle of protecting the Bosnian Government


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and its armed forces against Serb attack, but opined thatthere could be no role for peacekeepers in such anoperation. Protecting the safe areas, in his view, was a jobfor a combat-capable, peace-enforcement operation. Hesummarized his position in a communication to the

Secretariat, stating, one cannot make war and peace at thesame time.

C. Security Council resolution 819 (1993)

52. Before the Security Council had time to finalize itsposition on the concept of safe areas, events on the grounddemanded further action. The High Commissioner forRefugees wrote to the Secretary-General on 2 April 1993that the people of Srebrenica were convinced that theBosnian Serbs [would] pursue their military objective togain control of Srebrenica (S/25519). She noted that

evacuation of non-combatants from Srebrenica was oneoption, and that these people were desperate to escape tosafety because they see no other prospect than death if theyremain where they are. She stressed, however, that theBosnian Government authorities were opposed tocontinued evacuation of people, which they see as designedto empty the town of its women and children in order tofacilitate a subsequent Serbian offensive. Under thecircumstances, Mrs. Ogata concluded:

I believe we are faced with two options, if we are tosave the lives of the people trapped in Srebrenica.The first is to immediately enhance international

presence, including that of UNPROFOR, in order toturn the enclave into an area protected by the UnitedNations, and inject life-sustaining assistance on ascale much greater than being permitted at themoment. ... Fail ing that, the only other option wouldbe to organize a large-scale evacuation of theendangered population in Srebrenica. (S/25519)

53. The Secretary-General transmitted the HighCommissioners letter to the Security Council, after whichextended consultations took place among the members ofthe Council. Broadly, the members of the Council that weremembers of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,represented principally by Pakistan and Venezuela,proposed strong action to reverse Serb aggression, andinitially favoured two lines of approach: tighteningsanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, andlifting the arms embargo established under Councilresolution 713 (1991) as it applied to the Government ofBosnia and Herzegovina. Explaining the latter proposal,the non-aligned countries argued that the embargo was

hampering the r ight to self-defence of the Government ofBosnia and Herzegovina.

54. The non-aligned countries tabled a draft resolutionto this effect, which the President of the Council decidedwould be put to the vote on 26 April . Events on the ground,however, were overtaking the Security Councilsconsultations. On 13 April 1993, Serb commandersinformed the representative of UNHCR that they wouldenter Srebrenica within two days unless the townsurrendered and its Bosniac populat ion was evacuated.7 On16 April, the Secretary-Generals Special Political Adviser,Chinmaya Gharekhan (who represented the Secretary-General in the Security Council), informed the Council thathe had been in contact with the Force Commander ofUNPROFOR and that United Nations military observersstationed in Srebrenica had reported that the town had notyet fallen, but that the authorities there had offered to

surrender on three conditions, namely, that the woundedsoldiers be airlifted out; that all civilians be evacuated; andthat safe passage be guaranteed to all military personnel,who would walk to Tuzla.

55. There was considerable confusion in the SecurityCouncil, with the representative of one Member Stateindicating that he had heard from national sources thatSrebrenica had already fallen. After extended debate, theCouncil on 16 April adopted a draft resolution tabled bythe non-aligned members, as resolution 819 (1993) inwhich it demanded that all parties and others treatSrebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which shouldbe free from any armed attack or any other hostile act. Italso demanded the immediate cessation of armed attacksby Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against Srebrenica andtheir immediate withdrawal from the areas surroundingSrebrenica, and further demanded that the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia immediately cease the supply ofmilitary arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serbparamilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina. However, no specific restrictions were puton the activities of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia andHerzegovina. Upon learning of the resolution, UNPROFORexpressed concern to the Secretariat that the regime couldnot be implemented without the consent of both parties

which, given Serb dominance, would certainly requireBosnian Government forces to lay down their weapons.

56. The Security Council, although acting under ChapterVII of the Charter, had provided no resources or mandatefor UNPROFOR to impose its demands on the parties.Rather, it requested the Secretary-General, with a viewto monitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area,to take immediate steps to increase the presence of the


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United Nations Protection Force in Srebrenica and itssurroundings.

57. Thus, the Security Council appeared to rule out Mrs.Ogatas evacuation option, and instead condemned andrejected the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb partyto force the evacuation of the civilian population fromSrebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as from otherparts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overallabhorrent campaign of ethnic cleansing.

58. Following the adoption of resolution 819 (1993), andon the basis of consultations with members of the Council,the Secretariat informed the UNPROFOR ForceCommander that, in its view, the resolution, calling as itdid for the parties to take certain actions, created nomilitary obligations for UNPROFOR to establish or protectsuch a safe area.

D. Srebrenica demilitarization agreement of18 April 1993

59. While the Security Council was speaking out stronglyagainst the actions of the Bosnian Serbs, UNPROFOR wasconfronted with the reality that the Serbs were in a positionof complete military dominance around Srebrenica, andthat the town and its population were at r isk. UNPROFORcommanders, therefore, took a different approach from theCouncil, convincing the Bosniac commanders that theyshould sign an agreement in which Bosniac forces wouldgive up their arms to UNPROFOR in return for the promiseof a ceasefire, the insertion of an UNPROFOR companyinto Srebrenica, the evacuation of the seriously woundedand seriously ill, unimpeded access for UNHCR and ICRC,and certain other provisions (see S/25700). Representativesof the Bosnian Government were apparently divided as tohow to proceed. According to General Halilovi A , thenCommander of the ARBiH, President Izetbegovi A was infavour of the UNPROFOR proposal, which, as heunderstood it, meant that the Bosniacs would hand theirweapons over to UNPROFOR in return for UNPROFORprotection.

60. The text of the agreement was negotiated in Sarajevo

on 17 April 1993, and was signed by General Halilovi A andGeneral Mladi A early in the morning of 18 April. TheForce Commander witnessed the agreement on behalf ofUNPROFOR. The agreement laid down the terms underwhich Srebrenica would be demilitarized, though it did notdefine the area to be demilitarized. Halilovi A has sincestated that he understood the agreement to cover only the

urban area of Srebrenica, and not the rural parts of theenclave. UNPROFOR seems also to have understood theagreement in this way. The Serbs, however, did not. Theagreement also called for the deployment of UNPROFORtroops into the area by 1100 hours on 18 April in order to

secure a landing site for helicopters which would evacuatewounded personnel from Srebrenica; for the monitoringof the ceasefire in Srebrenica and those areas outside thetown from which direct fire weapons could be brought tobear; and for the establishment of liaison with authorizedmilitary leaders of both sides.

61. Approximately 170 UNPROFOR troops, principallyfrom the Canadian contingent, deployed into theSrebrenica area on 18 April, establishing a substantialUNPROFOR presence there for the first time. TheCanadian force then proceeded to oversee thedemilitarization of the town of Srebrenica, though not of

the surrounding area. HaliloviA

has stated that he orderedthe Bosniacs in Srebrenica not to hand over any serviceableweapons or ammunit ion. The Bosniacs accordingly handedover approximately 300 weapons, a large number of whichwere non-serviceable; they also handed over a smallnumber of heavy weapons, for which there was nosignificant amount of ammunition. A large number of lightweapons were removed to areas outside the town.

62. The Secretariat informed the Force Commander that,in the light of the views of several Security Councilmembers, he should not pursue the demilitarization processin Srebrenica with undue zeal, ruling out, for example,house-to-house searches for weapons. On 21 AprilUNPROFOR released a press statement entitledDemilitarization of Srebrenica a success. That documentstated that UNPROFOR troops, civilian police andmilitary observers had been deployed in Srebrenica since18 April to collect weapons, ammunitions, mines,explosives and combat supplies and that by noon today theyhad completed the task of demilitarizing the town. Thestatement noted further that almost 500 sick and woundedhad also been evacuated from Srebrenica by helicopters andhumanitarian aid convoys have been entering the townsince Sunday. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR wasquoted as saying, I can confirm that from noon today the

town has been demilitarized .... The [UNPROFOR] teamprepared a final inventory of all the collected weapons andmunitions, which were then destroyed by UNPROFOR.

E. Security Council mission to Srebrenicaand further demilitarization agreement of8 May 1993


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63. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution819 (1993), members of the Council had a rare opportunityto assess the situation on the ground firs t hand, when aSecurity Council mission led by Diego Arria, PermanentRepresentative of Venezuela to the United Nations, arr ivedin Srebrenica on 25 April. On arrival in Srebrenica, themission members noted that whereas the Council inresolution 819 (1993) had demanded that certain steps betaken by the Bosnian Serbs, the UNPROFOR-brokeredagreement of 18 April 1993 had required the Bosniacs todisarm. Confronted with the reality of the situation on theground, the Council members appeared to support theUNPROFOR course of action. In their report submittedshortly upon their return to New York, the members of theSecurity Council mission wrote that the alternat ive couldhave been a massacre of 25,000 people. It definitely was

an extraordinary emergency situation that had promptedUNPROFOR to act .... There is no doubt that had thisagreement not been reached, most probably a massacrewould have taken place, which justifies the efforts of theUNPROFOR Commander (see S/25700). The Councilmembers then condemned the Serbs for perpetrating aslow-motion process of genocide. Comparing theapproach of the Council with that of UNPROFOR, aCanadian UNPROFOR officer told the Council membersthat even though the Security Council is obviously animportant organ of the United Nations it is of noimportance to the Serbs in the area (ibid.).

64. In its report the Security Council mission noted thediscrepancy between the Council resolutions and thesituation on the ground. It stated that even thoughSecurity Council resolution 819 (1993) declared the city[of Srebrenica] a safe area, the actual situation obviouslydoes not correspond to either the spir it or the inten t of theresolution. The mission then stated that Serb forces mustwithdraw to points from which they cannot attack, harassor terrorize the town. UNPROFOR should be in a positionto determine the related parameters. The mission believes,as does UNPROFOR, that the actual 4.5 by 0.5 kms decidedas a safe area should be greatly expanded. How this wasto be done was not indicated. The mission report

recommended that Gora de, epa, Tuzla and Sarajevoalso be declared safe areas, as an act of Security Councilpreventive diplomacy. The report concluded byrecognizing that such a decision would require a largerUNPROFOR presence, a revised mandate to encompassceasefire/safe area monitoring and different rules ofengagement. It proposed the gradual introduction ofmeasures that could, if the Serbs ignored the integrity of

the safe areas, lead to eventual considerat ion of militarystrike enforcement measures.

65. On the ground, events were developing in a differentdirection. The agreement witnessed by the ForceCommander on 18 April was followed by a morecomprehensive agreement on 8 May, in which GeneralHaliloviA and General Mladi A agreed on measures coveringthe whole of the Srebrenica enclave and the adjacentenclave of epa. Under the terms of the new agreement,Bosniac forces within the enclave would hand over theirweapons, ammunition and mines to UNPROFOR, afterwhich Serb heavy weapons and units that constitute amenace to the demilitarized zones which will have beenestablished in epa and Srebrenica will be withdrawn.Unlike the earlier agreement, the agreement of 8 Maystated specifical ly that Srebrenica was to be considered ademilitarized zone, as referred to in article 60 of the

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims ofInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol I).

F. Security Council resolution 824 (1993)

66. As had been the case from 16 to 18 April, theceasefire negotiations of 6 to 8 May took placesimultaneously with consultations of the Security Council.A draft resolution presented by the non-aligned memberswelcomed the recommendations of the Security Councilmission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and proposed

expanding the safe area regime to include the city ofSarajevo, and other such threatened areas, in par ticularthe towns of Tuzla, epa, Gora de and BihaA . Duringthe Security Council consultations of 5 May, the Secretary-Generals Special Political Adviser remarked that theSecretary-General would normally be requested to makerecommendations on the resources he would need to ensurethat the status of those towns as safe areas was respected.He added that UNPROFOR could not be expected to takeon this additional responsibility within its existingresources and that it would need at least one brigade ineach town declared a safe area. Quite simply, he concluded,the Secretary-General did not have the means to implement

the draft resolution.67. On 6 May, members of the Security Council learnedthat the Bosnian Serb Assembly had rejected the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The Council then adopted the draftresolution under discussion as resolution 824 (1993), bywhich it declared that Sarajevo, and other towns, such asTuzla, epa, Gora de and Biha A , should be treated as safe


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areas by all the parties concerned and should be free fromarmed attacks and from any other hostile act. It alsodeclared that in the safe areas the following should beobserved:

(a) The immediate cessation of armed attacks orany hostile act against the safe areas, and the withdrawalof all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units fromthose towns to a distance wherefrom they ceased toconstitute a menace to their security and that of theirinhabitants to be monitored by United Nations militaryobservers;

(b) Full respect by all parties of the rights ofUNPROFOR and the international humanitarian agenciesto free and unimpeded access to all safe areas in theRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and full respect forthe safety of personnel engaged in these operations.

(A map showing the general location of the designated safeareas is included at the end of this chapter.)

68. As in resolution 819 (1993), all of the SecurityCouncils demands in resolution 824 (1993) were directedat the Bosnian Serbs. UNPROFOR, as before, stated thatit could not implement the resolution unless there were anagreement between the parties or unless it were given theresources to enforce it in the face of Serb opposition.References to enforcement measures, which had beenproposed in a draft resolution submitted by members of theMovement of Non-Aligned Countries, however, had notbeen included in the text of resolution 824 (1993). Instead,the Council authorized the Secretary-General to strengthen

UNPROFOR with 50 additional unarmed United Nationsmilitary observers.

69. Noting the discrepancy between the agreement of 8May 1993 that had been negotiated on the ground byUNPROFOR and the resolution concurrently adopted bythe Security Council, the Secretariat explained toUNPROFOR that the Council had laid great emphasis inresolution 824 (1993) on the withdrawal of the BosnianSerbs from their positions threatening the safe areas . TheSecretariat believed that it was essential that UNPROFORreiterate it s determination to ensure the implementationof those parts of the agreement concerning the Serb

withdrawal from around the safe area. The Secretariatadded that the implied sequence in the agreement Government forces disarming first, followed by a Serbwithdrawal later would be unacceptable to the SecurityCouncil.

G. End of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan;moves to strengthen the safe area regime

70. Following the rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan bythe Bosnian Serb Assembly, a referendum was held in

Serb-controlled territory on 15 and 16 May. The Paleauthorities claimed that the result of the referendumoverwhelmingly confirmed the decision of the Assemblyto reject the peace plan, which had been signed by Mr.Karad i A only on the condition of the formersconcurrence. This led to a new round of activity in theinternational community, the focus of which was on howto stabilize the military situation on the ground.

71. On 14 May, the Permanent Representative ofPakistan transmitted to the President of the SecurityCouncil a memorandum containing the views and concernsof the members of the Security Council that were members

of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries with regard tothe situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/25782). Thememorandum presented the argument t hat the safe areaconcept would fail unless the security of those areas wasguaranteed and protected by UNPROFOR. Without thoseguarantees and protection, the memorandum stated, suchsafe areas would provide no help to their inhabitan ts butrather force them into helpless submission. The failureof the international community to use enforcementmeasures, or threaten to use such enforcement measures,would inevitably lead to a much more substantial use offorce in the future. ... We should have all learned the mostimportant lesson in this conflict: that the international

community will not be respected until it decides to takeeffective actions. Referring to UNPROFOR, thememorandum stated that in spite of the fact that the forcewas established under Chapter VII, its functions have beennarrowly interpreted and its focus limited to the provisionof humanitarian assistance and that, too, based on theconsent of the perpetrators of the aggression. Thisrestrictive interpretation, coupled with the denial of theinherent right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to invoke Article51 of the Charter [self-defence], has encouraged the Serbsto continue with their aggression (S/25782, paras. 7-10).

72. The next response was from the Permanent

Representative of France who forwarded a memorandumto the President of the Security Council on 19 May. TheFrench memorandum outlined changes that would have tobe made to the UNPROFOR mandate to give it expressly,more clearly than in resolution 824 (1993), the task ofensuring the security of the safe areas. To this end a newresolution should provide explicitly for the possibility ofrecourse to the [use of] force, by all necessary means


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(S/25800, para . 4). It explained that the general aim of thescheme should be to stop territorial gains by the Serbianforces (ibid., para. 3).

73. In their memorandum the French outlined threeoptions which could be considered, namely:

(a) A light option without formed units;

(b) A light option with formed units;

(c) A heavy option.

The task of UNPROFOR in the first two options would beto deter aggression. The following criteria might triggerthe use of force, determined in a limited way:

(a) Shelling of safe areas by the forces of one of thefactions;

(b) Armed incursions into safe areas;

(c) Impediment of free movement of UNPROFORand protected humanitarian convoys.

74. The French memorandum specified that a symbolicUnited Nations presence would be required in each safearea for the light option without formed units. For thelight option with formed units a brigade (5,000 soldiers)would be required in Sarajevo, plus a battalion (900soldiers) each in Biha A and Tuzla, a battalion dividedbetween Srebrenica and epa, and a battalion dividedbetween Gora de and FoC a. For the heavy option adivision would be required in Sarajevo, and a brigade ineach of the other areas. The memorandum concluded thatthe effective participation on the ground of the United

States and the Russian Federation with the countriesalready involved would confer added credibility to such aconcept of safe areas and might make the light optionssufficient (S/25800, paras. 5-8).

75. A third response came on 22 May, whenrepresentatives of the Governments of France, the RussianFederation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the UnitedStates met in Washington, D.C., agreeing on a joint actionprogramme. The meeting followed an unsuccessful missionto Europe by the United States Secretary of State seekingsupport for a lift and strike policy (i.e., lifting of thearms embargo and striking the BSA from the air). The joint

action programme attempted to bridge the positions of thevarious Governments concerned. Instead of insisting thatthe Serbs accept the Vance-Owen Peace Plan as a completepackage, as earlier statements had done, the programmespoke of building on the Vance-Owen process, andencouraged the parties to the conflict to implementpromptly mutually agreed provisions of the Vance-OwenPlan. The programme referred to the continuation of

humanitarian assistance, to the rigorous enforcement ofsanctions against the Serbs, to the possible sealing of theYugoslav border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, tocontinued enforcement of the no-fly zone, to the rapidestablishment of a war crimes tribunal and to the valuable

contribution that could be made by the concept of safeareas (see S/25829).

76. The joint action programme was strongly criticizedby members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countrieswho objected to the lack of clear commitment to reversingthe consequences of Serbian aggression. Those countriesalso expressed concern about what they saw as theabandonment of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, and wereparticularly sceptical about the advancement of a weak safearea policy as a substitute for more resolute act ion such asthe lifting of the arms embargo.

77. The Security Council then asked the Secretariat to

prepare within 24 hours a working paper on safe areas,which was presented to the Council, the next day, on 28May. That unofficial working paper stated that anyconcept of safe areas must assume the cooperation of thewarring parties. Without a ceasefire in the region of thesafe areas, the concept of safe areas is vir tually impossibleto implement. The paper laid out the argument thatpeacekeeping operations could only succeed with theconsent of the parties, and that the Serbs would certainlynot consent to any arrangement which put UNPROFOR inthe way of their military objectives. Having said that, thepaper then stated that if UNPROFOR is given the task toenforce the establishment of a safe area (i.e., Chapter VII)it is likely to require combat support arms such as artilleryand perhaps even close air support. The Secretariat paperlaid out a number of options for the size and compositionof United Nations units in each safe area, as follows:

(a) Token, predominantly United Nations militaryobservers and United Nations civilian police;

(b) A sizeable United Nations military presence,with a military capability to protect the safe area;

(c) An UNPROFOR presence capable of defendingthe safe area against possible aggression.

The distinction being made between a military capability

to protect t

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