The Choice to Believe

A defence of deontological epistemology, a critical analysis of Alston’s “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” (1988), and an explanation of where, precisely, Alston went wrong.

University of Cape Town

Faculty of Humanities

Philosophy Department

Full name: Robert Jenkin

Student number: JNKROB003

Course Title: PHI4019W – Research Essay/Project

Supervisor: Dr Dean Chapman

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Table of Contents

SECTIONI.INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................3Alston’sErrors................................................................................................................................4OutlineOfEssay.............................................................................................................................5

SECTIONII.TWOTYPESOFVOLUNTARISM....................................................................................5WhatIsVoluntarism?WhatIsItForSToVoluntarilyOrFreelyDoφ?..........................................5

VOLUNTARISM.......................................................................................................................................6MetaphysicalFreedom..................................................................................................................7MoralFreedom..............................................................................................................................7ClarificationOfTheDistinction:“TeaOrCoffee?”ThoughtExperiment........................................8

SUB-CONCLUSIONOFSECTIONII..............................................................................................................9

SECTIONIII.VOLUNTARISM,ACCOUNTABILITYANDBLAMEWORTHINESS.....................................9IntroductionToADeontologicalTheoryOfEpistemicJustification.............................................10TheImportanceOfPraise-/Blameworthiness..............................................................................11AModelOfAccountability...........................................................................................................12DoesThisContradict“OughtImpliesCan”?.................................................................................12Sub-ConclusionOfSectionIII........................................................................................................14

SECTIONIV.ALSTON’SARGUMENTANDHISERRORS....................................................................15ALSTON’SARGUMENT...........................................................................................................................15

Alston’sAssumptionError............................................................................................................15Alston’sConceptionOfDoxasticVoluntarism..............................................................................15Alston’sArgumentAgainstTheDeontologicalJustificationOfBeliefs........................................17Alston’sModelOfDegreesOfControlOverActions....................................................................18

VOLUNTARISMANDBELIEFFORMATION..................................................................................................20DegreesOfControlOverBeliefs...................................................................................................21ReligiousBelief.............................................................................................................................22CognitiveBehaviouralTherapy....................................................................................................23PhilosophyOfEducation..............................................................................................................24

ANALYSIS............................................................................................................................................25BackToVoluntarism....................................................................................................................25EvaluationOfReligiousBelief;LongRangeControlOverBeliefs.................................................26ThreeKindsofAccountableBelief................................................................................................28

ALSTON’SEQUIVOCATIONERROR...........................................................................................................30SUB-CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................30

SECTIONV.THEINCONSISTENCYARISINGFROMALSTON’SERRORS.............................................31CHOOSINGACTIONSANDCHOOSINGBELIEFS...........................................................................................31

BasicBeliefsAreLikeReflexActions............................................................................................32SUB-CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................32

SECTIONVI.REVISEDCONCEPTIONOFDOXASTICVOLUNTARISM.................................................33SufficientDoxasticControlForDeontologicalEvaluation............................................................34

SECTIONVII.CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................36

SECTIONVIII.CITATIONS...............................................................................................................38

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Section I . Introduction In this paper I argue in defence of the possibility of a deontological theory of epistemic justification. That is, I defend the possibility that a believer is justified in believing their beliefs just in case he/she has taken those actions required of them (in the context of their enquiry) which would be sufficient for their belief being a “good” belief – i.e. they have fulfilled their epistemic duties. Deontological theories are theories of praise and blame.

A deontological theory of justification is a theory of justification. Such theories say that justification just is a matter of praiseworthiness, and that having an unjustified belief just is a matter of being blameworthy. As such, justification is essentially or intimately related to notions of duty, permissiveness, praiseworthiness, and blameworthiness.

My defence of a deontological theory of justification targets William P. Alston’s paper, “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification” (1988). Let me highlight one point about this essay: I will not argue that a deontological theory accurately describes the nature of justification. Rather, I argue that Alston’s critique of the deontological epistemology fails to rule it out.

Alston argues that the deontological theory fails because it implies the existence of epistemic duties. He argues that we cannot be duty-bound to believe (or not), if we do not have sufficient control over what beliefs we believe. If so, we must be able to choose to believe p, or not. This control/freedom is a prerequisite for epistemic accountability. We lack this control, thus we cannot be accountable for our beliefs, and we cannot be duty-bound to believe (or not). As such, Alston argues that any theory of epistemic justification, which relies on the existence of epistemic duties, is bound to fail. Deontological theories rely on the existence of epistemic duties, thus they fail to give a good account of epistemic justification.

The main topics of this essay concern (1) voluntarism (particularly deontological voluntarism) and (2) accountability. I agree with Alston that accountability is a necessary condition for praise- or blameworthiness, thus it is necessary for a deontological theory of epistemic justification. That is, a deontological theory is apt only if we have epistemic duties, which we can only have if we are accountable for our beliefs. In other words, we must have sufficient “effective choice”1 or “voluntary control”2 over our beliefs for us to be accountable for believing (or not believing) them.

However, Alston assumes that discussions of doxastic voluntarism do not relate to free will, so he imposes a particular model of voluntarism that I argue is not necessary for accountability. I argue that “moral freedom” is sufficient for accountability; one need not have “metaphysical freedom” (I define and discuss these concepts in Sections II and III). Consequently, Alston’s argument equivocates on the meaning of “freely choose”. This equivocation leads him to falsely conclude that we cannot be praise- or blameworthy for our beliefs, although we can be praise- or blameworthy for our actions.

I will not argue that we can be praise- or blameworthy for either our beliefs or our actions; rather I argue that if we can be are praise- or blameworthy for our actions, then we can also be

1 William P. Alston, “The Deontological Conception Of Epistemic Justification,” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 259. 2 Ibid.

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praise- or blameworthy for our beliefs. Alston is only able to argue his case by having a “double standard of freedoms”. That is to say, he holds actions to one standard of freedom (moral freedom) and believe-choice to another (metaphysical freedom). As such, he treats them inconsistently. However, our model of accountability requires that he use the same standard of freedom for each.3 Thus his position ought to be revised.

Alston’s Errors In particular I accuse Alston of making three errors:

Assumption Error4

He assumes that our freedom (or lack thereof) over belief-choice is not related to the problem of free will/action.

Equivocation Error5 In his argument, he equivocates over the term “freely choose”. In one instance, Alston uses “freely choose” to mean: “to make a decision, according to the free operation of the will” (such that the choice is unhindered by external limitations). In another instance, Alston uses “freely choose” to mean: “to make a decision according to the operation of a free will” (such that the person could have chosen to have done otherwise and to have wanted to do otherwise).

Inconsistency Error6

The Equivocation Error allows him to maintain two separate standards of freedom: one for action and another for belief. When discussing freedom of action, he requires only moral freedom for accountability. So, for us to have sufficient freedom for our actions to be deontologically evaluable, we must have “chosen our action by free operation of our will”. Whereas, when discussing freedom of belief-formation, we need to have been able to have chosen otherwise. In other words, for doxastic voluntarism to apply, Alston requires us to have “chosen our action by operation of a free will”.

I address these three errors throughout this essay. In resolving the Inconsistency, I undermine Alston’s argument for the impossibility of a deontological theory of epistemic justification. This leads me to my conclusion:

If we have sufficient a degree of freedom of action (voluntarism in general) for accountability, then our actions can be evaluated deontologically. This consequent entails that we must also have sufficient freedom over our beliefs (doxastic voluntarism) for us to be accountable for believing them. As such, they too, can be subject to deontological evaluation. So if we can act freely, then we can choose our beliefs freely. And if so, Alston does not eliminate the possibility a deontological theory of epistemic justification. 3 The model of accountability I propose, in Section III, is based on Alston’s account. 4 Alston’s Assumption Error allows him to equivocate, in his argument for the claim that beliefs cannot be deontologically evaluated. 5 Alston’s Equivocation Error allows Alston to move from (legitimately) claiming that moral freedom is a necessary and sufficient condition for deontological evaluation, to (illegitimately) requiring metaphysical freedom. 6 I also refer to Alston’s Inconsistency Error as his Double Standard of Freedoms Error. It allows him to (erroneously) maintain that we can make deontological evaluations of actions but we cannot make deontological evaluations of belief-formation.

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Outl ine Of Essay This essay is written in seven sections:

In the next section, Section II, I define and discuss two conceptions of freedom. These are “moral freedom” and “metaphysical freedom”. I refer to each throughout the essay.

In Section III, I propose a model of accountability that would be sufficient as a basis for deontological evaluation. This model is based on Alston’s account of praise- and blameworthiness and I refer to it throughout the essay.

In Section IV, I formally lay out and critique Alston’s central argument, going into further detail on his Errors, which I introduced above. I explain how they arise, the relationship between each, and how they make his argument unsound.

In Section V, I explain the consequence of Alston’s mistakes for his central thesis. I argue that they lead him to treat action-choice and belief-choice inconsistently.

In Section VI, I propose a revised conception of doxastic voluntarism that is consistent with Alston’s deontological evaluation of actions and resolves his inconsistency problems.

In Section VII, I sum up and conclude. I conclude that Alston’s argument is unsound because it relies on equivocation. If we accept a model of accountability that makes our actions deontologically evaluable, then we must accept that some of our beliefs can be deontologically evaluable too. If so, then Alston’s argument, as written in “The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification”, does not rule out the possibility of a deontological theory of epistemic justification.

Section I I . Two Types Of Voluntarism

What Is Voluntarism? What Is I t For S To Voluntari ly Or Freely Do φ? A sufficient understanding of “voluntarism” is necessary for my analysis of “doxastic voluntarism”. “Voluntarism” describes our ability to act, choose, or make decisions freely. “Doxastic” means pertaining to “beliefs”, or what Alston calls: “doxastic attitudes”,7 “propositional attitudes”,8 and “attitudes towards propositions.”9 In essence, “doxastic voluntarism” is the idea that a thinker is able to freely choose witch propositions they believe, and which they do not.

In this section, I introduce two terms: “metaphysical freedom” and “moral freedom”. These illustrate two different ways of answering the, “What is it for S to voluntarily or freely do φ?” question. I shall not analyse either term in any depth, since this section is merely intended to equip the reader with a sufficient conceptual framework to be able to follow my analysis of Alston.10

7 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 263. 8 Ibid., 277. 9 Ibid., 275. 10 Alston’s Assumption Error (that conceptualizing doxastic voluntarism does not concern free will) allows him to conflate these two different types of freedom. In his analysis of doxastic behavior, he conflates moral freedom with metaphysical freedom. This leads to his Equivocation Error when he gets round to arguing that we have

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The aim of the section is to draw attention to the fact that this topic can be riddled with vagary, which can lead to logical errors and inconsistency. I hope to clear up some of that vagary so that I can resolve Alston’s Errors.

Voluntarism Louis Charland describes voluntarism as, “the capacity for voluntary choice”.11 This, too, is vague, but illustrates the kinds of ambiguity that is common to this topic. This is why I ask my second question: “What is it for S to voluntarily or freely do φ?” In Schopenhauer’s “Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will”, he describes three types of freedom: physical, moral and intellectual freedom.12 In this paper, I distinguish between just two types. One is analogous to Schopenhauer’s “moral freedom”,13 but I call this “metaphysical freedom”. What I call “moral freedom” is closer to a compatibilist’s conception.14

Moral Freedom A decision that is, “chosen by free operation of the will”.

For moral freedom, one need not be able to choose to will otherwise. One has moral freedom whenever one is acting in accordance with what one wills (and one would have done differently had one willed otherwise). Alston believes that this is sufficient for accountability and deontological evaluation. Metaphysical Freedom

A decision that is “chosen by operation of a free will”.

For metaphysical freedom, one must be able to choose to actually will otherwise; to choose what they actually will (in which case, one would have done otherwise). Merely acting in accordance with what one wills is not sufficient for metaphysical freedom.

In Sections IV-VI, I go on to argue that Alston does not appreciate the distinction between metaphysical and moral freedom. He maintains that conceptions of doxastic voluntarism have nothing to do with free will problems (his Assumption Error).15 He conflates these two kinds of freedom (Equivocation Error), but implicitly holds freedom of action to the standard of moral freedom whilst holding freedom of belief to the more demanding standard of metaphysical freedom (Inconsistency Error). So, my task of disambiguating voluntarism is essential to unpacking and resolving Alston’s Inconsistency. Having outlined the concepts of metaphysical freedom and moral freedom, I build on our understanding of each, in outlining a model of accountability.

insufficient doxastic freedom for doxastic voluntarism, and thus epistemic justification cannot be analyzed deontologically. 11 Louis C. Charland, “Decision-Making Capacity,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 12 Arthur Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will,” trans. F. J. Payne (extracts) in Reading Philosophy, ed. S. Guttenplan, J. Hornsby and C. Janaway (Blackwell, 1839), 172-92. 13 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay,” 174. 14 Michael McKenna and D. Justin Coates, “Compatibilism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 15 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 262.

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Metaphysical Freedom “Metaphysical freedom” refers to the kind of voluntarism discussed in the classical metaphysical questions of free will. Are we the authors of our own wants and desires? To have metaphysical freedom implies that the decision is “chosen by operation of a free will”. It can be contrasted with any action that is necessitated by a prior cause, and, contrary to these, metaphysically free actions are completely un-determined or un-caused. So, any action necessitated by a prior cause is not a metaphysically free action. Schopenhauer writes:

“Absence of necessity is characteristic of what is free… dependant on absolutely no cause at all… The free remains that which is in no relation to necessity; and this means that which is dependant on no ground.”16

Applying this conception of freedom (metaphysical freedom) to the human decision-making process (voluntarism), he says that a metaphysically free will would,

“Not be determined by causes or sufficient reasons in general, for otherwise its acts would not be free but necessary… freedom is the power to initiate of itself a series of changes. For this ‘of itself,’ when reduced to its true meaning, signifies ‘without antecedent cause’.”17

He goes on to say that:

“A free will would be one that was determined by nothing at all. The particular manifestations of such a will (acts of will) would therefore proceed absolutely and quite originally from itself, without being brought about necessarily by antecedent conditions, and thus without being determined by anything.”18

Any choice of the will (or “act of will”) necessitated by a prior cause is not metaphysically free. To have metaphysical freedom is to be able to decide what one does and what one wills, and these decisions must find their origins in the thinker themself. These decisions are not caused (or even influenced) by events in the external world. To be metaphysically free is to have the freedom to have been able to do other then what you actually did do; to be able to will other than what you actually will.

This may seem incoherent, however, my argument will not rely on either the possibility or impossibility of metaphysical freedom. I merely use the concept to clarify my analysis of Alston, and to contrast against moral freedom.

Moral Freedom “Moral freedom” pertains to a less cosmic conception of voluntarism, one which is associated with compatibilist theories such as Walter Stace’s linguistic analysis of freedom,19 Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical mesh theory,20 Susan Wolf’s theory of actions and values,21 Laura

16 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay,” 177. 17 Ibid., 177-8. 18 Ibid., 178. 19 Walter T. Stace, “The Problem Of Free Will,” in Religion And The Modern Mind, Walter T. Stace (London: Harper Collins, 1959) 419-424. 20 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom Of The Will And The Concept Of A Person,” The Journal Of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20. 21 Susan Wolf, “Sanity And The Metaphysics Of Responsibility,” in Responsibility, Character, And The Emotions: New Essays In Moral Psychology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 46-64.

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Roberts’ ethical approach to voluntarism,22 and so on. Most compatibilists concede that metaphysical freedom is internally inconsistent and out of our reach. At the very least, metaphysical freedom is not necessary for moral accountability. They argue that another kind of voluntarism is possible and it is sufficient for responsibility, accountability, and praise- or blameworthiness (see Section III, below). Alston’s position, like the majority of compatibilists, is that we can be accountable for our actions when we have moral freedom.

This conception of voluntarism is what I call “moral freedom”. According to Stace, moral freedom just is that which is necessary for a person to be held accountable for their actions,23 because one can be held accountable for those actions which one had deliberately chosen to do, freely, in accordance with one’s will.24 Moral freedom may legitimate the deontological evaluation of actions, and perhaps deontological evaluation of beliefs. Alston accepts the former, but not the latter.

For moral freedom (unlike metaphysical freedom) an agent need not be the ultimate author of one’s own desires (i.e. one need not be able to will other that what one actually wills). However, the morally free agent must know what they will, and act in accordance with their will, such that if they were presented with a choice between two alternatives, each alternative must be “viable”. An option is viable whenever an agent can take whichever alternative they want, according to their will. The agent need not have control over the will itself. If one acts in accordance with one’s will to φA (when one would have not φ-ed A had one not willed to φA), then one is choosing/acting freely. Thus, although what one’s will might be determined (by one’s wants, desires, past experiences, tastes, and so on), one still freely chooses the alternative that one wants.

According to Alston and the compatibilists, Moral freedom is sufficient for responsibility and accountability.25 Thus, even if metaphysical freedom were impossible, moral freedom would be enough to legitimate deontological evaluation of some actions (and maybe some beliefs, too).

Clar if icat ion Of The Dist inct ion: “Tea Or Coffee?” Thought Experiment Suppose I offer you the option of tea or coffee. You find coffee revolting but you like tea, so you choose tea. As long as I actually have both, and am prepared to give you either (dependant only on your response to my offer) then the option would be viable. Then, you would have moral freedom (despite, perhaps, not having metaphysical freedom).26

22 Laura Roberts and Laura Weiss, “Addiction and Consent,” American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2002): 58–60; Laura Roberts and Laura Weiss, “Informed Consent and the Capacity for Voluntarism,” American Journal of Psychiatry, 159 (2002): 705–712. 23 Stace, “The Problem Of Free Will,” 419-424. 24 “Chosen by free operation of the will.” 25 I will offer no argument for this assumption here. In fact, it may be false. It could be that responsibility implies metaphysical freedom and the metaphysical freedom does not exist, so responsibility is an impossibility. I do not deny that possibility. However, Alston seems to assume a model of freedom of action which resembles this, so I make this assumption for the sake of my analysis in this paper. Later, in Sections V and VI, I will demonstrate that one way of resolving Alston’s Inconsistency is by dispensing with this assumption. However, a consequence of this would be the abolition of responsibility and, according to Stace, morality as a whole! So, with Alston, I will hold this assumption for now. I expand on the relationship between freedom and responsibly in Section III, below. 26 The possible lack of metaphysical freedom is derived from the fact that you do not like coffee. Perhaps you would not chosen coffee due to the fact that you do not want it. Your dislike of its flavor may cause you to choose

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Unlike metaphysical freedom, a morally free agent need not be the ultimate origin of their desires. Your dislike of coffee and enjoyment of tea might necessitate your desire for tea, and this may eliminate the possibility of metaphysical freedom – but it would not diminish your moral freedom. You are responsible for your choice because your choice of tea is a morally free choice. No one forced you to take one over the other. So, if you had chosen coffee, despite your knowledge that you do not even like it, you would only have had yourself to blame!

Sub-Conclusion Of Section II I do not want to suggest that either metaphysical freedom or moral freedom exist. I remain unconvinced by Stace (that our linguistic use of the concept of freedom, as it relates to moral accountability, entails its existence27), but I appreciate that our use of the word “free” differs between its moral and metaphysical meanings. Thus, even if neither type of freedom exists in, conceptual difference does. It is this conceptual difference that Alston overlooks.

Furthermore, I do not deny that accountability might require metaphysical freedom, which is Schopenhauer’s position.28 Although the two terms may refer to distinct linguistic concepts, I leave it open that moral freedom may entail metaphysical freedom.

The only aim of this section was to distinguish between two distinct terms, which denote two distinct concepts. In the following section, Section III, I present a model of accountability that illustrates the connection between moral freedom and deontological evaluation. I will argue that, if moral freedom is sufficient for the accountability (of actions), then when “choosing” to believe a proposition, moral freedom is sufficient for accountability (of beliefs), thus sufficient for a deontological theory of epistemic justification.

Section I I I . Voluntarism, Accountabi l ity And Blameworthiness In this section, I will first explain what a deontological theory of epistemic justification is, and then I explain the importance of praise-/blameworthiness to a deontological theory. Thirdly, I present a model of accountability that connects freedom to praise-/blameworthiness and deontological evaluation. This model is descriptive only, not normative. So, the aim of the model is to get close to describing our norms of praising and blaming.29 Fourthly, in a critical evaluation of the model, I argue that it need not contravene “ought implies can”. None of these ideas are at odds with Alston’s position.

the alternative over coffee. If so, then this choice is not uncaused. Thus, it would not be free in the metaphysical sense of the word. 27 For example: Ghandi was praiseworthy for his fasting for Indian liberation, because he did so according to his will. Had Ghandi willed otherwise, he would not have fasted. Thus he did if freely and is praiseworthy. Stace’s “man fasting in the desert because there was no food” (Stace, “Free Will,” 422), on the other hand, is not worthy of praise because he is not fasting for a noble reason and he is not doing it freely. He wills to eat, but the “to eat or not to eat” option is not viable to him. (Stace, “Free Will,” 422). 28 Schopenhauer argues that 1) moral freedom entails metaphysical freedom, 2) metaphciyscal freedom does not exists, so 3) moral freedom does not exists. [My terminology, not his] 29 This is not a paper on the ethics of praise and blame. It may be that we never ought to praise or blame persons for their anything at all. I remain neutral to those issues.

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Introduction To A Deontological Theory Of Epistemic Just i f icat ion For a theory of epistemic justification to be “deontological” means that a thinker is justified in their beliefs whenever, when forming their beliefs, they fulfil their epistemic duties or responsibilities. According to Pappas’s definition, “The justification of a belief is a matter of living up to one's intellectual duties.”30 So, for S’s believing the belief that p (S’s φBp)31, S is justified in her belief just in case that S has fulfilled her epistemic responsibilities. In contrast, if these duties have not been fulfilled, then S would not be justified in her belief – in which case S ought not believe that p.

For deontological evaluation, epistemic agents must be able to be held accountable for their beliefs, so that if S believes that p, prior to fulfilling her epistemic duties, then she is blameworthy for believing that belief.32 Thus, Alston argues that a deontological theory requires that we have sufficient “control” over belief-choice (sufficient doxastic voluntarism)33 that we are able to “effectively choose” our beliefs. This idea is best captured by what Andrew Chignell calls “Clifford’s Principle”.34

Clifford’s Principle: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence.”35

Clifford argues that one is justified in believing a proposition only if one has sufficient evidence for believing it. If one believes that p (φBp) when one does not have sufficient evidence, then one has committed both an epistemic and moral wrong, and one ought to be held accountable and can be blamed. Any deontological theory requires that persons can be praise-/blameworthy for their actions. Thus, a deontological theory of epistemic justification requires that we can be

30 George Pappas, “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 31 I will use this notation in my evaluation of Alston’s argument:

• “S” denotes an actor, agent or person. • “φ” denotes an action, it illustrates agency, and implies that an actor “does” something.

o This agency could be free or unfree. o It must be one or the other (free or unfree), but that an action is φ-ed does not imply that it is

φ-ed freely, nor does it imply that it is φ-ed unfreely. • “B” denotes a “belief”. It can be contrasted with “A”, which denotes an “action”.

o It draws a parallel to believing beliefs and doing actions. Each involves φ-ing. o E.g. “Bp” denotes “the belief that p”.

• “SφBp” denotes an agent’s (S’s) activity of believing a belief. It means something like: o “S believes the belief that p”, or o “S accents to the belief that p”, or o “S affirms the proposition p”.

So, “SφAx” would mean “S does action x” and “SφBp” would mean “S believes the belief that”. I use “φ” to denote an action, something which agents do. Believing is (often) a type of action. After all, “to believe” is a verb. Some beliefs (basic beliefs) do not involve much action. When one sees a red pen, one simply believes “That pen is red”. The thinker does no reasoning, thinking or investigation to come to believe that proposition. Framing “believing” as an action, emphasizes the active role one has in believing one’s beliefs. 32 On the other hand, S is praiseworthy (or something like it) only if S believes those and only those beliefs for which she has sufficient evidence (or something like it). 33 However, Alston assumes that this has nothing to do with the topic of free will. I address this mistaken assumption below, in Section IV. 34 Andrew Chignell, “The Ethics of Belief,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 35 William K. Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief” [1879], in Reason and Responsibility. J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau, eds. (London: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), 101-105.

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praise-/blameworthy for the beliefs we hold, so we must be able to “choose” which beliefs we believe.36 Alston agrees, and writes:

“This [deontological] conception of justification is viable only if beliefs are sufficiently under voluntary control to render such concepts as requirement, permission, obligation, reproach, and blame applicable to them.”37

In this section, I explain how this implies that a deontological theory requires that epistemic agents can be held “accountable” for their beliefs, which implies we must be “sufficiently responsible” for believing them. I argue for a particular model of accountability which keeps to “ought implies can” without requiring metaphysical freedom.

The Importance Of Praise-/Blameworthiness Deontological theories are theories which suggest that we have a duty to believe p under certain conditions, and a duty to not believe p if these conditions are not met.38 If we act in accordance with these duties, then we are praiseworthy; if not, we are blameworthy. It seems intuitive that we are not worthy of praise or blame for an action for which we are not sufficiently responsible or accountable. Alston does not dispute this claim. So, if one is to be held accountable for an action (or belief), then one must be sufficiently responsible for φ-ing it.39 So, accountability and responsibility are a function of how free one is, or a measure of the degree to which one is in control of one’s actions. And so, for deontological evaluation, one must have sufficient freedom to be in control of the choices one makes and the actions one takes.

According to Alston, if we are to analyse doxastic-justification deontologically, then we must be accountable for our beliefs, so we must be in control of the belief-choosing processes.40 Therefore, an agent and her actions can only be evaluated deontologically if she has:

1. sufficient freedom of action to be sufficiently responsible, so 2. accountable, so 3. praise- or blameworthy, and so 4. deontologically evaluable.

Each of these conditions is sufficient for the next, which is why sufficient responsibility entails praise- or blameworthiness, which entails the possibility of deontological evaluation.

This supplies the framework for the model of accountability that I expand on, below. This model need not be watertight. It need only help us better understand what would be sufficient for deontological evaluation and how deontological evaluation relates to moral freedom.

36 Perhaps “φ” in S(φBp) is best understood as the act of choosing. At least it would be, if these were effective choices (which I argue they are). 37 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” p. 259. 38 It may be that, dependent on the extent to which we fulfill our epistemic duties, we sometimes have a duty not to believe, but sometimes it is permissible to believe and permissible not to believe. The distinction between obligations to φ or not-φ versus φ-ing or not φ-ing being permissible are not relevant to my or Alston’s discussions. 39 In this paper, I do not distinguish between “being accountable”, “being held accountable”, and when one “ought to be/be held accountable”. Although there may be differences, in this paper I use all three expressions with normative weight. So, when I say “S is accountable” or “S is held accountable” I mean that we ought to hold S as accountable in this instance, and that she thus warrants the praise and/or blame to which we offer her. 40 Pappas, “Internalist vs. Externalist.”

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A Model Of Accountabi l i ty

For an action to be evaluated deontologically implies that the actor is praise-/blameworthy for the action (i.e. one is praise-/blameworthy if and only if one is accountable). According to this model, accountability is a bivalent property (one is either accountable or not). To be held accountable for any actions, one must be sufficiently responsible for them (“and their upshots”41). In contrast to accountability, responsibility is a property which one can have in degrees, according to a function of voluntarism (freedom and knowledge).42 The greater the degree that an action is chosen by the free and well-informed operation of the will, the more responsible the actor is.43 Sufficient responsibility for accountability requires sufficient ability to choose what one does (i.e. sufficient voluntarism).

Here is a short argument for the conclusion that voluntarism is necessary for deontological evaluation.44 The argument’s soundness relies on the relationship between freedom, control, responsibility, accountability, and praise-/blameworthiness (described above). Voluntarism applies when S has sufficient freedom/control (and information), that S can be held sufficiently responsible for the act (and its upshots), such that S is accountable.

1. Accountability is necessary and sufficient for praise-/blameworthiness. 2. Given S’s accountability, S is praise-/blameworthy (for the action “and its upshots”45). 3. Praise-/blameworthiness is necessary for deontological evaluation. 4. Thus voluntarism is necessary for deontological evaluation.

I do not consider this reliance problematic for my critique of Alston, since, from his discussions or responsibility, it is clear that Alston would agree with this model (or something like it).46 So, for a deontological theory of epistemic justification, we must have sufficient doxastic freedom to be held sufficiently responsible, and so accountable, and so praise-/blameworthy for believing those beliefs. If one does not have sufficient doxastic freedom/control, then one is not sufficiently responsible, then one is not accountable, then one would not be praise-/blameworthy, and so epistemic justification could not be evaluated deontologically. Thus doxastic voluntarism is a necessary condition of a deontological theory of epistemic justification.

Does This Contradict “Ought Implies Can”? So far, Alston would find this model uncontroversial. However one critique might be apparent. The problem is that this model seems to contradict the “ought implies can” schema, which Alston accepts. Generally, “ought implies can” refers to a metaphysical conception of freedom, such that if one ought to do action x (φAx), but does not, it implies that one could have done x. I argue that this conception of the Kantian maxim is ill-suited to an account of accountability. Here is Alston’s concern:

41 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 269. 42 How responsible one is depends on how free the action was an how well one know that one’s decisions would bring about the resulting actions and their upshots. 43 For examples of similar compatibilist internalist models of moral responsibility, see Stace, “Free Will,”; Frankfurt, “Freedom Of The Will And The Concept Of A Person”; and Wolf “Freedom Of The Will And The Concept Of A Person.” 44 Later I argue that moral freedom is sufficient for this kind of voluntarism. 45 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 269. 46 Ibid., 257, 261-2, 264, 272, 275, 278, 280-1, 293, and 295-6.

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“Now this [deontological] conception of epistemic justification is viable only if beliefs are sufficiently under voluntary control to render such concepts as requirement, permission, obligation, reproach, and blame applicable to them. By the time honored principle of “Ought implies can”, one can be obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice as to whether to do A… S cannot be rightly blamed for doing (not doing) A if S is incapable of effectively deciding whether or not to do A.”47

If the model of accountability that I have proposed here contradicts “out implies can”, Alston might not accept it.

We must ask what this passage means by “voluntary control” and “effective choice”, so we must unpack the meaning of “ought implies can”. I demonstrate that Alston need not object to this model of accountability on account of its supposed contravention of the “ought implies can” maxim. Whether or not the model contravenes the maxim depends on the interpretation of terms like “voluntary control”, “effective choice”, and “ought implies can”. This depends on which conception of freedom is more important for blame-/praiseworthiness: metaphysical or moral.

On the one hand, we have metaphysical freedom: a Schopenhauer-like interpretation of voluntarism. For S to have “effective choice” over the decision of whether to do action x (φAx) or not (∼φA), S must have been able to do otherwise. But, this is still ambiguous. What it means is that: given S wills to φAx, S must be able to autonomously (without any other causal influences which would affect her decision-making process) change her will, such that she no longer wills to φAx. And this autonomous change of will would affect her actions, such that she would ∼φAx. This decision to change the will would have to be completely uncaused.48 So, S has the ability to control her actions, and even her will, so that she can effectively choose (not only what she does), even what she wants, and even what she wants to want. For S to choose to freely do A or not implies that it must be chosen by operation of a free will. On this interpretation, the above model seems to contradict “ought implies can”.49 But it is not the only account of free choice that is available.

On the other hand, we have moral freedom. For S to have “voluntary control” or “effective choice” over the decision φAx or ∼φAx, S must be able to freely φAx or ∼φAx, according to whichever option S wills. It must be “chosen by free operation of the will”, but it need not be “chosen by the operation of the free will”. This means that, whenever one does what one wants to do (and would have done otherwise had one wanted to do otherwise), one is acting freely: whenever S wants to φAx, then S does φAx. Conversely, if S did not want to φAx, then S does not φAx. In each case, S chooses the option according to her will. Whether or not S could

47 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 259. 48 Conversely, if S wills to ∼φA, then S must be able to autonomously change her will to want to φA, and this autonomous change of will would affect her actions, such that she would φA. (See Section II, § “Two Types of Voluntarism”). 49 On this interpretation, the above model seems to contradict “ought implies can”, since, according to this model, moral freedom is sufficient for accountability (and metaphysical freedom is not necessary). This first interpretation of “ought implies can” implies that on ought to be able to do other that what one does, i.e. metaphysical freedom is necessary for accountability. So, on this interpretation of “ought implies can”, the model and the maxim seem to be at odds with each other.

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choose to will otherwise does not affect whether or not one has sufficient control to be considered morally free.

The essential difference between these two types of freedom can be illustrated by reference to my “tea or coffee?” thought experiment.50 If I offer you a choice of tea or coffee and you could have either, is your choice free? We intuit that your choice is free whenever your decision determines which drink you have. And even if the situation were exactly the same, but for the fact that I knew which option you were going to take (due to the fact that I knew you don’t like coffee), then your choice is still free. Even if I have the knowledge of LaPlace’s demon I would not be affecting the world, merely reading it.51 And so, someone’s knowing which decision you will take cannot not affect your freedom.52

My knowing that you will prefer tea does not influence your decision-making process. So, your choice is just as free as if I did not know which decision you were going to make. You have moral freedom, since you freely choose your beverage “according to your will”. Perhaps you do not have the ability to choose to have willed other that which you (in fact) willed, so you may not have metaphysical freedom.53 But this does not matter! You are still choosing the drink you want, and you have the drink you choose. Had you wanted coffee you could have had it. So, you had sufficient freedom for sufficient responsibility for accountability and thus this model does not contradict this interpretation of “ought implies can”.

Sub-Conclusion Of Sect ion I I I In this section, I introduced a model of accountability. This model relates voluntarism to deontology. I acknowledged that it might seem to contradict both “ought implies can” and Alston’s requirements for “effective choice”. However, I defended it from this possible critique, demonstrating that my model is consistent with both.

I will now go on to evaluate Alston’s argument. First, I will describe and evaluate what I have called his Assumption Error. I falsify his Assumption by demonstrating that we must acknowledge the relationship between free action and free belief-choice. Then, in Section V, I discuss how this leads to his Inconsistency Error. In Section VI, I will argue for a revised account of doxastic voluntarism, which resolves Alston’s Inconsistency and establishes what kind of relationship exists (between free action and free belief-choice).

50 See Section II, § “Two Types of Voluntarism”. 51 Simon P. Laplace, A philosophical essay on probabilities, trans. F. W. Truscott & F. L. Emroy. (New York: Cosimo Inc., 2007). 52 Side note on determinism and free will: It would be interesting to consider the scenario where I make you the offer, with the certain knowledge that you would choose tea over coffee, but then, before you answered I began to pour the tea. I can think of a fourth scenario (for those whose intuitions are still unshaken). Perhaps, the day before you visit, I go to the shops in anticipation of your wanting tea or coffee. I project my thoughts forward to the next day and picture myself asking you, “Dean, would you like tea or coffee?” Now, with my certain knowledge, I need not even buy the coffee. If I were to offer you tea or coffee the next day, would you choice still be free? 53 It seems that the only way that I would be able to predict (with certainty) which drink you would choose to drink is if the decision making process were determined, however, moral freedom is not concerned with whether or not one’s choices are determined. It is only concerned with whether or not one is able to choose to act freely, in accordance with the will (not that the will, itself, must be free).

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Section IV. Alston’s Argument And His Errors Above I have argued that there are two ways to conceive of voluntarism: metaphysical freedom and moral freedom. Then, in Section III, I argued that, according to an Alstonian model of accountability, metaphysical freedom is not necessary for deontological evaluation; moral freedom is sufficient. In this section, I shall argue that by ignoring the distinction between the two concepts of freedom (by ignoring the connection between doxastic voluntarism and voluntarism in general) Alston argues (mistakenly) that metaphysical freedom is necessary for deontological evaluation of beliefs, although he implies that moral freedom is sufficient for deontological evaluation of other actions.

Alston’s Argument

Alston’s Assumption Error Alston suggests that the problem of free will is sufficiently distinct from belief-choice that although “our problem concerns voluntary control over propositional attitudes… [it] does not concern free will or freedom of action.”54 So, he overlooks the logical relationship between doxastic voluntarism and voluntarism in general, which I highlighted above. My argument was similar to Steup’s argument that explains compatibilist versus “metaphysical” definitions of freedom and applies them to theorise about doxastic freedom and responsibility.55 A sufficient (even if rudimentary) understanding of voluntarism demonstrates that there is a logical relationship between doxastic voluntarism and voluntarism in general. So his assumption must be mistaken. So, prior to any analysis of doxastic voluntarism, we must come to a sufficient conception voluntarism and accountability. I accounted for this in the previous two sections.

If doxastic voluntarism exists, then it means something like this:

Doxastic Voluntarism Doxastic voluntarism applies to S’s believing the belief that p (S’s φBp) whenever S freely chooses whether or not to belief p.

So it is clear that free will and doxastic voluntarism are logically connected to each other. Any analysis of doxastic voluntarism requires sufficient analysis of free will/free choice. This undermines Alston’s Assumption that issues are not related. And this gives me a good place to begin my enquiry into the nature of doxastic voluntarism.

Alston’s Conception Of Doxast ic Voluntarism Alston claims that for a deontological theory to explain when a belief is justified the believer must be able to freely choose whether or not he believes the belief in question. This seems intuitive. If one is to be held responsible for one’s belief, then one ought to be responsible for that belief. In other words, one can only be accountable for the beliefs for which one is sufficiently responsible. Plantinga refers to this principle as “The First Internalist Motif”.56

Plantinga’s M1 “M1. Epistemic justification (that is, subjective epistemic justification, being such that I am not blameworthy) is entirely up to me and within my power.”57

54 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 261-2. 55 Matthias Steup, “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology,” Acta Analytica 15 (2000), 25-56. 56 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993),19. 57 Ibid.

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If I can be held accountable (or blameworthy) for my beliefs, then I must be responsible for them; which beliefs I believe must be “entirely up to me and within my power.”58 Then the ability to freely choose which beliefs I believe must be within my power. I must freely choose my beliefs. I highlighted this relationship (between voluntarism, choice and praise-/blameworthiness) in my model of accountability.

To accept a deontological theory of justification, we must be able to freely choose whether we believe the belief that p (φBp), or believe not-p or withhold assent from beliefs that p (∼φBp)59. In other words, for any theory of deontological justification, one must have “effective choice”60 or “voluntary control”61 over whether or not one believes one’s beliefs. So a theory of deontological justification can only apply to beliefs that we choose to believe.62

This is important to Alston:

“If I don’t have the power to choose between A and not-A, then we are without sufficient reason to say that I did A at will… responsibility, obligation, and their kindred attach to doing A only if the agent has an effective choice between doing and not doing A.”63

This illustrates Alston’s acceptance of M1: “To have control over believing that p is to have control over whether one believes that p or not.”64 One is accountable if and only if one has an “effective choice”65 or “voluntary control”66 over one’s belief. In other words, one is accountable for believing and belief if and only if doxastic voluntarism applied to that belief.

According to Alston, doxastic voluntarism exists in respect to a thinker’s belief that p only if they could have believed otherwise. Appealing to “ought implies can” (as discussed above): Alston argues that deontological justification can apply only if one has “voluntary control”67 over one’s beliefs; and one has “voluntary control”68 over one’s beliefs only if one chooses whether to believe p or not-p; and such a choice exists only if, whenever one chooses to φA, one could choose to ∼φA, and whenever one chooses to ∼φA, one could choose to φA.

This gives us enough background understanding of Alston’s conception of doxastic voluntarism to begin our analysis of his argument.

58 Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate, 19. 59 I equate both choosing to “believe that not p” and choosing to “withhold from believing that p” to choosing to “not believe that p” (∼φBp). In neither case does the agent believe that p. Thus in either case, the agent does not believe that p (∼φBp). (See also, Alston, “Deontological Justification”, 260). 60 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 264. 61 Ibid., 260. (According to Alston this control may be direct or indirect). 62 But we must understand “choose to believe” according to an appropriate conception of doxastic voluntarism, which turns out to be a moral freedom conception, not a metaphysical freedom conception. See Section II. 63 Ibid. I discussed an adequate conception of “voluntary control” and “effective choice” in Section III, § “Does this contradict “ought implies can”?” According to both Alston and the accountability model discussed in that section, moral freedom (chosen by free operation of the will) is sufficient for “voluntary control” and “effective choice”. Metaphysical freedom (chosen by operation of a free will) is not necessary. 64 Ibid., 261. 65 Ibid., 264. 66 Ibid., 260. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

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Alston’s Argument Against The Deontological Just i f icat ion Of Bel iefs I represent my best formulation of Alston’s argument, below.69

1. A deontological theory of justification applies to S’s belief that p, if and only if S has voluntary control over S’s belief that p.

[Premise]

Premise (1) demonstrates the importance of voluntarism, specifically doxastic voluntarism. To have “voluntary control over a belief” means that the belief is under the thinker’s doxastic voluntary control; or that doxastic voluntarism applies to that belief.70

2. S has voluntary control over S’s belief that p, if and only if S has the effective choice to believe the belief that p (φBp) or not believe that belief (∼φBp). 71

[Premise/Definition]

Premise (2) introduces the important concept of “effective choice”, and defines it in terms of voluntarism, which demonstrates the importance of freedom. If one has “effective choice”, then one can freely choose. Premise (2) could also be written:

2*. S has voluntary control over S’s belief that p, if and only if S can freely choose to φBp or to ∼φBp.

3. If S can freely choose to φBp or to ∼φBp, then, whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

4. So, a deontological theory of justification applies to S’s belief that p, if and only if whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

5. Thus, if it is not the case that whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp, – then a deontological theory of justification does not (and cannot) apply to S’s belief that p.

6. It is not the case that whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp, and, whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

7. Thus, a deontological theory of justification does not (and cannot) apply to S’s belief that p.

[2, reworded] [Premise]

[1-3, HS]

[4, contrapos.]

[Premise] [5&6, M.P.]

Thus, Alston argues (from only a few fairly intuitive premises) to the main conclusion of his paper: that beliefs cannot be justified deontologically. I will argue that this argument equivocates and that his Equivocation Error leads to his Inconsistency Error.

Next, I analyse how Alston classifies various classes of actions and how responsibility and accountability relate to these action-classes. For some classes of actions, we have a high degree of control (a high level of responsibility which is sufficient for accountability, and thus deontological evaluation). For other action-classes, we lack that control. These actions, like “reflex actions”, cannot be evaluated deontologically. Alston goes on to argue that belief-

69 This formal representation is based on Alston’s own argument. I have merely formalised it to facilitate a good understanding. I have not written an new argument for Alston’s conclusion. 70 Already, Alston’s first premise challenges what I called his Assumption. 71 In this example, choosing not to believe encompasses both options: belief that not p and withhold from belief that p or belief that not p. Both, to my mind, entail not believing p, thus not φ-ing the belief that p.

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formation is analogous to acting on reflexes. We do not have sufficient doxastic control for responsibility and accountability, thus we cannot be praise-/blameworthy for them. Thus belief-formation cannot be evaluated deontologically.

I will argue that some belief-formation processes may be like reflex actions. These are often referred to as “basic beliefs”,72 and we (probably) lack sufficient control over them for sufficient responsibility, for accountability. So, our believing these beliefs (probably) cannot be evaluated deontologically.73 However, some belief-formation processes are more like what Alston calls “basic actions”74 and “non-basic overt actions”.75 (Let us call these beliefs “non-basic beliefs”). I will argue that, for non-basic beliefs, we can have sufficient control for sufficient responsibility for accountability. So, our believing these beliefs can be evaluated deontologically. Thus, if Alston holds us accountable for basic or non-basic overt actions, but not for analogous belief formation processes, then he is guilty of treating acting and believing inconsistently.

I find that he is inconsistent in his application of the two concepts of voluntarism (the degree of freedom he requires of us to be accountable for our actions, on the one hand, versus the degree of freedom required of us to be accountable for out beliefs, on the other). This explains why he (mistakenly) concludes that deontological evaluation is apt for action-justification but not for belief-justification. I argue that his Inconsistency Error arises from equivocating the two types of voluntarism, which, in turn, is overlooked due to his Assumption Error, analysed above.

Alston’s Model Of Degrees Of Control Over Act ions Having discussed voluntarism, which forms the basis for premises (1), (2), and (3), I will now discuss Alston’s foundations for premise (6). In arguing for premise (6), Alston introduces useful concepts, which classify various classes of actions. He assigns them various degrees of voluntary control (see the table, below). By analogy, he argues that we lack sufficient voluntary control over our beliefs. Alston uses these concepts to argue for premise (6). In Section V, I will employ them in my analysis of his Inconsistency.

We cannot simply choose to believe a basic belief (e.g. to belief that “that pen is red”) in the way that we can simply choose to do a basic action (e.g. to do/φ “raise my arm”).76 Such “basic actions”77 are performed freely, at will, by our own volition. Alston calls this type of freedom (the freedom we have to control basic actions) “basic voluntary control”.78

72 Steup, Matthias, "Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). 73 However, some philosophers might argue that these kinds of beliefs are also deontologically evaluable. About “basic beliefs” I tend to agree with Alston, that they are neither justified nor unjustified – they simply cannot be evaluated deontologically. The Alstonian model of accountability requires voluntarism for deontological evaluation. If there is no voluntarism then the actions/beliefs cannot be justified deontologically so they are either unjustified or neutral regarding justification. Perhaps they are neither justified, nor unjustified, but “a-justified”. According to the Alstonian model of accountability, justification is not a property that can be applied to non-voluntary actions or non-voluntary beliefs. So, in effect, the “justification status” of reflex actions and basic beliefs may be ambiguous. 74 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 260. 75 Ibid., 269. 76 Ibid., 260. 77 Ibid., 268. 78 Ibid., 263-268.

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He contrasts this with “non-basic immediate voluntary control”79 or “indirect voluntary control”80. (He uses these terms synonymously). This is the control that we have over “non-basic overt actions”.81 Non-basic overt actions are more complex than basic actions, and so the control we have over their performance lacks the immediacy of the control that we have over basic actions, but “we take many familiar non-basic overt actions to be voluntary (and their upshots to be under voluntary control) in a way that is sufficient for their being required, permitted, and prohibited.”82

Alston’s examples are opening a door, giving testimony that p, or switching on a light.83 These actions are non-basic because they are constituted of various more basic actions. To successfully perform a non-basic overt action one must have the requisite volition, and perform the action according to that volition (moral freedom). Meeting these conditions is sufficient for accountability, since doing an action according to one’s will is to choose to do it, freely. Thus, according to Alston’s analysis, actors can be accountable for bon-basic overt actions. Importantly, Alston would hold that they are accountable despite not having metaphysical freedom.

A class of action over which one would not have direct voluntary control is a “reflex action”. Examples of reflex actions include the jerk knee reflex or withdrawing a hand from a hot surface. These actions are re-actions to environmental stimuli. They are more like basic beliefs because they are involuntary. One does these actions in immediate response to the stimulus, without deliberation, and one would do them even if one had an opposing volition (despite that volition to the contrary). We lack voluntary control (moral freedom) over reflex actions because, even if I willed not to jerk my knee, given the stimulus, the reaction would still happen. Since one does not have voluntary control over reflex actions one cannot be accountable for them or their upshots, so one cannot be blamed or praised for them. Thus deontological evaluation would not be apt for the justification of basic actions.

A fourth class of action is one for which we have varying degrees of responsibility. Sometimes we have sufficient control over them for deontological evaluation, but sometimes not. Alston calls these types of actions a “long-range project”84 (long-range actions) and we have some degree of “long range voluntary control”85 over these actions. Sometimes this is sufficient for accountability, which would make them deontologically evaluable.86

79 Ibid., 268. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., 269. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., 271. 84 Ibid., 275. 85 Ibid., 274. 86 A fifth class of action, according to Alston, is “indirect voluntary influence” (Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 277). For want of space, I will not discuss this action-class in this essay.

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Table of Alston’s Classes of Actions

Class of Action

Type of Control

Examples of Action

Accountable (for the action and its upshots)?

“Susceptible to deontological evaluation”?87

Basic action Basic (direct) voluntary control

“Raising one’s arm”88 Yes Yes

Non-basic overt action

Immediate (direct) voluntary control

“flipping a switch”89 Yes Yes

Reflex action Involuntary Jerk knee reflex No No Long-range actions/projects

Long range (indirect) voluntary control90

Control of body weight and cholesterol

Sometimes; when sufficiently responsible.

Sometimes; when accountable.

According to Alston, actors can be accountable for both “basic actions” and “non-basic overt actions”, but not reflex actions. Whether or not we are accountable for long-range actions depends on the degree of voluntary control we have over that action (and its upshots).

Alston’s analysis of voluntarism is compatible with the model of accountability I proposed in Section III, where I proved that, according to an Alstonian account of responsibility, moral freedom is all that is required for accountability. That is, actors are accountable for their actions whenever they act freely, “according to their will”. They need not have been able to do otherwise, so long as, had they wanted to do otherwise, they would have done so).

Voluntarism And Belief Formation Alston argues that belief-formation is analogous to performing reflex actions. One simply forms beliefs in response to environmental stimuli. In such instances (e.g. seeing a red pen), one cannot but believe beliefs (like that, “that pen is red”), so the choice of whether to believe that, “that pen is red” or not, is not an “effective choice”. So, such beliefs cannot be analysed deontologically.

Belief-stimuli can be more complex than a mere tap on the knee; they might include evidence gathering, argument, and so on. Nonetheless, beliefs are formed as a direct causal consequence of exposure to particular stimuli, and thus, we do not have sufficient control over whether or not we choose to believe these beliefs. This gives some credence to premise (6). Thus, according to Alston, although we do have voluntary control (of various types) over actions (of corresponding classes), we do not have voluntary control over our beliefs.

Alston concedes that, “it does seem that we have some degree of long range control over at least some of our beliefs”,91 but the degree of freedom is insufficient for voluntarism, so insufficient for deontological evaluation. Thus, although the justification of actions may be deontologically evaluable, justification of beliefs would not.

87 Ibid., 269. 88 Ibid., 274. 89 Ibid. 90 Alston treats ‘Long Range Voluntary Control’ and ‘Long Range Control’ as synonyms for the same concept. I do the same, usually saying just ‘Long Range Control’. 91 Ibid., 275.

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Next, I explore what types of control one might have over belief-formation and I argue that Alston equivocates concepts of free choice/control/voluntarism, switching between metaphysical and moral interpretations of freedom. In my formal presentation of the argument (above), the equivocation occurs in the way “freely choose” is used between premises (2) and (3). I then argue that Alston’s Equivocation leads to what I call his Inconsistency.

Alston’s Inconsistency The degree of freedom necessary for deontological evaluation of actions is inconsistent with the degree of freedom needed for deontological evaluation of beliefs.

Degrees Of Control Over Bel iefs Alston believes that we have voluntary control over investigative (or epistemic) actions:

“One certainly has voluntary control over whether to keep looking for evidence or reasons, and voluntary control over where we look, what steps to take and so on.”92

However, the control that this might give us over belief-formation is indirect. Indirect control is contrasted with direct control, which one has in the present moment, “right away, in one uninterrupted intentional act”.93 But, this difference need not matter, for if one wills to believe a particular belief and takes actions which are conducive to producing that belief, then it seems as though one is freely choosing one’s beliefs.94 If one wills to φBp (believe the belief that p) and then one does φBp, (where if one had not willed to φBp then one would not φBp) then one has moral freedom over one’s belief-choice. This is analogous to my “Tea or Coffee?” thought experiment.95

Alston even concedes that this happens:

“Devices employed include selective exposure to evidence, selective attention to supporting considerations, seeking the company of believers and avoiding non-believers, self-suggestion, and (possibly) more bizarre methods like hypnotism.”96

Applying these “devices” may be sufficient to change one’s beliefs, but Alston argues that the evidence that it is successful and happens frequently enough for serious consideration is so sparse that it is hardly worth thinking about. He “doubt[s] the success rate is substantial”97 and says, “To my knowledge there are no statistics on this, but I would be very much surprised if attempts of this sort bore fruit in more that a small proportion of the cases.”98

Here, I propose three examples of belief-types that demonstrate that people can be much more successful at choosing their own beliefs than Alston appreciates.99 Alston argues that belief-

92 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 270. 93 Ibid., 274. 94 At least, this would be so, according to a “moral freedom” understanding of free choice. 95 See my Section II, § “Clarification of the distinction: “Tea or Coffee?” Thought Experiment” 96 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 275. 97 Ibid., 276. 98 Ibid. 99 This should almost always be considered a kind of “self-deception”. In these examples it is initially the case a person either believes that p or not-p, but they want to believe the opposite. They can freely take actions to change their mind. Since their initial state is not one of epistemic indifference they must, at the time of willing to believe the opposite of their present belief, believe that they will set out to dupe or trick themselves into believing what they presently believe is false. If it were not self-deception then they would not be setting out to believe something of which they already believe the negation.

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“choice” is either impossible or so rare that it is hardly worth considering. On the contrary, I demonstrate that it is frequent enough to be worth considering. My first example is religious belief. My other two examples are taken from the fields of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) and philosophy of education. I touch on these two briefly, before referring back to religious belief in my analysis.

Rel ig ious Bel ief From time to time, religious people doubt their faith, lapse from belief, but once more come to believe. These “crises of faith” are so frequent that scripture prescribes the actions one ought to take to “remedy” the situation.

“Ask, and you will receive. Search, and you will find. Knock, and the door will be opened for you. For everyone who asks receives; the one who seeks finds; and to the one who knocks, the door will be opened.”100

“You will seek me and find me when you seek me with all your heart.”101

Such passages encourage people to act as if they believe. Saying prayers is often the solution – praying in spite of not believing in God may convince you to believe in Him. Do you doubt that, if you prayed to a God that you do not believe in (with sufficient devotion) you would not come to believe in that God?102 Pascal knew it worked:

“Follow the way by which they [religious believers] began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you believe, and deaden your acuteness.”103 [emphasis added]

A quick online search reveals other “solutions” to a crisis of faith. Online religious forums offer simple steps which one can follow to help lapsed believers come to believe in God, once more. The advice has hardly changed over the last two thousand years.

“Continue with your reading of the Scriptures and with prayer, even if these don’t feel too authentic at the moment. God may speak into your life through these disciplines... Talk to a more mature believer… they can certainly pray with you and provide a steadying presence… wait patiently as God continues to help you grow.”104

If I freely choose to follow these instructions and consequently come to believe in God, then it seems as though I have succeed in freely changing my beliefs – of my own volition. Prior to my actions, I did not believe in God – then, I freely choose to take actions which were conducive to changing my propositional attitude, in full knowledge and with the intention that they would do so. These actions, freely taken, caused me to believe in God. Thus, I freely changed my belief, “by free operation of my will”. This is an example of a belief of a certain kind; beliefs p which you form as a result of wanting to belief p, whether p is true or not. If such a case were possible, then it seems as though the believer has voluntary control over this belief.

100 Matthew 7:7-8, Contemporary English Version. 101 Jeremiah 29:13, see also Matthew 21:22. 102 This would depend on the kind of God you were imagining. I suppose it might be much harder to come to believe in the God of four-sided triangles than the God of classical theism or a deistic God. 103 Blaise Pascal, “Section III,” Pensées, trans. W. F. Trotter. Cited in Kelly James Clark and Raymond J. Van Arragon, eds., Evidence and Religious Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 104 StudentSoul, “What if I doubt my faith?” StudentSoul Website.

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Is this voluntary control sufficient for accountability? The example resembles Alston’s “Long Range Voluntary Control”,105 which can be sufficient for accountability.

“Long range control is simply the foil of immediate control. It is the capacity to bring about a state of affairs, C, by doing something (usually a number of different things) repeatedly over a considerable period of time, interrupted by activity directed to other goals.”106

According to Alston, one has long range control in degrees, and the degree of control one has varies widely from one situation to another, but it can be sufficient for accountability – which is why one can be accountable for one’s weight and cholesterol level.107 So, Alston must concede that we do seem to have some control over our beliefs, whenever we are prepared to employ these “devices” of (apparent) self-deception. Whenever the thinker does have sufficient control, this would amount to voluntary control, which would be sufficient for deontological evaluation.108

Cognit ive Behavioural Therapy CBT is a psychological therapeutic technique. Persons in therapy may be asked to change their “overt behaviours”109 so that they can change their “negative thoughts and maladaptive beliefs”.110 If this technique works, then persons who do so voluntarily choose their beliefs, and their belief-choice can be evaluated deontologically.

Prior to therapy one might believe that (1) they cannot succeed in their goals, (2) they are not intelligent enough, that (3) they are a bad person, or that (4) they are not worthy of being loved or liked. Often people seek this kind of help to eradicate perfectionism, which can prevent them from achieving simple tasks. They believe beliefs like, “[I] must never make a mistake.”111 They sincerely believe these types of beliefs, but also know that believing them is not conducive to human flourishing. So they set out, intentionally, to believe something which they believe is false. (They set out to believe the negation of their present belief).

Therapists recommend behavioural assignments which may include journaling, saying positive affirmations to oneself, confronting fears and so on.112 Another therapeutic approach under the CBT umbrella is Rational Emotive Behavioural Therapy (REBT), developed by Aaron Beck and Robert Ellis in the mid-20th century. The theory that people can change their “beliefs that “cause” their disturbed emotional consequences is at the heart of REBT.”113 Actions, which can foreseeably change a persons beliefs and can be freely undertaken in accordance with the will, include, “Disrupting irrational beliefs… Doing cognitive homework… Changing one’s language… [and] Psychoeducational methods.”114

105 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 274. 106 Ibid., 275. 107 Ibid., 280. 108 Ibid., 275-6. 109 Wayne Weiten, Psychology Themes and Variations (Andover: Cengage Learning EMEA, 2014), 653. 110 Ibid. 111 Gerald Corey, Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy (Belmont, CA: Thompson Brooks, 2009), 30. 112 Susan Nolen-Hoeksema, Abnormal Psychology (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008), 151-3. 113 Corey, Theory and Practice, 278. 114 Ibid., 282-3.

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One can take actions and “educate oneself” to change one’s beliefs. Although Alston claims that there is very little evidence available to support such deliberate belief modification techniques, a number of studies have found such techniques highly successful.115 In fact the entire CBT approach is founded on this assumption: CBT relies on our ability believe differently than we do/did. In fact, all teaching/learning relies on this assumption.

Phi losophy Of Education Learning is, partly, a process of acquiring knowledge (or beliefs).116 At school I was taught that the Magna Carta was written in 1215, in 1066 the Normans invaded Britain, green plants use photosynthesis to harness the Sun’s energy, and our species evolved by natural selection. I came to believe these beliefs at a particular time (when I learned them), and did not believe them prior to learning them. This learning process does not only occur in formal education. When I introduce myself to a new neighbour, we tell each other our names. I come to belief that my new neighbour’s name is Anne and she comes to know that mine is Robert. Prior to the introductions, I did not believe that “Her name is Anne” and she did not believe that “His name is Robert”, but after the introductions, we did believe these beliefs.

These examples are about beliefs of a different kind; beliefs about which one wants to believe something about a certain question, but is indifferent about what belief one ends up with. It is more like standard investigation. Teaching and learning change persons beliefs (one class of which, Alston calls their “propositional attitudes”117). Thomas F. Green describes the process like this:

“[Teaching] might therefore be defined as the effort to reconstitute the structure of our belief systems… [Learning is] an activity of shaping belief systems… its execution seems to be aimed at the realisation of a certain good, namely the formation of people who so not simply belief the right things, but believe them in a certain way.”118

“Therefore, define teaching as an activity aimed at the formation of belief[s].”119

So, one aim of teaching is to ensure that people “believe the right things.”120 (Of course I do not want to underplay the importance of teaching students how to learn, but this is another kind of teaching; teaching how, not teaching that.) Green assumes, as often we do, that it is always apt to believe (or seek to believe) true beliefs – but this need not be the case. Green offers a pragmatic argument in favour of the value of truth-seeking, and he argues that we ought to believe that truth is valuable on an evidential basis121 – but these arguments do not argue for the fact that truth is valuable in a way that Bernard Williams argues.122 In any case, the fact that that we need not assume that we ought to believe true beliefs, does not affect my argument that teaching and learning involve changing which beliefs one believes. Whether or not a belief may

115 For examples see Kellogg & Young, 2008; Rush, 1984; Jacob &Pelham, 2005; Stanley & Beidel, 2009, and especially Zinbarg & Griffith, 2008. Cited in Weiten, Psychology Themes and Variations, 653. 116 There may be more to learning than this. The difference between learning that and learning how is commonly acknowledged. In this paper I am concerned with the acquisition of beliefs, i.e. learning that. 117 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 270. 118 Thomas F. Green, Activities of Teaching, (New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1971), 52. 119 Green, Activities of Teaching, 55. 120 Green, Activities of Teaching, 52. 121 Ibid. 122 Bernhard Williams, Truth & Truthfulness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

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be justified need not be determined by whether or not believing it is aimed at truth, as Susanna Rinard argues in “No Exception For Belief”.123

Furthermore, it may be false that truth is valuable – but, if we buy into Green’s argument, we should still believe that truth is valuable, even if it were not.124 Whether we could wilfully convince ourselves that truth is valuable, if we first believed that it is not, is a hard question to answer – certainly Alston would say this is impossible task.

Alston would say that it is impossible because we cannot wilfully change our beliefs. Alston might concede that teaching/learning is a process of belief changing – but the process is not determined by the learner. Typically, the teacher knows that p and informs the learner that p. The learner then believes that p, but has no effective choice over whether they believe the belief that p, or not. Perhaps the learner might refuse to believe that p because they have greater evidence that ∼p. But it still seems that whether the learner believes the belief that p or not is determined by something outside of herself (such that the learner would not have metaphysical freedom over what she learns or believes). Teaching (or testimony) is just one component of the body of evidence that one accrues when deliberating over whether or not to believe a particular belief. Our attitudes towards the evidence at hand determine whether we believe p, or not – and we do not have the power to determine which.

Analysis Evaluating these three examples forces us to ask whether or not these really are examples of self-determination of beliefs. Alston might concede that events occur, which determine our beliefs and have the power to change whether or not we believe that p. But he need not concede that doxastic voluntarism applies. In general, evidence determines our beliefs. Whether one believes that God exists, that one can succeed in one’s goals, or that the Normans invaded Britain in 1066 is determined by the evidence one has (and one’s attitude towards that evidence). If one deems it sufficient, then one will believe – and there is nothing more to it: no choice, no decision, no voluntarism whatsoever. Deliberation is “the evaluation of the evidence”, which determines one’s believe. Deliberation is not the process of deciding whether or not to believe.

Alston challenges the reader to “believe that the U.S. is still a colony of Great Britain, just by deciding to do so.”125 I concede that I could not, “at this moment”,126 believe it. Alston reminds us that “we are speaking about believing at will”127 and so he assumes that we must have the same kind of voluntary control that we have for basic actions, such as raising ones arm. This is where he falls victim to his Equivocation Error.

Back To Voluntarism We have seen that there are two ways that we can understand voluntarism.

Moral Freedom A decision that is “chosen by free operation of the will”.

Metaphysical Freedom A decision that is “chosen by operation of a free will”.

123 Susanna Rinard, “No Exception for Belief,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2015): 1-23. 124 The fact that we should believe any belief implies a degree of doxastic voluntarism. 125 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 263. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid.

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Alston tells us that one is not free in matters of belief-choice because one could not belief other than what one does believe. What we believe is determined. One cannot simply choose to shun the evidence that America won her independence from Britain centuries ago. And even if one could, these beliefs are still determined cognitive processes (which seem to be out of our control). If you managed to convince me that Britain still ruled America, you are doing the convincing, and but for it, I would not believe.

Evaluation Of Rel ig ious Bel ief; Long Range Control Over Bel iefs Alston says that one cannot be held accountable for failing to do something, or failure to bring a situation about, when one puts all one’s efforts into trying, and still fails.128 He observes that sometimes we cannot persuade ourselves to believe a proposition, despite wanting/willing to believe it and taking actions that we hope would persuade us to believe. In such cases, I would agree that deontological evaluation of beliefs would not be apt. And so he concludes that,

“It is very dubious that we have reliable long range control over any of our beliefs, even in the most favourable cases, such as beliefs about religious and philosophical matters and about personal relationships.”129

But, he overlooks occasions when the believer comes to believe a belief when they find persuasive evidence for it, because he claims that, “The intention to believe that p played no effective role.”130 But Alston ought not overlook such cases so readily. Perhaps there are times that the intention does play an effective role, even if they stumble across the evidence for p, by accident or luck.

Suppose Stephen does not believe that “God is watching out for me”, but he wants to believe that He is. In desperation, Stephen prays every morning and every evening for a week and, on Sunday, he goes to church. He leaves, after the service, still failing to believe that God is watching out for him. Disheartened he decides to walk home. On his walk, he raises his gaze heavenward, curses God for His failure to appear to him, but, through the clouds, Stephen sees the face of God smiling down upon him.131 He is moved by the feeling of being watched over. These events (given his prior intentions, prayers and other “priming” actions) are sufficient for him to change his belief, and he comes to believe that “God is watching out for me”. If Stephen had not wanted to believe this proposition, then he would not have sought evidence for it (by praying, going to church, and otherwise trying to persuade himself of its “truth”). He would not have been disheartened, given up on his hope of believing, and walked home. And he would not have stumbled across this “evidence”, which turned out to be sufficient for him to change his belief. So, his believing is a consequence of his wanting to believe, and if he had not wanted to believe, then his beliefs would not have changed.

Simon is Stephen’s brother. Simon’s story is the same as Stephen’s, other than the fact that, after church, on his walk home (still a non-believer), he continued to actively search for

128 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 276. 129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 131 It is irrelevant whether or not God does actually appear to him or it just seems to Stephen that he sees God in such a way that it is fairly reasonable for him to thing that it really was God. The difference is irrelevant because the only significant points are that he has a sense experience and (given his prior intentions, prayers, and other “priming” actions) he deems this sense experience sufficient evidence for believing that God is appearing to him.

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evidence of God’s care for him, which would convince him of His presence. Simon continued to act with the intention of convincing himself. Simon sees the same apparition that Stephen sees and, similarly, comes to believe that God is looking out for him. So, he comes to believe what he wanted to believe, which he would not have believed had he not wanted to do so. The only difference between Simon’s case and Stephen’s is that Simon did not “give up” – so we intuit that Simon was more responsible that Stephen and Stephen was more luck than Simon for their believe changes.

We do not tend to say that Stephen would be as responsible for his newly acquired belief as Simon is for his. Although Stephen might not be as responsible for his coming to believe as Simon is, Stephen does want to believe p, and he did freely act to facilitate his belief, and he came to believe as a consequence of his actions. All this is true, despite the fact that he happened upon the deal-breaker by accident, chance, or luck. His will to believe caused him to come to believe, and if he had not wanted to believe, he would not. Thus, although we might not want to hold him equally as responsible as his brother, Stephen is sufficiently responsible to be held accountable for his coming to believe that God is watching out for him. Both Stephen and Simon came to believe, freely, according to a “moral freedom” interpretation of voluntarism. Thus, whether they believe in God’s paternal benevolence or not is deontologically evaluable.

Clearly, there is a degree of luck (happening to see God in the clouds) and this degree of luck diminishes one’s responsibility, but in this case, it does not diminish Stephen’s responsibility sufficiently for him not to be accountable for his belief. Thus, he is sufficiently responsible for his belief to be accountable. There is sufficient doxastic voluntarism for deontological evaluation. Remember, one need not be acting in accordance with a free will; one need only be acting freely, in accordance with the will. That is sufficient for responsibility, accountability, and deontological evaluation. If this luck factor makes you want to deny Stephen’s accountability (whilst still holding Simon accountable), then consider an analogy of the soccer player, Sócrates.132

Sócrates the Soccer Player Sócrates receives the ball from a teammate and, demonstrating exceptional skill, he dribbles around many opposition players into their half. He fools the goalkeeper with a dummy shot, the keeper dives, Sócrates shoots, and he scores. We praise Sócrates, duly, for his skill and for achieving his desired end. Suppose Sócrates had stumbled and obviously scuffed the kick and, rather than scoring in the top-right corner of the goal, as he hopes, he kicks the ball into the bottom left corner – but the ball still passes the goalkeeper. We would still credit Sócrates for the goal, even if we knew that he was (perhaps) slightly less responsible than he would have been, had he struck the ball as intended.

Luck can play a part, but whenever a person wills an event to occur and freely takes the right actions to achieve that end, then we tend to hold the person responsible for the result. This affirms the models of voluntarism and accountability proposed in Sections II and III.

132 Sócrates (1954-2011) was a Brazilian footballer. He played for Botafogo SP, Corinthians, Fiorentina, Flamenco, and Santos football clubs. He also represented Brazil 60 times in an international career spanning seven years (1979-1986).

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Two further points follow. First, the lucky event need not be the final event in the series of actions required to bring about the aim. Sócrates was lucky to have received the ball from his teammate, in the first place. But this does not diminish the degree to which we hold him responsible for his triumph.

Secondly, it is clear that he must act freely, “in accordance with his will”. If Sócrates had been threatened or coerced to score an own goal, then he is not exercising moral freedom (although he may be doing so freely, according to Schopenhauer’s definition of “physical freedom”133). He is not doing what he wants to do (to protect his goal and attack his opponent’s). Given the threat/coercion, we would not hold him as responsible as we would have, had he done so of his own volition (according to “free operation of his will”). Any responsibility he has would be insufficient for accountability. He would not be accountable, and he would not be to blame.134 So, this kind of coercion would diminish his freedom sufficiently that his actions would not be deontologically evaluable.

If we can praise or blame Sócrates for his footballing prowess, then we can praise or blame Stephen and Simon for changing their beliefs. Each of the three persons is acting according to moral freedom, which is sufficient for voluntarism, responsibility, and accountability. Each is praise-/blameworthy and so each can be evaluated deontologically.

Three Kinds of Accountable Bel ief So, there are various kinds of accountable beliefs that can be classified into three (rough) categories. In two cases the believer decides, in advance, what they want to believe, and in the other case they thinker decides not what they want to believe, but that they want to believe something about a topic (where they didn’t believe anything about it, before, and they are indifferent as to what beliefs they come to believe). These categories seem to vary widely, in their epistemic virtues, but they all seem to imply the possibility of deontological evaluation.

The first is the category of belief whereby thinkers are able to (apparently) dupe themselves into believing a belief (which, at the time of setting their intentions, they believe is false). This involves various forms of motivated reasoning and, as such, there is arguably something epistemically irresponsible about it; there is little concern for truth. I remain uncommitted as to whether or not beliefs of this kind can ever be deontologically justified, but they are deontologically evaluable. Rinard gives persuasive examples of how these beliefs can be justified (by their practical consequences). If a terminally ill patient has little chance of survival, but knows that believing her chances of survival would increase her ability to fight the illness, then she may be justified in trying to dupe herself into believing that, “I can beat this illness and I will recover.” Similarly, the likelihood of a marriage being successful or of a person being able to give up smoking may be slim, but believing that, “my wife and I were made for each other” or “I can give up cigarettes” may be justifiable.135 This is the kind of accountable belief that Stephen and Simon exhibit. There is a degree of doxastic voluntarism which seems sufficient for deontological evaluation.

133 Schopenhauer, “Prize Essay,” 174. 134 Perhaps we would still deem him responsible, to a degree, but not sufficiently for him to be accountable for the own goal. Rather, he who would be held accountable would be the person making the threat or coercing Sócrates to behave in a way, against his own will. 135Susanna Rinard, “No Exception for Belief,” 6.

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The second category of accountable beliefs is learning, in which the learner is indifferent as to which belief they come to hold. These are a bit like fairly standard investigation. One does not care what belief one ends up with; at the outset one just wants to come to have a belief – specifically a true belief – in connection with a certain question. Perhaps would not satisfy Alston, for the learner does not choose which belief they believe, “p” or “∼p” – but they do choose whether to believe “p or ∼p”. This category of accountable believe is exemplified by the student who learns the date of the Magna Carta and the story of my becoming acquainted with my neighbour, Anne. One acts (freely), according to one’s will, and comes to believe something about what one wanted to believe. In which case one voluntarily changes one’s doxastic attitude and one’s belief-choice can be evaluated deontologically.

The third category is when someone changes something about the world in order to change their beliefs about it. This could be exemplified by Alston’s example of flipping the light switch (and changing one’s belief about whether or not the light is on or off)136 or my CBT patient who is paralysed by insecurity or perfectionism and thus cannot achieve their goals. CBT patients decide what they want to believe, in advance, then act (freely) in a way to bring that belief about. They might learn to do simple tasks by planning their time effectively, then move on to doing more demanding tasks and achieve greater things. As such they have changed from being a person who cannot achieve their goals to being someone who can – thus they are able to change their believe from “I cannot achieve my goals” to “I can achieve my goals”. So they have changed the way the world is in such a way that the body of evidence they draw on to form their beliefs changes. They have become someone who can be successful, and so they have come to believe that they can be successful.137

Sometimes the CBT patient’s belief-change may be more like the religious believer’s. If they are a really nasty person (who is not worthy of being loved or liked), but they say positive affirmations to themselves every day, then they may come to believe that they are worthy or being loved, without actually becoming a person who is worthy of being loves. As such they set their intentions (to believe that they are worthy of being loved), then they feely took actions to convince themselves to believe the belief they want to believe, and then came to believe that belief (according to their intention). If they remain a nasty person by the time they come to believe that they are worthy of being loved, then their believe-choice seems more like the epistemically irresponsible believer, exemplified by Stephen and Simon. This may seem epistemically irresponsible, but may be rationally according to the model of rationality described by Rinard. In either case, belief-choice of this ilk is deontologically evaluable.

That the CBT patient’s belief choice does not fit neatly into any of the three categories demonstrates that belief-choice is diverse and multi-dimensional. Each of these categories, and each of my examples, illustrate a number of ways that thinkers might be able to have voluntary control over their beliefs, according to the Alstonian model of accountability I suggested in Section III. If, in any of these examples, the thinker demonstrates sufficient responsibility for their belief-choice, then their belief-choice can be evaluated deontologically.

136 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 269. 137 I give another example of this category of belief-change in Section VI. In that example, I believe that “I am not on campus”, then I decide that I want to believe that “I am on campus”, so I drive to campus to change the way the world is, and consequentially, I change my belief.

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Alston’s Equivocation Error Regarding belief-formation, Alston mistakenly assumes that metaphysical freedom is necessary for accountability. First, he assumed (wrongly) that there is no conceptual difference between moral and metaphysical freedom and that doxastic voluntarism is not related free will problems. And so, when he assumes (rightly) that “free choice” is necessary for accountability (see premises (2*) and (3)), he equivocates. In premise (2*) all that is needed is moral freedom; but in premise (3) he means metaphysical freedom.

2*. S has voluntary control over S’s belief that p, if and only if S can freely choose to φBp or to ∼φBp.

3. If S can freely choose to φBp or to ∼φBp, then, whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

Premise (2*) supplies the meaning of voluntary control; the degree of control that is sufficient for accountability. As I showed in Sections II and III, moral freedom is sufficient. So, in (2*), “freely choose” must mean “choose by free operation of the will”. Whether or not the will itself is free is insignificant. So, whenever S is faces the option φBp or ∼φBp, S is accountable for her belief-choice whenever she believes “according to her will” – and she need not have been able to have believed otherwise. This is the meaning of “freely choose” in premise (2*).

If “freely choose” meant “choose by operation of a free will” (metaphysical freedom – i.e. being able to do otherwise), then the premise would be false, for one can have sufficient voluntary control for responsibility and accountability, and yet not have free will, just so long as you act by free operation of the will.

In premise (3), “freely choose” means something different. The premise states that free choice is only available if the believer could do/believe other than what they actually do/believe. This is the definition of metaphysical freedom. But we have seen that metaphysical freedom is not necessary for accountability (and Alston does not require that an actor be metaphysically free for their actions to be deontologically evaluable), but Alston makes metaphysical freedom necessary when he equivocates the term over these two premises in premise (4).

4. So, if a deontological theory of justification applies to S’s belief that p, then whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

Without equivocating “freely choose”, he would not be able to assert this premise. In fact, (4) is false. You are responsible for your choice of tea, even though you may not have been able to have chosen coffee. Moral freedom is sufficient for deontological evaluation.

Sub-Conclusion So far, I have shown that the moral-metaphysical distinction must be acknowledged and we must also acknowledge the relationship between doxastic voluntarism and voluntarism in general. I have shown how Alston uses concepts of voluntarism to argue (mistakenly) that we do have sufficient control over our actions, but lack sufficient control over our beliefs, for deontological evaluation – which is why our actions can be evaluated deontologically, but our beliefs cannot. However, with three examples and a thought experiment I drew analogies between choosing beliefs and choosing actions to argue that the type voluntarism we have over our belief-formation processes can often be sufficient for accountability and, thus, deontological

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evolution. Then I showed that where his argument became unsound was when he equivocated over the term “freely choose” in premises (2*) and (3). I called this his Equivocation Error.

Section V. The Inconsistency Aris ing From Alston’s Errors In this shorter section, I explain how Alston’s Equivocation Error leads to inconsistent treatment of action-choice, on the one hand, and belief-formation, on the other.

Alston’s failure to acknowledge the connection between doxastic voluntarism and voluntarism in general means that he makes his Equivocation Error. By assuming that there is only one kind of voluntarism (requiring a completely free will) and that voluntarism is necessary for deontological evaluation, Alston reasons that a free will is necessary for deontological evaluation. We have seen that this is not the case. Thus, his Assumption Error permits his Equivocation Error.

However, we have also seen that Alston believes that we can be held accountable for our actions, whenever we have voluntary control over them. In fact the only kinds of actions we definitely do not have sufficient voluntary control for deontological evaluation over are reflex actions. Thus, when analysing the degree of freedom required for deontological evaluation of actions, Alston deems that all that is required is that we act according to our will or intentions (a la Stace/Frankfurt)138 – all that is required is moral freedom. This contrasts with the metaphysical freedom he deems necessary for doxastic deontological evaluation. Thus, he treats choosing beliefs and choosing actions inconsistently, regarding the degree of control required for deontological evaluation.

Choosing Actions And Choosing Beliefs Observing the differences between these two types of freedom: if we are to hold anyone sufficiently responsible for any action such that they are accountable for it, then we can only ask that they are morally, not metaphysically responsible for that action. They need not have been able to actually have done otherwise. It is sufficient that they freely acted in accordance with their will. They wanted to φ, and they φ-ed (and had they not wanted to φ they would not have φ-ed). Thus they are sufficiently free to be sufficiently responsible, to be held accountable. And thus their action is sufficiently free to be evaluated deontologically. No greater degree of freedom can be required. And thus, if we are to be held accountable for any of our actions, as Alston maintains, moral freedom is sufficient; metaphysical freedom is not required.

So, when Alston says “I had no control over that; it was not subject to my will”,139 what kind of “control” does he mean? What kind of freedom/free action/free choice is he talking about? He says that the reason that he had no control was that, “it was not subject to my will.”140 The implication is that, what he did was not done “by free operation of the will” (moral freedom), in which case he would not have had sufficient freedom for sufficient responsibility for accountability, and his action (and its upshots) would not be deontologically evaluable.

Could he mean the freedom he was lacking was metaphysical freedom? Could he mean that he did not have control because his action was not decided “by operation of a free will”? I think

138 Stace, “Free Will,” and Frankfurt, “Freedom Of The Will And The Concept Of A Person.” 139 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 272. 140 Ibid.

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not, because, according to his prior discussion on action-classes, one can be held accountable for one’s actions, despite not having metaphysical freedom. All that is necessary for a person to be accountable for their actions, according to Alston, is that “the agent will voluntarily exert herself and the act will be done.”141 Acting according to “free operation of the will” is sufficient for “immediate voluntary control”142, which is sufficient for accountability, so sufficient to make one’s action deontologically evaluable. Thus, metaphysical freedom is not necessary for an agent to have sufficient control, for sufficient responsibility, to be accountable and have their actions evaluated deontologically.

So, in forming the belief (the belief over which Alston says he had no “control”), Alston must have meant “control” in terms of moral freedom, rather than metaphysical freedom. He can’t have meant metaphysical freedom, firstly because, according to Alston’s own definition of “immediate voluntary control”,143 metaphysical freedom is not needed for accountability. Secondly, the suggestion that the reason that an action is beyond an agent’s control is that the action is not subject to the agent’s will implies a conception of control in terms of moral freedom (i.e. the action is beyond the agent’s control because it is not done by free operation of the agents will).

Whether or not the agent’s will is free is not relevant. Alston’s only concern is whether the actions are free (done freely, in accordance with the will). Thus, whether or not a person has control (“immediate voluntary control”;144 control which is sufficient for responsibly, accountability, and deontological evaluation) depends on whether or not that person has moral freedom.

That Alston says that, “I had no control over that; it was not subject to my will” (272) need not mean that, had he willed otherwise, he would have done otherwise. Rather, saying so implies that he did other than what he willed. He lacked control because he lacked the power to do his will. If he had had the power to do his will, then he would have done it.

Basic Bel iefs Are L ike Reflex Act ions Alston writes that when he sees rain, he believes “it is raining”145, and this is not subject to his will. This implies that he cannot refrain from believing that “it is raining”146, even if he willed not to believe it. It is intuitive, at least in respect to basic beliefs, that we cannot control these beliefs and are not accountable for them. On seeing a red pen, one cannot help but believe that “that pen is red”, and one cannot simply, “at that moment”147, choose to believe these beliefs. Alston’s examples tend to be of basic beliefs, which we do not have control over, like reflex actions. However, I have shown that not all beliefs are like basic beliefs and like reflex actions, and that we do have control over some of our beliefs.

Sub-Conclusion Of Section V I agree with Alston that, for a deontological theory of justification to be successful, we must be able to freely decide what we believe. But I do not think we need the type of freedom that

141 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 269. 142 Ibid. 143 Ibid. 144 Ibid., 271. 145 Ibid., 270. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid., 266.

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Alston requires of us. Alston requires that we have the ability to have believed other that what we believe. What other concept of freedom is there? Moral freedom. We must only be able to decide what we believe to the degree that we are able to decide what we do (what actions we perform). If I can be responsible for my cholesterol level, then I can be responsible for at least some of my beliefs – for similar types of actions (long-range projects) determine each (my cholesterol level and my beliefs). By consistently eating healthily and exercising, I can lower my weight and cholesterol level. And by consistently praying devoutly and going to church I could come to believe in God. I need not be able to either reduce my cholesterol level or come to believe in God “in this moment”, but, given moral freedom, I am still accountable for these changes when they happen.

Section VI. Revised Conception Of Doxastic Voluntarism In this section, I will argue for a conception of doxastic voluntarism that is consistent with Alston’s deontological evaluation of actions. To resolve his Inconsistency Error, this conception of doxastic voluntarism will have to be consistent with Alston’s conception of voluntarism of actions, which grants us sufficient freedom to be held accountable from acting the way we do. The exception is reflex actions – which we are not usually held accountable for.

I have also shown that moral freedom is sufficient for accountability, according to Alston’s assessment of free action. In Section II I clarified the distinction between moral freedom and metaphysical freedom and demonstrated that, when choosing between tea and coffee, one is responsible for one’s choice whenever one acts according to one’s will. That an action is “chosen by free operation of the will” is sufficient for moral freedom, which, in section III, I demonstrated is sufficient for accountability and, thus, deontological evaluation.

But, Alston uses “effective choice” in two distinct ways. The first is in keeping with the idea that it is necessary (and sufficient) for responsibility, accountability, praise-/blameworthiness, and thus deontological evaluation. The second use of the term defines it as the ability to do other than what one wills:

3. If S can freely choose to φBp or to ∼φBp, then, whenever S choses φBp, S could have chosen ∼φBp and whenever S choses ∼φBp, S could have chosen φBp.

This is a definition of choice derived from a metaphysical conception of freedom, which we have already shown is not necessary for deontological evaluation. Thus, we rejected premise (4) as false. Establishing it relied on equivocation.

Due to this equivocation, Alston treats acting and believing inconsistently. To be responsible for one’s actions, all that is required is that one does what one wants to do (and would have done otherwise had one wanted to do so). But to be responsible for one’s beliefs one needs to be able to want to believe other that what actually wants to believe, and for one’s beliefs to be completely uncaused. I showed that if one wants to believe p and takes certain actions which are conducive to believing p and these actions are successful, then one has moral freedom. Moral freedom is sufficient for accountability. And accountability is sufficient for deontological evaluation. Thus, acting in a way such that one changes one’s beliefs demonstrates doxastic voluntarism sufficient for deontological evaluation of beliefs.

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Sufficient Doxastic Control For Deontological Evaluation So, it follows form Alston’s conception of voluntarism that we also have sufficient doxastic control to be accountable for our beliefs. In other words, if we have sufficient control over our actions to be held accountable for them, then we have sufficient control over our beliefs to be held accountable for them, too. The freedom one exhibits when undertaking long range actions (or “long range projects”148) is analogous to the freedom one exhibits when trying to change a core belief. But changing some beliefs is much easier.

Although it might be quite hard for me to change my beliefs about the dates of the Norman invasion of Britain and the Magna Carta, it would be quite easy for my to change my beliefs about the dates of the Ming Dynasty, in China. All I would need to do is (freely) open a textbook on Chinese history, and I would have freely changed by belief. It would also be very easy to change my beliefs about my neighbour’s name. All I would need to do is knock on her door and introduce myself, and I would learn something new.

By using CBT techniques and “devices” employed by religious leaders, one can even convince oneself of the truth of a belief that one believes is false at the time that one decides that one wants to believe it. So, if at time t0 one does not believe in God but decides that they want to believe the opposite of that belief (i.e. what, at t0, they believe is false), then one can undertake a “long range project”149 conducive to causing oneself to believe in God at some later time, ti. At t1, t2, and t3 one may not believe in God, but studies show that if one continues to act as if one believes (and takes other actions), then one will come to believe.150 Just as, in the field of CBT, if a patient believes that he/she is worthless and will never amount to anything, but decides to act as if they are successful (they go about their work with an attitude of success, and otherwise do what they believe “worthy successful people” do) then they may be able to change their beliefs. They would come to believe that they are worthy successful people.151

These active belief-changing choices need not be effective every time. If one tries, with all one’s might, to change a belief, but fails, then one does not believe what one wants to believe. In which case the thinker does not exhibit the moral freedom to believe the belief that they want to believe. In which case the thinker does not exhibit doxastic voluntarism and they cannot be held accountable for their beliefs. They cannot be blamed or praised for believing the beliefs that they believe, could not be evaluated deontologically. However, whenever one believes what one wants to believe (and would have believed otherwise, had one wanted to do so), the one exhibits moral freedom. Then one demonstrates sufficient doxastic voluntarism for deontological evaluation.

I have not needed to show that this degree of doxastic voluntarism is frequent. All I have needed to show is that it is plausible and may be frequent enough to be worth considering. As it is, I have shown that it is frequent enough for us to acknowledge that we have an “effective choice” over many of our beliefs. Currently, I believe that “I am not on campus”. However, if I wanted to change this believe all I would need to do would be to get in my car and drive to

148 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 275. 149 Ibid. 150 Kellogg & Young, 2008; Rush, 1984; Jacob &Pelham, 2005; Stanley & Beidel, 2009, and especially Zinbarg & Griffith, 2008. Cited in Weiten, Psychology Themes and Variations, 653. 151 In a way they will have demonstrated, to themselves and others, that they could be worthy and successful from the outset.

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campus. My belief would change and I would come to believe that “I am on campus”. This is an example of a way one can change one’s beliefs about the world by changing the way the world is, which is a greatly simplified example of beliefs being under our voluntary control. But, despite its simplicity, it effectively demonstrates that one has sufficient control over at least some of one’s beliefs for us to be accountable for them. As such, these beliefs can be analysed and evaluated deontologically.

Alston writes that:

“[To] show that we have immediate voluntary control over propositional attitudes in basically the way we do over the positions of doors and light switches, it would have to be the case that the search for evidence was undertaken with the intention of taking up a certain particular attitude toward a particular proposition… in that case the outcome would show that we have exercised voluntary control over what propositional attitude we take up.”152

I have shown that (a) there are instances of belief-control which do not satisfy Alston’s condition for immediate voluntary control. Examples include any open-minded investigation into my neighbours name, the dates of the Ming Dynasty, and so on. I have also shown that (b) there are examples of doxastic immediate voluntary control, whereby one sets out to believe the negation of one’s present belief. These do satisfy the condition Alston asserts in the quotation, above. The first example is in deciding to believe in God (or believe certain properties about Him), and coming to believe those beliefs. The second broad set of examples come from the CBT branch or psychotherapy. My third example (deciding to believe the belief that “I am not on campus”) is the most simple and the most illustrative.

It is illustrative because I can use it to demonstrate that I have immediate voluntary control over this believe in exactly the way Alston requires of us when he challenges his reader to believe that “the U.S. is still a colony of Great Britain, just by deciding to do so.”153 Right now, at t0, I believe that “I am not on campus” with the same degree of certainty (possibly a greater degree of certainty) that I believe that “the U.S. is not a colony of Great Britain.” However, if Alston were to offer me $500 (he need not offer me the $500,000,000 that he offers his reader) I would immediately, and freely, change my belief by deciding to go to campus.

This example might, be trivial – for one is deciding to believe otherwise by changing the state of the world about which one has the belief. I concede that that might be so, but cannot see how this would make one any less accountable for the belief. Any accusation of “cheating” to win Alston’s money would fail, for the simple truth is that at t0 I believed ∼p, at t1 I chose to believe that p (according to my will), and by ti I came to believe that p. I did so freely; I chose to believe that p “by free operation of the will”. Thus my believing (or not believing) that “I am not on campus” is under my immediate voluntary control.

The other examples (CBT and religious belief) are more difficult “long-range projects”.154 I say that they are more difficult because changing these beliefs requires a more sustained effort. But, if possible, then they also demonstrate that we sometimes have sufficient voluntary control over

152 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 271. 153 Ibid., 263. 154 Ibid., 275.

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our beliefs to be held accountable for them. Alston even acknowledges how this might be possible (without acknowledging its frequency) when he says:

“By such methods people sometimes induce themselves to believe in God, in materialism, in Communism, in the proposition that they are loved by X, and so on. Why doesn't this constitute a kind of voluntary control that grounds deontological treatment? Well, it would if, indeed, we do have sufficient control of this sort.”155

Alston argues that we do not have sufficient control of this sort – but I have shown that it is (1) theoretically possible, (2) practically possible, and (3) far more frequent than Alston appreciates. Thus I have shown that there is a case for the possibility of deontological evaluation of beliefs.

I have shown that the best way to resolve Alston’s Inconsistency is to concede that we need not have metaphysical freedom for accountability; moral freedom is sufficient. If moral freedom is sufficient for accountability then moral freedom is sufficient for deontological evaluation, in general. We can have moral freedom over our choice of what we believe. In fact, we frequently do have moral freedom over our choice of what we believe. Thus we can be accountable for what we believe; Alston’s conclusion is false. So, according to this analysis, a deontological theory of epistemic justification could be acceptable.

Section VII . Conclusions Alston concedes that he has voluntary control of his actions, and thus that he can be responsible for them; he can be sufficiently responsible for his actions to be held accountable for them. And he acknowledges that his actions can have causal effects on his beliefs. I have argued that he should then concede that he has voluntary control of his beliefs. However, he denies this possibility (the possibility of doxastic voluntarism), and thus denies the possibility of a deontological theory of belief justification.

I concede what Alston points out, that we might not have control over our beliefs in the same “direct” way that we have control over our actions (“basic” or “direct voluntary control”156). However, it is unclear how we are any less responsible (or accountable) for our beliefs than we are for our actions, whenever (a) we are accountable for our actions and (b) know that our actions causally determine our beliefs. Given accountability, we would be as responsible for our beliefs as we are for our actions. Thus, whenever our actions are sufficiently voluntary for deontological evaluation (and we are aware of the noetic/doxastic effects of our actions), we are responsible for these noetic/doxastic effects – our beliefs. In such cases, one should be able to apply a deontological theory of justification to belief-formation.

It may be possible that moral freedom is the only freedom required for actions to be deontologically evaluable, but at the same time metaphysical freedom is required for beliefs to be deontologically evaluable. Someone might say that there is a relevant difference between actions and beliefs. However, I have shown that (a) Alston’s argument is unsound, and (b) that actions and beliefs seem similar enough to warrant similar treatment. So, although I have not ruled out the possibility of there being a relevant difference, the burden of proof that there is

155 Alston, “Deontological Justification,” 275. 156 Ibid., 260.

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would be on the philosopher that argues so. Given my discussion, we relationally should think that there is no relevant difference until such a difference were pointed out.

If we have sufficient a degree of freedom of action (voluntarism in general) for accountability, then our actions can be evaluated deontologically. It follows that we must also have sufficient freedom over our beliefs (doxastic voluntarism) for us to be accountable for believing them. As such, they too, can be subject to deontological evaluation. So if we can act freely, then we can choose our beliefs freely. And if so, Alston does not eliminate the possibility a deontological theory of epistemic justification.

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Section VII I . Citations

Alston, William P. “The Deontological Conception Of Epistemic Justification.” Philosophical Perspectives 2 (1988): 257-299.

Charland, Louis C. “Decision-Making Capacity.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/decision-capacity/>.

Chignell, Andrew. “The Ethics of Belief.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/ethics-belief/>.

Clifford, William K. “The Ethics of Belief” [1879]. In Reason and Responsibility. J. Feinberg & R. Shafer-Landau, eds. London: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005. 101-105.

Corey, Gerald. Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy. Belmont, CA: Thompson Brooks, 2009.

Frankfurt, Harry. “Freedom Of The Will And The Concept Of A Person.” The Journal Of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5-20.

Green, Thomas F. Activities of Teaching. New York: Mcgraw-Hill, 1971.

Laplace, Simon L. A philosophical essay on probabilities. Trans. F. W. Truscott & F. L. Emroy. New York: Cosimo Inc., 2007.

McKenna, Michael and Coates, D. Justin. “Compatibilism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/compatibilism/>.

Nolen-Hoeksema, Susan. Abnormal Psychology. Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Pappas, George, "Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/justep-intext/>.

Pascal, Blaise. “Section III.” Pensées. Trans. W. F. Trotter. Cited in Kelly James Clark and Raymond J. Van Arragon, eds., Evidence and Religious Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Rinard, Susanna. “No Exception for Belief.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (2015): 1-23.

Roberts, Laura and Laura Weis. “Addiction and Consent.” American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2002): 58–60.

Roberts, Laura and Laura Weiss. “Informed Consent and the Capacity for Voluntarism.” American Journal of Psychiatry, 159 (2002): 705–712.

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Schopenhauer, Arthur. “Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will.” trans. F. J. Payne (extracts) in Reading Philosophy, ed. S. Guttenplan, J. Hornsby and C. Janaway. Blackwell, 1839., 172-92.

Stace, Walter T. “The Problem Of Free Will.” In Religion And The Modern Mind, Walter T. Stace, 419-424. London: Harper Collins, 1959.

Steup, Matthias. “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.” Acta Analytica 15 (2000), 25-56.

Steup, Matthias. “Epistemology.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.

StudentSoul. “What if I doubt my faith?” StudentSoul Website. URL = <http://studentsoul.intervarsity.org/doubt-my-faith>.

Weiten, Wayne. Psychology Themes and Variations. Andover: Cengage Learning EMEA, 2014.

Williams, Bernard. Truth & Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.

Wolf, Susan. “Sanity And The Metaphysics Of Responsibility.” In Responsibility, Character, And The Emotions: New Essays In Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 46-64.