Transforming Political Party Landscapes 

in Europe

Assessing the Influence of European Anti­Austerity Movements on thePolitical Party Landscapes in Spain, Italy and Greece

Supervisor Pia Sombetzki

Tannelie Blom 19 June 2015

Table of Contents

1. Introduction........................................................................................................................................1

2. Literature Review...............................................................................................................................3

3. Bridging two stances on resource mobilization theory......................................................................5

4. Methodology....................................................................................................................................10

5. Applying 'mediated' resource mobilization theory...........................................................................11

5.1 Spain................................................................................................................................11

5.2 Italy..................................................................................................................................14

5.3 Greece..............................................................................................................................16

6. Discussion of Variations...................................................................................................................19

7. Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................21

Bibliography.........................................................................................................................................23

1. IntroductionThe global financial crisis hit countries all over Europe in 2008 and resulted in political response in the

form of heavy austerity measures imposed by the Troika (European Union, the European Central Bank

and the International Monetary Fund) in the following years. Early on in Ireland but also at a later stage

in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece, citizens had to face the severe social consequences from the major

economic breakdown which generated structural problems such as high unemployment rates. Heavy

waves of protest characterized the scene in Europe, peaking in thousands of people demonstrating in

2013.

The outcomes which followed after these waves of protests were generally not the same in these

different countries. In 2011, especially in the European South, governments were changed even before

the natural end of the legislature (Borreca, 2014). Whereas there are still protests in Ireland occurring

today, little has changed in the political party landscape of the country (McCarten, 2015, 'Northern

Ireland Workers Protest'; Cox, 2012). At the same time especially the rise of the Syriza party and its

lead position in the Greek government raises the question which factors have determined these different

outcomes and what was the influence of protests and citizens acting collectively as opposing social

movements. In this regard, the paper intends to gain new insights in the debate on political influence of

social movements at large. Particularly it aims at identifying the factors which caused an influence on

the political party landscapes in Spain, Italy and Greece in the aftermath of European anti-austerity

protests. This case selection excludes Portugal and Ireland, initially being part of the group of countries

which has been subject to austerity measures. However, Portugal and Ireland do not display significant

structural changes in their political party landscapes.

The paper follows the definition of social movements as “politically acting and as seeking to

alter power deficits and effect social transformations through the state by mobilizing regular citizens

for sustained political action” (Tilly 1999, Amenta et al. 2012). In contrast to many single-case studies,

this paper concentrates not on particular social movements but streams of movements, at large

contributing to structural political change. In line with this, it aims to go beyond analyses of changes

that concern legislation and merely the agenda-setting stage (Amenta et al., 2010). It rather investigates

the influence on the political party landscape which may generate more long-term effects than a mere

influence on a single piece or a set of legislation. By having the possibility to change a country's

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political direction as a party, chances may be higher to affect general policy fields, eg. social policy

which may also affect the country's behavior towards actors such as the Troika.

The analysis is based on an investigation of Edwards and Kane's (2014) five resource types (1)

material, (2) human, (3) social-organizational, (4) cultural and (5) moral resources, determining how

social movements gain influence. Their theoretical approach achieves to bridge conventional resource

mobilization theory and the culturally-centered approach1 of New Social Movement theory.

By explaining and comparing the different factors which influenced the political structural

outcomes in the five countries, this comparative study shows how especially the mobilization of

publicly accessible resources, including symbols and slogans and a generally horizontally-organized

party structure and campaign, proved to be the key for the success of parties such as Podemos in Spain,

the Five Star Movement in Italy and Syriza in Greece.

The structure of this paper pursues as follows: First, the literature review provides an insight

into the general debate of political influence of social movements and the merely policy-based outcome

analyses that are already in place. Second, the analytical framework based on Edwards and Kane's

'mediated' resource mobilization theory is presented and the resource types are explained and

operationalized. Third, the analytical framework is applied to the observed outcomes in Spain, Italy and

Greece. Fourth, the paper aims to identify the variations which explain the processes towards the

respective outcomes in the three countries and to make general claims about how and which resources

to mobilize to generate influence on the political party landscape in one's country.

2. Literature ReviewAs Amenta, Caren, Chiarello and Su (2010) argue in their review of studies investigating political

consequences of social movements, especially within the last ten years, the debate mainly centered

around the question if social movements generally matter in politics (Baumgartner & Mahoney 2005,

Piven 2006, Skocpol 2003, Burnstein & Sausner 2005, Giugni 2007). Gamson's (1990) idea of success,

namely the creation of new advantages and acceptance, has long been the basis for the debate on

political consequences of social movements. However, this research field has been greatly modified in

the recent past. Instead of following a classical success-failure dichotomy which Giugni criticized to be

in place already in 1998, scholars began to apply alternative perspectives based on political

sociological concepts such as collective goods or on group-wise advantages or disadvantages (cf.

Amenta & Young 1999). For example, Giugni et al. (1999) argue that there may also occur unintended

1 New Social Movement theory focuses on the importance of a 'cultural' mobilization of slogans, common identities etc.

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consequences a social movement may not anticipate priorly. In this regard, Tilly gives the example of

the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was intended to help minorities in their struggle for freedom and

equality. However, they stress that the attention that was given to the topic also triggered repression and

violence by authorities as well as by segregationists, especially so in the South of the US (p.xiv). In line

with this reasoning, also other scholars considered the possibility that social movements might even do

worse than fail (Piven and Cloward 1977, Fording 2001, Snow & Soule 2009).

Existing literature has further addressed the conditions under which social movements can be

politically influential. Conventionally, scholars referred to the factors that also relate to the

mobilization of social movements when answering this question. Mc Carthy & Zald (2002), Mc Veigh

et al. (2003), Andrews (2004), and King et al. (2005) all looked at the resources and the 'mobilizing

structures' that caused the emergence of social movements to explain in how far they can be politically

influential. Other scholars referred to framing strategies when explaining the degree of political

influence of social movements (Cress & Snow 2000, McCright & Dunlap 2003, McVeigh et al. 2004,

McCammon et al 2008, McCammon 2009). Further, various scholars looked at political opportunities

and contexts to explain the extent to which social movements could generate a political influence

(Giugni 2004, Meyer & Minkhoff 2004, Soule 2004, Meyer 2005, McVeigh et al. 2006).

Considering these different explanations for the extent of political influence social movements

might have, the general problem persists that influence often does not go beyond an attention-getting

phase (Amenta et al., 2010, p.14.3). Besides, most research conducted on the influence of social

movements was largely related to single pieces of legislation and policy in general (ibid., p.14.8).

This paper acknowledges the issues discussed in previous studies primarily focusing on the

directly legislative level. However, it goes further than this by pursuing the analysis of more structural

changes in the political party landscapes of the three countries. Moreover, this paper responds to the

lack of comparative studies on European anti-austerity movements and contributes especially to the

assessment of their electoral influence and the investigation of the factors which caused this influence.

3. Bridging two stances on resource mobilization theoryThis paper carefully addresses the existence of two parallelly existing paradigms in social movement

research. As Scholl (2014) indicates, generally two different ways of analyzing social movements

prevail. Mostly scholars distinguish between social movements occurring in Europe and those

emerging in the US. Whereas social movements in an US context are mostly analyzed from a rational-

choice actor stance that especially highlights resource mobilization and political process theory, in

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Europe in the 1960s/70s New Social Movement theory emerged with a greater focus on culture and

identity formation as triggering points for social movements to occur.

Edwards and Kane (2014) propose an approach which bridges the assumptions of these

opposing standpoints. They identify (a) money (McCammon et al., 2001; Andrews et al., 2010), (b)

people (Fetner and Kush, 2008; Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; Kane, 2010,2013; Olzak and Ryo, 2007;

Andrews et al., 2010; McGurty, 2009) and (c) organizations (Kane, 2003; Olzak and Ryo,2007;

Johnson, 2008; Greve et al., 2006; Andrews and Caren, 2010; Soule and King, 2008; Gillham and

Edwards, 2011; Rohlinger, 2002; Edwards and Foley, 2003) as the three conventional spheres on which

rational-choice based resource mobilization is grounded upon. Alternatively, Edwards and Kane

establish a model which incorporates five resources that eventually mediate the opposing stances on

resource mobilization theory: (1) material, (2) human, (3) social-organizational, (4) cultural and (5)

moral resources. In the following sections these five resources are explained and operationalized for the

purpose of the analysis of this paper.

Material resources (1)

Traditionally, the most important material resource is considered to be money. The category material

resources clearly acknowledges the importance money has, however also combines it with other forms

of financial and physical capital. What makes money and generally material resources so necessary to

investigate, is its capacity to be transformed into other resources. For example, money enables actors to

pay salaries for labor (human resources) or also to provide the means to mobilize social-organizational

and cultural resources (Edwards and Kane, p.212).

The parties to be investigated generally emerged by mobilizing the resources linked to the

characteristics of the autonomous social movements that were in place prior to their occurrence.

Accordingly, factors such as their methods of financing and the mobilization of other forms of financial

and physical capital for example through (a) crowdfunding or the provision of micro-credits by their

adherents have to be analyzed.

Human resources (2):

In the second category human resources, Edwards and Kane (2014) include labor, experience, skills

and expertise. What they add to this classical view on human resources is the factor leadership. They

argue that mobilization for a cause is very often not only influenced by numbers of people, but is

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determined by charisma and credibility of the people in a leading position. Edwards and Kane in this

context refer to Becker's (1964) stance on human capital which includes value-added components such

as experience, savvy, skills, or expertise. In the analysis, the (b) professional and social backgrounds of

the leading persons in the movements and parties respectively, have to be investigated. Moreover, (c)

quantitative numbers of participants should not be completely excluded in the analysis of European

developments in the political party landscapes, also to possibly assess the strength and

representativeness of a movement or party (ibid., p.213).

Social-organizational resources (3)

Edwards and Kane (2014) base the category social-organizational resources on the sociological

concept social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Foley and Edwards, 1999; Lin, 2001). It refers

to an ability of movements or parties to utilize social relations and their positions in specific social

networks to access resources. This perspective on social-organizational resources helps to understand in

how far not only formal organizations of movements and parties matter but also generally

infrastructures, social ties and networks, affinity groups and coalitions (McCarthy, 1996). Access to

social-organizational resources can be uneven due to the organizational infrastructure and the capacity

of ties, networks, groups and coalitions. Consequently, unevenness creates an unequal access also to

other resources such as material, human or cultural resources. The analysis focuses in this context on

the (d) preexistence of networks among the political actors that achieved to mobilize.

Cultural resources (4):

In the category cultural resources, it is also useful to consider the sociological concept of 'cultural

capital' by Bourdieu (1986), acknowledging that cultural resources are never evenly distributed and not

for every actor, potential social movement actors or political parties, equally accessible. Edwards and

Kane (2014) include in this category the movements' products such as music, literature, blogs, web

pages, or films/videos, which display their symbols and represent beliefs, values and identities. Social

movements which possess a rich variety of these cultural products, may especially experience

facilitated recruitment processes and an easier socialization of new adherents. Further, among these the

readiness for collective action is generally fostered (ibid., p.215f.).

In the analysis it needs to be investigated in how far political parties took up the (e) symbols

and especially slogans of autonomous anti-austerity movements in order to provide a link between

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adherents of movements and the political party.

Moral resources (5)

Often excluded from the conventional resource mobilization theory but not less important, are factors

such as legitimacy, authenticity, solidarity support, sympathetic support, and celebrity for the

emergence and sustainment of social movements and political parties (Cress and Snow, 1966). The

factor which is most often considered in research is the aspect legitimacy, as it is supposed to link

macro-cultural contexts and micro-organizational processes together (Suchman, 1995). Effectively, the

collective action which best imitates institutionally features, e.g. official elections, assemblies et cetera

are most likely considered to be legitimate (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Powell and DiMaggio, 1992). In

this regard, the (f) campaign strategy is investigated in the analysis.

Further, celebrities can increase a movement's or party's media coverage and generate public

attention as well as open doors to potential allies. A similar effect has the winning of awards and the

receiving of public endorsements from widely respected public figures (p. 217f.). In some of the

country cases, (g) celebrity engagement might have added to successful resource mobilization. In the

analysis, factors that determined the legitimacy of parties, eg. attempting a similarity to autonomous

movements in its way of organization, transparency and collectivity, are investigated.

Context-independence/dependence and proprietary

Edwards and Kane position the explained resources on a scale between fully context-independent

(fungible) and context-dependent (idiosyncratic). Each resource can be aligned on this scale. Further,

they highlight that resources are always either more or either less proprietary. This means that

resources vary in the degree to which individuals or collective actors can control their access to them.

Edwards and Kane describe the context-independent use value of resources as one which can be

(1) easily transferred between persons or organizations and (2) which is relatively constant from one

social-political context to the next. They give the example of money as a resource which could easily

be transferred into another. Nevertheless, they acknowledge that there prevail limits to conversions, as

it appears for example difficult to impossible to convert money into a moral resource such as

legitimacy.

The context-dependent use value of a resource is determined by (1) socio-cultural and political

factors and (2) the purpose for which it is used. Even though social-organizational resources can be

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valuable in any context, they are often limited to a specific geographical context. Edwards and Kane

take labor as an example which can be valuable in numbers and thereby makes it less context-

dependent. In contrast to that, human capital in form of skills or specific expertise is much more

context-dependent and not always accessible.

The limits to accessibility further relate to the second concept they describe: proprietary.

Resources generally range from being completely proprietary to being broadly accessible in the public

domain. Whereas material resources and human labor are good examples for resources which are rather

proprietary, as the decision of participation and contribution is mostly taken individually, cultural

resources are less proprietary. Movement repertoires, templates for action and display, and slogans are

publicly accessible. In contrast to this, moral resources are mainly proprietary as they are established

through a specific exchange situation of two parties. If social-organizational resources are either highly

proprietary or more widely accessible depends on the logic the organization follows. For autonomous

movements which are mostly organized non-hierarchically and which build their organization around

Internet platforms and Social Media, a wider accessibility to their social-organizational resources is

provided.

The characteristics of the aforementioned resources and their degree of proprietary and context

dependence clearly influence in how far social movements and their actions may be influential for the

restructuring of the political party landscapes in the studied countries. In this regard, when analyzing

the mobilization of the resources before explained, especially the assessment of their value in terms of

context-dependence/independence has to be incorporated.

In the table below the operationalization of the resources is linked to the factors context-

dependence/independence as well as proprietary:

context-dependent

resources

(-) public accessibility context-independent

resources

(+) public accessibility

Socio-organizational

resources:

(d) preexistence of

networks

depending on prior

specific human

relations and

interactions; highly

personal, context-

material resources:

(a) crowdfunding;

micro-credits by

adherents

online platforms

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dependent

human resources:

(b) professional and

social backgrounds

(c) numbers of

participants

depending on individual

developments

decision of participation

and contribution is

taken individually

cultural resources:

(e) symbols and

slogans of autonomous

anti-austerity

movements

movement repertoires,

templates for action and

display, slogans: highly

adaptive and

identification easily

achieved

moral resources:

(g) celebrity

engagement

depends on context-

specific factors such as

prior links to

movement; timing et

cetera

moral resources:

(f) campaign strategy imitation of institutional

features

Scale: - = more proprietary/ less publicly accessible; + = less proprietary/ easier to publicly access

The assumption that becomes evident from this theoretical framework is that the success of a party is

likelier when it achieves to mobilize resources which are most publicly accessible and most context-

independent.

4. MethodologyThis paper pursues an exploratory qualitative analysis and follows a similar case design. In five

countries, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Ireland, austerity measures were imposed to different

extents by the Troika. On a second level, in all the five countries, contention in the form of civil

protests and a mobilization of opponents followed. The outcomes were different in all countries,

however it can be noted that in Spain, Italy and Greece structural changes occurred in the countries'

political party landscapes. In contrast, in Portugal and Ireland such structural changes cannot be

observed (Accornero and Ramos Pinto, 2014; Cox 2012).

The theoretical framework responds to the research question, seeking to clarify to what extent

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the mobilization of the explained resources caused the structural changes in Spain, Italy and Greece.

Consequently, such a structural change needs to be in place in order to conduct the analysis.

Accordingly, Portugal and Ireland, lacking a similar structural change compared to Spain, Italy and

Greece, are not considered as case studies for this analysis even though they have been subject to

similar forms of economic breakdowns and public protest.

The data selection of this paper is primarily based on qualitative secondary literature. Further,

especially regarding the determination of the outcomes in the five countries, the paper also largely

relies on media publications, such as newspaper articles and expert opinion pieces. Even though

publications are not available yet in some cases, a number of scholars act and report as experts, either

on their own blogs (cf. Flesher Fominaya, https://austerityprotests.wordpress.com ) or externally in

newspapers and topical blogs such as https://www.opendemocracy.net/. The paper also makes use of a

number of primary sources, mostly on party slogans, ways of financing and structural organization.

These information are primarily drawn from official party websites and blogs.

In regard to the fact that developments in the structural changes cannot be said to have reached

a final stage, the paper's findings are certainly limited in generalizing them to other country cases,

especially outside of Europe. Despite this, the currentness of the topic clearly contributes to the

originality of the paper and may prevent the following of a reasoning that may inherit a bias, which

may be produced by a historical, retrospective perspective.

5. Applying 'mediated' resource mobilization theory

5.1 Spain

In Spain the rise of the anti-austerity party Podemos indicated not only a symbolic representation of

anti-austerity movements, but it also achieved to establish itself in the Spanish institutionalized political

party landscape. A relatively early sign was set when Podemos gained significant amounts of votes

during the European Parliamentary Elections in May 2014. Podemos, at this date being an officially

registered party for only four months, was able to reach 7,98% of the Spanish votes, claiming 5 seats

and being the fourth strongest Spanish party in the European Parliament.

Also on the national level, Podemos could so far mark successes in several regional assemblies.

With hindsight to public opinion, the daily newspaper El País published in November 2014 the results

of an opinion poll which indicated Podemos as Spain's most popular party with 27,7% of Spanish

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supporters (followed by the Socialist PSOE party with 26,2% and the Conservatives, Partido Popular

with 20,7% of the supporter's votes). The same poll predicts that 22,2% of the Spanish voters intent to

actually give their vote to Podemos (only 13,1% to the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) and

10,4% to the People's Party (PP)) (El País, 2nd November, 2014). Further, Albertos (2014) finds in his

study that in several cities and autonomous communities, Podemos achieved to beat established parties,

e.g. surpassing the Galician Nationalist Party BNG in Galicia and the progressive/nationalist/ecological

coalition party Compromis in Valencia (paragraph 2). Moreover, especially the correlations Albertos

found between increased participation and the support for Podemos, speak for a visible shift in Spanish

party politics. Further, he indicates that a vote for Podemos also strongly correlates with an increase in

unemployment, showing that the crisis is an important element for the contextual success of the party.

In addition, he finds that the younger the voting district, the stronger the vote for Podemos (paragraphs

1 and 3).

In Spain, the interplay of several dimensions can be identified causing the gradual integration of

Podemos into the Spanish political party landscape. First, Pomedos' mobilization of cultural resources,

such as (e) slogans and symbols and the socio-organizational structure of the Indignados movement is

explained. Second, the importance of a charismatic leader, Podemos' Pablo Iglesias, is emphasized and

explained through an investigation of his (b) professional and social background. Third, Podemos' (a)

material resource and (f) campaign strategies are investigated as crucial factors for the party's success.

The (c) quantitative number of Podemos adherents adds to its ability to mobilize other resources such

as moral resources indicated by (g) celebrity engagement, including media attention. Nevertheless, this

factor as well as the (d) preexistence of networks are found not to be the central factors for Podemos'

success story.

Flesher Fominaya (2014) claims that Podemos could make great use of the successes previously

achieved by the autonomous Indignados/15-M movement in Spain. Not only could Podemos

effectively institutionalize the publicly accessible demands and goals of the movement and integrate

them in their own manifesto, but it also took over essential aspects of its framing strategy, thereby

depicting the party as a horizontally-organized, democratic and transparent party (section 1).

Essentially, Podemos adapted the (e) slogans and symbols of the 15-M Movement and adopted the

image it has established of being a movement of 'ordinary citizens' (Flesher Fominaya, 2015, p.144).

Examples of this are adapted statements of Podemos such as “we want to go beyond acronyms” which

initially referred to the slogans of the autonomous Movement for the Right of Housing which mobilized

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under the slogan 'no acronym, no flags' (ibid., p.157). Katsiaficas (1997) interprets in this regard that

generally autonomous movements often reject acronyms to ensure a diverse image of all the people

whose interests they are defending. An acronym can often create boundaries between a lead and

adherents, instead of representing one group of collective action (p.201).

The Podemos leadership displays its social and cultural capital by this effective use of

strategical framing. Investigating the (b) social and professional backgrounds of the Podemos' lead,

particularly of Pablo Iglesias, it is found that the leadership consists of long-term activists and

academic researchers of social movements and left political parties, in Europe as well as Latin America

(Flesher Fominaya, 2014, section 2). As a result from the knowledge they could have gained from

critical observations of other movements and parties, Podemos could apply a so far widely successful

(f) campaign strategy which combines modern use of media with 'old school' party campaigning (ibid.,

section 3). Currently, Podemos has more than 995 thousand followers on Facebook, a greater number

than any other Spanish party can present (cf. PSOE around 81k followers). On Social Media and its

website (www.podemos.info), Podemos continues its framing strategy, portraying an 'innovative' and

'transparent' picture of itself.

For example, Podemos displays on their website their income distribution (graphic: 'Ingresos'), which is

primarily based on donations (82,9%), to a smaller degree on electoral subsidies (9,7%) and to 7,3% on

Merchandising. Through their indication of zero money coming from banking loans, they show how

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Source: Podemos website – podemos.info

they are able to self-sustain themselves and their distance to conventional ways of financing. In this

line, Podemos also argues against 'corrupt politicians' and 'revolving doors' between governments and

the advisory and executive boards of corporations. Consequently, Podemos positions itself in

opposition to the current established political parties, essentially creating the image of 'a better

alternative' for citizens (Kassam, 2014, Interview: 'Yes he can!'; Stobart, 2014).

In terms of material resources and its financing, Podemos makes greatly use of (a)

crowdfunding and micro-credits. In this pursuit, Podemos displays the data on the current funding

progress of their campaigns on their website. Through the running of campaigns funded by their party

members, citizens become directly involved in the financial running of the party. The financing through

crowdfunding and the provision of micro-credits by their own adherents follows a strategical logic. By

not only promising votes but by actively participating through financial contributions, citizens feel

engaged in the party development and may pursue a success of 'their party' through their final vote in

upcoming elections.

Further, regarding Podemos' stance on its voting procedure and the general depiction of its

socio-organizational structure, they use online tools to pursue its directly democratic stance. For

example, the platform agoravoting has been used in May 2014 to select Podemos' MEP candidates for

the European Parliamentary Elections. 33,000 voters participated in the election on agoravoting. To

strengthen the 'directly' democratic image Podemos has adapted, the party works on further

possibilities to make direct participation even easier and more attractive for all Spanish citizens. By

establishing PlazaPodemos on Reddit, Podemos aimed at providing a platform on which to discuss

ethical, political and organizational principles that are to be voted on in upcoming elections as well as

to link politicians and Podemos voters.

In conclusion, Podemos achieved to position itself as the 'follow-up' of what has began with the

emergence of the 15-M/Indignados autonomous movement, responding to the public outcry against the

austerity measures imposed by the Troika. The general public critique of established parties in Spain as

well as the strategical adaption of (e) symbols and slogans as well as a 'innovative', 'transparent' and

'democratic' (f) campaign strategy, play together and created a fertile ground for the mobilization of a

great number of other resources, such as media attention.

5.2 Italy

In Italy, in the 2013 general elections, the Five Star Movement (MS5) achieved the entry to Italy's

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fragmented multi-party landscape. Even though the MS5 received about one quarter of all votes for the

Chamber of Deputies (second after the Democratic Party) in the general elections in 2013, its direct

linkage to the anti-austerity protests, mainly organized by students in 2008 and 2010, is yet not evident.

As Zamponi (2012) argues, Italian occupation has largely failed to mobilize and did not generate

lasting effects on the political landscape in Italy (p.416). Nevertheless, the MS5's success can be clearly

considered to be in relation with the popularity of the contentious protests that occurred in response to

the imposed austerity cuts and especially to the party's adaption of the movement's autonomous

character.

As Treré and Barassi (2015) argue, the MS5, under the lead of Beppe Grillo, achieved to fill the

void which social movements could not occupy in the aftermath of the anti-austerity protests in Italy.

The factors which favored this development mostly relate to the (e) use of symbols and slogans,

embodied in the liberating Net symbolism which Grillo and his right-hand and technology expert

Gianroberto Casaleggio, pursue. Further, this aspect also plays into the mobilization of socio-

organizational resources and the party's (f) campaign strategy which adds to the MS5's image of being

an autonomously acting movement with a 'democratic' organizational structure.

The MS5 which existed already prior to the peak of public protests, Treré and Barassi (2015)

argue, effectively exploited the public accessibility of cultural resources, which protest movements

mobilized at an earlier stage. Not only makes Grillo and his MS5 use of (e) symbols and slogans

established by previous student protests in Italy but especially takes up characteristics such as

transparency and democratic legitimacy which non-hierarchical autonomous movements generally

represent. Grillo's blog (beppegrillo.it) for example provides a link to the website MeetUp! on which

over 164k people registered for Beppe Grillo discussion groups. This platform is provided to “meet

nearby Beppe Grillo Fans!” and it invites people to “come to a local Beppe Grillo Meetup and discuss

the topics he proposes on his blog.” (Beppe Grillo – MeetUp! description).

In 2005, when Grillo launched his blog www.beppegrillo.it, Casaleggio's Milan-based company

Casaleggio Associati became responsible to create and manage it. On the blog, Grillo began to design

his political campaign and eventually founded the MS5. By linking elements of his general critique on

the failures of current representative democracy in Italy to the his counter-actions, he took up the

autonomous symbolism of grassroot action and direct participation of the citizen (Treré and Barassi,

2015, p.7).

Grillo and Casaleggio constructed a presumed movement ideology, transmitting the idea of a

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grassroot movement defined by “horizontal networks, participatory democracy and a new

understanding of political engagement and participation” (ibid., p.11). The MS5 bases its strategy on

the digital symbolism which constructs the Net as something neutral and as something which naturally

surpasses old forms of organizing society (ibid.). Mosco (2004) in this regard argues that there exists a

Western fascination with technologies through which digital media can be constructed as something

magical. Thereby it also becomes able to socially transform and generally democratically empowers

(Bordignon and Ceccarini, 2013, p.12). Accordingly, such a Western perception of the Net can in the

Italian and in the generally European context be easily mobilized for the purpose of a highly

symbolized campaign strategy. In the context of the MS5, Grillo and Casaleggio began to claim “The

Net is on our side” (2011, p.6) and thereby developed the Net as the legitimizing strength of the MS5.

In line with this, the party's image of a grassroot movement, which is based on horizontal networks and

participatory democracy and no obvious leaders, was nurtured. A number of scholars such as Del Lago

(2013), Mello (2013) and Santoro (2012) however argue that the MS5 is essentially hierarchical,

authoritarian and anti-democractic in its political process. Effectively, according to the 5SM's 'non-

statute', Grillo holds the political control (Del Lago, 2014, p.84). In Article 3 of the non-statute, Grillo

is further defined to be the owner of the trademark and the blog, consequently of the party, and has the

power to expel any member as he pleases.

In conclusion, Grillo and Casaleggio succeeded in mobilizing a commonly spread symbolism of

the Net, as an in itself democratic and non-hierarchical space. Pursuing this campaign strategy, the

MS5, essentially Grillo and Caseleggio, achieved to reach those that in the first place supported the

similar demands of the autonomous grassroot movement which first emerged in response to the crisis

and the public outcry against austerity-measures. The MS5 achieved not only a great commitment to its

cyber activism but also gained physical support as adherents engaged in large numbers of its protests in

Rome and other cities and eventually voted for the 5SM, determining its success.

5.3 Greece

In Greece, social movements and especially the mainstreaming of their demands into Syriza's

manifesto, helped the party to revive its position in the Greek political party landscape, especially since

its first great successes of 2012. In January of this year, Syriza achieved to significantly restructure the

Greek political party landscape through its election as the leading governmental party. In that election,

priorly established parties such as the New Democracy party lost 53 seats in the Parliament and could

14

be outpaced by Syriza. Further, Syriza's electoral success also revived the activity of other anti-

austerity movements in the rest of Europe, and particularly boosted the popular standing of Podemos

(Kassam, McDonald, Kirchgaessner and Penketh, 2015, section on Spain).

This analysis highlights multiple factors when explaining the success of the Syriza party in

Greece. First, it points to Syriza's simplistic one enemy (the Troika and their austerity politics) – one

solution (end of bailout agreement) discourse. Second, it analyses Syriza's exploitation of 'the politics

of resentment'. Taking this point of departure, the following section analyzes the resources that could be

mobilized from the (d) network of grassroot movements in Greece. Further, it is investigated in how far

Syriza could especially derive its success from the (e) symbols and slogans it used to create an image of

a brotherhood between leftists and nationalists. Finally, it is explained how the mobilization of a

diverse set of resources was successfully integrated in Syriza's successful (f) campaign strategy.

Matsaganis (2015) describes Syriza prior to the time of austerity as holding a comfortable 3-5%

position (section 1). With the onset of the crisis, Syriza has been fast enough to join forces with the

Indignados of Athens and the 'I don't pay' movement, mobilizing street protests which accumulated in

large assemblies on the central square of Athens and all over Greece. What Syriza and the Greek

Indignados shared were populist claims on being ruled by a ‘puppet government’ which is 'serving

Germany’s interests' (Rüdig and Karyotis, 2013, p.8). The then party in government, the Social

Democratic Party (Pasok), was generally depicted as being responsible for Greece's bad economic

position. Syriza began to form a strong alliance with other opposition parties which became to be

decisive for its future electoral successes. As a result of a mobilization of social-organizational

resources in this regard, mobilization of human, material and also moral resources followed almost

automatically, as Syriza was providing a wide platform for all kind of enthusiasts from left, right and

even the political center, turning into a 'catch-all'-party (Kirchheimer, 1966).

As voters from all sides of the political spectrum felt approached by the aims and goals of the

Syriza party, it could generate great numbers of supporters already during the double elections in 2012.

In the course of these elections, Syriza achieved a strong presence in parliament as the second strongest

party (closely following the New Democracy party). This result can also be seen to be related to the

campaign strategy of 2006, when Tsipras as a quite young member of the party, then thirty-two years

old, was standing as the party's candidate for mayor in Athens' municipal elections (Markaki and

Apospori, 2008, p.5). This unusual initiative strengthened Syriza's impact seen in the mobilization of

students against a constitutional amendment which would allow the establishment of universities by the

15

private sector (Spourdalakis, 2012, p.102). By opening up its organizational structure to many different

actors and particularly students that have been part of social movements before, crucially contributed to

the survival and development of the party. Effectively, Syriza created a 'mass connective party' which

unified all kinds of political, social, ideological and cultural anti-capitalist groups and thereby built on

its (d) preexisting strong network which comprised particular resourceful actors (ibid., p.103).

The (f) campaign strategy Syriza chose to follow portrays a 'move against and beyond'

(Spourdalakis, 2012, p.108). Led by this (e) slogan , the party achieved to create diverse and innovative

political activities in Greece. Further, with this all encompassing organizational structure came the

mobilization of human resources, engaging diverse actors such as well-experience activists. Further,

they marked importance for bridging activists from the left to the Alliance. Moreover, Syriza attracted

activists from the reformist left, contributing to a uniting organizational culture (ibid.).

A further crucial factor for the successful mobilization of supporters was the commitment of

activists from the different backgrounds to actively participate and shape the movements of resistance

in the squares of Athens. In these instances, they still acted on group or individual levels and Syriza

was then not yet linked to these actions. For example, the youth organization Synaspismos organized

educational meetings, adjusting to new concerns which were raised during the protests. Syriza

generally emphasized a pluralism of participants which remained open to social movements, already

since 2008 (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013, p.16).

In 2012, the Memoradum of the Troika identified the to be imposed austerity measures and

Syriza responded by a clear call for their abolition and thereby underlined its (e) highly symbolised one

problem – one solution discourse. Proposals for 'renegotiation', 'gradual withdrawal' or a withdrawal

from the EU could not achieve to convince as many people as the clear cut statements of Syriza

(Spourdalakis, 2012, p. 111). Responding to the public outcry of Greek citizens, Syriza framed its one

solution with a 'call for dignity' (Stavrakakis, 2015, p.278).

In the elections of 2012, Syriza could make use of an entire spectrum of skills and labor,

material and organizational resources, provided by all the different members of the Coalition.

Synaspismos offices and kiosks, functioning as meeting points, made wide distributions of leaflets and

door-to-door campaigns possible and contributed to an almost fully covered electoral campaign

(Spourdalakis, 2012, p.113).

Gradually involving more and more actors from various backgrounds and taking up a clear and

all encompassing discourse inspired by social movements, enabled Syriza to mobilize a wide set of

16

resources all at once. As the elections in January of this year have shown, this strategy was continued

successfully, outpacing established parties, which lost great numbers of its electorate. In how far

Syriza's standing and especially its movement character can be uphold, remains to be seen in the future.

In this regard Taggart (2006) argues that parties often face the problem that when their 'unusual'

practices, standing in contrast to established parties, become institutionalized over time, their appeal

gets lost (p. 276).

6. Discussion of Variations The analysis investigated the factors which caused the mobilization of resources in the cases of

Podemos in Spain, the Five Star Movement in Italy as well as Syriza in Greece. The findings show the

extent to which also autonomous movements have been influential for the success stories of these

parties. A comparison of the three cases displays two dimensions to be the most important for an

overall successful mobilization of resources.

First, in all the three cases, the (e) use of symbols and slogans of autonomous movements was

crucial for the mobilization of other resources such as human resources in generating high quantitative

numbers of adherents as well as material resources, such as gaining financial support. The adoption of

the symbols and slogans priorly established by autonomous social movements contributed to an overall

horizontal, transparent and legitimate image of the parties. Consequently, it attracted adherents to

actively participate in these 'directly' democratic organizations and thereby incorporated them as an

integral part of the parties. In the cases of Podemos and Syriza, this highly-incorporative organizational

structure also spread to the material resource domain in which adherents provided financial resources

through crowdfunding platforms and/or microcredits. As a result, adherents became increasingly

connected to the official running of the party which means that a failure of the party also would have

translated into a failure for the adherents themselves. Pursuing this logic, the direct incorporation of

adherents in the party's organizational structure, promised a solid base for the future of the parties,

arguing that a breakdown would have been prevented by its own adherents.

Second, the (f) campaign strategy is found to be another crucial factor which determined the

success of the three parties. Also in this regard, the form the campaign strategy took in the three cases

was clearly determined by means the parties could generate from the repertoire of prior autonomous

movements. In the case of Podemos, the combination of a modern use of online media tools, such as

the voting through agoravoting, with the 'old-school' party campaigning, eg. handing out leaflets and

17

door-to-door campaigns, provided the key to an overall successful campaign strategy. Similarly, Syriza

combined online media presence with conventional campaigning, particularly supported by the wide

network of activists it could profit from. The Five Star Movement has most dominantly relied on an

online presence, embodied in the blog of Beppe Grillo which functioned as its central point of action.

However, also in this case, the physical mobilization of thousands of people in the squares of Rome

significantly contributed to the legitimate image of the party and was clearly integrated in the MS5's

campaign strategy.

The reasons for the importance of the mobilization of especially these two factors can be linked

to the level of context dependence/independence as well as to their level of propriety. Both factors are

aligned with resources which provide a certain context-independent functioning, which means that their

mobilization does not depend on a specific ground which makes its mobilization possible. This context-

independence also relates to the public accessibility of these factors. Slogans and symbols, as well as

the repertoires and the organization of autonomous movements which have established these

beforehand, are highly publicly accessible. Slogans and symbols can be easily adopted and adapted to

one's own specific strategic goals. Further, organizational structures such as decision-making through

direct human assemblies or the use of apps can practically be incorporated by anyone and also by a

party that wants to create a highly transparent and democratic image of itself.

In sum, the analysis has shown that especially the interplay between the publicly accessible

kinds of the resources as well as their democratically 'legitimate' nature significantly contributed to the

successful mobilization of other resources, such as human and material resources. In this regard, priorly

autonomous movements have sparked the first anti-austerity protests and demonstrations and

established and adopted new slogans, symbols, horizontally democratic and transparent organizational

structures. In this study especially these factors have been proven to be influential for the emergence or

developments of Podemos, the Five Star Movement and Syriza and generally affected a structural

change in the political party landscapes in Spain, Italy and Greece. Consequently, the assumption that

the success of a party is likelier when it achieves to mobilize resources which are most publicly

accessible and most context-independent, can thereby be supported.

7. ConclusionThis paper identified current structural changes in Europe's political party landscapes which are

considered to be linked to the rise of anti-austerity protests in Spain, Italy and Greece. To find out the

mechanisms determining these changes and to fill the void of studies which are investigating the

18

influence of social movements in a structural political sense, clearly made this paper necessary. As the

literature review has shown, in the current literature the focus primarily remains bound to 'one-time'

influence on single pieces or sets of legislation in specific policy areas, eg. environmental policy. In

line with this, this paper criticizes that the current literature often inherits a bias in the sense that

influence of autonomous social movements is considered to be naturally attempted by these actors. In

contrast, this paper aimed at investigating the influence of autonomous social movements not from

such a 'either success or failure' perspective but it considered the influence as a factual outcome.

This paper aimed at identifying the factors which caused the influence of autonomous social

movements on the political party landscapes in Spain, Italy and Greece in the aftermath of European

anti-austerity protests. The analysis of these factors was conducted according to Edwards and Kane's

(2014) 'mediated' resource mobilization theory which comprised five resource types: (1) material, (2)

human, (3) social-organizational, (4) cultural and (5) moral resources. By operationalizing and

analyzing these factors in regard to the structural changes caused by Podemos in Spain, the Five Star

Movement party in Italy and Syriza in Greece, at least two main correlations among the parties could

be identified.

In conclusion, the analysis generally shows that the more resources a party could mobilize, the

greater and easier to achieve was its success, eg. measured by electoral success and media attention.

Further, the analysis identifies two factors that are correlating in all the three cases. First, the (e) use of

symbols and slogans of autonomous movements proved to be an important resource to be able to

mobilize also other resources, such as material or human resources. Second, the party's (f) campaign

strategy was identified as another factor which in all the three cases was crucially determining the

success of the party and greatly contributed to further mobilizations of other resources. The correlation

of these two factors is explained to be related to their context-independence and to their public

accessibility of these cultural and moral resources.

The findings of this paper are generalizable to the extent that the success of a party is likelier

when it achieves to mobilize resources which are most publicly accessible and most context-

independent. In this regard, these mechanisms can be generalized to all other contexts, followingly also

to political landscapes in other European countries and even outside of Europe. Nevertheless, it has to

be acknowledged that in other governmental systems an entering into a political party landscape may

be less easy.

Further, the success linked to the two factors which were correlating in this analysis, stands in a

19

direct relation with an evoking of a certain 'horizontally-directly democratic', 'transparent' and thereby

'legitimate' image of the parties which were analyzed. In this regard, this paper argues that the image of

the parties as a 'horizontally-organized' collective/ a party of 'ordinary citizens' which was created

through the mobilization of these factors, is generally important for the success of a party.

Consequently, it can be generalized that a creation of such an image, also through the mobilization of

other factors that may not be included in this research, contribute to the success of a party. In this

regard, the paper is somewhat limited as it naturally does not include every possible factor that may

evoke a similar development but merely applied a certain theoretical framework which may still be

subject to amendments.

Nevertheless, the application of the used theoretical framework helps to gain an insight into the

factors which determined the structural outcomes of the political party landscapes in Spain, Italy and

Greece. Finally, this paper thereby provided an alternative perspective on the influence of social

movements and with this comparative study greatly contributed to the current literature on the

influence of Social Movements in particular but also to comparative Social Movement studies in

general.

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