The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

The Darfur Conflict and

Civilian Protection

Conference Report

29-30 January 2007

Cairo, Egypt

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Table of Contents:

1. List of Abbreviations……………………………………………………….…………………..1

2. Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………….2

3. Introduction………………………………………………………………………………………….5

4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions:

4.1 Opening Session……………………………………………………………………………..6

4.2 First Session: Humanitarian Situation in Darfur…………………….......7

4.3 Second Session: Civilian Protection in Darfur……………………………….9

4.4 Third Session: The Future of Humanitarian Intervention………….…12

4.5 Fourth Session: Why the DPA (Abuja) Failed?..........................14

4.6 Fifth Session: The Arab and African Role in Darfur……………………..17 5. Final Session: Conclusions………………………………………………………………….19

6. Annex:

6.1 List of Participants…….…………………………………………………………………..22

6.2 Agenda…………………………………………………………………………………………..29

1. List of Abbreviations:

UN United Nations

AU African Union

SC United Nations Security Council

DPA Darfur Peace Agreement (Abuja, 5 May 2006)

NGO Non-governmental Organization

INGO International Non-governmental Organization

IGO Intergovernmental Organization (including the UN)

IDP Internally Displaced People

MENA Middle East and North Africa

GoS Government of Sudan

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

WFP World Food Program

IHL International Humanitarian Law

AMIS African Mission in Sudan

ICC International Criminal Court

ICJ International Court of Justice

JEM Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur)

SLM Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (Darfur)

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2. Executive Summary:

The conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" was held in

Cairo on 29-30 January, and was initiated by The Cairo Institute for

Human Rights Studies (CIHRS), with support from the Open Society

Institute. A wide range of participants were involved including

governmental, IGO, INGO, NGO, academic and media personnel. The

conference represented the first time officials and representatives from

the GoS and Darfur opposition movements met face-to-face since the

Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) process was concluded in May, 2006.

The conference was organized around five thematic panel presentations,

each followed by an open floor discussion. The five thematic panels were

entitled: (1) Developments Concerning the Humanitarian Situation in

Darfur, (2) Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of the

African Union and United Nations, (3) Perspectives on the Future of

Humanitarian Intervention, (4) Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to

Provide Peace and Security, and (5) Perspectives on the Arab and African

Role Regarding the Situation in Darfur. The conference also included an

"Opening" session and a "Concluding" session.

The presentations and discussions canvassed a wide range of issues

concerning Darfur, with a particular focus on the issues of civilian

protection, the peace process, and humanitarian intervention. An

overarching consensus was expressed that progress concerning all of

these issues remains dependent on finding a political solution to the

underlying causes of the Darfur conflict. While no formal list of

conclusions was proffered during the concluding session, none-the-less, a

convergence of opinion among a large majority of the participants

developed around the three main issues:

A. Civilian Protection in Darfur:

The security of civilians in Darfur, including IDPs and humanitarian aid

workers, is currently the worst it has ever been. There has been a

dramatic increase in attacks on civilians. The unprecedented rise in

pillage of humanitarian supplies and attacks on humanitarian workers over

the last nine months has endangered the viability of all humanitarian

operations within Darfur and eastern Chad. This situation is an extreme

threat to the protection of civilians, as millions of IDPs within these areas

depend on humanitarian aid for their basic subsistence. The GoS,

government supported Janjaweed militias, and, to a lesser extent, rebel

factions in Darfur are all guilty of attacks against civilians and hindering

the delivery of humanitarian aid. However, the burden of responsibility

for the humanitarian crisis primarily rests with the GoS, as the most

powerful actor in Darfur and the sovereign authority in Sudan. Civilian

protection has deteriorated in accordance with and as a result of the

intensified violence and geographical expansion of the Darfur conflict. In

the short term, there is a need for the leaders of the GoS and rebel

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factions to commit themselves to abiding by the rules of International

Humanitarian Law within Darfur, including allowing humanitarian agencies

to carry out their work in a secure and unfettered manner. In the long

term, civilian protection is dependent on two major elements: (1) The

willingness of the GoS and Darfur movements to hold genuine transparent

peace negotiations in which both sides compromise on their most extreme

demands, and protection of civilians is included as an obligatory condition

for all parties, (2) the legal system of Sudan must undergo a holistic

reformation to ensure that the national laws and judicial process' provide

sufficient and fair mechanisms of accountability which end the widespread

practice and culture of impunity that officials and others enjoy within

Sudan, especially for crimes committed within Darfur.

B. The Darfur Conflict and the DPA1:

The causes of the Darfur conflict are rooted in a collusion of resource

competition (especially for fertile land) and ethnic identity. Moreover,

unequal development caused by the central governments unwillingness to

distribute resources to the periphery areas of the country in an equitable

manner is largely responsible for the many internal conflicts within Sudan,

including in Darfur. Since the DPA was signed, the conflict in Darfur has

increased. The DPA failed largely because it neither adequately addressed

nor engendered widespread agreement concerning the issue of resource

management, distribution and control, including local natural resources.

Furthermore, the constant fragmentation, disorganization and lack of

political will for peace among the GoS and rebel factions has lead to an

inability and/or unwillingness among these actors to consistently adhere

to agreed upon obligations. There is a great need for transparent,

inclusive and genuine negotiations between the GoS and rebel factions;

and for non-combative stakeholders to peace in Darfur (ex: local Darfur

communities and tribes) to be involved in this negotiation process.

C. Humanitarian Intervention2:

The use of a UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur must be

considered in light of the deep, complex causes of the conflict. As such,

the use of force for humanitarian intervention in Darfur remains a limited,

short-term solution to the problem. Nonconsensual humanitarian

intervention (i.e. carried out without the consent of the GoS) within Darfur

has the danger of causing further destabilization in Sudan, and the region.

Therefore, any humanitarian action that is taken in Darfur may cause

1 On Friday the 5th of May 2006, the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

(Minni Minawi) signed the Darfur Peace Agreement. This peace agreement, which covers security,

wealth-sharing and power-sharing, was the result of two years of painstaking negotiations mediated by

the African Union (AU). DPA text available in English, Arabic and French at http://www.amis-

sudan.org/dpafull.html 2For the purposes of this report Humanitarian Intervention is referred to as an interference, usually

involving the use of force, in a sovereign state by an outside entity for humanitarian purposes. The

underlying idea being that state sovereignty can be by-passed in order to ease or halt certain forms of

human suffering and/or governmental behavior that contradicts with basic tenements of international

law.

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more harm than good, unless it is carried out in a widely

accepted/supported manner that is in conformity with international law.

Any intervening UN force may have to secure the acceptance of the

Sudanese government to avoid a further escalation and intensification of

the conflict. All efforts should be made to strengthen and support the

existing AU peacekeeping force, AMIS, in Darfur. In this respect, INGOs,

NGOs and others should lobby African governments to increase the size

and strengthen the civilian protection mandate of this force, while at the

same time pressuring the UN to provide generous financial support for its

operation. Furthermore, heavy pressure should continue to be applied on

the GoS to allow for an AU-UN hybrid force in Darfur that can provide

effective civilian protection. Unless the GoS becomes more cooperative in

this matter it is likely that civilian protection in Darfur will continue to

decline. As such, the unconditional support the GoS receives from most

Arab governments and within much of Arab mass media is extremely

irresponsible and unethical. Arab governments have an international legal

obligation and moral duty to do all they can to ensure that international

crimes are not committed against civilians in Darfur, and that the GoS

does all that it can to provide these civilians with protection and security.

This lack of will among Arab governments to apply sufficient pressure on

the GoS is symptomatic of a general lack of knowledge and/or

understanding of the Darfur situation within the Arab world, which often

leads to a rejection or mitigation of the seriousness of the humanitarian

crisis that is occurring.

In addition to the informative and constructive exchange of information

and views that took place, several positive developments occurred during

the conference. First, officials from the GoS and representatives from

some Darfur opposition movements expressed a desire to renew the

peace negotiation process, and to do so in a transparent, inclusive

manner. Second, the GoS renewed its commitment to the Darfur-Darfur

Dialogue process contained within the DPA.3 Third, the GoS welcomed

and pledged cooperation with a proposed Media Mission4 to Darfur to be

undertaken by CIHRS, in cooperation with other organizations. Forth, a

series of cooperative working-groups were established among a variety of

INGOs and NGOs dealing with the Darfur issue.

3 Chapter four in the DPA calls for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation “in which

representatives of all Darfurian stakeholders can meet to discuss the challenges of restoring peace to

their land, overcoming the divisions between communities, and resolving existing problems to build a

common future.” The DDDC was envisioned as a way to build support for the DPA and address

important outstanding issues of reconciliation, reconstruction, and political representation. However,

there is a great deal of confusion about the Dialogue because the DPA does not clearly define its

specific objectives, the process for achieving them, or the mechanism for implementing its outcomes.

Read more at

http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/9390?PHPSESSID=d249ea58b0e88eca1656

aa31f9e1e60d 4 The proposed media mission would allow for a delegation of reporters from Arab media outlets to

visit Sudan and Darfur, and meet up with Sudanese media personnel.

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3. Introduction: On the 29th and 30th of January 2007, the Conference "The Darfur Conflict and Civilian Protection" took place in Cairo, Egypt at the initiative of The Cairo

Institute for Human Rights Studies (www.cihrs.org), with support from the Open

Society Institute. The conference was attended by governmental authorities, parliamentarians, academics and representatives from opposition groups of

Darfur, embassies, the UN, NGOs, INGOs and Arabic media outlets. The majority of participants were INGO and NGO representatives from throughout the North

African and Middle East region, including from Sudan. The conference was scheduled to coincide with the proceedings of the AU summit in Adidas Ababa.

The interventions and presentations of the conference focused on the causes of

the Darfur conflict, with a special emphasis on the lack of civilian protection

within this conflict. Key issues that emerged included the role of local, regional and international actors in providing and promoting civilian protection for IDPs,

humanitarian aid workers and other civilians within Darfur and eastern Chad, the inability of humanitarian aid organizations to deliver aid to displaced peoples due

to the deterioration of the security situation, and the causes of increased conflict within Darfur since the signing of the DPA.

The aims of the conference included:

• To inform and raise awareness among the populations of North African

and Arabic countries concerning the humanitarian crises, especially the lack of civilian protection within Darfur

• To provide a platform for dialogue between Sudanese governmental

authorities, Darfur opposition group representatives, and the IGO, INGO, NGO community

• To pressure Arabic governments to play an active and constructive role in efforts to provide civilian protection within Darfur

• To strengthen and aid in the cooperation/coordination of INGO and NGO advocacy for and research on civilian protection in Darfur,

especially within the Middle East and North African (MENA) region • To provide a platform for information exchange among the IGO, INGO

and NGO community dealing with Darfur, including Sudanese NGOs

• To suggest methods and approaches on how different actors can contribute to strengthening civilian protection in Darfur

• To contribute to efforts to revitalize peace negotiations between the GoS and opposition movements in Darfur

This report contains a summary of the discussions and presentations that took place during the conference, and is not intended as a comprehensive review.

While this document is believed to contain a correct representation of the views

and opinions expressed by the conference participants, the organizers cannot assume any liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or

subsequent use of any of the information herein.

The Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)

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4. Summary of Presentations and Discussions 4.1. Opening Session

Session Panelists: Mr. Bahey el Dien Hassan (Moderator) Director of CIHRS

Mr. Ahmed Haroun Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs

Mr. Kamal el Jozooli Sudanese Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers

Opening Session Summary:

Mr. Jozooli began the session by drawing attention to the fact that the humanitarian situation in Darfur has deteriorated since the signing of the DPA on

5 May 2006, with the conflict becoming more intensified and wide-spread. Several factors have contributed to this deteriorating situation including: 1. The

DPA lacked the support and commitment of most rebel groups within Darfur, 2. The response of the Sudanese government to the situation is more dependent on

external factors (ex: threat of sanctions) then on dealing with the internal

dynamics of the conflict (ex: rebel grievances), 3. The DPA was a product of outside pressure more than internal agreement and compromise. Thus, the crisis

will only improve when the GoS begins a genuine dialogue and bargaining process with Sudanese actors and stakeholders in the conflict.

Minister Haroun acknowledged that the GoS may need to reevaluate their current relationship with civil society groups. He then asserted that the response

of the international civil society and media to the situation in Darfur has become entrenched against the GoS, and lacked sufficient coverage and attention on

crimes committed by rebel groups within Darfur. Security measures and terrorist actions are not distinguished from one another. The GoS seeks peace, and is

ready to negotiate with any party.

Mr. Hassan concluded the session by pointing out the "multiple layers of tragedy" that have contributed to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. The failure of Arab, African, and international efforts to stop the killing in Darfur has resulted in

four years of increased violence and daily atrocities. Rebel groups may share responsibility; however, the GoS bears the greatest responsibility, and lacks the

political will to solve the crisis. A sever lack of responsibility for civilian protection

exists within Sudan and the region at large. In particular, mainstream public opinion in Arab regions seem unconcerned about the victims of crimes when

committed by Arabs/Muslims against Arabs/Muslims, as in Darfur. Such victims seem of no value unless they can be used as tools to denounce foreign

involvement; and any attempt to raise awareness of the situation is met with accusations of imperialist or Zionist plots to replace the Sudanese regime. The

Arab media can only talk about Darfur in terms of conspiracy theories. Over 200,000 dead, mass rapes and 2.5 million refugees—yet none of this has stirred

the Arab conscience. A double-standard exists among the Arab public and

governments: What happed to the regional outrage against the killings and mass rapes of Muslims in Bosnia? Why, when it comes to Darfur, have the Arabic

intellectuals, governments, media and public fallen silent? It is extremely important for the Arab world to put moral pressure on the GoS to conform to

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their legal and moral obligations to protect civilians in Darfur, perhaps even more

important than the political pressure they can exert.

4.2. First Session:

Developments Concerning the Humanitarian

Situation in Darfur

Session Panelists: Hany Megally (Moderator) Director- Middle East Department, International Institute for Transitional Justice

Tamara Refaii

Media Official at ICRC (Red Cross) regional office Mosaad Mohamed Ali

Amal Center for Relief of Torture Victims (Sudan) Bashir Ahmed

Amnesty International Jamie Balfour

Humanitarian Advisor, Oxfam Khaled Mansoor

World Food Program (WFP-UN)

First Session Summary:

Ms. Rafaii began the session by outlining ICRC operations in Darfur and the challenges it faces. The ICRC has a mandate to deliver food, medicine, perform medical procedures, monitor IHL and document the situation. The ICRC project

in Sudan is its largest in the world, comprising 1500 staff and a budget of 73 million dollars. Within Darfur, security and medical care are the largest concerns

of most Sudanese IDPs and civilians. Over the last year the humanitarian situation in Darfur and the ability of the ICRC, and other humanitarian

organizations, to operate effectively have both dramatically worsened. 37 security incidents (ex: attack on workers) disturbed ICRC's ability to operate in

2006. The humanitarian situation in Darfur and the security of aid workers has

never been worse. There are daily violations of IHL, international customary law and basic ethics of warfare in Darfur. Within this context, ICRC and other

humanitarian organizations have no freedom of movement and limited access to IDPs. Without the ability to operate effectively humanitarian organizations can

not alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. As such, the solution to the humanitarian crisis lies in a political process that creates the necessary political

will to stop attacks on humanitarian organizations and civilians.

Mr. Ali then gave a historical overview of the conflict in Darfur. The conflict in Darfur is historically rooted in competition for power and resources between

different tribal and ethnic groups. In Darfur there are 107 tribes, most of these, Arab and African alike, are Muslim. In the 1980's, conflict in the area began to

escalate due in large part to the desertification of northern Darfur. Desertification of this area lead the nomadic Arab tribes of the north to begin encroaching and

seizing pastoral land of African tribes in central Darfur, initially around the Jabal Marra area. Open conflict between these two blocks began and escalated

between 1987-93. During this period 27 Arab tribes united to move against non-

Arabs and drive them off the land. Throughout the late 1990's Arab tribes attacked and burned the homes of the indigenous populations of central and

southern Darfur. This was carried out with the increasing support of the GoS. Many indigenous people began to flee. In the early 2000's, these attacks

increased and the government refused to intervene to prevent them from occurring. Thus, to stop these attacks indigenous groups began forming militias;

forming the basis of the Darfur rebel groups. In response to this armed

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retaliation the GoS began efforts to fragment the indigenous militias while at the

same time providing logistical and financial support to the Arab tribes/militias, including aerial bombardments of villages. The 2003 attack of rebel groups on a

government air base elevated the status of the conflict into what we are now witnessing. It is important to note that not all Arab tribes are aggressors within

the conflict, however, many Arab tribes involved have oriented their attacks to target civilians in an attempt to drive them off the land. These attacks have

been responsible for the destruction of over 2000 villages, and the creation of 4 million refugees. The DPA has had no positive impact on the situation, largely

because many rebel groups never signed it. Some of those that did sign it have

fragmented and are once again fighting. (Mr. Ali later added) The majority of responsibility for the continuing conflict in Darfur lays with the government, in

particular their policies of arming Arab militias and the use of indiscriminate bombing campaigns on villages.

Ms. Bashir Ahmed highlighted the expansion of the Darfur conflict into eastern Chad, and, with it, the exportation of atrocities committed against IDPs

and other civilians. Attacks on civilians by Janjaweed militias crossing into Chad

have increased in intensity and geographical range, at times penetrating 150km into Chad. Such attacks are not only an affront to ethics and international law,

but also contribute to the destabilization of the region. Ms. Ahmed then drew attention to the widespread use of rape as a weapon within the conflict and the

disturbing nature of the atrocities that are committed in Darfur and Chad by reading the testimony of a girl who was brutally raped by the Janjaweed and

forced to watch as they executed 19 men.

Mr. Balfour began by reiterating the unprecedented increase in the level of attacks on humanitarian workers within the last half-year and the deteriorating

access of humanitarian organizations to effected populations, which is worse than at any time during Oxfam's 20 year involvement in Darfur. Large amounts of

humanitarian workers have been evacuated from Darfur due to these attacks. Pillage of property and equipment is a huge problem for humanitarian

organizations. During 2006, 170 vehicles used by humanitarian organizations were hijacked in Darfur and Chad; severely limiting their ability to deliver aid.

Simultaneously, intensified violence has increased the number of displaced peoples by 25% since the signing of the DPA. 120,000 refugees have fled into

eastern Chad. Amid the increasing violence, AMIS, the ill-equipped

undermanned, and under financed AU peacekeeping force in Darfur, has switched into defensive mode, and now provides less protection for civilians than at any

time in its operation. In an unprecedented statement issued on 17 January 2007, UN agencies operating in Darfur have warned that humanitarian operations

in Darfur are on the verge of a complete breakdown.5

Mr. Mansour continued to stress the dire humanitarian crises faced by civilians and humanitarian workers in Darfur. WFP's operation in Darfur is its largest in the world, and attempts to provide food for 3 million people. Many gains made in

providing for the nutritional and sanitation needs of IDPs in Darfur have been under threat especially by the end of 2006. In July 2006 UN humanitarian

organizations were unable to deliver aid to 470,000 people. The reduction of aid services to IDP camps has resulted in a severe deterioration of hygiene

standards, leading to a recent Cholera outbreak that affected 2,700 people.

5UN Joint Statement available in English and Arabic at http://www.unsudanig.org/%2007.pdf

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First Session Open Floor Discussion:

Minister Haroun: The humanitarian crisis in Darfur is a product of the war, and

the rebel groups in Darfur bear full responsibility for the continuation of this war. The GoS does not, and has not been accused of blocking humanitarian supplies

within Darfur.

Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah (Ambassador of Sudan in Egypt): The

internal and border security of Sudan is of the utmost importance to the GoS. International organizations and media must be objective and focus on the crimes

committed by rebels in Darfur.

Other points: • General agreement that the solution is political

• GoS can do and is legally obligated to do more to protect civilians and stop the violence.

• Coverage of Darfur may concentrate on the GoS because the GoS severely

restricts the access of journalists into Darfur. • Important to try to find immediate, practical solutions to alleviate the

humanitarian situation while the political dialogue is in process

4. 3. Second Session:

Proposals for Civilian Protection- Including the Role of

the African Union and United Nations

Session Panelists: Mr. Abdullah Khater (Moderator) Darfurian Writer

Mr. Nadim Hasbany Arab Media Officer, The International Crisis Group (ICG)

Mr. Saleh Mahmoud

Sudanese MP and Human Rights Lawyer Ms. Diedra Clancy

The Darfur Consortium, International Refugee Rights Initiative Ms. Leslie Lefkow

Human Rights Watch

Second Session Summary:

Mr. Nadim Hasbany began by posing the question of where the conflict in Darfur is headed. Could the conflict become just as prolonged as the conflict

between North and South Sudan? A new generation in Darfur is being raised in refugee camps, a fact that damages the chances of a successful peace process

from occurring. The first priority concerning the conflict should be to provide protection for civilians; the second is to ensure that a genuine constructive

political process begins. The international community has failed in its international legal obligation to provide protection for civilians in Darfur. The

Security Council (SC) and the European Union (EU) have been unwilling to impose sanctions regimes, while Arab governments support the GoS against any

type of intervention. The Sudanese government only reacts to strong, concerted

pressure. The Crisis Group recommends targeted sanctions on Sudanese governmental officials. In particular, many individuals in the GoS have been

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acquiring large amounts of private wealth through "secret" companies run by the

government. Target these companies and the oil interests of the Sudanese government to apply immediate pressure on the GoS to stop feeding the conflict

in Darfur, and begin protecting civilians.

Mr. Mahmoud pointed out that the main issue should be the protection of the 4 million displaced peoples, 2 million of which live in refugee camps. In this matter, the GoS has the preponderant responsibility to protect these people

under international law. If the GoS fails to do so, then this responsibility falls to the international community, and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter should be used by

the S.C. to ensure the safety of IDPs in Darfur. Whether you call the situation "ethnic cleansing" or "genocide" does not matter, in both cases the international

community is legally obligated to step in and ensure protection. Some argue it is

only the responsibility of the AU—but AMIS does not have the capability to provide protection. A Commission from the Parliament of Sudan on Darfur

recently reported that AMIS itself has requested the GoS to provide them with protection. As such, the use of UN forces is the only means to provide real

protection for civilians in Darfur. If the international community does not step in then ethnic cleansing will continue to escalate. The GoS's suggestion to

"relocate" IDPs to "safety areas" is another way of furthering ethnic cleansing and should not be accepted. Depopulated areas in Darfur are already being occupied

by non-indigenous migrants. Furthermore, the issue of justice and accountability

is an important tool in efforts to stop the killing. When the ICC first announced its investigation and lists of names were being circulated, there were very little

attacks for 3 months. But after the perpetrators witnessed that nothing concrete was occurring they became convinced that there would be no accountability and

full impunity, so they began attacking the people of Darfur once more.

Ms. Clancy presented several "reflections on the role of the AU" concerning the Darfur situation. When the AU peacekeeping mission, AMIS, was first sent to Darfur their mandate did not include protection of civilians. This mandate was

expanded in October 2004 to include limited protection of civilians, an appropriate measure considering that the AU Constitution includes a "duty to protect" clause.

However, several factors, including the failure to provide sustained civilian protection, allegations that AU soldiers were involved in rape and AMIS's close

cooperation with the GoS, lead people in Darfur to view AMIS with distrust and

resentment. AMIS found itself being rejected by the very people it was supposed to be protecting. SC Resolution 1706, which seemed to call for the gradual

sidelining of AMIS by a UN force, was passed by the SC with minimal AU consultation. Officials at the AU felt marginalized by the Resolution. There is

currently huge confusion concerning what has and has not been agreed to by the GoS concerning the implementation of Resolution 1706. The African Union

Summit is currently in session in Adidas Ababa. It was agreed to at last years AU Summit that Sudan would be given the Chairmanship of the organization this

year. While the AU and AMIS have been criticized, they still have important roles

to play in Darfur. Many are calling on the AU to not allow Sudan to take the Chairmanship, fearing that this would severely damage the ability of the AU to

perform the role of a third-party peace-broker and peacekeeper within the Darfur conflict.

Ms. Lefkow's intervention concentrated on the role that accountability and justice can and should play in efforts to provide protection for civilians in Darfur.

Intervention by an international organization or force has a limited ability to

create lasting peace in Darfur. The solution to the humanitarian crisis is much more complex, and will have to include the development of a system of

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accountability and justice within Sudan that will engender the trust and

acceptance of citizens in Darfur. Furthermore, fair and transparent national mechanisms of accountability have an essential complementary role to play in

efforts to ensure the protection of civilians within the ongoing conflict. A "crisis of confidence" exists among Darfurians toward the GoS. Legal reforms can help to

rebuild this confidence. In particular, Sudanese law provides no legal framework for command responsibility.6 Also, immunities exist within Sudanese laws that

provide impunity for governmental officials. These types of laws are a signal to Darfurians that justice will not be delivered.

Second Session Open-Floor Discussion:

JEM: It is well-known that the problem is political and requires a political

solution. All humanitarian problems in Darfur have a political solution.

SLM: The GoS bears the responsibility for what is happening in Darfur.

There is a need for officials in the GoS to be strongly punished. AU plays very little role in Darfur. AU's role in the Abuja agreements was of no help.

International forces and sanctions are needed.

Ms. Clancy: Recommendations- 1. Use accountability mechanisms 2. Need genuine, inclusive renegotiations 3. Need clear timetable and benchmark for

hybrid operation in Darfur. 4. Call for deployment in Chad to provide security for

civilians and regional stability 5. Need to strengthen AMIS forces

Other Points: • International organizations are the life-line of Darfur people.

• Darfur has received very little aid from Arab governments or Islamic charities

• The fact that the situation in Darfur is a regional problem with regional effects has not been wildly recognized within the region

• Chad's support for rebel movements must be taken into consideration

6Command responsibility, sometimes referred to as the Yamashita standard or the Medina

standard, is the doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes, and includes the

obligation to refrain from ordering and/or to take action to stop ones subordinates from committing

war crimes/ human rights abuses. The doctrine of “command responsibility” was established by the

Hague Conventions IV (1907) and X (1907) and applied for the first time by the German Supreme

Court in Leipzig after World War I, in the trial of Emil Muller. The Yamashita standard is based

upon the precedent set by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Japanese General

Yamashita. He was prosecuted, in a still controversial trial, for atrocities committed by troops under

his command in the Philippines. Yamashita was charged with "unlawfully disregarding and failing to

discharge his duty as a commander to control the acts of members of his command by permitting

them to commit war crimes." The Medina standard is based upon the massacre at My Lai which US

captain Ernest Medina failed to prevent. It holds that a commanding officer, being aware of a human

rights violation or a war crime, will be held criminally liable when he does not take action. See for

instance:

http://www.hlc.org.yu/english/War_Crimes_Trials_Before_National_Courts/Serbia/index.php?file=729

.html

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4.4 Third Session:

Perspectives on the Future of Humanitarian

Intervention

Session Panelists: Khaled Mansoor (Moderator) World Food Program (WFP-UN)

Mr. Aryeh Neier Open Society Institute, President

Dr. Mohamed el Sayed Said Ahram Center for Political Studies, Vice-President

Third Session Summary:

Mr. Neier asserted that humanitarian intervention, as a policy choice within the international sphere, still is and will remain an effective and necessary tool to

prevent and/or stop the most egregious international crimes (ex: ethnic cleansing, genocide) from occurring. However, before humanitarian intervention

can or should be used a certain set of criteria must be met: 1. The crimes

committed/humanitarian crises should be of “extreme gravity” with massive negative consequences; 2. All other means of solving the situation (ex: economic

and diplomatic pressure) must have been exhausted; 3. The intervention should have a high-probability of success, and low-probability of making the situation

worse; 4. The act should possess legitimacy. While the first condition above is certainly true of the situation in Darfur, the answers to the other three criteria

need to be studied and discussed to see if they have been met. In particular, the criteria of “legitimacy” needs to be examined. What constitutes a “legitimate”

intervention? Certainly one carried out by the S.C. under Chapter 7 of the U.N.

Charter would enjoy legitimacy under international law. Yet, political considerations have and will always make it extremely unlikely that the S.C.

would authorize humanitarian intervention. Thus, what about unilateral intervention by another state? Another set of criteria would have to be met for

unilateral intervention to be legitimate: 1. The intervention should be based on extraterritorial human rights obligations, and/or convention based prerogatives

(ex: The Convention on the Elimination of Genocide); 2. The intervention must demonstrate a “purity of intention” that excludes motives based on securing the

strategic interests of the intervening country (ex: resource procurement); 3. The

intervention must be carried out in a manner that conforms to international humanitarian law standards and principles. As such, the purpose of the

intervention should never be to overthrow the government of the territory, and the use of force should not exceed what is required to protect civilians. At the

moment, the backlash against interventionist policies that has been created by the Iraq debacle has stifled debate on and support for the use of humanitarian

intervention in general, including when it comes to Darfur. As a result, the U.S., European countries and others are unwilling to send troops or lead in efforts to

intervene in Darfur. However, if we agree that genocide and ethnic cleansing are

not acceptable, than humanitarian intervention, when in conformity with the criteria listed above, must be considered as an acceptable policy choice of

international organizations, as well as individual states.

Dr. Said provided a counter argument to Mr. Neier’s point-of-view. According to Dr. Said, the principle of humanitarian intervention may be logically coherent. However, the history of Western intervention in the MENA region raises huge

questions concerning its legitimacy as a policy choice. First, humanitarian

13

intervention is reminiscent of the neo-colonial experience, and is often viewed as

an extension of this experience. Second, the case of Palestine evinces a prejudiced selectivity and double-standard concerning where and when

intervention takes place in the region. For instance, why do Western countries advocate for intervention in Darfur and not in the West-Bank and Gaza? Third, it

is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to ensure that humanitarian intervention is carried out with a “purity of intention,” and not as a means of furthering the

intervening states own interests. Iraq is a prime example of this difficulty. Fourth, the manner in which “humanitarian intervention” was carried out against

Iraq during and after the first Gulf War demonstrated a complete lack of respect

for the well-fare of Iraqi citizens. The bombing campaigns and later the sanctions regime were responsible for extreme human suffering, and contrary to the

standards and principles of IHL. There is a clear lack of mechanisms within the international realm to ensure the same type of abuses do not occur once more.

What matters then is not the principled logic of humanitarian intervention but the particularities: Who? How? Where? And for what purposes? In this regard,

considering that decisions of the S.C. are highly politicized, using the ICJ may offer a more fair and transparent method to decide the legitimacy of

humanitarian intervention on a case-by-case basis.

Third Session Open-Floor Discussion: Ms. Amal Basha: In Arab regions one of the main problems concerning the

issue of Darfur is the lack of acknowledgment that a humanitarian and political crisis exists. Instead people focus on conspiracy theories concerning Western

intentions to overthrow the regime.

Mr. Neier: Regarding legitimacy, both the AU and UN General Assembly have

accepted the principle of humanitarian intervention. The issue of humanitarian intervention needs to be debated and not ignored. Using the ICJ as a decision

body concerning humanitarian intervention would be ineffective. Bosnia filed a case of genocide against Serbia more than a decade ago and it still has not been

decided on.

Dr. Said: I support intervention in Darfur in some form. But many of those who

call for it have brutal, illegitimate records of intervention. Why should they be trusted?

Abbas Abdallah Suleiman (SLM): What is happening in Darfur is not

acceptable. I call it ethnic cleansing. Immediate pressure needs to be put on the GoS by local and international organizations.

Other Points:

• No Arab country wants to accuse another Arab country of committing

grave crimes for fear that its own crimes will come to light. • Talking about theories of intervention is not useful. What we need is

concrete solutions and recommendations. The case of Darfur is unique, and urgently needs a solution.

14

4.5 Fourth Session:

Why the DPA (Abuja) Agreement Failed to Provide

Peace and Security

Session Panelists: Mr. Kamal el Jozooli (Moderator)

Lawyer and Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers

Heidar Al Nour The Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM), Darfur

Mohammed Adam Elhassan Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Darfur

Hany Raslan Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

Dr. Alex De Waal Expert on Sudan, Global Equity Initiative

Dr. Pricilla Joseph

Sudanese Parliament Member

Fourth Session Summary:

Mr. Nour warned that the lack of a transparent, genuine peace process in Darfur could lead to the break-up of the country. The reason why the DPA/Abuja Agreement failed is simple—there was no actual agreement. There were peace

talks, but these failed. A majority of rebel groups never signed the DPA.

Minnawi, the leader of the faction that did sign the DPA, was never a part of the process or legally entitled to sign the agreement. Furthermore, the vast majority

of Darfurians were opposed to the terms of the DPA on key issues such as the distribution of resources. The GoS only signed the agreement due to

international pressure and never intended to adhere to it; a fact which has been attested to by the unaltered behavior of the government in Darfur over the last 9

months.

Mr. Hassan pointed out that the Darfur crisis is a part of a national historical problem related to mismanagement and unequal distribution of resources. The DPA process was faulty for several reasons: 1. Mediation by the AU was biased

toward the GoS. The Darfur factions were separated and not allowed to communicate with each other; 2. The international community applied too much

pressure and did not allow enough space for negotiations. The text of the

agreement was also flawed: 1. The DPA failed to observe the Declaration of Principles7; 2. The text was written by foreign experts not the parties to the

conflict; 3. The percentage of national revenue granted to the Darfur region was less than the percentage of Sudan’s population that Darfurians comprise. These

reasons explain why only one of the three main movements in Darfur signed. The one that did sign is perhaps the weakest of all three. The DPA not only

failed, it made matters worse. The JEM is ready for a ceasefire and serious, genuine negotiations.

Mr. Raslan held that all parties involved in the DPA negotiations contributed to its failure. The fragmented and divided nature of the rebel factions and the lack

7 Representatives of Sudan’s government, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality

Movement all signed a three-page "declaration of principles" aimed at helping calm the Darfur crisis,

on Wednesday July 5, 2005. This Declaration is available in English and Arabic at www.africa-union.org

15

of consistency in governmental policy make it almost impossible to create a

common political outlook or “unified vision” concerning a solution to the conflict. Due to this internal fragmentation and lack of central coordination, no party to

the DPA was capable of meeting the obligations of the agreement. Most representatives of the rebel factions are chosen from within tribal groups. As a

result, many of the rebel representatives lacked experience and the necessary skills to effectively contribute to the negotiation process. The representatives of

the JEM were experienced in this process but their Islamist politics made them unpopular among the other groups. Furthermore, conflicting regional and

international stances contributed to the confusion and inconsistencies. The IDPs

and people of Darfur have largely been left out the peace process, and are being held hostage by the inefficiencies and lack of political will for peace among the

government and rebel factions.

Mr. Alex de Waal was an expert consultant in the DPA process on negotiations concerning “Security Arrangements.” He began by drawing attention to the fact that the conference represented the first time that representatives of the GoS and

rebel groups have met face-to-face since the Abuja negotiations, which could be a positive indication that mediation between the groups may be a possibility once

more. He then went on to describe the context of the negotiations. The DPA process was extremely hindered by the fact that neither the GoS nor the rebel

movements demonstrated a willingness or readiness to compromise on any of their demands. A long and painstaking process was required, yet the

international community applied great pressure for an unrealistic “quick fix” that

would immediately stop the bloodshed. This pressure ultimately resulted in a premature end to the negotiation process. The core concept that guided the

drafting of the Security Arrangements was the principle of consent. Any security arrangement had to be obtained by consent, and could not be forced onto the

parties. One of the problems encountered during the process was the lack of active involvement within the process by the JEM. Though they were repeatedly

sought out for consultation they were rarely forthcoming in their participation. None-the-less, the Security Arrangements arrived at were a relative success and

neither the GoS nor any of the rebel factions objected to any clause within the

security section of the text when presented to them on the 4th and 5th of May 2006. The political power-sharing arrangements of the text were more

problematic and divisive. The Security Arrangements were organized around a ceasefire leading to disengagement and withdraw of forces to designated

positions. Also included were a partial arms-control regime and a ceasefire commission that would monitor hostile actions. In the end the GoS did not live

up to its ceasefire obligations and the commission failed. One major mistake of the AU was to expel two non-signatory groups from the ceasefire commission. It

is impossible to have a ceasefire without the agreement and participation of all

parties. Key issues and difficulties concerning the Security Arrangements: 1. Demilitarization of IDP camps is a necessity. Yet, who should provide security

within the camps? ; 2. Disarmament of the Janjaweed is also essential. However, it is impossible to do this through force, and must be done through an

agreement. ; 3. No matter how many peacekeeping troops are deployed they must have the correct mandate and operational concept, otherwise they will fail.

Working with the communities in Darfur to gain their consent and acceptance must be a key aspect of any future peacekeeping mandate. The fundamental

responsibility for the DPA’s failure lies with the belligerent parties to the conflict,

and not with regional or international actors, despite their many mistakes. The way ahead lies in taking immediate measures to protect civilians and revitalized

efforts to get a workable security agreement between the parties to the conflict.

Dr. Priscilla Joseph argued that the failure of the DPA was due in large part to what the agreement neglected to include. In particular, the DPA failed to

16

address the allocation of land/water resources within Darfur, referring instead to

the national allocation of resources. Local resource competition is one of the main causes of the conflict. Unless such regional resource arrangements are

worked out disarmament of the Janjaweed, and other militia groups will remain impossible. Also, the DPA was focused on arrangements between the fighting

groups, but did not properly consider the role or interests of other, non-combatant, stake holders, in particular the IDPs and other civilians within Darfur.

The agreement between South and North Sudan was partially successful because southern leaders were allocated positions within the central government; no

similar allocation has yet occurred with Darfur leaders. Furthermore, the

assumption that those who signed the agreement were the most influential leaders in Darfur has been proven very wrong. It now appears the GoS is ready

to bring on-board other factions that have not signed the agreement. If so, this is a positive development. If a solution to the Darfur crisis is not found there is a

risk of it escalating into a regional conflict.

Fourth Session Open-Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: The GoS is ready to negotiate if and when other parties are.

We intend to accelerate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to reach compromises among different groups.

Ambassador Mohammad Abdullah: The DPA has not failed as an agreement.

The implementation of the agreement has failed. The text of the DPA is a valid

foundation to base peace on but was abandoned. The GoS and other parties need to make efforts to adjust and negotiate this document. We welcome a

reactivation of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process.

Mr. Hassan (JEM): The agreements on security and civilian protection are too vague in the DPA.

Mr. Al Nour (SLM): The Darfur movements don’t lack a vision. They presented

their demands very clearly, but were ignored by the GoS. The GoS is mainly to

blame for not paying attention to the demands and needs of the Darfur tribes.

Mr. Raslan: The national state in Sudan is not crystallized. Equitable distribution of wealth within the country may be impossible without central

organization in the state. The economic and political development of Darfur may be the only way out of the situation.

Mr. de Waal: The government is without stable polices and keeps changing its

positions. The greatest danger is the loss of confidence in the negotiation process

on both sides. Need confidence building measures. Any future peacekeeping will have to be 90% outreach and 10% force. Negotiations in the future need to be

as transparent and open as possible.

17

4.6 Fifth Session:

Perspectives on the Arab and African Role Regarding

the Situation in Darfur

Session Panelists:

Ms. Amal Al Basha (Moderator) The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Regional Coordinator; The Arab

Sisters Forum for Human Rights, Director

Mr. Ahmed Haroun Minister of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan

Mr. Osman Kalibo Bella Ambassador of Chad in Egypt

Dr. Iglal Raafat Professor in Political Science, Cairo University

Fifth Session Summary:

Ambassador Bella began the session by high-lighting the serious threat to regional stability and security that is caused by the extension of the Darfur conflict into Chad.

Dr. Raafat concentrated on the regional, especially the Egyptian role in the ongoing conflict. The conflict in Darfur is part of the overall crisis in Sudan in

which the central government neglects and marginalizes the economic development and distribution of resources to other regions of the country. While

the solution is largely political, the problem also has a significant cultural element that shouldn’t be ignored. All post-independence governments, including the

current GoS, have failed to address and/or respect the diverse cultures and pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This is a historical factor inherited by the

current government and not only of its own making. However, one problem with

the current GoS is that it has intensified and solidified the aggressive armed confrontation in Darfur, and has deepened cultural divides within the society.

Egyptian policy makers also fail to acknowledge the pluralistic nature of Sudanese society. This has led the Egyptian government to ignore different parties and

interests within Sudan. Egypt prefers to deal with Khartoum as if it is the only political player in Sudan. In other words, Egypt sees Sudan in its own likeness.

It strongly favors dealing with a centralized, undemocratic stable government rather than a fragmented, decentralized democratic state. Thus, Egypt supports

the central government almost unconditionally and refuses to participate in any

action that may contribute to fragmentation or pluralization within Sudan's political sphere. There may be indications that this relationship is changing.

Egypt has allowed South Sudan to open an office in Cairo. Also, Egypt tacitly supported S.C. Resolution 1706, and voted against Sudan's chairmanship of the

AU.

Minister Haroun asserted that the situation in Darfur is a local conflict, based on resource competition. None-the-less, Arab and African states have a role to play in the solution of the Darfur situation. Events in Darfur effect countries in

East Africa and the MENA region, and have consequences for the national security of states throughout the Arab world. Furthermore, the structural features of the

conflict—questions of identity, development, center-periphery relations, etc—are present in all Arab and African countries. The interest of all Arab and African

states is to secure peace and security in Sudan. The motives and strategy of the

“big powers,” in particular the U.S. and E.U., are not justified. These powers do

18

not have a role to play. They are only interested in Sudan as a theater of US-

China competition and the exploitation of resources. To understand this point one must examine the interests of the 108 foreign organizations operating in

Sudan. Questions concerning the budgets and management of resources of international humanitarian organizations operating in Darfur are relevant and

necessary. The GoS supports humanitarian work in Darfur as long as it does not support any other agenda. The GoS is supportive of AU peacekeeping troops, but

highly skeptical of the deployment of international troops due to the experiences of international troop coalitions in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Resolution

1706 will lead to the collapse of the Sudanese state if international forces enter

the country. The DPA is a valid framework for peace agreements. The DPA was not opposed by Darfur movements when it was presented. The main substance

of the agreement is still valid. An Arab role in humanitarian action is requested, but this must be carried out in a clear and transparent manner. The AU needs to

resume and strengthen its role in the cease fire. Also, the AU remains the best choice for mediator concerning peace negotiations. Egyptian-Sudanese relations

have been very strong and unified until recently. Egypt's vote against Sudan Chairmanship of the AU is puzzling considering the position would not give Sudan

any more power or influence than it already has.

Fifth Session Open-Floor Discussion: Minister Haroun: There needs to be an agreement on the level of intervention

that will be allowed. The GoS wants to bring others to the table. All other

countries in the region suffer from similar problems. There are some limitations on the role that Arab countries can play concerning aid and intervention.

Ms. Lefkow: The proxy war between Chad and Sudan has a large effect on the

human rights of civilians in Darfur, and must be dealt with in order to have progress in the peace process and civilian protection in Darfur.

Mr. Nadim: The Arab states have largely played a negative role in the Darfur

crisis by giving unconditional support for the GoS. One can not compare

international intervention in Darfur with Palestine/Iraq/Lebanon/Afghanistan. In these countries the crisis has largely been caused by foreign intervention. In

Sudan the crisis has been brought on by the government.

Other Points: • Is there an effective role that can be played by the Arab League?

• Arab and African countries need to put more pressure on the GoS • Role of Egypt should be to try to bring together groups in Sudan

19

5. Final Session: Conclusions

Session Panelists: Mr. Majdi el Naeem (Moderator)

Human Rights Activist, Sudan

Mr. Ahmed Haroun Minster of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan

Mr. Moataz el Feigery CIHRS, Programs Director

Ms. Diedra Clancy Darfur Consortium

Mr. Kamal el Jozooli Lawyer and Sec. Gen. of Sudanese Union of Writers

Mr. Alex de Waal

Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative

Mr. El Feigery began by giving an overview of the conference. One of the main goals of this conference has been to increase knowledge in the Arab region on the

situation in Darfur and to encourage the Arab public and governments to become involved in a constructive manner to solve the situation. There seems to be a

consensus concerning several observations made throughout the conference: 1. Civilian protection in Darfur is largely dependent on a political solution to the

conflict; 2. A political solution is in turn dependent on their being a political will

for peace among the parties to the conflict; 3. Any successful political solution will have to find a way of halting human rights abuses in Darfur; 4. The situation in

Darfur is part of a larger problem of unbalanced and inequitable development in Sudan; 5. The DPA has not improved the situation in Darfur; 6. The use of

forceful intervention in Darfur will do little to improve civilian protection, the most important tool remains reconciliation and trust-building measures; 7. Sudan

needs to reform its judicial and legal system to provide accountability for crimes committed in Darfur; 8. Humanitarian access in Darfur is the worst it has ever

been, and efforts need to be made to protect humanitarian workers and allow

them free movement and access to IDPs within Darfur. Large disagreements were expressed concerning a couple issues, including:

A. S.C. Resolution 1706 and Humanitarian Intervention as a policy choice: There

was disagreement among participants whether the large UN peacekeeping force envisaged in 1706 would help to provide stability and civilian protection in Darfur

or if it would destabilize Sudan and have a negative effect on civilian protection. Most agreed that the use of force without the GoS consent would be destabilizing.

The legitimacy of Resolution 1706 was also highly controversial. Some argued

that it represented a Western attempt to expand control over resources, while a majority argued it represented the international will and should be accepted by

the GoS. The debate concerning Resolution 1706 was reflective of the more general debate on the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention as a policy choice.

Some held that humanitarian intervention is a necessary and legitimate choice when confronted by international atrocities. Others contended that humanitarian

intervention may have to be abandoned a policy choice because it is extremely open to abuse as a means of justifying military action motivated by resource

expropriation.

B. The DPA: Many rebel faction representatives argued that the DPA was

fundamentally flawed and peace negotiations needed to start all over. The GoS held that the DPA constituted a valid basis for future peace negotiations and

simply needed to be adjusted in some ways. INGO and NGO representatives

20

usually advocated for a middle-ground approach: the DPA can be a basis for

future talks but significant and fundamental changes may be required. Some important developments that took place during the conference included: 1.

The attendance of both GoS officials and rebel movement representatives at the conference, which constitutes the first such face-to-face meeting since the Abuja

talks; 2. The Minister of Humanitarian Affairs for Sudan and Sudan's Ambassador in Egypt have expressed the desire of the GoS to begin inclusive negotiations

once more with rebel groups, and to invigorate the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue process; 3. A number of Darfur faction representatives have also expressed a

desire to reopen the negotiation process with the GoS.

Ms. Clancy began with a serious of “reflections and questions from the NGO community” attending the conference. Some important points made by the NGO community included: 1. Protection of civilians in Darfur is essential to any

solution to the crisis; 2. The role of AMIS and its relation to the U.N. needs to be

clearly defined; 3. A UN-AU hybrid peacekeeping force still remains the best option to date for providing civilian protection; 4. Attacks on civilians by both the

GoS and rebel groups must stop; 5. Access for humanitarian organizations, journalists, etc. in Darfur should be facilitated by all parties to the conflict; 6.

There is a need for more awareness and understanding concerning the inter-state element of the conflict and human rights abuses in Darfur; 7. The Sudanese legal

system does not provide a sufficient framework of accountability for the actions of governmental officials, and may need to be reformed; 8. There is a need for an

open debate on the meaning of “civilian protection” in connection with

humanitarian intervention. Questions for the NGO community: 1. How can we improve our understanding of the political context in which our advocacy takes

place?; 2. How can we engage a broad spectrum of Sudanese political, intellectual and cultural opinions concerning our work?; 3. How can we respond to

questions dealing with international interests in Darfur?; 4. Is there a need for greater dialogue between international, regional and local NGOs on the issue of

Darfur?

Mr. Jozooli reviewed the weaknesses of the DPA, and recommended that inclusive dialogue between the GoS and rebel factions needs to be commenced using the DPA as a starting point. The DPA process and text should serve as a

learning experience and lessons need to be taken away from the experience. Any

new peace process needs to include a comprehensive reform of the legal and judicial system in Sudan, and a commitment by both sides to refrain from

attacking civilians and to actively provide protection for civilians.

Mr. de Waal welcomed the invitation by Abdul Mohammed to reopen Darfur-Darfur Dialogue. Such a dialogue may be required to produce a lasting peace. Mr. de Waal suggested the NGOs, such as CIHRS, could help to initiate such

dialogue. He then pointed out that a Chad-Chad Dialogue may be in order as well. Mr. de Waal then pointed out that CIHRS and others are interested to send

a Media Mission of Arab journalists to Darfur, and wanted to know the Sudanese Ministers opinion on such mission.

Minister Haroun began be reiteration the government's commitment to inclusive talks and to abide by these talks. He said an effective ceasefire was

needed, and also called for further deployment of AMIS forces to monitor and streamline humanitarian aid within Darfur. The negation process needs to

continue to reach a peace agreement. The DPA can serve as the core to build on. The fragmentation of movements remains a challenge. A bottom up approach to

negotiations may be needed to reach a peace agreement. The Arab role should

21

be to provide humanitarian aid and solidarity with Sudan. The African role needs

to be enhanced through the 3-package deal8, and this is the best framework to overcome the difficulties of Resolution 1706. Attempts to revise Resolution 1706

will only slow and damage the process. The GoS appreciates humanitarian aid but still has reservations including their high administrative spending and

adoption of the Western agenda. Minister Haroun then invited human rights organizations to begin an active dialogue with the government. The concerns of

all must be considered in their advocacy campaigns. Concerning the “Media Mission,” Minister Haroun welcomed the initiative, and asked for a proposal of the

project to be sent to him. He stressed that the presence of the reporters in

Khartoum would be desirable. This way a balanced view of the situation could be gained.

Final Session Open-Floor Discussion:

Ambassador of Sudan, Mohammad Abdullah: We extend an invitation for the Media Mission to come to Sudan and for a Darfur-Darfur Dialogue to begin. Talks

are important between the GoS and factions. Negotiations are not conditional and are open to all groups.

JEM: We can’t sit at the table with the government unless government proves it

is truly committed to abiding by an agreement and providing a atmosphere conducive for peace.

SLM: The government's intention is to manipulate the opinions of people here today.

Mr. Amir Osman: The rebel groups and government are urged to sit down

together and write a declaration on (1) their acceptance of each other and desire for peaceful coexistence, and (2) draft an agreement on arms control.

Other Points:

• Proposal: Send a delegation of Arab writers to Darfur. • Get the reporters who will be attending the Media Mission delegation to

Sudan to "Knock on the Doors of Arab Countries" and try to get people within the Arab world to pay attention to what is happening in Darfur

• It is important to make Darfur citizens a part of the solution in our work.

8 The 3-Package Deal was brokered between Kofi Annan and the Sudanese government at the end of

2006, as an alternative to accepting Resolution 1706. In this agreement the UN provides technical and

logistical support to AMIS, followed by a limited deployment of UN peacekeeping personal into

Darfur under the over-all control of the AU.

22

6. Annex:

6.1. List of Participants:

Participants from Egypt

Organization Occupation Name N

American-

university

Intern Catherine Baylin 1

AUC lecturer Ibrahim Alnour 2 Ahram center for

strategic and

political studies

Journalist

/researcher

Dr. Mohammed Sayed

Said 3

American-

university

Human rights

lecturer

Lana Baydas 4

American

university in

Cairo

Director of

Center for

Philanthropy &

Civic

Engagement

Barbara Ibrahim 5

Ahram center for

political and

strategic studies

Researcher Hanny Raslan 6

Cairo university Political scientist Dr.Iglal Raafat

7 Shomooa

association

Administrative Mohammed Kamal 8

African

development

center

Researcher Saber Nayel 9

Ahram Journalist Asmaa Al-Hussieny 10

Middle east

association for

peace and human

rights

chairman Abdel Fattah Hamid 11

Arab human

rights activists

program

Executive manager Ahmed Badaawi 12

v-day karama Director Hebak Osman 13 Egyptian

initiative for

personal rights

Executive director Hossam Bahgat 14

Andalus institute

for tolerance and

anti-violence

studies

Lawyer Mahmoud Farouk 15

Khalil center for

consultance and

legal studies

Lawyer Ahmed abdullah 16

Arab human

rights activists

program

Researcher Waddah Idris 17

African

development

center

Executive director Mohieldien Soliman 18

Eggyptian center

for child ights

Post graduate

student

Nezar Isaak 19

Solidarity for

development and

Board director Mariam Ishak 20

23

human rights

association

ICRC regional

office

Media official Tamara Riffai 21

United Nations

world food

program

Media Official Khalid Mansour 22

World food

program-United

Nations

Media coordinator Mohammed Ammasha 23

Human rights

watch office at

cairo

Media official Fady Alqady 24

ERT lecturer Dr.Abdulmoneim

Yossuf 25

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Cairo office media

official

Mohammed Adam 26

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Sharafeldien Saleh 27

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Adam Senousy 28

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Essa Yehia 29

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Official speaker Abdel Fattah Ibrahim 30

Justice and

equality

movement

engineer Mohammed Essa 31

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Secretary general

cairo office

Abdullatif Adam 32

Justice and

Equality

Movement

Doctor Shaza Samir 33

Sudan liberation

movement

regional office

Office manager Idris Arbab 34

Sudan liberation

movement

Secretary general

of the regional

office

Ahmed Hassan 35

Sudan liberation

movement

Media official in

the regional office

Musa Babker 36

Sudan liberation

movement

Member Heidar Alnour 37

Sudanese

ettehady party

Director of

Alettehady party

office in cairo

Merghany Mosaad 38

Contemporary

sudan research

center

Director Moniem Soliman 39

Contemporary

sudan research

center

secretary Ibrahim Yehia 40

Maan Post graduate Bakry Mohammed 41

24

Officials

Email Occupation Name N

Chad minister to

cairo

Mr.Osman Calibo

Bella

44

Esam2005_com@hot

mail.com

Office manager Essameldien

khalafallah

45

Sudanese State

minister for

humanitarian affairs

Mr.Ahmed Haroun 46

Monitors

Organization Occupation Name N

Libya embassy Delegated

minister Ammar

Mohammed

Kourish

47

Sudanese

embassy

Ambassador Mohammed

Abdullah Idris

48

Sudanese

embassy

Diplomat Moddather

Abdullah

49

Sudanese

embassy

First Secretary Abdelraouf

Amer

50

Saudi embassy First Secretary Mofleh

Alsalman

51

Ford

Foundation

Emma playfair 52

Ford

foundation

consultant Sara

Hammood

53

Participants from outside Egypt

• Participants from international organizations

organization student

Social

democratic

forum

Secretary general Nabil Magid 42

Darfur media

and

journalist's

league

Vice-chair Mohammed Abdel

karim 43

25

Organization Occupation Name N

CICC Outreach

Liaison , middle

east and south

africa

Anjali kamat 54

International

refugee rights

initiative

Co-Director Deiedre Clancy 55

OXFAM Humanitarian

Policy Adviser Jamie Balfour 56

International

Cisis Group

Media official Nadim hasbany 57

International

center for

transitional

justice

Director of MENA Program

Hanny Megally 58

Human rights

watch

Researcher Leslie Lefkow 59

Save darfur

coalition

International

outeach

coordinator

Amir Osman

mohammed

Osman

60

Human Rights

first

Campaign manager

Nicky Lazar 61

OSI Program

director Gregor

B.M.Meiring

62

OSI Nejla

Sammakia

63

OSI President Aryeh Neier 64

OSI Senior legal

officer Killy Askin 65

Amnesty Campaign

coordinator Bashair

Ahmed

66

Save darfur

coalition

International associate

Sean

P.Brooks

67

International

media

support

Program officer Finn

Rasmussen

68

Social science

research

council-

England

lecturer Alex Dewaal 69

• Participants from Sudan

N Name Occupation Organization

70 Magdy Elnaiem Researcher

71 Abdoallah

Adam Khater

Journalist Darfur Center

for peace

26

enhancement

72 Pricilla Kuch Parliament

Member

73 Salih Mahmoud Parliament

member

74 Osman

Hemmieda

Director SOAT

75 Kamal Gezouli Lawyer Sudanese

Writer's union 76 Faisal Elbagir Program

coordinator

Khartoum

center for

human rights 77 Massaad

Mohammed Ali

Lawyer Amal center

for relief

• Participants from Arab organizations

N Name Occupation Organization

78 Amal Basha CICC Regional

cooordinator

Arab sister's

forum for

human rights 79 Maan

Elbayary

Journalist Gulf journal-

emirates 80 Mahifiz

Mohammed

Lecturer Moroccan

center for

democracy

and human

rights studies 81 Sameera

Ainan

Lawyer Moroccan

organization

for human

rights 82 Mohammed

Neshnash

Vice chair Moroccan

organization

for human

rights 83 Hamid Marey Economist Civil society

enhancement

committees 84 Fawzia rabia Educational

resoursec

specialist

Amnesty

Media Personnel

organization Occupation Name N

Watany

alyoum

Journalist Taher Abozied 85

27

Middle east

news

agency

Journalist Ahmed Gheeth 86

Ekhbaria

channel –

saudi

Arabia

Camera

director Hany Mustafa 87

Watany Journalist Rimon Edward 88

Almasry

Alyoum

Journalist Wael Ali 89

Gulf journal

Emirates

Journalist Naglaa Kamal 90

Middle east

journal

Journalist Zeinelabedien

mohammed

91

Gezeera

journal

Journalist Atteyat abdelrehiem 92

Rose

Alyossuf

Editor Howaida Yehia 93

Nahdet

Misr

Journalist Mahmoud Bassuny 94

Al-Hayat,

Egypt

Journalist Haytham Kasem 95

Al-Osbooa Journalist Khaled mohammed

Ali

96

Gomhouria Journalist Moataz El-Hadidy 97

Ahram Journalist Emad Hegab 98

Ahrar Journalist Mohieldien Said 99

Ahaly Abdelsalam Amira 100

Al-Raay Journalist Mohammed

Abdelmaguid

101

Al-Hayat Journalist Ahmed Mustafa 102

Noseldonia Journalist Tamer Kamal 103

Al-

Massaeya

Journalist Sahar Ragab 104

Almogaz Journalist Marwa Said 105

Reporter Salha Omar 106

Participants from Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies

N Name Occupation Phone Email

107 Bahey Hassan Director 7951112 bahey@cihrs.org

108 Moataz elfegiery Programs

director

7951112 moataz@cihrs.org

109 Mohammed Ahmed Sudan Project

coordinator

7951112 mahmed@cihrs.org

110 Jeremie Smith Researcher

and advocate

7951112 jsmith@cihrs.org

111 Bassam Bahgat Project

coordinator

7951112 bassam@cihrs.org

28

7. 2. Conference Agenda:

The Conflict in Darfur

and Civilian Protection Cairo 29-30 January 2007

Agenda

First Day: 29 /1/2007

9-9:30 Registration 9:30-10 Opening session

Panelists:

Minister.Ahmed Haroun

Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs

Bahey el Dien Hassan

29

(Moderator) Director of CIHRS

Kamal EL Jozooli

Lawyer and the Secretary-General of the Sudanese Union of Writers

10-12 First session

Developments of the humanitarian situation in Darfur

Moderator: Hany Megally

Director of the Middle East Department at the International Institute for Transitional

Justice

Panelists:

Bashair Ahmed

Amnesty International

Tamara Refaii

Media official at ICRC regional office

Mosaad Mohamed Aly

Amal Center for Relief of Torture Victims (Darfur)

Khaled Mansoor

World Food Program UN

Jamie Balfour

OXFAM

12-12:30 Coffee break

12:30-2:30 Second session

Proposals for Civilian's Protection: Role of the African Union and UN troops

Moderator: Abdoallah Khater

Darfurian writer

Panelists:

Saleh Mahmoud

Sudanese MP and Human Rights Lawyer

Nadim Hasbany

The International Crisis Group

30

Leslie Lefkow

HRW

Diedre Clancy

The Darfur Consortium

2:30-3:30 Lunch break

3:30-5:30 Third session

The perspectives of future humanitarian intervention

Moderator: Khaled Mansoor

World Food Program UN

Panelists:

Aryeh Neier

President of Open Society Institute

Dr. Mohamed el Sayed Said

Vice President of Ahram Center for Political Studies

The Second Day: 30 January 2007

10-12 Fourth session Why the Abuja agreement failed to provide peace and security?

Moderator: Kamal EL Jozooli

Lawyer and the Secretary General of the Sudanese Union of Writers

Panelists Dr.Pricilla Joseph

Sudanese parliament member

Heidar alnour

The Sudanese Liberation Movement ( Darfur)

Mohammed Adam Elhassan

Justice and Equality Movement (Darfur)

Hany Raslan

31

Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies

Dr. Alex DeWaal

Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative

12-12:30 Coffee break

12:30-2:30 Fifth session

Perspectives on The Arab and African role regarding the conflict in Darfur

Moderator : Amal albasha

Regional Coordinator for the CICC and Head of the Arab Sister's Forum for Human

Rights

Panelists: Minister Ahmed Haroun

Sudanese State Minister of Humanitarian Affairs

Mr.Osman Kalibo Bella

Ambassador of Chad

Dr. Iglal Raafat

Political Scientist, Cairo University

2:30-4:00 Lunch break

4:00-5:00 Final Session: Conclusions

(Moderator) Majdi el Naeem

Human Rights Activist, Sudan

:

Panelists: . Minster Ahmed Haroun

of Humanitarian Affairs, Sudan

Moataz el Feigery

CIHRS, Programs Director

Diedra Clancy

Darfur Consortium

Kamal el Jozooli

Lawyer and the Secretary General of the Sudanese Union of Writers

32

Dr. Alex de Waal

Sudan Expert, Global Equity Initiative