whānau ora and the collaborative turn

Whānau Ora and the Collaborative Turn

Rodney Dormer

Victoria Business School

Victoria University of Wellington

PO Box 600

Wellington 6142

New Zealand

email: [email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

Abstract

In the context of the on-going evolution of the field of public

management, this paper first explores the two interlinked concepts

of collaboration and accountability. It suggests that these are

understood and applied in a number of different ways. Using

research and semi-structured interviews with a number of government

officials and non-government service providers, the paper then

explains how these approaches are reflected in a current New Zealand

initiative of devolved governance – Whanau Ora. The different, and

at times conflicting, perspectives of New Zealand’s formal model of

public sector management and that of traditional Māori culture are

explained.

Key words: collaboration, accountability, Māori, devolvedgovernance.

1. Introduction

In New Zealand, as in many other western economies, a consequence of

the global financial crisis has been an increased pressure on the

size and scope of the budgets of government departments. At the

same time a shift in political perspectives to the centre right has

resulted in a return to broader questions as to the appropriate size

and role of government together with a renewed emphasis on the

economy and efficiency with which public expenditure occurs. In

effect, a desire for smaller, more efficient and effective

government is being coupled with an increased expectation of the

role of non-government organisations and community groups.

In New Zealand there is also a growing sense that the central

government is failing to solve (and is possibly incapable of

2Whanau Ora and the Collaborative Turn

solving) the ‘wicked’ and seemingly intractable social problems

associated with issues such as disproportionate crime rates, low

educational achievement, child abuse, drug and alcohol abuse, and

endemic health issues. These concerns were possibly heightened by

the global financial crisis which caused many to also question the

ability of current economic models to adequately facilitate

economic, environmental and social well-being. Among those critics,

leaders of New Zealand’s parliamentary Māori Party have pointed to

the failure of successive governments to solve these issues as they

relate to Māori and suggested that local communities and extended

families (whānau) should be given the funding and freedom to solve

their own problems.

New Zealand’s legislation and system of governance for public sector

expenditure reflects a constitutional principle associated with all

public expenditure by central government requiring specific

parliamentary approval. It also reflects the formal contractual

relationships that characterised much of the new public management

reforms supported by ideas drawn from new institutional economics.

However, such a framework does not readily suit the funding of

initiatives that involve devolved service specification, self

determination and value for money also measured against a cultural

rather than just an economic construct.

The Whānau Ora initiative, based on Maori cultural values, was

driven by the Maori parliamentary party as part of its coalition

agreement with the National party following the 2008 general

election. Whānau Ora represents an alternative model in which the

power of central government decision making is devolved to foster a

greater sense of local community and individual responsibility.

However, questions remain in respect of the appropriate accounting

and accountability for the use of public money. For this model to


work both those at the centre and in local communities must acquire

an improved understanding of each other’s aspirations and

limitations.

We are, therefore, left with the following questions:

What is the relationship between the largely instrumental

rationality of New Zealand’s official model of public sector

management, as codified in the Public Finance Act 1989, and

the expectations and practices of the cultural constructs

within the Whānau Ora initiative?

To what degree is the use of the funds applied in the context

of Whānau Ora consistent with the authority provided by the

related appropriations voted by Parliament?

To what extent are local communities and whanau free to

operate according to their cultural values and objectives or

are they constrained by the accountability requirements

associated with the receipt of public funding?

This paper will explore the differing perspectives and tensions

associated with devolution of responsibilities for service provision

to parties other than those comprising central government. That

devolution can occur in the context of a range of different

relationships, collectively reflected in what has been described as

the ‘collaborative turn” (O’Flynn, 2008), central to all of which is

the concept of accountability As with the relationships in which

they are embedded, accountability arrangements may also take a

number of different forms that reflect the differing relative

distributions of power and approaches to risk.

For indigenous groups such as New Zealand Maori the right to, or

aspiration for, self-management remains central to their

relationship with the modern state. For government such devolution


of power provides access to increased resources and knowledge but it

also brings increased operational and political risk.

2. The Collaborative Turn

It has been suggested that in a number of western democracies the

current model of public sector management is in decline and being

replaced by “a new government model in which executives’ core

responsibilities no longer centre on managing people and programs

but on organising resources – often belonging to others – to produce

public value” (Eggers, 2008, p. 25)1. This change involves a shift

from a hierarchical and contractual model of public sector

governance, based on principal-agent relationships and market-like

mechanisms, that has under-pinned much of the public management

reforms of the last thirty years. Rather than being seen as passive

consumers of public services (Jun, 2009) citizens and community

based groups are emerging as participants in the processes

associated with both the design and delivery of those services. In

so doing they are raising questions as to the nature and location of

power, risk and accountability.

To the extent that an alternative model is emerging, it is arguably

being driven by a number of factors that include:

a recognition that many of the complex and enduring economic,

environmental and social problems faced by governments cannot

be solved by individual government agencies working to siloed

accountabilities;

1 Although this can also be seen to reflect Metcalfe’s earlier suggestion that “if management in general is about getting things done through other people, public management is getting things done through other organisations” (Metcalfe, 1993, p. 296).


fiscal pressures that are forcing governments to seek

alternative means of service provision that include the use of

not-for-profit and private sector organisations;

the growth of a younger and more educated electorate that has

increased expectations of its ability to have an input in to

government decisions and a role in their implementation;

the expanding role of information and communication

technologies in facilitating accessibility to public

information; and

a ‘re-birth’ of the previously subsumed voice of indigenous

populations such as New Zealand Māori.

Central to, or reflective of, these changes is what O’Flynn (2008)

has referred to as “a collaborative turn”. Although calls for

collaboration between government agencies (joined up government) or

between government agencies and organisations from the not-for-

profit and private sectors are not new, O’Flynn points out that

there remains a “relative fuzziness” as to what exactly

collaboration means. Indeed, this is not an uncommon problem as

words such as ‘strategy’, ‘performance’ and ‘efficiency’ have

entered the management and public policy lexicons to be used in a

range of differing and, at times, conflicting contexts. In terms of

collaboration, those contexts involve different allocations of power

and exist along a continuum of political and management risk that

are represented in the following diagram.


Figure 1. The Collaborative Turn

Cooperation

Coercion

Consultation

Coordination

Collaboration

Self-Determ ination

Citizen Power

Low political riskHigh political risk

Governm ent Power

PURCHASE PROVIDE

High political riskLow m anagem ent risk High m anagem ent risk

2.1 Coercion

To the extent that planning and decision making powers remain with

government agencies we may conceive of the resulting relationships

as being largely coercive in nature. As Wanna (2008) suggests,

“collaboration can involve power and coercion, the ability to force

outcomes or impose one’s own preferences on another, to some extent,

with their compliance or involvement” (p. 3). In other words, while

a relationship may involve a degree of participation by both parties

at least one of them may not do so voluntarily or with a view to a

common set of objectives.

For a government agency and its responsible minister such a

relationship potentially provides the least level of management risk

but may generate a degree of political risk to the extent that

enough of those affected, and their supporters in the general

public, feel aggrieved by their lack of input into the planning and

decision making processes.


The criticism of being coercive was applied to the Australian

Government’s 2007 Northern Territory National Emergency Response

(commonly referred to as “the Intervention”). The package of

welfare and other measures was launched by Prime Minister Howard’s

government in response to reports of widespread child sexual abuse

in the Territory’s aboriginal population. However, subsequent

criticism stemmed from the compulsory nature of many of the

components of the initiative and a perceived failure to effectively

consult with the aboriginal communities concerned.

Less dramatically, the contractual relationships between government

departments and third parties in the not-for-profit sector may also

be seen as coercive to the extent that the supplier has little or no

input into the terms of contracts that they view as onerous but

unavoidable if they are to gain the related funding.

2.2 Consultation

Even though planning and decision making power may effectively

remain with ministers and central government agencies, they may

undertake consultative processes which involve “seeking feedback on,

say, a policy proposal that is already prepared and which those

consulted can only modify, endorse or reject” (Ryan, 2012, p. 99)

An example is provided by the quota management and cost recovery

provisions of New Zealand’s Fisheries Act 1996 which give affected

parties (members of the commercial fishing industry, recreational

fishers, customary māori fishers, and members of environmental lobby

groups) an opportunity to comment prior to the Minister of

Fisheries’ final decisions on proposed annual regulations in respect

of catch limits and cost recovery levies. Such a relationship is a

risk management strategy to the extent that an effective

consultation process that demonstrably precedes those decisions is

critical if the Ministry is to avoid court action by fishers in what


is a potentially very litigious environment. However, the decision

making power in respect of fisheries management rests firmly with

the Minister.

2.3 Cooperation

Whilst members of the public may be engaged in consultation on

issues that affect them, their engagement or involvement in the

decision and implementation processes may be very limited.

Cooperation, on the other hand, implies the sharing of information

and the acceptance by both parties of the need to change existing or

planned practices. In this context both managerial and political

risk may be minimised. As O’Flynn suggests this represents “an

informal relationship without a common mission in which information

is shared on an as needed basis, authority remains with each

organisation, there is little or no risk and resources and rewards

are kept separate” (2008, p. 185).

However, a major criticism of both central and local government in

New Zealand has been the extent to which attempts to solve complex

social, economic and environmental problems have been frustrated by

the retention of resources and decision making authority within

organisational silos (State Services Commission, 2011; Department of

Internal Affairs, 2012).

2.4 Coordination

On the other hand, as a response to resource interdependencies,

coordination between two or more entities suggests the existence of

at least compatible objectives and more formal communication and

planning processes. Whilst each entity retains its independent

authority, O’Flynn notes “risk enters into the equation” as

organisations become more inter-dependent with others to achieve

their broader and longer term objectives. However, given effective

coordination mechanisms, managerial risk may be minimised while, at


least for individual Ministers, political risk will increase to the

extent that reliance on another party decreases effective control.

2.5 Collaboration

Both management, and ultimately political, risk will also be

incurred as organisations more actively collaborate through the

creation of new structures, the joint acquisition and pooling of

resources, and the sharing of rewards. Collaboration may involve

planning, communicating and sharing information across multiple

levels within each organisation. Ryan (2012) has suggested that

this is a “more engaged, intensive and open-ended relationship

wherein the power to determine and decide is shared.” He notes that

such participation “… therefore assumes a deep, direct engagement

between ministers, officials and citizens working on a common goal

and built on mutual influence” (p. 99).

In the New Zealand context, an example is provided by the

Government’s 2009 Deed of Settlement in relation to the Waikato

river which provided for the co-management of the river by

establishing the Waikato River Authority consisting of one

representative from each of five local Maori tribes (iwi) and five

representatives for the Crown. Nevertheless, Muru-Lanning (2012)

has suggested:

Though pragmatic, the co-governance structure is an

inherently western model with appointed representatives

making formal statutory decisions on behalf of the various

groups. Therefore, it is a model or way of viewing the

river which is foreign to most Māori and one in which they

cannot easily participate. (p. 130)

That observer further suggested that this arrangement ultimately

represented a sub-optimal compromise for both the local iwi and the


Crown in that in focusing on management it avoided the more complex

and pressing issues associated with ownership of the river.

2.6 Self-determination

Formally, the concept of self-determination may be defined as the

ability to make decisions for oneself without influence from

outside. Providing such an ability to groups of citizens involves a

more significant transfer of power from the state and a related

increase in both managerial and political risk.

In New Zealand the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown

and native Māori tribes remains a central element of the country’s

constitutional framework. However the exact meaning of the Treaty’s

wording remains a contentious issue particularly in relation to the

extent to which the signatories ceded sovereignty or governorship to

the Crown while still being free to own their resources and control

their lives according to their customs.

Therefore, at one level, self-determination is seen in the context

of Article 2 of the Treaty and the idea of undisturbed possession of

land, forests, fisheries and tangible and intangible treasures

(taonga). In the Māori language version of the Treaty, Article 2

used the words ‘tino rangatiratanga’ or chiefly authority2. From a Maori

perspective, self-determination is viewed as involving a degree of

political autonomy and self-governance (if not actual secession).

While examples of a ‘nation within a nation’ have been established

in a number of countries (such as Norway, Canada and the United

States) to support the self-determination of indigenous peoples, in

New Zealand the equivalent concept (mana motuhake) is not well

understood or supported (Hawksley & Howson, 2011; Williams, 2007;

Durie, 2003). Plausibly part of this reticence is derived from the

2 A Māori concept of chiefly authority has been explained as “…not somebodywho tells people what to do, but it’s somebody who weaves the opinions of people together” (Hawksley & Howson, 2011, p. 250).


fact that, from a public governance perspective, a central feature

of such arrangements is the receipt of public funding together with

considerable freedom to decide how that funding will be employed.

2.7 Summary

In summary, rather than exact descriptions these versions of the

collaborative turn are broadly representative of the different

approaches that may be taken, and can be observed, in the

relationships between public sector organisations and between those

organisations and different elements of the community. However,

whatever form the collaborative turn may take there remains a number

of questions around the appropriate forms of accountability that

apply to the use of public money. As Gregory has recently observed:

It is ironical, if not paradoxical, that the emergence of a

more diverse and variegated means of delivering public goods

and services, without total reliance on state bureaucracies,

has simultaneously made it increasingly difficult to satisfy

public demands for enhanced accountability of public

officials. (Gregory, 2012, p. 685)

3. Accountability

‘Accountability’ is another word that has entered the management

lexicon to be broadly but not consistently applied. Indeed, as

Bovens (2007) has suggested, the idea of accountability “today

resembles a dustbin filled with good intentions, loosely defined

concepts and vague images of good governance” (p. 449). However,

like collaboration, concepts of power and risk are central to how

accountability arrangements are structured.

For many observers (and practitioners) accountability most simply

implies that one person is responsible to someone else for the

performance of a predefined task and the use of related authority


and resources (Gregory 2012). In terms of ‘financial

accountability’ (Behn, 2001) for the use of public money the New

Zealand Treasury has explained:

Accountability for public money is central to contracting and

funding arrangements in the public sector. This involves:

• Being clear why and how money is to be spent.

• Ensuring that it is spent for the purposes it was provided.

• Having reasonable assurance that the expenditure is value

for money.

• Having a credible response where the expected services are

not provided.

• Accounting to Ministers, Parliament and the public. (NZ

Treasury, 2009)

This conception of accountability reflects a traditional view of

management within a set of hierarchical relationships that require

subordinates to comply with externally derived expectations and

standards of performance. Thus for the last twenty five years the

conceptual framework and evolving model of public management in New

Zealand (and many other Western democracies) has framed

accountability in a series of hierarchically structured mandates

from the electorate to the legislature, from the legislature to

ministers, from ministers to departmental chief executives, chief

executives to senior managers, and so on. At least in theory, this

model employs contractual, or quasi contractual, agreements between

an agent and a singular principal and tends to preclude a broader

view of accountability that includes other parties (both existing

and yet to be born). It manages performance through the clear

specification of objectives and related metrics. This then also


requires that the objectives sought and results obtained are both

reasonably unambiguous and measurable.

However this instrumentally rational model is seldom practical in

the varying public sector contexts in which the work undertaken

and/or its results are neither definable in advance nor subsequently

identifiable (Wilson, 1989; Gregory, 1995) and in which objectives

are frequently multiple, conflicting and vague (Wildavsky, 1979).

It also follows that the collaborative turn further complicates

these issues as more actors, and potentially competing perspectives,

are added to the mix. Rather than a series of formally mandated,

linear relationships the collaborative turn creates a world of

sometimes shared objectives, inter-dependencies, overlapping

mandates, and resource competition. Such a world of polycentric

governance arrangements (Tollefson et al, 2012) reflects Hooghe and

Marks (2003) Type II governance in which “there is no up or under,

no lower or higher, no dominant class of actor but, rather, a wide

range of public and private actors who collaborate and compete in

shifting coalitions” (p. 238). Considine (2002) has suggested that:

The question then becomes one of tailoring accountability

arrangements to reflect a mix of vertical and horizontal

imperatives, depending on how much consensus and how much

risk is to be accepted (p. 28).

That author also goes on to stress that in this context

accountability needs to move beyond performance against a plan or

contract, framed in legal or quasi-market terms, to a culturally-

based management of the whole in a concert framed by core values and

agreed principles. However, such an approach still implies the

existence, or creation, of a singular set of core values and

principles.


Romzek (2000) has noted that at different times actors may be

involved in different accountability relationships that are framed

in hierarchical, legal or political contexts all of which will

require compliance with externally derived rules and standards. In

contrast she suggests that “professional accountability”

relationships involve “performance standards established by

professional norms, accepted protocols and prevailing practices of

one’s peer or work group” (p. 26). This concept might be further

extended to encompass a cultural accountability that is based on a

distinct set of cultural norms and practices. How that cultural

accountability is managed at the same time as the hierarchical,

legal and political accountabilities that underpin New Zealand’s

model of public management is central to the tensions within New

Zealand’s treaty partnership between Māori and European cultures and

values.

The reality of accountable management in the context of the public

sector is, then, complicated by both the multiple perspectives to

which public managers need to respond and by the measurement

difficulties that exist in relation to many public sector functions.

However, despite the disconnect between this reality and the formal

hierarchical and legal model (Romzek, 2000) we are left with the

suspicion that it is the formal model that shapes how accountability

is understood and exercised by officials and elected members.

4. Method

The research involved a review and analysis of publicly available

documents from New Zealand’s central government agencies,

principally the Ministry for Māori Development (Te Puni Kokiri), as

well as those of community groups and providers involved in the

Whānau Ora initiative. A search of news media websites for articles

and reported speeches relating to Whānau Ora was also undertaken.


Eight semi-structured interviews were also conducted. A request for

an interview with the Minister for Whānau Ora was declined. Three

senior government officials interviewed were those holding primary

responsibility for the initiative in the affected departments,

namely the Ministry for Māori Development, the Ministry of Social

Development and the Ministry of Health.

Similarly, two managers interviewed from District Health Boards were

those holding primary responsibility for māori issues. New

Zealand’s District Health Boards are responsible for administering

most of the day-to-day business of the country’s health and

disability system and around three quarters of its funding. The two

health boards selected came from a largely urban and relatively

affluent region and a more rural region that is facing significant

economic challenges.

Gaining access to local community-based organisations proved

difficult with a number of those approached not returning phone

calls and emails. This may in part be a reflection of the workloads

that these, often small, organisations have to manage. However,

there was also a sense that some of those approached were not

willing to publicly discuss issues that at the time were receiving

significant negative media attention. Of those interviewed, two

came from small community-based organisations providing social

services and one interviewee was responsible for managing health and

welfare services for an urban marae3. All three of those

organisations were currently in receipt of Whānau Ora funding.

Notes were taken during these interviews which were also transcribed

and a copy provided to each interviewee for correction or further3 In New Zealand a marae is piece of land and a group of buildings, associated with a māori tribe or sub-tribe, that serves as a focus for social and cultural events and activities, where social and family events are celebrated and important issues discussed and ceremonies performed.


comment. The final documents were loaded into the NVivo software

where successive readings allowed the recurring themes, and common

and differing ideas, to emerge.

5. Whānau Ora

Whānau Ora is a New Zealand central government initiative managed by

Te Puni Kokiri (the Ministry of Māori Development). For the

2012/2013 financial year the Ministry received an appropriation of

$9.2 million to fund activities associated with implementing,

developing and evaluating the whānau ora service delivery approach.

On behalf of the Minister for Whānau Ora (Hon Tariana Turia) the

Ministry also managed funding of $33.2 million to provide support to

service providers to develop whānau ora service delivery capability

and $6.4 million to support whānau integration, innovation and

engagement.

For many Māori the concept of whānau ora was not a new one when the

current Government’s initiative and funding was first appropriated

to Vote Māori Affairs in 2010. As a focus on the broader wellbeing

of Māori it lay at the core of the 2002 Māori Health Strategy, Te

Korowai Oranga, which stated that its overall aim: “is whānau ora –

Māori families supported to achieve their maximum health and

wellbeing” (Ministry of Health, 2002, p. 1). Following the 2008

formation of the coalition government between the National and Māori

parties and the appointment of a Māori MP, Dr Pita Sharples, as

Minister of Māori Affairs, the Ministry’s strategy was redefined to

specifically include an objective of Whānau Ora in its 2009-2012

Statement of Intent. That document stated that:

Whānau Ora is descriptive of a state where the combined

cultural, spiritual, social and economic wellbeing of Māori

people, and the kinship of other collectives to which they

belong, interact in a manner which optimises their overall


wellbeing according to their own preferences and norms. (Te

Puni Kokiri, 2009, p. 11)

A Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives was subsequently convened

in 2009. Its report in 2010 (Te Puni Kokiri, 2010) provided

recommendations in respect of a framework by which whānau-centred

services might be provided and identified the following goals for

whānau, to be:

self managing

living healthy lifestyles

participating fully in society

confidently participating in te ao Māori (the Māori world),

economically secure and successfully involved in wealth

creation; and

cohesive, resilient and nurturing. (Te Puni Kokiri, 2010, p.

7)

There is no standard definition of ‘whānau’. For most people

outside of te ao Māori it is generally seen to mean ‘family’ or

‘extended family’. The 2009 Taskforce on Whānau-Centred Initiatives

interpreted whānau to mean “a multi-generational collective made up

of households that are supported and strengthened by a wider network

of relatives” (Te Puni Kokiri, 2010, p. 13). Mason Durie (the

chairman of that taskforce) has elsewhere placed whanau at the

centre of the survival and development of Māori culture and society

(Durie, 2003). He suggests that for whānau to play its proper role

its capacity to care, share, provide guardianship, empower, plan

ahead and grow must all be recognised and reinforced. Thus

investing in and growing the strength (mana) of whānau in spiritual

and cultural terms is seen as an end in itself (Winiata, 2005).

As part of this research an interviewee from a District Health Board

(DHB) therefore drew a distinction between Whānau Ora as an


“aspirational goal” and Whānau Ora as a shorter-term “programme”

(regional 1). The aspirational goal was also described by an

interviewee from a local provider collective who stated that “Māori

have their own Whānau Ora, and have had it for a long time”. (S)he

explained that this is based on the concept of whanaungatanga which

represents the links or connectedness between family members,

friends or others with whom reciprocal relationships exist. (S)he

suggested that loss or breakdown of these links was historically

associated with “that loss of history, that loss of connection, that

loss of land, that loss of identity, of productivity, of skill mix,

of capacity and capability” (local 1). (S)he also explained that

Ora is not then:

“Ora as in health as we think about it … [but rather] … how

do you get the potential, whānau potential, to be expressed

in all the ways that whānau want – whether its housing,

whether its education, whether its travel”.

However, it was also suggested that Whānau Ora has become something

of a brand in as much as both funders, including district health

boards, and local providers of social services are seeking to state

‘this is our Whānau Ora strategy’. Perhaps reflecting this

response, Whānau Ora the programme was also described by a local

provider as “a window of opportunity” to advance longer-term

objectives related to Māori development. Generally, at the local

level, the possible impact of the departure of the current Minister

for Whānau Ora or the loss by the Māori Party of its status as a

government coalition partner was not described as a major concern.

Rather it was suggested that individual ministers and differing

policy initiatives may come and go and Māori must therefore take

what advantage they can from each of them.


On the other hand central government officials that were interviewed

were more simply concerned with implementing Whānau Ora as a

Government policy. This was explained in terms of utilising

government funding “to position a group of providers of services in

order to be able to work with whānau rather than necessarily with

individuals … [and] to progress work with whānau more directly to

look at building their capability and capacity to be self-managing”

(national 2). Arguably, the logic of a capability and capacity to

be more self-managing (but not self-governing) fits within a broader

philosophical and policy framework of smaller (less) government.

These officials were clear that the Whānau Ora “funding is entirely

about capacity and capability; it is not about the purchase of any

social services or health services” (national 3). However, this is

seemingly in stark contrast to a broader public, and at times

political, perception that the related appropriations may in some

way be used to fund the provision of a range of social services to

the public (see, for example, 3 News 2012; Dominion Post, 2013). As

one official explained:

There’s a lot of confusion about what Whānau Ora is and

isn’t. It’s everything from solving child poverty through

to the latest sort of housing innovation activity to provide

for affordable and social housing. There’s a huge diversity

on what people think it’s going to achieve. …[But] it’s not

a programme or service. (national 2)

Similarly another central government manager explained how the

cancellation of contracts with some community providers for ‘Family

Start’ home visits by social workers was reported in the media as a

removal of Whānau Ora funding. However, in reality the only link

between these service delivery contracts and Whānau Ora was that the


five organisations involved were also receiving funding from the

Whānau Ora initiative.

Perhaps central to the definitional issues around the scope and

objectives of the Government’s Whānau Ora initiative is the more

specific issue of whether or not it is targeted solely at Māori or

applies more broadly to New Zealanders as a whole. As noted above,

the initiative arose out of the 2010 Taskforce Report which was

strongly anchored in a Māori context and view of the world. Part of

the terms of reference for the taskforce was to:

… determine how government agencies could better work

together to deliver whānau-centred interventions; as well as

good practice between the public sector, private sector,

not-for-profit sector and Māori. (p. 68)

The subsequent initiative and funding has been managed by Te Puni

Kokiri and, despite ministerial statements to the contrary and a

limited amount of funding being provided to non-māori organisations,

the initiative has been the subject of public and political

criticism for being racially-based and discriminatory against non-

māori. However, as a Māori interviewee from a District Health Board

explained:

… at the end of the day what sits under a whānau-orientated

set of values is the principle of manaakitanga or caring … it

isn’t just for Māori; it can’t be because many of us have

non-māori in our families. (regional 1)

A manager of a local health services provider similarly invoked

manaakitanga to explain that his/her organisation could not limit the

provision of services to Māori and stated:

I know we’re a Māori organisation but if you follow kaupapa

Māori [Māori traditions and values] it doesn’t matter where


you come from … and once you walk past that door you’re part

of the whānau, that’s the whole. (local 3)

The operational and political risks associated with the Whānau Ora

programme were acknowledged by a number of the interviewees. A

manager from a District Health Board noted that:

allowing a non-government entity to define and decide has a

level of risk …[but] if you are willing to live with the

potential for innovation that is beyond the safe way of

thinking then it can be done; but I have to say from a

contracting perspective it is very, very challenging.

(regional 1)

Those challenges were reflected in the suggestion by another

District Health Board manager that the Whānau Ora programme had

become “a political football” (regional 2) and in the comment from a

central government official that (s)he had been instructed by the

Minister to keep away from the risks that are particularly

associated with that part of the initiative relating to the Whānau

Integration, Innovation and Engagement (WIIE) fund. Despite its

very small size ($6.2 million) in the context of the Government’s

overall $93 billion budget, the WIIE fund has proved the most

contentious element of the Whānau Ora programme. Te Puni Kokiri’s

website suggests that the Fund will provide for activities that will

“support whānau to engage with each other, with other whānau,

communities and providers” with the objective of building whānau

capability, strengthening whānau connectedness and supporting the

development of whānau leadership (Te Puni Kokiri, 2013). Such

statements resonate with the comments in respect of the role and

importance of connectedness in local communities made by the local

providers that were interviewed as part of this research. However,

in Parliament and the media the Government has been attached on the


basis that these activities represent “family reunions” which are

“an appalling waste of tax-payers money” (Peters, 2012a).

As noted above, the Whānau Ora programme arose from a political

initiative, as part of a coalition agreement for New Zealand’s

central government, which in 2009 initially established a Taskforce

on Whānau Centred Initiatives. This was given the principal

objective of constructing an evidence-based framework that, as well

as leading to improved whānau capabilities, would also reflect the

Government’s concern for “improved cost effectiveness and value for

money” (Te Puni Kokiri, 2009, p. 68). The job of developing an

implementation plan for the Taskforce’s recommendations was then

given to a central government Ministry, Te Puni Kokiri, with the

objective to:

… see some health and social service providers identified

and supported with capability funding to shift their

existing service delivery approach to being more focused on

how to work across a household of individuals, or multiple

households of individuals, to further the individual and

collective outcomes. (national 2)

The framework that was subsequently developed represents a

hierarchical chain of:

a national governance group to provide oversight and advice to

the Minister for Whānau Ora;

regional leadership groups, based on Te Puni Kokiri’s regional

structure and boundaries, to provide strategic leadership, to

foster local coordination and relationships, and to provide

advice to the governance group;

provider collectives (currently there are 34 of these)

representing local groups of providers of social services who


work together to develop whanau-centred models of service

provision; and

‘navigators’ who work with individual whanau and families to

help them identify and plan for their service needs.

The formal structure and central direction of this programme was

acknowledged by interviewees from central government departments and

regional District Health Boards. A manager in a government

department explained the need for central government control by

stating:

When we talk about self-determination it’s not absolute. It

can’t be absolute because in a society we have certain

expectations about the way people behave; we have

expectations about the way people will be treated, about how

families might work. (national 1)

The interviewees spoken to did not distinguish the accountability

framework in respect of Whānau Ora from that applying to normal

contracts for the provision of goods and services4. In terms of

government contracts for the delivery of services, an interviewee

from a regional Health Board (DHB) argued for a classically

contractual model of accountability that involves a need for

Ministers to provide “really clear and really explicit policy” and

“clear accountabilities for targets”. (S)he stated:

… when you have clear direction and leadership like that we

all know what we’re being held accountable for and then we

all know the areas we need to perform in. (regional 1)

4 This may in part be explained by earlier use of ‘whānau ora’ in other contexts. Thus in 2011 the government agency responsible for the purchase of social services, Family and Community Services (FACS), renamed its Family Violence Whānau Ora Fund to the Family-Centred Services Fund – a semantic exercise that would have been lost on the non-government agencies receiving the related funding.


On the other hand an interviewee from central government

acknowledged that feedback from many service providers reflected

their perception of a coercive, or at best cooperative, approach to

the collaborative relationship. Their comments suggested that:

… this is a master-servant relationship; you’re the master,

you’re the funder and you tell us what we’ve got to do and

we go and do it. (national 2)

Similarly a manager of a local service provider explained that

although that organisation had followed a Whānau-centred approach

“since time began” it had not been helped by the government’s

contracting model:

… has that been supported at all by the way that we’ve

received our contracts, or by the funding, or by the

outcomes that have been asked of us – all of those things –

and obviously the answer is no. (local 2)

The problem of encompassing the full scope of services that are

provided locally in formal, nationally derived contracts was also

noted by other providers that were interviewed. It was explained

how there will always be other things outside of a contract that

would be picked up by local providers. For example:

Nobody’s ever going to contract for transport to take

somebody to the dentist; or nobody’s is ever, ever going to

contract to say, ‘well this mother has got no transport we

need to get them up to the paediatrician or the doctor. You

know, there isn’t the money for that. (local 1)

Another local provider explained how that organisation received a

number of different contracts which together provided capacity and

scope for it to also undertake a number of unfunded activities.


(S)he also explained that, as those contracts tended to be for a

predefined, and relatively short, period, the organisation:

… moves the clients around so we can keep them. So most of

our contracts will say things like, six months and then

you’ve got to move them on. Well, if you’re working with a

family for the last two generations … ! (local 2)

The issue was further highlighted by criticism from a Minister of a

local breakfast programme for young school children that was being

run by a community provider. The Minister suggested that it was not

the organisation’s job to feed them but was told that the resources

were not:

… coming off the contract apart from probably using the

infrastructure – that maybe the rental of the building might

have been paid for by the contract but that was a positive

thing, adding leverage. (local 1)

The nature of the tensions inherent within relationships between

central government and/or District Heath Boards and local service

providers and communities was summarised by the interviewee who

observed:

… if you have an entity, a governance entity, sitting

outside of another governance entity trying to impact, and

direct, and guide, and influence what’s essentially the role

and responsibilities, and functions of this entity, then

it’s always going to run into some significant challenges in

the absence of really clear and really explicit policy.

(regional 1)

6. Conclusions

The formal model by which the departments of New Zealand’s central

government are governed, and which in turn governs the relationships


between those departments and organisations outside of government,

is built on concepts drawn from new institutional economics and

private sector practices. These concepts require ex ante

specification of, and ex post accountability for, clearly specified

objectives and performance targets. That accountability relates to

a hierarchically structured series of mandates by which agents, as

individuals or individual organisations, receive resources and

authority from a single principal. The collaborative relationships

involved therefore sit to the left side of Figure 1 above; they are

at best consultative or cooperative. The related accountability

arrangements are designed to minimise management and political risk.

From a government policy perspective the devolution of

responsibility provided by the Whānau Ora initiative can, therefore,

be seen as a step towards smaller government and a society in which

individuals look to themselves and services provided by market-like

forces rather than government intervention.

In contrast, from a Māori perspective the Whānau Ora initiative was

conceived against a different set of values and expectations.

Rather than deliverables measured in the context of an annual

appropriation, or at best a three year parliamentary term, the

objectives are long term and potentially inter-generational and

accountability is based on cultural as much as economic criteria.

Rather than specific deliverables defined centrally in a

departmental output plan in terms of quantity, time and cost, the

Whānau Ora programme seeks to, more flexibly, involve locally

defined problems and solutions. In contrast to accusations that

Whānau Ora involves the funding of self-referential group of Māori,

a “bro-ocracy” (Peters, 2012b), providers in receipt of Whānau Ora

funding that were interviewed emphasised a kaupapa (Māori custom) of

manaakitanga (hospitality) and inclusiveness.


The relationships between government and providers that are thereby

envisaged sit to the far right of the collaborative turn shown in

Figure 1 above. From this perspective the initiative represents a

step towards mana motuhake or, at least for the staff interviewed in

community-based organisations, it represents another opportunity in

a long struggle for social, economic and cultural equality.

Accountability arrangements are then focused both upwards and

downwards, are inter-generational and designed to also minimise

cultural and spiritual risk.

However, these broader objectives and concepts of accountability

have not sat comfortably alongside the formal model. Perhaps in an

attempt to defend the initiative against political criticism,

Minister Turia and her officials at Te Puni Kokiri have more

recently emphasised the need for evidence, albeit in the form of

anecdote or “stories of change”, that demonstrates its success. She

has explained:

As far as I’m concerned, whānau are the best ones to tell us

whether Whānau Ora is working for them – because their

stories count. (Turia, 2012)

On the other hand, the chairman of the Whānau Ora Taskforce, Prof.

Mason Durie, has acknowledged that some form of quantified

measurement is important as, “in the end that is what our funders

are looking for” (Durie, 2012). However, he also drew a distinction

between traditional contractual measures that focus on the quantity

of inputs such as numbers of staff or the number of particular

activities such as immunisations, and a focus on quantified measures

of achievements. This latter category, he suggested, should include

items such as the percentage of Māori who are home owners or

succeeding in a programme of education, or participating in marae.


Again, the focus on achievement was described in far-reaching terms,

beyond specific ex-ante specification, that relate to:

… an impact that has a broader meaning than a focus on the

results of specific intervention. The impact of it should

go well beyond the families you are dealing with to embrace

communities, to have an impact on iwi5, and to shape a model

of practice that will go well beyond the providers you are

dealing with. (Durie, 2012)

The Whānau Ora initiative represents both a contradiction and a

challenge in the on-going evolution of the New Zealand model of

public management and, indeed, of its society. It reflects the

continuing divergence in New Zealand society between different

understandings and enactments of the relationship under the Treaty

of Waitangi between Māori and other New Zealanders. Not that New

Zealand is any way alone as a state that encompasses different

cultural groups, both indigenous and imported.

Whānau Ora therefore represents an opportunity to more broadly frame

concepts of accountability and more effectively engage all citizens

in identifying and implementing solutions to the seemingly

intractable social problems that are also not unique to New Zealand.

This will, however, require further research that does not seek to

establish the supremacy of one worldview over another. Rather it

will require an approach that promotes a more open dialogue and

willingness to both inform and be informed.

5 A māori tribe.


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