the non-dual and interconnected nature of aesthetic judgments

Uppsala University

Department of philosophy

Master’s program in aesthetics

MA thesis, 45 credits

Spring 2022

The non-dual and interconnected nature of aesthetic judgments

Josua Li

Supervisor: Maarten Steenhagen


Abstract

This thesis explores what an aesthetic judgment would be if we take existence to be non-dually

interconnected. Interconnectedness and aesthetic judgment does not seem to be compatible because

aesthetic judgment seems to depend on, at least, the dualism of the beautiful and the ugly and that of

subject and object. In contrast, interconnectedness can not accept these dualisms.

Zen philosopher Dōgen provides a non-dually interconnected framework that allows for aesthetic

judgments in an interconnected view of existence. Zen philosophy concludes that we can both have

dualism and non-dualism and that the ideas do not cancel each other out but deal with different

aspects of existence. Dualism with a centric view where existence is viewed from a standpoint and

thus is restricted by a perspective, and enlightenment, where existence is perceived non-dually

interconnected, can coexist. Because Aesthetic judgments are dependent on dualism, they must take

place on the centric plane of existence. However, because, in enlightenment, everything is seen as

Beautiful, it can not reveal much about an object’s beauty. Instead, the aesthetic judgment reveals

something about the standpoint taken in judgment. In light of this reformulation of the meaning of

aesthetic judgments, aesthetics will become phenomenological no matter if you deal with how

centric or enlightened ways of existence reveal themselves. Whether your focus is on aesthetic

judgments, appreciation, or artistic practice, you will always deal with aesthetic experiences.

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Table of contentIntroduction..........................................................................................................................................4

Research question and objective......................................................................................................5Structure...........................................................................................................................................5

Part 1. Interconnectedness or judgment?..............................................................................................6Dualism.......................................................................................................................................6Dualism in Aesthetics..................................................................................................................7How should we understand aesthetic judgments?.......................................................................9How should we understand interconnectedness?......................................................................10Are aesthetic judgments and interconnectedness compatible?.................................................11

Previous research and theory: Zen Philosophy is a fitting theory.................................................12Part 2. Zen interconnectedness and its view on dualism and aesthetics.............................................14

Zen and interconnectedness...........................................................................................................14The theory of dependent origination.........................................................................................14Zen idealism and mind..............................................................................................................15

Buddha-nature: Dualism and non-dualism....................................................................................17Buddha-nature: Non-dualism....................................................................................................17No-Buddha-nature: The non-existence of independent properties...........................................19Is dualism completely rejected?................................................................................................21Enlightenment: Moving from dualism and centrism to non-dualism and Buddha-nature........24

Aesthetics and enlightenment: the non-dual nature of aesthetics..................................................25Part 3: Zen Aesthetics.........................................................................................................................28

What is an aesthetic judgment? Different perceptions of beauty..................................................28Zen aesthetics and contemporary aesthetics.............................................................................32Is the Zen view on aesthetic judgments an aesthetic view?......................................................35

This is not a fictionalist view.........................................................................................................36A shift in focus from aesthetic judgment to aesthetic experience..................................................37

The centrality of practice: artistic practice and aesthetic appreciation as aesthetic experience38Centrism and aesthetic experience............................................................................................40Some benefits to Zen aesthetics................................................................................................42

Summary, Conclusion and outlook.....................................................................................................43References..........................................................................................................................................46

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Introduction

We live in an interconnected world, and we know it. However, is this aspect of existence

taken seriously enough in aesthetics? Unfortunately, I do not believe this is the case.

There are different ways we can see existence as interconnected. On a physical plane,

existence is causally interconnected. By throwing a stone at a glass window, I cause it to shatter.

The glass shattering is dependent on me throwing the stone, and thus we have an interconnected

relationship. This type of interconnectedness is global. For example, someone buying coffee

produced in Brazil is part of causing the deforestation of the rainforest.

We can also see interconnectedness through dependence on other things for their existence.

For example, I could not exist without water, nor most living things we know about. Without hair,

there would be no lice, or without soil, we would have no plants, no animals, no humans, Et cetera.

We also have the interconnectedness between mind and material existence. This

interconnected relation reveals itself because a thought someone has can change the world. An

example would be our great philosophers and theologians and how their ideas have changed how

existence is perceived and lived. My thought can also directly affect someone on the other side of

the globe, thanks to our modern technology where messages and communication are instant

worldwide. For example, a CEO of a big company could order the cutting down of the rainforest

and thus affect everything in that forest and its proximity. However, the cutting down of rainforests

affects the climate all over the globe and thus affects everything on planet earth.

We have the same tendencies in aesthetics. The broad approach in aesthetics seems to be

dualistic and relies on the belief in independent properties. Aesthetics seem to focus on what in

objects makes them beautiful so that they can provide a judgment about them. This approach

presupposes a dualism between the beautiful and the ugly and subject and object. The dualistic

assumption in aesthetics does not seem compatible with interconnectedness because

interconnectedness does not allow for a strict dualistic separation between subject and object and

the beautiful and ugly. If we take an interconnected view on aesthetics, we need to consider why

dualistic thinking is so prevalent in our philosophies.

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Research question and objective

This thesis aims to show that an interconnected non-dual approach to aesthetics does not

need to be opposed to a dualistic approach. On the contrary, a combination of the two might help

provide a bigger picture of aesthetics and help provide significant progress in the field.

The objective of this thesis will be fulfilled by dealing with aesthetic judgments if we take

existence to be non-dually interconnected. Thus my research question will be, “what is an aesthetic

judgment if existence is interconnected?”

Structure

The thesis is divided into three main parts. In the first part of the thesis will focus on

presenting the core problem of the thesis. Some core ideas will be defined and the relationship

between interconnectedness and aesthetic judgments and why these concepts do not seem

compatible will be explored. Finally, this part will end with a short presentation of my theory choice

bundled together with some relevant previous research.

In the second part, I will focus on presenting the Zen Buddhist view of interconnectedness,

the nature of its non-dual approach, and its connection to aesthetics. The second part will be divided

into three main parts, Zen and Interconnectedness, where the main ideas of interconnectedness and

the idealistic nature of Zen Philosophy are explored. Then the idea of Buddha-nature will be

explored under the main heading, Buddha-nature: dualism and non-dualism, where I discuss the

Zen view of dualism, the true nature of objects, and the relationship between what is ultimately real

and the conventional way we commonly view the world. Lastly, I will focus on Zen and aesthetics

under the heading of Aesthetics and enlightenment: the non-dual nature of aesthetics and see if

dualistic thinking seems to be compatible with Zen aesthetics. These three main headings of part

two will also have relevant under headings.

In the third part of the thesis, I will apply the content explored before on aesthetics to finally

answer what an aesthetic judgment will be in my Zen-inspired view. First, under the heading What

is an aesthetic judgment: Different perceptions of beauty, I will explore what an aesthetic judgment

will be in a non-dually interconnected view of existence. Next, I will move on to a section where I

compare Gorodeisky's view of aesthetic judgment with mine. After that, I will defend myself

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against fictionalism. I will move on to discuss, under the heading A Shift in focus from aesthetic

judgment to aesthetic experience, the implications of my view of aesthetic judgment on aesthetics

in general. Central for this section will be questions of aesthetic practice. Finally, I will end with

a Summary, conclusion, and outlook where the results of my thesis are discussed.

Part 1. Interconnectedness or judgment?

Presenting the problem

In this part, some core ideas will be defined, and it will be shown why it seems as if

interconnectedness and aesthetic judgments are incompatible. Finally, this part will end with a

presentation of my theoretical framework, which is based on Zen philosophy.

Dualism

How should dualism be understood? For something to be dualistic, we need to accept that

there are at least two independent properties. Let us use a theoretical example. Something can not

be true and false simultaneously. Truth and falsehood are independent of each other and thus form a

dualism. We have the same relation in aesthetics.

There are at least two forms of dualism relevant to aesthetics. Firstly, we have the dualism of

beauty and ugliness. If we say that something is beautiful, it can not also be ugly. Munch’s The

scream can not be beautiful and ugly simultaneously. This should be very clear. However, if

something can only be beautiful or ugly, beauty and ugliness seem to be independent of each other.

Either something has the quality of beauty or ugliness, but never both, and thus we have a dualism.

Secondly, we have a subject-object dualism in aesthetics. If we accept that objects can be

objectively beautiful even if I, as a subject, do not like the object, then we accept that something in

the object is independent of the subject. This, too, should be very clear. For example, a person liking

the Mona Lisa does not affect whether Mona Lisa is beautiful or not. Nevertheless, if this is the

case, then we accept that something in the object, the Mona Lisa, is independent of the subject, and

we end up in a subject-object dualism.

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If we do not hold that something in the object is independent of the subject, we will get a

problem in aesthetics where appreciation of an object is purely subjective. This would be similar to

Kant’s notion of the agreeable, which he defines as; ”that which pleases the senses in sensation”

(Kant 2000. 91). The agreeable is also mingled together with interest, and there is a sense of

gratification in that experience (Kant 2000. 92). However, we do not want the beautiful only to be

agreeable to the senses. It has to be something that is not purely reliant on a subject liking it, and

thus there needs to be something in the objects that is independent of the subject.

Dualism in Aesthetics

Is it true that most of our approaches to aesthetics take dualism for granted? I do believe so.

There are at least two dualisms in aesthetics: subject-object and beautiful and ugliness1. These two

dualisms are the most important for this thesis. Let us examine how these dualisms present

themselves in some modern philosophers of aesthetics.

Gorodeisky’s philosophy is dualistic because she takes the dualism of the beautiful and ugly

for granted (Gorodeisky 2011: 417). For example, at one point, Gorodeisky writes: “Imagine that

we replace the particular bright shade of Sabine’s neck in Lesende with a less bright patch. If we do

that, the beauty of the whole painting might be lost” (Gorodeisky 2011: 432). We can see here that

Gorodeisky assumes that the independent quality of beauty can be lost. However, if beauty can be

lost, it is seen as an independent property, and we have the dualism of beauty and ugliness.

Even if we would interpret that Gorodeisky also believes that when beauty is lost, it

becomes aesthetically neutral we have the same problem. The assumption that ugliness and beauty

are independent properties is still present; it is just that an extra party is added, the neutral.

Nevertheless, as will be shown further down, the two in dualism are not necessary; believing in

multiple independent properties will present the same problem.

Gorodeisky also takes the dualism of subject and object to be true by claiming that

a subject judges an object as beautiful (Gorodeisky 2011: 430). She writes that “[…] because many

of the beautiful objects we judge are inanimate, they do not make objective claims on us. Yet, in

making a judgement of taste we take ourselves to be responsive to them as we ought to be, although

this ought is not captured by any notion of duty or obligation” (Gorodeisky 2011: 432). The

1 There is probably more dualisms in aesthetics. However, the one between the beautiful and the ugly and between the subject and the object is the most critical dualisms for this thesis.

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keyword here is ought, we respond to them as we ought to, but we do not have to because there is

no obligation or duty. This implies that the beauty of an object would still be beautiful even if you

falsely judge it to be ugly. If that is the case, then the object is not dependent on the subject because

the subject’s reaction to the object is not necessary for the object to be what it is. Thus, we have a

subject-object dualism where something in the object is independent of the subject. Further, because

Gorodeiskys philosophy is Kantian, it should be clear that she does not hold that beauty is the same

as the agreeable. It is not purely a matter of a subject liking something.

Zangwill also holds that there are beautiful and ugly properties (and more in his case). He

states that “[...] beauty is one among many aesthetic properties, such as ugliness, elegance,

daintiness, and dumpiness” (Zangwill 2018: 2). Clearly, he would not say that the ugly property can

be beautiful nor that the beautiful property can be ugly, and thus we have the dualism of ugliness

and beauty here.

He also has a subject-object dualism because if an object can be judged beautiful or ugly by

a subject, there needs to be a subject-object dualism at play. If not, the judgment can not be entirely

about the object but at least equally about the subject judging. However, this assumption does not

seem to be held by the author of any of my examples in this section.

Carroll also seems to take for granted both the subject-object dualism and that of beauty and

ugliness. Again, dualism can be seen in the idea that an object can be judged beautiful, as opposed

to ugly by a subject (Carroll 2016:1). Carroll states, “[...]if all of the ideal critics derive pleasure

from the object, then the object is beautiful” (Carroll 2016:1). We can see a subject-object dualism

here because it is implied that you do not have to judge something beautiful. This is especially true

if you are not an ideal critic. However, if we allow for the possibility to judge something beautiful

as ugly falsely, we allow for a subject-object dualism. That is, there is something independent in the

object that you can judge falsely. Again, even if pleasure is central here, it does not say that

something’s beauty is only pleasure-based. You can be wrong.

We can also see the dualism of ugliness and beauty for two reasons. First, it seems very

unlikely that Carroll believes that the beautiful can be ugly simultaneously. Secondly, in the

discourse of his paper, there is nothing stated that ugliness and beauty can simultaneously be part of

an object (Carroll, 2016). This would be a radical statement, and it is fair to assume that he does not

hold this belief.

We can thus see that subject-object dualism and that of the beautiful and ugly are prevalent

in aesthetics. Instead of moving towards interconnectedness, there is a focus on dualistic thinking.

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Indeed, as we shall see, some of our concepts, like that of aesthetic judgments, seem to rely on this

line of thinking.

How should we understand aesthetic judgments?

A broad definition of aesthetic judgment will be sufficient for this thesis. Firstly, an aesthetic

judgment is a judgment about beauty. This judgment is subjective but claims that others should

agree with the result. As Kant puts it, “For he must not call it beautiful if it pleases merely him”

(Kant 2000.98). When an aesthetic judgment is made, we could say it is made by a subject about an

object and should say something about the object that everyone should agree with . Thus there is a

universality and normative claim at the root. An aesthetic judgment is a human action that decides

if something in existence is beautiful or not, and what is deemed beautiful should not be subjective

but objective. Everyone should agree with this judgment. When someone makes a correct judgment

about the beauty of Mozart’s requiem, everyone should agree with that judgement, and if they do

not, they are misguided and wrong.

Most people would most likely agree with this claim or at least agree with something similar

to this. If we reject that the judgments are made about objects, then we would have a problem

claiming that there is anything objectively beautiful, and the beautiful would be purely a subjective

experience concerning only the subject. This type of position would come dangerously close to

nihilism about beauty. If I claim that my judging a Monet painting as beautiful has nothing to do

with the painting but only what I like, we are saying that objects do not have beauty, that nothing is

beautiful, and that beauty does not exist. I think this type of position should be rejected because we

should be able to say that there is something objectively beautiful.

What the deciding factors for an aesthetic judgment are will not be important to decide upon

in this thesis. It will suffice to say that it must be made posterior to an encounter with an object,

both in a logical and temporal sense. I see something, it is beautiful, then I place the judgment, but

in the initial state, I have not done the judgment yet. The judgment is made posterior to the

experience and is based on some intellectual thinking or emotion.

Aesthetic judgments are dualistic because it relies on the dualism of subject-object and the

beautiful and ugly. To clarify, a judgment is dual because when I judge the “Girl with a pearl

earring,” I rely on the assumption that the painting is an independent object apart from me and that

there are independent properties in it that are either beautiful or ugly. Without these assumptions,

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aesthetic judgments would become very strange indeed. If a judgment is not about an object, then it

has to be about the self, but that is not what we mean by aesthetic judgments. We want to discern

whether “girl with a pearl earring” is beautiful. Because we want to discern whether something is

beautiful, as opposed to ugly, we also have to accept the beauty-ugliness dualism. If I claim that

“girl with a pearl earring” is both beautiful and ugly, I arguably have shied away from making a

complete judgment, or at least state that it is neutral. However, as stated earlier, neutrality only adds

an extra component to the dualism and changes it to, maybe, trialism. Either way, judgments depend

on the idea of independent properties.

Before we continue, we need to consider another aspect of aesthetic judgments. When it

comes down to it, any question about a judgment is also concerned with human behavior. This is

because judgments are something that humans do. Because of this, we cannot only restrict ourselves

to a complete theoretical and metaphysical discussion but also need to incorporate a psychological

and practical dimension in our examination of aesthetic judgments. Preferably, then, a suitable

theory should also deal with the practical dimension of aesthetic judgments.

How should we understand interconnectedness?

Because this thesis is partly a reaction to dualistic thinking, I think the only way to go is to

conceive of interconnectedness as non-dual. If we take a non-dual stance on interconnectedness,

then no one thing can exist without the other, and no independent properties exist. For example, I

cannot exist without the existence of humans, animals and plants, et cetera. In the philosophy of

mind, it has become increasingly popular to use non-dualistic theoretical frameworks. For example,

panpsychism is an idealistic philosophy that broadly holds that everything is one and rejects that

matter is mind-independent.

The 2 in dualism is not essential. This view of interconnectedness would also oppose

trialism because it opposes the idea of independent properties. Whether it is two, as in dualism, or

more is irrelevant. They are all in opposition to non-dual interconnectedness. This is very important

because there are trialist options in many of my examples. For example, something could be neither

beautiful nor ugly but neutral, but this still relies on the belief in independent properties, which

interconnectedness opposes.

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We can see here that dualism and the idea of whether things in existence have independent

properties or not is central. Let us examine how interconnectedness and aesthetic judgment stack up

against each other.

Are aesthetic judgments and interconnectedness compatible?

Now that we have an idea of the notion of interconnectedness and aesthetic judgments we

need to ask ourselves if an aesthetic judgment and interconnected thinking is compatible. I think

that at an initial glance the answer should be no. If we follow a non-dual conception of

interconnectedness we end up in a type of monism where everything is part of the same whole, no

aspect of existence can exist without the other and we cannot have independent properties. On the

other side we have the notion of aesthetic judgements. For something to be judged beautiful there

needs to be independent properties, something needs to be beautiful or ugly, and we need someone

that does the judging and something that is being judged. In this way, for a judgment about beauty

to truly be about an object we need to accept dualism between both beauty and ugliness and subject

and object. However, as soon as we accept that things are either beautiful or ugly, and subject-object

relations we accept dualism and the idea of independent properties.

For example, if I judge Van Gogh's Starry night to be beautiful then I am placing it on the

spectrum of beauty and ugliness and are claiming that it sticks out as being beautiful. Clearly, the

judgment presupposes a dualism between ugliness and beauty. When judging Starry night to be

beautiful I am also accepting a subject object duality. I think that everyone should judge it beautiful

but I do not judge it because everyone, including me, thinks it is beautiful. Thus I accept the idea of

independent properties in the objects. I want to claim that Starry night is objectively beautiful and

that people who do not agree are wrong.

We seem to have a problem here because if we accept existence to be non-dually

interconnected it seems like we cannot separate one thing from the other because it holds that

everything is part of the big whole and is equally important. Thus, the apparent dualism between

subject and object, beautiful and ugly can not be accepted as a dualism. We cannot have these

independent properties. This is a problem because for aesthetic judgments to exist we need dualism

and for interconnectedness we cannot have dualism. It thus seems to follow that if an aesthetic

judgment is true then interconnectedness is false and if interconnectedness is true then aesthetic

judgment cannot exist.

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This problem does not derive from aesthetics in particular but from the idea of judgments

and the idea of independent properties. The same problem would arise in a theoretical judgment

about whether something is true or false. If I say it is true that I sit in a chair, it can not also be false.

An independence claim is being made. But if we reject the idea of independence, which

interconnectedness does, we come to the same problem: interconnectedness and judgments are not

compatible.

If we look at the problem in this way it seems like if you want to engage with ideas of

interconnectedness you need to choose between judgment and interconnectedness and thus many

will give up interconnectedness because we do make judgments and things does appear to be

different. However, at the same time, as I showed in the introduction, things does seem to be

interconnected too and to decide between the two would be very unsatisfactory. Thus, I want to see

if we can have aesthetic judgments in an interconnected framework and claim that both are true and

that this supposed dilemma actually is caused by a misconception about what an aesthetic judgment

actually is.

The main issue that makes judgment and interconnectedness to be incompatible seems to

primarily derive from interconnectedness rejecting independent properties and dualism while

aesthetic judgment depends on dualisms and independent properties. Thus going forward, questions

about dualism and non-dualism have to be central in this thesis.

If we want to see if we can have an aesthetic judgment in a non-dually interconnected

framework, that also include the practical dimension of aesthetic judgments, because the question of

aesthetic judgments are not only theoretical, we need to find a fitting theory and examine what

happens to aesthetic judgments if we take this theory to be true. Preferably, we should turn to a

theory that also deals with aesthetics. Fortunately, Zen philosophy hits all the marks for a fitting

theory.

Previous research and theory: Zen Philosophy is a fitting theory

Zen philosophy provides a non-dual and interconnected theory with a practical dimension.

Further, Zen philosophy and Japanese aesthetics have had a solid connection for hundreds of years

(Carter 2017:3, Suzuki 2019:27). Suzuki calls Japanese culture a Zen embossed aestheticism

(Suzuki 2019:27). Carter points out that most people point towards Zen as the origin of the unique

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characteristics of Japanese aesthetics while failing to truly explore the Zen ideas that lie at the root

of Zen aesthetics (Carter 2017:4). Because Zen philosophy focuses on interconnectedness in a non-

dual manner, has a practical dimension, and deals with aesthetics, it is a very suitable theory choice.

Zen Philosophy hits all the marks that I claim should be part of an interconnected theory.

The connection between Zen Philosophy and aesthetics has been explored, and the

connection between Zen and aesthetics is widely agreed upon (Saito 2017: xxx). Unfortunately, as

Carter points out, this connection has not been explored enough. Among the articles on Japanese

aesthetics that have, to some extent, explored the Zen connection, we find people like Cooper

(2017), Carter (2017), and Saito (2017). Many of these articles are part of the anthology New essays

in Japanese aesthetics (2017). There is also an anthology compiled of classical writings in

aesthetics written by Japanese philosophers starting from the Meiji era (1868) edited by Michael

Marra named Modern Japanese aesthetics (1999). Nancy G. Hume has also edited a volume

called Japanese aesthetics and culture: A reader (1995). Even if Zen is sometimes addressed,

Carter seems to be right in saying that Zen is rarely directly dealt with in exploring Japanese

aesthetics. One exception is D. T Suzuki’s book Zen and Japanese culture (2019). However, this

work focuses primarily on art practice and has little connection to the philosophical tradition of

aesthetics. Suzuki’s work is thus not very helpful for a metaphysical understanding of aesthetics but

is vital for our practical understanding that will be explored towards the end of the thesis.

Even if Zen is sometimes touched upon, most of the articles mentioned above are

descriptive where they try to explain, usually in terms of western philosophical language, a

phenomenon in Japanese culture. Thus, they are not theoretical, where they try to see if the

underlying philosophy, Zen, can be helpful to aesthetics and do not delve into the Zen philosophy

they state lies at the root of Japanese aesthetics.

The implication of the lack of engagement between Japanese aesthetics and Zen philosophy

is that I have to provide a breakdown of Zen philosophy and connect it to aesthetics so that we can

see what implication Zen philosophy, as an interconnected theory, has on aesthetic judgments.

One of the most influential philosophical thinkers in Zen Buddhist philosophy is the 13th-century

Zen monk, philosopher, poet, and founder of the Soto Zen sect Dōgen. I will primarily draw on

Dōgen’s philosophy. Dōgen is also mentioned in aesthetic articles which, to some extent, engage in

Zen philosophy (see, for example, Cooper [2017]). Dōgen’s philosophy will be used as the

backbone of my theory. Zen philosophy, in general, will also be utilized as long as it is compatible

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with Dōgens philosophy. Because Dōgen is also part of the Mahayana tradition of Buddhism, I will

also draw a little from Mahayana Buddhism in general to explain his position.

Part 2. Zen interconnectedness and its view on dualism and aesthetics

In this part of the thesis, I will explore Zen philosophy and its relation to aesthetics. First,

under the primary heading of Zen and interconnectedness, the Zen view of interconnectedness and

idealism will be explored. Second, under the main heading of Buddha-nature: Dualism and non-

dualism, I will explore the Zen view on dualism. Lastly, under the heading of Aesthetics and

enlightenment: the non-dual nature of aesthetics, I will explore the Zen view on aesthetics.

Zen and interconnectedness

We need to begin by affirming that Zen is an interconnected philosophy and see how it

approaches interconnectedness. When approaching the idea of interconnectedness in Zen

philosophy, one needs to take a step back into one of the core ideas in Buddhist philosophy and

explore the theory of dependent origination. When that is done, we can explore, under the heading

Zen idealism and mind, the monistic and idealistic nature of existence as presented in Zen

philosophy and see that Zen provides a fully-fledged interconnected theory.

The theory of dependent origination

What is the metaphysical foundation of Zen interconnectedness? To fully understand why

existence is non-dually interconnected, we need to explore the Mahayana Buddhist idea of

dependent origination.

The theory of Dependent origination holds that everything in existence is interdependent.

Dependent origination is constituted by three types of dependence: causal dependence, part-whole

dependence, and dependence on conceptual imputation (Garfield 2015:25). The rough idea of the

first two should be almost self-explanatory. Roughly, causal dependence holds that no event or

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entity can be independent of other events or entities (Garfield 2015:30). This should be a very

intuitive idea because it basically says that nothing can exist without being caused by other things

while simultaneously being part of causing things in existence. For example, a painting might be

caused by the artist, but the painting causes reactions in the viewers.

Part-whole dependence holds that everything is a part of a whole and is dependent on it, and

every whole is dependent on its parts (Garfield 2015:33). For example, a plant depends on the

existence of plants, the existence of living things, and the existence of existence. However,

existence is dependent on the things that exist in it, the plants and living and non-living things. The

list goes on.

Dependence on conceptual imputation holds that “[…] the entities and properties we

experience in the world depend for their reality and identity on our minds, including our perceptual

and conceptual apparatus, for their existence as the entities we encounter” (Garfield 2015:33). A

stone can not be a stone if it is not perceived as it is by me and everything/one else. Dependence on

conceptual imputation is interpreted differently in many Buddhist doctrines. The main cause of the

different interpretations made by different Buddhist schools lies in the conception of mind. From

now on, these dependencies need to be understood in light of Dōgen’s conception of mind and

Buddha-nature. Basically, Dōgen’s view of mind is that mind is a necessary part of everything that

exists. Dōgen’s idea of mind and the idealistic position taken in Zen Philosophy need to be

explored further.

Zen idealism and mind

Is there any room for a dualism between mind and matter in Dōgen’s Zen philosophy? If

there is, this theory would not be a non-dual interconnected theory.

Dōgen renders mind and matter the same thing in a non-dual relationship (Kim 2004: 122).

This can be seen in his statement that mind is “mountains, rivers, and the earth, the sun, the moon,

and the stars” (Kim 2004: 116). Dōgen claims that everything is mind, a familiar idea for idealists.

However, the difference between his position and other idealistic positions is that the relationship

between mind and matter goes both ways. Matter is not reducible to mind nor is mind reducible to

matter. That is, mind is matter, and matter is mind. Therefore, neither mind nor matter has a

privileged position over each other, and they are non-dually part of the same whole.

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A classical Buddhist statement says, “The triple world is mind-only; there is no dharma

other than the mind. Mind, Buddha, and sentient beings—these three are no different from one

another” (Kim 2004: 122). It is more helpful to understand the “triple world” as “all existence.

Dōgen claims that in a proper interpretation of the statement, you can not see “the triple world” (all

existence) and “mind-only” as separate entities. Instead, the best way to describe it would be to say

“the triple world of mind-only” and “the mind-only of the triple world” (Kim 2004:122). In this

reinterpretation, we can see a move from an idea that everything is reducible to mind to an idea that

mind and everything else in existence is aspects of the same thing. Thus all existence is mind, and

mind is all existence.

The following quote from Dōgen’s Shobogenzo captures his view of mind nicely.

“The mind alone” is beyond one or two; it is beyond the triple world and

beyond leaving the triple world; it is free of error; it has thinking, sensing,

mindfulness, and realization and it is free of thinking, sensing, mindfulness,

and realization; it is fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles and it is mountains,

rivers, and the earth. The mind itself is skin, flesh, bones, and marrow; the

mind itself is the picking up of a flower and a face breaking into a smile.

There is conscious mind and there is unconscious mind; there is mind in

which the body is present and there is mind in which no body is present;

there is mind before the moment of the body and there is mind after the

moment of the body. When the body is born, there are different kinds of birth

—from womb, from egg, from moisture, and from transformation—and

when the mind is born, there are different kinds of birth— from womb, from

egg, from moisture, and from transformation. Blues, yellows, reds, and

whites are the mind. The long, the short, the square, and the round are the

mind. Living-and-dying and coming-and-going are the mind. Years, months,

days, and hours are the mind. Dreams and fantasies, and flowers in space,

are the mind. The spray of water, foam, and flame are the mind. Spring

flowers and the autumn moon are the mind. Each moment is the mind. And

yet it can never be broken. For this reason the real form of all dharmas is

themind, and buddhas alone, together with buddhas, are the mind.”

(Dōgen 1997:64-65)

As the quote above shows, mind encompasses everything in existence, both material, such

as mountains and rivers, but also actions, as in “holding-up-a-flower-and-bursting-into-laughter.”.

The quote attempts to list all types of things and phenomena in existence and say that they all are

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mind. Ultimately, then, everything is mind, and mind is everything. So when talking about mind or

material things, all you do is have a dualistic discourse on one aspect of the same thing. The

difference between mind and matter and other things in existence is that from a particular

standpoint, you might focus more on mind and from another on matter, just as from one angle, you

see the head of a coin and another the tail.

It should be clear that Zen is indeed an interconnected philosophy that rejects dualism.

However, the idea of dualism needs to be explored further. As shown in the first part of this paper,

dualism seems to be the central aspect that makes aesthetic judgments and interconnectedness

incompatible. Therefore we need to explore Zens position on dualism further. To understand the

Zen philosophical position on dualism, we need to explore its view on Buddha-nature, which can be

translated to Enlightened-nature or ultimate reality.

Buddha-nature: Dualism and non-dualism

As has been shown in the first part, the relation between dualism and non-dualism seems to

be central in causing aesthetic judgments and interconnectedness to be incompatible. Because

dualism is so central, we need to examine how Zen handles dualism further.

Under the headings of Buddha-nature: Non-dualism and No-Buddha-nature: Non-

essentialism, I will explore the non-dual position in Zen. Next, under the heading, Is dualism

completely rejected? I will explore the Zen view on dualism and its place in Zen philosophy.

Finally, I will finish with a shorter section on the role of enlightenment and the fundamentality of

impermanence in Zen philosophy.

Buddha-nature: Non-dualism

For most of us, the world appears dualistic, and things appear to have independent

properties. For example, the trees outside my window seem to be independent of me, and even if I

did not exist, it seems clear that the tree should still be there. This type of thinking is dualistic

because it renders me and the tree independent of each other. Dōgen claims that this conception of

reality is false. However, how can it be the case that existence is non-dual even if it appears not to

be?

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Buddha-nature signifies the true nature of existence and is that which is realized in

enlightenment. That is to say, in enlightenment, you realize the whole nature of existence as

opposed to the way it seemed to be prior to enlightenment. The relationship between enlightenment

and the pre-enlightened state derives from the theory of primal confusion. The theory of primal

confusion holds that the nature of existence is that it appears as if phenomena (including oneself)

are permanent, independent with independent properties. However, in actuality, all phenomena are

impermanent, interdependent, and without independent properties (Garfield 2015: 8). This means

that realizing Buddha-nature is a move from the state of primal confusion (the pre-enlightened state)

to enlightenment. For example, when I perceive the tree outside my window as independent of me,

it is due to primal confusion where existence seems dualistic. However, In actuality, me and the tree

are part of the same whole, dependent on each other.

Dōgen claims that “all existence is Buddha-nature,” and in doing so, he creates a new

conception of Buddha-nature that is consistent with his theory of mind. (Kim 2004:128). For

Dōgen, Buddha-nature was at once beings and being itself (Kim 2004:128). He transformed the

psychological conception of Buddha-nature into an ontological and soteriological one where

Buddha-nature was synonymous with “Suchness”2 and Dharma-nature. Suchness and Dharma-

nature are seen as the impersonal ground of being or ultimate reality (Kim 2004:128). This means

that Buddha-nature is equated with the true nature of things, the way things truly are. For example,

realizing Buddha-nature is realizing that the tree outside my window is not independent of me and

other beings in existence. That the tree and myself seem independent is just part of the nature of

how the tree appears to me as a viewer but does not represent the full extent of what a tree is. Not

realizing Buddha-nature would then be the same as not being able to see the true nature of things or

even being delusional. Thus, Buddha-nature is ever-present in everything and signifies how things

actually are. Thus, Dōgen stated that “all existence is Buddha-nature.”

The problem why the world seems to be dualistic when in fact it is not, is explained as a

matter of perception. Humans are seen as inclined to misperceive existence. The idea of “All

existence is Buddha-nature” breaks down the duality of having Buddha-nature and not having

Buddha-nature because everything is Buddha-nature3. However, we seem to have a problem here. If

the non-dual nature of existence is right and the dual nature is wrong, then we have a dualism

2 To understanding something in its “suchness” should be understood as understanding something “such as they are.” That is, to understand the true nature of that thing.

3 Buddha-nature is not restricted to form, qualities and measures but is always realized through activities and expression. In this sense, Dōgen did not see language and symbols as a necessary evil, something other Buddhist traditions did (Kim 2004:139). Surely, if everything is an expression of Buddha-nature, we need to include language and symbols.

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between a true and a false way to perceive existence, and Dōgens’s philosophy would not be non-

dual after all. Furthermore, there seems to be a dualism between being and nothingness because

there is a focus on that everything is Buddha-nature and what things are. This relation can be

reformulated into the relation of being and nothingness: that which is there and that which is not.

Let us begin to focus on the dualism of having and not having and then, in the next section, move to

the idea of a right and wrong way to view existence.

No-Buddha-nature: The non-existence of independent properties

There is a danger in focusing on Buddha-nature and that everything is Buddha-nature. If we

abide in this line of thinking, we have a duality between being and not being, or nothingness,

because we only focus on what things are. We are only focusing on what the stone is and what is

here. However, what about what things are not and that which do not exist? Therefore, the

relationship between being and nothingness needs to be considered further. It is here where the

Buddhist concept of emptiness becomes important.

In Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, the concept of emptiness is common. There are two ways

in which emptiness is used, in the conventional sense, to point out the lack of something, and in a

more extreme sense, to point to the true nature of things.

To understand the concept of emptiness, it is helpful to recall the theory of dependent

origination. One of its ramifications is that nothing can have independent properties where it

renders, together with the idea of primal confusion, the appearance of independent properties as an

illusion of the phenomenal world. Because of this, the idea of emptiness is used to point out that

even if it appears that a thing has independent properties, it ultimately does not; it is empty. For

example, you could say that a bird is not a bird to signify that the bird lacks independent properties.

However, this line of thought would still be dualistic and not connect being and nothingness and

having and not having in the interconnected non-dual scheme of things. Indeed, it would be

nihilistic because emptiness would be the fundamental nature of existence if everything is empty.

The bird and everything else would be seen as not being anything, least of all what they are.

Therefore even emptiness needs to be empty (Garfield 2015. 65). This is the strong metaphysical

use of emptiness. In its strong use, emptiness is more of an interrogative pointing toward what is

ultimately real, that is, Buddha-nature and the non-dual nature of existence.When someone is using

emptiness in its strong sense and is saying that the bird is not a bird, they not only guard themselves

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against the idea of the bird having independent properties but point toward the non-dual nature of

the bird.

Dōgen thought this same problem was present when talking about Buddha-nature. Therefore

he introduced the idea of no-Buddha-nature, which builds on the idea of emptiness.

Like with emptiness, you could say that things have no Buddha-nature to guard us against

essentialist and dualistic thinking. However, ultimately that would still be acting in the dualistic

realm of having and not having. Therefore the idea of no-Buddha-nature is introduced to capture the

radical idea of emptiness or the emptiness of Buddha-nature (Kim 2004:133).

While Buddha-nature, in a sense, focuses on existence due to its claim that everything is

Buddha-nature, no-Buddha-nature liberates us from the world's particularities (Kim 2004:132).

Because Dōgen could not accept dualities, a focus on existence could not be accepted. To truly

capture Buddha-nature in its complete non-duality, Buddha-nature also had to be no-Buddha-nature.

Therefore, no-Buddha-nature had to be a part of Buddha-nature (Kim 2004:132). The way that no-

Buddha-nature is part of Buddha-nature should not be seen as an opposite to existence, an

antithesis, instead, no-Buddha-nature is a constituent part of Buddha-nature. Both are dependent on

each other. To fully realize the interconnectedness of existence, non-existence and existence need to

be woven into the same mesh because existence and non-existence rely on each other. There cannot

exist something without things not existing, and there cannot be any non-existence without

existence. Therefore the existent and non-existent way of existence needs to be connected. Thus

Buddha-nature should not be seen in its positive sense, as only focusing on the way things are and

the things that exist, nor in its negative sense, focusing on the things that do not exist and the way

things are not. In this way, the focus is moved to the non-dual nature of existence. No-Buddha-

nature thus points to the true non-dual nature of things, the same as emptiness.

This can be seen as a language game. If I focus on what a road is, I am dealing with the

dualistic nature of language, and it will seem like we are focusing on existence as opposed to non-

existence. However, ultimately existence and non-existence are not separate. The move to say that a

road is not a road would still be moving within dualism even if it negates the idea of roads having

independent properties. If you instead say no-road, you negate both the positive sense of the road

and the negative and thus point toward the way the road is when the dualism is overcome. The

dualism between being and nothingness anymore.

We can now see that Zen philosophy is radically non-dualistic. Ultimately, it wants to

overcome all dualism and go for monism. However, with all this said, we still need to acknowledge

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that there are different things in existence, or at least things that appear to be different. Dualism

does seem to exist in one shape or form. It does seem like the table in front of me is distinct from

me. Therefore we need to see how Zen explains this very intuitive view that there are such things as

independent properties and dualisms.

Is dualism completely rejected?

At this point, it might seem like we cannot have dualisms at all. However, it also seems like

we have a form of dualism between a right and a wrong way to view existence, where the non-dual

nature of existence is right, and dualism is wrong. To stay here would be unsatisfactory because we

do want to say that it is true that I have a cup of coffee in front of me. Further, we can not have a

dualism between a right and a wrong way to view existence for this to be a non-dual interconnected

theory.

The crux of the problem is that we have so far only dealt with enlightened reality where, as

Dōgen puts it, particular things are most accurately called a “What” that “thus comes” so that to

avoid the illusion of independent properties and to acknowledge the impermanent nature of

existence (Abe 1991: 45). Following this line of thinking, we must reject independent properties

because they entail dualism which we have rejected. It also seems like we cannot accept things

having value in enlightenment because everything is equally vital for existence, and value seems to

entail difference, dualism, and independent properties. Surely, if something is more valuable than

another thing, it must have something independent that other things do not have. For example, for

grass to be more valuable than soil, there has to be something that separates the two from each

other; something needs to be independent. However, as Abe points out, it is not that in

enlightenment, the pre-enlightened way you view existence disappears. Your view is

just expanded where you realize the true significance of what seemed to be a dual existence (Abe

1991:58). Thus my seeing a bench as distinct from me can be true even if I do not fully grasp the

true significance of what me seeing a bench as distinct from me entails. If we accept the pre-

enlightened dual way of existence also to be true, then we can have independent properties and

dualisms, albeit the significance of this plane will change. Let us examine the unenlightened way of

existence.

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I think that the thoughts of Nishitani Keiji can help us here. He uses the term “standpoint”

and “field” to describe how we conventionally perceive existence. He states, “We may look upon

things and make judgments about things one way in daily life, another way in science, and still

another way in philosophy. And yet in each case, we position ourselves, in the broad sense of the

term, on a standpoint of reason where we cannot come in touch with the reality of things” (Nishitani

1982:118).4 What Nishitani is echoing is the Buddhist idea of primal confusion and claiming that

there is a conventional way to view existence that will be dualistic and an enlightened way to view

existence that is non-dualistic. Basically, Nishitani claims that the way we normally perceive the

world is from a perspective, and thus, we normally view existence centrically.

The way I use centric here should be understood as how things appear from a specific

perspective or standpoint. It could be a subjective view, that is, how I as an individual see things, or

how things appear from the perspective of a culture or theoretical framework. For example, a

standpoint could be adopted so that I view things through the lens of natural science, Swedish

culture, western culture, analytical philosophy, or even from the perspective of a fish or a plant. Any

type of perspective that you can adopt or framework that you use to scrutinize or understand

something is centric because it is viewed from somewhere, a standpoint.

We now have two ways to view existence, a centric and an enlightened, and,

importantly, both are true. It is not the case that you live a life where you rarely see or experience

truths. Clearly, we cannot accept that, and we should not. Indeed, it is true that in front of me is a

computer which seems independent from me. In fact, what we conventionally see and experience

are true modes of existence. My computer is indeed in front of me. The claim that is being raised by

Nishitani is that in everyday life, it is exceedingly hard to experience, see and understand the

true full nature of things, and a perspective is always taken. This means that there is a limit on how

much you can understand through your normal senses and methods, like reasoning. For example, I

view my computer from a subjective perspective. However, what I see is in fact, true. In this sense,

it is true that the person next to me appears to be independent of me from my human perspective but

it is also true that, in actuality, we are all part of the same whole. To better understand this point, it

will be helpful to look at Dōgen’s interpretation of the relation between unenlightened and

enlightened states.

Dōgen clarifies that it is not that what was before enlightenment ceases to exist when

enlightened. The way we saw the world does not ceases to exist in enlightenment. Rather, in

4 Nishitani further claims that we usually are reason centric, and I’m inclined to agree with him, but I do not think it is necessary to go as far as he does to prove my point.

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enlightenment, you expand your view beyond what was previously perceived. Thus it is not only

our unenlightened existence that needs to be overcome but also the enlightened, or rather, the notion

or idea of enlightenment as devoid of unenlightened existence (Abe 1991:58). The idea of a non-

dual way of existence without a dual way needs to be overcome, and we need to accept both that

things, like cars, seem to be independent of hills and that things, hills, and cars, are ultimately part

of the same whole. Nishitani states that on the field of sunyata, or to put it into more appropriate

words for our context, on the field of enlightenment, things are absolutely two and absolute one at

the same time (Carter 2017:9). This means that when enlightened, you still see the world as it was

prior to enlightenment, dualistically. However, added to your dualistic view, you also realize the

non-dual nature of existence and the true meaning of what you already knew prior to enlightenment

and what place it has in the bigger scheme of things. In enlightenment, we have both dualism and

non-dualism.

Thus the unenlightened view is centric, dual but true, and the enlightened view is non-dual

and also true. On one level then, we have an enlightened view of the world, and on the other, a

centric view. In the centric view, you can adopt many viewpoints, that of reason, that from a culture,

a discipline an individual or a group of people, the list goes on, and these views are not false, just

incomplete if you claim them to be something more then centric. On the centric plane, existence

also appears to be dualistic. On the other hand, in an enlightened state, you realize both the centric

way of existence and the true nature of existence because the centric way of existence is part of the

true nature of existence.

One might ask which view is better, the centric or enlightened. The simple answer would be

the enlightened, but it is actually more complicated than that because the enlightened view includes

the centric view of existence. An enlightened view is preferred not because a non-dual view is better

than a dual one but because in enlightenment you maintain both views simultaneously. Ultiamtely,

centrism and dualism are just as important and good as interconectedness and non-dualism.

We can now see that there is no dualism between a right and wrong way to view existence.

In Zen it is just a matter of different perspectives where Zen claims that dualism is centric and thus

cannot capture the full holistic view of existence.

At this point, we can see that we can have both interconnectedness and dualism in the same

framework. Nevertheless, this move will have implications for our understanding of things and

phenomena in existence. Indeed, Zen philosophy, because it tries to reach enlightenment through

and from the centric pre-enlightened way of existence, deals with worldly phenomena and can

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accurately be called phenomenological (Garfield 2015:179). This phenomenology is placed in the

backdrop of and is embraced by idealism.

Enlightenment: Moving from dualism and centrism to non-dualism and Buddha-nature

How do you navigate between centrism and Buddha-nature? The answer lies in the act of

enlightenment.

The notion of enlightenment has already implicitly been discussed because, in

enlightenment, you realize Buddha-nature. The pre-enlightened state has been explained as a view

restricted by centrism. When enlightened, the subject-object distinction is broken, and you are, as

Nishitani puts it, in the home-ground of yourself and everything else simultaneously (Nishitani

1982: 64). This is only possible due to the radical interconnectedness in Zen Philosophy, where

somethings self-identity is dependent on the identity of everything else and vice versa. That is, your

identity is both yours and shared with everything else.

Practically, enlightenment is to fully function at every step of practice (Abe 1991: 67).

Practice should not be seen as a means to an end. That would entail a dualism between having and

not having. Instead, practice and enlightenment are seen as inseparably one (Abe 1991:65).

Practice, then, is enlightenment (Abe 1985:57).

The state of enlightenment is often practically called a state of no-mind. As Suzuki explains,

no-mind refers to the mind prior to the separation, or dualism of mind and body, or mind and the

world. It is not something that stands against the world and receives information but is connected

with it (Suzuki 1996: 262). No-mind is the state where you are part and realizes the non-dual nature

of existence. No-mind is enlightenment.

No-mind can be likened to a state of flow, where you act to the fullest of your capability

without reflection. This means that experiences in enlightenment is empty of intellectual, emotional,

and ego-driven thinking. Intellectual, emotional, and ego-driven thinking are moved to the centric

plane. However, experience is always central, and the goal is to experience existence in an

enlightened way through a state of no-mind. On this practical plane, Zen is phenomenological. As

Garfield states, “Broadly speaking, [phenomenology] is the study of the nature of experience, of the

cognitive processes and structures that enable experience and of the nature of subjectivity”

(Garfield 2015:175). Thus, even if Zen philosophy is metaphysically idealistic, on a practical plane,

it is phenomenological.

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The practical dimension of enlightenment is essential and fundamental to Zen philosophy

because of the fundamental place of impermanence in Dōgen’s philosophy. For Dōgen, you could

not correctly discuss being without discussing becoming. He thought that becoming, and by

extension, ceasing, was fundamental to all existence and that nothing can exist without this

temporal aspect (Kim 2004:139p). The idea of permanence would be placed on what I have called

the centric plane because it is dualistic in nature. As Stambaugh states, “[...] permanence,”

according to him [Dōgen], is the state of “non-turning” (miten) or dualism” (Sambaugh 1990: 56).

Because permanence is placed on the centric and dual plane, it would seem like in enlightenment,

everything would be impermanent, and this is true. However, we need to be cautious not to fall into

the pitfall of a dualism between permanence and impermanence. It will be more useful to use the

logic used regarding emptiness. On the centric plane we have permanence and impermanence in its

dualistic sense but in enlightenment, we have the permanence of impermanence. Existence is here

conceived as permanently appearing impermanent. Impermanence, is impermanence beyond the

dualism of impermanence and permanence. Here, any moment in time has the aspect of past,

present, and future, which make it appear to be impermanent. However, this is always the case

because impermanence is permanent. As Stambaugh states: “True permanence and true

impermanence as Dōgen conceives of them differ from previous conceptions, and are ultimately

identical” (Stambaugh 1990:55).

The importance of impermanence can be seen as follows: if all existence is conceived of as

impermanent, then all you do must be conceived in a temporal sense. Thus everything you, as a

human, can do is an action or practice. Thus enlightenment is practice, no-mind is practice, and

everything is practice. You cannot ever discuss anything apart from this temporal aspect. It is here

that Zen philosophy becomes practice-oriented. As I stated in the first part of this thesis, we do want

a theory of interconnectedness also to be able to encapsulate the practical dimensions of aesthetic

judgments. Clearly, the potential to capture the practical dimensions of aesthetic judgments is here.

Aesthetics and enlightenment: the non-dual nature of aesthetics

Now that we have made a distinction between two planes of viewing existence, a centric and

an enlightened, we need to see on which plane Zen Aesthetics takes place and its implications for

aesthetic judgments? To get an answer, it is easiest to turn to classical Japanese aesthetics, which

can be seen as Zen aesthetics.

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Zen and aesthetics have always shared a strong connection in Japanese culture. As noted by

D.T Suzuki in his work “Zen and Japanese culture,” Zen has influenced almost all aspects of

Japanese cultural life (Suzuki 2019: 21). Further, Yuriko Saito states that aesthetic concerns affect

nearly every area of people’s lives, whether it is art, nature, or everyday tasks (Saito 2017: xxx).

The drive to express beauty in all aspects of life has been seen as the essence of Japanese culture.

Carter points out that most people point toward Zen as the origin of Japanese aesthetics’ special

characteristics while failing to truly explore the Zen ideas that lie at the root of Zen aesthetics

(Carter 2017:4). He further elaborates that the connection between Zen and aesthetics can be found

in the idea of enlightenment (Carter 2017:4). Because of the lack of reasearch connceting Japanese

aesthetics to Zen, I need to explicate this connection further.

One problem with the literature about Japanese aesthetics that Carter points out is that the

significance of Zen in Japanese aesthetics has tended to be overlooked (Carter 2017:4). Instead,

there is often a focus on a handful of aesthetic concepts such as Sabi, Wabi, Mono no Aware,

and Yugen. These concepts should reveal something about the nature of Japanese aesthetics. Sabi

describes the beauty in aging (Suzuki 2019:25p). Wabi is the appreciation of the imperfect (Cooper

2017: 21) and evokes a feeling of poverty (Suzuki 2019: 23). Mono no aware is the appreciation of

the impermanent and ephemeral nature of existence. Yugen describes a deep mysterious feeling

beyond intellectual culpability that moves you to the core of your being (Suzuki 2019: 220p).

There is nothing wrong with these aesthetic concepts, and some of them have been used for

a long time. However, unfortunately, in using these concepts apart from Zen philosophy, it is hard to

grasp the full significance of them because, as Cooper argues, ideas like Sabi, Wabi, and Yugen are

realizations of Buddha-nature and thus are enlightened experiences (Cooper 2017: 26p).

In enlightenment, everything is perfect and just what it is. Thus what is seen on the centric

plane as imperfect will, on the enlightened plane, be appreciated in its perfection. The same thing

can be said about sabi, the appreciation of aging and wabi, the appreciation of the imperfect. In

enlightenment, there is nothing scary or imperfect about wabi or sabi because the old and imperfect

are as perfect as anything else. Thus, in sabi and wabi we move from a centric perspective to an

enlightened perspective, where the imperfect, old or ugly are seen as beautiful. So, for example, an

old, broken, poorly made bowl which would typically be seen as imperfect old, and ugly, would be

seen as perfect, beautiful, and just the way it should be.

Yugen, which describes a deep mysterious feeling beyond intellectual culpability that moves

you to the core of your being, literally describes an enlightened experience (Suzuki 2019: 220p).

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Thus yugen is realizing Buddha-nature. Likewise, Mono no aware, which is the appreciation of

impermanence, is also a realization of Buddha-nature. Because impermanence is usually the cause

of suffering and something that, on the centric plane, is feared, consciously or subconsciously, its

appreciation is realizing and accepting the true nature of existence, that is, the impermanent nature

of existence.

We can now see that all of the aesthetic concepts and ideals ultimately concern aspects of

Buddha-nature. They also say very little about the objects themselves but instead focus on a certain

way to view existence: the enlightened way to view existence. This can be seen in how these ideas

have been applied in practice, where they can be applied to both art and nature and, indeed, all

experiences. For example, Suzuki explains that seeing a patch of grass sticking out of the snow

illustrates sabi. However, the appreciation of seeing the patch of grass does not lie in the patch of

grass itself but is suggestive and reveals something about the true nature of existence. In this case,

the foreboding of spring and the impermanent nature of existence. Only those with an eye and

sensibility for these experiences will be able to realize something about the true nature of existence

when seeing a patch of grass. Only those who can enter into an enlightened state can truly grasp

sabi (Suzuki 2019:25p).

However, because it is the case that wabi, sabi, yugen and mono no aware are just in

different ways describing enlightened experiences, it should be more helpful to deal with Zen

philosophy directly. Carter is right in pointing out that Zen philosophy lies at the root of the

Japanese sense of aesthetics. Surely, if aesthetic concepts like wabi and sabi are fundamentally

expressions of Zen, we can conclude that Zen is an aesthetic philosophy. As a result, we can directly

deal with Zen philosophy and sidestep conceptual constructs like sabi and wabi, that are trying to

separate aesthetics from Zen philosophy.

What happens to beauty in enlightenment? It would seem like the aesthetic experiences

presented through concepts like wabi, sabi, yugen, and mono no aware do not necessarily have

much to do with any specific object. This is true, and it is true because, in enlightenment,

everything is beautiful. As Carter states, “[t]rue beauty exists in the realm where there is no

distinction between the beautiful and the ugly, … a state where ‘beauty and ugliness are as yet

unseparated”(Carter 2017:5). This conception of beauty happens on the enlightened plane, where

everything is experienced in the state of no-mind (Carter 2017:5). Henceforth, the state of

enlightened beauty will be written with a capital B; Beautiful. Because everything is ultimately seen

as Beautiful we can have a greater focus on experience and phenomenology in Zen. Ultimately Zen

27


is not interested in whether a flower is beautiful or not because everything is Beautiful. However,

Zen is interested in how a flower is experienced.

It seems like an issue has arisen. If aesthetics, according to Zen, is connected with

enlightenment, how can we have aesthetic judgments? As we have already seen, aesthetic

judgments seem to rely on dualism and ideas of independent properties. On the other hand, the

enlightened view of existence is non-dualistic and rejects ideas of independent properties. If

aesthetics deals with the enlightened plane of existence which is non-dual, then it seems like we can

not have aesthetic judgments. Zen aesthetics, which focuses on enlightened non-dual experience, is

fundamentally incompatible with judgments that rely on dualism. It certainly seems like we cannot

have aesthetic judgments in an interconnected view of aesthetics.

Part 3: Zen Aesthetics

The third part of this thesis will consist of a formulation of my view of aesthetic judgments.

This will take place under the heading; What is an aesthetic Judgement? Different perceptions of

beauty. Under the heading of Zen aesthetics and contemporary aesthetics, a comparison between

my Zen-inspired view of aesthetic judgments and Gorodeiskys Kantian view of aesthetic judgments

will be made. After that, I will defend why this is an aesthetic view. This will be made under the

heading of Is the Zen view on aesthetic judgments an aesthetic view? Next, under the heading This

is not a fictionalist view, I will defend myself against fictionalism. I will then discuss the

implications my view of aesthetic judgments has on aesthetics in general. This will be made under

the main heading of A shift in focus from aesthetic judgment to aesthetic experience. I will end with

a summary, conclusion, and outlook.

What is an aesthetic judgment? Different perceptions of beauty

Let us turn to what an aesthetic judgment is in a non-dually interconnected view? In part 2, a

distinction has been made between two ways of perceiving existence, an enlightened and an

unenlightened centric way. This distinction cannot be made for aesthetic judgments because a

judgment is dualistic and depends on intellectual actions driven by reasoning or emotions. Some

28


reflection and evaluation need to take place in making a judgment. Further, because in

enlightenment, everything is Beautiful and thus can also be said to have aesthetic value, a judgment

is redundant and has no place there. A judgment is also inherently dualistic because you have to

either judge something to be beautiful or ugly in an aesthetic judgment. This dualism is not allowed

in enlightenment. Even when you are not making such a strong judgment as beautiful or ugly, you

are still on that dualistic spectrum. In the end, an aesthetic judgment is dualistic and must take place

on the centric plane of existence.

Now we get to the crux of the problem presented at the beginning of this thesis, where it

seemed like the idea of aesthetic judgment would not be compatible with a non-dual interconnected

view of existence because of its dualistic nature, which opposes the interconnected non-dual nature

of existence. The same can be seen here because an aesthetic judgment is not compatible with the

enlightened view of existence due to its dual nature and does not seem compatible with Japanese

aesthetics which is based on Zen philosophy, where aesthetics deals with enlightened experiences.

As I stated at the end of the last section, it would seem like we cannot have aesthetic judgments in

an interconnected view, and aesthetic judgments would need to be abandoned. For example, Zen

aesthetics are not interested in whether a dandelion is beautiful or not but in how the dandelion is

experienced. However, do we really have to abandon aesthetic judgments? I think not.

Aesthetic judgments can still exist on the centric plane because the non-dual interconnected

nature of the world presented in the Zen philosophical framework does not exclude the dual nature

of existence on the centric plane. As stated already, it is not that the pre-enlightened centric way of

existence ceases to exist in enlightenment. Instead, in enligthenment your view is expanded beyond

centrism and dualism (Abe 1991:58). The Zen view of interconnectedness is actually not in

opposition to dualism but instead goes beyond dualism and claims the truth of both simultaneously.

Thus an aesthetic judgment can be a centric phenomenon on the centric plane of existence and still

reveal truths about existence, albeit only truths taken from a standpoint and limited by centrism. For

example, it can be true that dirt is seen as ugly on the centric plane from the standpoint of a human

and that it is beautiful in enlightenment because the human can experience dirt as ugly even though,

utimately, dirt is Beautiful. This is important because the dilemma presented in the beginning is

dissolved because we do not have to put interconnectedness and non-dualism in opposition to

dualism and conceptions of independent properties. Instead, we can say that the dualistic way of

existence is just a question of how things are perceived and experienced from a standpoint, while

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non-dualism and interconnectedness deal with the whole nature of things, including how things are

perceived.

This conception of aesthetics raises a big problem. If everything is ultimately Beautiful,

does the aesthetic judgment that happens on the centric plane reveal something about objects? The

answer would have to be no. Suppose an aesthetic judgment does not actually deal with whether

something is beautiful or not objectively because it cannot due to everything ultimately being

Beautiful. In that case, we need to ask ourselves if it says anything about the object at all. For

example, if dirt, a flower, and a rotten apple are ultimately Beautiful, how can a judgment about

their beauty reveal anything about the object? Either you claim that the rotten apple is beautiful and

this would be correct but very uninteresting, or you say it is ugly, and you are wrong, and your

judgment would not reveal anything about the apple except for how you experienced it. In both

cases, nothing special, if anything at all, is revealed about the object judged. However, if a judgment

does not say anything about the object, then what would be the interesting things about existence an

aesthetic judgment reveals? If an aesthetic judgment does not reveal anything about the object, then

it must reveal something about the standpoint taken when the judgment is made. For example,

something about me or a standpoint adopted by me, or the relation between me or a standpoint and

the object makes me deem a pile of feces ugly even if it is, just as everything else in existence,

Beautiful. Clearly, the judgment reveals more about the standpoint taken in judgment and the

relation between the subject or standpoint and the object judged.

Even if an aesthetic judgment about a painting is experienced as deciding whether it is

beautiful or not, and this experience is true, the judgment does not reveal anything significant about

the painting. However, the judgment does reveal something about my experience and how and from

which standpoint I did my judgment about the painting. It further reveals something about the

relation between me, or the standpoint I adopted in judgment, and the painting. In this case, the

aesthetic judgment can at most reveal something about an object's relation to the judger, but this is

still a tiny aspect of the object. Thus, we can see that aesthetic judgments do not reveal much about

an object's beauty. Instead, it reveals something about the person or standpoint taken in the act of

judging and the relationship between the judger and the judged.

Further, as we have seen, because enlightenment is non-dual, the duality of subject and

object is broken, and everything can be seen as ultimately concerning the self because the self is the

entire interconnected existence. In centrism, then, anything judged and believed to be distinct from

you and the rest of existence is ultimately not distinct. Thus judging an object and judging the self is

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ultimately the same. Because in enlightenment, subject-object dualisms are overcome, revealing

something about the self is revealing something about all existence, including the object judged. For

example, a judgment made about the beauty of a flower does reveal something about the flower

because the flower and myself are part of the same whole and constitute what could be called the

ultimate self of all existence. The judgment also reveals something about my relationship with the

flower. However, more directly, it reveals something about the meeting of the two entities, myself

and the flower, in existence.

Now we get to another important point. Even if the judgments reveal something about the

standpoint taken in judgment, the person judging, the relationship between the object judged and the

judger, and even a little about the object itself, nothing revealed is about the object's beauty. Again

this is because, ultimately, everything is Beautiful. The judgment then reveals things about

experiences. However, because humans concern themselves with beauty, the aesthetic judgment

mainly reveals something about the subject that concerns itself with beauty; humans. It is humans

that care about the beauty of the Mona Lisa and not the painting Mona Lisa. The relationship is now

turned from the object being judged to the judger and the centric circles he/she is participating in.

Let us illustrate what an aesthetic judgment does with an example. I stand in front of a pile

of rubble, and I analyze it, then judge it to be ugly. What information can be drawn from this

judgment? First, we can conclude that the judgment is false. The judgment is false because I failed

to see the beauty in the rubble. Remember, everything is Beautiful. However, if I had judged the

rubble to be beautiful, I had only seen the rubble for what it is. This would not have made the rubble

more special. Instead, the judgment would have made me more special because I managed to see

something that many people find ugly to be beautiful. However, this time this did not happen; I

judged the pile of rubble to be ugly. Me judging the rubble ugly reveals that I or the tools I used for

analysis failed to see the beauty in the rubble. The cause of this lies in, among other things, my

personal experiences, which would include, among other things, the culture I am part of, my

education, or the theoretical framwork I used in my judgement. Again the focus and the interesting

information revealed is put on me, the judger, and the standpoint I take in judgment.

In a fully enlightened view of the situation of me judging a pile of rubble to be ugly, we

could go even further and say that in the meeting with the pile of rubble a reaction arises. This

reaction would be me finding the pile of rubble to be ugly. However, from this perspective, what is

revealed is neither directly about the judger nor the thing judged but reveals how existence presents

itself in this situation. However, because only humans are interested in beauty, everything

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concerning beauty is focused on the human actor. Therefore, even from an enlightened perspective,

everything concerning the aesthetic judgment of the pile of rubble is focused on the human judger.

You might say, and rightly so, that humans need to judge, and even the enlightened need to

do it because there can be no humans without judgments. This is not strictly speaking true. In

enlightenment, what is done is not judging because you do not have to judge anything. You simply

know and do. It is acting without giving space to reflection and intellectualization. Judgments are

not needed. When seeing something beautiful, you know it is Beautiful.

What happens with normal humans that are not enlightened but have some enlightened

aesthetic experiences? Clearly, the judging does not happen in the moment of the experience but

posterior to it when enlightenment has been left and your intellectual brain steps in and tries to

make intellectual sense of what just happened and places the non-dual way of existence into a

dualistic framework.

Aesthetic judgments are then just expressions of unenlightened human behavior. The truths

found in aesthetic judgments go the other way than one might think, from the object judged to the

person or persons judging or the standpoint taken in judgment. The aesthetic judgment has nothing

to do with the beauty of objects but everything to do with humans and their communities, cultures,

theories, the human intellect, relationship to the object, and the standpoint taken in judgment. If this

is true, the significance of an aesthetic judgment is changed into a phenomenological issue that

deals with cultural and human experiences and behavior. Questions about aesthetic judgment are

entirely changed to phenomenological questions where you try to explain why it is that someone is

judging something in a certain way. Thus it does not reveal anything about an object’s beauty at all.

Zen aesthetics and contemporary aesthetics.

How does my Zen-inspired view of aesthetic judgment compare to some contemporary

theories? I will focus on Gorodeiskys Kant-inspired view, which broadly holds, that a judgment of

taste is made when you are in contact with something aesthetically beautiful. It is not that the object

demands your reaction, just that, as a rule, you will judge the beautiful as beautiful (Gorodeisky

2011:432).

Gorodeisky thinks that a judgment of taste is a specific kind of judgment distinct from

practical and theoretical judgments. That is, it is purely aesthetic (Gorodeisky 2011:416).

Gorodeisky also holds that there are things that are beautiful and ugly. Here we have the first point

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of divergence between my view and Gorodeiskys. The assumption that there is something ugly and

beautiful is very significant because, in it, she accepts dualism, something that is rejected in Zen. In

the Zen view, everything is Beautiful in enlightenment, and everything is perfect. Therefore, the

duality between the beautiful and ugly does not exist. It does, however, on the centric plane, but

any distinction like that between a centric and enlightened plane is not part of Gorodeiskys

philosophy. Further, the centric judgment does not reveal much about an object but instead about

the judger and the standpoint taken in the judgment.

Gorodeisky states that some philosophers have claimed that Kantian aesthetics amounts to

the conclusion that everything should be judged beautiful. This conclusion, she believes, is absurd

(Gorodeisky 2001: 417). In my view, on the other hand, it would not be absurd to conclude that

everything is beautiful. On the contrary, Zen's claim about beauty on the plane of enlightenment is

that everything is Beautiful.

When do you judge something to be beautiful according to Gorodeisky’s Kantian view? She

claims that a judgment happens when an object makes you be in harmony with it. No concepts need

to be at play here. A beautiful object does not demand that you appreciate it but nevertheless makes

you appreciate it (Gorodeisky 2011:432). My Zen view would not agree on this point either. Even if

it is true that in enlightenment, there are no concepts at play and that this seems to be similar to

Gorodeisky’s assumption, we have seen that the judgment of taste is made on the centric plane

where concepts and intellectualization are at play. In enlightenment, judgments do not have a place

and are, in fact, irrelevant because everything is Beautiful. There would also be an agreement that

objects do not demand that you appreciate them, and there might even be room for the assumption

that you should be in harmony with the object. Nevertheless, even if some agreement can be found,

Zen would hold that the points of the agreement mentioned above have nothing to do with aesthetic

judgments and thus are irrelevant to it.

Gorodeisky states that the beautiful object is unique because everything about it seems to be

as it should be; perfect (Gorodeisky 2011:432). The difference here can be drawn back to the dualist

assumption in Gorodeisky's philosophy contra the non-dual assumption made by Zen. Zen would

agree that the Beautiful is exactly as it should be, perfect, but it would say that everything in

existence has this quality and not just some objects. Because of this, Zen will conclude that there is

nothing unique about the Beautiful object.

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Things being what they should seem to be what gives something aesthetic value, according

to Gorodeisky. However, it is very unclear what exactly it is that makes a thing valuable.

Gorodeisky states that: “ I [...] suggested that the distinctive instantiations of aesthetic value greatly

vary from object to object in part because they supervene on the specific response‐independent

properties of each specific object and the ways in which these properties interact with each other”

(Gorodeisky 2021: 277). I find this to be very unhelpful. Basically, she says, there is aesthetic value,

but I do not know what it is, though it seems to be different from object to object. She seems to

have a problem pinpointing what is valuable in the objects.

If we compare Gorodeisky view of value to my Zen view, we see that in enlightenment,

everything is just how it should be, perfect. In a sense, everything is equally important and valuable.

However, on the centric plane, things are valuable depending on the perspective taken and the

standpoint you view things from. In Zen, it would be impossible to decide on one aesthetic property

that is objectively more valuable than another. Just as Gorodeisky states, everything has to be

determined on a case-to-case basis and will vary from object to object. Importantly, as we saw in

the section about aesthetic judgments, the judgment of taste reveals more about the person judging

or the standpoint from which the person makes his judging. It follows then that even here, the object

judged to be valuable is less important than the standpoint from which someone is judging. We can

thus conclude that an aesthetic value judgment, just like that of beauty, reveals more about the

standpoint from which a judgment is made. This is possible because, in enlightenment, everything

is Beautiful and thus is aesthetically valuable. Here is the most important point of difference.

Gorodeisky accepts dualism, which causes differences in the conception of phenomena. For

Gorodeisky, aesthetic judgment concerns objects, not the self or the standpoint from which

something is judged.

Let us illustrate the difference in an example. When I judge the movie Spirited Away as a

beautiful movie, Gorodeisky would probably say that this movie has beautiful properties that make

it so that I find it beautiful. These properties do not demand that I judge it beautiful. Nevertheless, I

do judge the movie to be beautiful because it is beautiful and, just as it should be, perfect. The

perfection addressed by Gorodeisky is in opposition to the imperfections in other movies. Finally,

the judgment is not practical or theoretical but aesthetic.

Through my Zen aesthetic framework, the judgment about the beauty of the movie Spirited

away can be practical and theoretical because it is a centric activity that is trying to make sense of

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an experience. Further, Spirited away has beautiful properties, but this is irrelevant because

everything is Beautiful. Spirited away is perfect, but this is irrelevant because everything is perfect,

and no opposition exists between the perfect and imperfect. The difference between the perfect and

imperfect is just a matter of whether you view things centrically or from enlightenment. Finally, my

judgment does not reveal anything about the movie Spirited away but instead reveals something

about me as a person or the standpoint or analytical framework taken in my judgment.

Is the Zen view on aesthetic judgments an aesthetic view?

Considering the differences presented here, one could ask whether this is an aesthetic view.

We have to say yes because if we compare Zen aesthetics to Kant’s philosophy, we find many

practical similarities. The main differences seem to lie, just as above, in the dual conception of

reality and what we explain the same phenomena to be.

Zen aesthetics focuses primarily on aesthetic experience and practice and does not deal with

concepts of judging. Here the state you should be in is the state of no-mind, which is the practical

dimension of enlightenment. Enlightenment is set in contrast to analytical thinking, which is tainted

by dualistic thinking. Practically enlightenment is intuitively seeing into the true nature of things. A

new world will arise when seeing the true nature of things (Suzuki 1996: 98). No-mind refers to the

mind prior to the separation, or dualism, of mind and body, or mind and the world. It is not

something that stands against the world and receives information but is connected with it (Suzuki

1996. 262). In this state, you are empty of intellectual and emotional thinking. All egocentric

behavior is absent. In this enlightened state, you can see things for what they are, in their perfection

and beauty. Here everything is Beautiful. It is this feeling that the Japanese aesthetic concepts

like wabi, sabi, yugen, and mono no aware, point towards.

If we compare this state of emptiness to Kant’s notion of disinterestedness, or ohne

Intresse, we will see that these states are basically the same. If we look at the original

word, ohne, that is without, we already see similarities to emptiness. Emptiness and ohne virtually

mean the same thing. Intresse or interest could be equated with personal egocentric thinking. Thus

the lack of interest will be just like the state of emptiness, or the state of no-mind, where you do not

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have any egocentric and intellectual thinking. Therefore, we can already see that these ideas are

very similar on an etymological level.

Kant states that “[...] the taste for the beautiful is a disinterested and free satisfaction; for

no interest, neither that of the senses nor that of reason, extorts approval” (Kant 2000. 95).

However, If you do not have any special interest in the thing perceived, neither provided by senses

or reason, then surely it cannot be tainted by your wants and needs. So we could as well say that we

are empty of these faculties, just as in Zen philosophy.

We can now see that practically the Kantian disinterested state in which we experience pure

beauty is virtually the same idea as the enlightened state of no-mind in which you are empty of

interest and also experience pure beauty. Of course, Zen philosophy would say that everything is

Beautiful, which differs from Kant. Nevertheless, we should definitely accept this as an aesthetic

theory because it deals with the same type of experiences as Kant. The difference in the belief

concerning the significance and meaning of these experiences is not relevant. Besides that, Zen

philosophy has been practically used aesthetically throughout Japanese history, which also makes

Zen philosophy a clear aesthetic theory. Though importantly, Zen does not deal with judgments.

This is not a fictionalist view

It might be thought that this is a fictionalist view, but that is not the case for several reasons.

Kroon presents the basic fictionalist assumption in contrast to realism. He states that “[…] realism

about Xs is the view that X exist and do so independently of minds, theories, concepts, and the like.

By analogy, we might take fictionalism about X to be the view that X exist as useful fictions rather

than as genuine mind (etc.)-independent entities”(Kroon 2011. 787). If we apply this to aesthetic

judgments, one could say that the fictionalist would hold that me judging something to be beautiful

is just a useful fiction. For example, it might be useful for me to judge a painting made by a friend

to be beautiful because maybe I deem it good for my relationship. However, this judgment would

not reveal anything about whether or not that painting is beautiful.

We have a couple of problems here. First, the centric way of existence is not fictional. The

centric way of existence is true and does reveal something about the nature of existence. For

example, it reveals that a realist position would seem to be true through centrism. The setback of the

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centric view is that a perspective binds it, and thus, it can never grasp a complete picture of

anything apart from itself. That is, apart from the truth in the action of judging itself. For example,

if I judged my friend's painting to be beautiful, my act of judging would not be seen as fiction. No

fiction would be present at all. However, my judgment would not say much about the painting but

reveal something about me. For example, that I think that judging my friend's painting to be

beautiful is beneficial to my relationship with my friend. The difference here is slight but important.

The fictionalist would say that I lie for my benefit, even if I believe in the lie, but in Zen, my action

and my judgment would be a truth. The shift in focus from the object to the subject that is made in

fictionalism is not a problem but is explained as the fundamental nature of aesthetic judgments and

the point where truths reveal themselves.

The notion of usefulness used by the fictionalist is also not compatible with my Zen-inspired

view on aesthetics because it is not concerned with usefulness but tries to explain experiences.

More importantly, the notion of fiction is dualistic and presupposes the existence of

something that is not fictional, that is, real. The view that I have presented is non-dual and would

not accept any dualistic assumptions.

A shift in focus from aesthetic judgment to aesthetic experience.

Does my Zen aesthetic view on aesthetic judgments pose complications for aesthetic research? It

might seem like a big problem to distinguish between enlightened and centric experiences and thus

make it complicated to choose an approach in philosophy. Indeed, I could state that my experience

was enlightened, and no one would know whether I lied or told the truth. This seems to pose a

problem. However, because Zen aesthetics is practically oriented, we will see that it makes no

methodological difference whether you deal with centric or enlightened experiences, nor truth or

lies. To unpack this problem, we need first to examine the place of practice in Zen aesthetics and

what reamifications on aesthetics the centric plane brings. We shall see that both will ultimately

focus on aesthetic experience and that the distinction between enlightenment and centrism is not as

practically relevant as it might seem at first glance.

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The centrality of practice: artistic practice and aesthetic appreciation as aesthetic experience

Practice is at the core of the Zen understanding of aesthetic appreciation and artistic

practice. Aesthetic practice should here be understood to encompass both acts of appreciation and

creation and every action concerning aesthetics. All are forms of aesthetic practice. Indeed, it will

be more appropriate to place both appreciation and practice under the heading of aesthetic

experience, where experience encompasses both modes in the same way.

The central position of aesthetic practice lies in the central position given to practice in Zen

philosophy which derives from the fundamental place the impermanent nature of existence has in

Zen Philosophy. For Dōgen, you could not properly discuss being without discussing becoming. He

thought that becoming, and by extension ceasing, was fundamental to all existence. Nothing can

exist without this temporal aspect (Kim 2004:139p). Thus fundamentally, existence is impermanent.

Because everything is impermanent, all we can do is practice because, in constant change, all you

can do is do something. This is what I mean by practice. Thus any action or non-action is an action,

and without practice, we can not have enlightenment (Abe 1991:67). Because all you can do is

practice, we can place both artistic practice and aesthetic appreciation under the same umbrella.

Both artistic practice and aesthetic appreciation are modes of practice.

Zen's preferred way of practice is in the enlightened state of no-mind. The concept of no-

mind is central to Zen aesthetics and is the aspect of Zen that has infiltrated Japanese aesthetics the

most (Suzuki 2019:94). In a letter to a famous swordsman, Takuan, a Zen monk, instructs the

swordsman in swordplay and explains that the master swordsman should not think but instead

empty his mind of his thoughts, wants, and needs. If he does not empty his mind, he risks faltering,

this is called suki, and as a result, he dies (Suzuki 2019:147). The state Takuan wants the

swordsman to be in is the state of no-mind, and when he is in it, he will fully function at every step

of practice (Abe 1991: 67), which in this case concerns swordplay. This state is the preferred state in

every practice, whether it concerns fighting, artistic endeavors, or appreciation.

We are generally familiar with the concept of no-mind in western cultures, but here we call

it a state of flow (Suzuki 2019:117ff). Most of us should be able to relate to the feeling of flow

when we do and do not think. You just let things happen, and for some reason, you perform better

than you knew possible. So essentially, no-mind is the same as the state of flow.

In aesthetic practice, this is no different. Here you do your best work as an artist when in the

flow state of no-mind. However, the same can be said for appreciation. You truly appreciate

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something when you are in the flow state of no-mind. In a sense, both questions of artistic practice

and aesthetic appreciation can be put under the umbrella of aesthetic experience because both

concern the same type of human experiences.

An implication for artistic practice is that, to an extent, artistic practice is not an act of a

human manipulating something into what he wants. Instead, artistic practice is an interplay between

a human individual, an object, and the rest of existence that results in art. The world is talking

through and with you and the object because the subject-object duality is overcome. The same

relation would be true for appreciation in the flow state of no-mind, where you would appreciate an

object in its dualistic sense and in its enlightened sense where the object is non-dually part of

everything, including you.

Similar ideas concerning both artistic practice and appreciation have been presented in

western philosophy. Focusing on creativity, Eli Lichtenstein presents in his paper “aesthetic

objectivity as creative receptivity,” a view that seems to broadly state that in creativity, the world

expresses itself through you instead of you controlling the creative process (Lichtenstein

2021:18ff). Lichtenstein’s idea of creative receptivity as a state that lacks the act of controlling, or

forcing out what you want, is akin to no-mind because you do not demonstrate any part of your

controlling ability in that state. You are not forcing or controlling things. Instead, you are,

perceiving the world and reacting without letting any wants and needs influence you. The difference

is that in Zen aesthetics the same state you are in when being creative is what you are in when

appreciating something.

Similarly, concerning appreciation, Mäcklin’s idea of losing yourself in an aesthetic

experience looks pretty similar to the Zen position on aesthetic appreciation. Mäcklin points out that

this idea, which he calls self-forgetfulness, has been present in philosophical literature for a long

time (Mäcklin 2021:13). He states that “[…] self-forgetfulness must not be understood as a total

loss of selfhood, as the perceiver remains pre-reflectively and non-thematically self-conscious even

in deeply immersive experiences” (Mäcklin 2021:13). I think this describes what enlightened

appreciation is because it is not that the self disappears in enlightenment. However, you are emptied

of intellectual, or as Mäcklin puts it, reflective thinking. Mäcklin argues that the feeling of self-

forgetfulness is not an annihilation of the self where the object swallows you up. Instead, he thinks

that the feeling of annihilation is a shift in the sense of agency (Mäcklin 2021:13). This idea is not

opposed to enlightened appreciation either because, in enligthenment, a shift of agency from a view

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of you as a subject with an agency to that of being part of the agency of existence needs to take

place.

As we can see, aesthetic appreciation and aesthetic practice would be central in any Zen

aesthetic endeavor thanks to their connection to enlightenment, where appreciation and practice,

ultimately, are enlightened experiences. Any aesthetic philosophy would then focus, in the broad

sense, on experience, where experience will encapsulate both aesthetic appreciation and artistic

practice. This would also include questions of aesthetic judgment because, as we have seen, an

aesthetic judgment reveals something about the centric way humans navigate existence. I claimed

that a shift of focus should be made from that of the object to the one judging, but in this shift, the

question about aesthetic judgments becomes assimilated into questions about aesthetic experiences

where you focus on how humans, intellectually, make sense and judge objects.

Throughout this thesis, I have distinguished between the centric and the enlightened nature

of existence. However, what should we do with this distinction when adressing aeshtetic

experiences?

Centrism and aesthetic experience.

How the relationship between the centric and enlightened plane should be dealt with in

practice needs to be addressed. We have earlier stated that aesthetic judgments take place on the

centric plane where we can focus on intellectual behavior. However, does this mean that we need to

approach questions about aesthetic judgments or any question on the centric plane differently than

enlightened experiences? Furthermore, what about cases that happen in the grey zone between

enlightenment and centrism or are similar to enlightened experiences.

Most of the time, most people cannot be said to be in an enlightened state. Still, we

appreciate things constantly, and we create things. We cannot just say that aesthetic practice in

enlightenment is right and everything else is wrong because, strictly speaking, Zen philosophy does

not ever want to deal with notions of right and wrong because of the dual nature of these concepts.

Zen philosophy wants to avoid this type of judgment. Therefore these ideas need to be accounted

for and placed in the theoretical framework. Further, if we were to hold a strict distinction between

enlightenment and centrism, we would get methodological problems where it would be almost

impossible to say whether someone is truthful in claiming that an experience is enlightened.

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Firstly and importantly, neither enlightenment, nor the state of no-mind is something you

always have. These are states you can come in and out of. Here true appreciation is equated with

entering into the enlightened state of no-mind.

Practically enlightenment is intuitively seeing into the true nature of things, and as Suzuki

states, when seeing the true nature of things, a new world will arise to you (Suzuki 1996: 98). In a

way, you could say that in enlightenment and the state of no-mind there is an aspect of realizing

something new about the world. This is an important point because, in a way, when seeing a new

artwork, it will grant you this experience, and the more creative or skilled it is done, the higher of a

chance there is that it will make you see and experience something new that you have not

experienced before. In this sense, it widens your horizons. So on the most basic level, seeing new

things, whether artwork or not, will have some of the qualities that are part of enlightened

experiences even if you are still on the centric plane. Then, of course, the more it can help you see

into the true nature of the world, the higher your aesthetic appreciation will be. For artistic practice

realizing something new about the world also holds true because you are partaking in the act

of creating something new in the world. Even if what you create is terrible or unsuccessful, it is

new. In this sense, we can deal with aesthetic appreciation and practice even if they are not entirely

enlightened and thus give a place to experiences that are navigating in the grey zone between

enlightened and unenlightened states of being. However, just because an experience shares

characteristics with enlightened experiences does not mean it is a fully enlightened experience.

Nevertheless, I do believe that most people regularly have small enlightened experiences. This, I

believe, is especially true for many artists.

Some kind of appreciation can indeed be found even if your experience does not qualify to

be an enlightened experience. These experiences take place on the centric plane of existence. Most

of the time, I believe these experiences are closer to feelings of satisfaction or pleasure. For

example, reading something can be pleasurable when it reinforces your identity, and seeing a

painting can be pleasurable because it reinforces or expands on your ideals. This type of pleasure is

also frequently measured by its more immediate nature. Most importantly, they are dependent on

subjectivity and centrism. Let us examine this.

As we have mentioned already, the relationship between enlightenment and the

unenlightened state is not that the unenlightened way of existence is false, just that it is limited.

What you see when not enlightened is not false but limited to centrism and bound up with your

predispositions as a human and the culture you are part of. In a sense, who you are and your

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experiences form how you see the world and what you will appreciate. However, this has little to do

with the true nature of things. It is just part of the puzzle. To use an example, let us turn to the Mona

Lisa. It is objectively true that many people appreciate it and that, at least within western culture, it

is regarded as a masterpiece. However, this fact says very little about Mona Lisa in itself and fairly

little about the individual viewing it. However, it reveals a lot about our culture and the way of life

and values that have formed the identity of the individuals appreciating it (or not appreciating it).

The same reasoning applies to artistic practice. Whether you enjoy and feel like you succeed in a

creative endeavor reveals something about the centric circles you partake in. Thus, even in centrism,

the focus is on experiences.

Here, it is helpful to look at Kant's notion of the agreeable. Kant sees the agreeable as that

which pleases the senses in sensation (Kant 2000. 91). However, if we change the agreeable to that

which pleases the standpoint you view a thing from, then you have what I mean by positive centric

experiences. This will be almost like Kant's dependent beauty. In my view, this dependence will be

mainly on a perspective. Thus, even in centrism, the focus is on experiences. Something will be

pleasurable when it fits into a theoretical framework you are using or some existing ideals and

preconceptions of existence that you have.

If you are both on a centric and enlightened plane dealing with a more phenomenological

approach, even if the focus and what types of actions you focus on changes, then aesthetics will

always be phenomenological and focus on experiences. Even if aesthetic judgments happen on the

centric plane, we do not need any shift in methodology because both centric and enlightened

experiences are experiences. Whether your focus is on the enlightened or centrism plane of

existence, both are unified by concerning experiences. This enables us to have a similar

methodological approach no matter if you are interested in enlightened or centric experiences. We

do not necessarily have more problems than in other philosophical approaches. On the contrary,

there are many benefits to my Zen aeshtetic approach to aesthetic judgments.

Some benefits to Zen aesthetics

My Zen aesthetic approach can answer the various ways things are appreciated and the

various aesthetic practices preferred over the world. For example, as Junichiro Tanizaki shows in

his essay “In Praise of Shadows” (2001), Japanese and western aesthetics are almost opposites.

However, if we adopt my framework, we will not have a conflict here because we can say that both

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are right and say that the difference has nothing to do with the objects themselves but rather with

the viewpoint from which things are appreciated. If, for example, someone from Sweden finds some

indigenous clothes, ornaments, and rituals in a specific culture to be aesthetically beautiful even

though the people that live in that culture do not, we can subscribe the difference to a difference

taken in judgment. This difference will be answered by saying that from the standpoint of western

and Swedish culture, the type of activities, clothes, and rituals are similar to what we call aesthetic

behavior even if these things have practical and functional value for the indigenous people.

However, no one of these perspectives is strictly speaking wrong because it is objectively, or rather,

centrically true that these indigenous clothes and ornaments are considered beautiful from the

standpoint of a Swedish person and practical and functional from the indigenous perspective. Thus

what is put forth here is a centric type of appreciation that is reliant on perspectives.

This approach would not make any difference between different aesthetic expressions like

music and painting, nor appreciating and creating. All will be unified by focusing on the experience

or actional aspect that is part of all of these acts. A difference in approach also does not need to be

changed between whether you are interested in the enlightened plane or the centric plane of

aesthetics. Everything would be phenomenological, where you only focus on different aspects of

existence. This is because everything concerns aeshtetic expereinces.

Aesthetic judgments have now been merged into a small subsection of phenomenological

aesthetics, which focuses on aesthetic experience where people centrically deal with aesthetic

experiences. Descriptions of enlightened ways of viewing the world will be aesthetically very

interesting because everything is Beautiful, and this might help you to broaden your horizons to be

able to find beauty in everything. Also, engaging in centric aesthetics and focusing on questions like

aesthetic judgments will be interesting because you can help describe and figure out how humans

and the world behave. No matter your focus of interest, you will still have to use a

phenomenological methodology which focuses on aeshtetic experiences I the way presented above.

The same method should always work.

Summary, Conclusion and outlook.

I started this thesis by asking what an aesthetic judgment would be if we took existence to

be interconnected. I showed that the ideas of interconnectedness and aesthetic judgments did not

appear to be compatible because judgments relied on dualism, and interconnectedness was non-dual

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in nature. Aesthetic judgment relied on the idea of independent properties, which allowed for, at

least, the dualism of subject and object and the dualism of the beautiful and ugly.

Interconnectedness, on the other hand, could not accept these dualisms.

We can now conclude that aesthetic judgments indeed can have a place in a non-dually

interconnected framework. One major implication was that we had to change our conception of

aesthetic judgments. Instead of revealing something about the beauty of an object, we saw that the

aesthetic judgment revealed something about human centric behavior in existence and the

standpoints taken in judgment. In my Zen framework, everything is seen as ultimately being

Beautiful. Because of this, aesthetic judgments do not say anything about the beauty of an object

but about the position or standpoint from which something is being judged.

One implication of the conception of aesthetic judgments presented in this thesis is that if

you are focusing on enlightened experience, centric experience, artistic practice, art appreciation, or

aesthetic judgment, whether centric or enlightened, your approach would always be

phenomenological. Everything concerns aesthetic experiences. The same methodological approach

should always be used no matter which aspect of aesthetics you focus on. I ended by claiming that

this would benefit aesthetics because it could easily handle the fact that aesthetics and what is

deemed beautiful have been so different across cultures and artistic media. The answer would

always be found in differences in the standpoint taken in judgment or that in a specific culture or

field, you more easily access the enlightened nature of things.

The shift in focus to aesthetic experience is, of course, something that needs further

research. Therefore, it would be beneficial to formulate a cohesive Zen phenomenological method

that would help you navigate between the different areas of interest in your research.

One of the significant benefits of this approach is that it is very understanding in nature. Any

phenomena you encounter will be something that you would want to understand. It would not be

satisfactory to say or even show that someone is wrong. You always want to explain why it is that a

particular conclusion is reached and show what it actually reveals. This will give this approach a

unifying nature where it always wants to place any theory or phenomena in the greater scheme of

things. This can result in a shift in the conception of some phenomena, just like we have seen with

aesthetic judgments, but the phenomena still need to be what it appears to be. For example, I believe

that in this framework, you would say that a communitarian and an individualistic approach to value

are not in opposition to each other and that the apparent difference is just a matter of the standpoint

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taken by the philosopher. In this case, from an individual or from a community. However,

importantly, both would be centrically true, and you would have started to unify two different

approaches into one. The same thing can be seen in this thesis, where I have unified a focus on

aesthetic judgments, artistic practice, aesthetic appreciation, enlightened and centric experiences, to

questions about aesthetic experiences. I believe this is a crucial point because it could help us create

the bigger picture that the analytical philosophical project is striving for instead of getting stuck on

whose argument is right or wrong.

This approach is also very elastic because it can be adapted to most areas of philosophical

research because of its non-judging nature where it only wants to explain phenomena. The

importance here is that you would get fewer cross-disciplinary problems where this theoretical

approach should be adaptable to all areas of research. However, there is a lot more to be researched

about what Zen philosophy can provide to analytical aesthetic philosophy. Whether the benefits I

have presented really are what I believe needs more research before a final conclusion can be made.

At the very least, I believe that this thesis hints at the possibilities that an interconnected and non-

dual approach that does not oppose itself to more dualistic oriented approaches can provide.

45


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the non-dual and interconnected nature of aesthetic judgments

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