why international standards of humanitarian response matter: the influence of religious-politically...

SUMMARY REPORT | OCTOBER 2014

WHY INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE MATTER: The influence of religious-politically extreme groups in Pakistan disaster relief

ContentsIntroduction 2

Methodology 3

Context 3

Religious-political radicalisation in Pakistan 4

Relief efforts by religious-political groups 5

Young people and radicalisation 7

Radicalisation during the flood relief 9

Other influential factors 9

Conclusion 10

Recommendations 12

References 13

Front cover: Displaced people fleeing the Sindh province during the floods in 2010 (photo by: Abdul Majeed Goraya / IRIN licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.0/

https://www.flickr.com/photos/irinphotos/


This report is a summary of the findings of a study carried out by a local partner supported by

Y Care International in the Sindh Province, Pakistan in 2012.

The study aimed to explore whether the widespread flooding that affected large parts of

Pakistan in 2010, and again in 2011 and 2012 provided opportunities for radical groups to

use humanitarian aid as a route for recruiting new members.

Introduction

In 2010, exceptionally heavy monsoon rains in Pakistan caused devastating floods affecting 20 million people across the country and covering one-fifth of the land area with flood waters. In 2011 and again in 2012, floods covered large swathes of the country, leading to wide-spread displacement, disrupted access to markets, and loss of livestock and crops.

Pakistan is vulnerable to a range of natural hazards, including floods and earthquakes, as well as conflict-related emergencies. The loss of social and economic capital as a result of disasters significantly reduces the coping capacity of marginalised groups, already vulnerable due to their existing levels of poverty and social exclusion. This often pushes people further into poverty. Disasters not only result in economic damage – the estimated damage cost of the flooding in 2010 is 9.5 billion USD – but they also undermine development gains made and can result in funds being diverted from longer term development programmes.

In many cases, disaster relief is carried out by non-governmental actors, and where there are gaps in disaster response, there is the potential that they could be filled by radical groups. A number of reports suggest that radical groups might be motivated to become actors in disaster relief as a route to engage disaster affected people in their extreme religious/political agenda. The vulnerability of disaster-affected people combined with frustrations that they are not receiving the assistance they need make them potential targets for recruitment by such groups.

A Policy Briefing by International Crisis Group (ICG) on the political impact of the 2005 Kashmir earthquake stated: “In Pakistan, distinction between the missionary groups that have no political agenda and the jihadi groups which have political agenda propagated through violence, is not clear … two of the most prominent jihadi outfits banned by Pakistani Government under anti-terrorism laws and listed as terrorist by UN, Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, are conducting relief operation under changed names or through front organisations.”

Y CARE INTERNATIONAL 2


Methodology

This study took a qualitative approach employing a combination of interviews and focus group discussions with community members and key informants.

Semi-structured interviews were held with almost 100 flood-affected community members in Mirpurkhas District, Sindh Province, and also with 15 key informants representing researchers, university and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) staff, doctors and activists across the country in 2012. Focus group discussions were held with 10 women in Sindh Province to cross-reference the information collected through these interviews.

A literature review was carried out to collate and analyse existing study and learning on the subject. This consisted of a thorough review of secondary sources of information on the subject such as newspaper articles, journals and news pieces on the internet.

Due to increased security challenges the study team could not reach the planned number of flood affected community members. Security concerns also meant that volunteers in religious-political organisations could not be approached directly to ask about their disaster relief activities.

Further, it was found that due to the elapsed time since the severe floods in 2010 and emergency relief and the limited literacy levels, some respondents struggled to recall the names of the organisations that provided them with assistance. However, the majority of respondents were able to identify the organisations by the type and scale of the relief goods and activities provided, and some by the logos or flags they used.

Context

Pakistan dashboard

Human Development Index rank: 145

Population: 175 million; 22% aged 15–24

60%+ live on under $2/day

Only 23% of young people complete secondary education1

Youth literacy rate: 53% (est.); female youth literacy 43%2

Challenges faced by young people:

• poverty

• limited economic opportunities

• socio-economic disadvantage

• exclusion

• lack of engagement in politics

• restrictions on freedom of speech and expression

1 Planning Commision, Government of Pakistan (2010) Youth Strategy: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities. Retrieved: Oct 2012: http://pc.gov.pk/feg/PDFs/youth.pdf.

2 UNDP (2013) Pakistan: UNDP and The Youth http://undp.org.pk/undp-and-the-youth.html. Source of data UNFPA.



The floods of 2010 further exacerbated the existing vulnerability of the Sindh Province, prior to the flood the province was ranked as one of the poorest in Pakistan.

The floods which peaked in July/August 2010 were a result of torrential monsoon rains and affected nearly eight million people in the province. Located at the delta of the flooded Indus basin, Sindh was one of the worst hit provinces and large areas were still submerged months later. Infrastructure, homes and crops were damaged or destroyed, and hundreds of thousands were displaced and dependent on aid. A year later, in 2011, flooding again caused severe disruption in Sindh.

The study took place in the Mirpurhas District of Sindh Province. The district was selected as the main location focus of the study as it was severely affected by the floods of 2010-2012 and it represents a complex social context.

Mirpurkhas District is located in southern Sindh and has an estimated population of 1.4 million, 20 per cent of this is young women and men. Two-thirds of the population live in rural areas in the district and the average family size is six, higher than the national average. Mirpurkhas is a varied district made up of Muslims, Christians, Ahmedis and Hindus speaking Sindhi, Urdu, Punjabi and Pashto.

One town in Mirpurkhas District, Naukot, was cut off by the floods in 2011 and roads were submerged for two months. There were demonstrations about the failure of the administration to provide assistance to this area as well as the alleged corruption of the district administration in the distribution of aid when it did come.

Religious-political radicalisation in Pakistan

The term ‘religious-political’ groups or organisations refers to those groups who are motivated by religious and/or political principles and includes a range of groups from faith-based charitable organisations to highly organised radical groups.

By including the range of organisations in the definition, the research allowed a more open analysis of disaster relief activities following the flooding over recent years. This term is not intended to define these organisations, nor is it suggesting that all religious-political groups have fundamentalist or radical aims, it is to distinguish them from the neutral humanitarian aid agencies that have no religious or political affiliation or sympathy3.

However, in Pakistan, “religion, especially Islam, underlies the motivations and activities of many welfare organisations.”4 In the last few decades, emergency relief activities in Pakistan have been dominated by religious-political organisations. The limited national institutional capacity for disaster management has allowed non-state actors to fill this role.

3 While also recognising that many organisations are based on, or motivated, by their religious beliefs but carry out humanitarian aid in line with international humanitarian standards of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence.

4 Kirmani, N (2011) Interactions between Religion, the State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Some Implications for Development. Development Policy Research Centre (DPTC).



Pakistan has seen some rise in radical rhetoric and groups within the past two decades and as it has gained momentum it has also gained increasing membership. Radicalisation is a process by which an individual or group adopts progressively more extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo.

Some tangible manifestations of radicalisation in Pakistan include a decreasing number of music shops in the cities, more religious books in bookshops and stalls, an increase in the amount of anti-American graffiti, and more voters choosing religious parties at elections.

In 2002, more people voted for religious parties than before in Pakistan’s history, and in 2013 more than 60 per cent of votes went to right-wing and religious parties. Many saw this as a demonstration of the rise of a fundamentalist religious movement. Tanwir (2002)5 however suggests that the incentive could have been more in reaction to frustration with the limited progress made by major political parties in reducing poverty in the country.

Pakistan has further seen a revival or strengthening of conservative opinions and practices. 67 per cent of educated young people surveyed in 2010 by Pak Institute For Peace Studies6 believed that women should observe the veil outside their homes, showing that many young educated people do support conservative customs.

The rise of radical sentiment has been linked to many factors including: poor governance, anti-Americanism, foreign policy agenda of the Pakistan Government in recent years, under/unemployment, a lack of political engagement, and inequality.

In an opinion poll carried out by PewResearch (2014), 66 per cent of Muslim Pakistani respondents said they are concerned about Islamic extremism. However, this same poll found that 3 per cent believe attacks on civilians are justified in comparison to 41 per cent in 2004, showing a significant decline in support for this in the past decade.

Relief efforts by religious-political groups

During the flooding in 2010 and 2011, a variety of actors provided aid to those affected including international and national NGOs, religious-political organisations, and the Pakistan Army.

The role of the state was largely recognised by its absence or insufficiency by those responding to the study. The Pakistan Army was identified by many as having provided relief consistently, however, other government departments and authorities were perceived as active only during key times such as the Prime Minister’s visit to the affected areas. This left a space for religious-political organisations and others to intervene and assist those that were in need of support.

A number of respondents said that Muslim clerics were an active part of the relief process working under various religious-political organisations, some of which were based in other Islamic countries.

5 Farooq Tanwir (2002) ‘Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan’ in International Journal of Comparative Sociology. October 2002, vol. 43, no. 3-5, pp250-268.

6 Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS) (2010) Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan. Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS), September 2010.



Many of the study respondents stated that local madrasas provided relief, such as food and shelter for community members affected locally, and some religious organisations used madrasas as a base for relief distribution. Responses suggested that there was a long term commitment from religious groups and madrasas to the community in comparison to government officials and NGOs “who leave after a project is finished”7.

One study respondent said that, although large amounts of aid were given from madrasas following the floods: “the preachers only distributed aid to the Muslims. They preferred distributing aid to those Muslims who prayed daily, and also to those who visited the mosque in their presence.”

The study found that the preaching of religious ideas was generally carried out by religious organisations in local mosques, although some members of these groups also carried out proselytising efforts in the communities as well. A young male respondent said that members of a religious organisation came to their village mosque and asked the local Muslim cleric to identify those that were religious, and community members that prayed regularly. They provided aid following preaching and instructed everyone to spread the word of how important religion and praying is. A CEO of a national NGO interviewed for this study told of visiting a flood relief distribution camp situated alongside a madrasa where the distribution of relief goods was timed around prayer times and the organisers would ask the recipients to pray with them and share their ideology before distributing the goods. Many respondents stated that non-Muslims were not provided with any aid from Muslim clerics, with some even saying that those who did receive aid were told not to share it with non-Muslims. Respondents said that some groups of the population affected by the flooding were neglected as a result of their lower likelihood of being converted.

Selection based on religious beliefs directly contravenes humanitarian principles and international disaster relief standards. These outline the importance of providing humanitarian aid based on need alone, without any other distinction; regardless of race, creed, nationality, political beliefs etc. Not only is this kind of selection criteria against humanitarian principles, but it can also act to polarise families based on religion, and challenge harmonious coexistence.

However, while there were many references in the interviews and focus group discussions conducted for this study to praying and preaching throughout the aid distribution process, there was no mention of radical or extreme ideas. Even where more extremist groups worked in the area there was no mention of radical agendas being presented to community members.

Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), reported to be the new name for banned Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, commonly known as one of the largest and most active Islamic terror groups in South Asia8, was allowed to collect funds in Pakistan following the earthquake in 2005, officially for reconstruction work. Many of their offices reopened and its members played a prominent role in rebuilding work9. According to respondents of this study, JuD was also one of the first responders in 2010 following the flooding;

7 Quotation from one respondent

8 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba was fighting against Indian control in Kashmir and is blamed for several deadly attacks in India including the 2008 Mumbai attacks. BBC News (2010) Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Retrieved 19th August 2013: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3181925.stm).

9 BBC News (2010) Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Retrieved 19th August 2013: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3181925.stm



bringing tents, medical supplies, and machinery, and cooking free meals. A member of a Students’ Federation in Pakistan interviewed for this study, said that religious organisations “use the vulnerability of the people to increase their reach. Hence, any disaster is an opportunity for them and they are successful because of the absence of the State in crucial situations…signage is important for the aid deliverers and providers, it is inherently political.”

The latter part of this quotation was corroborated by reports of some religious-political organisations distributing aid supplies wrapped in flags of the party colours and invited those affected to their camps.

A number of respondents also reported discrimination in accessing relief supplies based on political party membership. One respondent said that he was denied aid by a representative of one of the major political parties in Pakistan because he was a supporter of their political opposition. He was told that if he joined the party he would be given aid. Another respondent said:

“The [political] party provided a tent to us. They said if you hoist the flag on the roof of the tent, then we will give you more aid. We did that, we received huge amounts of aid.”

A number of political parties were also mentioned as having provided aid along with political groups’ charity arms. Many respondents were unable to recall the names of the organisations which provided them with assistance but mentioned for example that they were displaying flags and inviting people to their gatherings. Jamaat-e-Islami reportedly displayed their name prominently, however one respondent said that their political work was limited during this time.

A less extreme approach to gaining political party support was outlined in an interview with a renowned human rights activist. He suggested that many religious-political organisations have field agents who assessed the needs of the people affected by the floods and built rapport with them. They then used this relationship to suggest political candidates to vote for as being honest and trustworthy.

As mentioned above, selection for aid based on political or religious views disregards international humanitarian standards and could result in the neglect of extremely vulnerable families who are in desperate need of support leading to additional inequality. Inequality was mentioned earlier as a potential catalyst for radicalisation.

Young people and radicalisation

A number of recent studies10 analysing the link between youth and extremism suggest that radicalisation amongst young people is linked to: poverty, poor governance – supported by a renowned historian interviewed for the study who stated that the absence of democracy is a reason for radicalisation – political instability, and poor quality of education.

10 Wimthrop and Graff (2010) Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the links between education and militancy in Pakistan. Brookings, Center for Universal Education; Working Paper 2; June 2010.British Council (2009) Pakistan: The Next Generation. British Council Pakistan, November 2009. Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS) (2010) Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan. Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS), September 2010.



Links between the provision of free education via the religious schools, madrasas, and the rise in militancy and armed conflict have been put forward by many academics and organisations in recent years, including Wimthrop and Graff (2010)11. Low income families are more likely to send their children to madrasas for their education, many of the madrasas, especially the larger ones, are under the patronage of religious-political parties and therefore could be influenced by the radical views or practices of their patrons.

Two Pakistani human rights activists interviewed for this study said that religious scholars are able to influence young people owing in part to the lack of performance of elected representatives and state institutions and the limited trust in them by young people.

A 2009 British Council survey of over 1,000 young people across the country found that the most trusted institution was the military with 60 per cent saying they trusted it. Interestingly the institutions that came second in this poll were religious educational institutions12, also highlighting their potential influence on young people.

Another factor linked to an increase in radicalism is food insecurity, which often follows disasters such as flooding13, as a result of people becoming disenchanted and increasingly desperate to meet their daily basic needs. The National Nutrition Survey (NNS) 2011 found that Sindh Province was the most food insecure province of Pakistan with 72 per cent of the surveyed households defined as food insecure14.

Those affected by the flooding and interviewed for this study identified displacement and food insecurity as the biggest impacts of the floods. They described the time during and following the flooding as the most difficult in their lives and talked about the impact on their livelihoods, homes, land and crops. A number of those interviewed moved into relief camps when flooding got too bad to stay, and several left behind young male members of their household to look after their homes and livestock.

“Heavy rains flooded our houses and eventually destroyed them. We took refuge on the train-track on a higher level. During heavy rains, we made [our own] shelter. In the beginning, we faced much difficulty in preparing food.”

For many academics and organisations these conditions represent a high risk setting for the deployment and uptake of radical rhetoric.

11 Wimthrop and Graff (2010) Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the links between education and militancy in Pakistan. Brookings, Center for Universal Education; Working Paper 2; June 2010.

12 British Council (2009) Pakistan: The Next Generation. Retrieved Aug 2013: http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf.

13 Heinrich Böll Stiftung Pakistan (2011) Interview: "There is a relationship between food insecurity and militancy in Pakistan". http://www.pk.boell.org/web/116-646.html

14 Government of Pakistan (2011) National Nutrition Survey (NNS). http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=scqw_AUZ5Dw%3D&tabid=117&mid=752



Radicalisation during the flood relief

Respondents were divided on whether the recruitment of young people into radical groups in the period following a disaster was an issue. One respondent said:

“Radicalisation is bound to increase in disaster-hit areas because calamities aggravate poverty, make people angry, and render them helpless. They inadvertently fall prey to the radical groups, who take advantage of the situation to influence those affected.”

However, none of the young people included in this study said that they had adopted practices of religious organisations as a result of their disaster relief interventions. The majority of respondents reported that young people were not receptive to being formally recruited by religious-political organisations during the emergency relief provision.

Additionally, a number of respondents believed that young people were less at risk from being recruited into jihadi or extreme groups than they had been in the past as a result of increased education, more skills and additional access to information via the internet.

Other influential factors

Other factors at play in the post-disaster context may have reduced the risk of young people being affected by conditional aid delivery. For example, the majority of respondents said NGO’s relief activities in the area were timelier and more direct than response from the state. The general consensus of those interviewed was that NGOs provided aid based on the humanitarian principles of need above any other distinction. They were perceived as the least biased of all actors responding to those affected by the flooding.

Whilst the government did not provide adequate levels of aid to address the situation it was found that initiatives such as the Watan Card scheme, where flood affected people were provided with financial assistance through the distribution of cards worth monetary value, were extremely effective.

Some accounts suggested that many local landlords and other locals not affected also supported the aid effort. Many respondents referred to aid passing through the wadera or local landowner as the route for accessing the most vulnerable. People interviewed generally believed that only areas where local leaders and community workers were involved and able to influence the aid process were able to receive adequate shares of aid.



Conclusion

The flooding in Pakistan in 2010 affected over 20 million people and submerged one-fifth of the country’s land area. A number of factors were involved in making it, and the subsequent floods in 2011, such devastating disasters:

– a lack of disaster preparedness

– poor early warning systems, particularly to reach remote rural communities

– limited disaster risk reduction initiatives

– exceptionally high monsoon rains

– absent or insufficient state response

– large number of people living in poverty on flood plains

Whilst it is not possible to draw conclusive findings from such a small sample within a narrow number of locations, there is no evidence to support the claim that young people affected by the floods had been recruited by radical or extremist religious groups. Not one respondent reported adoption of practices of religious organisations as a result of their disaster relief interventions, or that family members had adopted such practices.

Promisingly, the majority of respondents said that young people were not receptive to recruitment and radicalisation by religious-political organisations during the emergency relief period of the flooding in 2010 and 2011. Whilst the immediate post emergency period is often a time of increased vulnerability for young people and their communities and therefore they are at greater risk of being radicalised, the study has identified a couple of reasons why radicalisation may not have been taken up so widely.

Firstly, people become more vulnerable and disenchanted when excluded from receiving aid as a result of their religious-political beliefs rather than being motivated towards it through aid. It may be valuable to conduct additional research to understand if those who were refused aid based on their religious or political beliefs have modified their interaction with community members, acquaintances or others belonging to the religious or political group who refused them.

Secondly, young people may have increased education, more skills and additional access to information via the internet, than in the past and so their likelihood of recruitment into such groups may be declining due to increased skills, knowledge and opportunities.

There was no clear consensus from those interviewed for this study on what the objectives of religious-political organisations were for providing disaster relief following the flooding in Pakistan in 2010 and 2011. Regardless of motivation it is clear that many religiously or politically motivated groups or organisations in Pakistan provided aid to flood-affected people and were often the first to provide such assistance.

However, worryingly many did not follow internationally recognised standards of humanitarian response of providing aid based on need alone. Accounts collected during the study confirmed that



many organisations’ aid distribution process was characterised by proselytising rhetoric, religious based bias and aid being offered conditionally on religious and political belief and membership.

It is clear that in the aftermath of a disaster young people are more vulnerable than at other times and there is evidence to show that some religious-political organisations acted biasedly in aid provision. Many made attempts to coerce those in need of aid to take part in religious rituals, such as prayers, but there is no evidence that this was for the purpose of radicalisation rather than religious conversion.

This study concludes that religious-political organisations were not successful in recruiting or radicalising young people through emergency relief provision during the flooding of 2010 and 2011 in Sindh, Pakistan.

Young women and men and their communities must be supported to become more resilient to the wider risk of disasters and also to religious-political organisations who exploit disasters and the aid process to further their own agenda.



Recommendations

Religious-political groups, the government and other NGOs must receive more training and support on the importance of international humanitarian standards in disaster relief. Increasing understanding of the importance of these standards for all disaster relief actors should help to ensure selection is based on need alone and prevent discrimination based on religious belief or commitment. The opportunities for religious-political organisations to recruit new members and supporters through the conditional provision of emergency relief are then removed.

The government must be more accountable for aid provision and for the oversight of aid by NGOs and religious-political groups. Mechanisms must be in place to report and handle the misuses or exploitation of the provision of aid by all groups. Complaint mechanisms and rigorous quality assurance procedures must be put in place not just by NGOs but by the state as well.

Communities vulnerable to the threat of disasters should be sensitised on basic aid provision and how it should be conducted. With improved knowledge they can hold aid providers accountable and recognise and report when aid is being offered against international humanitarian standards.

Young people should be supported to understand their rights and engage in national and local decision making. Local and national decision makers should be lobbied to increase their responsiveness to the unique needs of young women and men and make decision making processes more inclusive. This would increase political participation, a lack of which was mentioned as one of the catalysts of radicalism.

To sensitise young women and men as early as possible to the dangers of extremism and radicalisation, the Ministry of Education should be lobbied to take a more proactive stance in promoting tolerance and living harmoniously in a multi-cultural society within schools to deter extreme views and behaviours.

Young women and men should be provided with more opportunities to access conflict resolution, communication and peace–building trainings. Young people with increased life skills will have increased capacity to evaluate options and make informed choices.

Young women and men should be supported to interact with other young people from different ethnic, social and religious backgrounds to create increased understanding between the groups and to sensitise them to different beliefs and needs.

Vocational, literacy and numeracy training, and training on entrepreneurship, business and job skills should be provided to young men and women to increase livelihood opportunities. Gaining skills and increasing income lead to an increased sense of well-being and purpose, and reduce feelings of anger and frustration which are cited by many as catalysts for radicalisation and extremism.

Communities should be supported to increase their resilience to disasters. By increasing knowledge, understanding and resources on disaster risk reduction the vulnerability of communities will be reduced and they will be less dependent on external support in the aftermath of disasters. Disaster risk reduction can also help to save lives, livelihoods and homes, and reduce the impact of such natural hazards.



References

British Council (2009) Pakistan: The Next Generation. British Council Pakistan, November 2009. Retrieved Aug 2013: http://www.britishcouncil.pk/pakistan-Next-Generation-Report.pdf.

Farooq Tanwir (2002) ‘Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan’ in International Journal of Comparative Sociology. October 2002, vol. 43, no. 3-5, pp250-268.

Government of Pakistan (2011) National Nutrition Survey (NNS). http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=scqw_AUZ5Dw%3D&tabid=117&mid=752.

Heinrich Böll Stiftung Pakistan (2011) Interview: "There is a relationship between food insecurity and militancy in Pakistan". http://www.pk.boell.org/web/116-646.html.

Lashkar-e-Tayyaba was fighting against Indian control in Kashmir and is blamed for several deadly attacks in India including the 2008 Mumbai attacks. (BBC News (2010)

Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Retrieved 19th August 2013: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3181925.stm). BBC News (2010)

Profile: Lashkar-e-Taiba. Retrieved 19th August 2013: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3181925.stm

Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS) (2010) Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan.

Pak Institute For Peace Studies (PIPS), September 2010. PIPS, 2010. “Radicalization: Perceptions of Educated Youth in Pakistan.” http://www.san-pips.com/download.php?f=045.pdf, accessed on October 20, 2010.

Planning Commision, Government of Pakistan (2010) Youth Strategy: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities. Retrieved: Oct 2012: http://pc.gov.pk/feg/PDFs/youth.pdf.

PewResearch (2014) Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East, 1 July 2014. Accessed: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/01/concerns-about-islamic-extremism-on-the-rise-in-middle-east/.

International Crisis Group (ICG) (2006) Policy Briefing on Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Asia Briefing N°46 Islamabad/Brussels, 15 March 2006. Accessed: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/pakistan/B046-pakistan-political-impact-of-the-earthquake.aspx.

UNDP (2013) Pakistan: UNDP and The Youth http://undp.org.pk/undp-and-the-youth.html. Source of data UNFPA.

Wimthrop and Graff (2010) Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the links between education and militancy in Pakistan. Brookings, Center for Universal Education; Working Paper 2; June 2010.


http://pakresponse.info/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=scqw_AUZ5Dw%3D&tabid=117&mid=752

This report is a summary of the findings of a study carried out by a local partner

supported by Y Care International in the Sindh Province, Pakistan in 2012.

The study aimed to explore whether the widespread flooding that affected large

parts of Pakistan in 2010, and again in 2011 and 2012 provided opportunities for

radical groups to use humanitarian aid as a route for recruiting new members.

© Y Care International 2014

Y Care International67–69 Cowcross Street London EC1M 6BPUnited Kingdom

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