the application of communication technologies in canada's
TRANSCRIPT
THE APPLICATION OF COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN CANADA'S INUIT
COMMUNITIES
Ursel Koebberling
Diploma Political Sciences, University of Hamburg, 1978
M.A. Communications, Simon Fraser University, Bumaby, 1984
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFZLLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Communication
@ Ursel Koebberling 1988
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
1988
All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.
Name :
Degree :
APPROVAL
Ursel Koebberling
Ph.D.
Title of Thesis: The Application of Communication Technologies
in Canada's Inuit Communities
Examining Committee:
Chairman: Dr. William Richards, Assistant Professor
'36- ./Y, ,/-
// Cm 1 //- / G ,, I-lu /Y '--u r. William ~ e l o d f r I / - " /
Professor S y S u p r v i s o r
Associate ~ro?essor Supervisor
Dr. Colin B. Crampton Professor , Department of Geography Supernor -
- -, _ .
Dr. Robert Elwood Babe Professor, Department of Communication University of Ottawa External Examiner
Pr or, ~ssdciate ~ e a n of Arts Un ity of British Columbia External Examiner
Date Approved: July 18, 1988
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my written permission.
Title of Thesis/Dissertation:
The Application of Communication Technologies in Canada's
Inuit Communities
Author: signature
Ursel Koebberling name
July 18, 1988 date
This study analyzes the technological choices in the transfer and adaptation of new electronic
communication technologies, particularly telephone, radio and television, into Inuit communities in the
Northwest Territories of Canada and assesses the socio-cultural impacts and implications of the
technology transfer for policy formation and Inuit self-government It is based both on field research
(interviews and observations) and secondary literature. The study compares transfer mechanisms in the
Eastern and Western Arctic to evaluate which technology and policy choices for improved communication
capacity have enhanced socio-cultural development It argues that the Inuit have been successful in
adapting new communication technologies only when structural arrangements enabled them to participate
in policy formation and implementation of communication applications, and to pace and direct the
technology transfer.
The study further argues that underlying value systems have influenced technological choices and
consequently the rate of adaptation. It concludes that the Inuit have gained some benefits from the
transfer of communication technologies in expanding telecommunication and broadcasting services to
locations not previously served. Yet the achievements have been moderate. In the telecommunications
sector the institutional structures of service provision, both public and private, did not allow the realization
of the full potential of the highly demanded, integrated, interactive network of high frequency radio and
satellite supported telephone. Public ownership of the telephone system did not lead to provision of a
more socially-responsive service. The offrcial treatment of socio-economic benefits as peripheral
externalities led to underinvestment in provision of service and a price structure that resulted in reduced
usage.
The achievements in native language radio and television have been substantial because of strong
community involvement and the provision of special government support programs. However,
insufficiencies in production funding, training monies and distribution arrangements have hindered full
realization of the federal government's and the Inuit's stated objectives of promoting Inuit culture and
iii
self-development Government support has been crucial in establishing native communications. Because
it is based on national cultural objectives rather than the need for services, aboriginal communications are
marginalized from general communications as a special cultural pursuit
The study points to the lack of Inuit participation in policy formation and implementation, and
resulting socio-cultural costs. It recommends that control over communication service delivery be
transferred to the North, that the social role of telecommunications be considered in government
communication policies, and that native language broadcasting rights be guaranteed in the Broadcasting
Act to strengthen native initiatives in expanding production, distribution and ongoing training.
Communication policies should not be based on the rationale of cultural preservation but on general rights
to native language services and self-government
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The study would not have been possible without the generous support of the Inuit and Inuvialuit of
the region, and a variety of non-native northern residents who freely provided information, assisted with
accomodation and travel arrangements, and took me out onto the land. They aided me in gaining an
understanding of a way-of-life and of cultural values that was an invaluable contribution to the thesis. I
want to thank the staff and management of the Inuvialuit Communications Society and the Inuit
Broadcasting Corporation who responded to my many inquiries. Special thanks goes also to the staff of
the Northern Native Broadcast Access Program at the office of the Secretary of State, in particular
Florence Woolner and Jane Lewington - for sharing experiences, guiding me to government documents,
and providing encouragement throughout the study. I am also indebted to many individuals for their
invaluable advice and assistance during the course of the study, fmt and foremost my committee
members. I want to thank especially my editors, David McNeill and Kelly Russel for their time and
energy to proofread the thesis. The "Stiftung Volkswagenwerkw provided the principal funding. Its
support is kindly acknowledged The Department of Secretary of State helped to reprint and distribute
this thesis to interested agencies and individuals.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMNS
BCF! Cancorn CBC CEIC CNT CPR CRTC DOC DRIE DSOS GNWT IBC ICS INAC IRC ITC NCAP NCP NFB NNBAP NWT NWTel RCCS TNI TVRO
Bell Canada Enterprises Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Canada Ihployment and Immigration Commission Canadian National Telecommunications Canadian Pacific Railways Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission Department of Communications Department of Regional Industrial Expansion Department of Secretary of State Government of the Northwest Territories Inuit Broadcasting Corporation Inuvialuit Communications Society Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Inuvialuit Regional Corporation Inuit Tapirisat of Canada Northern Communications Access Program Native Communications Program National Filmboard of Canada Northern Native Broadcast Access Program Northwest Territories Northwest Telephone Corporation Royal Canadian Corps of Signals Taqramiut Nipingat Incorporated Television-receiveonly satellite dish
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Approval .......................................................................................................................................................................... ii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................... iii Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................................................... v
List of Abbreviations and Acronymns ...................................................................................................................... vi
List of Tables .................................................................................................................................................................. xi
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................................................. xiii
I . xi Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................... 1
Research Methods ............................................................................................................................................. 9
I1 . Putting Modem Technology to Inuit Use: Theoretical and Methodological Framework .................. 16 Centrality and Bias of Information and Communication ........................................................................ 17
4 Media for Said Change and Education ..................................................................................................... 20 $ Cultural Dependency ........................................................................................................................................ 23 4 Communication Technology Transfer and Value Conflicts ..................................................................... 26
Poky Analysis ....................................................................................................... : .................................... 29 A Framework of Communications Technology Transfer ...................................................................... 31
I11 . ?;?he Arctic in Transition: The Transfer of Socio-Cultural Structures ................................................... 35 The Arctic and Its People: Historical Overview ofSoci0-Political Development and
Socio-Economic Conditions .............................................................................................................. 35 Claim Settlements. Constitutional Development and Self-Government .............................................. 44
The Transfer of Education: From Assimilation to Cultural Identity ..................................................... 60
Literacy and Language Policies ...................................................................................................................... 67 Summary and Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 83
IV . The Transfer of Telecommunications Services .......................................................................................... 86 ....................................................................................... The National Telecommunications Environment 86
................................................ Government Strategies of Communications Technology Development 90
vii
Southern Strategic Interests of Expanding the Northern Frontier .......................................................... 95
Inuit Presentation of Telecommunication Needs ...................................................................................... 100
.............................. Recent Telecommunication Policies to Promote Socio-Economic Development 104
Experiences with Telephone Services in the Western Arctic ................................................................. 107
Experiences with Telephone Services in the Eastern Arctic .................................................................. 118
Experiences with Portable High Frequency Trail Radio ...................................................................... 136
Experiences with Mobile Telephone ........................................................................................................... 141
Teleconferencing. Teletype and Data Transmission Services ............................................................... 143
Implications for Socio-Economic and Cultural Development ............................................................... 146
Summary and Implications for Telecommunications Policies .............................................................. 153
.................................................................................. V . Arctic AM: The Transfer of Radio into the North 158
The National Broadcasting System: Policies and Structural Arrangements ........................................ 158
The Introduction of Radio Services in the North: Government Strategic Interests .......................... 164
Inuit Needs for. Radio Broadcasting ............................................................................................................ 167
Federal Response: Extension and Programming Policies ....................................................................... 169
............................... 'The Introduction of CBC Radio in the Western Arctic mmmms: ..................................... 171
Experiences with CBC Radio in the Eastern Arctic ................................................................................ 178
The Inuit Role in CBC Northern Service .............................................................................................. 184
Needs and Policies for Inuit Community Radio ..................................................................................... 188
Experiences with Community Radio in the Western Arctic .................................................................. 198
Community Radio in the Eastern Arctic .................................................................................................. 201
The Role of Community Radio ................................................................................................................. 207
Regional and Community Radio and Inuit Self-Development ............................................................. 209 I
VI . (The 'Idiot Box' Moves North: Southern Television and the Inuit ...................................................... 216
The National Broadcasting Context: The Canadian Dilemma of a Neglected Content Policy ...... 216
Southern Strategic Interests to Extend Television Coverage .................................................................. 224
. =. 1nuit Needs and the Choice to Introduce Southern Television ............................................................. 226
viii
CBC Television Services in the North ...................................................................................................... 232
The Introduction sf Southern Commercial Television ....................................................................... 237
$Experiences with Television in the Western and Eastern Arctic .......................................................... 240
Television and Video Use .............................................................................................................................. 247
t ................................................................. h P a c t s of Television and Video Consumption ..................... 251
Television Programming Diversity and Communication Policy: Conclusion ..................................... 263
Native Broadcasting Policy ............................................................................................................................ 266
Native Broadcasting Rights .......................................................................................................................... 268
Inuit Participation in Native Broadcasting Policy ..................................................................................... 270
The Establishment of Special Native Programming Funding ................................................................ 281
Inuit Participation in Policy Formation and Regulation ......................................................................... 289
Summary and Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 299
Native Television in the Eastern Arctic: The Inuit Broadcasting Corporation .................................. 306
Origin and Goals .............................................................................................................................. ............ 306
............................................................................................ Organizational Structure and Administration 310
The Constant Search for Money: Funding Experiences ........................................................................ 314
Broadcast Production ...................................................................................................................................... 315
Training ............................................................................................................................................................. 323
Children's Television ...................................................................................................................................... 330
Midnight Television and Audience Response .......................................................................................... 332
Implications of Native Broadcasting Policy on IBC's Development ..................................................... 334
Summary and Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 337
Native Television in the Western Arctic: The Inuvialuit Communications Society .......................... 341
Origin and Goals ............................................................................................................................................. 343
Organizational Structure ................................................................................................................................ 345
The Search for Money: Funding ................................................................................................................. 351
Broadcast Production ...................................................................................................................................... 353 Training ....... ; ................................................................................................................................................. 361 Issues in Cross-Cultural Training and Production .................................................................................. 364
< Responses from the Audience ...................................................................................................................... 366 ....................................................... Implications of Native Broadcasting Policy on ICS Programming 368
Evaluation and Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 370 X . Communication Technology Transfer in the North: Assessment ........................................................ 375
The Conflicting Goals of Government, Industry and Inuit ................................................................... 375 The Presence or Absence of Conscious Technological Choices and Its Implications ....................... 378 Appropriateness of Communication Policies ............................................................................................. 383 Transfer Mechanisms and Institutional Arrangements ............................................................................ 386 Socio-Cultural Costs .................................................................................................................................. 391 Inuit Control in the Communication Technology Transfer ................................................................. 393
The National and International Context: Communication Technologies and ............................................................................................................................... Self-Development 397
XI . Culturally Responsive Communication Policy: Conclusions ................................................................. 405 The Need for a Comprehensive Northern Communications Policy ..................................................... 409 Policies for Telecommunication Services .................................................................................................. 411 Policies for Local and Regional Radio ...................................................................................................... 415 Native Language Television and Video ...................................................................................................... 421 Financing the Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 432
References ................................................................................................................................................................ 435 Appendix 1: Ethical Guidelines and Practical Experiences in Northern Research ...................................... 462
Appendix 2: The Validity and Value of Quantitative Audience Surveys ........................................................ 468
Table
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Transfer of Telephone Technology ............................................................................................................. 33
Distribution of Population by Region ........................................................................................................... 42
The Transfer of Political Structures .............................................................................................................. 45
The Transfer of Education ........................................................................................................................... 61
Level of Education .......................................................................................................................................... 64
The Transfer of Literacy and English .......................................................................................................... 68
Ability to Speak Inuktituk by Age ................................................................................................................ 70
Inuit Ability to Speak English by Age ........................................................................................................ 70
Inuit Ability to Read Syllabics by Age ......................................................................................................... 70
Ability to Speak Inuvialuktun by Age .......................................................................................................... 70
Ability to Understand Inuvialuktun by Age .............................................................................................. 70
Inuvialuit Ability to Speak English by Age ................................................................................................ 70
Transfer of Telephone Technology ..................................................................................................... . 87
Overview of Telecommunications Services ................................................................................................ 87
Telephone Penetration Statistics. 1984 ....................................................................................................... 89
Customer Complaints by Category. 1983-1986 ........................................................................................ 115
NWTel Intra-Regional Message Toll Revenues ....................................................................................... 116
.......................................................................... Bell Canada Quality of Service Problems. 1978 Survey 123
........................................................................... Eastern Arctic Telephone Ilensity and Capacity. 1976 125
1984 Mean NWT Originated MTS Charge per Resident Account ...................................................... 129 . 1984 Mean NWT Originated MTS Charge per Business Account ....................................................... 129
Bell Average Monthly Long Distance Revenues ...................................................................................... 129
Bell Canada Rate Schedules 1 and 3 ........................................................................................................... 135
Uses of HF Radio. 1973 .............................................................................................................................. 151
.................................................................................................................. The Introduction of CBC Radio 159
............................................................................................... CBC Inuvik Radio Programming Schedule 176
............................................................................................. CBC Eastern Arctic Programming Schedule 182
...................................................................................................... The Introduction of Community Radio 189
..................................................................... Radio Services in Arctic Communities of the NWT. 1981 191
................................................................................................... The Introduction of Southern Television 217
................................................................................................. Audience Share Trends by Station Group 219
.................................................................................... Availability and Viewing of Television Programs 223
.................................................................... Adapting Television: The Inuit Broadcasting Corporation 267
........................................................................................................................... IBC Training Expenditures 328
Inuvialuit Interest Gained in Language and Culture ............................................................................... 368
xii
Figure
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
Canada North of 60•‹ .......................................................................................................................................... 4
Total NCP Funding from 1974 to 1986 .................................................................................................... 282
Average NCP Funding per Society ........................................................................................................... 282
MAP-Funded Societies ......................................................................................................................... 287
The Inuit Broadcasting Corporation Network ......................................................................................... 307
IBC Organizational Chart ............................................................................................................................ 311
ICS Target Area .............................................................................................................................................. 342
ICS Organizational Chart .......... .; .................................................................................................................. 347
ICS Revenues and Expenditures ............................................................................................................... 352
xiii
CHAPTER I
There are so many things happening today. Out parents and grandparents may have had a hard life, but our children are at greater risk. ... Todays modern techndogy is silently killing our traditional way of life which has been handed down to us by our great ancestors. Yes, it has been handed down to us, to repeat and honour. Without our traditional culture,
i our strength, power, and unity will crumble befote our eps. It is not that I would like to see people retrieve the traditional life style of our ancestors, but only to see them use the techndogy that today has to ofler. Use it to our advantage and not let it take advantage of us. (Rosie Mantla, Rae Lake) 3 This study analyzes the application of new electronic communication technologies, particularly
telephone, radio and television in Inuit2 communities in the Northwest Territories (NWT) of Canada. It
discusses telecommunication and broadcasting developments in the Eastern Arctic - a region where
Inuktituk3 is predominant - and in the Western Arctic - a region where the native language is seriously
threatened. It analyzes communication policies and their implementation in these two regions and uses
the two Inuit communication societies as detailed examples. The study assesses the socio-cultural impacts
of the application of new communication technologies and examines how improved communication
capacity has directed social development Finally, it evaluates the implications for federal policy
formation for communication developments in the North and for Inuit self-government
The research attempts to test the hypothesis that the Inuit have been successful in adapting new
communication technologies when their needs fit national goals and when participation in policy
Quotes from fieldnotes will be printed in italics and quotes from secondary sources in normal font
The term "Eskimo" originates in the Algonkian language and means "eater of raw meat" '
The expression was widely diffused by French fur traders (Esquimeaux). The native people of the Eastern and Central Arctic refer to themselves as "Inuk (singular) and' "Inuit" (plural), which simply means "personn and "people," respectively. The people of the Western Arctic, in order to distinguish themselves from the East, refer to themselves as "Inuvialuk" and
. "Inuvialuit," respectively, meaning "genuine person/people." Thus when referring to the Arctic people in general, I will use "Inuit," and when speaking of the Western Arctic in particular, "Inuvialuit "
The common language of the Inuit is Inuktituk and stretches across the Arctic, yet with very distinct dialects. The Inuvialuit of the Western Arctic refer to their language as Inuvialuktun. (See chapter three for more detail).
formation and implementation of communication applications allowed conscious technological choices and
adaptations. Thus, whether impacts are beneficial or detrimental depends largely on the ability of the
Inuit to influence the pace and direction of the transfer and application of technologies to make them
compatible with their socio-cultural interests.
Scope of the Study
In this study communication technologies are understood broadly and include telephone, radio and
television and other new applications of telecommunication and broadcasting technology, as well as
techniques and more content related aspects, such as schooling and writing. Because the focus is on
electronic media print material is not further dis~ussed.~ The study emphasizes electronic communications
which have facilitated communication over long distances. The research addresses not so much the effects
of particular technology as the effects of what these new services permit, such as a commoditization of
information and the establishment of a second communication system by the non-natives community.
The study concentrates on experiences in the Northwest Territories, yet at times includes reference
to experiences in Northern Quebec. However, experiences in neither Northern Quebec nor in Alaska or
Greenland have been further analyzed because the political, socio-economic and cultural context differs
substantially from that of the NWT. However, the relevant literature has been reviewed and, where
appropriate, included in the argument
The research addresses historical developments but focuses on transfer processes since the 1970's
when the employment of satellites allowed the introduction of new communication technologies and
services in remote settlements. The analysis includes policy developments until the end of 1987, whereas
fieldwork related information terminated with the iast field trip in June 1987.
' Historically, print material has played only a minor role in Inuit media use. Exceptions are the bible and hymn books. In recent years publications of native organizations have gained importance yet are only included when directly contributing to the argument
When speaking of non-native people, I refer to the non-aboriginal, i.e. primarily white people of Euro-Canadian origin.
Techndogy trmfer has been chosen as a central term to indicate the importance of the central role
of government policies and institutional structures when introducing a technology or service into a
culturally different society. The term d i e o n is considered to be too closely linked to one particular
research approach, i.e. diffusion studies, which does not address major aspects of this thesis, for example
structural arrangements. The literature on technology transfer also reflects the problems arising from a
too narrow approach of strictly focussing on economic development However, a framework of guiding
questions has been developed to structure the analysis. This framework incorporates a variety of
approaches in order to address Inuit and government interests, underlying value systems, policy strategies,
institutional arrangements, actual experiences of the adaptation process and socio-cultural implications.
Research Rationale
Approximately 25,000 Inuit inhabit the Arctic regions of Canada (see Figure 1.1. Canada North of
60•‹) with about 16,000 in the NWT. Although comprising the majority of the Arctic population, the Inuit
have long been neglected in the planning and implementation of communication policies. Only in the last
decade have the short and long term implications become an issue in communication policies, has the
federal government provided special support programs, and have the Inuit become advely involved in
service provision. The federal government and the Inuit expect that the remote northern regions
participate in socio-economic and cultural development through new communication technologies. The
thesis will analyze to what degree this goal has been achieved.
The introduction of satellite supported communication services in the 1970s meant a drastic change
because until the 1950s the Inuit had lived a semi-nomadic subsistence-oriented way of life in isolation.
Satellites brought Inuit into full contact with southern media by "parachuting telephoqe, radio and live
- television simultaneously into a region that is culturally different from that of the producers of both the
- technology hardware and software" (Roth, 1982: 3).
The Arctic has turned into an enormous communications laboratory. Technology is proliferating
with a pioneering spirit, involving the testing of applications such as remote sensing or mobile satellite
communication. The extensive experimentation with new technologies reflects a government policy of
promoting high technology development. At the same time the federal government pursues a police of
strengthening national cultural production.
This issue is also of relevance in the North. The Inuit are in a position of relying heavily upon
high technology to fulfdl their communication needs while their cultural expression and identity are
threatened through the application of these technologies. This thesis will pursue the question whether the
industrial policy of high technology development serves or undermines a stated cultural policy of
strengthening Canadian identity based on multi-culturalism, and in particular the policy of promoting
aborigml cultures. In response to increasing pressure from the native and academic communities, the
Canadian government has recognized the important role of indigenous culture and language and the need
of Inuit participation in socio-economic and cultural development. It has set up various financial
programs to support Inuit initiatives to strengthen their cultural identity. Most importantly it has
established a program to support native controlled broadcasting, which is unique in North America and
probably for many industrial and Third World countries with aboriginal peoples. At the same time
multi-channel satellite services and video tapes make southern programming all the more easily
accessible, and native services face a formidable challenge.
The dilemma of promoting industrial high technology development and pursuing a cultural policy
of strengthening national identity is also relevant on a national and global scale. It points to the general
role of a cultural policy within the broader economic-industrial policy. The significance of the results of
this study goes beyond the Canadian context and sheds light, not only on the relation of cultural and
economic policies in an industrial country, but also on dependency relations between developed and
developing countries.
What is happening in the North is one example of what has been occurring since time immemorial.
A dominant culture invades and incorporates a sub-dominant culture. With improved communications
the peoples of this earth have got into closer contact and become more compatible. In this sense "the
world is becoming smaller." Dominant societies draw traditional peoples into a painful acculturation - --- -
process. The people of Canada have also undergone this transition. However, in this day and age, ,' -- - -- -
Western society, and non-native Canadians in particular, can show more compassion for the
sub-dominant culture. With a federal policy of multi-culturalism that encourages a cultural mosaic, the
persistence of entire peoples as groups has been officially sanctioned. It is clearly demonstrable that most
of the minority groups are in a disadvantageous status and denied access to power. The niches that these - - - sub-dominant cultures ffi are not the most desirable but they are viable ones. In Western democratic
society they challenge some widely held political beliefs of equality. The strategy of occupying a
disadvantaged niche rather than acculturating seems a possible strategy for the survival of the group as a
group. However, the human costs in terms of social disruptions are high. This study will address the
important role of the identity system itself, based on the assumption that in order for a minority culture to
survive - the society must maintain a minimal structure and a minimal membership so the cultural core
remains intact
To pursue discussions on the cultural and social consequences of communication applications is a
major thrust of this study. The significance of studying the effects of policies, transfer mechanisms and
adaptation strategies becomes evident when it is asked which policies should be implemented to permit
culturally and socially responsive communications technology development. The aim of this study is to
provide guidelines for communication policies that are in the principal interest of the minority recipient.
In this case it is the Inuit, and policies refer consequently to northern telecommunications and
broadcasting. The cross-cultural character of the study leads to questions of compatibility of native and
non-native interests in evaluating which policies are more and which are less useful.
The contribution of the thesis is thus to 1) enhance the understanding of the technology transfer
process; 2) evidence whether and why certain policies do or don't achieve the stated objectives, whether
they are in the interest of the minority culture in the first place, and if so, what factors influence the
success; and 3) provide guidelines for more effective policy implementation in this field.
Research Approach and Definitions of Key Terms
The study is based on the assumption that development is defined as a process of cultural change,
encompassing the totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour. The so called socio-cultural
dimension of development is not simply seen as one dimension but as a totality within which the
development process - including political and economic development - takes place. By employing this
broad definition of culture, which includes the totality of values, institutions and forms of behaviour,
it will be possible to consider the effects of new information technologies on the cultural experience of any country, on its identity and cultural sovereignty, and on the possibilities for democratization of communication and society (Roncaglio 1986: 372).
When speaking of culture, the study therefore refers to a complex system that includes: 1) the
knowledge, beliefs, values, morals, language and intellectual work; 2) the cultural activities, language
practice, styles of art; and 3) the means for achieving this, i.e. the general way of life with its political,
economic and socio-cultural institutions, organizations and power structures (adapted from Geertz, 1973:
11).
Culture is understood as dynamic and changing in character. For example, Ellberg (1984) reports
that the concept of the "real Inuk", i.e. the "stone age mann is causing problems for the identity and
self-esteem of younger Inuit who have learned the skills of the space age. They use speedboats, skidoos
and other modem technology, and some people say that in this way they are not true blood Inuit Yet
they feel they are Inuit Ellberg argues that it is time that non-native people stop evaluating the
authenticity of contemporary Inuit according to standards (one could say cliches) for previous generations
of Inuit
Further, one has to keep in mind that there is a difference between the impatts on certain
individuals or families, and the effects on the socio-cultural system. Vogt (1972: 3) argues that we should
not conclude that full acculturation will soon take place simply because we observe a certain segment of
the population leaving the Inuit world and taking up residence in the white man's world.
Smythe (1979: 232) identifies "cultural screens" as those features of a society that serve to protect a
satiety's culture against disruptive intrusion. The mechanisms include customs, language, religious and
mythical beliefs, as well as border controls of the passage of people and things.
Cultural identity refers to having positive attitudes towards one's own historical values, institutions
de of production to the specificity of local human and '-\ social needs (Preiswerk, 1981: 4).
There is a plethora of definitions of techndogy, from theoretical as well as practical socio-economic
perspectives which Fleron (1977: 12) summarizes as follows:
The simplest version views technology as involving only changes in artifacts. A more sophisticated approach adds to the physical objects the labor and managerial know-how. Finally, technology can be viewed as a "socio-technologicalw phenomenon, by adding to the material and artifact changes the cultural, social, and psychological factors as well.
This study is based on a broad understanding of technology which also includes institutional
arrangements.
Defmitions of techndogy transfir generally stress the methods or modes of transfer, the actors
involved, the content and the economic growth impacts on the actors and society in general. This study is
based on a wider perception of technology transfer and stresses five principal criteria: 1. the
appropriateness of the technology; 2. the cost of the technology and its transfer; 3. the degree of local
control of the technology and its transfer; 4. the contribution of the technology to the social development
of northern communities; and 5. the extent of the transfer of linked socio-cultural phenomena.
The analysis of the application and socio-cultural implications of new communication technologies
leads to questions of the relationship between technology and culture. In this study it is assumed that
technology is an integral part of a culture. Technology is not approached as an isolated, culturally neutral,
external and causal factor which can be beneficial or detrimental dependent upon the use by the receiving
society. Nor is technology approached as a factor which by itself pushes society in a particular direction,
as, for example, expressed in theories about the technological imperati~e.~ Rather, technology and its
applications is seen as an expression of the dominant forces in society and their culture. This thesis
argues that the transfer of technological hardware also includes a transfer of cultural elements. The
interesting question is to what degree these cultural characteristics can be altered to fit the needs of the
receiving society.
The term electronic media is used when referring to telecommunications and broadcasting facilities.
Telecommunications refers to point-twpoint electronic communication such as telephone, teletext, high
frequency trail-radio, e k , whereas broadcasting media refer to the distribution of information From a
centre to dispersed receivers.
For the research the following methods were employed:
1. field research: observation; interviews of key resource people, in particular representatives of local
and regional Inuit communication societies, people involved in language and culture development,
elders, as well as federal and territorial government representatives involved in communication
developments and regulation;
2. literature and documentation review: analysis of primary literature, including government
publications; presentations and briefs to, notices, and decisions of the Canadian Radio-Television
and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC), the Department of Communications (DOC), and
the Department of Secretary of State (DSOS); audience surveys, research reports and secondary
literature;
3. case studies of two Inuit communication societies in the Eastern and Western Arctic.
See, for example, Winner (1977). For a critique of this approach, see Leiss (1974).
The study uses qualitative field research methods as discussed by Miles and Huberman (1984),
analyzing experiences with new electronic media in two Arctic regions. The selection of communities in
the Eastern Arctic includes the northern center of Iqaluit (Frobisher Bay) and three small remote
settlements with only a few hundred residents. Igloolik has been chosen because of its unique role in
broadcasting development, Pond Inlet because of its long experiences with community radio and its
unique community television project, and Hall Beach because of its close proximity to a main military
radar station. The small size of the Western Arctic and contract research for the Inuvialuit
Communications Society permitted visits to the six Inuvialuit communities, including Inuvik.
In-depth, open-ended interviews with Inuit of various age groups in the communities, employees of
native communication and cultural institutions, and selected native people working in Inuit political
organizations formed the basis of the field research. Government and industry representatives of
relevance to the research topic were also interviewed. Field research was undertaken from May - June,
1985, February - May, 1986, October - November, 1986, March - April 1987, and June, 1987.
In 1986 the author researched and wrote a case study on the development of indigenous
broadcasting in the Western Arctic for ICS. It was financed by Indian and Northern Affairs Canach
(INAC). The research included travelling to the six communities in the Western Arctic and extensive
interviews with people involved in communication and language projects as well as the native public in
general. The results of this work have directly contributed to the research of this thesis. Quotations and
information from the study reappear in this dissertation with reference only to the original source. From
October-November, 1986, the author worked as field administrator for an ICS audience survey in five
Inuvialuit communities and was, to various degrees, involved in the actual conducting of the interviews. It
provided further helpful insights. The results of that survey are included in the the&.
The Stiftung Volkswagenwerk in West-Germany provided the principal funding for the research in
the Eastern Arctic. Its support is kindly acknowledged. A research grant and travel budget permitted
travel to the four Eastern Arctic communities, Ottawa and Montreal and follow-up research in the
Western Arctic. Without this support the comparative analysis would not have been possible.
The selection of in-depth interview partners in the Arctic communities was based on a
"snow-balling" system, i.e. the initial contact people suggested further interview partners. This proved
useful because the selected Inuit could contact the reference and then decide whether to participate or not.
As a result cooperation and openness increased If people permitted, the conversations were tape
recorded, otherwise notes were taken. The interviews were mostly conversational, lasting usually between
one and two hours. The questions as well as the interview styles differed among the interview partners in
order to gain a maximum of information and understanding.
Because of the oral culture of the Inuit, detailed and in-depth information could often best be
obtained when the interviewed Inuit were asked to tell a story and were rarely interrupted hesenting
people, in advance, with a list of open-ended questions, so they could better prepare, had mixed success.
Sometimes they were discouraged by the list of questions and withdrew. Yet this approach was useful in
interviewing Inuit already familiar with the questioning style of non-native people. Generally, interviews
with representatives of Inuit organizations and non-native people were held in a more formal and
structured atmosphere.
The interviews focussed on the following issues: 1) the Inuit influence on structure, quality, and
costs of telecommunication services; 2) the Inuit influence on the structure and content of regional and
community radio services; 3) the impact of southern television content on communication patterns and
socio-cultural development; 4) the implications of native controlled television and other educational and
language efforts on native language and socio-cultural development; 5) the role of Inuit in communication
policy formation and implementation; 6) the implications of govemment policies and implementation
strategies; in particular the impact of government supported training programs, funding and broadcasting
distribution arrangements on native language program production; 7) the impact on communication
patterns and socio-cultural development of government communication policies and telecommunications
and broadcasting developments; and 8) the relation of native language broadcasting and
r
telecommunication services to community and regional development
Two detailed case studies of native communication societies, the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation
(IBC) and the Inuvialuit Communications Society (ICS) were undertaken in order to illustrate major issues
in the transfer of television technology. Whereas IBC has been in operation since 1982 and is the
flag-ship in native television programming, ICS broadcast its first program in 1985. There are marked
differences in size, programming methods and organizational structures, well worth comparing.
The study did not use questionnaires because the questions of interest for this research were mainly
qualitative in character. The aim was to analyze the ways policies have worked in Inuit communities and
not to provide a quantitative effects study. The limitations of quantitative audience research is discussed
in Appendix 2.
The interviews and field notes were transcribed and "codedw or "taggedw according to a coding
scheme (see Appendix 3) which was developed out of the framework of communications technology
transfer (Table 2.1.). A data-base computer program was employed to generate the grouping of
comparable information.
Occasionally Inuit complained about yet another white person studying their culture. The use of
this study for their own organizations was questioned. In Appendix 1 the ethical issues encountered in my
northern research are summarized.
The search for a model to explain the implications of new communication technologies was a
dialectic process between theoretical models and field experiences. At the outset I worked within the
framework of dependency theory. It provided a broad orientation for examining some fundamental
institutional features of dependency, although in a manner that reversed traditional relations of the
. northern and southern hemisphere. It helped to define cultural impacts as a problem of political
economy, i.e. to emphasize the structural arrangements, sources of power and control, and resulting
consequences. Yet the dependency literature did not provide me with guidelines for my empirical
research.
I turned to the empirical research on media effects. However, in this literature impacts are
generally narrowly defined and include only socio-economic and cultural indicators that are easily
quantifiable and measured. Often impacts are defined as short-term effects.
]During the research, policy analysis and the study of the introduction of new communication
services as specific cases of technology transfer became increasingly important and eventually the guiding
models. They are further discussed in chapter two. When referring to policy analysis I do not use the
term in only the narrow sense of formalized, written down policies, which are then the cause of particular
actions and events. Rather policy analysis is understood as the study of implicit and explicit policies
reflected in motives, statements and actions that often emerge in an ad hoc or part hoc fashion.
Research Outline
In chapter two theoretical models of communication technology, culture and development are
reviewed and a research framework developed which consists of guiding questions. This set of questions
is applied for each of the technologies under study, whereby particular attention is drawn to the
experiences in the two regions of the Eastern and Western Arctic of the NWT. The research framework
addresses Inuit and government needs for communication services in the North, communication policies,
implementation strategies, institutional arrangements, diffusion and adaptation processes, and
socio-cultural implications.
Chapter three provides a socio-historical overview of the transfer of technologies complementary to
electronic communications. In particular, it examines the adaptation process within political-economic
structures, the education system, and of literacy and English language use. This provides the general
- background to better understand the transfer of electronic communication technologies. It also shows the
linkages between communication systems and the broader political context of northern development.
Chapter four analyzes the transfer of telecommunications, including high frequency trail radio.
Following the theoretical model of contrasting Inuit and government interests and strategies, it compares
institutional arrangements and service provision in the Western and Eastern Arctic and their implications.
Analyzing in detail the services of both a public and a private common carrier, as well as the trail radio
network, which is not integrated into the regular telephone system, shows the implications of different
institutional arrangements on service provision and thus on the achievement of stated objectives.
Chapter five analyzes the characteristics of the transfer of radio broadcasting, both of non-native
controlled regional and Inuit controlled community radio in the two Arctic regions in terms of
programming content and Inuit participation in service provision. The comparison between non-native
controlled regional radio and native controlled local radio makes evident the differences in the adaptation
process. It is interpreted as a result of different institutional arrangements. The analysis of radio
broadcasting in two particular regions points to the importance of regional characteristics, such as
language use, attitudes towards volunteer work, community involvement and the like.
Chapter six focuses on southern television. It contrasts Inuit needs and government policies and
d i w s e s the experiences with the intrsdu&sn of CBC belevision in the two Arctic regions. The
assessment of socio-cultural implications is based on a review of the literature of the effects of television
and on field observation. This discussion of southern television in the Arctic is an example of a
government policy that as such was not in the principal interest of the minority culture but was requested
to be complemented by relevant northern and native programming.
Chapter seven investigates the evolution of the federal northern native broadcasting policy and
native communication initiatives to serve objectives of cultural development This analysis shows the
strengths and weaknesses of native broadcasting policies and defines the issues that are crucial for
- effective native broadcasting policy implementation. The case studies in chapters eight and nine examine
the development of IBC and ICS. They are detailed examples for analyzing: 1) the effects of the federal
northern broadcasting policy and implementation programs; 2) the adaptation process and its implications
of a southern technology under Inuit control; and 3) the strengths and weaknesses of federal programs to
support native controlled communications.
Chapter ten assesses the transfer of the various communication technologies in terms of the
appropriateness of technological choices, government policies and institutional arrangements to achieve
cultural and communications objectives and examines the implications in terms of social benefits and
costs. This analysis outlines which factors influence the success of native broadcasting and consequently
which policies and implementation strategies are most effective. The northern study is then viewed from
the broader national and international context This allows the analysis to incorporate experiences made
elsewhere and to consider constraints in international market relations that also affect the Canadian North.
The final chapter develops ideas and recommendations for culturally responsive government
policies concerning the different communication technologies and for Inuit strategies to achieve their
objective of self-development
CHAPTER II
PUTTING MODERN TECHNOLOGY TO INUIT USE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
FRAMEWORK
The study draws from a variety of sources in order to develop a framework for analyzing the
application of new communication technologies, assessing socio-cultural implications and evaluating the
cultural responsiveness of communication policies in Inuit communities. The aspects of communication
technology for development and value conflicts in technology transfer are of particular importance. A
variety of authors and theoretical directions are important for the thesis, namely: (a) the concepts of the
centrality and bias of communication, developed by Harold Innis, and the characteristics of oral cultures;
(b) the dominant development communication theory (Lerner, Schramm, Katz) and the related diffusion
model as developed by Everett Rogers; (c) the concept of cultural dependency, which are discussed
primarily by Latin American (Fejes, Salinas, Friere) and a few North American scholars (Schiller,
Smythe); and (d) the issue of value conflicts within the technology transfer literature, as addressed by
Goulet and Leiss in a general socio-political context and by Valaskakis in a northern communication
context
The literature reviewed does not fully represent the work that has been written addressing the
application of communication technologies. Rather, a few authors have been selected that represent the
main approaches, with a view to their applicability to the northern native context
The methodologies employed in policy analysis and technology transfer studies form the
methodological basis of this thesis. They have structured the analysis and presentation of results.
,/ Centralitv and Bias of Information Communication
The unique situation of Canada with its close proximity to the United States, and the historical
struggle for its national identity and political, economic and cultural independence, has produced scholars
who have approached communication and national development in a different way than the U.S. main
stream. Arthur Kroker (1984: 8) argues that
at work in the Canadian mind is, in fact, a great and dynamic polarity between technology and culture, between economy and landscape. And this dialectical movement between the power of American empire and our bitter historical knowledge that the crisis has ils origins much deeper in European culture is the gamble of the Canadian discourse on technology.
There is an urgent sense that the full significance of a technological society, typified by images of
computerland and pay-tv, cannot be understood within its own narrow terms of reference but only in the
jeopardy of fundamental traditions of Western culture (Kroker, 1984: 12). Reflection on the relationship
of technology and culture points to two aspects: the relationship between technology and civilization and
between technology and power (Collins, 1986: 2). Canada's destiny is that of a society trapped between
the cultural legacy of its European past and the expanding space of the American empire.
Harold Innis (1884-1952) is one of the earliest researchers to recognize explicitly the centrality of
communication and information to all forms of cultural, political, economic and social activity. He defines
communications broadly, including communication technologies, organizations and products of intellectual
activity, and addresses communications in its relationship to other determinants of political-economic and
cultural development The availability of media of communication strongly influences the forms of social
organization that are possible. Control of communication implies control of both consciousness and social
organization. His ideal was one of balance and proportion between the competing claims of empire
(power, space) and culture (history, tradition) (Innis 1972: 62).
The economic characteristics of communication systems affect the nature of the information that is
generated and the conditions of its use and interpretation (Melody, 1987: 1). In his early writings on the
political and economic development of Canada, Innis explains the interdependence between
communications and economic development and how these developments alter the social and political
structure of the nation (1933,1970).l
Communication and Power
The second central theme in Innis' work is that of
using the concept of empire as an indication of the efficiency of communication It will reflect to an important extent the efficiency of particular media of communication and its possibilities in creating conditions favorable to creative thought. (1951: 11)
The definition and structure of institutions are significantly influenced by the state of information
Institutional structures and power relations change when the flow of information changes. In his later
work on empires and communication (1950,1951) Innis is concerned with the interrelation of cultures and
institutions and the ways in which they are phenomena influenced by communication technology. He
concludes that a distinctive change in modes of communication results in a shift in power relations and
leads to an expansion of empires with resulting impacts on the internal power and social structure of
affected societies and cultures. Any given medium will bias social organization and control, for it will
favor the growth of certain kinds of interests and institutions at the expense of others.
Melody (1987) emphasizes the economic power behind the provision of communication services.
He approaches the value of information as an economic resource. The cost of replication of information
is much lower than the cost of its initial generation. Therefore, there are generally very significant
economies in diffusing that information throughout a society and to other societies. The mass
entertainment market is an illustrative example. Specialized data banks, on the other hand, are based on
increased market values when access to information is restricted
Harold Innis' staple theory has been criticized for its mercantilist viewpoint and its commodity fetishism, i.e. neglect of analyzing the class structures (Leo Panitch, 1981: 7-34, David McNally, 1981: 25-64; Collins, 1986: 1-19), and its equation of development with manufacturing (Schmidt, 1981: 65-92); yet in the context of this study emphasis is less on the economic aspects of dependent trade relations and more on the broad concept of communication and its centrality for all aspects of national development.
C , Orality and the Bias of Time and Space
A core element of native culture is its orality, i.e. the lack of any written system, and thus the
emphasis on close relations and the transmission of knowledge, beliefs and traditions through forms of
oral presentation. The reliance upon written or oral forms of communication has significant
socio-political and cultural implications.
Innis argues that any given medium of communication is biased in terms of the control of time or
space. Media which are durable and difficult to transport are time-biased Modes of communication
which make it easy and inexpensive to transmit information over distances are spacebiased They lead to
the development of centzal monopolies of knowledge, as they favor administration over vast distance.
Those who have expertise in, and control access to, the technology of production and communication,
increasingly control the legitimacy of explanation as well. Control can be exerted through directed or
excluded interaction, whereby certain forms can be favoured through promoted access to comm~cation
technology.
James Carey (1975: 31ff) distinguishes three dimensions in Innis' concept of time and space bias: a
physical, a structural and a cultural dimension. When Innis suggests that time and space are reciprocally
related, he first of all means that demands for the physical improvement of communication over distance
are related to the progressive difflculty in maintaining effective communication in proximate relations.
The second, structural, level refers to the fact that with improvements in long distance communication
there is an attendant shift of the location of authority to more distant, diffuse, and abstract centers which
reduces the importance of the local authority. The third, cultural, dimension refers to the structure of
consciousness, the place of mind in nature. Innis argues that changes in communication technology affects
cultures by altering the things they think about, the things they think with and the arena in which thought
- develops, as for example, the concept of land as real estate and empire vs. land as the basis of a way of
life and identity.
Innis admires oral cultwes where speech is the principal means of information transfer and storage.
It requires a collective, c o m m a , and celebrative way of life, focusing on the past and emphasizing
tradition and social cohesion in the present The shift from oral tradition to literacy leads to a centralized
authority that extends the hierarchical authority to marginal locations. It results in distant, foreign rule
based on a monopoly of knowledge (Innis, 1971: 29ff). In most cases, the local population has great
difficulties communicating with the new authority and their traditional communication networks are
undermined. In "The Bias of Communication" Innis pleas for a recovery of time and historical
remembrance against the 'monopolies of space' (radio, television, ne~spaper).~
Gail Valaskakis, applying this model to her study of communication impacts on Inuit of Southern
Baffin Island (Eastern Arctic), concludes that by
losing the traditional cultural orientation based on relationships solidified in time ... the Inuit lost their identification with the past.. As Euro-Canadian authority made it difficult for them to understand or accept their cultural change, Euro-Canadian control made it impossible for them to adapt to i t (Valaskakis, 1981: 220)
Media for Social Change and Education
In the 1950s and 1960s a tradition of studies developed which emphasized the role of media in
national development, theoretically expressed in the writings of Schrarnrn (1964), Lerner (1958), Pye
(1963) and others. In these classical writings of modernization the scholars emphasized the modernization
effects of mass media which would lead to industrialization processes and thus to national development,
based upon a dichonomous world view, such as tradition and progress, development and
underdevelopment, or modernity and primitivity.
Lerner (1958) argued that exposure to new communication media would result in rising
- expectations based on new social values and perspectives that would trigger industrialization processes.
The focus of research was to analyze the success or failure of introducing communication technologies to
See in particular "A Plea for Time" (1951: 61-91) and "The Problem of Space" (1951: 92-131).
20
spread the ideas of modernization.
The failure of the media to bring about the modernization which this paradigm had promised,
together with the more general failure ~f economic development policies in the 1960s, led to a critical
re-evduation of the media's relation to development By 1976 Rogers acknowledged that the dominant
paradigm of developmenVmodernization had passed (Rogers, 1976). Schramm (1977) and Katz (1977)
similarly began to promote decentralization of systems of communication technology into the hands of the
powerless to help them better understand and change their situation. Yet the model of modernization was
not dismissed but rather modified and broadened to include social developments.
Of particular theoretical interest from a technology transfer perspective is "diffusion research,"
developed largely by Rogers (1983; Solo and Rogers 1972). Diffusion is defined as the process "by which
an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among members of a social system"
(Rogers, 1983: 5). The innovation is an idea, practice or object The channel refers to the means by
which this idea is transmitted Mass communication systems are expected to convey "superior
technology," i r . info-tion to perform a purposefbl activity (Solo, Rogers, 1972: 3) in an interactive
communication flow within a social system. Integrating this interactive element, diffusion becomes more
broadly defined as "information exchange by which one individual communicates a new idea to one or
several others (Rogers, 1983: 17) However, the principal one-way street of information transfer remains,
because "only the expert can discern its values and potential applications" (Solo, Rogers, 1972: 14). Time
is the third element, focusing on the rate with which an innovation is adopted. The fourth element is the
social system. It is narrowly defined as the unit under study, i.e. an Asian village or farmers in Wisconsin
but does not include the broader socio-political context
The model introduces aspects that are useful for this study, such as the diffusion of a technology
. over time and the notion of interaction, yet not the underlying linear development approach. Rogers
(1983: 91) admits that the model needs a more critical viewpoint In particular, four assumptions need to
be reconsidered: 1) the pro-innovation bias of diffusion research; 2) the issue of equality in the diffusion
of innovations; 3) the individual-blame bias; and 4) the problem of measuring time of adoption and
determining causality.
This requires questioning the underlying premises. Values and concepts and technologies are seen
as prime movers in historical development, rather than material conditions and related political-economic
forces (Gelding, 1974: 43). The social history of the traditional societies is neglected as a stimulus of
development Specific forms of culture enter the analysis only insofar as they constitute forces that hinder
or support desired changes. Media are not seen in relation to other institutions which influence the
development of technology and the diffusion into the 'backward' society.
Diffusion research rarely addresses how electronic media serve different interest groups differently.
Rogers admits that "segments of society have failed to adopt new technologies is due more to the lack of
opportunities rather than built-in traditional resistance." Often innovations do not have the desirable,
direct and anticipated effects but result in "at least some unanticipated consequences that are indirect and
undesirable for the system's members" (1983: 12).
He acknowledges that diffusion research has reflected an individual blame rather than a system
blame bias, because the employed variables are conceptualized so as to indicate the success or failure of
the individual within the system rather than that of the system itself (1983: 106). The economic, social or
cultural appropriateness of the innovation is out of the scope of investigation. In order to overcome the
individual blame bias, social, communication, political and economic structures need to be considered.
Rogers has adopted the language of critical researchers that demand self-reliant development and
social equality, yet he declares "effective communication strategies" a sufficient prerequisite to serve the
demands of the underprivileged, "even when social structural changes at the macro ievel hwe not
occurred" (1983: 126). Thus, the basic approach is not altered. There is a greater appreciation of the role
of tradition and its compatibility with modernization; there is a plea for abandoning the old paradigm
(Schramrn, Lerner, 1975), but this plea seems more concerned to rescue the basic theoretical framework
than to reorganize or abandon i t3 Mansell (1981: 43/53) concludes:
The new model adheres to the concern of its forerunner, i.e. how does the communication structure affect the rate and choice of adoption of innovation? It is the "Diffusion Modelw in new clothes. ... The sum total of its effect is to neutralize and deflect critical analysis of real relations between those participants.
Rogers own critique of current diffusion research points to the important issues that need to be
considered in this study of the application of new communication technologies in Inuit communities. Yet,
whether this new approach can still be subsumed under diffusion research, once the suggestions for a
revised model are implemented in practical research, is questionable.
Cultural De~endencv
Attempts to challenge the traditional development perspective have shifted attention to the
structures and characteristics of dependency. The dependency approach, (see Blomstroem, Hettne, 1984,
for an overview of its development), has been so widely applied that the diversity of theories, from
mercantilistic to marxist perspectives, makes it appropriate to talk of a "school of dependencyw (Paldan,
1978: 882) or a "framework of reference" (O'Brien, 1975: 12).
"Cultural dependency" is the communications component of the dependency school. A
fundamental principle of cultural dependency is the imposition of alien values upon a genuine national
culture. Economic penetration is closely related to cultural penetration. Cultural models and policies are
brought forward by central countries and supported by the local administration. The production of
culture becomes a mass marketed commodity (IPAL, 1983: 13).
This strategy has had success. The status of diffusion research is impressive. During the 1960s and 1970s. the results of diffusion research have been incorporated in basic textbooks in all social science disciplines. Many government agencies, particularly in the U.S., sponsor diffusion research and base their funding policies and development programs on diffusion approaches. Further, most commercial companies have a marketing department that is responsible for diffusing new products and a market research activity that conducts diffusion investigations in order to aid the company's marketing efforts. (Rogers, 1983: 88).
'Technology plays a vital role in the emerging scheme to deepen the dependency of the peripheral
world on communication hardware, software, training, and administration supplied by the dominating
system (Mattelart, 1979). Latin American scholars reject the argument that the new decentralized
technologies, such as micro-computers and video-recorders, represent a form of liberation vis-a-vis the
macro technologies of high centralization. They point out that the micro techniques serve as an
introduction to large systems, paving the way in the educational and technical fields for the insertion of
macro systems. The new technologies "establish socially the need for the technical treatment of
information" (Capriles, 1982: 50). The linkage of various systems in social networks tend to be controlled
by transnational corporations. The claimed possibility of audience production and choice, where the
consumer can become the editor or producer of his own programming, is misleading. This argument
focuses on the technological aspect rather than on the content For example, within the market system
these media simply reproduce mass information on a smaller scale, such as prerecorded video cassettes.
The choice is limited to a selection among content of the same kind. Where audience production takes
place, like the community channel on cable systems, these programs play only a marginal role and in most
cases cannot compete successfblly with slick commercial programs. The use of decentralized technologies
mmt be understood as being inseparable from the major mtiond systems and their technological
domination.
A major concern of cultural dependency approaches is the threat to the integrity and development
of the receiving society and the creation of a consumer society through massive ideological penetration.
However, as Fejes (1981: 287) admits, this cultural dimension is one of the most difficult areas in
communication studies to evidence empirically. The ideological support for consumer society is
considered instrumental for maintaining present patterns of domination (Gilbert 1984: 12). Dependency
- scholars stress that it is not only the specific program contents that are exported but also the arrangement
and presentation of the components, such as the dynamics of drama 4eries with their ad breaks or the
sponsorship of news, which are deemed to constitute an appropriate schedule or format (Sarti, 1981: 321).
Some scholars present the receiving societies as mere recipients or passive elements without any
critical ability (Dagnino, 1980: 299), whereas others (Salinas, 1978; Sarti 1981) object to this notion and
stress the internal dynamics of national cultures. The media cannot be assumed to be all powerful and
embracing, despite their 4mpomce for the process of cultural homogenization. The ways in which
different groups of the recipient society resist the homogenization tendency and promote cultural identity
have to be analyzed in each particular situation (Salinas, Paldan, 1979: 91).
Salinas (1978: 6) points out that the expressions of the dominated cultures are deformed under the
influence of domination, yet they still represent genuine contributions that add to the heterogenity of
cultural processes. In Third World countries, where transistor radios and television are widespread, 4he
national media do not reflect the truly national cultural character but limit the capacity for original
cultural creation. There is a tendency to equate genuine national cultural expression with traditional,
folkloristic foms of the past This approach does not allow a dynamic definition of genuine culture. It
corresponds with the stereotypical image of the Inuit living in snowhouses, travelling by dogteams, and
living from the land and the fur trade.
To end cultural domination requires going beyond economic 44beration from the dominating
cultural industries and their products and initiating a process of awareness of a society's situation. To use
Friere's (1970: 452) terms, the people need to undergo a process of conscientization. The use of new
communication technologies by minority groups to produce indigenous programming indicates that there
are potentials of the media to serve cultural interests and needs as they are expressed at the regional and
local level. Within dependency structures there are still areas where potentials of true cultural expression
can be realized (Salinas, 1978; Valaskakis, 1976; 1986). The dependency approach seems to generally
underestimate this potential.
The level of generality of most of the cultural dependency literature does not clarify specific
dynamics and their effects upon the people of the periphery. It has led to an overemphasis on the
importance of external sources at the expense of analysis of specific regional and national dependencies.
,
Often it implies a mechanistic approach to society, a dichotomous view of social reality that fails to
apprehend the complexity and variety of the dependent cultures. In the northern Canadian context,
where making a living ranges from subsistence to wage employment for oil companies within one family
unit, a polarized view cannot grasp the multifaced reality.
However, this framework enables us to develop a research design for technology transfer which
addresses the underlying structures of cultural dependencies, their perpetuation, and the attempts at
liberation. The useful characteristics of the dependency approach for this thesis are the interdisciplinary
character of its research, the emphasis on structures, and the critique of euro-centric values.
Communication Technoloav Transfer and Value Conflicts
The subject of technology transfer is now a distinct research domain. There exists an abundance of
literature on technology transfer for economic development, which is found mainly in the area of
industrial transfers through transnational corporations. Only a few studies address communication and
information technology, by concentrating on either the hardware or the software aspect but rarely on the
dynamics between technology and content (Hancock, 1984; Reiffers, 1983).
In most studies the social and cultural values that are affected in the process of change through the
introduction of new technologies remain outside the realm of study or are seen as a hindrance towards
modernism. Because of the failure of many transfers to achieve expected goals, the need to analyze
underlying value conflicts, socio-cultural concerns, and general implications for the host society has been
recognized in recent years.
Goulet (1976: 17) argues that the system of values is at the root of demands and criteria for
. choosing and adapting new technologies. Any evaluation of a technology transfer needs to make these
values explicit According to Meredith (1975), four basic values are embedded in contemporary Western
technology and thus transferred to the technology adapting cultures. The first is Western culture's
,
approach to rationality, which excludes mythical and symbolic levels. The second, closely related, value is
, efficiency and its expression, productivity. Within a narrow economic approach which equates economic
growth with development, social values are treated as externalities. A third value is industrial society's
predilection for a problem solving stance in response to natural and human events. This attitude breeds
impatience with contemplation, harmony with nature and indifference in the presence of perceived
problems. A fourth. value of western technology is the view of natural forces and human institutions as
objects to be used, inanipulated and controlled
The importance of these differences in values for social development in the Canadian North
becomes evident in relation to land and nature. Leiss (1977: 115-137) points out that western capitalism
was the first social form which tended to regard all non-human nature in exclusively utilitarian terms.
Technology is seen as the concrete link between scientific knowledge and the mastery of nature. From
this perspective, the North is nothing but a warehouse of resources for human needs. Traditional
societies, on the other hand,
had institutionalized prohibition of appropriation of nature for human use; there were sacred places and animals, ritual procedures, and such were cultural expressions of a sense of identity with other living things and a desire to harmonize human purposes with the course of nature as a whole (Leiss, 1977: 132).
The necessity to alter the mastery of nahue approach is also stressed by Goulet (1971:206) who
criticizes the tendency of western thought to view technological progress as an absolute goal instead of a
simple means. The utilitarian approach views the values of a population as either aids or obstacles to
achieving development, which itself is uncritically assumed to be good. Quantities are favoured over
qualities.
In light of this value conflict, Goulet (1977: 21-22) argues that affected societies have to choose
between two demoralizing options. The first is to adhere to ancient signifying values, even if these are
contradicted by behavior norms which increasingly determine daily practical activity. This will result in
serious identity problems. The alternative is to develop a synthesis of coherence between meaningful
values and rules for action. According to Goulet, this is practically impossible, at least in the short term,
I
because Western societies do not provide a valid framework of broad goals within which to evaluate
technologies. Societies adopting modem technology lack the long familiarity with science and technology
to make a new synthesis. They are condemned to social disruption unless they can successfully involve
the entire population in decisions about tolerable value sacrifices that need to be made.
For this to happen, two things are required (Goulet, 1976: 22). First, the change agent who
impinges upon affected communities has to learn how to respect the core values of a culture. These core
values and aspirations are inner limits without which a society loses cohesiveness and its members lose
social identify. Outer boundaries are the broad zones of attitudes and behavior. Departures from normal
social demands are permitted because they do not directly threaten survival, esteem, or freedom. Goulet
(1971: 212-213) points out that there is an almost instinctive resistance to any attempt to implant
"intruder values" which do not respect the core values. The scope for changes is thus limited, yet offers
room for changes that reinforce the society's principal strategy to assure life sustenance, esteem and
freedom.
Secondly, new capacities for handling information must be generated, and the alien rationality of
modernization must be critically linked by the people themselves to their core values (Goulet 1971: 213).
The subordination of social values to the goals of development,
must be inverted, for development itself is but an instrumental good. What is conventionally termed development, dynamic economic performance, ... is simply one possibility among many. (Goulet, 1971: 206)
This idea of value conflicts and its implications for technological choices is crucial for this study.
Cultural Synthesis
Gail Valaskakis (1983) has developed a model of acculturation that addresses the reactions of Inuit
individuals and society to new ideas and tools and their coping strategy to maintain a cultural identity.
She interprets her obse~ations in the Eastern Arctic as representing a form of restoring Inuit control and
identity within a model of "synthesized behavior." She argues that Inuit react through a shifting of
emphasis within a synthesized role or image within cognitive sets that combine both traditional and new
forms. The integration of the two divergent cultures is enforced by the dominant culture upon the
marginal one. Maintenance of cultural identity is sought through a new form of native self-esteem within
the over-arching industrial model. Certain situations draw upon one form or source of information more
than on the other, but both are active. She argues:
The super-imposition of southern Canadian values and concepts carries an assumption of linear, uni-directional change and discounts important aspects of actual change, including the shift in the native perception of what is traditional and what the varied experiences of individuals internalizing and using two differelat information systems." (1983: 10)
This synthesis differs among generations, sexes, individuals and communities and makes
communication amongst the population more difficult. The model is helpful in that it explains how old
and new forms exist side by side and what implications this has for social coherence in the community.
Policy Analvsis
Policy analysis has developed as a research direction to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of
policy options for specified problems. In this study it directs research emphasis to the interests sf the
major stakeholders, their policies and implementation strategies and the outcomes and implications of
these strategies. The evaluation of policy performance measures the effectiveness of achieving intended
goals. Major elements are the assessment and evaluation of observed effects, program spill-overs,
constraints and feasibilities, and the development of criteria for alternative policy actions and
implementation strategies and for monitoring and evaluating policy outcomes and performances.
Evaluation research has developed as a distinct approach for assessing the eff~ctiveness of policies
in achieving their objectives, including the production of intended arid unintended results. In the vast
- literature on program evaluation (House, 1981) the term is used broadly to encompass research activities,
methods and techniques borrowed from a range of fields. No standard theory or set of methods is at the
root of evaluation practice. The lack of a substantive, unified body of theoretical knowledge to underpin
evaluation research has resulted in a growing body of literature critical of program evaluation (Picot, 1985:
26).
In the communications field, Melody (1986: 11) notes critically that the external environment and
institutional aspects tend to be eliminated from the analysis. Rice (1984: 84) criticizes that
evaluation consistently overestimates the effects of the medium, because any extraneous effects that may exist are included as a disguised residual in the measured effect.. (Rice, 1984: 84)
The issue of value determination is one of the most troublesome aspects of evaluation research
because measuring a project's value entangles the evaluator in judgements that go beyond simple
accountability and would demand a different approach altogether. This conflict is solved in
fundamentally different ways by the two principal research paradigms.
Underlying the traditional paradigm is the claim that the researcher maintains the greatest possible
detachment from current policy issues as "a non-participant in the policy issues of the day and acts more
like a historian or archaeologist." (Melody, 1985: 6).
The second approach, and of primary concern in the context of this study, intends to inform policy
makers with respect to the implications of policy alternatives and aims to provide guidelines for the
implementation of policies selected. These can be political, economic, cultural or communication policies.
The research is seen as "part of the policy process and the test of its value is its relevance and usefulness
to ongoing policy decisions that are in the process of formationw (Melody 1985: 6).
To inform communication policy decisions, McAnany etal. (1980:xi) approach communication
developments in terms of levels of constraints outside the communication processes. Contreras (in
McAnany, 1980: 116-117) distinguishes between first and second order constraints.
First-order constraints concern relatively fixed resources ... the alteration of which may imply major transformational social policies affecting the status quo and the power structure of society, because they imply redistribution of resources among social groups. For all practical purposes, this alteration lies beyond the realm of normal rural development policies. Second-order structural constraints are other societal resources that are lacking ... that can be, and usually are, the object of ameliorative social policies.
An understanding of the first-order constraints determines what is possible for communication
developments and informs the choice of policy. In some cases the degree of freedom allowed by the
first-order constraints is so little that intervention in the communication area at the technical level may
not be worth the effort (McAnany 1980: xvi). But in most cases there is room for communication policies
that will yield modest returm4 The structural-constraints approach does not make a fetish out of
communication nor an excuse out of political constraints, but suggests a realistic method of studying
communication processes in development
This approach of affecting policy decisions emphasizes the need for committed social inquiry and
conscientization of the population of the problems under study. Geertz (1968: 142) perceives this
conscientization of problems as somewhat unsatisfactory. Often social research serves only to demonstrate
just how deep problems are. The imbalance between the ability to uncover problems and the power to
solve them causes an inherent moral tension.
A Framework of Communications Technolonv Transfer
The theoretical and methodological approaches discussed above make evident that the analysis of
applications of new communication technologies must be based on a broad concept
The analysis draws from Harold Innis' writings by stressing the centrality of communication to all
social activity and by analyzing the introduction of new technologies in terms of their impact on power
structures. Translated into practical research this means to investigate how new forms of communication
have altered communication patterns and what broader consequences have become evident
The study builds upon diffusion and technology transfer research by analyzing the adaptation
process over time. It requires investigation of how the new communication technologies are actually
introduced, diffused and used. Questions of importance relate to the initiation of the transfer, the
McAnany etal. do not have grandiloquent visions of communication as a cure-all.
principal stakeholders involved, the information provided, the external and internal assistance, the
diffusion rate, and the extent of usage.
This thesis draws from the cultural dependency approach by studying the underlying structural
arrangements and power relations between the southern agencies and the Inuit to provide communication
services. It requires an investigation of the winners and possible losers in the technology transfer and the
implications for the political, economic, social and cultural development of the host society.
The idea of value conflicts in technology transfers plays a central role in this study. The distinction
between core values and outer zones of behavior is used to explain the ability and inability of the Inuit to
cope with the rapid change. This notion of value conflicts draws attention to the underlying approaches
that emerge in the transfer policies, the technologies, its applications and the content. It also helps to
explain the implications for the cultural identity of the Inuit.
Policy analysis provides the principal methodological approach for this study, intending to inform
actual policy decisions. The analysis of needs or problems, stakeholders, implicit and explicit policies,
institutional structures, implementation strategies and intended and unintended implications highlights the
relationships between policy objectives and actual outcomes. Based on the evaluation of government
programs and Inuit initiatives to support stated objectives, the study can then develop recommendations
and policy and program alternatives that appear more effective and efficient from a government viewpoint
and an Inuit participatory perspective.
The framework of guiding research questions, outlined in Table 2.1. distinguishes the principal
stakeholders and their needs and strategic interests. It points to the differences in the underlying
approaches to northern development These are the basis for specific policies to trhsfer and diffuse the
technologies within specific institutional arrangements. This analysis draws from the methodology of
policy analysis. Based on this context, the study addresses the specifics of introducing and adopting the
technology, comparing the experiences in the Western and Eastern Arctic. A successful transfer requires
that the technology is not only introduced, but also adopted to the local circumstances. This adaptation
Needs
Strategic Interests
Table 2.1.
A Framework of Communications Technology Transfer
Government L Communication Industrv L
Underlying Approach
Policies and Programs
Institutional Arrangements
Regulation
Experiences: Western, Eastern Arctic
Impacts
Evaluation
What are the stated needs and goals?
What is the historical context? What are the national and northern strategic interests? How do they relate to those of the Inuit? Where are they compatible, where not? Why are particular interests compatible and others not?
What is the approach to development? What are the underlying values? Where are in harmony, where in conflict? Which values and approaches are predominant? Why?
What programs and policies are put in place? By whom? On whose initiative? Why?
Who determines the principal service provision? Who makes the technological choices? Who influences the pace and direction of the transfer? How is power exercised? What is the character of the principal relationship? Why have the relationships taken their particular form?
Who influences the pricing and content of communication services? How are alterations made?
What are the similarities and, differences? How can they be explained?
How has the transfer affected individuals and society in terms of: behavior, value system, power structures, objectives?
Are policy objectives achieved? Are Inuit stated needs achieved? What policy alternatives are possible? What changes need to be made?
process influences the intended and unintended effects of the transfer. The next step in the analysis of
the transfer of each of the technologies is the assessment of socio-cultural impacts. The final step
involves the evaluation of the effectiveness of chosen strategies and the development of more effective
alternatives.
cmnmrn THE ARCTIC IN TBANSJTION: THE TRANSFER OF SOCIO-CULTURAL STRUCTURES
This chapter includes a brief socio-cultural description of the Inuit It discusses the historical
development of native non-native relations through the transfer of the technologies of political
organization, education philosophy and literacy. This provides the necessary context for the study of
transferring communication technologies. The chapter intends to provide evidence of the underlying
approaches that guide the transfer of the various communication technologies.
The Arctic and Its Pemle: Historical Overview ofSocio-Political Develo~ment and Socio-Economic
Conditions
In pre-contact time an Inuk might encounter a few hundred people, during his entire life. Most of
these would be relatives of one kind or another, who were obliged to share with each other.'
The life of the Inuit was intimately bound to the natural environment This is seen, particularly, in
their traditional religion. Inuit culture was an oral culture. There was no written language and skills and
knowledge were passed down by word of mouth through storytelling, songs, and dances. As was pointed
out in the previous chapter, the oral tradition makes for a slow paced, communal and traditional lifestyle.
Early Techndogy Transfer and Social Change
The lengthy history of intervention in the Canadian North by government and other parties goes
back four hundred years when explorers adventured into Arctic waters. White incursions into the Arctic
have taken five principal forms: exploration and trade, mission, law and defense, welfare, and capital
investment These influences arrived in the North approximately in that order, today all five are present
The historical triumvirate of the traders (including the whalers), missionaries and police all had their
For an overview of historical and present socio-political and cultural developments see, for example, the collection of articles in Damas, 1984 and his bibliography.
35
special reason to be in the North, irrespective of the desires of the Inuit The whalers were primarily
interested in the whales and only secondarily in trade. The Hudsons's Bay Company (HBC) and other fur
traders wished to control the fur market, expand the trapping geographically and seasonally, and keep the
pattern of dispersed camps. The missionaries' foeus was on converting Inuit to Christianity and
destroying traditional belief systems and leadership patterns, yet not undermining the subsistence
life-style. The Canadian government's sporadic forays into the North since 1880 were motivated by the
desire to defend the claim over its territory.
Valaskakis (1975) has characterized this historical process of intervention as a succession of those
whom she calls "change agents," a term borrowed from Rogers (1969). The main thrust of her argument
is that change agents brought with them goods and technical knowledge that were adopted by the Inuit to
suit their needs and purposes. Through this adaptation process, they permanently changed their lifestyle,
patterns of social interaction, leadership, economic orientation, and culture and the like.
Generally, Inuit in the Western Arctic were drawn into the trade much later than in the Eastern
Arctic, but then on a massive scale. With extensive whaling, resources began to be depleted while the
diseases of the white man greatly reduced the Inuit population. The Inuit were pften treated unfairly,
being both drastically under-paid for their furs and overcharged for southern goods (Crowe, 1970: 68), or
betrayed with tobacco and alcohol (Neatby, 1984: 384). Around 1900 the whole population of Inuit had
been reduced by about one third.
Whaling had initiated the shift from independence to dependence. With the collapse of the
whaling period in the early 20th century, the majority of Inuit found it impossible to return to their
former independent life because they had become used to southern goods and technologies. Only the
central Arctic people from Coppermine to Pelly Bay were still barely touched by European influence.
The gap left by the whalers was quickly filled by the fur traders who were accompanied by
missionaries and the police. Patterns in the Western kctic differ from those in the East, where there was
less of a sudden boom and where traders remained more independent. The Inuit adapted with a
1
restructured yet distinctive indigenous way of life. It included subsistence economy and market-oriented
fur trapping that is now considered "traditional." Trap lines necessitated a more decentralized lifestyle
which undermined the old work-sharing concept The boom ended as resources were depleted and fur
prices fell.
Where the traders went, missionaries of the Anglican and Roman Catholic church quickly arrived
and began to work among the native people. As a result of their work, many spiritual beliefs of the Inuit
were lost Many Inuit cultural features were identified with indigenous religious practices and beliefs and
considered harmful. The missionaries established schools and also provided some medical assistance.
Gradually the federal government took over responsibility for education and health care. The first
government presence in the north, however, was the police. The North-West Mounted Police watched
over Inuit-non-native relations and also introduced a system of law and justice foreign to the Inuit Like
the missionaries, they sought to eradicate those Inuit practices which were contrary to non-native beliefs.
Until the 1950s the Inuit lived in a manner which was half a return to the very old way of
subsistence life and half a new life-style centered around the trading posts. In the Western Arctic, people
\ were more independent of police. missionaries and the HBC than Inuit further east
The relationship between native and non-native people, established during this contact period, has
been defined and cemented through the conditions of the technology transfer from a dominant to a
marginal people. This early transfer of trading goods led to clear patterns of social and cultural change in
native communities.
Valaskakis (1983: 3ff) lists three major historical trends that are important to understanding the
significance of current communication technology in northern communities. Firsf non-native people
gained overriding authority through the mere possession of technology and its distribution. This
dominance was reinforced by the impact of diffusing the English language and Christian religion.
Second, non-native people set up new criteria for leadership in Inuit society by selecting individuals
to work for them. Working for the whalers was hierarchically structured. This new order was introduced
along with European technology. Later it contributed to the rudimentary shift in leadership from elders
to those with access to technology and authority.
When the whalers l e j , they gave their baats to the people that had worked for them. A person that had a baat was one of the richest of our people. It had some social and economic impact, (created) some inequality. People with a bwt were economically better ofland peopie looked up to ymr. (Randy Pokiak, Tuktopzktuk)
Choosing individuals became the modus operandi for subsequent change agencies that moved
n~rth, such as missionaries, trading companies, government representatives and finally industry.
Missionaries selected "lay readers" that undermined the traditional leadership role of shamans. Traders
used post servants and the police agents or guides who became the interpreters between the Inuit and the
white men and thus occupied a strategic position, resulting in the erosion of local decision-making.
Third the oral communication system of the Inuit was undermined by the establishment of a
second, English language system within the non-native comwnity. They had the technology and power
to establish new rules. The leading role of the storyteller was taken over by those Inuit who could
communicate between the two systems.
"As a result of this historical process," Valaskakis concludes (1983: 7), "technology transfer during
the first half of this century played a vital role in the economic and political dependency of Inuit people."
The Inuit faced another upheaval when the North became suddenly of military importance during
World War II and the Cold War that succeeded i t The Arctic still has strategic importance. Yet, the
military has less physical presence because new communications developments allow,remote control from
southern centres.
The building of air fields and radar stations for the Distant-Early-Warning Line (DEW Line)
created a market for unskilled labor: yet when the construction phase ended and the unskilled workers
See John Nicholas Harris, 1980.
were discharged, economic stress returned and was worse than before.
There were people that lejt their traplines to work on a bulldozer, or building the DEW line. And a lot of ow younger people thought that this was the time to make that switch. They lejt everything. They got rid of all of their dogs, they got rid of their traps, gave them away or sdd them, and they basically went out and made an income with the DEW line. When the DEW line was set up, only a hand@ of them were kept employed. The rest were let go. They came with a pocket @I of money, but they came back to basically ndhing,&st their families. Their dogs were gone, their traps were gone and basically there was nothing there. So they had to start all over again. A lot of our people went to the Bay to buy back the equipment w buy other equipment and replace what they had sdd or given away. And the Bay &st went dry, both fbr equipment and foad. They basically bought the store out. ... When all of this was gone, they had to go back to the land. And a lot of them suffered because they could not get the equipment because there was nothing to buy there." (Randy Pokiak, Tuktopktuk)
Second in the list of reasons for action since the 1950s was the concern for native welfare. The
poor health conditions of the Inuit were brought into the broader context of northern development The
federal government adopted the view that the short term solution to the northern crisis was to rapidly
increase the health and welfare services and in the long term to enable the Inuit to participate in the wage
economy. Literacy, formal education, vocational training, employment, housing, rehabilitation programs
and the whole range of developing welfare services were recognized as an integral and necessary part of
improving northern health, and thus Inuit social and economic conditions. The missionary schools were
taken over by the federal government and rapidly expanded (Jeness, 1964: 125). The intension was to
allow choice, not to impose one's will. However, in the eyes of many Inuit this was poorly implemented.
They felt that their opinions were rarely considered. According to Crowe (1970: 115), it was the
"superimposition of a onedimensional 'solution'":
Planning and action has been governed by logistical, administrative and political needs rather than those of the Inuit population. Advice of competent social scientists has never received more than token consideration.
Nobody in government or industry believed that any normal human being, giien the choice, would
opt for anything but the southern life-style. This was reflected in a statement by the then Northern
Affairs Minister, Jean Lesage, in 1955:
If he has the chance to do so the Eskimo will undoubtedly climb the ladder of civilization. (1955: 5)
The nomadic Inuit had to move into settlements to receive goods and services. However, with the
rapid increase in government programs to integrate the Inuit, the primary function of new communities
was that of conscious social change. Settlements were considered social units which would facilitate a
seiective assimilation into the wage economy, in order to receive government support (Crowe, 1970: 97).
Ottawa, with all good intention, was convinced that the Inuit should be entitled to the same lifestyle and
services as other Canadians. Yet it became a pathway to "welfare colonialism" (Paine, 1977).
With the increase of government presence in the North since the 1950s scientific inquiry and
written doc~unentation about government policies expanded (Judd, 1969; Crowe, 1974; Jenness, 1964,1965
and 1968). Emphasis was placed on problems and pathology to justify the increasing government
involvement and domination of northern socio-cultural affairs (Brininski, 1982: 16). The employed
measures were mainly quantifiable and supposedly objective. Culture and non-quantifiable beliefs and
values were omitted from the research. These studies, as Lotz (1976: 26) states,
produced snapshots of the life of the Inuit in the mid-1960's. They were snapshots taken with the cameras of southern intruders, who spent a limited time on the surveys, but reported honestly and accurately what they saw. The information gathered was fitted into an economic framework based on the concepts and needs of a southern bureaucracy, charged with 'helping the Eskimos'. The Inuit perspective is almost entirely missing.
The third, and most influential, reason for the Canadian government to take an interest in the
North was the discovery of mineral wedth. The Beaufort region was swamped by intense industrial
activity. The welfare of Native people, as the claimed rationale for the promotion of rapid
industrialization, was based on the conviction that Canadians were doing the North a favour.
These people want a higher standard of living. They want the opportunity for education, for better housing, for better health, for quality of life that we have. One of the best ways of doing this is to encourage oil and mineral exploration and development, so that these opportunities will be available to our northern people on their own ground. (Chretien, 1971)
Various authors (Dacks, 1981; Etudes Inuit Studies, 1985; CARC 1984; Keith 1976) evidence the
imposition of the industrial development framework for Inuit participation. Only in response to the
pressure from northern native people, who expressed their need for native controlled research and
initiatives, were funds made available to carry out their own research (e.g. Freeman, 1976).
The "Berger Inquiry" with its controversial report (Berger, 1976) also emphasized the necessity of
native participation in northern research and development The inquiry, investigating the opinion of
northern residents on a pipeline through the Mackenzie Valley and on petroleum development in the
Western Arctic, revealed the resistance of native people to a rapid industrial strategy and recommended a
moratorium on development in order to settle the outstanding claims and to investigate the long-term
socio-economic, and cultural implications of large scale industrial development
Tulctoyaktuk illustrates, in perhaps the most extreme case, the pervading influence of rapid
industrial development on the life in the region. The Inuit had already endured the impact of the DEW
line construction, when oil and gas development entered. Pressures seemed to have peaked in 1983 when
there were seven suicides and twenty-eight suicide attempts, as well as many other acts of violence,
including murder. Alcohol was often a factor in such cases (ICS. 1984: 12). Concentrated efforts from
within and outside the community to deal with these problems have helped considerably to reduce suicide
and violence.
What happened to the people is that they almost lost their culture. A new way of lifi was crt their d m step, wage employment. People were moved into communities and that brought all the destruction, booze, dope, parental problems. People were not prepared to live in a big community, we were d i c people. There was no phasing in to meet big development. (Bertha Allan, Inuvik)
Arctic People Today: Economic and Social Demographics
The substance of the situation is that Eskimos are trying just as hard today to adapt as they did 500 or 900 years ago. The difficulty is that they are adapting not to the Arctic but to a temperate zone way of living. The new people with their new standards have nearly overwhelmed the Eskimos, not in numbers but in wishes and wants. (Laurentis, in Hughes, 1984)
It is only in the last thirty years that the huit have lived in permanent settlements and worked for
wages. The Eastern Arctic has generally remained more isolated. Industrial developlment is concentrated
in the West with its mineral and petroleum resources. Consequently the Western Arctic has always had a
much bigger population (see Table 3.1. Distribution of Population by Region). In the Eastern Arctic 76%
of the regional population are Inuit, (32% in Iqaluit, yet between 94% and 98% in the small settlements);
whereas only 67.83% of the Western Arktic residents are Inuvialuit, with as low as 28% in Inuvik, and as
Table 3.1. Distribution of Population by Region
Region
Baffin Kitikmeot Fort Smith Inuvik Keewatin
Po~ulation Distribution - Area & Pmulation Pmulation w m
Source: Statistics Canada. Census 93-912, 1981. Tables 1 and 3, own computation.
high as 96% in Paulatuk (ICS, 1984: 5).
The age structure of the Inuit population is much younger than that of the general population of
Canada and reflects conditions found in many Third World countries. In the 1981 Census, 43% of the
Inuit were under 15 years of age, compared with 23% of Canadians as a whole. Inuit form one of the
fastest growing minorities of the world. The annual birthrate is 32.1 per thousand, compared to the
Canadian average of 15.3 (NWT Data Book, 1984185: 40). Although recently the mortality rate is equal
to that of the national population, the causes of death reflect the poorer social and health conditions.
Among the Inuit 34% is due to injuries and poisonings (often related to excessive consumption of alcohol), 1
compared to 9% of deaths among the general population (Robitaille, 1985: 22).
Inuvik and Tuktoyakhlk in the Western and Iqaluit in the Eastern kctic are towns which are
dominated by southern Canadians. Inuvik was carved out of the bush in the late 1950s to replace Aklavik
(which was prone to flooding) as the administrative center for the region. Iqaluit developed as a military
and trading center. In 1959 it became the eastern regional headquarter for the fedeial government.
Tuktoyaktuk gained its importance as an economic base for oil and gas exploration in the Beaufort sea.
These communities provide various wage work opportunities. Employment is highly concentrated in the
public service with 40% of the labor force working for the federal and territorial governments (News
North, 06 03 87: C5).
The discrepancies among northern regional centers and small Inuit settlements are also reflected in
per capita income. In ,1981, per capita income was $7,216 in Tuktoyaktuk and $10,026 in Iqaluit, whereas
in the small northern communities incomes ranged between $3,200 to $3,500 (WWT Data Book, 1984,
Community Profiles). The annual average income of the Inuit (15 years of age and older) at $8,272 lies
well below that of the general population of $12,993.
the Inuit's economic situation has ... not much improved. The Inuit also lost ground between 1970 and 1980 in terms of the percentage of the Inuit and general populations at the various income levels. ... The Inuit, who were already at a disadvantage, clearly made little progress between 1970 and 1980 in improving their income position relative to the general population (Robitaille, 1985: 46).
Most native people still depend on animals for their livelihood as a supplement to store-bought
food and clothing. Hunting, fishing and trapping are still an important source of income, country-food
and clothing. Skills in living off the land are an important element in the pride, identity and self-respect
of northern natives and essential to the general well being.
I go and buy a skidoo this spring and go out trapping muskrats at the weekends. It's not to make money at it. Sure you are happy when your catch covers expenses, but y o ~ c do it more for the lifistyle than for the money. When I am in town in the spring time, Ifind it really hard to work. I know all my fiiends and relatives are out on the spring hunt and that's where I want to be, too. (Dennis Alunik, Inuvik)
The reduction of cash income from the fur trade has been partially replaced by the guiding of big
game hunters. Tourism has also become increasingly important to the Arctic economy, as has the work of
artists and crafts people.
That's what we always wanted, to move on to the land and live there. But because of the cost of living we could not aford to@t live away fiom town. (Ann Kaswk, Inuvik)
Yet these options are insufficient for the growing population. With the creation of native
development corporations, the Inuit have become involved as business owners in widbly diversified fields
(Whittington, '1986).
The importance of cash income becomes particularly evident when looking at the cost of living. In
the northern centers it is about 60 to 70% higher than in the nearest southern cities. In the remote
communities it is about 80 to 120% higher (NWT Data Book, 1984, Community Profiles).
The unemployment rate, as measured by the 1981 Census, is twice as high among the Inuit (15%) as
among the total Canadian population (7%) (Robitaille, 1985: 39-40).' A study investigating the actual rate
of people who would like to work but have no wage employment revealed a rate of 60% (Stabler, 1988).
The socio-demographic statistics indicate a bleak situation with historical roots, yet it provides a
distorted picture, as one has to also look at the qualitative aspects that determine the perceived quality of
life. These include such things as the continued preference of living off the land, close family ties, and a
communally oriented lifestyle with cooperative and egalitarian values.
Claim Settlements. Constitutional Develo~ment Self-Government
The historical colonial approach was institutionalized in the North in the 1875 North-West
Territories Act that set the legal framework for the government of the NWT. The Territorial Council was
merely an administrative branch of Ottawa. In 1967 the seat of government was transferred to
Yelhwknlfe. Qver the yeas, tlae appointment of members to the Legislative Assembly has been rqlaced
by direct elections in the NWT and Ottawa has transferred power over various departments, primarily in
the social services, to the government of the NWT. However, Ottawa has retained its authority over
non-renewable resources and the provision of the basic funding of the NWT coffer. The typical
corehinterland dependency relationship has thus been maintained Table 3.2. summarizes the key issues
of transferring political structures which have shaped northern development.
The unemployment rate only indicates the percentage of the labor force without a job. Since the labor force is limited to those currently working or actively looking for work within the last month, many Inuit without employment but available for work are excluded because they have not looked actively for a job in the month prior to the census.
44
Table 3.2.
The Transfer ~f Political-Economic Structures
Government Industry
Needs
Strategic Interests National Context
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Underlying Approach
Policies
Institutional Arrangements
Impacts
Sovereignty Industrial Develop.
Integration Inuit
a) Acculturation Cultural Identity
Qaim Settlement Constitutional Dev.
Territoral Status Limited Transfer of Power to North
Funding Loss Power
, Self-Sufficiency Cult. Identity
Pol.&. Control Cultural Identity
Bicultural Dev. Cultural Identity
Nunavut Native Corporat.
South. Business Struct Increase Control Continuing Dependency
Persistance and Transition= Inuit Cultural Values and Development Gads
There is a tendency to depreciate native culture (Berger, 1977: 93). White nor;therners have
- particularly argued that the native way of life is dying, that "what we observe today is a pathetic and
diminishing remnant of what existed in the past" Berger explains that this argument arises from our
attitudes toward native people in that we (Euro-Canadians) find it hard to believe that anyone would wish
to live as native people do in their homes and villages.
The Inuit, including those living in towns, have values that are in many ways quite different from
those of Euro-Canadians (Honigman, 1965; Brody, 1975). These values are related to the struggle for
survival waged by their ancestors. They persist in the Inuit's struggle today to survive as a distinct people.
Important values are sharing, egalitarianism, responsibility to the tribe or extended family, respect for
nature, cooperation and respect for others, particularly elders, knowledge of the language, humility,
domestic skills, humor and spirituality, as well as avoidance of conflict (See for example: Briggs, 1970;
Williamson 1977).4
The social and economic system of the 'real' or 'traditional' Inuit is not that of a semi-nomadic
subsistence hunter. It includes the practical skills needed to use steel traps, high powered rifles, outboasd
motorboats and skidoos, and the artistic skills utilized in soapstone carving (which was promoted by
southerners in the 1950's to improve the changing Inuit economy). The use of native languages is also an
essential element in defining Inuit culture and identity.
For the modem Eskimo, many modem elements of economy and technology are perfectly reconcilable with being a genuine exponent of all that is today regarded as the essentially Eskimo tradition. (Brody, 1978: 30)
Goulet's distinction of core and peripheral values helps to better understand, the evolution and
survival of basic Inuit values and beliefs which are still evident today, although having undergone
changes.
For example, the tradition of sharing is still regarded as vital and is generally practiced, yet it has
undergone some adaptation, particularly regarding cash income. Initially the wage-eamers found
themselves expected to support, as far as possible, members of the extended family and even people to
whom they were more distantly related sharing not only food, oil and gas, but also money. At the same
time they were under the pressure from white authorities to not respond to the value of sharing. Today,
- the sharing of food is still widely practiced whereas the sharing of money is limited to the closer family
In the following I do not intend to present a detailed picture of Inuit non-material culture, but briefly highlight some aspects that are essential to the self-esteem of today's Inuit.
unit.
Peter Usher concludes in his study on the impact of industrialization in the Beaufort region that
although people have chosen to obtain the "goodies" which industrial civilization brings, they do not
necessarily accept the obligations, the "social contract," to perpetuate the material benefits.
What is remarkable is not that wage employment now constitutes a greater portion of personal income, but that the increase since the early 60s is not rather more spectacular, especially since wage employment is now so widely available. (Usher, 1982: 13)
The core values continue to exist in light of the great changes, particularly in the last twenty years.
Inuit are striving to maintain these values while adjusting to the modem world and thus fmd a new
synthesis of old and new.
When Eskimos worry about the loss of their tradition, they are thinking of the passing of the fur trade way of life. They are concerned with ensuring that further modernization of an already transformed economy will not result in complete separation of the Eskimos from the land-based activities. Many are anxious about the possible eclipse of their traditional life; but none are interested in returning to subsistence hunting. (Brody, 1978: 29-30)
Sometimes native people use strategies of rejection when dealing with the infringement of
industrial society upon their lives. This is manifested by sabotage, hostility and deviance. What Heather
Robertson observes in Indian reserves is also evident in Arctic communities:
... it was several months before I realized that there, right before everyone's eyes, in all the chaos and withdrawal, was the Indian resistance. Indian lives are a study in passive resistance. ... Reserve society is instinctively geared to alienating white people, whether by frightening them by drunkenness, begging and threats, intimidating them by silence or retreating from them through feigned stupidity and fake psychosis. Indians have instinctively patterned their lives to prevent whites from really knowing what is going on among the Indians. (Robertson, 1970: 8)
Sheila McDonnell reports about withdrawal and non-involvement in education, co-ops and health
care, and in the effective sabotage of government meetings and projects in a western' Arctic community.
As a strategy it seems to be adopted when there do not appear to be any more effective alternatives and people need to protect themselves from outside threats in any way they can. To some extent there is satisfaction to be gained, when outsiders 'hold the winning hand' in being able to spoil the victory, but these tactics rarely enable one to steal the game. On the oher hand, passive resistance may indeed provide diversions and screens to protect and support the formulation of more actively organized resistance. (McDonnell, 1983: 23).
The aim is to avoid the sacrifices of existing cultural and economic values, where the loss of these
values outweighs the benefits of the new influences. It requires to actively adapt and integrate elements
on their own terms in order to maintain an active relationship with the larger society. McDonnell(1983:
24) points out that the Inuit frequently refer to strengthening traditional ways when speaking of their
rights to determine their way of life. This promotion and revival of traditional customs and values is
often at the core of struggles to maintain a distinctive, independent way of life.
G d s of Self" Development
We want to develop and control our own policies rather than modify southern policies and adapt them to the north. The attempt to do this is not very successful in many, many instances, Telescoping programs into the North does not work and very often the people in the North cannot even qualify for most of the programs that the governments puts out (Mark Gordon, 1986: 65).
Inuit developmental goals and strategies have evolved out of historical experiences of domination.
Paine (1977) has analyzed the relations between the Inuit and the government with the help of the
concepts of "welfare colonialism" and "tutelage" which indicate center-periphery relations. Tutelage
refers to a government policy that sets up structures and services with the intent to have the Inuit acquire
the experience for running their o m affairs. Qften this form of dominance is of a non-demonstrative
character.
The principal goal is to achieve self-government and enjoy economic prosperity on their own terms.
The continued use of renewable resource harvesting in the context of industrial, community-oriented,
development is the basis for the socio-economic life-style native people envision for themselves. They
base their demands on aboriginal rights which recognize that Inuit have existed as a distinct people in the
North for thousands of years. That they have maintained their own culture, economy, language and
- decision-making structures, and that they have a right to continue exercising these historical 'rights' both
now and in the future (IttinwJ985: 47).
We are seeking our goal of entrenchment of our rights, because up to now the white man has never had any respect for our rights and it is only if they write it in their own language, in their own constitution, that they will be forced to respect our rights. (Nungak, 1986: 79)
Also, the Inuit want their'historical grievances, particularly over lands, recognized and dealt with in
an equitable fashion. E q d l y important, they demand direct and meaningful participation in the making
of policies which affect their future. During the First Ministers Conference on Aboriginal Matters in
March 1983, the Inuit presented a short paper on self-government in which they listed six basic
principles: 1) participation in programs and policies that affect their regions; 2) genuine political
representation at territorial and provincial legislatures; 3) recognition of use and occupancy of lands,
waters and resources; 4) access to adequate revenues; 5) access to an economic base for the future; and 6)
structures of government in Inuit homeland which reflect and provide for the special needs and
circumstances of the Inuit (NCF, 1983:8-9). Inuktituk should become an official language of Nunavut
(meaning "Our Landn), be available for all public services, and be the language of instruction in the
schools at all levels as soon as possible (ibid: 18).
What we are trying to do now is to get control in our communities and we have succeeded to some degree. But the task of controlling our communities is far from complete because we still cannot make the major decisions and policies for our communities. We have some local control, but do not have adequate control yet Our people are having to live with policies and decisions being made in the south which have been applied in the north. (Mark Gordon, 1986: 65)
interaction with external forces. This means rejecting both assimilation and isolation. The realization of
this goal means self-sufficiency through native institutions which are independent and self-determining.
It implies Inuit acquisition of expertise and power through training in all roles and levels of the system,
' including as administrators, planners, as well as the financial resources to carry out the tasks. To achieve
this the Inuit have to establish ties with the circumpolar Inuit world and with institutions of the
non-native culture (Stairs, 1984: 35).
The Inuit do not see the necessity to accept the values and business ethics of western culture, such
as competitiveness, individualism, and accumulation, or their style of politics and management, which is
adversaxial, hierarchical and aggressive. The realization of this remains to be seen.
The Euro-Canadian system provides valuable resources, such as medicine, airplanes, electricity and warm houses. It provides exciting and pleasurable novelties - television,
49
movies, liquor and bingo. Yet Inuit are surprised that Qallunat (Inuktituk word for white people), who live so comfortably and have so much power, seem to be a discontented and anxiously competitive people. (McElroy, 1977: 379)
Negotiating a Way of Life: Native Claims
To realize their goals of self-development and cultural identity the Inuit have been seeking political
solutions through the court., land claims settlements and constitutional development In 1969, the
government had come forward with a statement on Indian Policy (INAC, 1969) that called for the
termination of the special rights and status of aboriginal peoples within Canada. This paper was
developed in a secretive fashion (Weaver, 1981: 3). excluding native participation. The destiny of
Canada's natives was to have no more or no less equal access to the ordinary rights and opportunities of
other Canadians. Equality, or non-discrimination was seen as the key ingredient in the solution of the
problems prevalent among native people.
This government believes in equality. It believes that all men and women have equal rights. It is determined that all shall be treated fairly and that no one shall be shut out of Canadian life, and especially no one shall be shut out because of his race. (INAC, 1969: 6)
Underlying this policy was liberal philosophy with its focus on the individual, equality and freedom, and
denial of the political sights of said cdkxtivea The native cultural systems were~put in the past tense
and viewed as outmoded.
Court decisions supported the assumption of a doomed culture. For example, Inuit and Cree
Indians in Northern Quebec were denied the right to stop a major hydro project, because of their
apparent acquisition of southern Canadian goods. Therefore they would have no right to continue their
traditional way of life. (Court d'Appel, Quebec, 1974: 10). In spring 1971, the government officially
withdrew the policy paper, yet native people were now alerted that termination of aboriginal rights
remained the unofficial policy that was still being implemented (Weaver, 1981: 5).
In contrast a court decision in 1973 in British Columbia (Calder, 1973), confirmed the existence of
aboriginal rights. It precipitated a reassessment of the federal government's policy on claims and on
aboriginal rights. Ottawa responded with a claims policy (INAC, 1973) in which it recognized the rights
of aboriginal groups to traditional land use and occupancy and called for claims settlements that
exchanged undefined aboriginal land rights for concrete rights and benefits, including land, cash
compensation, economic development, wildlife rights, and self-government at a local level. Yet it denied
general political rights. Settlements have only been achieved (James Bay, 1975; Western Arctic, 1984)
when the federal government was eager to facilitate economic development project^.^ Native people were
pressured to settle their claims or to be ignored by the developments.
The patriation of the Canadian Constitution in 1982 was another milestone in recognizing native
rights. It established, after many heavy disputes, that indigenous peoples were finally recognized in the
constitution as a group with special rights within the nation. Future constitutional talks would have to
define what these special rights were.
At the same time, within the governing and opposition parties, criticism had developed against the
colonial manner in which the government ran native affairs. A report of the Standing Committee on
Indian Affairs in 1983 criticized the paternalistic approach of the federal government and its hindrance to 2
native economic and social development The report made fifty-eight recommendations, all of which
flowed from Native views and demands presented at hearings that were held throughout the country. Tiae
committee urgently recommended transferring responsibility of all and not just a few selected
socio-economic programs to the native population (Canada. Standing Committee, 1983). It argued for
tribal self-government tied to the land claim settlements and recommended that self-government be
recognized as an aboriginal right, explicitly stated and entrenched in the constitution of Canada. The
report reflected the basic policy paradigm of native people, yet did not trigger significant changes in native
policy.
The major political priority of the new conservative government, which came to power in 1984, was
to "make a fresh start" David Crombie, whose appointment as Minister for Northern and Indian Affairs
was welcomed by Native leaders, began extensive consultation with indigenous leaders and councils
For an overview of literature on native claims see, INAC, 1985; House of Commons, 1983; Bulletin, 1976; Morrison, 1983; Boldt and Long, 1985).
throughout the country and expressed his support of establishing aboriginal self-government.
At the Constitutional Conference on Aboriginal Rights in April 1985, the Prime Minister also
expressed his intention to improve socio-economic conditions by encouraging the development of native
self-government as the solution to poverty and dependency. He also promised to entrench the right of
self-government in the constitution (Mulroney, 1985: 157-164). Yet this and a subsequent conference in
1987 (INAC, 1985,1987) failed to achieve an accord and the issue still remains to be ~ettled.~
At the same time the tap government priority which affected most visibly the course of native
policy was the desire to cut back spending. Erik Nielson, the Deputy Prime Minister, headed a ministerial
Task Force to undertake a cost-cutting review of all government programs. The Task Force on Indian
and Native Programs revealed a totally different thinking within Cabinet than what had recently been
expressed at the Constitutional Conference.
It's most important recommendation was to dismantle INAC and to transfer Indian programs to the
provinces (Nielson, in Weaver, 1986:6), which were already known to provide lower quality service.
Although native self-government and constitutional reform were the important issues in the political
arena, they did not become the frame of reference for the development of the recommendations. These
were not confined to a review of the native programs but they also advised the government to redirect its
role in Native affairs (Weaver, 1986 (a): 9). The report recommended to reduce significantly federal
responsibility, not by transferring power and finances to native people, but by simply not claiming
, re~ponsibility.~ The sum of the recommendations meant significant long-term cutbacks in programs and a
Whereas native groups want to have the right for self-government entrenched in the constitution and then defrne to what that means in each particular case, the provinces want to have these rights clearly defined before they become constitutionally recognized (Government of Canada, 1987).
INAC's total spending between 1973 and 1983 had increased fIom $0.4 billion to $1,8 billion and in 1985/86 would reach $3 billion, housing and land claims issues not included. Yet only 25% of these monies were considered necessary to meet the strictly legal obligations and another 40% were required under the Constitution Act of 1982, yet those would normally fall under provincial and municipal responsibility. This left 35% as "discretionary, based on incremental social policy decisions" of the past decade (in Weaver, 1986: 12).
reduction in the support of native political organizations. On the community level it meant that band
councils would have to take on many new responsibilities for service provision while facing cutbacks
rather than additional financial resources.
Instead, the task force promoted economic and business developments whereby normal conventions
of business practice should be applied to native peoples. Weaver (1986(a): 17) concluded that the
recommendations meant "in effect, that INAC and its minister would be put into receivership and that
Indian self-government would be shaped by central bureaucratic agencies."
Prime Minister Mulroney was forced to react immediately, asserting that the report was not a
statement of government policy, and refirmed the special rights of aboriginal people, including
self-government, and the maintenance of current funding levels to correct the serious inequities (Weaver,
1986(a): 22). So far, no major restructuring of federal responsibility has taken place. However, the
proposals were politically damaging, as they questioned the integrity of the new government.
In support of the Prime Minister's statements, INAC issued a "Policy Statement on Indian
Self-Government in Canada" (Crombie, 1986) and established "Alternative Funding Arrangements"
(INAC, 1986) which increased the power of bands to modify and redesign federally funded programs and
to transfer funds between programs. Subsequently, self-government was enacted for the Sechelt Indian
Band in British Columbia. However, under the new legislation, the Band receives $24,000 less while its
responsibilities have increased significantly. Rather than dealing with INAC, the self-governing Sechelt
Band now has to deal directly with Treasury Board officials, who, rather than turning the money from a
down-sized INAC to the band, prefer "instead to hang onto the saved salaries for government coffers"
(Price, 1986:75).
INAC also established a Task Force on Comprehensive Claims Policy, which based its
recommendations on extensive consultation with those involved in the policy implementation, both
government officials and native people. The report recommended the termination of the federal
government's policy of extinguishing aboriginal rights. It built upon the arguments of the "Penner
Report" (Standing Committee, 1983), arguing that the collective rights of cultural minorities should be
respected and native self-government negotiated (INAC, 1985: 29-30). However the report was vague on
how to practically implement greater economic self-sufficiency and self-government
In June 1986, the new minister for Indian and Northern Affairs followed a more bureaucratic
strategy (Weaver, 1986(b): 33) and responded to the recommendations of the Coolican Report with a new
"Comprehensive Land Claims Policy" (INAC, 1987). This policy paper was more a list of reforms to an
existing policy than a fundamental departu~e in thinking focussing on matters of process management Its
most important reform was the acknowledgment that future settlements would only involve the
relinquishment of aboriginal rights relating to land but not those relating to social and cultural rights . Aborigmal title was allowed to continue in specified or reserved areas (INAC, 1987: 12). It also
conf~rmed the willingness to negotiate guaranteed aborigml participation in decision making bodies
which managed lands. However, the policy statement did not provide explicit political and economic
goals to help shape the negotiations and to provide the basis for evaluating claim settlements. In solely
focusing on land issues, it reflected a rejection of the philosophy and did not contain the breadth of vision
of the Penner and Coolican report and made relatively little change for native groups (Fenge and
Barnaby, 1987: 15).
Inuit Organization and Claims Settlements
To address these major political issues, the small local Inuit organizations, such as community
councils, were insufficient and had to be complemented by organizations of a general nature. To gain
political clout, they had to follow the Euro-(=anadian model of political participation. These associations
were staffed with Inuit who could speak at high political levels on behalf of the communities and people
- who had previously gone unheard.
The first organization, the Committee of Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE), emerged in the
Western Arctic in 1970 in response to oil and gas exploration in the Beaufort Sea. It was a genuinely
grassroots movement and did not initially receive any financial support from federal funds. Its goal was
to provide a single voice for native people (including Indians and Metis) of the North and to speak to
government and industry. A year later the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) was established to help
preserve the Inuit language and culture, represent the Inuit on matters affecting their well-being, improve
communications to and between Inuit communities, and help Inuit achieve full participation in Canadian
society (ITC, 1980: i). The headquarters were set up in Ottawa COPE became a regional organization to
separately negotiate its claim settlement
A side effect of the 1969 Claims Policy, and the discussions surrounding it, was the establishment of
a program under DSOS to provide core funding to political associations representing aboriginal groups to
help run their organizations, conduct research and investigations, hire specialists, publicize newsletters, and
use the methods of modem business while keeping in touch with local native ways.
The '"topdown" orientation of national and regional native organization was a reaction to the 1969
White Paper. Native people across the country suddenly saw the need to get organized and recognized.
In order to gain the political clout, they had to establish organizations with political structures and
business practices acceptable to government representatives in Ottawa.
COPE was able to maintain more of a grass-roots approach because of the small size of the
population it represented. In 1978 it signed an "Agreement in Principle" with the federal government on
Inuvialuit land rights. Seven years later, on June 5, the claim was finally settled and signed. Its guiding
principles are:
1. to preserve Inuvialuit cultural identity and values within a changing northern society; 2. to enable Inuvialuit to be equal and meaningful participants in the northern and national economy
and society; and 3. to protect and preserve the Arctic wildlife, environment and biological activity (INAC, 19851).
Besides describing ownership over land, harvesting rights and provisions for screening development
- activities in the region, the agreement also provides financial compensation through a 45 million dollar
package to be paid in installments over 13 years, as well as economic enhancement and social development
funds. Control over the funds lies in the hands of the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation (IRC) which is
made up of members of the community corporations. Several subsidiaries of IRC deal specifically with
economic development projects, petroleum, land, and renewable resource development A social
development fund serves to particularly address socio-cultural issues.
In 1975, the Inuit of Arctic Quebec had similarly settled their claims and established corporations
and organizations to run and administer a broad range of political, economic and sociecultural issues and
services.Vs there have been no urgent, large-scale resource developments at stake in the Eastern Arctic,
the claims settlement process is still in the phase of negotiation and it is progressing very slowly.
Consequently emphasis has been focussed on the political-constitutional development of the NWT.
Constitutional Development and Inuit Self Government
By virtue of being a majority, native people control the territorial Legislative Assembly (LA.) (15
out of 24 in the current, 10th LA. are native people). Within the constraints set by federal fiscal power
they can develop and implement policies. They have no control over non-renewable resources and crown
The development in our community has been retarded by the reluctance of the government to give authority and decision-making powers to the people .... The government tells us to make our own decisions, but won't give us money for the ones they don't like. (Mark Gordon, 1986: 68)
In the NWT there are no fractions along party lines, the LA. elects the Executive Council which, in
turn, elects the Government Leader in an "upside down" process. In recent years the territorial
government has passed a variety of laws in those areas were it has jurisdiction to increase participatory
processes, such as improving language rights, regionalizing educational responsibility, and transferring
power to local band councils and local governments. It has established a Ministry of Aboriginal Rights
and Constitutional Development to effectively address native issues. Similarly, Inuit communities have
Because they are not part of the NWT but fall under Quebec's provincial jurisdiction, they are generally not included in the discussion.
Regarding a more detailed description of constitutional development, see: Dacks, 1981; 1986; Drury, 1979, INAC, 1980; Nunavut, 1983; Robertson, 1987.
taken over responsibilities and administrative functions and have even gained the power to send back
non-native Canadians they d~ not like to have in their communities.
In 1979 the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC) called for a division and the establishment of an Inuit
homeland "Nunavut" with the fl~mcial power for self-government (ITC, 1979). A plebiscite was held on
the question of division in April of 1982, where half of the eligible voters participated and 56.5% of those
supported division (Abele, 1984: 6).1•‹
Two Constitutional Forums were set up - Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) and Western
Constitutional Forum (WCF) - to reach an agreement about the division. However, attempts to settle
have fallen through (News North, 30/01/87, Al; 06/03/1987: Al). Also, because of a change in the
national constitution in June 1987, the creation of a new province, such as Nunavut, now requires the
consent of all provinces and the federal government This is not very likely to achieve.
In addition, there is criticism that the division of the NWT is too costly and also contradictory as it
divides Inuit homeland (Dachs, 1986) Development towards regionalizing seems more fruitful. Emphasis
should be given to local government and regional control. Economic growth through native development
corporations would lead to more economic self-sufficiency and thus more power in dealing with Ottawa.
Surely, the goal of constitutional change in the North is to maximize the ability of northerners to govern their own lives. The major obstacle to this self-determination has not been the NWTs internal divisions or the problem of managing politics and policy throughout its vast territory. The problem has been the South and the relationship of colonial dependence which the south has imposed on the North.(Ibid, p. 207)
lo ITC thus argued that people had spoken in favor of two territories. The small predominantly Inuit communities of the Eastern Arctic clearly favored division with a majority of over 90%, whereas a significant part of the Inuvialuit and the non-native northerners, who are concentrated in the Western Arctic, voted a against a division. In Inuvik 77% voted against and 23% in favor and in Sachs Harbour 55% were against and 42% for a division (Abele, 1984: 6-9).
The ConjEcttng Frameworks in Northern Policy
The historical overview of government policies and political evolution of the north evidences a
transition in the approach, from the colonialism to the neo- or welfare-colonialism and
self-determination. However, reality is still shaped by structures of dependency. It could be shown that
within government there is no coherent approach but a dichotomy of two dominant policy frameworks,
the most extreme positions of which are total assimilation or true native self-government.
The principal assimilationist ideas, expressed in the 1969 White Paper and subsequent
administrations, are also reflected in Nielson's recommendations and thus rescue federal authorities from
the responsibility of attending to the recognized needs and rights of native communities (Dyck, 1986: 49).
The most recent view of claims settlements (INAC, 1987), although recognizing aboriginal title, still falls
in the framework of administrative solutions and a reluctance to transfer government control. Funding
for self-government is limited in such a way that it almost guarantees the permanence of the supervisory
system.
On the other hand, there have been self-government based approaches which emphasized 1)
changes toward participatory government of the NWT; 2) greater accountability by native communities to
their electors rather than the federal bureaucracy; 3) expansion of power on the community level; 4)
replacement of non-native administrators on the local, regional and territorial level with native people;
and 5) increase of the resources of native organizations to manage their own affairs.
The 1985 Task Force report can be seen as a variation of the Penner Committee's policy proposals
of self-government and self-determination. The Prime Minister has tried to reconcile the tug of war over
native policy between these two fractions.
Implications of Government Pdicies on Inuit Pditical Structures and EBcacy
From the native point of view the transfer and adoption of southern foms of political expression
and economic organization under dependency structures has had important implications on native
organizations trying to gain political clout and administer southern initiated programs. The creation of
topdown Inuit organizations in response to the White Paper of 1969 was mentioned as a prime example.
The federal policy of eliminating or narrowly defdng collective rights affected the Inuit's attempts to
establish truly self-determined institutions and services.
For example, ITC's founding leader was Tagak Curley, who had spent considerable time in the
south and had acquired a knowledge of English and a great deal of experience in southern political ways
(Brody, 1978: 37) and thus a different, although politically more effective - approach than the grass-roots
oriented COPE. When it became obvious that a settlement in the Eastern and Central Arctic was going to
be immensely complex from a legal point of view, ITC increased its dependence on legal advisors, lawyers
and other southern experts.
Increasingly young Inuit, trained in English and other skills of importance in dealing with the white
men's society, have taken over these expert positions. Without question, one of the most urgent needs is
for trained Inuit to manage and administer developments within their communities. As a result, the move
towards southern shaped governmental and administrative forms, in order to be recognized, have been
taken over by young, literate, English-speaking Inuit These roles were traditionally occupied by elders.
Thus there arises a paradoxical situation. The issues that the political leadership feels most deeply
about center on cultural and economic matters which are closely linked with the traditional way of life.
Yet they have become deeply involved with legal, political and economic questions &at mean little to an
important element of their membership - Inuit primarily interested in land-based activities. To
participate in the political process, Inuit organizations needed technical experts whose interests have
tended to be remote from those of the grass roots. All of these factors seem to separate them from the
people they aim to represent
,
The Inuit corporations, as corporations of the people, claim that they are open and democratically
run with strict guidelines regarding salaries and payments and conflict of interest guidelines and thus
respect deep principles of native society - a kinship based communal society with egalitarian and
cooperative values (Daniels, 1986: 99). However, the enforced adaptation of southern corporate
structures, in contrast to the cooperatives, has created a new class of corporate natives. The tendency to
elitism has become an issue in the Western Arctic, where Inuvialuit challenge the behaviour and attitude
of their Regional Corporation whom they accuse of secrecy and domination and demand their right to
information and participation in decision making (News North, 2/01/1987, As; 29/08/1986, B3;
06/03/1987 A 1,3).
Daniels (1986: 101) interprets these developments as typical for Third World countries, where
early, courageous and unpaid leaders work for independence and decolonization, to frnd themselves taken
over by educated young leaders who are co-opted by the dominant government and become the governing
apparatus for the people in an elitist position. Yet it is an elite that lacks the fundamental power over its
resources. After this period of salaried, established native bureaucrats, he foresees eventually emerging a
"third wave" of young leaders outside the establishment as social activists, reemphasizing the egalitarian
communal society and a viable local and regional economy (1986: 106).
Transfer of Education: From Assimilation @ Cultural Identitv
An important area that affects s o c i d t u r a l development and is closely linked to the cultural
implications of communication technologies is the education system and its underlying values. Table 3.3.
summarizes the key issues in the transfer and its link to communication policy objectives.
Traditionally, native people acquire skills through close observation, practical doing and teaching
through story-telling. Children assume contributory roles and are given responsibility in accordance with
their ability to perform certain tasks which have a clearly defined usefulness to the family and the group.
Playing is patterned after the activities of adults and elders play a significant role as teachers of both
Table 3.3.
The Transfer of Education
Government Industrv
Needs
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Underlying Approach
Policies
Institutional Arrangements
Experiences
Impacts
Southern Education Wage Work Skills
Acculturation Integration
South. cuniculum Development
practical skills and knowledge transfer.
Non-Native Control
Inuit
Bi-Cultural Skills
Bi-Cultural Skills
Cultural Identity Self-Sufficiency
Inuit Curriculum Development
Inuit Control
Cultural Imposition
cultural Clash
Rules are subtle and times for eating and sleeping are determined by individual preference rather
than schedule. Children learn through experience that appropriate behavior involves emotional restraint,
self-reliance, generosity, and cooperation in play and in performance of tasks. There is a strong social
sanction against the overt expression of aggression and throughout their childhood mmpetition among
peers is criticized (Souaid, 1988; see also: Sindell, in Darnell, 1972: 47 - based on Cree Indians).
Pdicies of Acculturation
Notions of education changed with the anival of the first missionaries in the 1800's in Labrador, in
the 19th century in Northern Quebec and the Baffm region and around the turn of the century in the
Western Arctic. (Crowe, 1974: 142-151). Small day and residential mission schools were set up to
provide formal education for both Inuit children and adults and thus to replace Inuit traditional forms of
instruction with southern education techniques and values. The government provided small subsidies on a
per-student rate base to support the slowly increasing number of mission schools. Beginning in 1949, and
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, INAC opened federal schools to replace mission-run institutions.
Determined to assimilate the Inuit into southern mainstream culture, strict rules were enforced to prohibit
the use of Inuktituk in school. The intentions were benevolent and reflected a sincere expression of
human concern. However, in its course the spiritual beliefs and expression of the Inuit were banned.
Because ice and other conditions frequently prevented the schooner from returning the children
each summer to their parents and relatives, they often spent several years at a mission school.
When I went to s c h d , I completely lost my language. I stayed in schod fbr fw years without going home. When I l e j , I wasn't even too sure who were my mom and dad. (Nwa Ruben, Paulatuk) -
In the1950s, the federal government took over responsibility. At that time, less than 15 percent of
the young people of the north had any formal training (NWT Info, 1983: 6). In 1955 compulsory school
attendance was introduced and control was centralized in the hands of a single government agency. The
intentions were well meant, yet southern Canadian curricula, facilities, teachers, and laws were imposed on
the indigenous population, regardless of their traditional ways of living and learning.
At both mission and federal schools, children had to abide by rules and a time'structure completely
at odds with their previous experience. Emotional expressiveness was encouraged, as was competitiveness
and individualistic achievement in performance. The teachers rarely knew anything about Inuit life.
There were no vocational courses specifically oriented to northern economic opportunities. Schoolbook
material was utterly inappropriate for the north and has been blamed for the failure of Inuit literacy
(Fraser, 1962: 2).
In 1967, with the transfer of the seat of government from Ottawa to Yellowknife, the newly created
NWT Department of Education assumed responsibility for the delivery of the education program. Yet it
did not change the basic philosophy of education. Rosemary Kirby, an Inuvialuit language teacher in
Aklavik, pointed out to the Berger Inquiry in 1976,:
There was a time after being raised in residential schools when an Eskimo person felt that they were useless. They were worthless, that what they were was something to be ashamed of, and so we grew up to feel ashamed of being Eskimos. (in Berger, 1976: 91)
Although since 1970 98% of the school-aged population of the NWT has been in school, level of
achievement has remained low and socio-economic opportunities have not increased The dropout and
truancy rates are very high, although decreasing (see Table 3.4. Level of Education). In 1986 the average
attendance was 82.4% (GNWT, 1986 (b): 25)"
Often those who are still in school at grade 9 are there against all odds. They get themselves to school, they are not hanging out in the streets as their buddies. They can't hang out late at night They have to be disciplined (Bill Loney, Hall Beach)
Children felt they were neither white nor Inuit Teachers reported about unhappy and cranky
children (Beager, 1976: 91) md elders complained that children didn't know how to live out on the land
and felt sorry for the trouble they got into.
Education has been advantageous in that it has contributed greatly to the ability of the Inuit to
adapt to and, to a degree, control the changes that have occurred so rapidly in their lives. Those Inuit
who are now leading in political and economic organizations have gone through the school system in the
1960s and 1970s. Yet these benefits have come at the cost of reduced cultural identity. Abe Ruben, a
young Inuvialuk from Paulatuk, told the Berger Inquiry:
You were more or less told that you could not express yourself as an Inuit and you had to adopt a totally different life-style. What the hostels [and schools] were put there for was to make stereotype images of native people, setting them up or educating them where they would be able to fit into the mainstream of Canadian society ... A lot of these students
" Four to five years ago, attendance was sometimes as low as 40% now it may peak at 90%. A teacher in Pond Inlet reported that 5 years ago out of 190 school age kids there were 40 non-attending, now it is 15 out of 280.
Grade 8 or less Some High School High School Graduate Tech/Vocational Some University University Degree
Source: Whittington, 1986: 25.
Table 3.4. Level of Education (in %)
&&t Indian Non-Native North North
Canada
couldn't cope with being this southern image of a second-class white person and going home in the summer time and trying to cope with going back to their parents or their villages and trying to live as Inuit. (in Berger, 1976: 92)
Indigenization of Education
As a result of the failures of the education system, the Inuit began to request reviving native forms
of education, establishing culturally appropriate education curricula, and having the community,
particularly the elders, involved. It led to a new Education Ordinance in 1977 which introduced a
regionalizing of authority. It also provided for a local institution, the Community Education Committee
(CEC) or Local Education Authority (LEA), to play an advisory or operating role in the delivery of
education programs.
Inuit see the bicultural alternative as the only possible developmental goal for their children, and
for the schools and other institutions. Rejection of the Native life, i.e. an assimilative development, has
. proven unsuccessful, nor is it considered preferable to follow isolanionist development by rejecting the
non-native Canadian life. Also anomic development should be avoided where affiliation is lost to both
the native and non-native way of life (Larnbert, in Stairs, 1984: 33).
So thinking of education our children are having now, we are saying that they should learn the Inuit way fmt Once they have learned tnrly to speak.. and write the Inuit way, they would go on learning the Qallunaq [non-Inuk] way. By doing this, the child would be better able to live the Inuit way and at the same time, he would learn the Qallunaq way of life (in Stairs, 1984: 33)
The new philosophy of education recognizes cultural diversity, stresses cultural reinforcement of
independence, avoidance of stereotypes and the preservation of native language and culture. In
congruence with the federal policy on multidturalism (DSOS, 1985 (d)), it also admits cultural
differences in learning rhythms, motivations, levels of participation, forms of learning and the role of
competition in Inuit life (NWT, Department of Education, 1978: 6-7). The ideal of bicultural education
envisions an Inuit cultural identity which is enhanced through its interacxion with external forces. This
development should proceed in two phases.
It is a nwessity for Inuit children to learn the Inuit tradition frrst That way they would help themselves when they are older ... and they also would understand themselves better, because once a person forgets his tradition and his own language, his thinking would seem to be nowhere. (In Stairs, 1984: 34)
In the second phase, children should be integrated with the non-native culture from a position of Inuit
cultural strength, and that way ensure wide-ranging life-choices in education and professions.
We absolutely want our child re^? to lean another way beside the Inuit way dmmt as much as we want them to learn the Inuit way. For they will have their own ambitions and we want them to do well with their ambitions. (in Stairs, 1984: 34)
The emphasis on bicultural development with a base of native thought, feeling and language in
early education is considered particularly important for cultural identity (Burnaby, 1984). It implies Inuit
acquisition of expertise and power in all roles and levels of the system, with no more reliance on external
support than that needed by people everywhere for highly specific skills and information (Stairs, 1984:35).
In 1982, a Special Committee on Education tabled a report which recommendid that education
divisions be created with elected autonomous boards of education and facilities and curricula adjusted to
northern needs (Special Committee, 1982: 73). The communities should become more involved in
program development and determine the language of instruction. Funds should be made available to
develop native-language programs in all subjects (ibid, p. 19).
Since the report was tabled, many of its administrative recommendations have been implemented
and the curriculum has increased its northern contents. In 1983 a new provision allows for increased local
influence and regional boards through which they can exercise greater power, as for example the decision
of the Baffiin Regional Board to aim for bilingual schools (Isherwood, 1986). As a result, people in these
communities have become more aware of what is happening in the schools, parents go to public meetings
and the community discusses education issues. For example, in Igloolik teachers and students produce
and present weekly half-hour programs on the community radio about various aspects of education.
On the regional level, significant developments have been made to better reflect education needs,
such as special courses, program development and language instruction. A learning center has been
established for the development of curriculum and support material in Inuktituk. Priority has also been
given to vocational training at the adult and high school level and the use of native languages in the
schools enabling students to stay in the north for professional training and negating the use of English as a
first language. The creation of regional Arctic Colleges has permitted the regions to offer courses of
special need in their area. Distant education as well as teleconference courses and other educational
technology, such as film and video, have been made widely available or continue to expand, including the
use of micro-computers (GNWT, 1986 (b): 22).
There has thus been a significant transfer of control to native people in the last few years. The
implementation of programs and institutional structures is just at the beginning. Its development is
strongly affected by f~~lifncial resources made available and its success depends on its integration with
other political and socio-cultural measures, such as language policies promoting Inuktituk. However,
despite the cultural emphasis of the new education philosophy, there are few new or innovative changes.
Aside from reduced student-teacher ratios and an increased number of native teachers,' students sit at
desks in four-wall classrooms and memorize textbook facts. Days are divided into a routine number of
periods with time off for recess and lunch. Students are grouped by grade level and the upper grade
levels are still being inundated with programs, materials and evaluation measures that reflect southern
values. Although the curriculum embraces Inuit culture, the gap between school and lifestyle has not
been bridged. Southern clocks and calendars still interfere with Inuit seasonal life. It still forces students
and families to make a choice between formal education and traditional learning (Souaid, 1988).
As non-native and Inuit education consultants are busy creating programs and reading materials
that reflect northern values, they are failing to consider the different philosophies around which Inuit
culture and school performance are based. In neglecting this, the northern schools have inadvertently
built conflicting values into the system which leave the Inuit students in a state of limbo, wondering
whether they can realistically strive for the best of both worlds. It is something only the Inuit can resolve
for themselves, but it requires to address this confusion.
Literacv and Lan~uaae Policies
For the Inuit their language comprises an essential, if not the essential, element of their cultural
identity. The history of education in the NWT showed how cultural values were undermined. This
section addresses the particular issues of literacy and English and Inuktituk language use. Table 3.5.
summarizes the main dimensions that are discussed.
The attrition of native languages has not happened by chance. The linguistic domination of
English is just another aspect of the general process by which southern economical and political interests
have imposed their domination over the Arctic peoples. Well intended developments, like the
introduction of literacy and the compulsory use of English in schools, challenged the oral culture and the
role of Inuktituk in northern life.
Present Native Lnzngurrge Use
Inuit-Inupiaq is a continuum of dialects that stretches from Alaska across Arctic Canada to
Greenland. The Western Arctic's three dialects are grouped together as Inuvialuktun. There are three
main dialects in the Central Arctic, and the Eastern Arctic has another six main dialects with various
sub-dialects, all summarized as Inuktituk (Woodbury, 1984: 49-63). However, the basic grammar and
Needs
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Underlying Approach
Policies
Experiences
Impacts
Table 3.5.
The Transfer of Literacy and English
Government Industry
Promotion English Unification ~ o g r a ~ h ~
Integration
English Enforcement Support Inuktituk
Promotion Inuktituk
Bi-lingual Education Unification Orthography
Inuit Control Choice
Official Lang. Status Language Promotion Unification
Language Suppression Language Promotion English Predominance
Language Loss Language Resurrection
vocabulary of all linguistic groups are essentially the same, even if diverging pronunciations often conceal
an overall similarity.
It can be said that despite some surface differences, all Inuit speak a language which has remained basically the same from one part of the Arctic to the other. For over 2,500 years, this language has constituted their principal medium of communication. (Dorais, 1985: 42).
Because of many intermarriages between the groups it is impossible to say that any one community
now belongs exclusively to one dialect or sub-dialect However, one linguistic group still predominates in
every community and most the people identify themselves as belonging by birthright to one dialect
(Osgood, 1984:IX).
According to an IBC audience survey in 1984,97% of the Eustern and Central Arctic Inuit above
the age of ten,12 speak Inuktituk There is no significant relationship between this ability and age or sex
On the other hand, among those age 10 to 15,92.8% speak English. The figure rises to 96.2% for those
aged 16 to 25 and then drops significantly. In the 46 to 60 year age group, only 14.1% speak English and
among those 60 and older, only 8.2% (Valaskakis etal., 1984: 8-10). The data of a survey conducted in
1985 differ slightly. (See Table 3.6. Inuit Ability to Speak Inuktituk by Age; and Table 3.7. Inuit Ability
to Speak English by Age.)
According to the 1985 survey, 86.8% read s$labics. This ability is higher among older Inuit (92.3%
among those over 60). and lowest among the youngest (77.3% for those aged 9 to 15) (Valaskakis, 1985:
12). The data from the 1984 survey indicate that there is a tendency for those aged 16 to 25 to read
syllabics less than any other group (76.2%). even among their younger friends (age 10 to 15) 80.6% read
syllabics (IBC, 1984: 11-12). 14.4 % consider themselves illiterate in their native tongue (see Table 3.8.
Inuit Ability to Read Syllabics by Age).
According to an ICS survey in the Western Arctic in 1984, only 445% of the Inuvialuit 15 years or
older are fluent in Inuvialuktun and 17.1% speak it to some degree. Understanding of the language is
significantly better. About 55.1% understand it and 25.6% at least some of it. According to a survey
undertaken in 1986,31.9% state they speak Inuvialuktun and 33.5% speak at least some. The percentage
of people who do not understand Inuvialuktun declined from 19.3 to 17.8 (ICS, 1984; Wilson, 1986).
More than half of those interviewed in 1986 cannot read Inuvialuktun, 16.8% can and 24.2% can some of it
(see Table 3.9. Ability to speak Inuvialuktun by Age; Table 3.10. Ability to Understand Inuvialuktun by
Age).
But in the Western Arctic English is the first language. Only one of those surveyed in 1984 and
- eight (1.5%) surveyed in 1986 do not speak English. (See Table 3.11. Inuvialuit Ability to Speak
English). In the 1984 survey 44.4% stated they prefer to speak English which increased to 65.9% in 1986.
l2 Younger Inuit were not surveyed.
Table 3.6. Inuit Ability to Speak Inuktituk by Age
In Percentage
1984 Survey 1985 Survey
1&15 16-25 26-45 46-60 @ Total 10-15 16-25 26-45 45-60 @ ---- N.Res. 0 1.1 0.7 1.6 1.6 1.2 1.3 0 1.5 1.9 2.6 1.1
Yes 97.2 97.8 97.4 97.8 98.4 97.4 84.0 99.5 96.4 91.4 94.9 95.2
No 2.8 1.1 1.9 0.5 0 7.5 14.7 0.5 2.2 6.7 2.6 3.6
Source: IBC Audience Surveys: Valaskakis etal. 1984, 1985.
Table 3.7. Inuit Ability to Speak English by Age
In Percentage
1984 Survey 1985 Survey
10-15 16-25 26-45 46-60 61+ Total 10-15 16-25 26-45 45-60 @ T a ---- ------
Yes 92.8 96.2 63.3 14.1 8.2 68.8 96.0 97.7 63.5 12.4 7.7 66.9
Source: IBC Audience Surveys: Valaskakis etal. 1984, 1985.
Table 3.8. Inuit Ability to Read Syllabics by Age
In Percentage
1984 Survey 1985 Survey
10-15 16-25 26-45 46-60 61+ Total 10-15 16-25 26-45 45-60 61+ ---- N.Res. 2.2 0.7 1.2 0 1.6 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 0 1.1
Yes 80.6 76.2 90.1 96.2 86.9 84.5 77.3 85.1 89.1 89.5 92.3 86.8
Source: IBC Audience Surveys: Valaskakis etal. 1984, 1985.
Table 3.9. Ability to Speak Inuvialuktun by Age
In Percentage
1984 1986
T d - 10-24 25-44 44.2
N.Res. - 1.0 1.6 3.7
Yes 44.5 7.1 24.7 70.4
Some 17.1 40.9 44.6 11.7
No 38.5 51.0 29.0 14.2
Source: ICS 1984; Wilson, 1986.
Table 3.10. Ability to Understand Inuvialuktun by Age
In Percentage (1984 Survey)
N.Res. ? 1.0 1.6 4.9 2.4
Yes 55.1 19.7 51.1 74.1 46.5
Some 25.6 48.5 34.4 13.6 33.3
No 19.3 30.8 12.9 7.4 17.8
Source: ICS 1984.
Table 3.11. Inuvialuit Ability to Speak English by Age
In Percentage (1984 SUN~Y)
1984 1986
T d - 10-24 - 25-44
N.Res. - 0.5 1.6
Yes 96.4 99.0 97.3
Some 3.4 0.5 0.5
No 0.2 0 0.5
Source: ICS 1984; Wilson 1986.
Preference to speak Inuvialuktun declined from 15.9% to 8.4% and preference to speak both from 39.9%
to 20.9.
The actual language use reflects the dominance of English, with 81.9% stating in 1984 they use it
most often. According to the 1986 survey the use of English only was 59.7%. In the 1984 survey 8.4%
stated they spoke Inuvialuit only, which decreased to 5.9% in 1986. Yet in the 1984 survey 93.8%
considered it important to speak and read their native tongue in order to maintain their culture and
traditions, and to pass them on From generation to generation (ICS, 1984: 1&11; Wilson, 1986: 14-16).
There is a classic pattern of language loss in the Western Arctic. Most elders, fluent in one of the
dialects and also in English, prefer using their native tongue which still plays a vital part in their lives.
Middle-aged people are bilingual but speak primarily English. Most young adults speak English while
having a passive knowledge of Inuvialuktun That is, they can understand it to some degree but have
difficulties in speaking i t Until language instruction started in school (see below), children spoke only
English and had very little or no understanding of Inuvialuktun. There is a f e a among young Inuvialuit
that they are losing even their ability to understand their mother tongue.
Every par, we w e losing more and more of our language. Every t h e I go to my parents' house, my mother speaks to me in Inuvialuktun and I answer her in English. Ijind it very hard to understand. I have to think about what she said Sometimes I have to pretend to know what she said and I don't. I am not proud of it. (Dennis Alunik, Inuvik)
The Introduction of Literacy
To the Canadian Inuit, literacy came with the Bible. While patterns of interaction had already
begun to change through contact with white people, their own traditions were still strong. This changed
with the massive conversion of Inuit to Christianity and the introduction of literacy. It has radically
shifted internal power structures. By the turn of the century, Moravian missionaries had firmly
established Inuit literacy among the Labrador Inuit, using the Roman alphabet Literacy was based on a
strict policy of teaching no English (McGrath, 1984: 7). In the Eastern Arctic, Anglican missionaries
introduced the syllabic alphabet It quickIy spread in use because it was easy to learn. Inuit taught each
other to read the bible and hymn books. Today, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic value the syllabic script as
an integral part of their culture. In the Western Arctic various grammars and dictionaries were developed,
using the Roman alphabet Yet they were difficult to understand.
The introduction of different alphabets across the north made it not only impossible for Inuit to
communicate with each other, but it also undermined the native language in its practical use. On the
other hand, missionaries were responsible for recording language and customs and "a great deal of
knowledge, perhaps the survival of northern native language, is the result of missionary work" (Crowe,
1974: 150).
In the 1950s and 1960s, letters often provided the only link between Inuit children in distant hostels
and their parents who had only reluctantly agreed to let them go:
On that first year in school, Marie and I got one letter from mom. That letter was written in pencil on an old piece of tea bag but those few written syllabics were the only ones that told us that mom and dad were at least alive .... I know that being able to write syllabics is a great help when you are away from home. (Agnes Pokiak, in Harper: 1983: 2627).
Yet literacy undermined the role of the storyteller by transferring authority to those who could read
and write. By 1924 the oral tradition had declined to a point that there were no longer any professional
storytellers (Valaskakis, 1980: 213). A major function of the oral culture, the passing of knowledge, had
lost its importance. Secondly, literacy in Inuktituk never became functional. Communication with the
authorities (traders and government) had to be in English. Except for the bible and hymn books, there
existed rarely any literature in Inuktituk.
Stairs (1984: 35) uses the concept of "literacy as an applied technology" and emphasizes literacy's
role in thinking and the sharing of thinking. As native language literacy was established on an external
cultural base, it reinforced thinking and pattern of social interaction which progressively submerged,
. alienated or disintegrated Native culture. For example, the widely distributed "Eskimo Book of Wisdom"
taught Inuit how to keep the igloo clean, feed a new baby, or plan for periods of scarcity.
Particularly in the Western Arctic the use of Inuvialukttm was discouraged and suppressed.
Inuvlialuit, now in their middle age, were picked up as young children during the summer by a scho~ner
&d taken to a mission school. Although only speaking their native tongue, they often were forbidden to
speak it at the hostel and punished if caught doing so.
I was going to the Cathdic hostel. They were really strict. There was a lot of punishment. I have seen a lot of my fiends being punished because they spoke their awn langucrge. They got a hit, 'don't speak that language.' Or if we did tnu games. We were taught and fwced to play their games, like vdleyball. You were hit, physical punishment, cu2d there was mental punishment. You were separated fiom ycrou fiiends, people yoer were always with. They w d d alienate the person that didn't @low the rules." (Vince Teddy, Tuktoyaktuk)
James Kavanna of Cambridge Bay, who attended a mission school at Shingle Point in the Western
Arctic commented:
"We weren't allowed to speak our own language for the simple reason that the teachers thought we were talking about them behind their backs. (in: Lowe. 1984: X).
When the government took over complete responsibility of education in 1952, a policy of English
language instruction was enforced. A cultural tradition, like Inuktituk, was considered a hindrance rather
than a source of strength. Also, to communicate effectively with government and business required the
speaking English. However, most of the information brought to the north did not directly involve the
Inuit Functional literacy, defined as relative to the requirements of an individual within a particular
society, thus remained minimal (Farrel, 1983: 15).
Indigenous Language Unification and Revival Efforts
While traditional forms of communication and native language use were undermined, the Inuit
nevertheless resisted the suppression. In the 1970s the Inuit recognized the need to take measures to
support their language. Pan-Inuit communication to participate in political-economic development
required a uniform orthography. Also, the government considered it important to reform the orthography
to better communicate with the indigenous population. The history of Inuktituk unification efforts is an
illustrative example of the implications of adapting a southern technology - writing - under first
non-native and then native control.
In 1954 the Department of Northern Affairs hired a linguist to unify the Inuktituk writing system.
He proposed to gradually phase out syllabics and introduce a new Roman alphabet based on the
Greenlandic alphabet, because there was already a great deal of writing material available. The Inuit
were not consulted about the necessity for a standard Roman writing system, nor were they asked t~
participate in implementing i t
In order to achieve an Eskimo cultural unity through writing and literature in Canada, the cooperation of all the missionaries, educat~rs, nurses and traders, as well as the administrators' efforts, are strongly needed. (Lefebvre, 1957: 2)
The attitudes and opinions of the Inuit themselves were given only one line in Lefebvre's report:
... we strongly hope that the Eskimo response will be favourable towards this cultural initiative on the part of the Department of Northern Affairs. (Ibid., p.1.)
In contrast, they rejected i t The "new standard alphabet" was never implemented. In the 1960s.
another linguist, Raymond Gagne, was hired to work on a unified Roman alphabet Linguists generally
praised the orthography developed by Gagne and the efforts that had gone into its development Yet the
attempts to implement the orthography were also criticized as
... a dismal failure, as anyone could have predicted For it had not been recognized by the Eskimo people for whom it was intended. (Harper, 1984: 46)
Gagne seriously misjudged the Inuit's attachment to syllabic orthography
... I do not believe that the Eskimo are sentimentally attached to their syllabi a...(Gagne, in Harper, 1984: 46)
This opinion could not have been farther from the mth. \
The system of writing in syllabic must not be removed, because Inuit are so used to it and can understand i t For the sake of older folks especially, who might not learn it right away, the system of syllabic must continue to be used (Simeonie Amagoalik, in Harper, 1984: 48)
Harper (1984: 48) argues that in this era, where Inuit feel their culture is seriously threatened,
syllabics assume a symbolic significance over-riding any considerations of "efficiency." Inuit did not want
. to abandon syllabics in favor of a Roman orthography.
Yet the federal government's attempts promoted the idea of orthographic reform by adopting
syllabics among some Inuit They began to look at the long-ignored question of revising or improving
instead of replacing the syllabic system In 1974 D I N agreed to provide ITC with up to $250,000 to
fund the Inuit Language Codssion. They wanted the Commission to comment on the viability of the
Inuit language and study the present state of the written language and recommend changes for the future.
Every Inuit community was to be visited to ensure that attitudes of Inuit throughout the North were taken
into account
The commission was appointed entirely of Inuit from the different regions. An administrator, a
linguist and a priest provided advice. They encountered an astounding polarization of opinion across the
Arctic. For example, people in Northern Quebec could not perceive any threat to their language. It was
alive, everybody spoke it and it would never die. On the other hand, people in the Western Arctic
thought the commissioners were wasting their time: "why bother to teach Inuktituk? It is dying anyway,"
(Ajurnarmat, 1978: 88), or "we need to speak English if we want to get jobs" (John MacDonald, Igloolik).
By 1978 the commission had developed two compatible orthographies, one in syllabics and one in
roman. For each particular vowel there is now one way of expressing it both in syllabics and in the
roman alphabet. The spelling system was thus fixed and interchangeable. It was ratified by the Inuit
organizations and clergy men. The language commission also made clear that it would not enforce these
suggestions and that the recommendations did not mean a unification of dialects.
The Commission recommended to give Inuktituk recognition as an "official" language in all
Inuktihrk speaking areas. This meant printing information bilingually, extending the amount of Inuktituk
television programming to at least one hour a day, utilizing more fully the potentials of local radio
programming, developing appropriate Inuktituk teaching material for both children and adults, and
reviewing the unification efforts ten years later (Ibid, p.85).
The suggestion of a dual standard sysiem and the emphasis on voluntary use reflects the Inuit value
of tolerance of diversity to the sacrifice of efficiency. The Greenland Inuit are often cited as an example
of rationalization which Canadian Inuit should have followed. It would have advantages for Pan-Inuit
communication and access to printed material. The continuance of local dialects in the face of a major
,
dominant standard dialect reflects the Inuit's ability to maintain a lively variety (MacDonald, Igloolik,
interview). Yet Mallon finds the differences too significant:
Greenland has gone through a process of institutionalization. Generations ~f Greenlanders have gone to school, generations of Greenlanders have been teachers, generations have been administrators. The nature of the bureaucracy may... be alien, but I would think the concept of bureaucracy no longer is. Greenlanders have accepted the idea of a standard dialect, which is a tremendous step forward for institutionalization. (Mallon, in Murdoc, 1984: 131)
A review of the Language Commission's recommendations in 1984 (Mallon, 1984) revealed that the
unification efforts have been generally very successful. There has been a unification of writing but not of
the language (dialects). The greatest achievements in promoting Inuktituk have been in education
through the development of teaching aids and teacher training.
Complementary Language Revival Effbs: Teaching Inuktituk
To successhlly revive a language, it has to be spoken and used in daily life. In the last years, there
have been strong revival efforts through 1) school instruction in Inuktituk or as a secondary language; 2)
general service provision in the native tongue; *and 3) the recognition of Inuktituk as an official language -
(Task Force on Aboriginal Languages, 1985).
The negative attitudes towards Inuvialuktun in the Western Arctic as a doomed and non-functional
language are beginning to change. In 1981 COPE established the Inuvialuktun Language Project. It aims
to try to halt the trend of decreased language use, study and document the local dialects, and produce
curriculum materials in the native language.
The result of the work have been a dictionary and grammar for each of the three dialects, curricula
for kindergarden to grade three and the establishment of teaching Inuvialuktun as a second language in . school. It began on a regular basis in 1984 from Kindergarden to Grade 3. However financing the
- instructors, who are mostly middle-aged women, remains a serious problem.
It seems every year we don't know what is happening next year. We are well into the school year befwe the language program goes on. With regard to finding, the LEA13 does not
l3 Local Education Authority, same as Community Education Committee.
78
know what is happening, It was October when the program began this year (1986). School begins in August. The only reason we have the course till the end of the school year is because it was so late when we started. Otherwise we w d d be short again. (Maureen Pokiak, Tuktoyaktuk)
The language instructors consider the time spent per day insufficient, ranging from 20 to 45 minutes
for each class. Also, when the children come home from school, it is English again, among their parents,
their peers and on television.
Kids come here to school and they like learning the language, learning words. But they go home and there is nobody talking Inuvialuktun. They always tell me their parents don't talk, or they don't understand them ifthey say something. Sometimes Ifkel sad for the little kids, they want to learn and there is nobody helping them at home. (Jean Hmy, Sachs Harbour)
There is general agreement that limiting language instruction to the schools is insufficient and has
to be supported in the community at large. Increasingly, parents and children recognize that bilingualism
can help them not only in the traditional but also in the industrial world. There are jobs in demand for
interpreters and translators. On an individual basis attempts are also made to relearn the language.
The way I was able to pick it up was the Eskimo hymn book. I really enpy singing, The word, it looked really long, something like a whde page and still mare to come. But I really wanted to learn it. So if there was a word I cddn't pronounce, I got somebody to say it and sat down and wrote it the way I heard her saying it, then I was able to pronmme it. (Ann Kasook, Inuvik)
The present language use indicates that it is already too late for Inuvialuktun to become again a
first language. However, Larry Osgood argues that "it may still provide them, as a firmly established
second language, with a cultural stability and access to cultural heritage that will serve them in present and
hture times of change and transition" (Osgood, 1984: xiv).
In the Emtern Arctic, where Inuktituk use is widespread, the situation is entirely different The
Baffin Regional Education Authority has established bilingual status since 1984. However, it is not yet
able to fully implement this policy. There are only sufficient bilingual teachers for Kindergarden to
Grade 2, where Inuktituk is taught as the fmt language with English being taught as a second language.14
l4 In the smaller communities the needs of the few English speaking students are taken care of by the bilingual teachers and in Iqaluit there are sufficient students for an English class.
In Grade 3 instruction shifts to English immersion. Native helpers translate into Inuktituk to aid the
transition. As more Inuit teachers are trained, instruction in Inuktituk is planned to be expanded.
In addition, there is a serious lack of adequate teaching materials which means that the English
programs are translated into Inuktituk. This kind of bilingualism, still presents a Western and often
dysfunctional point of view. A book on polar bears, for example, portraits 'nanook' (Inuktituk word for
bear) as a cute bear but not the dangerous animal that may attack igloos and kill people. To develop
Inuktituk curricula requires a massive amount of effort, time and money.
To translate it back into the first language, you are still looking at it fiom a western viewppornt. There are still a lot of concepts and values coming acrm that should not come first. Inuit should develop the programs. There is still this unwillingness to transfer contrd of the schod program, that somehow the standards would disappear if you let the natives do it, because they don't know what they are doing. (Janette Ireland, Iqaluit)
In February 1986, the Task Force on Aboriginal Languages called for an official status for native
languages, i.e. public services should be made available in the locally predominant native language. This,
in tum, requires the expanded training of interpreters. In October 1986, the government of the NWT
responded, announcing that it would legally guarantee aboriginal language rights within the NWT. It also
emphasized the continuance of its initiatives in supporting and coordinating language andl c u r r i d m
development and interpreter training through the establishment of centers for teaching and through
efforts to co-ordinate, develop, monitor and implement programs in various language areas (NWT,
Legislative Assembly, 1988).
Furthermore, several technological advances have helped to create an environment in which the
standardized syllabic and roman orthography is flourishing. Syllabic characters can be stored on word
processors and printed on typewriters, computer printers and type-setters. Another innovation is the
development of systems which automatically translate from syllabic into Roman orthography or vice versa.
And computer links permit sending text in syllabics over the telephone. The volume of material
interpreted or translated and printed has thus drastically increased (see, for example, Roberts, 1986 (a);
1986 (b); Harper, 1983: 66-68). This technology, also impressive, is still in its infancy. Technological
advances have enabled the Inuit to build up word banks for newly introduced terminology and the
instantaneous sharing of this information. The 20th century technology thus can support language
survival efforts. However, the success is dependent upon the broader sodo-political situation of the Inuit
Inuktituk, Cultural Identity and Political Power
Culture to me is language. It's good when you have a culture, you are a prouder person. (Bertha Allen, Inuvik)
Inuit emphasize the strong link between language, culture and identity which forms the basis for
language policies promoting Inuktituk. Yet the relation of language to identity is not a simple one, it
involves consideration of language functions and of the different elements of identity.
Singling out indigenous language as the most important marker of identity even in areas where it
has become a secondary language, as, for example, in the Western Arctic, ignores the evidence of daily
life. If one accepts that there is an Inuit identity and since a substantial part of the population does not
speak the language, it follows that identity does not depend primarily upon language use.
John Edwards (1984: 289) makes a usell distinction that helps to better understand the relation
between language use and cultural identity. He distinguishes between the communicative and symbolic
role of the language. The latter also has important consequences for language policy. The symbolic
element refers to the value of tradition and culture, the communicative element, to the daily use of the
language. For the majority of the population these two coexist simultaneously. Anglo-Canadians use
English in all regular domains. It is also the language of their past by which tradition and culture are
expressed.
However, the two aspects of language are separable, and it is possible for the symbolic to remain in the absence of the communicative. This describes the linguistic situatibn of many minority groups .... The symbolic value of language is essentially a private ethnic marker, while ordinary usage is a visible one. We should thus expect.. that communicative language shift would be a relatively early phenomenon in minority group adaptation to a larger society. This expectation is confirmed in North America and elsewhere, but insufficient attention has been given to the continuing symbolic function of a language no longer spoken. (Edwards, 1984: 290)
In the Western Arctic, the communicative element of Inuvialuktun has obviously declined and its
role in the Eastern Arctic is also threatened. The symbolic role has consequently gained importance.
This symbolic importance supports attempts to strengthen and safeguard the communicative role. Today
most Inuit across the Arctic are conscious of the importance of being fluent in their mother tongue.
However, Jacques Dorais raises some concerns about the future of the language. His research on
bilingualism in the Eastern Arctic shows that even if most smaller children are fluent in Inuktituk during
the first grades, when they reach eleven or twelve years, their knowledge of English vocabIll;w begins to
surpass that of Inuit words. He considers this particularly alarming because it occurs in a context where
all these kids have had at least three years of schooling in Inuktituk (Dorais, 1985: 43). .
The attrition of native languages has not happened by chance but is a process by which southern
economic and political interests have imposed their domination over the Arctic and its people. Dorais
(1985: 43) argues that the overall linguistic situation of the contemporary Inuit is
... a diglossic one. This means that almost every individual, enterprise and institution in the Arctic must work in at least two unequal languages: a dominant one, English, and a doplinated one, Inuktituk. The native language is now recognized as legitimate in the context of northern life, but the quallunaat [white men's] speech forms are still considered the most useful if one wants to get a good job or to go beyond the limits of his or her small village of origin. This explains why huit schools or Eskimo translations alone are not suflicient to ensure the survival of the language. As long as its position remains an inferior one, it will ineluctably tend to disappear.
Language shift clearly reflects sock-political change, and this dwarfs efforts made on behalf of the
language alone. Thus, language revival efforts will remain artificial if they are made on the basis of
abstractions like culture or heritage alone. "This is not to say that language revival efforts cannot serve a
vital rallying purpose in nationalistic political movements. Yet it only does so when it retains some degree
of communicative function. " (Edwards, 1984: 288)
Gail Valaskabis (1981:21) points out that non-native control of social and economic institutions has
been maintained through English language monopoly, non-native technology and trade goods. As a
result, southern institutions stand at the political center of northern settlements. The power, both spiritual
and material, lies in the hands of those who speak English. Therefore, the natural inclination of the Inuit
has been to learn and know the language so that they can also exert influence on the institutions that 4
increasingly control their lives. I Diglossia reflects the fact that the Inuit still do not possess complete control over their economy and politics. As long as they shall depend (or be forced to be dependent) upon southern governments and companies, they will be very strongly attracted by southern languages and cultures. If they must live in a world in which they believe they do not have any significant part to play, it is absolutely useless to translate English texts into Eskimo, or to elaborate Inuit school curricula The long term survival of their language and culture will only be insured when they shall feel confident that it is possible for them to create a new type of society, different from traditional culture, but still uniquely Eskimo. (Dorais, 1985: 43)
Sumrnarv - and Conclusion
The apparent powerlessness that Inuit people have expesenced has undergone significant changes
in the last decade. The historical approach of colonialism has altered and is overlapped by attempts to
establish forms of native self-government. Because of the existence of the two paradigms, northern policy
has lacked coherence.
The establishment and continuance of tutelage should not be interpreted as a deliberate plot to
suppress the Inuit , but as a means which intends to help native groups participate more effectively in the
socio-political development of the north. Yet it is set up in a way that perpetuates southern dominance.
Many government proposals suffer from the inherent weakness of paternalistic motivation at their
roots, for example, granting participation to bodies which have no binding powers. The federal
government is hesitant to transfer crown land (through claim settlements or giving the NWT provincial
status) and thus establishing self-government.
The second approach by the government in trying to reflect the native vieurpoint has resulted in
little actual political power for the Inuit. It is mainly found in bodies with only advisory character.
Temporarily it reflected a policy direction within DIAND, yet at the same time the department's role in
native issues was seriously threatened by other government policies. Measures of transferring control over
local government, education, and other social services were well-meaning. As Whittington (1986: 10)
83
argues, "if implemented, (they) would in some measure improve the political influence of native people."
Yet, real political power is directly linked to economic power which is still held by southern agencies.
The Inuit have set bi-cultural developmental goals based on strong native identity. This chapter
showed that in order to gain political clout, the Inuit had to adopt southern forms of organization. Inuit
organizations and corporations have made tremendous achievements in political-economic development
and self-government Yet they also run the risk of adopting bureaucratic tendencies and alienation from
the subsistence oriented people they intend to represent Kidd (1987: 8) argues that this is not just a
political inevitability. Rather, the technologies themselves come with this kind of southern spatial
wrapping and leave little room to manoeuvre.
Developments in the Eastern and Western Arctic have differed in that the Inuvialuit have been
affected more intensely by trading and industrial development The relative isolation of the Central and
Eastern Arctic has helped the Inuit to better keep alive cultural features such as language use and to
maintain the majority in their region.
The support of the federal government to promote native self-government finds its limits when
principal economic interests are involved. Where southern interests are less important, federal power has
been transferred to the North. In some areas, such as education and local government, the Inuit could
increase their participation. They have become involved in curriculum development and promoted native
language use in all sectors of public life. These initiatives reflect principal values of choice and
egalitarianism over efficiency. They do not impose one course of action and decentralized forms of
administration are stressed Yet the costs involved are substantial.
The transfer of power over the education system has not been complete to pe&nit self-government
This would require Inuit expertise and power in all levels of the system, from teachers and teacher
trainers to administrators and planners. In taking over administrative functions, the Inuit are faced with
the problem of inadequate skills and the urgent need for training. Most importantly, regional or local
control does not mean that southern structures have been overcome and replaced by school forms that
bridge the gap between formal education and Inuit traditional learning, between southern and traditional
patterns of thinking and behaving.
Native people have achieved major successes concerning native language status and use, such as
giving aboriginal language formal recognition through a language act Increasingly, social services are
available in native languages. Inuktituk instruction in the schools is institutionalized in the lower grades
while efforts are made to move twoards a bilingual school system.
However, dependence upon southern governments and companies encourages the dominant role of
English. The long term survival, it was argued, is only insured if Inuit feel confident that they can gain
the control needed to create a new type of society that is not traditional but uniquely Inuit This requires
the gaining of control of local and regional decision making. In this process of developing a society based
on cultural identity and self-sufficiency communication technologies play a major role.
CHAPTERN
THE TRANSFER OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES ,
This chapter briefly describes the institutional and policy context of national telecommunication
services that has also shaped the historical development of telecommunications in the North. Table 4.1.
summarizes the key issues, contrasting Inuit stated needs for telecommunications with government
policies, institutional arrangements and actual service development It analyzes experiences in the Eastern
and Western Arctic and assesses the socio-cultural implications and the effectiveness of policies and
institutional arrangements to meet Inuit needs. As shown in Table 4.2., this chapter concentrates on
public-switched telephone services, which provide the principal means of interactive local and long
distance communications for Inuit households. It also discusses "trail" or High Frequency radio1 and new
telecommunications applications, such as Telidon and mobile satellites.
National Telecommunications Environment
Canada has one of the highest levels of telephone service penetration in the world with 98.2% of all
households having access to the service (CRTC 1986 (c): v). However, as set out in Table 4.3., telephone
penetration varies across the country and is significantly below average in the North.
Institutional Arrangements and Regulation
The Canadian telecommunications industry is both publicly and privately owned. Total revenue for
the industry in 1986 was in excess of $11 billion, with Bell Canada accounting for 52% (CRTC, 1987: 80).
Local and long distance public voice telephone services are provided by the Telecdm Canada member2
Its institutional organization makes it a broadcasting application, not service. Yet because of its interactive use primarily between specified can also join listen, it is discussed in the telecommunications sections communication links.
a common carrier parties, whereby others of point-to-point
* The largest telephone company operating in each province plus Telesat
86
National Context
Needs
Strategic Interests National Context
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Table 4.1.
Transfer of Telecommunication/Telephone Technology
Underlying Approach
Policies
Institutional Arrangements
Regulation
Experiences Western Arctic Eastern Arctic
Impacts
Government Industry
Telcom Canada
National Sovereignty South-North Cmns
Service Provision
Eon. Dev. North
Subsidies Satellite Development NCAP
CNT/NWTel Bell Canada
CRTC: Rate Reg.
Dominance Profitability
Reliable Telecommunications
North-South Cmns
Lateral Cmns
Inuit Control
Lobbying
Presentation Rate Hearings
HF Radio Tel. Billing Quality of Service Rate Structure Trail Radio Mobile Telephone Teletype, Data
Lateral Cmns Self-Development Oral Culture Access, Expenditure Participation Control
Catenorv Service
Voice Public Switched Telephone Teleph. Services
Table 4.2.
Overview of Telecommunication Services
Maior Regulated ComDanies
Leased Circuits
Non-Voice Data Services
Public Switched Data Services
Leased Circuits (private lines)
Switched Teleprinter and other text Public Message (telegram)
Program Transmission (audio and video)
Telecom Canada and Telephone companies
Telecom Canada, CNCP, other telephone comp.
Telecom, CNCP, and other telephone comp.
Telecom, CNCP, and other telephone comp.
CNCP, Telecom, and other telephone comp. CNCP
Telecom, CNCP, and other telephone comp.
Source: DOC, 1986 (b): 25.
and other telephone companies. For switched teleprinter and other text and audio-visual services TCTS
competes with CNCP, a partnership of the telecommunications divisions of the major Canadian railways:
the Crown corporation Canadian National Railways (CNR) and the privately owned Canadian Pacific Ltd.
(CP) (DOC, 1983 (c): 16-24).
Telecommunication carriers are subject to federal jurisdiction if their operating territory crosses
provincial or territorial boundaries, as is the case for Bell Canada and NorthwesTel, the two telephone
carriers in the NWT. On 1 April 1976, regulatory responsibility was transferred from the Canadian
Canada
Ontario
N.W.T.
Yukon
Table 4.3.
Telephone Penetration Statistics, 1984
Source: Yukon Government, nd. page 5.
Transportation Commission to the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission
(CRTC).
The carriers are subject to the relevant provisions of the Railway Act which specifies that
telecommunications services are to be provided at a fair and reasonable rate and on a non-discriminatory
basis. Public ownership, government funding and tax incentive programs have been established to
override strict economic efficiency considerations and implement social objectives to achieve the goals of
universality and equality of service. Pricing has been designed to make access to the network attractive,
following "valueof-service" rather than "cost of-service" pricing principles while guaranteeing a
satisfactory rate of return (CRTC 1986 (c): Vol. 2: 10-11).
In Canada, opposition to deregulation has so far "proven sufficiently formidable that the CRTC
and the government were forced to back down from the seemingly inexorable march to deregulation"
(Pike, Mosco, 1986: 30). A telecommunications policy, announced in July 1987, reaffirmed as central
objectives "universal access to basic telephone service at affordable prices; an efficient telecommunications
network infrastructure; and a viable competitive marketplace in the supply of telecommunications services
and equipment in all regions" (DOC, 1987 (a).
Government Strategies of Communications Technolow Develo~ment
Canada's research and development policy has significantly influenced the provision of
telecommunication services in the North. To provide improved telecommunication services to rural and
remote areas has been a challenge to Canada's industrial strategy of high technology development The
decision to emphasize communication applications of commercial and experimental nature, outlined in a
White Paper (Canada, 1968), was based on the hope for future benefits from the space industry and
improved national and cultural integration. The policy emphasized especially the potential use of the
Canadian communications satellite system for its northern territories, along with its applications to all
developing areas of Canada. It was justified in terms of reducing the sense of isolation and thus
facilitating government and industrial projects in remote areas. (Canada, 1968: 12).3
The Rde of the DOC in Satellite Development
The Department of Communications (DOC) has been a major player in the development of
communication technologies and their applications. The justification for DOC'S creation in 1969 was
couched in terms of vaguely defined political and social benefits that were associated with
telecommunications projects in the north. The DOC was to devote particular attention to the north.
Northern telecommunications had received little attention from existing departments.
The aim of the department is to have communications frontiers extended northward so that the quality of service may be equivalent to that enjoyed in Southern Canada. Research will be undertaken to determine optimum technical solutions. Programs involving public and private investment will be encouraged. (ACND, 1968: 38)
Section 5 of the Act creating the DOC says the department shall "promote the establishment,
development and efficiency of communications systems and facilities for Canada" and "assist Canadian
See as well, Chapman, 1979. The application of Canadian satellites to meet domestic broadcast and telecommunications needs has been treated extensively in the policy literature. see e.g. Paghis, 1978, 1982; Davies, 1978 (a, b); for a critical analysis see Melody, 1979(a).
communications systems and facilities to adjust to changing domestic and international conditions." Since
then, the North has turned into a laboratory for testing new communication technology applications.
Northern Vision. Anik, The 'Older Brother'
Satellites were to bring reliable communication services and were optimistically called "a northern
vision of the 1970s." Using the Inuktituk word for older brother. 'Anik,' indicates that satellites should
serve northern native needs. This first satellite system was seen as a new version of the transnational
railroad, a critical factor in the historical development and sovereignty of Canada. Its importance for
communications in northern development led to a change in emphasis of research and development from
scientific space technology, which had begun in 1959, to geostationary communications satellite
technology. The Canadian government has provided substantial and continuing subsidies into high
technology research and development, experimentation and deployment High capital cost facilities are
constructed by the government and made available to the industry. For example, the construction of
Telesat served to both test the satellite's capacity and commercial viability, and its function as a vehicle on
which commercial skills could be proven (Molozzi, 1971: 5).
In 1972 Anik A 1 was launched and Canada became the fmt country in the world that employed
domestic satellites operating in the 6/4 GHz bands. Three satellites of this type were launched, each
carrying 12 microwave channels, whereby a channel can retransmit one television program or 960 voice
circuits (DOC FS 81-09: 4). With the Telesat Act of 1969, the government established the institutional
structures by setting up a corporation of shared public and private ownership. The government functions
as an equity investor in a business committed to profitable operation, and guarantees harmonious and
orderly development The common carriers were granted a special position, particularly through a
'Connecting Agreement' between Telesat and Teleccom Canada (see Melody, 1979 (a)).
Because Telesat is owned to a substantial degree by the telephone companies, it cannot act
independently to provide satellite services more efficiently if this competes with existing
telecommunication services and technologies (such as landline and microwave). For example, Telesat
initially permitted the lease of full transponders only. This resulted in idle capacity and comparatively
high costs. In a decision in 1981, the CRTC argued that these arrangements were not in the public
interest and would prevent the most effective use of satellite facilities (CRTC, Telecom Decision 81-13).
In 1984, the commission required Telesat to permit the resale of unused satellite capacity and partial
channels, and thus make the system more financially feasible and effective (CRTC Telecom Decision
84-9).
The Development of a Leading Communications Industry and High Powered Satellite Applications
The policy objectives, which the new communication technologies have been expected to fulfill, are
outlined in numerous government report., ministerial speeches and press releases. The development of a
leading communications technology is considered essential because of Canada's unique geographic
characteristics and its reliance on communication services. The main thrust has been to pioneer new
technologies for commercial application as part of the general industrial strategy of high technology
research and development and thus develop technological expertise for industries competing on the
international market and to support national industries (see Mansell, 1985).
In 1974 "A Space Policy for Canadaw was formally adopted, emphasizing objectives of developing
its space industry as part this industrial strategy (DOC, 1980: 17). This emphasis on research and
development has continued and is restated in various policy papers (e.g. MOSST, 1981, 1986).4
The goals of the Space Program are to build on Canada's long-standing expertise in space technology engineering and applications development; to maintain Canada's established position in international cooperation; to ensure that maximum economic and social benefits are obtained from the applications of space technology; and to ensure that Canada maintains a position of excellence in the world-wide scientific exploration of space. (MOSST, 1986: 1)
As a result, the technical sophistication and performance of satellites has tremendously increased
since Anik A. In 1976, Canada pioneered with the launching of its high powered experimental Hermes
satellite using the 14/12 GHz frequencies. The experiments performed were divided almost equally
For a detailed critical analysis of this industrial strategy in the communication and information sector see Mansell, 1985.
between those with technical and those with social objectives. The social experiments included
tele-medicine, Me-education, community interaction, facsimile and teletype transmission, and
teleconferencing (Davies, 1978 (a): 328-329; DOC FS 19/06/78: 5-12). The Hermes trials were followed
by experiments on A d k B, launched in 1978, "to advance national objectives in telecommunications and
broadcasting" :
The DOC Anik B program will examine the viability of new telecommunications services, further explore the potential of 14/12 GHz satellite technology and make users aware of that potential for delivery of new servic es.... The Anik B program will test a market that maybe developing in the public services sector and we hope the carriers will investigate the kinds of options open for future systems developments." (DOC, 1978: 3)
In the telecommunications sector, Canada's high technology policy has been pursued through the
development of a mobile satellite system (MSAT) that provides two-way radio and radio telephone
services without restrictions on location and distance. MSAT is seen as another step for Canada in
advancing its leadership in the field of satellite communications for both national and international
marketing, and as a means for providing mobile communications to the underserved rural and remote
areas at a user cost comparable to those in the major cities (DOC, 1982 (e): 1). It is planned to be
available by 1990.
Over $20 million was spent on studies alone to define the characteristics of a commercially viable
mobile communications satellite system. The cost of establishing a commercial MSAT service, including
military participation, is estimated to be in the range of $400 to $450 million. The majority is provided by
the federal government
The Department of Communications will do everything possible to create an environment in which Telesat and the telecommunications manufacturing and service industries can co-operate on the delivery of commercial mobile communications services to Canadians not served by terrestrial mobile systems. (DOC, 1984 (a): 1)
DOC claims that the main goal is not technology development, but the extension of new services to the
people of Canada (DOC, 1982 (e): 4-5). Among the potential users listed are people living in remote
areas and in the North. However, the tilting of the satellite is designed for maximum reception in
W e test relating to northern broadcasting will be discussed in chapter 7.
93
southern Canada and the US., whereas reception in the far north will be of borderline quality (DOC,
1987 (b): 22). It coincides with the government stressing the urgency for the Canadian space industry to
secure its benefits from the opportunities in the Canadian and the U.S. markets (Masse, 1985': 2).
Meanwhile, the DOC notes another research discovery in radio relay systems that is better suited
for the High Arctic. Although native people are placed first on the list of potential users to justify public
expenses, the major users are found within government departments. The Canadian Coast Guard and the
Department of Defense, in particular, have expressed their interest in setting up an experimental system
geared to their needs.
"Their interest could lead to a commercial development that can provide the widely scattered native, defence, mining and other Arctic communities with communications services as reliable, versatile and inexpensive as those in southern Canada. (DOC, 1986 (a): 44)
Eflds in Promoting a Canadian Videotex System Telidon
Another emphasis of high technology development of interest in the North has been in the data
transmission sector with the interactive visual communications system "Telidon." In 1978 the DOC
announced its first four-year Telidon development program of $9.7 million to support field trials, provide
investment stimulation, develop software and market it internationally. Between 1981 and 1985, the B8C
spent $50.5 million (Booth, 1985: 15) for field trials and services in Canada and abroad. "Grassroots" was
developed to provide farmers with instant information. It was one of the few trials that entered the
commercial phase, yet never developed into an economically viable service. In the North, the Council of
Yukon Indians was funded to develop Telidon software of interest to native people in isolated
communities. The project ended when funds ran out after two years even without having reached the
trial stage (Konrad Kordowski, Whitehorse, interview).
The DOC also financed the use of Telidon at the Inuit Circumpolar Conference in Iqaluit in 1983.
The experiment showed that Telidon was a useful tool for interactive visual data-communication, yet far
too expensive to be employed on an ongoing commercial basis (Stenbeak, 1984). Native people explored
the new possibilities but felt somewhat used as guinea-pigs to test Telidon applications. They considered
it worse to ignore the technological options and not experiment with them. Testing applicatiom would
enable them to adapt the technologies to their needs if they became available.
In 1981 AT&T announced the establishment of a Telidon compatible videotex protocol with
technical standards that served AT&Ts needs. It set the tone for developments in service offerings and
market developments. The expectations of mass production and world wide diffusion never materialized.
By the end of 1983, only 5,000 instead of the expected 40,000 terminals were in operation (Globe and
Mail, 9 Feb. 1984: B7). Through the merging of other established communication devices, such as video
discs, high defmition TV, large screen displays, personal computers, local area networks, mobile services,
satellite broadcasting and FM broadcasting of videotex signals, the mass market for in-home stand-alone
videotex terminals has disappeared (Booth, 1985: 17). Complementary technologies with higher market
penetration lend themselves to videotex applications at a much cheaper price, such as an add-on feature
of a management work station, personal computer or as a software within an ofice automation context
The original stakeholders in Telidon, who were geared to a mass market, like telephone companies,
newspaper publishers and the federal government, have been replaced by banks, fhmcial service
companies, software and high technology firms. They have aimed successllly at specialty services for
business, public service, education and training (Booth, 1981: 17-18).
It is a fallacious assumption to think that the public or consumers presently have real needs for information that may not be obtained with equal facility from other sources. (Wescom, in Globe & Mail, 14 Oct 1983, B 1)
Southern Stratenic Interests of Ex~andins, @g Northern Frontier
In the past, the development of communication services in the North was spofadic and slow because
of geographic (permafrost, vast distances) and demographic (sparse population) characteristics. Policies to
improve communication services were linked with national sovereignty, administrative or industrial
development considerations. Historically the Department of Defense and the RCMP had the major
interest in northern communications developments. This was complemented and eventually superseded
by commercial interests. In 1957 the responsibility was transferred to the Department of Transportation
and in 1968 to the DOC. DIAND has had the overriding responsibility over developments in the
territories and thus also participated in policy formation of northern communication services.
Radio telephone and broadcasting entered the Arctic in the late 1920's, just as airplanes began to
provide easy access. It was a basic service to the operation of RCMP, military, mission and trading posts
and primarily used to communicate the directives of southern agency personnel. The development of the
telecommunications system extended and centralized southern authority. Valaskakis (1983: 8-9) refers to
the expansion of RCMP radio stations that were reorganized and centralized in Ottawa
Early Telecmmunication Pdicies and Institutional Arrangements in the Western Arctic
Because of considerable concerns regarding the sovereignty of the Western North, beginning in the
1930s the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals (RCCS) constructed a radio telegraph system that linked
Aklavik and other more southern locations in the Canadian Northwest to Edmonton for military
communication (Stach, 1969: 147). RCMP posts, bush pilots, fur traders, missionaries and mining
companies installed their own high frequency (HF) radio telephone equipment to form links with the
NCS and RCCS system. The HBC developed its own short-wave radio network, yet most of the radio
stations operated only for the two months of shipping season, like the one in Tuktoyaktuk. Coppermine
and Chesterfield were the only two year-round stations (Roach, 1984: 20-22). The missions also had
daily radio schedules to get in touch with other missions.
Until 1952 the system continued to expand and in 1957 was integrated into the Department of
Transportation's network for weather information and air-ground ~overage.~ It was the basis for the
development of a commercial public network. In 1958 the DOT initiated a policy of divesting itself of
these responsibilities and turned the service over to the crown corporation Canadian National Telegraph
61n 1957, revenue from commercial traffic (11,175 messages) amounted to some $200,000, while government traffic (2,412,046 messages) transmitted without charge would have brought in an additional $ 5 million, if based on commercial rates. The army on the other hand paid $1.5 million annually for maintenance and operation (RCCS, 1962: 284).
World War 11 had triggered a massive undertaking by the U.S. Government to construct a
transportation and communications corridor from Edmonton to Alaska for defense purposes, known as
Northwest Communications System (NCS). At the end of the war, the U.S. government sold the '
Canadian portion of the communications system to the Canadian government
In 1955 the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, a complex radar communications system, was
constructed for military purposes. It links Labrador to Alaska (see Harris, 1981). It was not meant for
direct civilian use, yet special arrangements were made with the carriers for usage of microwave line.
The Establishment of the CNT/NorthwesTel Telephone System
In 1957 the RCCS system was transferred to CNT and in 1958 complete control over the NCS.
When CNT was granted the monopoly for servicing the Canadian Northwest it was instructed to replace
the equipment with its own facilities and to operate the system on a joint military-commercial basis as
part of its franchise. CNT is one of the Canadian National Railway Company's (CNR) operating
divisions and thus a part of the government owned Crown Corporation7 As such, CNR, and consequently
CNT, is intended to operate at arms-length from government direction and reports to Parliament through
the Minister of Transports
Crown Corporations are legally autonomous bodies through which the government carries on certain activities. They are "legal personsw in their own right, separate from the rest of the executive government, but enjoying certain rights and privileges as "emanations of the Crown." The Financial Administration Act, 1951, classifies Crown corporations into three main types - departmental, agency, and proprietary corporations. Departmental corporations (Class B) carry on adminisuative, supervisory or ~egulatory functions and are financed by appropriations from Parliament similar to ordinary departments. Agency corporations (Class C) engage in trading, service and procurement operations and are usually given controlled revolving funds for their purposes (e.g. National Research Council). Proprietary corporations (Class D) engage in industrial or commercial operations and are normally expected to pay for their operations out
. of their revenues (e.g. CBC, CNR). However, they are seen as an instrument of public policy. (See "Crown Corporations," Encyclopedia Canadians)
AS a subsidiary of CNR, CNT needs its operation and management decisions be approved by the CNR Board of Directors. The parent corporation is therefore in a position to approve or influence CNT's profitability. CNR receives payments from the federal government with respect to certain uneconomic transportation facilities and services which the company is
In 1978 CNT was reorganized, renamed to Canadian National Telecommunications, and on 1
January, 1979 the newly created wholly-owned subsidiaries NorthwesTel and Terra Nova (Newfoundland)
Telephone went into operation.
CN's objective in ... reorganizing the Division is to achieve optimum management of each of the very different business es... Each would have the managerial capacity to function as a profit centre, and with its own manager residing in the area it serves, each would be more responsive to its particular markets and business environments. (G. MacDonald, 1985: np.)
NWTel is accountable to CNT and thus to CNR's Telecommunications Division Yet as a separate
corporation, NorthwesTel is expected to sustain all its northern services on the basis of revenues collected
within its service area. This negatively affects the proportion of costs borne by users in the area compared
to carriers operating in southern areas. NorthwesTel serves the Western Arctic west of the 102" longitude.
The operating area covers 2.35 million km2, but has only 70,000 residents. It serves fewer than 28,000
subscribers (G. MacDonald, 1985: ap.).
The Canadian government's interest in developing and f~nancially supporting a commercial
telecommunications network was directly linked to its economic interest in the North, which began in the
late 1950s. Telecommunications were recognized as important means to promote national northern
development objectives. A crown corporation would - theoretically - be receptive to pressures of
engaging in telecommunications developments that would fail to meet strict criteria of economic viability.
When expanding the network, national development priorities were expected to be taken into account
Emphasis was placed on the construction and expansion of long distance trunk facilities to provide
increased interco~ection capacity between growing economic centers in northern and southern Canada.
In 1963 CNT began to build a 1400 km pole line from Fort Providence along the Mackenzie River
to Inuvik, with financial assistance from the federal government It took three years to complete, due to
the challenging weather and terrain conditions, and cost S 3.5 million (NWTel, 1980: 8). Inuvik, Aklavik,
and Tuktoyalctuk were connected to the trunk line. However, at the time it was built, the pole system was
8(cont'd) required to maintain in the public interest In the past, the company has also received payments from the government to cover deficits in income (Fin. Post Info Service, CNR, 1986: 2).
already outdated and unsuitable for the harsh northern conditions. Provided with further subsidies, CNT
began to set up microwave facilities with increased line capacity.
Yet remote sites away from the trunk line were left with unreliable HF radio telephone. In the
mid-1960s CNT began to introduce public single sideband radio transmitters with fixed frequencies, but
no dial exchanges.
Emphasis was placed on the construction and expansion of long distance trunk facilities along the I Mackenzie River and the Alaska Highway to provide increased interconnection capacity between growing
economic centers in the north and southern Canada, leaving remote sites with unreliable HF radio
telephone. Thus, there was little effort to establish a regional commercial telecommunication system
(Mansell, 1979: 46). The rationale of a crown corporation helped to implement economic but not social
objectives.
But surely it would mean an unrealistic mixing of priorities to supply immediately or in the near future relatively expensive telecommunications system to communities so small most of them apparently do not warrant electric power, a suitable airstrip or a semblance of local roads. However, as new industries and communities develop, these small settlements will eventually come within the sphere of economic telephone service. (CNT, 1970: 44)
Government Pdicies and Institutional Arrangements of Telecommunications in the Eastern Arctic
Initially, telecommunication developments in the Eastern Arctic were also determined by strategic
and administrative interests. In contrast to the Western Arctic, there was generally a lack of economic
activity and. thus less pressure on the federal government to provide subsidies for extending services. As a
result, the government did not get directly involved in service provision through a crown corporation. It
transferred responsibility from DOT to Bell Canada, which already served Ontario and QuebecS9 The Bell
territory thus covers a large area that includes most of Ontario, Quebec and the eastern half of the NWT,
east of 102O longitude.
91n 1983 Bell Canada was restructured and Bell Canada Enterprises (BCE) created as the mother company to separate its regulated and unregulated services. Bell Canada became a wholly owned subsidiary and operates the public switched telecommunications networks for voice and data communications and holds 24.6% interest in Telesat Canada (Fin. Post Info Service, BCE, 1986: 2).
Based on government subsidies, in 1957 Bell Canada and Quebec Telephone built the first
tropo~pheric~~ network, the so-called Pole-vault system, from Sept-Isles (Quebec) to Goose Bay on the
Labrador coast It also linked Iqduit (Frobisher Bay) with the south. The system served primarily
defense purposes (Shoveller, 1962). In 1961, Bell pioneered in the development of single sideband HF
radio. It began to develop a radio-telephone system in the Arctic using, HF, VHF and tropo-scatter radio
systems. Of the 17 exchanges established in 1961 in the remote north (i.e Northern Quebec, Labrador
and NWT), 7 were public HF, 4 regular toll and 5 private telephone service (Bell Canada: 1961). In 1957
Iqaluit got HF radio, in 1961 a local exchange and in 1964 HF dial service. In 1971 HF radio-telephone
reached the most northerly settlement, Grise Fjord on Ellesmere Island (Sleeth, 1982: 4-5). Expansion
was geared to meet government and industry interests. The government subsidized these developments
because it recognized the limits of cross-subsidization to expand service in the remote north by almost
totally supporting the early public HF single side band service. Inuit needs were generally not addressed:
Through the provision of radiotelephone and tropospheric scatter, we are linking once isolated Illissionaries, government officials and trading posts with the world's telephone networks. (Bell, 1965)
Although electronic communications technologies entered the Arctic in the 1920s, discussion and
explicit expression of communication needs and services for the Inuit did not begin until the 1970s when
the establishment of Inuit regional and national organizations gave communications increased importance.
In 1970, the DOC organized a northern communications conference in Yellowknife. It was the first
forum for Inuit to express their needs and concerns. Communications projects testing applications of the
new technologies, participation in the regulatory process through rate hearings, and Inuit public statements
and reports about their communication facilities and needs provided additional opportunities to lobby for
lo Tropospheric radio was developed to overcome the problems of distance in microwave transmission. The principle consists of using the reflective properties of the troposphere to relay the signal over distances of up to several hundred kilometers. Yet the system's reliability is limited.
telecommunications services. In the 1970's Inuit criticized the lack of communication services in their
communities. The areas of economic importance were fairly well served, yet the majority of native people
did not live in these areas. Rather they resided in areas of little or no economic significance which lacked
communications. In particular, the Inuit emphasized the unsatisfied needs of:
Interactive intra-regional and inter-regional communications for a medical and other emergencies; b. improving the quality of subsistence lifestyle; c. socio-political development; d. interpersonal communications;
teletype services;
relevant northern broadcasting in Inuktituk and English1' for a education; b. culture and language development; c. information; d. socio-political development;
training in managing new communications technologies;
Inuit participation in decision making and program delivery on northern communication matters;
reliable and timely mail service (DOC, 1970).
Inuit have emphasized as most important their need for reliable, inexpensive, interactive services
and facilities that are suited to the harsh conditions of the Arctic, on a 7-day, 24-hour basis.
Most importantly, communities have to be able to contact other communities for emergencies. In
the early 1970s this was especially serious because of the lack of medical personnel and facilities in many
of the small settlements. If the HI? radio failed, there was no other means of communication and thus no
help forthcoming (Maegher, 1974: 8).
Also, people on the land, who are frequently away for days or weeks at a time should have means
of contacting the community. Land-to-settlement communication services are therefore essential, which
. the miniaturization of equipment mobile trail radios has made possible. Ideally the trail radio network
l1 The issue of broadcasting needs will be discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, yet for completion will be listed here and addressed when necessary to understand reactions and Inuit requests for telecommunication policies and institutional arrangements.
should be able to tie into the telephone network.
In the North travelling is very expensive and native people are therefore dependent upon
alternatives. Partidarly as Inuit have become actively involved in the development of the North and run
their own organizations and businesses, they require access to a reliable telephone infrastructure. Timely
interactive telecommunications, including data transmission, is necessary to be effective, order goods and
services, exercise control, discuss issues, present interests in a politically effective way to southern agencies,
and disseminate information.
The phones finally went completely dead. About three weeks before Christmas I went to Rankin three times to call about them. We never knew if there was going to be a plane, either, because the phones were all dead. It gets very desperate without a way of calling out. (Joseph Kaludjak, Co-ap manager, Whale Cove, in Green,Simailak, 1976: 60).
Channels for feedback can increase community awareness and the ability to make their opinion
known to their leaders. Viable regional communications increases the base of common information
available to members of different communities and thus may serve as a cohesive force.
Especially in areas where family incomes are low, the prospect of a high purchase cost, and high calling charges can effectively inhibit use of a communication system. Also in this application, it may be anticipated that there will be a desire for calls of medium to long duration. It would be preferable, then that there either be no charges on a per call basis, or that charges be kept very low (Maegher, 1974: 34).
To keep in touch with family members and friends over long distances requires a system that is
two-way, private, inexpensive to acquire and use, and simple to operate.
It would be better if we could call in privacy. When there are a lot of people around we often do not say what we would have liked to. (Louis Oshokittuk, Repulse Bay, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 60).
With the government's establishment of social services came a massive relocation of land-based
families into communities, children into distant schools and sick people into hospitals in the south. The
- need to stay in touch with close family members over long distances thus increased significantly.
Postal service is an important, low cost alternative, yet until the establishment of regular scheduled
flights in the late 1970s, mail was delivered to the small communities only infrequently, sometimes once a
month, sometimes by any aircraft that happened to fly to the settlement, or sometimes parachuted on the
land In 1964, for example, there was no contract for Lake Harbour to carry mail. It accumulated in the
RCMP office and was picked up by any visiting aircraft (Higgins, 1964: 40). Igloolik's mail was carried
by canoe or bombardier from Hall Beach when weather permitted (Anders, 1965: 78). A contract bound
AklaSr air to deliver mail to Tuktoyaktuk three times a year. With increased business, it had expanded to
once a month by 1962 (Abrahamson, 1962: 31).
Inuit have repeatedly stated the need for adequate preventive maintenance of telecommunication
services on a routine basis as repairs have been a major problem. They suggested the establishment of a
long=range program to train northern operators for providing maintenance services. Also, new systems
should be introduced carefully, and with ample time to experiment and correct errors. Care should be
taken to train northerners in the most effective use, operation and maintenance of the technology.
Finally, northern native people should have more control in future decisions that affect their lives.
This requires not only facilities for communication, but also a willingness on part of the government to
share the decision=making process, to have Inuit at management positions in government departments, on
boards of governors and as commissioners at the regulatory agency, the Canadian Radio-Television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC).
Suggestions fw an Alternative Design of the Satellite System
When concrete plans for a Canadian domestic communication satellite became public in 1969, a
great deal of concern was expressed by native people and research academics as to the potential impact on
native cultures (Kemey, 1971, Telecommission 8(c), 1971; Mayes, 1972). The basic question, as Roth
(1982: 74) points out, was not whether a satellite system was necessary but the degree to which the
government planned to utilize satellites, provide services and address the potential social impacts on the
native peoples. In particular, it was questioned whether local access for community radio and television
would be encouraged or prohibited; whether the government had considered basic communication
priorities of native people when it decided to launch Anik A 1; and whether it was prepared to
compromise its preliminary intentions, in order to include explicitly stated requests of native people in
their long-range planning?
The conference in Yellowknife in 1970 was the first formal indication of a willingness on the part
of the government to listen to the northern viewpoint This did not necessarily imply that the resulting
'g policies would actually consider and implement the suggestions. For example, the criticism of the
structural arrangements of the proposed Anik system remained unheard, despite the clearly stated
conclusion that
"the proposed satellite will not service the immediate communication needs of the North. It is recommended that conventional methods of communication be expanded to meet these needs (DOC, 1971 (c) : 6).
The principal communication needs were thus clearly stated and can be summarized as: (1)
assessing interactive private and public communication links, (2) producing and distributing relevant
information on a local and regional level in both native languages and English; (3) receiving relevant
information from the south; (4) establishing communication/feedback links to those in power, thus
enabling native people to participate in northern development; (5) training in the use of the new
technologies; and (6) participating in policy formation and seguhaioa
Recent Telecommunication Policies to Promote Socio-Economic Develo~ment
By the late 1960s stated government policy also began to reflect social concerns. The need was
recognized to provide subsidies for extending telephone services into remote communities. With the
accelerating development of Arctic resources in the late 1960s, the need for improvements in northern
communication became more apparent every day.
Both the 1970 conference on northern communications and a report on by the Telecommission
Study emphasized the role of satellites as the only viable means for instant long distance communication.
The report made reference to the needs of northern residents, yet emphasis was placed on economic and
industrial development It suggested that communication developments should focus on the Western
Arctic with its petroleum development and an envisioned oil and gas pipeline. On the other hand:
The District of Keewatin is in the early exploration stage but the type of industrialization that would provide a base for drastic communications improvements is not anticipated for some time. It is representative of areas where there has been concern expressed for improved telecommunications facilities essentially to meet social needs. Such areas present problems of capital investment for the common carriers. (DOC, 1971 (a): 3).
The report raised the general question of subsidies. To provide equal services the per capita costs
in the north were higher than in the south, while the population was more dependent upon
telecommunications. This would raise the difftcult question who would cover these additional costs, the
subscribers or the general taxpayer, i.e. government subsidies. It argued that the remote regions would
not justify drastic communication improvements: "The high cost of satellite will certainly ensure that HF
systems will continue in operation at least in this decadew (DOC, Telecomrnission Study 8 (c): 6).
A decade later the DOC used similar arguments of maintaining unequal services when commenting
on the impacts and communication requirements for Beaufort Sea oil development. It admitted that the
smaller communities would have neither the wide range of services nor alternate routes for providing that
service (DOC, 1982:8).
The Northern Communications Assistance Program
Since the 1970s, the government has incorporated socio-cultural criteria in its rationale for
subsidies. At the same time, it has expected a certain level of cross-subsidization from the carrier's more
profitable operations. Examples of early government support are the Mackenzie Valley Pole Line,
subsidies for the establishment and operation of the early public HF radio telephone service, and
minimum annual revenue guarantee agreements (DOC, 1979: 1). PIoviding satellite sbpported telephone
service to every community required major investments for reception and uplink facilities.
In December 1974, a Cabinet decision set forth a communication policy for the NWT and the
Yukon that directed the DOC to undertake developments to improve northern telecommunications. Yet
not until three years later did the DOC introduce a subsidy program, the Northern Communication Access
Program (NCAP) in response to the Cabinet decision. The increasing pressure of Inuit organizations had
forced the DOC to act and not further postpone the implementation of the 1974 cabinet decision. The
Inuit had made it a condition of their participation in the high profile An& B satellite projects that all
Arctic communities would get reliable telephone service.
There is a very great public pressure at this time to proceed with northern broadcasting developments, as is manifest by the proliferation of unauthorized terrestrial and satellite broadcasting undertakings in the North, however, it would not be rational or acceptable fIom a public point of view to proceed with broadcast developments prior to securing the survival related telecommunication developments of NCAP. For this reason it is imperative that NCAP proceed as scheduled (DOC, 1979: 2)
To bring telecommunications to the remote communities, the government guaranteed the difference
in costs to CNT and Bell to a break-even situation over ten years. Over a five-year period, the NCAP
was to provide about $9 million in federal contributions. That covered the capital cost of communications
facilities to provide or upgrade facilities to every community in the NWT with over 100 permanent
residents, or at least the demand for 25 main stations. Bell Canada and CNT were required tb provide a
similar amount in capital and operating funds for local exchange equipment and for operating the
telephone circuits between communities (DOC, 1978: 2).
In 1978 the government signed the fust contracts with CNT and Bell Canada. For example, CNT
received $931,000 to provide the service to Sachs Harbour, Holman Island and an Indian community at
the Great Slave Lake, and Bell Canada $822,000 to bring service to Hall Beach and Whale Cove in the
Eastern Arctic (DOC, 1978: 1). Independently of public or private ownership, the carriers connected
northern remote communities to the system only after the government agreed to assist in the deficit
operation (Mansell, 1979: 185).
The significance of NCAP is that it provides development initiatives on a shared basis with the caniers, thus preserving the principle of cross-subsidization, and at the same time it does not commit Government to operational support in perpetuity. (DOC, 1979: 1)
The initiative marked the first time that direct federal government funding had been provided on
such a scale for a public telephone service. However, the implementation of the program was postponed,
then finally realized in 1985 at an approximate cost of $8 million.
Mansell (1979) argued that the way the government provided subsidies for the western North could
not be effective in reaching the objective of equal basic services. CNT has been successful in transferring
money to the mother company or other competitive services, while claiming to make losses in the basic
services. Therefore, it could postpone upgrading unless the government provided further public funding
or the CRTC granted rate increases. In the Eastern Arctic, services have been provided by a private
carrier, yet there has been a similar tendency to not expand service until subsidies are made available.
The question of how much cross-subsidization can be expected has been a major debate in the rate
regulation (see below).
Although the need for public subsidies was recognized, there was no specific investigation of the
means to ensure that investment decisions would result in the development of regional communication
systems that would provide high quality services on remote isolated locations. Nor was it investigated
whether the carriers could be expected to generate sufficient revenues in some services to make expansion
and investment decisions attractive (Mansell 1979: 75).
To conclude, the NCAP was mcial in ftnally extending service to the small Arctic communities.
Yet the program did not address the question of pricing of the service. This was left to the federal
regulator, and no policies were put in place to encourage the application of criteria that reflect the
developmental character of telecommunications.
Emeriences wiyj Telmhone Services in the Western Arctic
There is little written material available that describes telephone service in the area. The principal
sources are CRTC hearings and related documents, as well as oral information collected during the field
research.
Early Experiences with High Frequency Radio Telephone
In the 1940s and 1950s, the RCCS telegraph system was the only public communication service
available to remote communities in the Western kctic. The RCCS in Aklavik made regular scheduled
calls to the small coastal communities, where the RCMP, HBC or mission would have a HF radio. In the
1950s voice replaced morse code. Inuit employed at the DEW line used the system to exchange news
with friends based at other sites. The DEW line communication system was restricted to its own
personnel, but occasionally would also be used by Inuit for collect calls to relatives and friends
The RCCS in Aklavik also set up a local party line crank telephone system co~ecting 10-15
non-native people in health, administration or business professions. Everyone on the line could overhear
the conversation and its primary reason was for emergency and social services (Bamie McNeill, Inuvik).
When Inuvik was constructed it got a similar local party-line, again primarily for emergency,
administrative, and economic purposes. Here as well, the system did not provide telephone service to the
native population. CNT later upgraded the system to a local exchange, while DOT provided the circuits
of the system. For many native people this was their first exposure to the new technohgy.
1959 was the jirst time I used a telephone. I was going to the community hall. ... Someone dialed and gave me the receiver: 'Now talk.' - Boy, was I nervous. I was shy to talk to the telephone, talking to nobody. I couldn't see the person I talked to. (Sam Raddi, Inuvik)
The introduction and control of early local and long distance telephoning was in the hands of
non-native people who were generally generous in providing access for emergencies and personal
messages.
- In the mid-1960s CNT introduced public single-side band radio transmitters'with fixed frequencies
in the coastal communities. Yet there were no dial exchanges. The operator had to switch every time the
conversation changed from one person to the other. The fixed frequency permitted only one call at a
time for each community. Everyone could overhear the conversation. If the only local transmitter was in
a private home access time was restricted. Radio communication was subject to much static interference
and absolute black-outs at certain times of the year. At spring time, when daylight was coming back, the
reception was particularly poor.
There would be a total black- out of communication. And this happened every spring. You w d d have to rely on the RCMP. They had a stronger transmitter. But p u would use that only ifsomething was very urgent, mostly it were fir medical reasons. (Agnes Carpenter, Sachs Harbou)
The landline system in the Mackenzie Delta was not much better. Because of the few circuits, the
system was permanently overloaded People had to put their names on a waiting list to place a call. "It
was an expensive mistake. The landline was already out of date when it was builtn (Mike Zubko, Inuvik).
The trapo-scatter system, developed by Bell Canada for the Eastern Arctic, made telephoning much more
reliable. The system had significantly more circuits and, for the first time, allowed direct dialing.
Bissett (1966: 286) reports for 1965 that Inuit in Inuvik, particularly those permanently employed,
had telephones installed in their homes. However, native people in both Tuktoyaktuk and Aklavik had no
private telephones. The common practice was to use the telephone in the local cafe or have a message
passed over the mission HF radio. Messages were also telephoned to the radio station in Inuvik or private
residences.
In the mid 1970s the coastal communities finally got public-switched local exchange services.
Shortly thereafter the first communities were linked to satellites. Where possible, communities would tie
into the microwave system or the DEW Line facilities. For a successful transfer of telephone technology
it is also important to transfer knowledge of its use and implications, skills in usage and repair, and the
necessary infrastructure. Not only should northern residents be informed about the usage, costs and
maintenance, but also about the character of continuing relationships.
Experiences with Direct Dialing and Regular Phone Bills
People were proud of having the equipment. I was introducing them to the techndogy, explaining them, how it works, what it was fw. (Roy Goose, Sachs Harbour)
To introduce telephoning to a population with limited knowledge of English requires special
information to explain the different rates and services. Elder Inuit had to ask their children to talk to the
English-speaking operator until direct distance dialing (DDD) became available.
For years, a large number of phone numbers were unlisted. In the beginning people blamed that
on misuse, particularly for third party billing. That has significantly decreased, and now is primarily
related to alcohol abuse. Another explanation given was that children often phoned home collect,
particularly when they were homesick, and parents were unable to say no. Changing the number was an
indirect way to avoid paying the bills. People changed their number sometimes once or twice a year
(Mike Zubko, Inuvik).
The introduction of commercial services increased the ability of people to contact relatives and
friends in distant communities, but it also increased their regular expenses. In the beginning, phone bills
were around $300 or more, as people phoned all over Canada. Or if they were drunk, they would make
toll-free calls for mail-orders which could result in quite a rude awakening.
People were infmed, they knew it would cost them a lot. But they are hooked, and they don't bother abmt a bill that will come some time in the w e . (Father LuMeure, Tuktopktuk)
To establish timely billing was a learning experience for both CNT and Inuvialuit. If people didn't
pay right away, two or three months accumulated, easily adding up to bills of $700 - $800. However, if
CNT had immediately applied southern practices of disconnection, half the community would have been
cut off. The population as a whole would have rejected the new technology, as there was no point in
subscribing to a system when most of their friends and relatives were disconnected. Therefore, CNT was
at first tolerant of late payments.
CN had to learn what telephone meant to northern people. It was a long, sliw, two- way education process. (Roy Goose, Sachs Harbour)
When NorthwesTel took over in 1979, long distance telephoning had been in place for about two to
four years. It applied practices common in the south which "created quite some problems, hardships and
astonishment" (Roy Goose, Sachs Harbour). In 1984 NorthwesTel further decreased the allowable time
limit for payments and currently disconnects residential customers with proven good payment patterns for
non-payment after 60 days overdue. New customers and those with proven poor paying habits are
disconnected for non-payment of accounts if over $50.00 after 45 days (NWTel, 1985: Interrog. #110).
NorthwesTel argues that the reduction in the average days of outstanding payments from 58 days in 1984
to about 29 days in 1985 demonstrates the success of its revised credit policy (CRTC, Telecom 85-23: 26).
However, the average number of monthly disconnections increased from 517 in 1983 to 622 in 1984 and
dropped to 483 in 1985. Expressed as a percentage of total subscribers, it increased from 3.14% to 3.84%
and then declined to 3.00 (NWTel, 1985,1986: Interrog. #112).
People had to accept the rules. If they want to get reconnected, they have to pay a deposit of $150
to $300. In repeated cases, the connection charge increases which causes a lot of Frustration. Also,
because the mailing system is very slow "sometimes your cheque is due by the time you receive a bill."
(Teacher, Tuktoyaktuk). In 1985 NWTel began to establish community agencies where people could pay
their bills. By 1987, all Western Arctic communities finally had community agencies (NWTel, 1986,
Interrog. # 1106,17 10 86). However, the company still uses as its date for determining late payments
the date that payments are received at NWTel's regional business ofices rather than the community
agencies. Sometimes this can be days after the subscriber has made his payment because of the generally
slow mail delivery. People consider this unfair, particularly in light of the fact that often the bills are
mailed out significantly later than the billing date indicates. It cuts down even more on their time to pay
(CRTC, Telecom Decision 87-3: 17).
Because of improved collecting procedures, revenues from late payments have declined by 30%
from 1983 to 1986 (NWTel, 1986, Interrog. 406). The percentage of subscribers for whom security
deposits are held has varied around 4% (CRTC, Telecom 85-23: 16). Yet the average deposit for new
connection or reconnection changed from $72 in January 1984 to $219 in April 1985. The CRTC
consequently expressed concern that these required deposits might prevent some people from obtaining
service. It questioned the need for such amounts but did specifically tell NWTel to change practices.
Experiences with NorthwesTel's Quality of Service
In determining just and reasonable rates, the CRTC sees service quality as an essential element It
has been a continuous problem, and the issue has always played an important role in NWTel's rate
applications.
On many occasions it has been impossible to make local calls without receiving recorded announcements. It is often quicker for me to walk across town with a message than it is to telephone. It is not uncommon to dial one number and have someone answer on an entirely different line. While we all have learned to chuckle at the inept local telephone system, I would find this less numerous if our third rate service would cost fust rate money. (Victor Bargen, Spence Bay. NWTel1985: Intervention 014).
Rate hearings at the CRTC have been the most influential means for the Inuit and other northern
customers to express their views. The CRTC approved a set of quality of service indicators specifically
applicable to the northern regions that indicate system blockages and failures, installation and repairs,
operator, directory and billing services.
In 1984, NorthwesTel applied for a major rate increase but withdrew its application because it was
required to address and report on various service problems and concerns that were identified in a number
of interventions. NWTel was requested to undertake a survey that would prove that 90% of the
subscribers were satisfied with the service. In subsequent rate applications (1985.1986). NorthwesTel
referred to the improvements of service quality and stressed that its quality indicators generally reflected
acceptable service.
However, the data in the quality of service reports indicate continuous problems. For example,
there are months when ocnur&ces of long distance transmission problems, blockages or failures are well
above the set standards (NWTel, Qual. of Service Report, 1986: 18). Satisfactory quality has particularly
been lacking in the communities further east
Contrary to the Company's claim ... the quality of service provided by NorthwesTel has not generally been recognized as satisfactory. ... Long distance telephone users in Cambridge Bay are daily frustrated by problems such as: 1) reaching a busy signal when the line is actually free or reaching a recording that the number called is no longer in service when it is a valid number; 2) constantly having direct dialed calls returned to the dial tone or reaching the operator after completion of direct dialing; 3) having calls cut off in the middle of the
conversation when fortunate enough to be connected; 4) having the conversation fade in and out to the point where no conversation takes place anywhere from five seconds to the.point where a caller gives up after waiting for minutes at a time; 5) receiving a high amount of static on the line to the point where it is almost impossible to converse... (NWT Association of Municipalities: 1985: 2-3).
Repeated repair reports should not exceed 22%. Yet the ratio always exceeds the standard
significantly and may be as high as 36930. The ratio is slowly improving (NWTel, 1986 Interrog. # 2101,
NWTel (CRTC) 11/12/86). In several communities none of the telephone breakdowns can be cleared
within 24 hours (i.e. O%), whereas in Inuvik 77% can. The standard is set at 80% (NWTel, 1986, Interrog.
#2101,1112 87: 2-3,7). Locations accessible only by air are visited by repair crews once every 4 to 6
weeks. (CRTC, 87-3: 8).
A NorthwesTel survey in 1985, required by the CRTC, indicated low levels of satisfaction. Overall
only 74.7% were satisfied with the length of time to provide service. Of those dissatisfied, 60% stated that
it took too long to get connected or repairs done. Close to 20% complained that their equipment was not
repaired properly (CN Communications, 1986: 14-15). The survey results reflected significant disparities
between the data internally compiled and those based on the survey. Whereas the company data indicate
only 0.009% blockage, failure or transmission problems, 5.6% of those surveyed reported long distance
blockage, 14.6% transmission problems, and 2.1% both, with 5-7 calls per month affected 8.6% reported
problems with their local calls being blocked, and 7.3% experienced transmission problems (Ibid, p.
24-25). In the regular monitoring for the quality of service reports, only operator-handled long-distance
calls were surveyed This provided a better picture than that experienced by the public. At the 1986 rate
hearing, NorthwesTel admitted that 46.1% of customers experienced transmission problems on long
distance calling ( M e 1 (1986, Interrog. # 1111 (CRTC), 17 10 86).
In most instances I am required to redid as often as ten times before making'the proper connection. Even operator assisted calls are frequently misdirected to cities or people totally different (G. Wachsmann, Inuvik, Intervention 008, NWTel 1985).
Table 4.4. shows the historical development of complaints for various categories as reported to the
NWTel office.12 Quality has remained low, especially in the Central Arctic. By 1985 the few lines
available for long distance calls were still often overloaded and the system was shut down for hours.
Anyone who uses the phones regularly can attest to the fact that we often try two or three days before we are able to reach an outside line. ... To establish a one minute minimum basis for all long-distance calls is complete nonsense when the first minute of most conversations is spent confirming that you have the party you dialed. The entire call is usually interrupted by what is locally referred to as the "waven. It is a loud noise much like an ocean wave. Unfortunately, it makes most conversations virtually impossible. .. There are also numerous occasions when the line simply cuts out and only every second or third word is communicated. It is also not uncommon for the line to go dead in the middle of a call. (Victor Bargen, Spence Bay. ibid.)
In 1985 senior government officials in the Inuvik region reported improvements although there still
remained concerns about line quality, installation delays and tardy repair response (Tom Butters, Min. of
Government Services, NWTel1985, Intervention 011).
In Telecom Decision 85-23, the CRTC mentioned the substandard provisioning and repair
situation, yet assessed the overall performance as satisfactory. It considered the survey results and service
indicators too inconclusive to decide whether 90% of NorthwesTel's subscribers were satisfied with the
provided service. Consequently, it permitted the rates to increase. Two years later, it questioned the
measurement of local service quality because only the communities with over 2,000 lines were surveyed.
That meant only 5 exchanges out of the company's total of 62 were included. The CRTC directed NWTel
to include all communities with digital switches in its survey (CRTC Telecom Decision 87-3: 11).
NorthwesTel's claim of refunding faded or poor quality calls is met with suspicion. The promise of
"adjusting" phone bills remains dubious. There is no indication on the bill how this has taken place, if it
has occurred at all, how it is done, and what it has been adjusted to. Refunds are provided for whole
communities only when service outages exceed five days, and for individual customers only upon request
for outages exceeding 48 hours. This excludes many occurrences. Nevertheless, refunds from outages
l2 The data are based on written or verbal complaints to the office, and thus reflect only a rough picture of the dissatisfaction, as people often do not bother to phone long distance to complain, even less so to write. Local agencies to register complaints were not yet installed in most communities.
Table 4.4.
Average Monthly Customer Complaints by Category
Service Prov. Repair Local/Long Dist Oper. Service Directory Personnel Billing Other
Total 127
First three quarters
Source: NorthwesTel, Quality of Service Reports; own computation.
remain high. For example, between April and November 1986 NorthwesTel has paid $867.31 for 967
outage refunds (NWTel, Interrog. # 2102,1986).
Over the last years, NorthwesTel has invested in growth and modernization by replacing terrestrial
microwave systems with satellite terminals and increasing the available line numbers. This has improved
service quality. Yet, in the opinion of northern residents, the pace is too slow. It is understood that a
telephone company needs to make sufficient revenues to invest in technological improvements. However,
rather than focussing on improving the essential services, the company spends its money on gadgets, such
as Mickey Mouse or Snoopy shaped telephones.
Experiences with NorthwesTel's Rate Structure
There are few data available on the length and purpose of calls to substantiate the importance of
the telephone. Table 4.5. shows the average time per intra-regional calls and the message toll revenues
for 1985 for the different services and daytimes. According to a survey in 1985, NorthwesTel customers
Table 4.5.
Service
DDD Day DDD Even. DDD Night Pers. Day Pers. Even. Pers. Night Oper. Day Oper. Even Oper. Night M0b.R Day M0b.R Evn. Mob.R.Night
NorthwesTel Intra-Regional Message Toll Revenues, 1985
Revenue
338,081.57 62,903.25 4,449.49
13,834.65 4,686.54
453.75 89,245.60 51,588.67 4,346.13
25,340.85 11,731.69 2,544.29
Aver. Min/Call -
Source: NorthwesTel, 1986, Interrogatory # 704.
make an average of 39.2 local calls per week, 23.4 from residential and 59.5 from business phones. This
represents about 169 calls per subscriber per month. Long distance calls average 23.8 calls per month, 9.8
for residential customers and 42.0 for business (CNT, 1985: 24,27). Of 17,242 residential telephones,
only 2,090 made no toll calls. $214,375 revenues were made on intra-company calls, and $905,839 on
inter-Canada calls (NWTel, 1985 Interrog 2702,ll 12 86: 2)
Despite this heavy use, residence network access has remained below national average of 98.2 per
100 households, although it increased to 84.8 in 1986 (NWTel, 1985: Interrogatory 108). The toll free
area is confined to the settlement, sometimes as small as 165 residents. The relatively low saturation level
can therefore be explained by the relatively high costs of long distance telephone se'rvice. It prohibits
access particularly for the low income groups, who prefer to rather not have telephone than to have the
tool but not the financial means to call relatives and friends. NWTel admits that
In (its) operating area the long distance calling rate per access line is significantly higher than in southern Canada The Company attributes this to the isolated nature and sparse population of its operating area. The Company believes that a percentage of this higher
calling rate is non discretionary in nature compared with calling patterns in Bell Canada's operating area. For this reason NorthwesTel believes it is reasonable to assume that the price/demand relationship of message toll traffic originated in its area would be significantly less elastic than equivalent categories of traffic originated in Bell Canada's operating area. (NWTel (CRTC) Interrog. # 2705.11 Dec. 1986)
In non-technical terms, demand does not decrease with higher prices. A customer in Holman or
Paulatuk, who needs to call Inuvik or Edmonton during daytime, makes his call at nearly any cost, simply
because he has no other alternative. Off-peak hour reductions are useless to reach government agencies
or businesses. The charges for telephone rates are based on distance although the use of satellites has
made this rationale obsolete. This means higher costs than for similar services in the South.
When NorthwesTel applied for a general 15% rate increase in 1985 it was strongly opposed by
individuals and consumer groups.
I feel NorthwesTel must first improve its service to the residents of the NWT before being allowed to charge more for services not rendered. Up here telephone is often a matter of survival. So far this service is not acceptable. (G. Wachsmann, Inuvik, Intervention 008)
The CRTC granted NorthwesTel a 4.5% increase in 1985 (CRTC, 85-23) and a 6% increase for
1986 (CRTC 87-3: 43).
To investigate the impact of discounted one-way message toll service, CRTC ordered NorthwesTel
to establish a pilot project with a residential frequent caller discount plan on a one year trial basis. For a
one time service charge and $6.00 per exchange per month, a subscriber to this service received a 3m
discount on customer-dialed MTS calls to specified exchanges within the NorthwesTel area. (NWTel,
Follow-up Item 85-23:09,29 11 85).
In July 1987 NWTel presented its results. The number of subscriptions had grown steadily, yet
very slowly, with 69 subscribers in April 1987. Revenues from subscriptions in 1986 amounted to $3,870
. and for the first four months in 1987 to $1,626. The number of messages increased to close to 800 per
month with over 8,000 conversation minutes. The last few months in particular show a significant
increase in the number and length of calls. It reflects a slow diffusion. Apparently it took people time to
become aware of the service. To extend the experiment over a longer period may show significantly
increased usage.
The average call lasted approximately ten minutes. For the 16 months, NWTel assumed discounted
toll revenues of $39,331 yet a 3.3% stimulation in toll revenue because of increased calling. Subscribers to
the plan inaeased their toll minutes to the selected exchanges by 20%. Based on these data, NWTel
estimated a revenue stimulation of $4,800 for 1986. Yet it left unclear how it had come to this estimation.
In its submission to the CRTC, it did not further indicate what course of action was planned for the
future, and whether NWTel would continue to offer a frequent caller plan (NWTel, Follow-up Item
85-23:09,12/07/87).
Ex~eriences Telethone Senrices in the Eastern Arctic
As in the Western Arctic, research on telephone use in the Eastern Arctic is sparse. Statistical
information remains fragmentary and what has been done was largely conducted by Bell Canada.
Important sources of information are the interventions and briefs at the rate hearings and an Inuit study
on communications (Green, Sirnailak, 1976). Two studies address the telephone use (Dicks, 1977;
Valaskakis, 1975), undertaken a decade ago, at the time of transition from HF to satellite-supported
telephone.
Inuit Participation in Rate Regulation
Through ITC and TNI the Inuit in the Bell Canada area have been very actively involved in the
regulatory process. In 1974 TM also produced a report about communications in Arctic Quebec and two
years later ITC produced a similar study (Green, Simailak, 1976) for the Inuit of the NWT. They
complemented the evidence presented at the CRTC hearings and underscored the importance of
telephone service in their remote regions.
Bell Canada's application for rate increases in 1976 was the first heard by the CRTC under its
newly expanded mandate of regulating telecommunications. To set the precedence for future rate
applications the Commission was particularly thorough in investigating Bell, the largest common carrier in
Canada . In trying to define just and reasonable rates, the Commission approached "this principle in the
widest possible terms." (Telecom Decision CRTC 77-7: 8).
Before the Commission can approve tariffs or tolls, which specify the pr i~e the Company charges for its services, it is important to know the level and quality of service which is being offered at the price proposed. ... The Commission must also ensure that all segments of the public have reasonable access to the telephone service. While access is usually considered in terms of availability of facilities, it is not necessarily restricted to this dimension Evidence was presented at the hearings to the effect that access to the telephone service was also restricted due to technical problems, to certain of Bell Canada's administrative practices, and to certain rates charged in relation to the user's ability to pay." (Telecom Decision CRTC 77-7: 9)
The CRTC held hearings in Ottawa and, over a period of six days, in four northern communities.
54 people spoke at those northern hearings, representing 21 communities, 12 organizations and 23
individual subscribers. Community delegates held local meetings prior to these northern hearings, to
address concerns related to their own communities (ITC, 1977: 1). The extraordinary level of .
participation in these hearings reflected the importance of the issue to the people of the North. The
degree of their dissatisfaction with the telephone service. These rate hearings were the most thorough
ever held in the North. Government and telephone representatives emerged with a vivid picture of the
role of telecommunications in northern Canada. For example, the day the commission arrived in Igloolik
the telephones were out of order, as they had already been for the previous two days. Even before the
Commission had delivered its final decision, it could comment on the effectiveness of the CRTC:
One result of the Commission's northern hearings that has already been achieved is that Bell Canada was present in the community and they fixed Igloolik's telephone service at that time. (ITC, 1977: 3).
Subsequent rate hearings, though not held in northern communities, have been used by northern
residents as an opportunity to participate in and influence telecommunication services.
Experiences with l W y High Frequency Radio Telephone
Canadian and U.S. Air Forces, the Hudson's Bay Company, the RCMP, missionary groups, and
the Departments of Transportation and Indian Affairs have shaped the Eastern Arctic's early
communication services, as they did in the Western Arctic. They used HF radio to communicate with
their southern headquarters. In emergency cases they also provided communication links for the Inuit
Yet it was not a public service available for general use. The DEW Line facilities were not accessible,
either. As a result, the small community of Hall Beach, which sat right beside the main radar site with its
sophisticated communication system, had no telephone service. In 1975 Bell Canada offered one HF
radio which the community reluctantly accepted, hoping that would not hurt their chances of getting real
telephone service by satellite (Green, Simailalc, 1976: 3).
When Iqaluit got local exchange HF radio in 1961, and dial service in 1964, penetration grew
rapidly and reached a ratio of 249 per 1000 people. The introduction of the first HF telephone exchange
with individual phones in Igloolik was followed by an immediate surge in residential subscriptions, to
what Dicks (1977: 122) calls a "base-line" or "critical mass" of telephone density. This is an important
stage in the diffusion of the technology, for there is no point in joining the network, if none of the friends
or relatives are members. 10090 of the non-native and 79% of the native people subscribed to the HF
radio telephone service and used the system frequently. The introduction of dial exchanges thus had a
significant effect in establishing a density upon which economic factors could play (Dicks, 1977: 123).
Communities without local exchanges had to rely on one public HF radio or the HBC, RCMP or
mission phone, and residents were apprehensive about entering such "official" places when the public one
was out of order. Also, the use of the public phone involved costs, whereas messages passed on through
the private network were free. Hudson (1978: 275) quotes an Indian leader in northern Ontario who
. summarized access and financial problems when explaining why his people made little use of the existing
radio telephone facilities in the area.
It's not because we didn't have radios. We had them.. But most times local people didn't have the financial resources to make use of them, or else they belong to different
government departmen ts... or even the church es... But they weren't accessible to the people themselves. They were used either by the clergymen or by the doctors and nurses, or, in the case of Bell Telephone, we just didn't have the funds to make long distance calls.
Bell Canada's principal requirement to provide telephone service was a reliable power source.
Whereas communities in the NWT got all equipped with diesel generators provided by the territorial
government, this was not the case in Arctic Quebec and remote northern Ontario, where communities
purchased their own generator in order to get telephone service.
In 1973 satellite-supported telephone began to be introduced in the larger communities of Iqaluit,
Resolute Bay, Igloolik and Pangnirtung. By 1976 twelve Eastern Arctic communities had satellite
telephone s e ~ c e s , eight had HF radio, and three were envisioned to get service in 1977 (Green, Simailak,
1976: 58). With subsidies through the NCAP, HF radio was eventually replaced in all communities.
Dicks (1977: 123) reported for Igloolik that after its initial surge, subscriptions grew rapidly to a density of
131 phones per 1000 people in 1973. The rate of telephone growth from 1973 to 1974 was parallel to that
of economic growth, as indicated by per capita retail sales. He explained the rapid increase as being
related to the increased level of dispensable income. In contrast, the change to dial telephone in Iqaluit
had not little effect on subscription levels. Here the subscriptions were already close to the saturation
level.
In settlements served by HF radio the frequency of long-distance calls followed established growth
trends and the average length of long-distance calls actually dropped.
The HF system is not good We miss parts of the conversation. ... We have to repeat and repeat And we lose money that way as rates go higher with time spent repeating. (Theresa Voisey, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 56)
Calls from Iqaluit virtually doubled between 1972 and 1973, and the number from Igloolik
increased fivefold. In all the Arctic communities virtually all of the increase in long-distance calls was
directed towards towns newly served by Anik (Dicks, 1977: 124). A survey in 1974 revealed that 75 of all
respondents had made local calls and 25 percent long-distance calls "today or yesterday" (ibid.).
Experiences with the Quality of Bell Canadds Service Since 1976
The 1976 northern hearings provided ample evidence of the poor quality of the telephone service in
the remote north and how it affected the quality of life. Originally, northern data were not included in
the company-wide quality of service reports. Bell argued that it needed to develop measures specifically
designed for the northern conditions, but the National Anti-Poverty Organization (NAPO), jointly
presenting with ITC and TNI, pointed out that
the service quality is so abysmal in the North that it might affect averages even when placed against a very large mass of telephones in the South. Another reason is that the Company does not care to provide the facilities and work force necessary to provide quality control on service in the North (NAPO e t al. 1978: 21).
The CRTC required Bell to develop quality-of-service measures in consultation with interested
groups. In 1982 the CRTC finally approved a set of indicators developed by the company (CRTC,
Telecom Decision 82-13). ITC had tried to participate in the establishment of criteria, yet it found:
When the Inuit themselves seek the measures of improvement, the sampling plans, the procedures and the like, the Company invokes the cloak of secrecy by saying. "Bell Canada submits that the information requested is irrelevant and immaterial ..." and they consider the whole matter "proprietary". (NAPO, ITC, TNI, 1978: 37)
They criticized, for example, Bell's measurement of long distance system blockage as insufficient
because the company analyzed only the calls from the south to the north. If someone in Igloolik could
not get into the long distance system, Bell would not register this and thus did not know what the potential
utilization of the long distance service was by northerners (ITC, 1977: 5).
The quality-of-service measures give only a general quantitative idea because the data are based on
written or verbal complaints by customers to Bell, which excludes dissatisfaction not officially expressed.
Yet when analyzing the results of a quality survey conducted in 1978, the quarterly 'service reports and the
testimony from northern people, there is no escaping the conclusion that the quality of service was rather
bad until the mid 1980s. Table 4.6. shows the major problem areas that emerged in the 1978 quality
survey."
13 The 1978 survey was based on the 245 interviews.
122
Table 4.6.
Bell Canada Quality of Service Problems: 1978 Survey
Billing Network Performance - Long Distance Network Performance - Locat Operator Services Directory Installation Repair Business Office
Percentage
Source: Garwood Industrials, 1980: 2.
Nearly every community delegate who spoke at the 1976 hearings registered complaints about the
local exchange. In particular, they said the telephone system did not work, they got a dial tone or the
wrong number rather than the requested party, and they had to cope with poor quality in general. There
were large percentages of telephones not working for periods of three weeks to a month, or working in an
"on-again, off-again kind of thing" (ITC. 1977: 2). Often the local exchange equipment was outdated,
causing most of the system failures. There was not sufficient local exchange capacity to meet the needs
for telephone service in some communities, causing blockages and system failures. Until 1981 a blockage
rate, i.e. receiving a busy signal, stayed well above the limit of 1.5% (Bell, Quality of Service Reports).
Long distance telephone service, particularly in those communities served by HF radio, was loaded
with problems. First of all, HF radio telephone was only available four hours a day. For technical
reasons, transmission was best from late afternoons through the night, but that was not the time operators
were working. Yet people had to pay full access charges for 24 hour network availability. Echo, cut-offs,
clipping of words, and getting the dial tone were among the problems most often cited.
A lot of the time we get only half of the story .... I know a lot of people are feeling badly about paying phone bills when we have such poor reception. (Anthonese Mablick, Repulse Bay, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 60).
Once satellite-supparted service. was installed, service became available around the clock and the
quality improved significantly. However, there were not enough circuits (= number of long distance calls
possible at a time) instapled, as Table 4.7. indicates, and blockage problems continued.
Bell admitted that providing two lines per community was not enough and future satellite stations
would be provided with three. According to this single criteria, 7 of the 18 Inuit settlements with satellite
service were inadequately served and a further six had just the minimum. People trying to phone into
satellite served communities were unable to get through for days. People had to wait sometimes for two
days to place a single long distance call. In case of emergencies, "the only way was to run to the
community radio and tell people to get off the phone" (ITC, 1977: 4).
Right after the hearings, where company representatives were unable to make flight arrangements
because the telephone circuits were busy, Bell Canada announced its policy of a minimum of three
circuits. Introducing four phase modulation channel units on satellite transponders in 1979, Bell was able
to double circuit availability and over the years has further increased the number of circuits available. As
a result, reaching communities is no longer a problem.
People also complained about the repair situation. To fix a minor problem would take a maximum
of three months for settlements that are, in Bell Canada's words, "way o u ~ " Often problems reoccurred
right after the equipment was repaired.
The phones would die for about a month, nobody would .come. And when they did, the plane would be leaving as the phones, newly repaired, died again. (Joseph Koonw, Pond Inlet, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 64)
Originally, Bell had hired local repair personnel. Yet when the office in Iqaluit was set up, they
were replaced by a regional repair crew stationed in Iqaluit and communities had tb wait until a crew flew
in. Currently, of the 37 communities in the Eastern Arctic, only nine have a resident technician. Yet, due
to technological improvements the local equipment requires much less maintenance. It can automatically
reload in case of power failures which occur frequently in the North. (Myers, 1986: 41). In 1986 Bell
was still below the set standard of 80% with only 70.3% reporting troubles being cleared within 24 hours.
Arctic Bay Baker Lake Brought Isl. Cape Dorset Chesterf. Clyde River Coral Harbour Eskimo Point Iqaluit Grise Fjord Hall Beach Igloolik Lake Harb. pansnirtung Pond Inlet Port Burwell Rankin Inlet Repulse Bay Resolute Sanikiluaq Whale Cove
Table 4.7.
Eastern Arctic Telephone Density and Capacity, 1976
Pwul. Private Tel.
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1977 Yes Yes Yes Yes
1977 Yes
1977 Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Green, Sirnailak, 1976: 58.
Yet it had significantly improved from 59.8% in 1984.
Lines # Phones Lonn Dist - --
Anik Anik HF
Anik HF HF
Anik Anik Anik
HF
Anik HF
Anik Anik HF
Anik HF
Anik Anik
HF
Circuits
The statistics on repair issues give some indication of the improvements Bell has implemented over
years. However, they do not provide the information ITC considered essential when the quality indicators
were established In 1983 ITC argued that Bell Canada should be required to report all cases of
community isolation, duration and cause, because the lack of service to an entire community represented a
potentially lifethreatening situation. As such it was considered an extremely important indicator of
service quality (ITC etal., 1983: 2).
Experiences with Billing, Operators and Serwice Injhation
As in the West, Inuit in the Eastern Arctic encountered problems with billing, late payments and
disconnection. Additionally, there was a lack of communication between the carrier and the native
population because of language problems. For years, Bell did not consider that many Inuit were
unilingual and mailed out its bills and correspondence in English.
I didn't pay all winter. I answered that I had been paying faithfully before but they had declared that I hadn't been. I said that I was not able to send the bills myself because I did not write English. ... I went to the administrator with these letters. He read them and started to laugh. He told me that I should write to the phone company in my own language and see if they could make heads or tails of i t So I wrote them in Inuktituk. (Monica Adjuk, Whale Cove, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 70)
Primary reasons for billing problems were third-party fraud and late bills. Billing accuracy
remained below the set standard of 95% until 1985 (Bell, Quality Service Reports, Item #13). This was
often due to the delay in getting the bills and transferring the payments. It made it difficult for people to
pay in time or to clarify the charges. Previously paid amounts reappeared on the current bill which led
to confusion. People felt insulted and frustrated They also complained about being threatened with
disconnection even before receiving the bill. Inuit, who could neither speak nor write in English, just paid
for the calls because they didn't know what else to do.
Initially there was no local agency so people used postal money orders. Yet given the slow postal
service, they were at risk of getting disconnected because the payment didn't reach the Bell office in time.
Also, when the post office ran out of money orders, people were unable to pay bills (Garwood, 1978: 229).
The CRTC requested Bell to establish local collection agencies which report payments over the phone to
avoid punishments because of slow mail.
Information transfer and good communication links between the sender and the receiver of a ,
technology are two important issues for a successful technology transfer, yet these have been problem
areas in the North. Evidence gathered at the northern hearings showed that Bell Canada did little to
inform its northern customers about policies, services, and procedures. The questions addressed to Bell by
individual customers at the community hearings revealed little or no understanding of Bell's different
service offerings and their associated costs or the company's billing procedures and policies. In particular,
nothing seemed to be known about the rebate policy. People were not informed about advance payments
and why they had to pay them. ITC recommended an education campaign and a bilingual letter
informing people about the different services, discounts, and contact people to report their claims to. The
trilingual telephone directory was considered insufficient to meet these needs.
People also resented having to pay for access to the telephone system, when their phones were out
of order for days or weeks and they did not know what to do. Bell confirmed its policy of adjusting
charges, yet admitted it had not informed its customers about the necessary requirements for getting
refunds. To improve communicasions between Bell Canada and the communities, the Inuit suggested that
a local agent should be hired who could act as a mediator and translator. The CRTC also requested Bell
Canada to establish a community agency program to improve communications. It was implemented over
the last few years.
Because there was a lack of Inuktituk-speaking operators, unilingual Inuit could not communicate
with the Ottawa operators. It lead to "confusion and mistakes, and waste of time and loss of money in a
lot of calls." (KC, 1977: 7). Inuit therefore recommended to have Inuktituk-speaking operators and to
also have the directory translated into syllabics.
Bell was required to treat the operator and information campaign issue with urgency. The next
edition of the trilingual (English, French, Inuktituk) directory should be a more useful tool for the
northern subscriber, be free of major errors, contain maps relevant to the area and provide information
appropriate to northern communities (CRTC, Telecom Decision 78-7: 17). In the 1980 decision, the
. commission still had to emphasize that Bell should address the outstanding issues of repair problems and
. adequate information. Since 1981 the major issue has shifted from establishing and maintaining reliable
telephone service and providing adequate information to the pricing of northern telephone rates.
The Bell Northern Rate Structure
The valueofservice approach to telephone rates, which underlies current regulation, correlates
value of telephone with distance. 1.e. the longer the distance, the higher the value of the call and thus the
charge per minute. It is a rationale that was appropriate for land-line facilities but is obsolete for
satellites. A call From Igloolik, for example, travels about 35,000 kilometers into the sky. where it is
bounced off a satellite to travel another 35,000 km to reach a neighbouring community 50 or 200
kilometers away. Yet the customer is charged different rates depending on the distance. The "value" of
reaching the nearest regional center to inquire about a social service - in southern communities this would
be a local call - is thus increasing the farther the community is away and many times higher than in the
south.
Inuit have emphasized their reliance on telecommunications for social and economic development
which is reflected in the heavy use of the telephone. Table 4.8. shows the differences in usage of
residences, with a generally heavier use of long distance communication in small settlements compared to
the northern economic centers. A few communities in the southern Bell region are included for
comparative reasons. Table 4.9. provides the data for business phones, reflecting the generally greater
reliance on communication links to the south. In 1983, of the 2,011,898 calls of the remote North,
including remote northern Quebec and Ontario, 897,397 (44.6%) were intra-regional calls, 333,360 (16.6%)
originated outside and 781,141 (38.8%) terminated outside the north (Bell, 1984, Follow-up Item
81-15:01,27 July 1984, own computation). This also indicates the heavy use and reliance of both
north-north and north-south communications.
The average annual revenue from long distance service per main station in the NWT in 1975 was
$374 and in 1976 $400, compared to $139 and $159, respectively, for the total Bell territory. The average
- annual revenue from long distance toll per main station was thus 2.6 times greater in the NWT than in the
total Bell territory (ITC, 1977: 6). Over the years the discrepancy has increased to 3.1 in 1984, despite a
slower increase of northern rates, as Table 4.10. evidences.
Table 4.8
1984 M a NWT Originated MTS Charges per Residence Account
Exchange Arctic Bay Baker Lake Broughton Isl. Chesterfield Clyde River Coral Harbour Grise Fjord Hall Beach Igloolik Iqaluit Pond Inlet Rankin Inlet Resolute Algonquin ** Biscotasing ** Deux Rivieres ** Mont Apia **
Accounts 55
Zone - $35.52 $7.58 $31.28 $32.94 $46.12 $27.02 $64.40 $18.50 $31.28 $13.81 $39.50 $16.62 $7.86
North $35.53 $7.69 31.60 $32.94 $46.51 $29.47 $70.08 18.57 $31.31 $14.67 $39.78 $16.77 $8.89
World $67.14 $67.14 $53.26 $96.68 $57.24 $77.47 $115.64 $64.54 $41.91 $67.02 $68.57 $71.45 $76.33 $3.90 $19.56 $26.72 $20.40
Note: Zone refers refers to the total Trans-Canada and
to each of Remote Northern Ontario, NWT, and Northern Quebec. North northern region, Bell to -all Bell Canada territories, and World to Bell, international.
** Southern 9eU exchanges for compdwr
Source: Bell, Follow-up Item 81-15:01, 27 July 1984.
Table 4.9
1984 Mean NWT Originated MTS Charges per Business Account
Exchange
Arctic Bay Baker Lake Broughton Isl. Chesterfield Clyde River Coral Harbour Grise Fjord Hall Beach Igloolik Iqaluit Pond Inlet Rankin Inlet Resolute Algonquin Biscotasing Deux Rivieres Mont Apica
Accounts 37
Source: Bell, Follow-up Item 81-15:01, 27
Zone -
July 1984.
North World -
Table 4.10.
Bell Average Monthly Long Distance Revenue
NWT $31.17 $33.33 $43.13 $51.84 $54.78 $58.65 $67.35 $71.96 $76.43
Bell $11.59 $12.92 $13.83 $15.63 $17.16 $19.95 $19.79 $21.20 $24.25
Ratio 2.69 2.58 3.12 3.32 3.01 2.94 3.40 3.39 3.15
Note: The Data for 1977, 1985 and 1986 were not available.
Source: Bell Follow-up Item 81-15:01, 27 July 1984, Attachment
The average length of intra-northern calls varies significantly among communities, with as high as
8.9 minutes in Resolute to as low as 5.4 minutes in Chesterfield Inlet (Bell, 1982, Exhibit 6). Some
communities have strong social and economic ties and the telephone traffrc between these is consequently
high. This is expressed as a strong coxxmunity of interest (COI) which is based on one or more calls per
month per exchange.
In its Telecom Decision CRTC 77-7 the Commission denied any northern rate increases because of
the low q d t y of long distance service. It required a separate rate schedule to reflect the minor service.
This was implemented by establishing Message Toll Schedule (MTS) 3. The use of MTS 3 has been
maintained in subsequent Bell rate case decisions because a satisfactory long-term method of providing
long-distance relief for these subscribers was not yet established (CRTC, Telecom Decision 85-16).
Northern interests groups, in particular the joint interventions of ITC for the NWT, TNI for
Quebec and WaWaTa for Ontario, representing approximately 8,000 Indian and Inuit telephone
subscribers in the remote North, lobbied intensely for a special northern rate structure. In response, the
Commission required Bell Canada (Telecom Decision CRTC 78-7) to study the merits of a separate rate
structure for remote northern areas.
In its response, Bell rejected the economic feasibility for a separate rate schedule and asked
permission to apply the southern rates (Bell, Follow-up Item 78-7: 06.8 10 79: 10). The CRTC
requested Bell to reexamine the study data with a view to establishing a frequent calling plan that
included social and economic considerations relevant to the remote north (Telecom Decision CRTC
Bell Canada rejected the idea of a northern frequent calling plan because of the long distances and
consequently high costs involved to the subscriber (in: CRTC, 85-16: 3). There was no indication that
Bell had employed any special criteria relevant to the social and economic conditions of the northern
communities. The CRTC therefore decided that until a satisfactory approach to this question had been
identified, MTS 3 would be maintained. Yet Bell Canada was permitted to increase it by the same
percentages as those for Schedule 1 in order to maintain revenues (Telecom Decision 80-14: 25).
In the 1981 rate hearings the special remote northern rate structure was again discussed (CRTC
Telecom Public Notice 1981-5). Bell asked again to apply the southern rate structure, MTS 1, because the
circumstances were not unique and the costs of providing service in those areas far exceeded the revenue
produced. For 1983 it estimated revenues from remote northern exchanges as $1.2 million for local, $6.6
million for long distance calls, and approximately $3 million in long distance revenues with charges being
billed to customers outside the north, a total of $10.8 million. The cost of providing telephone services
was estimated at $25 million. Annual depreciation of investments add another $2.5 million, and general
actministration expenses were not even included. The costs of providing service to the north would
therefore far exceed the revenues received (Bell, 1984. Follow-up Item 81-15:01,27 July 1984).
However, the CRTC was of a different opinion.
The Commission continues to be concerned with the financial burden placed on subscribers in remote northern areas due to the relatively low value they receive for local rates and their dependence on long-distance service, and is of the opinion at this time that the circumstances of such subscriber wanant some recognition in the rate structure. These circumstances include the isolation of remote communities, from each other, the absence of reliable alternatives to telecommunications, such as road and rail links and dependable services, the wide area over which their community-of-interest extends and the small size of most of these communities. (Telecom Decision CRTC 81-15: 9)
The CRTC required Bell Canada to develop, within six months, proposals for flat rate
inter-exchange calling plans for the remote northern areas. ITC e t al. recommended that a special
permanent northern rate structure be established with the objective of bringing the northerners' monthly
long distance bills more closely in line with the average Bell territory. This could be achieved by keeping
Schedule 3 rates at their current level and by introducing flat rate inter-exchange calling plans on a
community rather than an individual basis. The North could be divided into three zones (Remote
Ontario; Northern Quebec, NWT) with possible sub-regions. Examples in the United States were quoted
- where the companies offered unlimited calling to a number of exchanges for a flat monthly fee within a
70 mile radius (Hudson, for ITC e t al., 1981: 2,19).
In its response, filed in March 1982, Bell Canada discussed four individual and community-wide
frequent calling plans, and concluded that they were not economically viable. Only off-peak discounts
were considered economically feasible, although resulting in a reduction in revenues. Bell recommended
to return to MTS 1 (Bell, 1982: 5.1). Again, the report did not pay any attention to the special northern
conditions.
Bell argued that providing average costs per exchange would distort actual calling patterns. There
would be a few accounts with high MTS charges that would b m t the typical intra-north charges of the
majority of accounts, particularly business accounts. An average of 67% or $25.40 of the mean residence
bill was associated with calling outside the North. For business accounts, the average was 75% or $59.96
respectively. Consequently, establishing toll free extended area calling would increase expenses for all
those customers with low toll charges and benefit only a few. The average telephone bills of northern
subscribers would not be substantially reduced.
In addition, Bell feared that relaxed criteria for extended area plans would set dangerous precedents
to the future detriment of the Company and all its customers. People in other parts of Bell's territory
could press for similar treatment The Company was not convinced that the "social circumstances" of the
customers in the remote north were so special that they justified unique rate treatment There would be
many customers outside the northern territory who would consider their isolation just as extreme, and
their circumstances just as special.
In an environment where rates for various telephone services are being driven more towards cost, the Company does not believe that it should be expected to perform a social wealth redistribution role to benefit a group of subscribers in one section of its territory, at the expense of another. Such a role, if necessary, would appear more appropriately borne by the citizens at large. (Bell, 1982: 35)
ITC e t al. rejected Bell's position. First, the company's evidence appeared to be based on the
. assumption that the value of service increased linearly with distance. In reality this value was very low
because the number of subscribers reached, even within a northern zone, was very limited. Second, to
provide frequent calling plans to selected communities and/or subscribers would result in a variety of
inter-conamunity rates and be too complicated for northern customers to understand A discontinuity of
Schedule 3, even with discounts at off-peak hours, would not reflect the developmental importance of
telephone services in the north. Many calls would have to be made in the daytime and across zone
boundaries (Hudson, for ITC etal., 1983: 10-12).
Hudson (ibid: 5-9) responded with three alternative flat-rate inter-exchange calling plans. The
rates would be flat within each remote zone; available around the clock on a two-way basis to all
subscribers; and thus easy to understand and simple to implement (Hudson, for ITC, etal., 1983: 5 - 9).
In its response, Bell claimed that the potential revenue reductions would range from $1.5 million to
$3.0 million. In addition, the increased demand in phonecalls arising for the fmt year was estimated to
result in higher annual equivalent costs that would range from approximately $2.5 million to $25.0 million
(Bell, 1984, Follow-up Item 81-15:01, page l).14
In its final decision on a northern rate structure (Telecom Decision 85-16) the Commission
followed Bell Canada's argument and rejected any of ITC's alternatives. It listed three reasons as having
guided its decision:
1. the significant negative net revenue impact on the company;
2. the low interdependence among exchanges within each region; and
3. the overall increase in monthly bills that would be experienced by some subscribers under some of
the plans.
The Commission did not see any reason to further reduce Schedule 3 in relation to Schedule 1.
The already established rate structure should continue unaltered. As approved in Telecom Order 86-823,
the current MTS 1 and 3 rates are outlined in Table 4.11.
l4 The cost estimates were based on the assumption that the extension of toll free calls would stimulate a five fold increase in messages within the extended toll free area. This was based on experiences in the southern Bell territory. Stimulation for all other message toll calling was based on Bell's econometric models of demand, i.e. pricedemand relationships for Bell Intra-MTS traffic (Bell, 1984, Follow-up Item 81-15:01, p. 5).
&& Distance Miles -
0 - 10 11 - 14 15 - 22 23 - 30 31 - 40 41 - 50 51 - 60 61 - 80 81 - 100 101 - 130 131 - 160 161 - 200 201 - 250 251 - 300 301 - over
Table 4.11.
Bell Canada Rate Schedule 1 and 3
Schedule 1 $/Min
Schedule 3 $/Min.
% Discount -
Source: Bell Canada, General Tariff, CRTC 6716, 19 December 1986; own computation.
The CRTC also ordered Bell to extend its Ecom- Pak, or frequent caller plan, to the remote North.
Under this plan, customer dialed calls to a particular exchange within the Bell area between noon and 8
p.m. pay a flat monthly charge of $17.45 for the initial 60 minutes of accumulated calls and $3.45 for each
additional 15 minutes (General Tariff, Item 3170; Telecom Order 86-77). The CRTC argued that the
calling patterns of remote northern subscribers showed heavy use both within the northern region and to
the south. Subscribers to the Econo-Pak should be able to make calls to either Ontario or Quebec during
the 8 A.M. to 8 P.M. period (CRTC, Telecom Decision 85-16: 5-6).
In March 1986, ITC etal. petitioned - unsuccessfully - to revoke the CRTC Decision 85-16. It
argued that the CRTC applied the wrong policy in determining the appropriate long distance rate for
telephone users in the remote north; allowed unjust discrimination by Bell, and thus rates which were not
reasonable or just As none of the members of the CRTC who rendered the 1985 decision were at the
hearings in 1976 the decision appeared to be based on lack of knowledge of relevant facts and policy.
(ITC etal. 1986: 2)
In its decision, the CRTC thus took more notice of the revenue impact on Bell Canada than on the
socio-economic situation of remote northern telephone users.lS Bell Canada's argument has been that
service in the north is more costly to provide. Yet the impact on Bell is relatively small when compared
to the total revenues. Using Bell's estimated loss in revenues of $3 million for a test year and up to $20
million additional network cost increases, and Bell's operating revenues of $6,255 million for 1986 (CRTC,
1986: 78), the potential revenue loss translates into a maximum of 0.004% of Bell Canada's revenues.
Using Bell's operating income of $1,738 million the income loss translates to 1.32%.
Ex~eriences Portable Freauency Trail Radio
Satellite supported telephone brought interactive point-to-point communication links, but not low
cost teleconferencing or mobile communication capacity, as it has been possible with HF trail radios.
Since 1970, the Inuit have repeatedly expressed their need for portable HF radios. They have a
low sound quality and are not very reliable, yet their miniaturization, light weight, relatively low costs,
easy use and simple maintenance have made the trail radios increasingly important. The Inuit have also
recommended a pool of portable equipment for every settlement to be leased or loaned to all hunters and
trappers. The Telecommission report also supported these requests (DOC, 1971 8(c)). The trail radio
network should be connected with the regular telephone system to make it more versatile and employ its
full potential. The DOC was asked to develop a special trail and camp radio system that could be carried
by travellers and did not require full-time operators in the communities (Inuktituk: 1980: 45). People
also emphasized the need to have waterproof radios that could be taken out on their fishing boats.
l5 Interestingly, when Bell Canada made substantial excess profits in 1986, the CRTC's order to reimburse its customers, by not charging access fees for three months, was overturned by the Court of Appeal.
Field Trials with HF Radio
The Northern Pilot Pro@ct, a series of experiments sponsored by the DOC from 1971 to 1974,
clarified the communication needs of people living in isolated areas and outlined communication facilities
to meet these needs. It underlined the importance for HF radio for communication both among isolated
communities and between hunters on the traplines and their home communities.
The purpose of the program was clearly developmental: to enable people to take part in planning their own future by s e ~ c e s which would enable them to communicate among themselves, to receive information from the rest of the society, and to contribute their own information to the society (Hudson, 1974: 2)
In a separate trial, yet under the umbrella of the Pilot Project, telephone conferencing was tested in
a CBCAell telephone experiment The system was capable of handling four simultaneous conversations.
The telephone circuit was connected to a low power relay transmitter of the CBC and could be listened to
on an ordinary AM radio within a five-mile radius of the community. The project resulted in the
establishment of a local community radio station in Rankin Inlet (Roth, 1982: 142). Patterns of HF radio
telephone use demonstrated a predictable increase in the lateral flow of information and confirmed the
need for reliable two-way communicatioa The two-way network was considered important for personal
well-being, the development of social and political awareness, and for political and economic
decision-making processes (Hudson, 1974: 209-210).
The project had significant impacts upon the DOC, notably "a growing interest at the regional level
in responding to social communication needs, ... wenine; of a dialoaue between technically and socially
oriented people in DOCn (Hudson, 1974: 213). There was a stated influence on policy formation and
communication projects, i.e. a project management that emphasized the participation of users in all phases
of the project. This was adapted in the Inukshuk project. In addition, ITC asked the DOC to help install
similar two-way networks elsewhere in the Arctic. The DOC network was more reliable than Bell
Canada's radio telephone network.
One of the major shortcomings has been the lack of co-ordination with other communication activity and planning in the areas. For example, the people in the Keewatin were not consulted in the selection of sites for Anik ground stations nor even adequately informed of
the services they will receive, And the knowledge of communication needs and priorities and of the approach used by the NPP was not conveyed effectively to Telesat, Bell, or the CBC (Hudson, 1974: 217).
By the late 1970s mobile HF radios were developed. They were effective under severe arctic
conditions and rough handling, could be easily transported by snowmobile or speedboat and set up within
minutes. They provided two-way single sideband communications within a 30 to 350 km range,
depending on the power of the radio, the terrain and the atmospheric conditions (Axtell, 1981: 31). For I
short distances, small, hand-held VHF transceivers (CB) are sufficient. If hunting groups plan to go
further away, they carry the larger HF transceiver with a greater range.
The DOC f m c e d several other field trials in the Mackenzie Valley (Robbins, 1974), Northern
Quebec (Inuktituk, 1980; Boulay, 1983), and Labrador (Axtell, 1981), to test equipment and usage. They
all proved the value of the technology for emergencies, regular contact with the community, and general
information exchange to reduce feelings of isolation After the trials were terminated, the equipment
remained with the Hunters and Trappers Associations.
A special technical application was tested in the Northern Quebec trial, where a repeater radio was
installed about twenty kilometers away from the settlement, run by a battery and functioned down to
temperatures of -50•‹ (Inuktituk, 1980: 46). It picked up the relatively weak signal, increased its power
and sent out a strong signal that cut through local interference so that it was heard clearly on any of the
community radios. Similarly, the returning call was picked up and transmitted to the traveller as a much
stronger signal. Because the radios had no background noise when they were not in use, people were not
tempted to turn them down or shut them off. It meant that there was a twenty-four hour emergency
system that needed no supervision until there actually was an emergency.
People in Koartak have been using the system for three years and have found it to be a very useful tool to the traveller. One day all Inuit communities may have this new service. (Inuktitk 1980: 49).
Yet the trial was not developed into a general service. Inuit still have to use HF radio without the
repeater that significantly improves the quality of land-community communication. The trail radio
system Is still not connected to the telephone system.
Usage of Trail Radio
In 1977, Mercer (1977: 19) reported that Inuit in Northern Quebec Frequently used the old HF
radio telephone system, despite Bell's telephone service "because it's free, and one hears more news from
other communities by listening to other people's conversations." Radio communication through the small
trail radios, which is not dependent upon the common carriers, has been widely diffused
There are a few families in every community that stay in outpost camps for most parts of the year
and virtually every family spends some time out on the land every year hunting and fishing. Individual
hunters and trappers, whole families and groups of families are scattered along, and hunting parties often
travel hundreds of kilometers by snowmobile in search of game and are gone for days without contact
with the community. Sickness, injury or mechanical breakdown out on the land, with no means of
communication, is no longer tolerated as a reality of living in the north. Every winter snowmobiles break
down in isolated places, or the weather turns so bad that machines Freeze in their tracks. People need
days to get back, while the whole village worries. Since all the radio sets operate at the same frequency
every community can be reached at the same time.
Listening to HF radio is a much-appreciated opportunity to exchange news. Families sit together
to listen to the messages, and conversations center around what is heard. Messages include where game
was sighted or shot, weather or terrain conditions, tools required, community events and results of hockey
games. The radios are also important for the logistics of tourism activities, like sports-hunting, fishing
and camp-life. Usually, the caller manges a radio schedule for a particular time of the day. Sbmetimes
the reliability is low because of signal weakness, radio interference, or other people using the frequency.
People then have to try several times until they get through with sufficient signal strength.
In each community some trail radios are available through the Hunters and Trappers Association
(HTA), which takes care of the license fee required to operate the radios ($76.00 for the initial year and
$58.00 for renewals) and maintains the equipment. In some cases, the HTAs did not bother to obtain a
license. Yet in order to get financial support, they have to follow the administrative requirements.
The Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) provides a special support program for
renewable resourcebased businesses that also covers the costs of HF radios to support the livelihood of
hunten and trappers. The program began in 1977 for five years and was twice extended until March
1987. During the last extension, From June 1984 to March 1987, it funded 244 HF radio purchases in the
NWT. Most applications were made in the early years when the program was established and portable
HF radios entered the marked on a large scale (Bob Decker, Yellowknife, interview). A major problem is
the maintenance of the equipment To establish rental agreements and collect revenues for repairs has
worked in only a few communities.
Yet a much larger number than presently available is required to adequately meet the needs. As a
result, people who are frequently out on the land and depend on it for a living have purchased their own
equipment, which costs between $17,000 and $23,000. Increasingly these private purchasers get
reimbursed through the DRIE program.
The battery-operated HF radios have been used extensively for many years now and have proven
themselves important for interactive communication. Yet the government policy to test the equipment on
a trial basis only reflects the tendency already discussed earlier: testing new applications but failing to
implement services. The full potential of the technology is forgone. Despite the low sound quality and
the limited reliability, trail radios have become a much-used tool in supporting the traditional life-style.
They permit unrestricted interactive and inter-community communication in the native language at little
Ex~eriences with Mobile Teleohone
Another form of land-community communication is the VHF mobile telephone. It is offered as a
commercial service by the common carriers as part of the general network and allows private
conversations. However, it involves expensive equipment and toil calls and has only a range of 50 to 60
kilometers.
In promoting mobile satellites and cellular radio, the federal government has stressed the potential
of these new technologies for remote regions and people travelling, by offering reliable service with good
voice quality. Mobile telephone thus could be a valuable and heavily used tool for northern residents.
However, the high rates for this service have prevented its widespread use. Once MSAT services become
available in the 1990's, it is questionable whether the tilting of the satellite will allow proper reception in
the Arctic region Also, the service will be substantial, similar to those of VHS telephone.
The VHF mobile telephone service has to be distinguished from fixed or mobile HF radio
telephone stations where no regular telephone is available. The latter has a range of thousands of
kilometers, but a lower voice quality. These radio telephones also connect to the general telephone
system but do not allow privacy. It is the single side band radio-telephone network described earlier.
Technological developments have significantly improved the service, and some systems even allow direct
dialing. Nevertheless, people in some areas and at outpost camps that subscribe to the HF radio
telephone service have regularly complained about the high costs. They have no alternative service. This
issue has emerged in NWTel's rate hearings.
Users paid a minimum monthly charge of $8.55 until 1985, when NorthwesTel applied to raise the
fee to $12.00. The CRTC not only refused, but ordered the company to reduce network access charge to
$2.90 per month for residential and $4.90 for business subscribers, equal to the multi-party access rate per
month, because mobile telephone users similarly have to share the radio frequency.
Mobile radio users have repeatedly complained about the high costs involved in mobile telephoning
and the disadvantages they have to cope with. Increasingly, users buy their own equipment, which ranges
between $1,000 and $2,000. With a licence fee of $58.00 (raised in 1985 from $26.00) to the DOC, and an
assumed amortization of equipment of $120.00, yearly costs total $280.60, or $23.38 per month minimum.
This means a premium of up to 1500% for normal service. In addition users pay for each call, including
local calls on a per-minute basis ($0.40 as approved in CRTC Telecom Decision 87-3,26 February 1987)
and also a service charge of $14.35.
Thus we have a captive market of telephone subscribers that have underwritten almost all capital costs themselves and merely require an operator to connect their calls. I recognize the labour intensive nature of handing radio telephone calls and my expensive phone bill attests to the fact that, like other radio-phone users, I pay a fair price for this service (S. Gilbert, Yellowknife, NWTel, Intervention # 006)
The subscribers pay person-to-person (rather than the cheaper station-to-station) day rates for all
long distance calls, regardless of time. They complain that there is no rationale for a denial of evening or
night rates because calls beyond the community use the same lines as do regular calls. This adds to a
significant loss in discounts. An intervenor used his latest phone bill of $216 for April 1985 for mobile
telephone calls to indicate the problems. All his calls were made after 6 P.M and he thus had lost at least
$54.02 in discounts. If station-to-station or night rates were applied, the foregone discount would have
been even higher. The intervener felt he paid $71.18 in excess, including amortization of equipment and
license fees, of what it would cost a normal telephone subscriber.
In the North a radio telephone is a basic utility, often a necessity, and should be made available at the same rates as regular telephone subscribers. (S. Holmes, NWTel, 1985, Intervention 004).
NorthwesTel has expanded its automated mobile telephone service (AMTS). Yet the Company
admits that "mobile usage can generate high volumes of trmc at certain times of the fear" (CRTC
Telecom Decision 87-3: 13). In plain words, the lines are still busy. According to NorthwesTel's
expansion plan of AMTS, it will take another five years to improve the basic service to a "reasonable"
level for a basic service (NWTel, 1987 (b): 11-12). In 1986, NorthwesTel had 2,709 business subscribers
with mobile and fixed stations and 181 residential fixed-station subscribers, for whom mobile telephone
was the only way of having access to the telephone system. Envisioned revenues for 1987 for these
telephones, excluding the local per minute usage rate were $77,192.00 and, if local per-minute rates were
included, $101,158.00 (NWTel (CRTC) Interrog. # 2701, 11 12 86).
NWTel charges a monthly service fee to connect the equipment with the general mobile telephone
network and the regular telephone system. In addition, it charges for VHF Local Manual Mobile calls
$0.35 per minute for outgoing and $0.35 for incoming calls, i.e. a call from a mobile to a mobile radio
costs $0.70 per minute. For the use of HF single side band radio network, NWTel charges $0.45 for
incoming and $0.45 for outgoing calls, on top of the per-minute person-*person rate (CRTC Telecom
Decision 87-3; NWTel General Rates, Item 3006. pp. 27-28).
Customers consider NorthwesTel's argument of matching its mobile phone charges with southern
rates as invalid because in southern Canada regular telephone is available and mobile telephone is a
luxury. Yet the CRTC has followed the strictly economic argument and approved maintaining the more
costly person-*person rates. It argued that NorthwesTel should be able to maintain approximately the
same revenue (CRTC Telecom Decision 85-23: 41). In 1986, the rate was further increased (CRTC
Telecom Decision 87-3: 47). In its decision, the commission took note of the need of remote residents for
telecommunications and mentioned social considerations when denying some proposed rate increases. Yet
it gave first priority to the revenue situation of the company and put the burden of remote residency on
the individual subscriber.
Teleconferencing, Teletwe and Data Transmission Services
Since the Inuit began to express their communication needs, they have empha'sized the importance
of interactive voice or audio-visual teleconferencing and teletype services. In recent years data
transmission has also become an important communication service.
The first organization to actively employ teleconferencing has been Arctic Cooperatives Ltd. which
oversees the operations of some 40 cooperative enterprises spread across the NWT. Native people were
trained in the use of the teleconferencing unit. The NWT telephone system allowed only five
communities to be connected, yet eventually could be expanded and the sound quality improved
Teleconferencing proved highly successful to provide weekly communication. It too cut down on costly
northern travel and accommodations. However, Stiles (1984: 32) reports that
Ironically, at approximately $85 per hour per community, the system proved too expensive to maintain when funds for the teleconferencing portion of the program (training of native coop managers) were exhausted "
Audio-visual teleconferencing was extensively used during the Inukshuk project (see chapter six)
and proved highly successful. Here as well, because of the high costs involved, the services were
terminated when the project ended The design of the Anik system, as was pointed out earlier, requires
the use of the telephone lines. This makes it a very expensive form of communicating. Today, a few
Inuit organizations, such as IBC, use teleconferencing on a weekly basis as a meam to keep in contact with
the various production centers and the headquarters in Ottawa (see chapter eight). However, there are no
regular teleconferencing services that link the different communities to exchange irrfontliition and discuss
issues of concern.
For most purposes telephone conferencing is as effective as full-video conferencing, especially
when the participants are already well known to each other. Yet there is also great importance placed
upon face-to-face communication in Inuit information dissemination (Valaskakis and Seaton, 1984: 36).
Teletype services are an essential, though very expensive, tool for Inuit political-economic
development For years ITC has tried to incorporate Northern communities into the CN& Telex
network, which is limited to the northern administrative and economic centers. Yet costs are prohibitively
high. Rates are charged based on a per mileage base of circuits installed to particular communities.
CNCP argues that it would cost over $5,000 per month to provide circuits that linked the remote
settlements with the Toronto network. On this basis CNKP concluded that the service could not be
commercially offered (Green, Simailak, 1980: 7).
Telex is available only in larger centers, such as Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Cambridge Bay and
Coppermine in the Western Arctic, and Iqaluif or Rankin Inlet in the East Bell and NWTel provide
their own Telex network and interconnect with the CNCP network. Tolls are charged on a mileage zone
and time used basis. Private leased teletype service is available at all communities (Williamson, 1987: 1).
Yet because of the prohibitively high costs through charges on a mileage basis, only government ofices
and large industries are able to afford the service.
Other narrowband technologies, such as telecopiers for facsimile transmission have proven very
useful. Slow-scan or freeze-frame audio-visual transmission is also used for applications, such as
transferring charts, photographs or maps. However, the necessary equipment costs more than $50,000
(Valaskakis, etal. 1984: 36). The advantage of facsimile is that information does not have to be typed
onto the system, as is required with computers or telex and handwritten documents can be easily
transmitted.
With the diffusion of micro-computers in businesses, electronic mail has become increasingly
important Most of the electronic teletype messages are sent by Envoy 100 and Te1epostl6
Low cost packet switched data transmission services, such as "Datapac," Telecom Canada's public
switched data network, is not available in the Eastern Arctic.
Northerners want modem services and are not prepared to wait while the local telephone company decides what to do. (Tom Butters, Minister of Government Services, NWTel, 1985, Intervention 011)
In July 1987, Datapac was extended to Yellowknife and Whitehorse (News North 17 07 87, All).
In the last quarter of 1988, NWTel plans to establish a regional packet switched data network within its
operating area that will interface with Datapac as a multi-phased project over several years (NWTel,
l6 TO do this, they need to dial a special 800 (WATS) number to access the Envoy system, and then complete the Telepost forms. At that point, CNCP takes over and bills the subscriber according to their rates.
1987: 20). The communities served are not yet identified, with Inuvik clearly being included. Yet "it is
very doubtful if Holman Island would be served unless there is sufficient customer demand" (Williamson,
1987: 1). Bell has not indicated any plans to provide a special northern data service. The most
cost-effective solution is still long distance with 1200 bps and the Envoy 100 Telepost service (Page, 1987).
At the same time, the introduction of syllabic wordprocessors has made the electronic transmission of
written Inuktituk a practical and valuable tool for information distribution.
The sophistication of the technology means northern residents must obtain the necessary
technological knowledge and skills. The case studies on Inuit communication societies in chapter eight
and nine will make special reference to this aspect of the technology transfer.
Im~lications for Socio-Economic g& Cultural Develwment
Socio- Economic Implications
The Canadian government has recognized telecommunications as an essential component in the
process of northern economic, political and d development The only alternative to a telephone call is
a personai trip or mail. The telephone has thus become an extremely important social %ild ecsfilonnic I d
and the demand is highly inelastic.
The crucial role of telecommunications has also been supported by numerous studies on rural
development. A review of the literature on telecommunications, undertaken in a series of the ITU studies,
reveals the absence of a general and comprehensive theory about the role of telecommunication for
development (Pierce, Jequier, 1983: 14). One of the reasons, as the discussion in the theoretical chapter
indicated, is undoubtedly the complexity involved.
The studies that examine the role of telecommunications in economic development generally point
to the high positive correlation between measures of economic growth, such as gross domestic product or
capita and telephone density. Because high standards of living are accompanied by high levels of
accessibility to a telecommunications network, it is argued these investments offer countries or regions
witti a low standard of living a chance to achieve faster rates of growth and development (see e.g.
Saunders etal. 1982). The numerous macro-economic studies of telecommunications tend to be
correlational (Hardy and Hudson, 1981). They indicate that telecommunications play an important, yet
not causal, role in socio-economic development and confirm the particularly vital contribution to
development in remote regions. A study on the role of telephone in economic development by Andrew
Hardy (1980) estimated that an increase of 1Wo in the number of telephones per hundred population in
certain developing regions led to an increase of about 3% in income per capita in the following seven year
period. Investments in rural telephone in Alaska show similar economic benefits (Hudson, 1981). The
literature thus suggests that the increases in economic development are the greatest in countries and
regions with the lowest incomes (Pierce, Jequier, 1983: iii). This finding is important in that it goes
against conventional development thinking that telecommunications are only of significant importance
once a country or region has reached an already a particular level of development
The analysis of the transfer of telephone technology into the Arctic also supports this argument.
Dicks (1977) study on telecommunications in the Eastern Arctic noted the increase in telephone use after
the system was upgraded, and the parallel increase in economic development
Investments in telephone services have yielded significant indirect benefits in terms of better access
to suppliers and markets, more timely access to services and information, substitution of communication
for transportation, management and coordination of regional organizations and development activities,
support of the renewable resource development, tourism and sports hunting, extension of social services,
such as health services and education, and enhancement of the quality of life of isolated northerners.
Hudson (1974) noted that improved communication in the Canadian Arctic led to increased travel.
. It has also led to greater economic activity. Telecommunications do not only substitute travel but create
new demand. The telephone helps to decentralize businesses and support local socio-economic
development by transferring information quickly and accurately. Telecommunications are also necessary
to support the renewable resource development, such as commercial fishing, hunting, or fur trading.
Tourism and sports hunting are also dependent upon telecommunications.
The size of the benefits from telecommunications is not clear (Prentis, 1978: 243;Hudson, 1979:
1-18). For example, costs for installing and using telephone facilities can be easily measured. However,
there is no quantitative value attached to the information transferred in the process. An emergency call is
fairly rare yet may save a human life and thus the measurable benefit may be tens of t h o r n & of dollars.
The majority of urgent calls are made to obtain important pieces of information, solve pressing business
problems or discuss crucial family matters. The benefits of these uses of telecommunications are social
rather than purely fmncial and thus difficult to assess. However, they are just as real and shodd be ~
taken into account in policies, rate regulation and service extension.
Northern residents have to use the phone extensively for their expanding and increasingly
sophisticated equipment and goods. Whereas in the larger centers, people may go to the store, in the
remote communities they have to rely on the phone.
If you have an d d skidoo, you make a lot of phone calls. (Peter Emu, Sachs Harbour)
This increase in long distance communication via the public switched telephone system has had
significant economic implications for Inuit families. It is an expensive form of communication in
comparison to interpersonal communication or the earlier use of the HBC, mission or RCMP HF radios.
Monthly phone bills require a steady income, yet neither the traditional lifestyle nor the seasonal wage
employment provide this steady cash flow. Together with the other increases in expenditures for
consumer goods and equipment for subsistence living (skidoo, outboard motor, gun, and ammunition), the
Inuit are further drawn into the industrial wage economy.
Despite the poor economic situation of many Inuit households, the data on toll-charges indicate the
heavy use of telephone services. It is a vital service and in many instances cost insensitive. The lower
telephone penetration rate on the other hand indicates that for a substantial part of the Inuit, charges are
prohibitive.
The literature on telecommunications for development also says the importance of residential
phones is underestimated in favour of business communication. Yet in developing countries or regions
the residential telephone is far more important than it was generally assumed to be. Its relative neglect by
planners seems not justified (Rerce, Jequier, 1983: 24).
Limited access to new technologies, due to excessive costs and the underestimation of the role of
residential telephone use, has become particularly evident for mobile telephone services. The government
is pioneering and subsidizing their development and supporting the transition into a commercial service,
but high rates may exclude many potential users in the North, who need mobile facilities.
In contrast, trail radio complements and expands the role of telephone at an affordable price, once
the equipment is obtained. It also allows extended information exchange and thus contributes to
interactive intra-regional communication. It has been the most preferred communications technology for
land-community communication, despite the low sound quality and the limited reliability. Technical
options are not employed to improve the quality and thus M y realize the potential of trail radio. It
reflects the secondary role social needs have played in federal telecommunications policy.
Implications fbt Pditical Self- Development
The introduction of dial, satellite-supported telephone service has provided Inuit with direct access
to the technology. They are not dependent upon southern expertise (operator) to place a call and the
equipment is easy to operate. The local exchange and the privacy of the service permit direct
communication, circumventing traditional agencies, such as the RCMP or mission phone.
The studies on telecommunications and development note that there must be a certain level of local
and regional organizational structure and administrative and economic activities to utilize the new
technology (Hudson, Parker, 1978: 271). A report by ITU in 1984 also emphasized the need for a
telecommunications system. It identified several key points that influenced its effectiveness. In particular
it referred to the necessity of an integrated development policy and implementation strategy, and the
existence of a transportation system and infrastructure which support the systems already in place. T&
would increase the effectiveness of expanded telecommunications.
For example, the Northern Pilot Project in 1974 showed a different usage by Cree Indians in
Northern Ontario and Inuit in the Central Arctic for business purposes, contact with government agencies
and personal messages, as Table 4.12 reflects. The Inuit of the Central Arctic were far less organized with
little institutional development As a result a much higher percentage of calls were made for personal
matters and general "news" (i.e. gossip). Hudson (1974) argues that there must be a threshold level of
local organizational structure and community of interest with other parts of the region With the political
organization of the Inuit telecommunications have increased in importance for information exchange and
diffusion. Inuit local leaders, who share common concerns about the development of their region, use
telecommunications regardless of their education or their ability to speak English. Telecommunication
applications not only substitute for other transfer modes (particularly travel) but also complement and
increase the flow of information necessary to establish structures of self-government.
The Inuit organizations make use of the new technologies, such as teleconferencing, data
transmission and interconnection through modems. However, the high capital-intensity of these
telecommunications applications makes investments, and subsequently the customer charges, very costly.
The institutional arrangements of service provision do not correspond to the northern needs. Although
the shortcomings of the satellite system were pointed out at an early stage, the federal government did not
make principal changes to allow cheaper communications links among communities.
Access to information provides no assurance that the information is actually used Existing power
hierarchies may limit its access, or the lack of knowledge to understand the information may prohibit its
utilization. Many of the problems of hinterland development are problems of distribution of resources
I * and power. As such, telecommunications developments may have little impact on such problems but can
I rather exacerbate them by increasing the resources to the rural elites yet not to the nual poor (Lesser, in
Hudson, 1979: 19).
Aircraft or mail Business Hospital Personal Matters General News Radio Operation Weather Unknown
Table 4.12.
Uses of HF Radio Telephone, 1973
Cree Main Base --- Cree Remote Settl. Inuit
Source: Hudson, 1978: 270.
This increasing information gap appears also in the Arctic, where the development corporations
venture into very diversified and complex projects and investment arrangements, for which 1
telecommunications and computer facilities are absolutely essential, while the general population does not
have the knowledge and/or interest to understand these developments, despite being shareholders in the
business. Valaskakis etd. (1981) had similarly concluded i;r 'Ihdr analysis of the Inuksh& project, &at
interactive potentials do not necessarily lead to equal access to and usage of the communication system A
reliable and affordable telecommunication system is essential, yet not the only factor, for general
participation in self-government
Telephoning and Oral Culture: Sacio- Cultural Implications
In the literature, the economic function is usually considered most important Yet the isolation of
northern people and the importance of close social units makes the social role of telecommunications no
less important. The few studies available on the use of telephoning in the Arctic have stressed the
importance of telecommunications for exchanging personal news and for contacting relatives and friends.
Quality of life increases because the telephone permits continued contact among native families who have
been dispersed due to exigencies of boarding schools, employment, health and other needs.
In an oral culture, where direct, spoken communication has played such an essential part, the
telephone was easily adapted. It allowed long-distance communication and information transfer in a
culture where a significant part of the population is unable to use the written form, and where the cost of
face-to-face contact is relatively high, due to the vast distances. The advantages of telecommunications
are considered higher the more spatially dispersed the population is (Lesser, Osberg, 1983: 19). With the
introduction of local exchanges and direct dialing, non-native control was overcome in the sense that the
phone calls are directly made by the users, do not require non-native help, and can be made in Inuktituk.
In this sense, the telephone has one of its main characteristics the power to induce participation and conviviality, two of the primary ingredients now recognized as intrinsic in self-development (Valaskakis, etal., 1984: 25)
It is a fast and convenient way to pass messages around. In connection with community radio it
plays an important role in discussing community and regional affairs. It draws neighborn and
communities together by allowing instantaneous, inter-active information exchange (Pierce, 1977: 173).
Valaskakis (1975) found for a community on Win Island that telephone was a critical factor in
counteracting misinformation due to a lack of regular communication channels. Native people continue to
use the telephone to a far greater degree for personal information exchange than the local non-native
residents, who restrict themselves to functional tasks, such as contacting government offices or placing
orders.
Yesterday Iphoned twice to Aklavik to talk to my sister. She got muskrat. I love and miss it and asked her to send me some raw meat. And then I had to arrange with Ken Borek, the Air Cargo Corporation, to have it shipped to Sachs Harbour. Ojten I talk to my sister because she lost her husband recently. She needs to talk and cry over the phone. (Peter Esau, Sachs Harbour)
Because telephone, radio and television and video were introduced at about the same time, effects
on socializing and visiting cannot be easily attributed to one medium in particular. .' With the introduction
of local exchanges social customs altered. People reported that initially visiting had decreased while the
role of the local store and other public places as social centres had increased. Yet one has to pay attention
to the different stages in the diffusion of a technology. As the curiosity of the new technology subsided,
visiting has again increased and is still one of the daily and widely practised activities of the Inuit. The
telephone now serves to reinforce and extend visiting patterns.
There are some unique features of local calling in the small settlements that can be attributed to the
characteristics of the oral culture and the reliance upon interpersonal communication. For example,
people rarely use the telephone directory but rather phone the coop or other resource people. They also
phone these places to inquire when the flight is due, and whether the plane brought any mail so the post
office would be open. The coop also gets inquiries to check what is in stock, to tell someone in the store
to add item to the grocery list, or to pak on some messages. People use the coop telephone to ask at
home what to get, or to remind of something that is in stock or freshly available (Sheila McDOnnell, Coop
manager, Sachs Harbour).
While personal contact is an important factor in Inuit information exchange, the telephone does not
appear to be an inhibiting factor. Valaskakis and Seaton refer to empirical studies which found that for
information transmission and problem-solving conversations the withdrawal of vision has no measurable
effect on the outcome of the conversation.
As more and more northern communities are buffeted by the effects of high technology and social change, native people's use of and access to the telephone becomes increasingly important in adjusting to and counterbalancing non-native information flows. (Valaskakis, Seaton, 1984: 26)
and - for - Policies
The combination of isolation and small population makes northerners highly dependent upon
telephone service. For interactive communication, they must use the long distance network as much as
southern customers use their local exchange service. Throughout the 1970s, native people sought to get
reliable telecommunications into their communities. Generally these efforts have been successful in that
- today all the Arctic communities in the NWT have satellite or microwave telephone services and, with a
few exceptions, an acceptable quality level.
The Inuit have not been successful in getting services at affordable prices. The average Northerner
spends more than three times as much for toll service as does the average southern customer. The gap in
average monthly toll charges has increased rather than decreased. At the same time, the relative
economic situation of native people has not improved. As a result, telephone penetration is lower than in
the southern regions because many people cannot afford the service, while they are more dependent upon
the technology to obtain essential services and use it for business purposes. The northern rate structure
reflects the lack of a comprehensive development policy. The federal government has expressed a
concern for the socio-economic development of the Inuit and stated its support for Inuit participation in
northern development and local self-government This requires access to telecommunication facilities at
affordable prices. The government's subsidy program supported the extension of facilities into remote
communities, yet ignored the question of telephone pricing.
The CRTC's continued reference to the special northern condition also reflects the recognition of a
policy approach to promote regional and local development However, this is not reflected in its
decisions. The commission recommended the private carrier improve its service quality and reduce its
charges, yet it barely enforced any obligations, except thro-%h the establishment of MTS 3. Yet even
under these arrangements the carrier was permitted to increase rates in a way that widened rather than
closed the gap between northern and southern charges. The CRTC's final decision reflects the rejection
of broader policy goals to influence the underlying cost-benefit analysis, such as the potential benefits for
local social and economic development. Instead it indicates the priority given to the economic
performance of the common carrier.
The Inuit continuously stated need for a quality HF radio system to allow land-community
communication and also to link the system with the telephone company's telephone! network. Yet this has
not been adequately reflected in government policy. The tests with trail radio indicated that new
technologies, such as repeater stations, could be successfully employed. Yet they were not in general use.
The employment of MSAT will provide a technically sophisticated alternative. However, it will be a
costly service and the tilting of the satellite will not be well-suited to the north.
The history of the telecommunications technology transfer shows how the localized authority was ,
removed and the Inuit put under the increasing control of distant bureaucracies. At first, the technology 4 I
was only accessible at non-native locations, and then the local exchanges were of such poor quality that ,
the Inuit remained highly dependent upon non-native personnel for connection and repair. Replacing
local repair personnel with distant crews further removed local control.
There was little consdtation with the community when introducing the technology to allow Inuit
participation. The lack of consultation, the exclusion from important service provision decisions, and the
general inadequacies in information about the service and company policies, all served to maintain
dependency relationships. The problem was worse in the Eastern Arctic, where the language barrier
made the dominant role of the southern agency even stronger.
By choosing public ownership for telecommunication in the Western Arctic, the federal government
broadened its responsibility and included political and cultural objectives in its mandate sf public
ownership. Yet the different institutional arrangements of a crown and a private corporation have had
less implications on service, cost allocation and Inuit participation than the general economic development
of the area and the distance of the settlements to these regional centers. NorthwesTel operates likewise
according to guidelines that the private investor-owned carrier Bell Canada follows.
For the established common carriers profitability, not social services, are the first priority, which is
understandable. What values enter the cost-benefit analysis and what is treated as non-dollar,
"externality," is not determined in the north but in the southern centers of the corporations. The result is
a widening gap rather than more equal access to increasingly sophisticated communication facilities. In
the north the value of the public good of universal access to the telephone system at affordable prices
includes the necessity for long distance communication. Yet the carriers were successful in excluding that
social good as an externality. The CRTC accepted the strictly narrow economic view without giving
similar weight to the socio-economic importance of telephone services.
The federal government policy to promote northern telecommunications was implemented through
direct subsidies, tax incentives, public ownership (CNT, NWTel), or government - corporate arrangements
(Telesat). The primary goal has been to pursue national objectives of industrial development and promote I
Canada's high technology industry. The Inuit were successful in achieving their goals when their requests
could be integrated into these policies.
The Inuit made use of Canada's high technology policy, by experimenting with repeater-supported
trail radio and audio-visual teleconferencing. However, despite proven successes, the applications were
not established as general services. New technological options for teletyping and data transmission
services have only very slowly, if at all, been made available.
The northern population, which should have benefited from the new technologies, is still not
adequately served in terms of access to services at affordable costs. Melody's (1979 (a): 4) assessment,
made nearly a decade ago, still holds true, as new potential services become available to selected
communities or customers.
The history of satellites is one of wasted technological potential and outrageous economic inefficiency in order to preserve the near monopoly market dominance of the established telecommunications carriers. Thus, the further development of satellite communications, technically, economically and for social applications, will produce a wider gap between the potential and realized benefits of satellites (ibid.).
Since the CRTC assumed responsibility for telecommunications regulation, it has attempted to
include the public by encouraging public participation through written comments and attendance at
regional public hearings. ITC has continuously participated in the rate hearings and the regulatory
development, and the CRTC has recognized the importance of this ongoing involvement by awarding the
intervener's costs for the 1978 case and subsequent interventions against the regulated companies
(Telecom Decision CRTC 78-7). This has permitted ITC to continue its involvement in the rate case.
However, it has not helped to recognize the organizations position in the CRTC's decision making.
The study points to the limitations of Inuit participation. Participation has amounted to a one-way
flow of information. There is no native person appointed as commissioner to present a native point of
view at the decision making stage. Increased Inuit participation requires a willingness on the part of the
government to include Inuit in the policy-making process, tougher regulations for the common m e n ,
and a policy that does not treat social benefits as externalities but as an essential element that enhances I
the quality of life in northern regions. The commission's continued reference to the special northern
condition shows the recognition of the need to promote regional and local development However, this is
not reflected in its decisions.
As Inuit communities are increasingly faced with the effects of high technology and social change,
the use of and access to an affordable quality telecommunication system becomes more and more
important to adjust to and balance the non-native information flow and to fa-'cilitate self-development
CHAPTER v ARCTIC AM: THE TRANSFER OF RADIO INTO THE NORTH
Radio broadcasting entered the Canadian North in the 1930s and today forms one of the principal
sources of information in Inuktituk and English. This chapter first discusses the national institutional
context of the public and community radio system and CBC radio programming policies. It contrasts the
Inuit's need for northern regional and community radio services and the suggested structural arrangements
with federal policies and regulation for northern radio broadcasting. It then analyzes the experiences of
the Inuit in the Western and Eastern Arctic with both the CBC Northern Service and community radio
and outlines the socio-cultural implications for the Inuit It concludes with an assessment of northern
radio broadcasting policies. The most important aspects of the CBC's northern regional service and
community radio, which will be developed in this chapter, are summarized in Table 5.1. for CBC and in
Table 5.4 for community radio.
While there is substantial literature available on the early development of radio broadcasting in the
Eastern Arctic (Hendrie, 1983; Mayes, 1972; Hudson, 1977; MacDonald, 1968), little has been
documented for the Western Arctic.
National Broadcasting System: Policies and Structural Arrangements
Since the first Royal Commission on Broadcasting recommended a public broadcasting system in
1928 to achieve genuinely Canadian broadcasting, the problems of sovereignty over the communications
system have remained principally the same: Canadian programming versus American, public ownership
versus private, the responsibilities of the public broadcaster versus those of the private sector, the
subsidizing of culture versus the protection of commercial interests ("cultural industries"), the commercial
needs of the private stations versus their national obligations, regulation of content versus freedom of
expression, federal authority versus provincial, annual financing of the national broadcaster versus
National Context
Needs
Strategic Interests National Context
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Institutional Arrangements
Policies
Experiences Western h e t i c Eastern Arctic
Impacts
Table 5.1.
The Transfer of CBC Radio
Government CBC
Broadcasting Act CBC Radio
Service Extension
Overcome Isolation Social Change
CBC North
Shortwave Service Accei. Coverage Plan Funding Programming Training
Prod. Constraints
Intm-, Inter-region. Cmns. Community Participation
North-South Communications.
Control of Cmns. System Lateral Communications
Community Radio CBC Access Agreements
Involvement in CBC Support Community Radio Inuktituk Programs
Establishment CBC m d i n g Program Production Employment; Training Usage
Prod. Constraints Information Exchange Language Use Pol. Participation
long-term financing, and technology versus programming as the driving force of the system.
The Brdcasting Act
The fmt Broadcasting Act of 1936 established that Canada's airwaves be public, the broadcasting , system be Canadian in ownership, service be extended to all Canadians, programs be primarily Canadian
and high in standard, and payments come from a blend of public and private sources. Redictably, this
development was strongly opposed by private stations who kept their already established position in the
broadcasting system.
From the beginning, the majority of Canadians had access to radio broadcasting from American
networks and they welcomed the fare. Television reflected the Canadian dilemma on a larger scale,
particularly as Canada did not choose to provide its public broadcaster with additional funds to develop a
complete national network on its own. Against the background of the dominance of private stations
distributing U.S. programs, a new Broadcasting Act was passed in 1968. This Act, with certain
amendments, has governed the Canadian broadcasting system ever since. A new Broadcasting Act is
planned to be announced in fail 1988 which will maintain the principal features of public broadcasting but
will also take note of the changes inherent with new technological advances.
In Section 3 the 1968 Act sets out the government's objectives, that is to be a "single system" and
"effectively owned and controlled by Canadians" so as to "safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural,
political, social and economic fabric of Canada." It should offer a varied, comprehensive choice of
programs and permit a "reasonable, balanced opportunity for the expression of differing views on matters
of public concern." It also asserts that the national broadcasting service of the CBC should be extended
to, and serve the needs of, all parts of Canada. It should also "be a balanced service of information,
enlightenment and entertainment of people of different ages, interests and tastes covering the whole range
of programming in fair proportion, and "be serving the special needs of geographic regions, and actively
contributing to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment" It thus
should be all things to all people.
In order to implement these policies, Part I1 of the Broadcasting Act established the CRTC and
gave it the power to 1) issue, amend, renew, suspend and revoke broadcasting licenses; 2) make
regulations regarding programming; 3) hold public hearings; and 4) attach conditions to licenses.' The I
role of the commission is that of an "administrative tribunal acting in a supervisory and policy-making
capacity to implement Canadian broadcasting philosophy as it is laid down by Parliament and embodied
in the Act" (Zolf, 1987: 23). The CRTC has defined its intermediate goals as 1) fostering quality, quatltity
and diversity of Canadian programming, 2) promoting the equalization of viewing and listening
opportunities; 3) expanding program choice; 4) facilitating the ability of the Canadian broadcasting system
to perform successfully; and 5) ensuring that regulation is responsive to cultural, social and other public
concerns and the evolution of new technology (CRTC, 1987 (a): 4).
Because of the increasingly close connection between the production of cultural content and the
technical means for its transmission, the DOC has taken over responsibility for arts and culture from the
Department of Secretary of State (DSOS) for the formulation of federal cultural policy. In this new
setting, cultural policy took on a more commercial and industrial coloring. It emphasized the economic
aspect of cultural industries, such as the export potential of Canadian cultural products, rather than their
cultural function of being a means of Canadian expression. Those connected with arts and culture felt
that the technological side of the DOC was controlling broadcasting policy which should be essentially
cultural in nature. In was only in 1985 that broadcasting policy was made a responsibility of the cultural
affairs sector of the department, with consequences yet to be determined.
For nearly twenty years the CRTC and DOC have struggled over the influence on broadcasting
policy. Through its decisions, the CRTC directly influences broadcast policy and thus competes with the
federal goveniment, represented by the DOC. The government, in turn, has made smcessive efforts to
obtain power of direction over the CRTC. While the DOC has pressed for the development of new
technologies in such applications as communication satellites and Telidon, the CRTC has given priority to
the programming content produced by Canadian broadcasters. Through the new Broadcasting Act, the
See .for a detailed description Babe, 1978; Johnston, 1980.
161
federal government plans to increase its power over the CRTC and to legislate programming content
policy (DOC, 1987 (dl: 10).
. The Canadian Braadcasting Corporation.- Radio Services
In 1936 the CBC was created as a publicly subsidized Crown Corporation to realize the goals
outlined in the Broadcasting Act. It is given annual funds by and is formally accountable to Parliament
The radio service has to rely entirely on Parliamentary contributions because advertising is prohibited.
From the beginning, the corporation was faced with insufficient funds to provide a basically Canadian
service. The annual approval makes long-term planning difficult, if not impossible. In 1984/85, for
example, the CBC's $900 million budget was cut by $75 million (Vancouver Sun, 5 Mar 85, B 8). Of the
$201.1 million spent for radio broadcasting, $39.7 million were used for distribution and $161.4 for
programming, and of these $128.9 million went to AM, $25.4 million to FM and $7.1 million to the
Northern service (CBC, 1985 (a)). There seems to be no practical limit, except political opportunity, to
how far the government of the day may reduce CBC's budget
Through a network of terrestrial and satellite links, feeding 1268 CBC owned radio and television
transmitters, the CBC has reached nearly all Canadian households.
CBC radio has been generally praised for its excellent service and for its contribution to the
socio-cultural fabric of Canada. A recent Task Force on Broadcasting Policy (1986) therefore strongly
recommended that at the minimum the CBC be spared any further cutbacks which have already forced
the corporation to cut its services to the bone.
Praising CBC Radio while reducing its resources puts the decision maker in an awkward position. CBC Radio needs more than lip service paid to its virtues; it also needs some reasonable assurances that it will be allowed to maintain as least its present leqels of service, rather than risk becoming the poor cousin to television, which gets lavished, if not with praise, at least with the devout attention of the policy makers. (DOC, 1986: 289)
To guarantee a minimum of Canadian programming, the CRTC has imposed content requirements.
However, commercial AM and FM stations have been under much less demanding requirements than the
CRTC Licensing Pdicy on Community Radio
Community radio has played only a fringe role in the Canadian broadcasting system. Its
development has been mainly shaped by CRTC regulatory policies. In 1973 the CRTC established its FM
radio license policy which included a special class of licenses for education, institutional and community
access purposes. According to these guidelines, the community station must be owned or controlled by a
non-profit organization whose structure provides for membership, management, operation and
programming which comes primarily from the community at large. The rules were developed with a view
to urban areas. Remote community radio stations automatically had to fit within these parameters.
Because the CRTC considered community radio to be a volunteer organization, it was reluctant to allow
the licensees to become involved in conventional commercial activity. The CRTC also felt that there was
no need for federal funding and apposed direct government subsidies because this could lead to political
interference in program policies (DSOS, 1986: 3/6).
In 1975 the commission relaxed its ruling and allowed some stations to engage in a form of
restricted commercial activity. In remote areas with inadequate radio service and little or no local
competition, licensees were authorized to broadcast conventional advertising (DSOS, 1986: 4). In 1985,
the CRTC further revised its regulation on community radio. In particular, it relaxed its advertising rules
to help community stations improve their financial situation because the Commission recognized the
importance of local programming (CRTC Public Notice 1985-194: 7). Its new definition of community
radio included reference to specific programming criteria designed to ensure that the programming be
authentically community-oriented, and that community participation exist at all leyels.
* For example, FM stations have to broadcast only 30% Canadian music during prime time hours (in contrast to television with a minimum of 50% Canadian content) and recently the AM regulations were relaxed to permit AM stations to carry advertising and to decrease the amoLht of foreground programming, i.e. spoken word (CRTC Decision 1986-248).
The Task Force on Broadcasting Policy also confiied the right of access of all Canadian to the
broadcasting system. It recognized community radio as one of the components of the system (1986: 154).
In its response, the CRTC agreed that community broadcasting should be supported by whatever means '
possible, and be considered an integral part within the entire broadcasting system (CRTC 1987 (a): 8).
Introduction of Radio Services in the North: Government Strate& Interests
In the fust half of the century national defense priorities shaped radio broadcasting services in the
North. The RCCS not only set up the radio telegraph system, as described in the previous chapter, but
one of its enterprising operators, Stg. Red McLeod, also started a simple radio station, broadcasting
weather, news and messages. The service was greatly appreciated by the local people who turned it into a
lively community radio station (see below). During World War I1 the Canadian (CAF) and American
Airforces started broadcasting stations in their main base camps, and the CBC set up its own Armed
Forces Radio Service in Iqaluit to provide programs and news to Canada's Nato forces in Europe and the
people stationed in the North. The programs were pre-recorded and shipped north by the CAF. The
CBC also operated a limited shortwave news service to the north. Yet the shortwave antenna system was
designed for broadcasting to Europe and not to the North. Consequently, quality was poor.
The first northern broadcast service, based on short-wave messages, was inaugurated in 1932 by the
CRBC, the forerunner of the CBC. The service, originally begun at the request of a British naval
expedition, consisted, at the outset, of technical information only. In a short while this was extended to
include messages to medical officers and government agents in arctic regions but did not include the
native population.
In 1933, the CRBC began to provide a public service to people in the Arctic beyond the reach of
normal telegram and telegraph. It transmitted personal messages from friends and relatives in the South
to non-native people who worked in the North. This "Northern Messenger" has been the oldest
continuous program being broadcast by the CBC Shortwave. For years it was the only service that linked
the Canadian North with the outside by means of broadcast communication (Stach, 1969: 148).
The shift in government priorities to promote industrial development and provide social services led \
to increased non-native presence in the North. Broadcasting was seen as an important means to overcome
feelings of isolation. It became the principal objective, supplementing, and eventually predominating,
military purposes.
For the transients, the prospectors, engineers, miners, civil servants, missionaries and others going into the north, the most important requirement is that they be kept in touch with the "outside" and that the programs approximate as much as possible what they were accustomed to there. (MacDonald, 1968: 146)
The CBC Northern Service was established as a result of the poor radio broadcasting situation in
the North, outlined in a Royal Commission report on broadcasting presented to Parliament in 1957.
In a sense the minimum requirements for radio broadcasting in the North is that Canada should provide its northern citizens at least the same degree of service that the Soviet Union and other foreign countries are already giving them. (in Mayes, 1972: 33)
According to Diubaldo and Scheinberg (1978: 81), one of the main reasons for the creation of the
new CBC region was the federal government's concern for Canadian sovereignty over the region. People
could better receive foreign stations than their own national service.
Oddly enough, the signals from Radio Moscow and Voice of America are stronger than our own shortwave signals, notwithstanding our present concern over Canadian content (Stach, 1969: 151)
Broadcasting was also seen as an important means to facilitate government policies of integrating
the Inuit into the southern industrial society by exchanging views and ideas.
Radio offers a unique medium for these people ... to discuss among themselves their attitudes, hopes, and their plans. Only in this way can they achieve a measure of consensus that will lead to the type of action that is accepted as normal in the life of Canadians in other parts of the country: (MacDonald, 1968: 146)
In 1958 Parliament approved the CBC's plan for a broadcasting service in the North. The newly
established CBC Northern Service took over the RCCS, CAF and DOT broadcasting facilities and
established its headquarters in Ottawa, which was considered "as accessible to all parts of the north as any
other place in Canada and allows close liaison with government departments and other agencies concerned
with the north and the Armed Forces" (MacDonald, 1968: 145). Funds were allocated to expand
reception facilities but only very few to produce northern programming.
In 1960 CBC North started a special northern shortwave service yet used transmitters that were
designed for CBC's international service and thus not particularly suited for good reception in the Arctic.
The shortwave service broadcast eight-and-a-half hours each day, with programs from the English and
French radio networks and those especially prepared by the Northern service production center in
Montreal. An Inuk was hired to produce one hour of Inuktituk programming daily which consisted
mainly of translations of English news into Inuktituk. By 1972 only about 16% of the shortwave service
from Montreal was in Inuktituk (Mayes, 1972: 93).
Although radio had been in the Arctic for 35 years, this was the first radio service established in the
region explicitly for native northerners. However, reception was of poor quality.
Many times you can hear a noise but not the sentence. Sometimes too, the program is drowned out by another station ... We Inuit should have our own ra@o stations, because I am sure that it would be better than the CBC because we would get clear reception all the time and we would be able to listen to what we wanted to hear. ( Peter Tukirqi, in TNI, 1974: 120)
To better serve northern interests CBC North established sub-regional radio stations at Whitehorse,
Inuvik, Yellowknife and Iqaluit in 1961/62, and in Rankin Inlet in 1979. A small production unit in
Kuujjuaq was opened in 1985 to report for Arctic Quebec. The centres are complemented by a native
radio and television unit in Montreal and a radio bureau and cenlral office in Ottawa.
The CBC extended its land-line system over thousands of kilometers to parts of the Yukon, the
western N.W.T. and remote northern Ontario in order to connect the northern program centers with the
national network Where possible, the regional stations served the surrounding communities by medium
wave low power relay transmitters (LPRTs). Iqaluit was not connected to the network because of terrain
conditions. This station had to rely on local programming, taperecordings from Montreal, and the
shortwave relay from Sackville, N.B. The communities beyond the reach of medium wave radio, i.e. those
in the Central, High and Eastern Arctic, had to contend with the unreliable shortwave service. Until the
early 1980s, in many communities, particularly in Arctic Quebec, this was the primary source of
information about the North and the outside world, besides community radio and word of mouth.
Inuit Needs for Radio Broadcasting
We need information, masses of i t We need it in our own language ... We need to have that information sp~ead throughout our comm unities... This has to happen fast. If it doesn't, we will vanish as a people. Our future is at stake. (Peter Inukpuk, in Hudson, 1974: i)
At conferences, in hearings and through reports, Inuit have expressed their desire for
communications permitting a) the reception of relevant information; b) lateral communications with other
Inuit; c) the transmission of their needs to those in power; and 4) community radio in their preferred
language (Kenney, 1971, Vol. I: 5-6). Radio is seen as a way of getting and distributing information
necessary to a community's development Without it, people feel left behind.
We are not up to date in Whale Cove. The only way sometimes we get news is through someone coming from Rankin Inlet (Joseph Kaludjak, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 42)
Assessments of the Northern Quebec Inuit Association (NQIA) in 1974 and ITC in 1976 were the
fust profiles of Inuit community views on the inadequacy of Northern communication services to be
published and widely circulated. The most important request was to not get television before telephone
and radio. The TNI report recommended to establish interconnected locally-controlled radio stations tied
in with a central Inuktituk radio production centre. Emergency or safety communication requirements
(trail radio, a better telephone system) also took precedence over television in their list of priorities.
The necessity to move program control north was also emphasized in government sponsored reports
(DOC, 1971 (a); Kenney, 1971).
Radio coverage should be available to everyone as the essential means of mass communication in the North. The CBC Northern Service should be established in the North and be given full program control including choice of what it wants from the national network. (DOC, 1971 (a): 7).
I
The Inuit requested that each community should have a radio program service for education,
information, entertainment, and social action purposes. This included a community operated radio station
in each community, a network of native controlled low power community broadcast stations connected
intra- and inter-regionally, and the CBC northern service. Northern orientation of programming was
considered essential, as was the coverage of radio reception. High powered AM broadcasting stations
were preferred over FM because they could serve complete regions. Programming in native languages
was considered extremely important Local people should fully participate in and operate the community
stations. Regulations and technical standards should be relaxed, as long as this would not interfere with
public safety and convenience, in order to permit the employment of low cost equipment
These principal requests have not changed Recent audience surveys confirm the need for regional
and community radio networks as an important element of northern communication services (Stiles, 1986:
30). Inuit organizations request the transfer of control over CBC's Northern Service to the North and its
eventual integration into a native public broadcasting system (IBC, 1985).
Northern residents have also expressed the need for comprehensive planning of northern
communications. They requested that a special northern group within DOC should be established and
should cooperate with northern groups so that areas of concern and the order of priorities could be
determined The Inuit should be informed of advance planning affecting them so that any necessary
adjustment could be made. They should also be given information in their own language on how to
formulate their communication needs. The Kenney report (1971 (a)) also recommended the
establishment of an on-going educational3, technical and cultural information exchange between
government and northern groups so that all communication priorities could be incorporated into the goals
and objectives of the satellite policy.
Inuit thus clearly requested that priority be given to radio over television, to provide a link-up of
community radio with regional and national network services, and to facilitate participation in the policy
Native groups requested help in learning research methods by which needs could be identified and articulated in a form appropriate to the planning authorities.
development in a meaningful way. The use of an additional channel (a northern transponder) was
mentioned as an option to ensure that northern oriented and originated programming could be transmitted
without running into difficulties with access to the distribution system.
Federal Remonse: Extension and Promamming Policies
In 1974, the federal government established an Accelerated Coverage Plan (ACP) to extend
television and radio broadcasting to communities with at least 500 residents. It was supplemented in the
NWT by a special program of the GNWT to extend service to the smaller communities not covered under
the federal program. As a result, CBC satellite radio and television had reached the last of 57 Inuit
communities by fall of 1983 (Valaskakis, 1986: 8). Yet neither the ACP nor the territorial programs
included funds for broadcast uplink facilities or northern programming production (DOC, INAC, DSOS
1983: 13). Under the ACP, the CBC replaced its existing AM with FM transmitted
From its beginning, the CBC North had to operate on a small budget Whereas moneys were made
available for distribution, there were no allocations made for production. Over the years, the Northern
Service was able to expand its production service and in 1985 operated with a $10.2 million budget (CBC,
1985 (a): 95). Serving a potential audience of about 80,000 thus cost about $168 per Northerner, close to
four times the per-capita cost of the entire network or twenty times as much for the English speaking
population in Ontario (CBC, 1985 (a): 107). When the government ordered CBC management to crop
$75 million from its $900 million budget in 1984/85, the Northern Service escaped with a relatively mild
reduction, given its low f~nancial resources in the fmt place. The cut-backs have resulted in eliminating
seven positions from its staff and substantially decreasing the travel budget to cove; events in the
communities.
The objective of the Northern Service is to provide a broadcasting service to meet the particular needs of northerners - the Inuit, the Dene, the Metis and the non-Natives - and give them a sense of identity with their fellow Canadians in the rest of the country. (Ward,
FM transmission improves the sound quality and is necessary for stereo (which is not available), yet decreases the coverage area around the community.
169
To fulfill its mandate in the north the CBC has to use of native languages (Inuktituk in the Eastern
and Inuvialuktun, Loucheux and Slavey in the Western Arctic). It requires finding a balance between
northern originating native and English programs and southern network programming (CBC, 1986 (a): 1).
In many communities the CBC provides the only regional radio network, and in some the only radio
signal at all. In smaller settlements community radio can supplement the northern service, but this option
is not available in the CBC production centers itself, because the CBC does not extend its transmitter
access policy to places which have professional staff.
CBC's present programming service consists of the AM network sewice - mostly broadcast on the
FM band - with extended segments in the day for programming originating in the production centres
which range from news, current affairs, human interest, historical and story-telling programs to messages
and announcements. Native language or mixed NativdEnglish programs occupy prime time slots in the
morning, at noon and in the afternoon.
The oral tradition of Native languages makes broadcast media a particularly natural means of communication and participation in the North. Our own experience has shown that, when given the qportunim, Native oorthemers are quick @ partidpate as broadcasters and listeners. (CBC, 1986 (a): 2)
Over the years the northern service has become heavily committed to radio production. With 28
hours of original northern radio programming each weekday from its four NWT production centres,
northern productions exceed those produced at southern regional centres. Of the 28 hours, 13.5 are
produced in Native languages (6.5 hours in Inuktituk, 1.5 hours in Inuvialukm, and 5 hours in the Dene
languages) with the remaining 14.5 hours in English. In 1985, CBC North produced a total of 8,775 hours
of native radio programming (an increase of about 1000 hours over the previous and only 65.5
hours of native television programming. Access time, i.e. programming carried on behalf of native
communication societies (excluding community radio replacements of the CBC network program)
accumulated to an additional 800 hours for radio and 300 for television (CBC, 1986: 17,1985 (c): 24).
Introduction of CBC Radio in the Western Arctic
In 1932, through the initiative of RCCS Sgt. McLeod, a small radio station opened in Aklavik. It
was powerful enough to be heard in the Delta, where people lived in their camps. The local people \
quickly took to the new service, became involved and contributed material, time and money.5 They sent 10
or 25 cents with their music requests to pay for the fuel to heat the radio shack. Native people used the
service frequently to contact their families in the camps. In 1948, the m y backed up the radio station,
got a proper license, set up a 300 watt AM transmitter and "CHAK - The Friendly Voice in the Northn
began its oftidal service, all based on volunteer work of local people.
In the springtime, somebody would broadcast all night through, all day and all night for the hunters out in the bush during breakup time. He would announce ifthe water was getting too high, so people could hang their caches higher ... And the door was open fbv people to come in. There were benches where they could sit. Even ifthere was a bit of noise, it was alright. You could hear the background. The young kids would come in to play. (Peter Thrasher, Aklavik)
With the 300 watt transmitter, the station was powerful enough to be heard through the Delta, as
far as Tuktoyaktuk. Under good conditions it could be received hundreds of kilometers away. It was a
people's station that everyone enj~yed listening to:
There is one finny incidence. Cameron McGomery had a program where people would ask fbr favorite records. And they had a tendency to ask fbr one record all the time. So one day he said: 'We have lots of records in the station. You don't have to ask for only this one.' Next time the request came on you could hear a crash and the announcement: 'We don't have that record any more.' (Barnie McNeill, f m e r RCCS, Inuvik)
For the first time, people knew what was happening locally and regionally. English language was
already predominant Yet native languages were also used
People in the Delta also listened to Alaskan radio stations. Occasionally, thd RCCS would send
telegrams to the station in Fairbanks to broadcast certain messages so it would reach people in their
camps. People on the islands and further east along the coast were outside CHAK's reach and had to rely
Although CHAK was a community radio station at this time, it is described in the context of CBC Northern Service to highlight the implications of transferring the southern framework of professional broadcasting onto the community station.
on shortwave radio. Through work at the DEW Line, some Inuit had learned to use shortwave radio and
the heavy military radio equipment However, they could not get a licence for transmitting on shortwave
because they were illiterate in English and thus failed to pass the theoretical tests.
I used to be a ham bugger, I listened to the news, especially the international news. I listened to Alaska all the time, because they had u p to- date world news right there. And when Russia invaded Czecharlovakia, I was listening to the European stations. We listened to the stations of the world. (Agnes Carpenter, Sachs Harbow)
In 1958, with the establishment of CBC Northern Services, the national broadcaster officially took
over CHAK. In 1960 it transferred the station to Inuvik where government personnel was residing. The
signal would reach Aklavik and the Delta, but not the coastal communities. In 1978, Paulatuk and
Holman Island still did not receive the signal at all, and Sachs Harbour's reception was marginal. It was
not until the early 1980s, when satellite dishes were provided by the territorial government, that they
received the national service.
After the CBC had taken over the community station, yet before the development of land lines,
microwave and satellites, it produced a broadcast that originated nearly exclusively in the area. With the
connection to the national service it was integrated into the hierarchical network structure. Many local
people did not like this move. Although volunteer work was replaced by paid positions, people lefk In
the beginning, the regional center had an Inulc as station manager. Since he left, the position has always
been occupied by a non-native.
When we could shut offthe southern broadcast we were more northern. Now we had tofit into a southern system. It never works and it will never work. And here people have little choice. The only reason I was invdved was because CHAK was a people's station and when I saw that it wasn't any longer, I@t le$. (Nellie Cownoyea, Tuktoyaktuk)
The connection with the southern network also affected the programming content People who
worked for CHAK in its early days enjoyed the local orientation and the absence of strict southern rules.
A talk-back show on Saturday afternoons was particularly liked. Sometimes phone calls would come
from as far away as the Eastern Arctic.
The people laughed at the radio. It was such Jun. ... Now it's different altogether. With . CBC, there are too many rules. You have to talk really fast to say 'hi' to the person. They
tell yac: 'Make it short!' If Inuvialuit had their own radio station, they would be peer. Time would nd count. Nobady would tell me &st to talk in minutes w seconds. You w d d have time to laugh. (Marry Teddy, Inuvik)
The frustration resulted from taking away control and imposing a southern logic of what radio
broadcasting is: professionalism and perfectionism. The CBC admitted that it removed the much liked
local and intimate service.
But this is replaced by news of a regional interest which we believe more than compensates for the loss. At the same time the listener is more closely identified with the rest of Canada and receives a higher quality of programming. Vital local news and information ... continue to be broadcast from the network centre. (CBC, 1963: 4)
The network programming did not compensate the loss nor were people particularly concerned
about the "higher quality" of programming. Rather, the introduction of CBC radio network service
reinforced the trend of south-north communication. Only recently has the CBC in Inuvik made
considerable efforts to provide native language programming and to apply levels of performance more
adequate to northern conditions. This means to work with native people who have very little fonnal
training. However, for the n e w m m southern standards are applied. As a result that no native person
works there. In the early 1970s most information provided by the native announcer/operators (A/Os)
came from English language newscasts that were translated into Inuvialuktun.
The native language staff rarely seem to have the time to travel around the area and report on events; this is the job of the professional reporters who are not native people. (McNulty, 1978: 166)
CBC Inuvik had planned to increase its monies for free-lance reporters and travel funds (CBC,
1979 (b): 22-40). Yet the general cut-backs resulted in a reduction of its staff and travel budget, and
consequently its original programming.
Programming for native people is loaded with problems. First, their is the perception of the CBC
itself. CBC staff members have sometimes difficulty in explaining that the government and the CBC are
two separate organizations.
Since numerous federal government departments and agencies which are present in the North engage in activities over which the native people feel they have very little control, it is
not surprising if many of them regard the CBC in the same light. (McNulty, 1978: 161)
Because the CBC is the only regional service available, the news and information content, whether
in English or Inuvialuktun, is an issue of concern to Inuvialuit organizations. Since almost every aspect of
life for people in the NWT is affected by matters such as land claims, territorial division or petroleum '
development, there are numerous items of political importance in the news every day. Whereas Inuit
organizations can use community radio to directly present their position, this ready access does not exist
for the CBC. This is the work of the corporation's professional news and current affairs staff. Native
organizations thus have had to gain expertise in publicity techniques to get their position to the people,
although filtered through CBC personnel.
Particularly in times of political high tide, such as the claims settlement, Inuvialuit in the
announcer/operator (A/ $ position felt caught between the expectations of the Inuvialuit and the CBC. "7 The native audience $xpected them to report about controversial, politically sensitive matters from a
native point of view, whereas CBC policy required impartial reporting.
The Transfer of Knowledge Skills- Training Experiences
Since its incorporation, CBC Inuvik has employed native people for its production, primarily as
A/Os and as translators. Because the station has to integrate Inuvialuit, Dene Indian, Metis and white
people, coherence within CBC staff is more difficult to achieve than in the Eastern Arctic. Staff turnover
has been high. Non-native people coming from the South use the northern station as a springboard for a
career and native people stay for a few years before moving into something else.
The CBC's objective has been to "train senior native staff to assume more program and
management responsibilityw (CBC, 1979: 27). Yet this has not materialized.
With every new management there is a new direction in programming. Basically every two years there is a turnover in management. Some time ago, they had more native people, yet it had fden apart. (Les Carpenter, Sachs Harbw)
At times it has proven difficult to recruit staff for vacant native A/O positions. Suitable people
either do not want to move from their communities to Inuvik or have already lost the effective use of
their language and are thus not qualified. Also, to put together a one and a half-hour show each day
from Monday to Friday and a Saturday phone-in show puts a lot of pressure on the two Inuvialuit, while \
little resources are available for investigative journalism.
Also, because of their lack of f o d broadcasting training the new A/Os have to rely on the
support of co-workers. It has resulted in feelings of inferiority, incompetence and isolation. For years
there was also no regular opportunity to communicate with Inuit producers in the other production centers
about work experiences. Through the establishment of regular workshops and an Inuit Senrice
Committee this has improved significantly.
The Transfet of Content: Programming and Audience Response
CBC Inuvik's present service is the AM network with segments in the day for programming \
originating in Inuvik and additional segments fmm the other regional cdters. Five times each weekday
CBC Yellowknife broadcasts regional news, and there are normally one or two items from the Western
Arctic. Table 5.2. shows a typical program schedule. Sample northern programs in English are the
regional current affairs stories, broadcast at the morning, noon and evening shows, "Trap line" and "The
Mom's Show," a country and western music program. The Inuvialuktun program "Tusaavik" from 2.30 to
4 p.m. is a mixture of translated newscasts, community news, interviews, oral history programs, messages,
and native as well as country and western music.
A split feed, that is the broadcasting of two different signals - one from Inuvik for the Inuvialuit
communities and the other from Yellowknife for the Dene speaking communities in the lower MacKenzie
Valley and Delta - helps to better serve the different language groups. If programs are intended for
younger native people, the usage of Inuvialuktun only is not effective because most of the target audience
can barely comprehend the language. However, use of English only would be an admission to defeat and
ran against all cultural revival programs and the needs of elders, who very much enjoy broadcasting in the
Table 5.2. I I CBC huvik Radio Programming Schedule I
Tlg HONDAY TUESDAY UEDSNESDAY THURSDAY FRIDAY SATURDAY SUNDAY --I-- ---- I I
04@ I-------- I------ I --I
043 1 I FRESH I FRESH I
0500 I M I S ARCTIC MORNING - EX FROB. I A 1 R I A I R I
(1530 1 I PART 1 6 2 I r PART I 6 2 I
oMlo I------ -1 -------------- --- I
0630 1 DAYBREAK EX- YK. I I I 07W] I - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - I EUSH RADIO I BUSH RADIO I
0730 I 1 I I 0000 I A R C T I C A.M.* I I 1
1 0630 1
I----------------I----- THE FOOD SHOW---I
09W I---------- --------- - I NORTH BY NORTHWEST-- I ------- I
093 I I THE HOUSE I I
1000 4 I -------- I SUNDAY I
1030 1 MORNINGSIDE PARTS 1,2, AND 3 I B A S I C BLACK I MORNING I
Inuvialuktun.
I hear it all the time. Where I keep up with my language is listening to the radio. That is important. We fbzrght to keep our native programming. Now we need to fight to keep the finding. (Bertha Allen, Inuvik)
Messages and announcements are a well appreciated and unique feature of the Northern Service.
The news, announcements and messages are among the most listened-to programming. According to an *
audience survey by the Inuvialuit Communications Society in 1984 (ICS, 1984), Inuvialuit spend 4-5 hours
a day listening to the radio. This peaks at times of the regional news and announcements and the one and
a half hours of daily native programming which contain the bulk of messages and announcements. It is
also high for country and western music programs ("Mom's Show"). Often, television and radio are on
for most of the day. The audio channel of television is turned down while northern programming is
heard on the radio. A survey for TNI reported that 35% of the respondents watched television only
occasionally with the sound volume turned down. 38% of the respondents of a James Bay Cree survey
indicated that they watched television sometimes with the sound on and sometimes off (Stiles, 1986: 43).
A radio survey for the CBC in Yellowknife in 1985 showed that CBC English language
programming amacted bemeen 2% md 11% of the total patentid audience. In contrast, the Dene
language broadcast attracted approximately 15% of the native population. Admittedly, the English
language programming has to compete with other English speaking radio stations, while the Dene 1
programs have no such competition. The fact remains, howdver, that when native programming is
available, native people listen to it in relatively large numbers (Stiles, 1986: 43). An earlier survey of
radio consumption among Dene Indians in the Mackenzie Valley and Delta similarly supported the high
listening levels for native language programming, news and current affairs and country music programs
(CBC, 1980: 95-97). The high listening rates for northern news and current affairsprograms in English
occur despite a certain lack of language comprehension and reflect the importance of the service.
Experiences with CBC Radio in the Eastern Arctic
Developments of the CBC Shortwave Service
In 1971 CBC Northern Service acquired its own northward beaming shortwave antenna system and
in 1973 increased the shortwave program hours to 19 hours daily (MacDonald, 1968: 147).
A study of the shortwave service in 1977 showed that the English-language resources of Montreal
were underutilized. Northern stations made only very limited use of the production expertise and did not
use the production center for current affairs. The Inuit and Cree staff produced 16 hour per week of
native language programming. Yet they were culturally and geographically isolated from their audience
and had only little contact with the staff in Iqaluit The evaluator (Hudson, 1977) suggested transferring
the production responsibility to the North and taking the basic feed from Iqaluit The northern regional
center should also coordinate the production and thus make more effective use of the southern staff.
Satellite reception facilities have reduced the importance of the northern shortwave service.
However, as long has there remain a few communities without the satellite or landline transmitted service,
which is the case fos a few settlements in Arctic Quebec, the shortwave system is still important Hudson
(1985: 50) reports that in 1985 1Wo of the households in Northern Queb'ecxtill had shortwave facilities I
besides the nearly total penetration of radio and television. I \
The Establishment of the CBC Eastern Arctic
The regional production center in Iqaluit took over the b e d Forces Service, and on 6 February
1961 officially began its service. Because of the rugged terrain LPRTs could not be used, and the station
was not connected to the national network. Until the advent of satellite transmission in 1973, it had to
rely on local programming, the shortwave service, and tape-recorded programs from Montreal. The lack
of landlines also hindered the distribution of the northern program to the communities in the region.
When Iqaluit finally got connected to the southern network, like the Inuvik station, it was integrated into
the national network and absorbed its professional standards. Over the years native and non-native staff
have been able to develop a programming schedule that is tailored to the northern needs. Currently,
Iqaluit produces nearly nine hours of regional programming on weekdays and four hours on weekends.
The Tramfer of Skills: Production, Employment and Training
People who worked or volunteered for a community radio station before joining the CBC found
production experiences very different Community radio imposes little t h e limits and requires no
detailed pre-planning, while the CBC broadcast has to be of high quality with a well planned program
schedule, prepared scripts and timed program contents, where "time is counted in seconds" (Peter Tapatai,
in Inuktituk, Nov. 1980: 5). Spontaneity is restricted. People cannot just phone in and expect to go on
air.
In spring 1987, CBC Iqaluit housed a staff of nineteen. Of the nine non-natives three worked for
current affairs, two for news, and four in the administration Of the ten Inuit, six worked as A/Os, two as
technical operators, one in the news department and one in administration.
We rather put people in positions where they are directly "felt" by the audience. (Mark Sanderfwd, Iqaluit)
An additional position for an Inuk in the newsroom was vacant, yet difficult to be filled, because '\ +tment people either did not want to leave their communities or did not have the qualifications or co
Because of the larger number of Inuit at the station, support has been better and easier than dperienced
by the native staff in Inuvik.
I started with radio a long time ago, 21 pars ago when CBC started. We like to take people who are serious fw their career. You should fwecast yozc stay open endedly, not &st a short time. That is very hard to find. And it's difficult fw people fiom small communities. Iqaluit is a very big city in comparison to these settlements. It's the impact of the large city. They feel isdated here. (Jonah Kelly, Iqaluit)
On the average people stay six to seven years and increasingly see it as a life-time profession. The
political clout that long-term employees have gained within CBC allows them to significantly influence
the regional programming and the management of the station. Because of the relative autonomy in their
native programming, the Inuit producers can influence the character of the programming. Yet they had
to adopt the professional standards set by the corporation.
To oversee the Inuktituk programming, the Northern Service created the Inuit Services Committee
to participate in the programming planning and administration and to improve communications among
Inuit staff in the different regional centers. The committee is comprised of all Inuit staff with the
manager of the CBC Kivalliq (Keewatin) functioning as chairman. The committee meets twice a year and P
stays in regular telephone contact It participates in the hiring of native staff, the strategic planning of the
stations, and the development of journalistic standards and policies. It represents Inuit concerns at the
senior management level, advises on Inuktituk programming, develops program initiatives, coordinates
radio services with Greenland, and generally helps to develop a collective identity and sense of unity
(Inuit Services Committee,l984).
An issue under discussion in spring 1987, for example, was the desire to recognize Inuit reporters as
providing bilingual services. This would result in higher pay, equal to what is paid to the bilingual staff in
the south.
With the development of the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation and its claim of being the
representative organization for native broadcasting, some annoyance emerged. Inuit working for the CBC
felt considered and judged as working for white people, in contrast to IBC staff working under their own
direction Native CBC staff argued that they likewise worked for the Inuit, some much longer than
people at IBC, and that they influenced the course and programming of the CBC.
Program Content and Audience Response
In the early days, Inuit broadcasters did more translating than reporting, but in time their role has J '
grown to include much of the responsibility for news coverage and current affairs. Today original
- programming far exceeds that of regional production centers in the south with 8 hours and 45 minutes
each day during the week and 4 hours daily on weekends. Two satellite lines to the south provide the
network program and the various feeds from the other northern regional centers that are incorporated into
the program. Table 5.3. gives an overview of the program schedule and a brief description of the
different programs. It reflects that news and current affairs in Inuktituk and English are at the heart of
the programming.
CBC Iqaluit shares a satellite channel with CBC Kivalliq, which produces one hour of daily
regional programming and contributes items for the Eastern Arctic news and current affairs shows while - taking the rest from the Iqaluit feed The Northern Quebec station directly feeds into the Iqaluit
broadcast With these mangements, CBC Eastern Arctic serves a total of 28 communities, numbering no
more than 20,000 people of whom 85% are Inuit
Inuktituk radio is no longer experimental, it is a basis. ( J o ~ h Kelly, Iqaluit)
A recent special achievement has been the reporting of the First Minister's Conference on
Aboriginal Matters in April 1987 in Ottawa. The entire two days' conference was simultaneously
translated into 1nk tuk and supplemented with commentaries to make the issues better understandable
for northern people. It was the first time CBC ventured into such a major project, and it was considered a
great success. Field observation in an Arctic community at that time showed that people had their radios
on all day. At times CBC television was broadcasting the conference in English, and people could follow
the debate in Inuktituk through the radio.
Like the other northern stations. CBC Iqaluit also operates an "open-line" program, the only
program that allows wme form of audience interaction. It has been very successful since it began in 1961.
The Fskimos seem to feel free to express themselves in their own language whereas the transient English speaking population, civil servants and others seem reluctant to do so. (MacDonald, 1968: 150)
An audience survey in the Keewatin region in 197g6 also indicates peak listeriing times for the
community and northern programming. Audience attention is particularly high when the community
radio is broadcasting and drops for northern programming and country and western music. (CBC, 1979:
Prior to getting its own production center, yet more recent data on radio use in the Eastern Arctic are not available.
181
Table 5.3.
CBC Eastern Arctic Programming Schedule
Qul l i q (6:OO-9:00 am) Hosts: Randy Henderson, SImor~ Awa An inlormative mix of current allairs, weather l0rer;asts and tide tinier along with rnusic to gel you moving.
Tamai-Noon ( 12:00- l:3O pm) Host: Andy Awa Lunch-time inlormation in English and Inuktltut. 'irvJing post: special guests, music, spwts and weather
Tausunni (3:OO-500 pm) Hosts: Monica Ell, I'loses Atagoyuk, J o n a h Kelly A prcqrari that fcr;us:& on the life of Inuit - ymt, present arid future. ,
A l l i q (5:OO-6:00 pm) Host: Curt Petrvvich Current allairs, sports, weather m d other information &uul the Eastern Arctic.
Tu t tav l 'k WKl-Q:QQ pm) Hosts: Wil liarn Tagoona, Alec Gordon Current al lairs, community reports, weather and,other information aloul Arctic Quebec.
S l n n a k s a u t i t ( 1 1: 15- 12:OO pin) Produced by: Moses Atagoyuk Bedtime s l o r i a by arid lor InuiL
Regional News:
S a t u r d a y AH (6:OO-8:00 am) Host: Kootoo CSnalik Music, wealher and rqiorial announcements
Nor th by Nor thwes t (8:OO-9:00 am) Host: i an McNeil
A weekly rm~ndu) up the best in news and currenl affairs lrom CPC locations a c r m the North. l l i n n i a r t i it (200-3:00 pm) An scccss p r o q r w n for Ultkivik residents Music and ddic;aliuns lor friends and relalives.
Sunday AM (6:00-9:00 am) Host: Kootoo Onalik I'lusic, we81tia arid regional announcemenls
Sunday R e q u e s t s (3:OO-4:00 pm) Your rnus ic by request 70 p! your musical chuir.* arid rne;sap on the a i r , wr i le us at Uox 490, Frobisher Boy, XOA OH0
Q a g g i a v u t (7:OO-9:00 pm) Host: Ceiestine Erkidjuk k u n t r y and Western music wilh announcemenls
English: 7:25 arn l2:X.J pm Inuktitut: 730 arn 1232 pm 825 am 530 pm 8:30.arn 5-00 yrn
Nat iona l News: Inukt i tut: 8:55 am
12:OO noon
17). Community radio thus continues to be the most appreciated broadcasting. Attention levels are
higher when the announcer of the CBC programming is speaking Inuktituk, with 60% listening to "all of
it" and 27% to "most of i t" whereas only 48% listen to all or most of the messages of the English speaking
announcer (CBC, 1979: 35).
The Inuit show distinctively different listening patterns from the southern audience. The \
proportion of those listening at prime times is three to four times higher than those found in the south.
This peak attention during the broadcasting of cornanunity radio, and to a lesser degree during northern
regional programming, indicates the importance of the local medium. It confirms the need for native
language programming, communications in close vicinity, and information of general concern to the north.
The Inuit Role in CBC Northern Service
The Northern Service employs approximately 180 people (including W and southern
administration), with 26 northern native staff in the NWT "on air," i.e. announcers and news reporters
(CBC 1986 (a): 3). Training and career advancement have improved significantly in recent years yet are
still not satisfactory because the corporation does not and, as it argues, cannot allocate the financial means
to provide any long-term training on a significant scale.
Implications of Training in a Southern Based Corporation
Historically production &d broadcast training has been carried out by a multitude of government
agencies, corporations, interested individuals and most importantly, native communication societies
themselves. Yet because both IBC and ICS do not offer radio programming, training in this sector has
remained the responsibility of the CBC and the community radio stations. Also, in the fall 1987 the
Arctic College began to offer journalism courses.
Increasingly, the CBC has held workshops in Ottawa and in the North and has sent native
producers to other stations.
Of course we do a lot of our training on-the-job with our own advisors. We try to use northern people and do our own training here rather than going to a southern radio station where things are run differently. (Peter Tapai, 1980: 12)
Primarily it has been on-the-job training, and thus a strain on new A/Os and senior producers who
function as trainers. Training costs money and the Northern Service has had notorious difficulties in
getting funds. Nevertheless, skilled Inuit have emerged. Yet a native person, who has been announcer \
for several years and does not want to move south, has barely any opportunity to advance.
It's sad that with all the money we have not more achieved. People felt better with CHAK @he old radio station in Aklavik). (Brian Cousins, CBC North, Ottawa)
In his study on the selection, training and employment of native people in CBC's Northern Service
in the early 1980s, Stiles (1982: 29) pointed out that training native people in broadcasting skills was
implicit in the Northern Service mandate, yet not fully understood or appreciated by most employees.
The result, he noted, is that "there are few native employees in technical, managerial or administrative
positions and little is being done to change the situation" (Stiles, 1982: 29-30).
The report not only criticized the limited career opportunities, but also showed deeper lying
g r ~ b k m relating to the enforcement of a southern framework of professionalism with its rigid time
schedule, technical specialization, and competitive emphasis. Native people, in contrast, would not
conform with these standards, particularly the rigid "nine to five work ethicw appeared inappropriate and
counter-productive. The non-native managers would enforce their rules with the result that many native
people left the station in frustration. Work morale was low and efficiency lacking. The historical nature
of native - non-native interaction thus emerged in the perceptual differences between the Inuit and the
CBC managers regarding journalistic approaches and forms. The southern agency was able to impose its
will and made the Inuit feel inferior and inadequate to fulfill southern journalistic eipectations. Stiles
(1982: 28) criticized the general lack of cross-cultural sensitivity on part of the non-native personnel and
quoted a former manager of the Iqaluit station:
We are unable to meet our Inuit employees on even terms... unilingual English employees have managed to turn that weakness (unilingualism) around so it appears it's the Inuit who are inadequate. We train the Inuit so they can work with us and not English-speaking
employees to work with them.
In response, the CBC has organized inter-cultural workshops and provided training in production,
supervisory, and management skills (CBC, 1984 (b): 26) to increase the cultural sensitivity of its
non-native staff.
The major obstacle to effective training is the language issue. Interpretation problems, as
Valaskakis (1979: 61) notes, have limited trainees to younger Inuit more or less fluent in English. Also:
Whites have a technical knowledge of equipment operation and installation, but can impart this information only in a language which serves white perceptions. (Banks, 1983: 140)
The Inuit producers have to be f d y based in their traditional culture, in order to produce
culturally appropriate programming. Yet this often affects their literacy skills. Inuit who are well
grounded in their culture often have only a low formal education. Those with higher education, and thus
literacy skills acceptable for the broadcasting corporation, run the risk of having deficiencies in their
native language or are less connected to the communities they intend to serve.
Banks (1983: 138) notes as a further factor influencing the effectiveness of training programs the
communal orientation of the population. They use radio and television as an "actual extensions of their
communities, and provide a service integrated with its needs and those of the surrounding area." These
media are approached as something shared and not plainly consumed. This explains the frustration which
resulted from the CBC taking over community radio and delivering a professional one-way broadcasting
service.
Because of the importance of social connections with the home community, the CBC has sometimes
difficulties in finding native people. Employees have to commit themselves for an indefinite time and be
willing to move to the larger regional center with its domination of white men's standards. The problems
of people having to adjust was evident in both case studies of CBC Inuvik and Iqaluit It is also a concern
of the native communication societies, who emphasize the need for close connection with the
communities.
The Rde of the CBC North fw Socio- Cultural Development
An examination of the needs expressed by the Inuit, as Kenney (1-17) points out, reveals a close
resemblance to what the developmental communications theory argues is required for effective social
change:
* reception of information relevant to the social context;
lateral channels between villagers and villages;
a channel back up the hierarchy to present the villagers' needs and wishes.
Initially, radio broadcasting was of little value to the Inuit When the government moved north on
a large scale, the potential was recognized for supporting the intended social change among the Inuit by
assimilating them into the Canadian society. The CBC Northern Service extended the established trend
of expanding southern culture and institutional control.
Over the years, native and northern originated programming increased, and today the CBC
provides a valuable source of information about northern, regional, national and international issues.
People working with the corporation highly commend the service.
CBC has done a great JiDb in educating people about their own culture. We also discovered local entertainers and helped them in promding their wwk. Again, we have to use southern techndogy fir recording songs. Yet is has educated people in the right direction. (Jonah Kelly, Iqaluit)
Northern and native radio programming has increased the sense of unity among native people through
shared information However, community links are inadequately reflected. Regular community reports
are only a poor solution to the requested inter-community communication links. The national corporation
argues that it cannot fulfill these demands under the current financial and distribution arrangements.
With only one radio channel in place, there is simply no time available to fulfill the ilifferent expectations
and needs. The cut-backs at CBC have further decreased the already limited ability of reporters to travel
to communities. Shortage of staff also increases the need to simply translate English newscasts rather
than produce a new write-up from an Inuit perspective.
From the beginning Inuit have requested participation in communication developments and control
over the regional radio system. The historical overview of CBC's development has evidenced the long
standing lack of native influence in basic corporate decisions. Inuit have gained significant influence in
programming, but not in principal administrative decisions which are made in Ottawa. What the Cultural
Review Committee recommended in 1982 still needs to be implemented
Native people should have a strong voice in shaping the policies and operations of a service which so directly affects their lives and communities. Additional resources seem to be justified, and we would urge the CBC Board to give the future development of the Northern Service careful and concerned attention. (Applebaum-Hebert, 1982: 294-95)
Needs and Policies for Inuit Community Radio
The development of community radio among native communities began when regular
communications services penetrated the north. Table 5.4. provides a summary of the main issues that will
be discussed in the following.
Inuit Stated Needs fbr Community Radio
From the very beginning, the Inuit have emphasized the need for locally controlled community
radio, linked to a regional and national network. They attached a high priority to a system of community
owned and operated FM radio stations, backed by a regional radio program-production unit Several
communities in Northern Quebec, for example, took the initiative of installing transmitters on their o h /
operated entirely by volunteers. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the Inuit have emphasized theifneed
to strengthen lateral communication links and to improve community identity and involvement in
socio-political development
Each community should have a radio program service for education, information, entertainment and social action purpose. Programming in native languages should be encouraged Full participation and operation by local people is recommended. (Green, Simailak, 1980: 2)
Needs
Strategic Interests
Institutional Arrangements
Policies/ Regulation
Experiences
Impacts
Table 5.4.
The Introduction of Community Radio
Support Culture High Tech. Dev.
CRTC Licensing Testing High Tech. Gov. Fin. Support CBC Access .
Local/Regional Info
Info Exchange Community Coherence Self-Determination
Community Owned CBC Owned
Community Control Program Goals
Funding/Support Production Community Partiup.
Info Exchange Clmnmi@ Coherence Soc.-Pol. Development
Community radio began shortly after people began to permanently settle into communities and the
Inuit began to organize politically and to get involved in southern initiated socio-economic development
In the 1970s. TNI and ITC were essential in establishing local radio and a network of community radio.
The isolated communities without regional service had to rely on the community radio which also relayed
the Northern Service's shortwave broadcast, if it could be received.
As basic broadcasting technology became more compact and therefore more accessible in the early
1970s, native people began establishing HF and community radio on a large scale. The first stations
licensed by the CRTC were Tuktoyaktuk, Rankin Inlet and Baker Lake. Over the years this number has
increased and currently there are 45 community radio stations in the NWT (both Dene and Inuit) and 13
Inuit stations in Northern Quebec (DSOS, 1986: 12/14). 139 community radio stations operate in native
settlements throughout Canada, out of which 97 are integrated in nine regional networks. Two of these
are run by Inuit in northern Quebec and Inuit and settlers in Labrador. Table 5.5. provides an overview
of the different community radio stations, their origination and institutional arrangements.
CRTC Licensing Pdicy
For years the small Arctic communities were not particularly concerned about obtaining a licence.
It meant dealing with a southern bureaucracy and delivering all the paperwork in a foreign language and
writing system. As long as they did not get any funds for establishing or maintaining their stations, there
seemed no need. It was seen as just another attempt of southern agencies to maintain control over Inuit
affairs.
There is a need to communicate about all manners of things and CRTC knows and understands this basic need, and therefore they will not interfere. Many community radio stations are operating without a licence and CRTC knows this. They turn a blind eye. (Ami Palliser, in Northern Communications Conference, 1978: 14)
However, for affiliation arrangements with the CBC or for agglications requesting financial
support, proper licences were essential. It was not a question of approval or denial but rather a time
consuming process. Sometimes stations had applied and been on air for a year until they finally got their
licence.
With its revised regulation on community radio in 1985, the CRTC has attempted to become more
responsive to the needs of the small stations, in particuiar to relax its advertising rules to help community
stations improve their financial situation. The commission recognized that "a diversity of funding sources
is the best guarantee of a station's independence" (CRTC Public Notice 1985-194: 7). Some of the radio
stations in native communities in the northern parts of the provinces have made use of this option, yet
CBC access policy does not permit advertising. The Task Force on Broadcasting Policy recommended
recognizing community radio as one of the components of the system (1986: 154). The CRTC
COMM.
Aklavik
Inuvik
Baker Lake
Cambridge Bay
Chesterf.
Copper mine
Coral Harbour
Eskimo Point
Rankin Inlet
Whale Cove
Resolute
Table 5.5.
Radio Services in Arctic Communities of the NWT, 1981
POPUL. NON LICENCE AM/FM SERVICE DATE ON NATIVE HOLDER AIR
11% CBC
76% CBC
11% Tuk Broadc. Society CBC
11% NWT CBC
12% Commua Qamani -P
22% Inuit Radio CBC
9% Comm.
8% Comrn. Radio CBC
13% Comm.
6% CBC
27% CBC
8% Private
10% CBC
1958 \
&om Inuvik
lOOOW AM CBC 1960 Prod. Center
lOOOW AM Local+ 1971 CBC Inuvik Mil. 1972)
SOW FM Local+ 1980 CBC 1982
60w FM
lOOW FM
5W AM SOW-IFhi
sow FM
AM
lOOW FM
40w FM
lOOW FM
CBC/Bell Tel. 40W AM Prodcentre
off air CBC Rankin
100 W
Local+ CBC
Local+ CBC CBC, Local access
Local+ CBC
Local
CBC Inuvik
Local+ CBC
CBC, Local Access . CBC + Local
CBC + local
CBC
1972 mil. CBC 1975
1972
1973 1979
1979
1974
1974
1979
1975 1976
1971 1974 1979
1975
BY
Saniki luaq
Spence &Y
Repulse &Y
Hall Beach
Igloolik
Arctic Bay
Clyde River
Iqaluit
pangnirtung
Dorset
Pelly Bay
Pond Inlet
Broughton Island
Lake Harbour
3% Cornmun.
7% CBC
8% Commm
4% NWT
5% CBC
5% NWT
7% Commun.
41 CBC
10% CBC
6% a c
7% NWT
8%
DIAND CBC
4% Kitajuaq CBC
7% comm.
25W AM 50W FM
lOOW FM
50W FM
sow FM
lOOW FM
2W FM 50W FM
50W FM
40w AM Prod. Center 250W FM
lOOW FM
lOOW FM Local Access
50W FM
Amateur SW lOOW AM lOOW FM Loc.Access
25W AM 50W FM
Local
Local CBC. Local
CBC+ Local
Local+ CBC
Local+ CBC
CBC + Local
Local Local, CBC
Local Local, CBC
CBC
C B C + . Local Access
mc +
Local+ CBC
Local
Local CBC, Local
Local CBC, LociJ
CBC
Local 1982
Note: Prior to the NWT becoming a license holder, the community stations often operated without licence.
Source: CRTC, 1981 (b): 27ff.
subsequently confirmed the desire to foster community broadcasting by whatever means possible, within
the entire broadcasting system as an integrated whole (CRTC 1987 (a): 8). What effect this will have for
northern stations remains to be seen.
Federal Government Support to Test New Communications Applications
The federal government's policy to test applications of new communication technologies, described
in chapter four, has also influenced community radio development. Between 1971 and 1974 the DOC
sponsored the Northern Pilot Project to determine the communication needs and technical options of
remote native communities. The field trials with HF and community radio in Baker Lake led to the
establishment the settlement's first community FM station in 1972. It proved to be more popular than the
HF trail radio system in meeting local communication needs (Hudson, 1974).
Taqramiut Nipingat Inc. (TNI) in northern Quebec also took advantage of the government's high
technology policy for an interactive radio network project linking eight communities in Arctic Quebec.
Broadcasting facilities were available in three communities, and a radio production centre was set up in
Salluit. The project was funded by the DOC. For two months in fall 1976, TNI was able to provide two
hours of Inuktituk radio programs every other evening. All settlements received the programming which
was produced in the individual communities. The trial proved highly successful in reaching its goals of
establishing inter-regional interactive communication, yet it did not develop into an on-going service
(Valaskakis etal. 1984: 10).
Under the Anik B Program, Inuit in the Eastern NWT and Northern Quebec demonstrated
participatory interactive applications of satellite radio and television through one-way video and two-way
audio links. With the end of the trial; financial support for the interactive use of the satellite system was
terminated.
Government Institutional Arrangements and Funding Pdicies
In 1970 the Department of the Secretary of State (DSOS) created the Native Citizens Development
Program. Three years later it took the primary responsibility for the development of an ongoing financial
assistance program for native communications organizations. It was expected to provide the technical
assistance whenever necessary.
The Act which established the DSOS mandates the department to develop policies and operate
programs related to citizenship, encourage the literary, visual and performing arts and promote learning
and cultural activities. The Native Citizens' Directorate supports two principle means of enhancing
involvement of native people in Canadian communications services:
1. the exchange of information within the native society to maintain their languages and cultures;
2. programming which exposes non-native Canadians to native perspectives on social, economic and
cultural issues, so as to increase the understanding between native and non-native sectors in the
population (DSOS, 1985: 16).
To meet the first objective, in 1974 the DSOS established the Native Communications Program
(NCP), which focuses on print media and community radio, and in 1983 the Northern Native Broadcast
Access Program (NNBAP), which particularly supports northern native groups in producing radio and
television programming (see chapter 7). To promote the awareness of the non-native society about native
issues, a special $13 million program of core funding has been established for the public relations work of
native organizations (DSOS, 1985: 16-17).
The funds for community radio are limited to support the costs of technical assistance and technical
training related to the maintenance of native community radio stations. They do nbt provide monies for
operational costs, such as program production and salaried staff. DSOS allocated $300,000 for community
radio for each budget year. In contrast, the individual community stations each requested about $15,000
per annum to establish a salaried position to operate the station. In 1985 the NCP was renewed for
anotper two years with similar criteria for supporting community radio:
Within current funding levels, assistance is restricted to costs of technical assistance and technical training related to the maintenance of native community access broadcasting equipment and/or one half of the cost of new equipment (DSOS, 1986: 7)
The present funding criteria of the NNBAP encourage only the development of regional
broadcasting networks. This has become a contentious issue for those native communication societies who
want to strengthen community radio in their regions. For example, WawaTay in Nortbem Ontario argues , that regional radio functions best when it is based on a solid foundation of active community radio
stations. Strong community roots contribute to a more personal regional service. On the other hand,
some societies which don't have well developed community radio experience difficulties in feedback
mechanisms at the community level (Stiles, 1986: 31).
The Department of Information of the Government of the NWT has been active in promoting the
development of community radio by providing stations with some on-going f~nancial support for
operational costs. In the fiscal year 1985-86, the Department gave grants to 25 of the 45 community radio
stations in the NWT (DSOS, 1986: 14). The Department's community radio program provides $5 for
each dollar raised by a radio society up to $5,000. In 1986 the support was increased to a maximum of
$6,000 per radio statim and the generd budget to support mmf~~udty progamming services raised from
The federal DOC has stated its support of community radio yet limited its assistance to the
provision of technical advice and summer employment projects whereby the department hires local
students to work at the radio stations (DSOS, 1986: 19).
CBC Support and Access Pdicy
CBC recognized the importance of community broadcasting in providing thd people of remote or isolated Northern communities with a means of expressing themselves on matters of interest and concern to themselves and the rest of Canada. Through access to community broadcasting, native people, for example, not only help maintain the continuity of their traditional culture, but are able to relate the problems that affect their every day lives, in a way that has immediate value. (CBC, Policy approved in 1974, in: 1987: 1)
The growth of cornunity radio was given a boost in the early 1970s when the CBC established a
policy supporting community access to local CBC transmitters. The policy was intended to allow people
in isolated communities to produce and broadcast their own local material via CBC facilities. When the
government approved the Accelerated Coverage Plan (ACP) in 1974 to bring CBC radio and television
into communities with more than 500 residents, an increasing number was able to choose this option.
Those communities with less than 500 residents had to await funds through the GNWT in the early 1980s. 1
The ACP provided only for the automatic EM transmitters. Money to provide any additional facilities for
studios and community access was envisioned coming through a special CBC Northern Broadcasting Plan.
However, this proposal was never approved The CBC had to back down on its promises until funds were
raised within the CBC and the government to provide community radio equipment
The Inuit made clear at the CBC license hearings to extend service under the ACP that they
rejected the idea of the corporation just coming in and installing its facilities. 'They wanted to be
consulted and have arrangements made to connect with the already existing community radio stations. In
response, the CBC English Services Division established a policy on community radio and set up an office
to mrd ina te access arrangements.
Communities had thus several options available. 1) An access agreement would permit the local
radio society to cut into the network schedule in order to broadcast Inuktituk programs at certain times.
The CBC would install its CBC-FM transmitter, provide the studio package and thus be responsible for
maintenance of the broadcasting facilities. This would also include CBC's control over the basic program
schedule by defining the time slots in which the community programming would replace CBC programs.
2) The radio society could sign an affiliation agreement with the CBC. This required getting a DOC
approved transmitter with which to broadcast the CBC network program The eq4pment would remain
the property of the community, and the radio society would function as license holder. To sign an
affiliation agreement, the CBC required the community radio to broadcast at least 25 hours of CBC
programming per week, including certain important news programs that could not be replaced. 3) The
CBC would set up its own transmitter, broadcasting independently from the community station and on a
different frequency (Mercer, 1977: 8). Most of the communities opted for community access, yet several
settlements preferred affiliation agreements to maintain greater local control.
The community has to set up an independent local radio society to gain access to the CBC
transmitter. In smaller communities this has created some difficulties because the radio society must
operate at arm's length from the community or hamlet council. The existing institutions cannot be \
directly employed. Finding enough members may take time because not everyone in the community may
have the inclination or competence in dealing with the bureaucratic requirements. The society must be
incorporated and legally recognized by the territorial government This includes having established
by-laws and approved accommodation with sufficient heat, light, electrical power and space to house the
equipment The society has to find funds or sponsors and communal support for continuing costs and
train local announcers/operators in the use of the equipment If it wants to pay its program hosts, it must
raise additional monies, for example through radio bingos or membership fees. The CBC then signs a
legally binding agreement that specifies the conditions, including the hours d~&g which the community
can switch off CBC programming.
Ir? 1987 the corporatioo came tq wit!^ a policy t~ clarify and unify the tern md conditions of
community access agreements. The societies have to outline the envisioned program schedule, operating
budget, financial resources, equipment and maintenance. CBC provides the equipment on a permanent
loan, yet on a onetime basis only. Replacements and additional equipment are the responsibility of the
radio society.
The policy forbids the radio society to broadcast or accept funds for commercial messages or to
charge for public service messages. Each local or regional non-profit organization ,may use the
community radio to broadcast their programs once per week (CBC 1987: Schedule B). Most importantly,
the new policy laid out exactly which programs may not be preempted by access programming (level one),
such as regional information and cultural programs intended for communities within the region and all
CBC news programs, as well as The World at Six, As it Happens, Sunday Morning and one hour of
Morningside. A variety of programs are normally maintained unless special reasons are given and
accepted by the area manager (level two), such as the Saturday morning programs. Primarily the music
programs are available for preemption (level three).
In February 1987, the CBC Iqaluit held a workshop on community radio where the corporation was
reminded that programming changes had to get out to the communities in a more efficient way and that
notices be sent in advance to inform communities when technical people would be coming. It was the \
fmt workshop held and participants from the communities generally appreciated the opportunity to get
together on an annual basis. Yet they also wanted to be integrated into the planning process: "The
delegates hoped that if there was to be another meeting, they would have some input to the agendaw
(CBC, 1987 (c): 3).
Ex~eriences Community Radio in the Western Arctic
The first community radio was developed by an RCCS Sgt in the 1940s in Aklavik, a mixed
Dene-Metis, Inuvialuit and non-native community of about 900 residents. The local residents quickly
adopted the station, spent time and money, and frequently used the station to pass on messages. CHAK
was a people's station that everyone enjoyed listening to.
I went to s c h d in Aklavik. We always listened to messages on CHAK. People always send messages. For the &st time we knew what was going on. (Sam Raddi, Inuvik)
As described above, in 1958 CHAK was turned over to the CBC and with the transfer of facilities
to Inuvik in 1960 the lively local station was taken away from the people, and control over an important
means of communication was removed. For over a decade no attempt was made to start a new
community station.
In the 1970s, the Dene band set up a local radio in their band office. Of the initial $10,000 to set
up the station, one half was provided by the band council and the other raised in the community. It was
therefore perceived by most Inuvialuit to be a Dene rather than a true community radio station.
dn the beginning, there was a l d of interest of different groups. We had programs such as . request shows, daily news, community news. And we also brdcas t tapes form the native
organizations, their activities, government programs, for example on alcohd. Diffetent groups in town sponsored their own programs fw half an how. People listened to it. But there was a lack offinding and good vdunteer work and then the community lost interest. And in the last two years it was only used fw bingo. (Charlie Furlong, Aklavik).
The equipment was primitive and outdated and the FM tower not powerful enough to be heard \
throughout the Delta and thus only of limited use. When the community got the Cancom satellite service
for television, with equipment set up in the hamlet office, the studio equipment also moved In early 1986
the old FM tower for the community radio failed, and the system was shut down until another transmitter
was erected a year later.
However, being used to its Monday through Friday daily radio bingo from 7.30 p.m. till 9 or 10
p.m., the community simply hooked the local studio into the audio channel of B(;TV and people had to
turn on their television set to listen to community radio. The system continued until early 1987, when the
community had raised enough money through bingos to get another FM transmitter. Programming is still
limited to the daily weekday bingo and some messages which are passed over the system right before or
after the game.
hesently discussions are under way to revive a true community station with programming in
English, Inuvialuktun and Loucheux Yet progress is very slow, because there is no money available for a
paid staff position and volunteers are hard to find
Tuktoyaktuk, an Inuvialuit community of nearly 900, has also a history of once having had an active
community radio station that eventually terminated In 1970 the hamlet got a licence for a community
radio. It was supported by CHUM in Toronto, which operated a news tapeexchange program and
provided about $30,000 worth of equipment, including a 1000 Watt AM transmitter.
The Tuk station made an affiliation agreement with the CBC and continued for more than a
decade. With its powerful transmitter, and under good atmospheric conditions, it could be heard over 600
kilometers away. CFCT's license required that "a substantial amount of programming be in the Eskimo
language and that Eskimo personnel be utilized and encouraged in all possible ways" (CRTC Decision
70-114,15 June 1970).
I wasn't paid much, but I enpjed it. We had a news slot, local news, announcements, music and dd time stories. We were on the air #om 9 to 12 a.m. and 6.30 to 10 p.m. .. We really need a radio station. Because during the spring, when people are out on the land, they use radio a lot to communicate and HF radio is so poor in quality. It was really use@. (Mikkel Panaktaiok, Tuktoyaktuk)
\
However, the lack of funding and volunteers in this boom-bust stricken community contributed to
its deterioration. Equipment was getting old and needed desperately to be replaced The CBC had set up
its own transmitter, b d i n g ceased with the winding down of community programming, and the station
shut down in 1982, when the local transmitter needed to be relocated To reestablish the station at its
original size would cost $100,000. However, in 1986 a group of residents decided to begin on a small scale
with community access to the CBC program. This would allow a limited number of hours for community
participation and would not require large amounts for volunteer staff, equipment, and money to operate.
Everybody wants it. There are so many meetings going on. People want to know what is happening. Like the question of (ierritcKia) division. ... Many people go to meetings and they don't know why they sat there. They can't read the minutes, so they don't know what's on the agenda. We c d d ask people fbt their opinion, annaurce the agenda. The radio can explain developments in the community, why the arena isn't open, what's happening, have radio bingo. Another concern are people out on the lad . ... Mope@ly, eventually we will go on our own, but right now we have no choice but to go under somebody else (CBC)... We really need a community radio. (Jean Gruben, Tuktoyaktuk)
A local non-profit society, "Tuk-Tuk Communications Society," which was set up in 1984 to run
the local Cancom satellite television service, provides the organizational structure for the community radio
station.
In spring 1986 Paulatuk, a coastal Inuvialuit community of about 200 residents, also incorporated a
communications society to set up a community radio station with a 5 Watt FM transhtter. Yet the start
of the broadcasting was postponed until funding was provided through the territorial community radio
support program. Other communities in the Western Arctic have had similar problems in getting funding
and volunteers to start or continue operating a regular community radio service.
We broadcast mainly music, local news and announcements. On Sunday evenings we had a program with kids, playing their requests, and it was very much liked. Yet we have a problem getting people and finding. ... It worked really good for a year, people were proud having their own radio station. But once p u had the station a little bit, people lost interest. We had to start paying, but it is diffcult to find people working fbr 10 ddlars an hour, and we are a bit picky- they have to speak both Inuvialuktun and English. (Kane Tdoganak, Holman)
Inuvik with its CBC production center does not permit community access. In 1984 a community \
station was established by some local - mainly non-native - residents and run on a volunteer basis. Like
the others, it operated on a shoe-string budget with the most basic equipment. The station worked for
nearly two years, broadcasting primarily pop music. However, it also faced a lack of dedicated volunteers.
By the time it finally got its proper license, the FM transmitter failed and since January 1986 the station is
shut down.
Although the importance of community radio is generally recognized, it has not developed into a
strong movement in the Western Arctic.
Communitv Radio in the Eastern Arctic
In contrast, Eastern Arctic communities have had a long and strong tradition with community radio
since it started in the late 1960s. In several communities there is now a generation of young Inuit who
have grown up with daily community radio and for whom it is impossible to imagine that this essential
service would not be available. Initially, most community stations were band-owned and survived on
shoestring budgets. Often the DOC supplied the rudimentary equipment and low-powered FM
transmitters, although the settlements preferred mono AM transmitters which broadcast a stronger signal
and thus could reach families farther out on the land. The ACP provided high sound quality FM
equipment, which was unable to reach the camps out on the land and along the Arctic coast When the
CBC started its community access policy, many communities made access arrangements. A few
communities kept their community ownership.
Pond Inlet established its own radio station as early as 1967. A local non-native engineer had set
up the facilities. Yet the station was owned and operated by the community.
We had never even though of it before and then we learned about it, everybody loved i t Since 1967 we've run it ourselves .... At that time we didn't know enough about such things, besides we were just gathering for the first time in a settlement (Simon Anavioalcpik, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 53)
\
Initially the station was housed in the engineer's private home. He taught the interested people
how to use it. The station was then moved to the hamlet office. The station used a powerful 100 W AM
transmitter, which was very useN in reaching people far out on the land, even as far away as Igloolik and
Resolute Bay. Because the transmission caused interferences and disturbances the broadcast power had to
be lowered, but the station could still be heard at the popular camping places around Pond Inlet
This is very convenient because if one's appointment down south is due, we'll say over the radio that he should come soon and he arrives before the plane does. (Simon Anaviakpik, in Green, Simailak, 1976: 54)
Because Pond Inlet fell under the ACP, the CBC intended to extend its services. In 1973/74 the
corporation met with the community to inquire about introducing the northern service on FM. The
community accepted this only if there would also be AM service, so hunters and campers out on the land
would be able to listen to the station. When the CBC brought both network radio service and television
to Pond in 1975, it installed AM together with FM. The community station set up an affiliation
agreement with CBC and kept broadcasting on AM. The community had to fix its old outdated facilities
and make do with them until the promised equipment, provided by the territorial government, was
installed in June 1976. Under the affiliation agreement, regular maintenance was the responsibility of the
GNWT, which meant that repair people had to come all the way from Yellowknife.
Yet the radio society was not under the same constraints of program scheduling as societies with
community access. Consequently, it broadcast many more hours than was possible under access
arrangements. Because the equipment got too old and there was no money for replacement the
community station switched to local access in 1978
We used to run a twelve hour day. Sine we got the equipment installed by the CBC, we have to go by the d e s . (Baud member, Pond Inlet)
The introduction of CBC radio changed the organization of the community station. A society with
a board of directors had to be formally established. The station needed a stricter organization to establish
broadcasting times in agreement with the CBC. To deal with the increase in paper work which was left to
the younger Inuit who were able to read and write in English. Community broadcasting times were
established and enforced. They are currently set for 11 am. to 12.30 p.m. (switching back to CBC for the
national and regional news), 5.15 p.m. to 6.00 p.m. and 9.00 to 11.15 p.m. on weekdays and 3.00 - 5.00
p.m. on weekends.
Because an increasing number of paying jobs have became available in the community and living in
the community more dependent upon cash income, the radio station established salaried positions, paid by
the settlement office. Yet when money m s short, people are willing to continue on a volunteer basis
until further fiulds become available. Except in late spring, when everyone is going out on the land, the
radio station has no difficulty finding people to work as hosts. The hosts realize the importance of the
service and feel committed to i t The board works on a volunteer basis and is actively involved in the
administration of the station.
Two years ago the society established a membership fee of $2 and recently raised it to $5. To go
on air is not limited to those who pay, but open to everyone. That 70 families are members reflects the
importance of the community radio s e ~ c e as does the active involvement of the board, the members and
hosts, and the community at large.
The station's crucial role became particularly obvious in spring 1987, when the hamlet council made
clear that it needed the ofice space which it provided free of charge to the radio station. The hamlet
council asked the radio society to look for new space, yet made clear that it would not throw the station
out in the cold. However, people feared that the radio might be shut down because of a lack of space.
There was an outcry. There was a lot of public support: 'You can't close it down because of the community. It relies on it. You can't close down.' Our position is: if you can find a
place to put the equipment, please move because we need the space.. But until you find that space you can stay here. (Rhaia Kanaksat, Pond Inlet)
To make the necessary move requires money to rent or set up a radio shack and pay for heat and
other utilities, which is presently covered by the hamlet To tap into other potential government funding
resources, besides the annual $6,000 from the GNWT, requires someone knowledgeable in fund-raising.
Also, people are reluctant to tap into further government sources because they have already experienced
how much this strangles their autonomy.
The settlement of Igloolik is another example of a community with local access arrangements. For
four years it had tried to get a local station until in 1974 it got a transmitter from the Selkirk Broadcasting
Company in Toronto. At the same time, the CBC got in touch with the settlement to introduce radio and
television. The community decided with a narrow margin to refuse television and maintained that
decision until 1983 because it had no local access to the transmitter. The community would accept radio if
it got the studio equipment to produce local programming. CBC representatives signed a commitment to
- provide $4,000-$6,000 worth of studio equipment, maintain the facilities and pay for items phoned in to
Iqaluit for use on the network service. Igloolik in turn would provide the building, operating costs and
volunteer announcers from the community for the local programming. However, because the Northern
Broadcasting Plan fell through, the CBC had to back down from its commitment and Igloolik remained
without radio.
In May 1975 the settlement intervened at the CRTC license hearings to set up a FM transmitter for
the CBC northern service. It requested rejecting the Iicense until there were provisions for native
broadcasting and community access. The residents rejected the service because they feared they would
not have any access to the radio station. At these hearings the CBC promised that boolik would get a
radio station along with local studio equipment for local programming before the end of 1975. In October
the Northern Service set up the transmitter and provided the studio equipment. In January 1976 Igloolik
began its local programming.
The Igloolik radio society, like many others in the Eastern and Central Arctic, has been very active.
The six board members meet twice a month to discuss programming, funding and other issues of concern
to the station.
People rely on the radio. It is very important. When they have to renew their membership, they rush in to be first. Some people really depend on it. Some were starting to pay their membership befwe J a n ~ ~ v y to be a member. (Eugene Ikpanak, Iglodik)
Like any other local station, the Igloolik community radio has to survive on a shoe-string budget
It organizes regular radio bingo for fund-raising to pay the program hosts $7.50 per hour. The Igloolik
radio society has also established a $5 membership fee per year per household, and $50 per institution in
order to increase its operational budget In this community of about 750 residents. 215 are society
members, which means that nearly every household is involved.
Only those who pay their membership fee are allowed to go directly on air, non-members can pass
on messages and opinions to the announcer. The school, for example, uses the community radio on a
weekly basis for broadcasting a half how show in Inuktituk and English to inform the community about
school related issues and provide a channel for feedback. As a result, communication between the
mmuaity and the school has improved.
Under the ACP four other communities also got FM radio transmitters to receive the CBC in 1975
but not studio equipment for local productions (ITC, 1975: 32-34). Of these settlements, Eskimo Point
started community radio in 1976, yet Resolute Bay not until 1986. Most communities started community
radio in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
In the beginning, CBC did not enforce a very strict time schedule and the community stations
would go on air whenever they needed to. Yet over the years, CBC began to enforce its scheduling rules
and today the community radios have to confine to the local broadcast time slots in the late morning,
afternoon and evening. Yet at special occasions, like Christmas or New Year, they can broadcast 24
hours. People phone in from all over the north and the show is considered "one of the most exiting
programs to hear" (Eugene Ilcpanak, Igloolik).
People over twenty are generally all involved in the operation of the radio, elders show the greatest
interest and have their own show. The teenagers hardly listen, except to their own shows which feature
pop music.
Usually the hosts are paid an hourly rate, yet when money runs out they continue on a volunteer
basis until new funds become available. Usually, the hamlet councils provide the radio stations with free
space and utilities because there is a general shortage of money. The equipment is old and breaks down,
yet the radio societies are financially unable to buy new equipment and the CBC does only repair work.
The corporation is itself short of workers to be readily available. However, when a member of the
Igloolik radio society was asked if he wanted the government to provide larger funding, he raised its
doubts because that would also increase the government's power to enforce by-laws and rules the
community would have to respect "If you don't obey them, the government can stop you."
Some communities have seen several ups and downs in the development of their radio station,
along with difficult periods of fmding volunteers. The low power transmitters continue to be a source of
fmtration and irritation because they cannot reach camps further away from the communities. The lack
of music is dm a concern. The stations amnot afford to buy new records nor do they have access to new
ones. At a workshop on community radio some delegates also raised their concern about the amount of
access time, especially in the period of 5.15 - 5.30 p.m. For the busier communities this was not enough
time for messages and news (CBC, 1987 (c): 1-2). There are also difficulties in finding dedicated people
for volunteer work, particularly in late spring and summer. Also, People who understand how community
radio works and recognize its importance, usually are already in paid positions.
There are no recent audience surveys of community radio consumption in the NWT beyond those
discussed in the context of regional radio. The peak listening at times of community radio broadcasting
confirms the crucial role of the stations in community life. The amateur character is considered a merit
that promotes general community participation. Survey's conducted for TNI in Arctic Quebec show a
high level of audience participation in local radio programming. Radio bingo plays an important role,
with nearly half of those surveyed played it at least once a month. One out of three had their personal
messages broadcast and one in three participated in radio phone-in programs (Stiles, 1986: 41).
The Role of Communitv Radio
In contrast to the national network's northern service, community radio has been native initiated
and controlled, yet the dependency on CBC access arrangements has increased. The financial resources
for community radio have been minimal. Reliance on government funding is relatively little, while
commercial income through advertising is not permitted under the CBC access arrangements. Money has
to either be raised in the communities, which are mostly very poor or come from the government Grants
provided under the NCP have been insufficient for capital investments, as are the $6,000 of operating
funds from the territorial government. The stations therefore survive on shoestring budgets and work
with outdated equipment
Although the federal government has long recognized.the need for community radio in native
settlements, there has not been a substantial funding program in place that provides ongoing programming
support. particularly core funding that would not only provide monies to upgrade or replace the outdated
equipment but also allow a regular salary to hire a station manager on a full-time basis for operations,
coordination and fundraising activities. By the same token, government funding has its drawback in
removing control from the local level to a distant bureaucracy, the very tendency community radio aims to
overcome.
The CBC's provision of equipment, maintenance and technical assistance has brought important
financial relief but does not address the problem of replacing outdated studio equipment It has also
reduced local control. The Northern Service recognizes the need for access. However, it cannot function
independently from the national network, which sets the principal rules.
Public support, provided by non-government sources, has been significant, even in monetary tern,
and is most important for the survival of community radio. It occurs in a variety of form, such as
membership fees, bingo games, volunteer work, donations of equipment, facilities, maintenance, advice
and direct funds. Non-financial support is also important not just in terms of substituting for dollars but
as a sign of community support. Reliance on the community itself has been considered the most
important and is recognized as a step towards greater self-reliance and self-government Yet, certain
major capital and operating expenditures need to be covered and the lack of money has strained the
energy of the radio stations.
The CRTC has recognized the importance of community radio for social development in urban and
rural areas. Therefore it has relaxed its regulatory requirements about advertisements. Particularly those
stations where no local competitor is available can broadcast up to 250 minutes a day advertisements.
Otherwise, advertisement is limited to 20% of a station's total; broadcast time. As a result, advertising
provided 35.4% of the income of community radio stations in Quebec in 1984/85. It had increased from
$733,196 (= 29.1%) in 1981/82 to $1.3 million (Task Force, 1986: 498). Yet this option is not available for
Inuit communities in the NWT, because the CBC access and afffiation agreements to not permit
advertisement.
The regional comparison showed that the intensity of public support varies among the communities
and is much stronger in the Eastern than in the Western Arctic. The differences in local support for
community radio can be attributed to several factors, most importantly, the history of local programming,
the use of native languages, the general level of local volunteer work and locally available salaried jobs,
and the presence of non-native people and institutions effecting the social coherence of the community
(McNulty, 1979: 91-92). That CBC policy forbids local access in places with CBC' production facilities is
not understood by many Inuit They consider community radio to be just as important for Iqaluit or
Rankin Inlet than for a smaller settlement.
-
In the Eastern Arctic, community radio has become an established and much needed part of Arctic
community life, based on public participation by people who are not professional broadcasters. There is a
generation of Inuit that grew up with the daily exchange of messages, news, discussions and stories. The
hosts and board members are involved because they are interested in the community well-being, and not
because they want to make a career in broadcasting. A few have moved to the CBC. Yet several
producers left the national service when they felt that the requirements of professionalism restricted their
social and cultural expression. The local station has facilitated discussion on any matter of concern to the
community and thus contributed to community cohesion and participation. Valaskakis and Sheaton (1984:
19) conclude that community radio
added an important cultural dimension and paved the way for more sophisticated uses of electronic media by native peoples.
Regional and Communitv Radio and Inuit Self-Develo~ment
Radio services have played an important role in northern development
Inuit are starting to understand what is going on in their region and other regions. They're fanding out m e things and don't feel isolated. Now they an hear the hag from Nmtsiao, on the radio and see and hear him on television. They can hear their national organization and regional organizations., They can hear right down to the local level, from hamlet councils and people in the settlements. (Peter Tapatai, 1980: 12)
The goal of access to information also includes meaningful "topdown" information that can be
acted upon. With the increased Inuit participation in production, regional programming has become more
northern in orientation and the stations have adapted to the special Arctic conditions. Inuit producer have
been successful in promoting their culture and identity. Yet the Northern Service remains a branch of the
national English language network with principal decision making authority, both ai the CBC and the
Parliamentary level, located in the South. Major decisions, such as cut-backs which drastically affect
northern broadcasting, have thus remained outside the North. Inuit therefore want the service under their
control as part of their request for Inuit self-determination.
New distribution technologies introduced in the north to deliver southern television programming,
carry also a few southern pop and country and western radio stations. However, the option of subcarriers
to distribute native community and regional programming has not yet been employed. This means of
distribution could provide a cost-effective northern intra-and inter-regional communication network.
Community and regional network radio are complementary rather than competitive. Whereas
community radio provides the opportunity for maximum community participation and the dissemination
of local information, messages and entertainment, regional radio can decrease community isolation and
strengthen regional unity through common language and cultural bonds. It carries its messages to a much
larger audience and links the widely dispersed settlements (Stiles, 1986: 30). Both serve important
information, education, language and culture needs; yet they differ significantly in their approach to
broadcasting and their structural arrangements.
The change From community stations to regional CBC production centers clearly reflects the
contrasting perceptions of the role of a northern radio service. .The cogflict over professionalism vs.
amateur programming and, related to this, of programming for or by the local population.
Professional production requires special skills in broadcast journalism. Training is consequently
implicit in the mandate of the Northern Service because native people have to be trained to produce
professional native language programming. Yet initially there was a general lack of training opportunities
within the CBC. The corporation would not make available funds for special training programs. Because
of the resulting difficulties caused by high staff turn-over and low work morale, the CBC now provides
special workshops both in the North and in the South. Yet training on-thejob is still predominant,
Despite these training conditions, the native staff has acquired journalistic and technical skills that enabled
the producers to advance into challenging projects and to employ new program forms and services.
The experiences the CBC Northern Service show that training is not simply a transfer of some
technical skills but comes wrapped in a cultural structure. This is reflected in differences concerning the
value of time and community involvement and the selection and organization of news reports and stories.
These differences have led to high staff turn-over in most of the northern production centers. Iqaluit is
exceptional with its low turn-over rate. The station was not connected to the national network until 1973
which allowed the station to develop its own style that is more responsive to the local conditions. Also,
the Inuit comprise the majority of the regional population and the station has to cater to these needs.
The strong development of community radio in the Eastern Arctic reflects the ability of the Inuit to
successfully provide an essential service under their control. The amateur character is not a hindrance but
a basic characteristic of the interactive service and encourages participation.
The social objectives of "access" and "participation," as McNulty (1979: 258) points out, are the
two key concepts that have played major roles in the formation of community radio. They contribute to
the democratization of the media, the diversity of information and viewpoints that are of greater relevance
and interest than the mass audience programming, the efforts of native people and organizations to
overcome feelings of helplessness in face of the southern imposed rapid social change, and the decision
making process. Access refers to the choice of material requested by the public and to effective feedback.
Participation implies the involvement of the local people in the production and management of the
c~mmaaaaication system hcluding production, decision-Ung md planning. Reviewing Inuit
involvement in interactive communication projects and community radio, Valaskakis and Sheaton (1984:
10) conclude:
Community animation, satellite radio and television, as non-commercial, interactive media clearly encouraged Inuit participation.
However, they also point out that community access and participation do not necessarily unify
people. The Inuit of Northern Quebec, for example, were deeply divided over the claims settlement issue.
Interactive radio contributed to the heated debate about the settlement and the diviiion It did not unify
people. However, it facilitated considerable discussion and educated people about the issues involved
(Valaskakis. 1983: 125).
Community radio thus contributes to self-development, "understood as a participatory process in
which people initiate, execute, and control actions which are the solutions to their developmental needs"
(Valaskakis, etal. 1984: 13). Yet because of the lack of permanent interactive communication links on a
regional level, the potential of the medium to encourage a northern native dialogue is thus not fully
realized.
This chapter showed the importance of the institutional structure for the ability to adapt radio to
the local and regional requirements.
The CBC Northern Service is based on a hierarchical structure, with southern based headquarters.
In its early period the transfer of CBC radio clearly reflected the traditional development communications
approach of Schramm, Rogers and others discussed in chapter two. It was a limited view of development
communication, being vertical and onesided, assuming that certain behaviors and habits can be changed
through the provision of messages.
It is not a use of communications in which there is any opportunity for the individual to find out more, to question, to learn the whys and wherefores, to voice suspicions and/or protests. (Berrigan, 1981: 11)
Over the years, the Northern Service has increased its regional production substantially. Native
language programming has become an established factor in northern programming and Inuit influence on
programming decisions has improved. The establishment of a special Inuit Service Committee has given
further institutional expression to the role of Inuit in the northern service.
However, the structure of the Northern Service set narrow parameters within which the Inuit can
exercise influence. The Northern Service is part of the English language network, which makes the
principal decisions. Over the years substantial control has been transferred the headquarters of CBC
North. Yet this still has not changed the basic principle of decision making power being located in the
South and exercised by non-native people.
The northern broadcast is thus the national program with substantial parts of the day allocated to
regional production and some community access. The corporation argues that its one channel radio
service cannot fulfill the diverse needs of northern residents. Under the existing arrangements and
mandate of the CBC, which has to be everything to everyone, the community needs cannot be adequately
fulfilled.
A network of community stations, complemented by regional northern programming of both the
CBC and native communication societies, was requested since the northern conference in 1970. This
arrangement would provide a much needed program choice to an English language service. Inuit
organizations argue that the CBC Northern Service should be integrated into a truly northern oriented
service and programming by local and regional communication societies not being isolated on a second
channel.
The Inuit demand a public northern and native network, like the English and French network.
This arrangement would provide the north with an English service that includes much of the national
network programming and a separate northern service in native languages. To be a truly northern service
requires !he transfer d control to the No& with native people participating in the Becisi~rr m&g
process. This new service would still have to operate within the funding levels set by the national
network. Yet within the given budget, the control over scheduling and allocation of funds for particular
services and projects would lie in the North. A northern service separate from the English network would
allow greater flexibility in programming choices. It could incorporate community programming and
regional programming produced by the native communication societies.
On the other hand, the establishment of a separate native channel, in addition to the CBC Northern
Service under its present arrangements would create competition and possibly repetition of services rather
than choice between a northern and a national public service.
Developments in the television sector, particularly the introduction of a northern transponder, may
also affect the Inuit's repeated demand for linking their community radios to regional networks. Yet as
long as audio uplinks have to use the commercial telephone network, interactive broadcasting remains
prohibitively expensive and timely information exchange limited
To conclude, lateral communications is an approach or technique and not limited to particular uses.
The type of involvement, be it feedback, self-management, participation in production, management and
planning, can vary according to circumstances and resources. Community involvement is total when the
local people run their own station with little reliance on government funding or limitations through
program schedules that are strictly enforced by an outside agency. For the purpose of plain information
dissemination, this type of community involvement is unnecessary. Productions reflecting on the needs of
the population and well developed feedback networks can be a successful way to serve information needs.
CBC Iqaluit's reporting about the conference on aboriginal rights was an example for relevant information
dissemination. Yet for the discussion of implications, grass-roots oriented structures are necessary.
Berrigan (1981: 25-27) lists several factors of participation and control in the media sector that are
necessary for community media to be successful. They are also important for the Inuit to achieve their
socio-cultural goals of development 1) Local support through community involvement is absolutely
necessary. It requires keeping at least good communication links between relevant decision makers,
producers and the audience. 2) Those in power have to recognize the need for lateral communication by
establishing supportive programs. They have to commit themselves to follow up on the recommendations
and suggestions of the local people prior to encouraging grass-roots participation in the dialogue. 3)
Training of media skills, including maintenance of equipment, is important yet not enough. Those
involved in policy making and program production have to also know the local conditions, people and
regional problems and to develop a sensitivity to the cross-cultural context 4) Effective channels of
communication have to be in place so that the feedback is actually heard And f d i y , 5) continuity is
essential to maintain community involvement and use. Field trials, that are considered successful yet
terminated after the project phase, create frustration and resentment People are made aware of services
that do not become available. The Canadian government has chosen interim solutions which has given
the Inuit some leeway. Yet over the years it has left them with frustration over the lack of commitment
and transfer of control.
The lack of a coherent and comprehensive communications policy and the prevalence of ad hoc
solutions has been evident The analysis of radio services in the North showed that reforms could
improve service provision. For example, advertising and sponsorship could become a valuable source of
revenue for community stations, or the administrative control over CBC North could be transferred to the
North and include participation of the northern native population. The early isolation of radio services
from hierarchical network structures allowed a more northern orientation. This issue of "delinking" is
crucial for the analysis in the final chapter concerning policy alternatives. The use of subcarriers of
television channels is also an option that allows the regional distribution of community programming and
possibly of regional productions by the native communication societies. For example, subcarriers are
currently used by Indian communication societies in the Yukon and Northern Ontario to distribute their
regional programming.
However, this chapter shows also that more substantial structural changes are necessary to
overcome the outlined problems of community involvement, funding, journalistic standards, training and
distribution. For example, the establishment of a truly northern and mtive public service, besides the
English and French network, could provide the basis for a radio service based on productions by the CBC
northern regional centers, the native communication societies and the community radio stations. To
overcome the limitations of ad- hoe approaches and to develop and implement a comprehensive northern
broadcasting policy requires a shift in emphasis in national priorities. Whether or not this change can be
initiated will be discussed in the final chapter.
The issues of southern control over the communication system, relevant northern programming,
native language broadcasting, distribution arrangements and Inuit control over the public broadcasting
service have emerged on an even larger scale in the television sector.
THE 'IDIOT BOX' MOVES NORTH: SOUTHERN TELEVISION AND THE INUIT
A report about Inuit experiences with television, from which this chapter drew its title, indicates
their strong resentment against the content of southern productions (Inuit Today, 1975: 23). Video-taped
television programs entered the Canadian North in the 1960s, and in 1983 the last community in the NWT
received live-television service. This chapter fmt discusses the national policy context with its dilemma
of program content and national interests underlying the extension of services to the North. Inuit stated
needs for northern and native language television and participation in the regulatory and policy making
process are compared with actual policies and regulatory decisions to extend southern commercial
broadcasts. The chapter then analyzes experiences in the Western and Eastern Arctic with television
services and video in terms of technological choices, and adaptation strategies. It concludes with a
discussion of existing research results about the impacts of southern television on the Inuit and their
implications for a northern communications policy. The most significant dimensions are summarized in
Table 6.1..
National Broadcasting Context: The Canadian Dilemma of& Neglected Content Policy
Canada has one of the world's most advanced distribution technologies and highest penetration
levels of broadcasting services. In 1986 78.18% of all Canadian households subscribed to cable service,
with access to television, pay-tv and a variety of specialty services (CRTC, 1987 (a): 76-77).
Canada has a complex array of public and private networks, stations and services. The concept of
public broadcasting stems from the overriding idea that public ownership will provide a service for
- everyone, regardless of social status, place of residence or aesthetic preference. The CBC is the therefore
the most important broadcaster in size, finances and scope. In 1986-87 its parliamentary appropriation
was $854.7 million and the total CBC budget $1.1 billion; the balance of $240 million was made up by
National Context
Needs
Strategic Interests National Context
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Underlying Approach
Regulation
Policies -
Institutional Arrangements
Experiences
Impacts
Table 6.1.
The Introduction of Southern Television
Government Broadcasters
Nat Broadc. System High Tech Dev. Content Policy
Support Econ. Dev. Reduce Isolation
Serve Inuit Needs
Integration
CRTC Hearings
Extension Distribution CBC TV North Northern B~oadc. Pol. Increase Choice
CBC TV North CANCOM
Native Language TV Northern Relevance
North-South cmns. Linirs
Control Cmns Participation TV Prod.
Cultural Survival
Challenge Intro TV
Native Lang. TV Northern Prod Participation Policy
Inuit TV Production Inuit in CRTC, DOC
Introduction TV Video Programming Content Community Access Commercial TV Audience Preferences
Visiting, Socializing Leisure Activities Behaviob Expenditures Language Values
advertising and other revenue sources (DOC, 1987 (c): 60). Table 6.2 indicates that the CBC competes
with an abundance of commercial television signals.
In addition to 15 non-profit community and educational stations, there are 40 CTV and 17
independent commercial stations (CRTC, 1987 (a): 74) which are extremely profitable. Revenues are
generated largely by advertising. After-tax profits increased twelvefold from 1971 to 1984 when the
industry could claim $900 million revenues (DOC, 1987(c): 60). In 1985 radio and television broadcasting
and the cable-television industry earned $2.3 billion (DOC, 1987 (c): 59).
While broadcasting is an industry, the programs have cultural importance. The contribution of
private broadcasters to Canadian cultural interests has been widely debated, because the profit motive
driving the private sector has resulted in a high proportion of inexpensive foreign programming (Task
Force, 1986; Standing Committee, 1987a). Federal broadcasting policies, therefore, have attempted to
help Canadians retain control of their culture, one of the important aspects of Canadian sovereignty.
Policies, laws and regulations emphasize the need to serve a broadly-defined Canadian culture. However,
this policy has been adversely affected by Canada's industrial policy of promoting high technology.
The changes in communications technology, such as cable, fibre-optics, micro-wave and satellite
distribution, video, digital and computer-based broadcasting services, have allowed instant communication
across the vast landmass of Canada. The government's high technology policy, as was argued in chapter
four, aims to make Canada competitive in the international aerospace industry. Yet these developments
have allowed the U.S. networks nearly unrestricted access to Canada, which has become merely an
extension of the American market
The Canadian marketplace is abnormal for two reasons: the vast majority of books, films and records available here are produced elsewhere. And the revenues generated by their distribution largely flow out of Canada to f a c e production industries elsewhere. (DOC, 1987 (c): 19)
This tendency of U.S. services penetrating the Canadian market was continued with the
development of direct satellites. The Anik B trials tested not only new services but also improved
Table 6.2.
Audiense Share Trends by Station Group
Station
English CBC CTV Independent Pay TV TVO/KNOW U.S.
TOTAL
French CBC TVA Radio Quebec Pay TV WQ Others
Total
All Stations
Source: Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986: 421.
distribution in the 14/12 GHz band, a first step towards direct broadcast satellites. The following steps
were field trials with direct broadcast satellites (DBS) that would further enhance broadcast receiving
capacity. In November 1982, Canada launched Anik C 3. It was more powerful than previous satellites
and represented a major step towards direct broadcasting to small 1.2 to 1.8 meter - receiving dishes. In
the following years, two more of these satellites were launched, transmitting south& programming;
including pay-television and specialty services, to both cable television companies and individual viewers.
The expanded communication capacity, and the increased speed and efficiency of delivering
broadcast signals have "been accompanied by a direct trade-off in the erosion of influence over television
content in Canada" (Melody, 1982: 4). It is about ten times cheaper to purchase U.S. programs than to
produce new domestic entertainment and drama programming. For example, the Canadian broadcasting
rights to an hour of Dallus cost $60,000. An hour of original programming can cost up to $1 million to
produce (DOC, 1987 (c): 62).
The new technologies could serve as vehicles to distribute the work of Canadian talent through the
increased program choice. However,
We are now preoccupied with controlling entry of foreign satellite signals and programs into Canada, instead of recognizing that this new technology provides unprecedented opportunities for us to increase the distribution of new Canadian programs and services, not only domestically but internationally. (Federal Cultural Review Committee, 1982: 305)
In 1986, the report of the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy recommended that Canadians be given
more opportunities to view quality Canadian programming, for example, through new public broadcasting
channels in English and French for programs which currently have few distribution options. It said the
CBC should be given adequate funding to carry out its unique responsibilities, including an
English-language all-news and public a f f h television channel. And it requested the private networks to
produce more Canadian programming for peak-time viewing (Task Force, 1986). These
recommendations were in principal supported by the Standing Committee (1987 (a)). A federal
government response is expected in 1988 with a view to enacting a new Broadcasting Act
The most crucial measure to strengthen Canadian programming has been the CRTC's Canadian
content requirements, designed to ensure a strong Canadian presence in all broadcasting. At least 60% of
the CBC's television programming must be Canadian. For private broadcasters the ratio is a minimum of
5Wo during prime time and 60% for the reminder of the day. The CBC has exceeded its content quota
and aims to remove commercial U.S. programs completely. This, however, would depend upon the
availability of incremental funding (CBC, 1985).
In contrast, the contribution of the private sector to meet national goals, "has been distinctly
limited" (Task Force, 1986: 451). Of the $68.3 million the CTV network and its affiliates spent on feature
r -
films and TV series in 1984/85, $54.1 million, or 79%, went for the acquisition of foreign programs and
only $14.2 million, or 2196, on Canadian programming, including in-house production, co-productiom,
licence fee payments and investments in independent productions. Only 3.4% of CTV's revenues were
used to support Canadian feature-length films and television series (Task Force, 1986: 454,456).
Independent stations are under no licence obligation to provide national programming, including the
Global network, and thus to take on the responsibilities of a national broadcaster.
The criteria that determine "Canadian" character are so broad that the Task Force (1986: 468)
considered them "conducive to systematic evasion of broadcast& objectives." The CRTC's definition
refers only to technical aspects, such as produced in Canada, Canadian actors e k , yet does not speak to
the programming quality. The Task Force therefore argues that there is no point in substituting mediocre
American programming with mediocre Canadian programming. "After all, it is not the overriding goal of
Canadian broadcasting policy to build an industry or create jobs but rather to establish a Canadian
presence on television through programs that are made by Canadians, chiefly for Canadians and good
enough to attract Canadian viewersn (Task Force, 1986: 468). Further, in the mass-market Eramework,
the economics of program production are closely linked to the economics of selling advertising. Because
of a broadly-based appeal, high production budgets, and spill-over promotion, American programs have
traditionally generated higher advertising revenues than Canadian programs.
The success of a strategy of Canadian programming as its objective has to be rooted in sound economics as well as in profound conviction. (DOC, 1987 (c): 62)
The Canadian quota policy has not been supplemented by effective financial support programs of
Canadian program production and distribution. On March 1,1983, the federal government issued a
broadcasting strategy that had the three fundamental goals of 1) maintaining the Canadian broadcasting
system as an effective vehicle of social and cultural policy; 2) making available to all Canadians a solid
core of attractive Canadian programming in all program categories; and 3) providing a significantly
increased choice of programming of all kinds in both official languages in all parts of Canada (DOC, 1983
(c): 5).
A Canadian Broadcast Program Development Fund was established to encourage the production
and broadcast of certain categories of quality television programs made by private Canadian producers.
The fund, administered by Telefilm Canada,' has provided over $150 million to over 400 projects, with
total budgets of $500 million (DOC, 1987 (c): 62). To gain access to the fund, producers must obtain a
prior commitment by an over-the-air broadcaster to run the program in the most attractive viewing hours,
7 p.m. to 11 p.m.. TO fulfill this requirement has become a major problem (Task Force. 1986: 367).2 The
federal government therefore plans to link the incentive programs with regulatory requirements for the
broadcasters to carry these Canadian productions at prime time (DOC, 1987 (d): 37-43).
Funding policy has also been geared to improve Canadian cultural products on the international
market However, this has its drawbacks. It means a blurring of the distinctly Canadian character, in
favor of a mainstream (i.e. U.S.) oriented taste that dictates the criteria for contenf packaging and
distribution (Federal Cultural Policy. 1980: 259; DOC, 1987 (c): 17). Despite all the programming
support measures, the proportion of Canadian content viewed by Canadians has declined steadily over the
years (See Table 6.3. Availability and Viewing of Television Programs).
Cutbacks in funding, promotion of distribution over Canadian content, and the emphasis on
economic performance of private broadcasters indicates that the cultural policy is largely rhetoric. In
pursuing a policy of high technology development that increases distribution without giving at least similar
weight to the quality of programs distributed, Canada has been subsidizing its own cultural erosion. The
Task Force on Broadcasting Policy therefore recommended that CBC Television should be spared further
cutbacks and not be asked to confine itself to whatever minority material would fill the gaps left by
private television (1986: 299).
The Canadian Film Development Corporation, subsequently known as Telefilm Canada, was formed in 1968 to stimulate the development of a feature film industry in Canada by covering up to one third of the cost of projects.
Among native producers, the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation has been the only one who applied for and received Telefilm funding for its children educational television.
Table 6.3.
Availability and Viewing of Television Programs
English Television French Television
Availability
Canadian Programs Foreign Programs
Viewing (Two p u s and up)
Canadian Programs Foreign Frograms
Viewing (I2 - 17 years)
Canadian Programs Foreign Programs
Source: DOC, 1983: 31.
In the CBC license renewal of 1987 (CRTC Decision 87-14)), the CRTC also commended the
Corporation for its achievements, given the very demanding needs amd tastes of the broadcasting audience
and CBC's financial constraints. While most expectations for the new license period (until 1992) call for
maintaining current levels of activities in Canadian content, drama and children's programming, the
CRTC expected improvements in five areas, which require at minimum maintaining current funding
levels. There should be: 1) an increase in the number of regional productions aired by the networks; 2)
the provision of a daily pan-Arctic newscast on the Northern Service; 3) an increase to 4090 in the amount
of programming acquired from Canadian independent producers; 4) an improvement in the quality of the
weekend information programming of the French television network; and 5) more closed captioned
programming (CRTC 87-140: 81-105).
Institutions, particularly established to produce Canadian productions, such as the National Film
Board, have not been successful in distributing their productions through the broadcasting networks. The
National Film Act, which established the NFB in 1939, provides the legislative authority to "initiate and
promote the production and distribution of films in the national interest" and "to produce, distribute and
promote the production and distribution of films which interpret Canada to Canadians and other nations."
(DSOS, 1985: 4) Yet within the Canadian broadcasting sector, the NFB has played only a minor role,
having faced disincentives for what it does best: Canadian programming on a regional and national level,
using local talents, on educative and provocative subjects with little pretence to impartiality and balance.
This secondary role of cultural policy has also influenced the extension of television services in the
North.
Southern Strategic to Extend Television Coverage
In the mid 19609 the CBC came under increasing pressure from the government, in response to 7 i
/ requests from mining companies and northern non-native groups, to extend its service to all Canadians, as :
I
the Broadcasting Act required3 Television was seen as a modem means for reducing isolation, and the
various federal government agencies involved in northern development, such as INAC, became major
proponents of the introduction of television to the North. The DOC provided funding for the extension
through a "Frontier Coverage Package" of video-taped programs. Because the government was already
considering the possibility of launching a communications satellite, CBC engineers designed an interim
system which made use of relatively inexpensive video equipment that had just been put on the market
Television was introduced to provide entertainment for southern miners and government personnel.
Regional centers in the Arctic, such as Inuvik and Iqaluit were the first to get the service.
The name of the first geostationary satellite "Anik," meaning "older brother'" in Inuktituk,
supported the claim that satellites were primarily introduced to serve northern native needs, yet those I needs were defined by government agencies. It corresponded to the general policy of integrating native
The policies of the extension of television are well analyzed in Feaver, 1976 and only briefly summarized in the following overview.
people through assimilation. The North should be brought into the mainstream of Canadian life by high
quality communications that permitted access ta southern communication services. Jean Chretien, the
then Minister of INAC stated before the House of Commons:
Anik has tremendous importance for Northern Canada, for its inhabitants and especially for the Eskimo and Indians. For the first time in their whole life, once the system is established, those people will really be in a position to communicate with other Canadian citizens and to take part in all aspects of Canadian life. ( K e ~ e y , 1971: I 20)
There was no expressed concern among planners about the lack of native access to the broadcasting
technologies, nor about the impact of southern television on native languages and cultures. The switch to
satellite reception on February 5,1973 "parachuted, at least potentially, simultaneous radio, live television,
telephone and data transmission into a region that was culturally different from the producers of both the
hardware and software" (Roth, 1982: 3).
The extension of broadcasting services to the North by satellites also required appropriate reception
facilities. The CBC developed a "democratic formula" which was based on the size of the communities
and the costs of service to them. In the north, the small population and the vast distances made the cost
so great that most northern communities "came far down on the national list" (Feaver, 1976: 8).
In 1974 the federal government approved a special fund of $50 million for an "Accelerated
Coverage Plan" (ACP) to provide the reception equipment for satellitedistributed broadcasting. Every
community with more than 500 people was eligible to get the satellite receivers for television and FM
radio. Over 600 communities applied, whereby the North was given special emphasis in this plan (Inuit
Today, 1975: 30).
The territorial government established a funding program, supplementing the ACP, to extend CBC
coverage to the smaller communities not covered under the federal program. Small communities in Arctic
Quebec and Labrador did not receive similar funds from the provincial government and thus remained
without the national service.
The ACP provided only the money for extending distribution facilities to communities yet not for
the production of programming. The CBC developed a Northern Broadcasting Plan which envisioned
television program production centers in Whitehorse and Yellowknife, portable production facilities at two
locations in the Eastern Arctic, and recommended a policy of community access for both radio and
television upon request (CBC, 1974: 2). Yet Parliament considered it too expensive and rejected i t A
revised, less expensive plan that eliminated the possibility of community television and altered 'the idea of
community access to the transmitter in favor of a northern regional production studio in Ottawa (!) was
also rejected by the Cabinet in 1976. The primary reason for its elimination, as Roth (1982: 87) points
out, was still its high cost, but native opposition to the Ottawa studio was also a critical factor in the
rejection. Finally, the plan dealt only with programming in the territories and excluded the northern parts
of the provinces. Work toward another comprehensive plan did not proceed The national content
dilemma was repeated in the North: the hardware got first priority without consideration for the
The (=BC was left in the precarious situation of being responsible for northern broadcasting, while
not being granted any budget for either pan-Arctic or locally-produced native programs. Nor were there
any government funds available to support nativeproduced programs to be aired through the CBC
(Feaver, 1976: 63). Stated the Director of Northern Services, Doug Ward:
We have laid down the signal, we have laid down the transmitter, the program money has not come ... at half time it's technology one, northerners zero. (Ward, 1978: 7)
Inuit Needs and the Choice to Introduce Southern Television
There is a general feeling among the northern people that the satellite has been sold at their expense; the impression has been created that there is going to be television f ~ r every Indian and Eskimo in the Northwest Territories. The northern people will not complain about this, but when requests are made to meet their real needs the response may be that the money has already been spent and more is not forthcoming" (Nelly Cownoyea, in Feaver, 1976: 43).
The Yellowknife conference and the K e ~ e y report confirmed the necessity to reformulate the
Anik satellite policy to conform to the expressed needs of the people it was intended to serve. The clear
omission of lateral channels (other than the expensive telephone system) within the Anik system was
evident and needed to be reversed. The second volume of the Kenney report, which discussed solutions,
suggested the federal government's recognition and financial support of northern communication societies
and projects.
Because of the economics of the northern situation, it is believed that governments have certain special responsibilities to assist financially such ventures" (Kenney, 1971: 11-5).
It was considered the CRTC's role "to provide the guidelines and rulings necessary to ensure
adequate and equitable development of the radio and television media in the North, in keeping with the
needs of the people" (11-5). The report concluded that
The priorities of spending vast amounts of money to bring live TV to certain northern locations must be balanced against expenditures that would attain socially valid goals in terms of communications as desired by the people - for example, satellite channels in conjunction with community radio stations, regional and local programming for radio and TV, community videotape projects, improved telephone communications, educational television, etc. (11-3)
Kenney considered it extremely important that the use of the system in the underdeveloped North
be significant in social terms. He developed a broadcasting system which would use a special channel on
the satellite and would involve a different arrangement, of earth stations from the one propxed by !he
federal government This system would have uplink facilities in the North to interconnect local and
regional programming, rather than providing receive-only dishes, and it would also link with the
telephone system (Kenney, 1971: 11-36).
Inuit have repeatedly expressed their concern that programming designed for southern audiences
distracts'ind disturbs their cU1h.e. It can also widen the generation gap between the older traditional.
groups and the younger people who have been exposed to the southern way of life. While television -*
should be extended to more communities in the North, programming should meet the northern needs.
Particularly, programming should be in the native languages.
As Aboriginal peoples of Canada, we firmly believe Inuit have inalienable language rights. , By extension, we contend that in our homelands, where we form the majority, we have a right to fundamental public services in our own language; among them education, health que, justice and broadcasting (IBC, 1985: 17).
At a conference in 1970 in Yellowknife, native people considered the establishment of CBC
northern production centres with full program control and proper inter-regional connection an essential
means of mass communication in the North. They said that on the local level technologies such as video
tape recorders (VTR), films, sound cassettes and records - which are flexible in use and economical -
could provide education, information dissemination and interactive communication services. Pilot studies
in communities with VTR could help establish program requirements for regular TV service. Inuit
stressed the need for connecting mass communication with local interactive forms.
Over the years, as Inuit have taken over responsibility in many social sectors, with the ultimate
goals of cultural survival and self-government Inuit request for control over the communication system
and the services offered to the Arctic population have thereby increased in importance. After the Inuit
had tested applications of new communication technologies, they emphasized the potential of these
facilities to serve their needs. Predominantly Inuit communities say they should have the right to control
the distribution of electronic media available to each community. Access to local transmitters for the
purpose of limiting or substituting programming should be guaranteed (IBC, 1985: 33).
Underlying these requests has beer? the ?reed f ~ r a fo rm and vehicle by which Inuit can exercise
their right to freedom of expression, interpretation of issues in the context of their own understanding,
and exchange of cultural and political information between northern communities and to the south.
The new technologies are seen as a means to popularize and thereby strengthen the Inuit culture, language, mythology, social patterns and features which define and give meaning to being Inuit. (IBC, 1985: 10)
The Kenney model of an integrative national communications system, as Roth (1982: 63) notes,
appealed strongly to native and northern activist groups, but did not have a visible, action-oriented impact
within federal planning bodies. Their approach to the Anik A series was set It was perceived as a
distribution satellite which would deliver information in one direction. However, northern groups
informed planners of a set of issues which would have to be considered in future communication
endeavors in the North. The CBC Northern Service and the CRTC certainly took note of the numerous
references to culturally relevant, native-language programming, the desire for local and regional
participation in future broadcasting undertakings in the North, and the question of a second northern
transponder specifically for northern programming.
In 1973, a select committee of senior CBC, CRTC, DOC, INAC, Government of NWT, DSOS and
Treasury Board representatives was established, yet with no northern involvement It appointed a
Northern Broadcasting Study group to develop a three year long range Northern Broadcasting Plan. The
resulting report recommended the provision of radio to all communities of 200 residents and over,
regional and subregional programming, and community access. The government did not follow up on the
proposal, yet the CRTC issued a communique which recommended the establishment of emergency
services for communities of 500 people or more (CRTC, 1981 (b): 5). This goal was eventually realized in
the Accelerated Coverage Plan in 1974. Roth (1982: 64) comments critically that
These minor responses attest to some attempt at modification of the unilateral decision-making process of Northern communication planners, and also show the CRTC to be somewhat flexible in their initial approach.
Television arrived in the North uninvited Initially Inuit were not consulted when the CBC
planned to introduce its services. Also, the decision oa what Inuit wodd watch was being made by
southern broadcast managers, marketing and advertisement experts. "Northern television was essentially
a lifestyle propaganda for a consumer society" (IBC, 1982: i).
License applications under the ACP to bring CBC services into Inuit settlements became an
important vehicle for indigenous people - although reactive - to participate in policy formatioa4 It forced
the CBC to consult with Inuit communities to extend the service.
Both the CBC and the CRTC recognized the southern commercial-oriented programming as a
massive cultural assault A CBC representative admitted publicly that the existence of the satellite had
indeed molded the decision of Northern broadcasting developments, despite the CBC's knowledge that
television should not necessarily have been given priority over other communication services (Feaver,
For a detailed description, see Roth, 1982.
1976: 46). And the Director of the Northern Service admitted that CBC was "largely a crass-cultural
intrusion" (in IBC, 1982:ii).
But the strongly worded concerns did not result in protection of the Inuit culture through regulatory
measures and it never fully asserted the people's right to determine the amount and content of northern
television (IBC, 1982: ii). At the CBC network licence renewal hearings in Ottawa in February 1974, and -
in subsequent CBC license applications (CRTC 75-515; CRTC 75-516; CRTC 76-6-43), the CRTC urged
the CBC to increase the amount of relevant northern television programming as soon as possible. The
CRTC chairman also wrote to the president of the CBC, stressing the concerns of northerners about the
impact of television.
Roth (1982: 80) concluded that the communication studies of NQIA and ITC and the CRTC
interventions "marked the beginning of a series of Inuit interruptions into what the federal government
had hoped would be a smooth-flowing 'extension of service' policy." The CBC was pressured to modify
its licensing process by establishing a policy of fmt asking the communities if they wanted to be served
before applying for a CRTC license. Yet the Inuit's choice remained limited to get service or not get
service. ??ley could not comprehend l3e CBC's intmtior? tn provide five colo~lr television before had
developed an adequate radio service in the region.
At the 1976 hearings ITC proposed the creation of a Northern Television Advisory Board, made up
of northerners, CBC, ITC and CRTC representatives, before any licenses were granted. The mandate of
the Board should be to ensure that northerners had genuine power over program selection, and real
participation in policy making. The CRTC informed the Inuit that the DOC, INAC, and DSOS planned
to pursue the matter directly with the CBC and sought concrete measures to beginsimproving northern
native programming. ITC responded with a request to participate. A meeting took place in October 1977,
yet it led to no results (Roth, 1982: 76-77).
The Annual General Meeting of ITC in Igloolik in 1979 adopted the resolution that no more
teleyision channels be brought into Inuit communities unless the channels are controlled by the
community and revenue from such channels goes to local broadcasting societies for the production of
programming (CRTC, 1981: 12). No one has acted on this resolution.
ITC and hamlet councils also complained that the CRTC held its CBC licence renewal hearings for
various operations in the NWT in Winnipeg rather than in the North. The CRTC subsequently held
special hearings on the CBC network licence renewals throughout the North. The CBC was again
challenged on its lack of northern programming. In issuing the licence renewal the CRTC noted that
Concerning the northern television service ... the almost unanimous opinion, expressed strongly and eloquently by many northerners, emphasized the fact that the service has been and remains woefully inadequate" (CRTC 79-320: 27).
The CRTC recommended the CBC to produce a minimum of two hours daily of northern regional
television programming by the end of the licence period in September 1982 and confirmed the Inuit need
to participate in the northern broadcasting development
To the fullest practical extent the people of the North themselves should set their own priorities for their broadcasting services and appropriate mechanisms should be established to facilitate this. Programs of the northern service should originate in the North and the necessary satellite uplink facilities to permit thisshould be acquired (CRTC 79-320: 29).
At the network license hearings in 1986 the Inuit stressed again the inadequate northern
programming and the lack of access of Inuit broadcasters to the distribution system In the license
renewal decision, the CRTC
particularly regrets that over the past decade, while satellite technology has enabled an increasing abundance of southern programming, both Canadian and American, to be delivered to this part of Canada, the North has had minimal opportunity to speak to itself or to reflect its unique character to the rest of the Canada. (Decision 87-3: 37)
For the 1987-1992 license term, the CRTC expects the Northern Service to provide a daily
panArctic newscast with important and active contribution of northern residents, an'd to better integrate
native produced programming (Decision CRTC 87-140: 89). The Commission requested
that the CBC must endeavor to provide the North with culturally appropriate programming that meets its particular demographic constituency; it has a special obligation to foster and protect the unique lifestyles, cultures and sense of community that exist in northern Canada. Accordingly, as a long-term objective, the CBC should establish a specific and identifiable service for the northern region on a basis comparable in status to its other regional services.
, (Decision CRTC 87-140: 37)
C x Television Services in the North
I want to emphasize that in our concern for the preservation of a Canadian television presence, we must not lose sight of the impact that white, southern programming has had on the fragile native cultures of the North. (MacDonald, Min. of Communications, in NACS, 1986 (a))
In 1973, northern programming amounted to only 10 minutes per week and there were no native
broadcasts at all (Feaver. 1976: 41). Despite repeated reference to the importance of relevant northern
programming, the northern television service has remained a medium dominated by Southern Canada and
the U.S. When CBC's Northern Broadcasting Plan was turned down, it redirected internal funds to
bolster its efforts in northern television production and established a small production center in
Yellowknife in 1979. Yet it could not afford the uplink facilities necessary for live-programming. In its
1980/81 Annual Report the CBC noted that
Northern Service continued to be restricted by a lack of funds, and despite a fidl year's operation, the amount of northern material produced was only one percent of the total television programming camed on CBC North. (CBC, 1981: 22)
CBC North's television service operates from a single northern production center in Yellowknife.
It produces a small, yet important, part of the northern program schedule. Regular series, such as the
half-hour show "Deneland," the weekly half-hour current affairs show "Focus North," and the
documentary series "Northland," are broadcast in English and nativelanguage versions through repeats.
The Northern Service in Montreal produces a weekly 15-minutes' Inuktituk native language program
"Tarqravut" and a half-hour show in Cree. The Eastern satellite channel also broadcasts the four and a
half hours Inuit produced television programs and the Western channel half an hour ICS programming.
Eight percent of its staff are of native origin (Stiles ,1985: 37); about seven percent - eight and a half
- hours per week - is devoted to original northern regional programming, five and a half hours of which are
produced by IBC, ICS and TNI. It reflects CBC's continuing problem of securing funding for northern
television production.
CBC network shows, the national news and U.S. soap operas like "Three's Company," and "All My
Children" still dominate the program day. In 1985/86, the regional center produced only 64 hours of
original northern television (CRTC 87-3: 34).
In contrast to our radio service, CBC television is not able to adequately reflect the North to itself or to the rest of the nation (CBC, 1985 (d): 4).
In 1983, the DOC asked the corporation to present costed alternatives in t e r n of its o m
production and access by independent northern native program producers. The CBC responded with a
northern policy and plan (CBC 1984 (a)) for a 5-year period that would cost $11.7 million in capital
expenditures and $13.7 million in annual operating funds when fully implemented. The plan outlined the
goal for a daily half-hour news and information program, produced in Yellowknife with northern material
generated by program staff in the territorial capitals, Whitehorse and Iqaluit The program would be
"pan northern" in scope and produced in English. It required a dedicated northern satellite transponder,
video uplinks, downlinks, and associated facilities at Yellowknife, Whitehorse and Iqaluit, increased staff,
equipment, and studio facilities at the three locations, and increased capacity of the national cue and
control system in Toronto. To serve Labrador and the northern part of the provinces nine 3- man
television units were planned to be established. In addition, the plan included a radio station in the
Central Arctic and additional radio staff in Labrador, and northern Saskatchewan and northern Manitoba
The Minister of Communications has not yet responded to the Northern Regional Broadcasting
Plan, except to the question of a dedicated northern transponder and the video-uplinks.
The funding for relevant television programming has not kept pace with the ability to deliver the
signal. The CBC is left in the position of promoting culture on radio and then overwhelming the Inuit
with southern television. Northern Service management has stated its receptiveness to native concerns
and its intention to provide a more equitable level of regional television service. Yet it argues that the
dependency on government approval for funding and its diversified objectives within budgetary
constraints do not permit the corporation to provide appropriate northern programming (Ward, 1978: 5;
Ward in CRTC 87-3: 36-37). On the other hand, the CBC spends substantial amounts on technical
improvements and capital assets, such as a new production center in Toronto. This makes native people
wonder about the legitimacy of CBC's argument. about fkancial constraints.
Direct access to satellite television uplinks in Yellowknife, Whitehorse, and Iqaluit are necessary to
produce a daily panArctic news and current aff& show. Fucus North, which had its debut in 1982, is
still taped and flown to Toronto for the satellite feed, resulting in a delay of several days. An uplink is
considered to cost about $150,000 (CBC, 1984 (c): 60). Another major constraint is the lack of a fully - -
dedicated northern transponder. At present, CBC transmitters in northern communities receive the same
satellite feed used to deliver network programming to provincial centers, such as Winnipeg or Vancouver.
The Eastern and Central Arctic receive their feed from Toronto but broadcast in Atlantic time, while the
Western Arctic receives network and regional programs out of Vancouver in the Pacific time zone which
makes for a rather early schedule in the East and a late one in the West
In the 1984 Northern Broadcasting Plan, the CBC claimed responsibility for the envisioned
dedicated northern transponder, provided it was considered CBC's investment with resulting responsibility
for maintenance and administration and connected to the CBC transmitters. The fmt stage in setting
shedding priorities would therefore rest with the corporation to determine what network or regional
programs it was willing to preempt for native productions (CBC, 1985 (b): 23). At the CRTC hearings
for a second CBC television channel in 1981, the CBC agreed to negotiate with ITC and the federal
government about the sharing of responsibility (CRTC, 1981: 15). The corporation argues that a shared
northern transponder can only be an interim solution. The displacement of CBC programming by Inuit
produced programming should not affect the "national integrity of the CBC's service", i.e. national
Canadian program content should not be replaced
In addition to a northern transponder, provision should also be made for separate transmitters to provide non-CBC programming to northern communities. ... On a long-term basis, the CBC believes northern Canadians should have the opportunity of receiving a full CBC service, comparable to other Canadians, PLUS the full quantity and variety of program production envisaged by the Northern Native Access Program. (CBC 1987 (a): 21-22)
- Contingent on the availability of a transponder compatible with existing satellite ground station
facilities used to receive CBC services* the co~poration estimates that a second network of trmmitters
could be established to serve all communities of the Yukon, NWT and Arctic Quebec for less than $3
million. At a time when southern - and largely U.S. - television services are proliferating across the
North, northern residents should have a choice including both CBC and native programming (CBC 1987
(a): 22).
However, CBC North did not get increased funding and native groups demanded their principal
influence in the distribution arrangements. In spring 1987 CBC North reconsidered its role to simply
become one of the users of the transponder, besides the native organizations and educational institutions.
Administration would rest with a separate organization responsible for the management of transponder
use (Brian Cousins, CBC North Ottawa).'
Unlike radio, we carry the burden of knowing that our television service can still be called another remnant of colonialism. (Brian Cousins, in MacQueen, 1985).
This persistence is reflected, for example, in the UI~SUCC~SSN attempt of northern Natives to move b 4 the headquarters of the Northern Service, and thus the control, to the North. Major decisions are made
in Ottawa. The CBC rejects the need for a separate mandate for the Northern Service. It believes that
the regional broadcasting structure and the mandate of meeting "the special needs of geographic regions"
is sufficient "to provide a somewhat tailored response to regional needs while providing a consistent
national program service" :
It is not the nature of the existing mandate which has restricted the CBC's ability to provide the North with a regional television service more comparable to that provided elsewhere in Canada. It is that ... the required special funding for northern programming has not been provided to the CBC by Parliament. (CBC, 1987 (a): 20)
In contrast, native groups want to separate the English language network program from the
northern service and to organize the northern channel under shared CBC and native control.
Because the transponder issue particularly affects the distribution problem of IBC-produced programming, it will be discussed in more detail chapter 9).
The CBC also intended
to support community television in a modest way since this is a component of northern television production, one that could be very important to some communities, and could teach us all some lessons - as well as provide us with some program materials. (CBC, in Beker, 1978: 22)
However, except in Pond Inlet, community access was not further pursued. When CBC's northern
broadcasting plan was refused, the CBC did not encourage further field trials because it feared the costs
involved for the necessary hookup. To include community television also meant removing control From
f l the CBC to local groups and accepting program standards that were contrary to the southern professional /
level.
For years, rigid institutional and bureaucratic attitudes had resulted in poor relations with northern
residents and filmmakers. As was already noted for the radio service, the imposition of southern ideas
and perceptions of professional journalism had prevented the efficient use of northern resources. Native
producers complained that the CBC would not recognize their special style and reject their productions on
technical grounds while ignoring the more important sociO-CU1tural implications. Another criticism was
that northern producers had to adjust to CBC's southern standards and not the reverse. Producers
admitted that their work should meet basic technical requirements to caphue and keep the interest of the
audience (Beker, 1978: 10-11).
Initially, the northern television service also lacked the fm commitment to a consistent, long-term
or ongoing training program. This has changed somewhat. The CBC does not provide long-term
training, but it provides workshops and specialized seminars in southern and northern locations (CBC,
1985 (b): iii). Compared to the native communication societies this is only a marginal training effort
Introduction of Southern Commercial Television
An important factor in the development of television for the North was the mushrooming of illegal
reception of commercial and pay-TV U.S. channels through home antennas. There were no programs
available in most m a l and remote regions of Canada, while U.S. pay-TV services sent out their signal
unscrambled. As a result, an increasing number of Canadians set up their own satellite dish to receive
U.S. programming. Southern Canadian broadcasters and cable operators wanted to capture this market
and urged the government to act
In January 1980, the CRTC established the Therrien Committee to "issue a report on how the
number and variety of television services to northern and remote communities in Canada might best and
most expeditiously be increased," to also address the issue of pay-TV, and to be responsive to the needs
of native people (CRTC, 8 Jan. 1980: 1). The Committee provided a public forum in which television
broadcast options of various interest groups could be examined before implementing structural changes to
the broadcasting system in northern Canada,
The committee represented a critical turning point in northern broadcasting policy. For the first
time a native person, John Amagoalik, a prominent Inuit spokesman from Iqaluit, was invited to become a
panel member. Indian and Inuit groups from across the North took the opportunity to present their
assessment of the impact of southern television on their languages and cultures and to promote
Inuit-produced television (see chapter 7).
In its report the committee emphasized that pay-television should not be linked with the extension
of services. It advocated the use of satellites to relay programming from Canadian television stations to
remote areas. The program package would contain a broad range of Canadian services, including native
- produced broadcasts and the best of U.S. programs (CRTC, 1980: 3). This was considered satisfactory to
meet the needs of northern and remote audiences (CRTC, 1980: 20). At the same time the committee
criticized the lack of public funding for the extension of broadcasting, the pressure of the American
entertainment industry on Canadian markets, and the unfulfilled cultural needs of native people. The
report neither analyzed who would pay for original, primarily indigenous programming, nor the
implications of an abundance of commercial television and its advertising on northern audiences. It also
recommended flexible planning, yet did not point out how past inflexibilities could be overcome. Despite
the critical comments in the report, the broadcasters and the cable industry could live with all the
recommendations:
Within three months, the CRTC responded to the report and called for licence applications for the
extension of services to remote and underserved areas. In a separate notice it called for applications for
pay-television services, which were licensed in fall 1982. On April 14,1981 the CRTC issued a network
license to Canadian Satellite Communications Inc. (Cancom), for a multi-channel radio and television
(four commercial Canadian stations) network distribution system to meet the demands for more television I
services. However, it emphasized that
The extension of southern originated broadcasting services to the North, and to native communities in particular, carries with it a concomitant responsibility to facilitate the development of native-originated broadcasting services. (Decision CRTC 81-252: ...)
Chmm promised to start its service within 90 days of licensing, which made the CRTC favor its 1
\ \
proposal, but it took Cancom more than double the time, until 1 January 1982, to start distributing the i\ I !
four Canadian stations. The DOC expressed optimism that the new service would solve the problem of \ \ 1
illegal reception. \,
Operators of unauthorized earth stations and broadcasting facilities will be expected to apply \
for the necessary licensing app~ovals to receive Canadian satellite services and to cease intercepting U.S. satellite transmission. Mr. Fox [Minister] expressed optimism that the people responsible for existing unlicensed installations would respond positively to the new Canadian satellite initiatives. (DOC, 1981 (b): 2)
However, Cancom did not solve the problem, which was predictable. The CRTC gave Cancom
- permission to charge !$4 per subscriber from the local distributor who in turn could charge as high as $25
per subscriber, more than twice or three times the amount an urban dweller might pay, to cover the costs
The recommendations for native broadcasting are discussed in the following chapter.
for cable or scrambled distribution, earth station equipment, maintenance and a profit margin. It thus cost
households a double digit monthly fee for what they could receive freely - once they had the DBS
reception dish - that is, unscrambled U.S. pay-television programming.
The high Telesat transponder rates for a relatively small subscriber base puts Cancom in an
economically tight position Telesat charges Cancom $2,342,208 per year for each 6/4 GHz channel, and
$1,704,528 for the 14/12 Ghz channel (Telesat (1986): 29). Yet Cancom charges the local distributors for
the broadcasting channels Cancom itself takes off-ttaeair free of charge.
Subscription to the new service has therefore been slow. By the end of 1984, subscription had risen
to only 355 distributors (CRTC, (a): 5) In order to better compete with the continuing illegal reception of
U.S. satellite services, Cancom was permitted to add the four U.S. network programs (NBS, CBS, ABC,
and PBS) to its satellite package (Decision CRTC 1983-126).
The launch of Anik D increased distribution capacity and enabled the distribution of further
pay-television and specialty-services, which Cancom was also able to add to its packxige. The CBC,
Cancom, and the Canadian specialty services of Much Music and The S p d Network are distributed on
Anik D (61 4 Ghz), whereas pay-television and provincial educational services are delivered by Anik C 3
(14/12 Ghz) which requires two separate TVRO dishes to receive the complete range of services available.
It makes for a rather expensive Cancom service. The primary source of Canadian satellite services for
remote areas is Anik D and only major remote centers find the f h m i a l means and subscriber base to
raise another $10,000 to $15,000 to purchase a second dish to receive Anik C-3 services. The lack of
economic incentives has contributed to the relatively slow growth of the Cancom service and the f m c i a l
difficulties of small distributors (CRTC, 1985 (a)). In March 1987,101 systems transpitted the Cancom
service off-air (using scrambled or unscrambled signals). Of the 1,205 cable systems, an unidentified
number carried the Cancom service (CRTC, 1987 (a): 73).
In March 1983 the DOC announced a new broadcasting policy. Among other things, it allowed
individpls and commercial establishments to own and use satellite dishes without a licence (DOC, 1983
(d)). However, scrambled U.S. pay-TV has made access more difficult, requiring a special decoder
available only in the U.S.. The DOC northern broadcasting policy, announced shortly after the national
policy, had as its first priority access to an increasing range of programming choices (DOC, 1983 (a): 3)' .
In practice, the new northern broadcasting policy added more U.S. channels to the Cancom package
and introduced pay-television and specialty services. The actual priority of federal northern broadcasting
policy was the extension of commercial services to support Canadian broadcasters and cable &erators.
Extension to northern communities seemed only an add-on feature.
At the CRTC hearings in 1982 to restructure the pay-television service and in 1983 to add the U.S.
signals to the Cancom package, IBC and TNI again emphasized what the CRTC, CBC and many
government spokesmen had already agreed upon for years: that native people needed native broadcasting
if they were not to lose their culture. In her presentation at the CRTC hearing on the tiering of
pay-television services, Rosemarie Kuptana, Resident of IBC, wondered about the problem. Referring to
the long history of native interventions and stated government and CBC intentions, she described the
continuing problem as one of "ineffectual goodwill" and strongly rejected additional southern
programming.
Ex~eriences Television in the Western and Eastern Arctic
With the launch of Anik, 17 hours per day of southern programming flooded the North. The
program fare northern audiences came to see was a daily reminder that they were not the main reason for
launching Anik. Extending television to small Arctic communities was rather a side-benefit secondary to
practical purposes outlined in CBC policy, because the transponder served network transmission needs.
What Inuit could see in the first years were network service feeds, i.e. a package of fragments of news
from coast to coast for subsequent rebroadcast, a dose of miscellaneous news, and several repeats of
The northern broadcasting policy will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven, as it particularly addresses native programming and participation in policy formation.
ordinary shows, interrupted by other programs and syndication feeds, or an empty screen. The confusion
persisted well into 1975. By 1938, CBC North c ~ u l d report that the most obvious problems of network
feed served across the North had been solved.
We have filled station break dead air with northern announcements. We have eliminated double exposure of programs and initiated a weather forecast print-out for each of the northern sub-regio a,.. For five years we have used borrowed resources at CBC Montreal to produce a 15 minute weekly talk show in Inuktituk. And in the Eastern Arctic we have co-operated with Nunatsiakmiut, which is an Inuktituk speaking Frobisher Bay-based . production group, by procuring - albeit at modest rates - their 15-minute weekly program for telecast. (Ward, 1978: 7)
The Introduction of Television in the Western Arctic
There are no studies available that discuss the introduction of television in the Western Arctic.
Much of the information is therefore based on interviews and on occasional references in the literature.
Prior to television many Inuit had already been exposed to either television in the south, film
screenings in the North, or video tapes. For example, Aklavik housed a small theater for regular movie
shows, and during the construction of the DEW line in the mid-fifties many Inuit saw films at the radar
station:
That was something great. Every other night we could see Plms at the DEW line station. They had lots offilms. ... It sure looked like real. (Joe Thrasher, Paukztuk)
Since the 1970s, people have used video recorders, which are still highly appreciated and often used
to supplement or replace the television broadcast In contrast to the Eastern Arctic, all communities were
eager to get television service, despite their complaints about the lack of northern content Because the
majority of the population has at least some knowledge of English, language problems are by far not as
evident and severe as in the Eastern Arctic. The regional center of Inuvik with its substantial number of
- non-native people and the communities nearby, got television significantly earlier than the small remote
coastal communities where the Inuvialuit are in the majority.
In 1969 Inuvik received the video-taped Frontier Coverage Package and in 1973 was included in
the A q . In addition, in the 1970s a pirate television station developed which broadcast taped southern
programs for several years to 160 paying subscribers. Another 200 picked up the signal for free (Alberta
Report, 15 Feb. 1980). The station never applied for a license and the CRTC turned a blind eye, as it
usually did with operations in remote areas. Yet when the DOC wanted to set up a trial extension of
CBC and BCTV signals via Anik B in 1980, the pirate station argued that it should be the distributor.
Government officials could no longer ignore the illegal operation. They did not want to close it down, but
they also did not want it to continue unlicensed. Both DOC and CRTC sent out application forms and
urged the station to fill them out To be licensed, however, the station would have to attend a CRTC
hearing in Inuvik. At the best of times, this procedure takes about six weeks. The experiment with
broadcasting via Anik B was expected to last only six months and there was no guarantee that it would
continue. "What happens if the whole community gets television for six months and then we decide we
can't continue?" (Johnston, DOC, in Alberta Report, 15 Feb. 1980). The pirate station closed and was
superseded in 1982 by the properly licensed Inuvik TV Ltd. to deliver the Cancom service.
By May 1985, Inuvik TV had 397 subscribers for the Cancom service distributing four Canadian
stations. In 1986 the U.S. channels were added. For the basic Canadian service, subscribers were charged '
$21.20 monthly. They also had to pay an additional one time fee for a decoder ($106 to $212 depending
on quality) and monthly rental charges of $5.30 for the equipment (Inuvik TV Ltd. 1986). In 1985 about
30% of the Inuvialuit in Inuvik subscribed to the Cancom service (ICS, 1984: 19). Inuvik TV also sells
DBS dishes, of which there are an increasing number, particularly among non-native people to receive the
pay-television and specialty services.
Tuktoyaktuk got CBC livetelevision in 1975 via microwave feed from Inuvik. The service diffused
rapidly and quickly reached the saturation level. In 1982 a group of people got together and formed the
non-profit Tuk-Tuk Communications Society to get the licence for broadcasting the'Cancom service. An
oil company donated the earth station and rebroadcasting equipment When the U.S. stations were added
to the satellite service, the community decided to subscribe to three additional channels (the fourth was
broadcast at the eastern time zone and thus too inconvenient). It also dropped the French channel and
added a rock music radio subcarrier from Edmonton.
In contrast to the commercial enterprise in Inuvik, the local non-profit communications society
broadcasts the service unscrambled and relies on voluntary subscription from businesses, of which there
aye quite a few due to the petroleum development, and private residents. The society depends heavily on
large donations provided by major businesses. The number of volunteer subscribers is flexible and hovers
around 160; a drop from the original 240. People pay or don't depending on their fhincial ability and
their interest in watching television, which is usually lower during the summer months. " .
From time to time it is necessary to have a fund raising campaign. And at times the society
threatens to pull the plug because they cannot pay the monthly subscriber fee. People then quickly pay
their contribution. At one time, when there was a power failure for a few days and therefore no
broadcasting, people assumed the society had run out of money and rushed to the hamlet office to pay
their fees (Brenda Blair, Tuktoyaktuk).
Because of its close proximity to Inuvik, Aklavik got also connected to the CBC service via
microwave lines in 1975. In 1982, like Tuktoyaktuk, it also subscribed to the four Canadian channels
offered on the Cancom service which are broadcast unscrambled. With no petroleum companies at hand
but a strong dedication to radio bingo and a supportive hamlet council, the necessary monthly fees can be
raised. Yet Aklavik has not added the U.S. channels.
CBC television did not reach the coastal communities in the Western Arctic until 1982/83 when the
territorial government made funds available to extend services to communities with less than 500
residents. In 1985/86 many communities also decided to subscribe to Cancom for an additional channel.
They opted for CITV from Edmonton, which broadcasts the "Edmonton Oilers" hockey games. The
money is raised communally and the program rebroadcast unscrambled. Usually, a group of people or the
community council itself forms a non-profit society that holds the licence and people pay a voluntary
annual subscription fee. In 1986187 communities also began to also add one or two U.S. channels to
receive further favorite soap operas.
This number is used as the basis of "subscribersw to the $1.04 fee per channel per subscriber to Cancom.
A typical evening's program fare contains a second or third rerun of Three's Company, the
Vancouver news and weather, a series of situation comedies w drama series, the 2> National and the
Journal, followed by either the Edmonton or Vancouver regional news, a U.S. sitcom, and a late movie
starting at 1 am..
Holman Island, as well as communities in the Central Arctic are in the unique position to receive
the CBC from both the western and eastern satellite channel in order to also get the IBC progra~nming.~
The four hour time zone difference in broadcasting gives people also some choice and allows to follow up
missed programs later in the day.
To conclude, in the Western Arctic the diffusion of southern television has been rapid and
relatively smooth. The communities did not reject the service, although they complained about the
content Experiences in the Eastern Arctic were significantly different
The Intrwluction of Television in the Eastern Arctic
The introduction of what Inuit called "Magic in the Sky"l0 in Eastern Arctic communities was
greeted with mixed emotions, ranging from curiosity to great concern In contrast to the west, the fact
that there was no Inuktituk programming played an important role, because most of the older Inuit could
not understand English. Whether or not to get the service was discussed extensively in the communities.
Often house-to-house votes were held that generally favoured the introduction of the popular entertainer.
People were aware that the introduction would change the lifestyle of the community. The communities
with more than 500 residents received television between 1973 and 1975. As in the Western Arctic, those
communities not covered by the ACP did not receive the national service until 1983/84 when temtorial
funds provided reception facilities.
The Holman dialect is close to the central Arctic Inuktituk dialect, and people are able to receive and understand the IBC programs broadcast on the Eastern Arctic channel.
lo Title of a film produced by Peter Raymond and Arthur Hammond. A co-production of the National Film Board of Canada and Investigative Productions in collaboration with the Inuit &Tapirisat of Canada.
Like Inuvik, the regional center of Iqaluit, with its large non-native population, was included in the
Frontier Coverage Plan of videotapes. With the introduction of live-television in 1973 the new
technology diffused rapidly. Wilson (1987: 44) reports that within one year 78% of Inuit households had
acquired television. By 1974 it had reached a saturation level of 98%. Television diffusion was thus
significantly faster than telephone. When Cancom started in 1982, the Iqaluit distributor provided the full
service through cable and added the U.S. channels when they became available. As a result, only 0.006%
of the daily program fare available in Iqaluit is in Inuktituk (IBC (1987 (c): 5). The subscribers are
charged up to $25 each.
As in the Western Arctic, many of the small native communities decided in the mid 1980s to
subscribe to one or two channels of the Cancom service. In most cases it has been a communal enterprise
whereby the settlement raises the money through voluntary subscription and fundraisers, like bingo, and
rebroadcasts the channels (Hamilton, Edmonton, and/or Vancouver) unscrambled. Hockey games have
been a major factor in deciding to subscribe to a commercial channel. Recently, communities have also
become interested in subscribing to U.S. stations to receive favorite soap operas. The threat to switch off
the commercial channels is a useful last resource to raise the necessary fees. For example, the hamlet
council in Rankin Inlet switched off the four commercial transmitters until residents raised $24,000 - the
amount needed to keep the satellite dish operating for 12 months (Casimiri, 1987: 12).
The predominantly native community of Pond Inlet provides the service on a discrete basis. It is
exceptional and based on initiatives by a local non-native engineer. He bought a satellite dish to receive
the unscrambled U.S. pay-television channels, then bought a transmitter and rebroadcast the U.S. Home
Box Office channel to the Pond Inlet community. There were some concerns about the content of the
HBO service and someone mentioned it to the CBC. The engineer was informed of the illegal character
of his broadcasting. It took one and a half years to get the proper licence for the Cancom service, which
by then had become available. He now distributes the four Canadian and one U.S. channel. At first the
service was broadcast over the air, based on voluntary payments. Yet that could not raise enough money.
so the service was switched to cable. Officially there are 41 subscribers (Bob James, Pond Inlet), yet
apparently many more families in the community watch the southern programs, as they are able to tap
into the cable system.
To the astonishment of southern politicians and broadcasters, some communities, primarily in
Northern Quebec, refused southern television, even when offered it under the ACP. Many did not accept
television until the CBC provided an adequate radio service for the region and a television service that . .
included Inuit programming. Iglodik in the NWT resisted television until 1983. It has been a special
case in that it was the only community in the NWT having tumed down the offer for a decade. In 1975
the settlement rejected the offer because programming was only in English and children would not be
encouraged to learn their own language. Also, meetings of community organizations and many other
traditional activities would die out, because people would stay at home. In 1979 a second vote was held
and the majority still rejected television. However, there was already a strong minority of 46% that would
have liked the service. In a third vote in 1983 73% favoured television and on 29 October 1983 the CBC
started its service. By that time, IBC had established its hourly presence on the daily program schedule
which justified the move.
Yet the issue is more complicated, as John MacDonald (INAC: Igloolik, interview) points out
There is this official story that shows the community as an island of cultural strength and tradition, where
people are protecting themselves and their traditions by cutting out the southern cultural threat. They
believe that television has destructive values and reject i t Following the Inuit experiments with television
and the beginning of IBC programming, the people see the advantages of the medium. And now that
there is Inuktituk programming, they allow television to come into their community. Indeed. Igloolik is
strongly holding onto its culture, the traditional element is very alive and the cultural programming
produced in this IBC production center has won awards (see chapter nine). Thus thkre is something to
this story. Yet there is also another side.
Before television came, there were regular movies, including action and horror films, shown at the
town hall. Videos were also diffusing, which people watched increasingly. Long before television came
people had television sets and VCRs. Thus television came in through the back door and not overnight
People were prepared for it for a long time. Yet VCRr were never an idue for public discussion in the
community. It was considered a private decision.
Iglwlik is now one of the few communities, besides settlements in Arctic Quebec, that have refused
to take any southern commercial television through Cancom. Opinions are divided Some residents like
to get additional channels, while others are strongly opposed. On an open-line radio discussion a
commentator argued that the community could not afford another channel. It would cost about $600.
W e are not rich. People will have to be selling more things (artificts, jkrs)Jicst to get the channel (Radio comment, Iglodik).
Those arguing for additional television programming feel tired of seeing the same things over and
over. They want more choice.
Some residents say that if the community decides to get more channels, it should take control and
shut the programming off for undesirable shows. Generally people feel that there should be more
selection in what is broadcast. They request more quality programs, documentaries, and educational
shows, and also cartoons for children and hockey games. They reject violent and meaningless programs.
Definitely there should be more Inuktituk programming. Some fear that more television will be
disruptive to community and family life. Children would spend more time in front of the screen and
forget their homework. If Iglwlik decides to subscribe to the Cancom service, the decision will be based
on a communal vote, preferably on a house-to-house basis, and the channel broadcast community wide.
Television and Video Use
Program Prefeences and Viewing Habits
Although southern television came to many northern communities without consultation, and with
little regard for local or regional input, it has become a popular, permanent fixture in most homes.
Audience surveys indicate that between 88% and 96% of native households across the North have
television (Atiles, 1986: 38). Inuit spend a lot of time watching television. Coldevin (1979: 121) reports
that after two and one-half years of service availability, adults watched on the average 6.7 hours during
weekdays, and 18% reported that the set was turned on as long as there were programs being broadcast ___- -- -
For weekends the figure rose to 7.4 hours per day, with 21% indicating that the televiqon was on all day.
One has to keep in mind that these high consumption patterns are despite the fact that many older Inuit
do not or only marginally understand English. ~.
CBC audience surveys in the late 1970s and early 1980s and IBC and ICS surveys in the mid 1980s
provide the most recent data on television consumption. Despite their strong rejection of southern
commercial television programs, the Inuit seem to support commercial programming. Besides native
language oriented programming, sports, and news and current affairs, there is a strong preference for
"soap opera/serialU (CBC, 1982 (b): 73). Among the CBC programs surveyed in 1981 - when
programming by IBC or ICS was not yet available - the soap opera Edge of Night scored with 56% as
preferred program, followed by Hockey Night in Canada (25%) and closely followed by the Inuktitulc
program Turqravut (22%), Ddlus (21%) and Nunatsiakmiut (20%) (CBC, 1982: 29). The subscription to
the Cancom service on the basis of hockey games or soap operas also reflects program priorities.
According to IBC's audience surveys in 1984 and 1985,77.5% watch the national news, and 57%
enjoy watching it, while interest and preference drop significantly for The Journul. 64.6% watch and 34.2%
enjoy the current affairs show Focus North, and 70.7% watch and 53.9% enjoy the science program The
Nature of Things. Interest is also high for Three's Compny, and Saturday morning cartoons. 57% of the
audience likes Dallas and 60.8% enjoy watching A11 My Children (Valaskakis, Wilson 1984: 84,87;
Valaskakis, Wilson, 1985). Yet audience surveys tell only part of the story.
When the television is on and there are a number of people in the household, it is usually the - - - - -.
children and younger people who watch, partly because they are the ones more likely to understand
English and partly because the older people are less likely to be seduced away from social activities
(Graburn, 1982: 11) Elders also reject more strongly violence and negative influences. In most cases the
living room is large enough for conversations to be carried on at the back of the room by those who don't
want to concentrate on the program. Another characteristic of northern television consumption is that the
volume of the tv set is often turned down. People listen to the radio with its Inuktituk and northern I
programming while watching television. The volume is turned up when Inuktituk programming appears
on television.
Like southern viewers, northerners do not pay full attention to television, except for special
programs, and continue their family activities and socializing, like eating, homework, sewing, and talking.
k. Video Ownership and Use
Besides television, VCRs have played an important role in media consumption. Hudson (1985: 4)
reports of 15% to more than 40% of households owning or renting video equipment Lucas (1987: 15)
reports about one unidentified Inuit community with a penetration rate of 75% of all households. VCRs
are present in most northern schools. In most of the smaller communities, people own the equipment
because there are no facilities for renting. On the average, fees per tape range between $3 to $4 per night
In the Western Arctic a boom year for VCRs was the fiscal year 1981-82 when there was a lot of
disposable income, due to the oil and gas development That year the local electronics store in Inuvik
sold as many units as in the following two years. Other Arctic regions have also seen a continuous growth
in video penetration. Purchase levels have remained high, because prices dropped generally. People
made increasing use of catalogues or trips to the south to buy their eq*pment Also, more tapes became
available, due to regular scheduled flights and the spread of video networks. Today, new video titles
arrive in the Arctic about the same time as they hit corner stores in southern Canada.
At first, local outlets in the regional centers would mail out rental videos to the communities. In
the early days, many illegal (copyright violation) tapes from television programs circulated, because there
was no livetelevision in the small communities. It stopped when the CRTC pursued the copyright
violators and stores began to carry only properly copyrighted movies.
--
4 -T
With the increase in video consumption every community now has at least one video outlet
Depending on the size of the community, there is either a special rental shop, a private home where
people drop in the evening to rent movies, or a video section in the local store. Generally the video
business is thriving. What started as a small sideline often developed into a principal enterprise. When
the Cancom service was introduced, sales briefly dropped, yet not to a significant degree. Even in a
community with the full Cancom service, like Tuktoyaktuk, video rentals are a growing. .
Northern viewers prefer action films mainly of U.S. origin, including horror, science fiction,
western, wrestling, and cartoon. Favorites include Indiana Jones, Temple of Doom and Back to the fitwe
(Harper, 1987: E13). It is known that northern people rent a lot of videos, but there is very little research \
that addresses video consumption.ll
Early video viewing patterns were similar to those found shortly after the introduction of television.
When families in the small communities ordered three or four tapes, several orders would often arrive on
the same fight, so suddenly a dozen or more videos were circulating. For a while, people tended to watch
several tapes non-stop. Yet when the novelty wore off and both tapes and live-television were available
locally, consumption levelled out
VCRs are generally not used to record television programs for later viewing, so called "time
shifting," but mainly to watch rental movies. Studies in other countries with a limited television
environment show that the home VCRs have displaced to some extent other media and leisure time
activities. In the North, with few television channels available, video has significantly increased viewing
options. Videos are not disrupted by advertisements. They can be seen at convenient times and repeated
as often as required (Cohen, 1987).
l1 What is absolutely lacking is any systematic, exact information on the operation of the video industry in the North. The technology has come on the market, there is a supply of recorded video cassettes, but it remains unclear to what degree there is illegal copying and distribution.
Imwacts of Television and Video Consum~tion
The introduction of television has meant the last refuge of Inuit culture, the home, has been invaded by an outside culture. (John Amagoalik, in Magic in the Sky)
At a CRTC hearing, the president of IBC compared commercial television with the neutron bomb,
a statement that has often been quoted as the Inuit assessment of southern programming.
We might liken the onslaught of southern television and the absence of native television to the neutron bomb. This is a bomb that kills the people, but leaves the buildings standing. Neutron bomb television is the kind of television that destroys the soul of a people, but leaves the shell of a people walking around. This is television in which the traditions, the skills, the culture, the language, count for nothing. (Rosemarie Kuptana, 1983: 12)
It is impossible to distinguish the effects of television12 from the complex net of facton that
influence the social change in the North. The introduction dE television served as an additional factor
reinforcing the change that had already begun. One must to be very cautious in linking these factors to
television only. Roth (1982: 67) points out that many changes became apparent after the introduction of
television Wilson (1987: 27) argues that it is not so much the effects of television as the information and
, the context, that need to be analyzed.
The introduction of satellite broadcasting brought an influx of southern researchers investigating
the impact of a programming that was intended for a culture foreign to the Inuit Academic research
focussed on the Eastern and Central Arctic, and generally directed its attention to children and those
young adults who were bilingual, and on adults with only a very limited knowledge of English.
Granzberg (1981), Valaskakis (1986) and Wilson (1987) have reviewed the literature on television
and its implications for the North, which forms the basis for the following overview. At first the
attractiveness of the Eastern Arctic as a unique research environment became apparent to only a small
- number of researchers. Coldevin (1973, 1976) began collecting data on the attitudes of Inuit adolescents.
His quantitative data approach differed from Granzberg's (1982) longitudinal fieldwork on the cultural
l2 In the following, the discussion about television effect. also includes video consumption unless particularly specified. The literahue generally only refers to television; however principal similarities in the cultural context of media content - except the advertisement - suggest that video. can be included in the impact assessment.
role of television among the northern Algonkian, or Watson's (1976) snapshot of the impacts of television
right after its introduction in Rankin Inlet. These studies documented native cultural dislocation resulting
from southern television programming. The interpretative framework for these, and the many studies that
followed, focused on the relationship between television images and information and native cultures
(Vaiaskakis, 1986). The literature review provides evidence of increased knowledge and " W e s t e ~ t i o n "
of speech, behavior and technical modes of life, but also of resistance and increased tension and conflict
People were both highly attracted and shocked by television.
Expected Impcts
The communities "participationH in the inqduction of television, as noted above, was to accept or
reject i t In this decision-making process, people expressed their concerns and expectations. Only in
response to Inuit complaints at CRTC hearings did the CBC Start to consult with the settlements. There
was no information about what television actually meant
One of my biggest fears is the violence shown on films nowadays, as well as on TV. We do not have this violence up North, and I do not want my children to be subjected to viewing this. (Johnny Ohitol, Sugluk, in Inuit Today, 1975: 39)
The Inuit's greatest fear related to the hann it would do to chiIdren. They resented not only the
violenck- te man's world. Children would assume that white men
were smarter, and therefore listen to them rather than to the Inuit. Also, people recognized the
compelling force of the television set to keep children up late and inside the house all day. Similarly,
adults would watch too much,'stay up all night, and be too tired the next day for their work
(Green,Simailak, 19786: 12-16).
People thought that one good use of television would be to keep the children &e and out of
mischief, particularly at time of break-up and freeze-up. Also, television was recognized as a convenient
entertainer.
If you have work to do, you can ignore it, but If you don't have anything to do, it is worthwhile to watch. I would like to have more channels in the morning. Television is my companion. (radio comment, Igloolik)
The English programming was considered useful only when it could teach them and their children
the white man's language in an entertaining way. Even advertisements could be useful:
We Inuit never know what all those bottles are, standing on shelves at the Bay. Household commercials taught me what they were. (Emily Epoo, in Inuit Today, 1975: 39).
However, given the serious threat to Inuit culture from the dominant non-native ways in all spheres
of northern life, Inuit strongly emphasized the potential of television as a tool for teaching Inuktituk, and
informing them about issues relevant to the North. It was tied to the hope that television would educate,
change habits and help them cope with community problems.
InfiKmcrtion is one of the most important things* us. We need communication for i n f m i o n . We want to kn . Our education was lejt behind. Education is a tod and we got no tods. ... The number r ne issue is to be able to get better infknnrrtion, better education, to be able to use the media. ... Television should be used more fbr education. (Sam Raddi, Inuvik)
Studies across the North, including Alaska with no-TV and TV-exposed Inuit communities,
indicate a tendency which can also be found in developing countries introducing television. It points to
the limitations of the communications development theory in that the envisioned learning effects do not
materialize. Communities with no television over-anticipate the positive and de-emphasize the negative
implications. They tend to see television as very powerful, having some negative impacts, but also being
enjoyable, interesting and exciting. "But those who have been experiencing television may bemoan the
'bad' and 'powerful' things, once exposed to them, and no longer attribute excitement and all good things
to a forthcoming prize." (Forbes, 1980: 14).
Coldevin and Wilson (1980) also found that those without television tended to be very positive
about what they anticipated tv would bring. This was in stark contrast to those living in television towns,
who tended to be very negative. These findings contradict the traditional commudcations development
literature. They indicate a decreased level of personal adjustment when faced with rapid change.
Behaviwal impacts on Inuit Families
The literature on television effects suggests that there are several stages in the diffusion of
television technology, from novelty, to saturation to maturity (Perrot, 1986). Any snapshot of impacts has
thus to consider the stage of diffusion of the technology.
On Saturday October 13,1973 Rankin Inlet as a community entered the television age by watching "Bugs Bunny." Home television sets were surrounded by obsessive watchers, drawing relatives, friends and neighbours who lacked sets of their own, so that reportedly 'everybody' in town was watching TV 'non-stop' for the first wee k... The streets were dead. (Watson, 1977: 51)
Changes in community and family life during the first few weeks after television is introduced are
generally similar (see, for example, Watson, 1977; Green, Simailak, 1976; Graburn 1982; Granzberg,
1977) and reflect an acceptance found all over the world. Once the decision was made to get television,
people could hardly wait for it to come. The Bay or the local coop advertised their big co1our television
sets for weeks. People had no buying choice, there was no competition, and they ended up spending
about $1,000 for their sets, often through monthly installments which increased their dependency. The
diffusion of the technology reached saturation level within the first year, a rate not found for any other
csaamumaimtions technology introduced to Arctic communities.
In the first few days, people were absolutely absorbed by i t Community life came to a halt After
they got over the fist waves of excitement, people started to pay attention to the contents and became
more selective. They reached the saturation level. However, some changes persisted and continue to
influence family and community life.
Research results suggest that television has the most profound socio-cultural impact on children
because of their vulnerability. to novelty (Coldevin, 1977: 3).
* There was a significant drop in school attendance. In Tuktoyaktuk, for example, attendance went from 78% to 50% and is now up to about 65% to 70%. Parents usually let the children decide for themselves when to go to bed With television sets on all night, teachers found some kids commenting on late movies thdt ran at 4 an They continue to report about sleepy children and a generally low attendance in the morning. In Paulatuk (already prior to tv), school hours had been adjusted to the community life style and school would not start until 11 A.M., so the low morning
' attendance and sleepiness of children was somewhat cushioned. Lunch break was at 2 p.m. . - just
in time to watch the popular soap opera "All My Children" before returning to school from 3 p.m. until 5.45 p.m.I3
Children play less outside while competitive televised games, such as hockey, and play-fight have "3 increased As anywhere else, television characters and behaviour serve as role models. The school in Igloolik, for example, made a particular effort in counteracting violence. It invited officers from the Canadian air force to explain that the role of military forces differs from that of Rambo, and
< prohibited play-fights on the school yard as part of a sensitization towards violent behavior.
2-
I /
Television has also affected adult social activities The major disruption at the beginning ceased as
people integrated television into their lives and started doing things that they were doing before.
However, there are social changes that can be, at least partially, attributed to television.
* People are reluctant to attend community activities when this competes with popular television programs (Roth, 1982: 68). Many hunting, home and community related activities are scheduled -1 around major television events. During the Anik B project the Inuit in Quebec therefore insisted [ on having control not only over broadcasting content but also over timing to not interfere with their communal activities. Unless controlling mechanisms are set up, the audio-visual entertainer 1
I seriously disrupts any other activities.
* An alien time awareness has been imposed. It was already existing for wage work and schooling but now was extended into the private home. It has resulted in a "rush-rush attitude." In 1 pretelevision days, as Watson (1977: 116) observed, "people would seldom have been in such a i hurry for the start of anything, since not many events had a definite reliable starting time to which ) to gear one's expectations."
* Some communal events disappeared, such as movies at the recreation hall. The family-centered 'I television watching at home has replaced the social gathering.
* Visiting and sociaiizing patterns have changed. People stay more often at home to watch television. ' Or if they are visiting, interactive communication is reduced. "Television brought the monologue. ; Visiting was always a dialogue. Now it's always a monologue" (Roy Goose, Sachs Harbour). i
* Brand awareness has increased. People refer to slogans of the advertisements when they mention the product at the local store, which therefore keeps quite sophisticated goods such as Kiwi, canned lobster, or decafeinated coffee. "People wouldn't be aware of things if it weren't for the ads and trips to the south." (Sheila McDOmell, Sachs-Harbour).
On the other hand, people are not convinced that television should be blamed for all the changes
that researchers noticed in the community. It came together with increased wage work that bound people,'
in a nine-to-five schedule, increased government administration, and new technological gadgets. For S'
example, Rankin Inlet Inuit did not blame the decrease in fishing, hunting and camping on television, but
l3 In 1986 school hour were advanced one hour and ultimately to community intends to catch. up with the rest of north and start at 9 a.m.
rather on industrial activities, low flying helicopters and non-native people hunting and fishing who would
scare away both animals and Inuit (Green, Simailak, 1976: 32).
Thus television had a roughly similar effect on Inuit social life as it did on white people in rural
areas in North America and Third World countries: the tendency to break up social activities and groups
into the core family units, replacing community-wide events with family activities. Although visiting is
still widely practiced, it is shaped by the presence of television
Culture Conditioning and Conditioned Long- Term Impacts
By the late 1970s evidence was accumulating that the effect of television, so far as it could be
measured, was probably far subtler than the early television-effects literature had suggested (Wilson,
1987: 24). Many communication experts and government officials realized
that they had not been adequately cognizant of the variety of ways by which a seemingly-invariant phenomenon like television may be interpreted and perceived ... Neither had they anticipated the extent to which imbalances may exist between Western television content and Native needs and perspectives. (Granzberg, 1981: 31)
Satellite television was not understood as a force of modernization but as "an alien culture
socialization agent" (Coldevin, 1977). It carried disruptive cultural images which increased out-group
identity, stress and even a sense of "helplessness" among northern native people (Granzberg, 1982; Caron, c!
1977; O'Connell1974; Graburn, 1982; Wilson, 1981,1987; Forbes, 1980). The analyses emphasized the
continuity of the historical role of earlier change agencies (such 'as missionaries, RCMP and traders), and
criticized the federal broaddting policy as a factor in "cultural replacement" and the expansion of
southern control (Meyes, 1972; Valaskakis, 1976; 1979; 1984). Along with other research, these studies
provided evidence to support a challenge to the federal policy on native broadcasting (Roth, 1982).
The impacts differ substantially from those in southern Canadian rural areas in terms of an
increasing generation gap. In the south people of all ages watch television a lot, and the issue of native
language loss and communication impasse is not a particular problem.
Southern television obviously increased the knowledge about the southern culture. People pick up
information from a southern viewpoint, behavior models, goods, advertisements. They also learn the
English language. Studies addressing the educational value and developmental role of television
(Coldevin, 1977; Caron, 1979; Forbes, 1980, Wilson 1987) refer to the increased knowledge of current
events at the national and international level, and cultural awareness of the southern culture. Yet they
also indicate that this increase is at the expense of interests at the local community levels (Forbes, 1980:
13). In her study undertaken shortly after the introduction of television, Forbes found a general tendency
of acculturation and cultural replacement, reflected in socio-economic orientation, preferred employment,
site of residence, evaluation of lifestyles and leisure time activities that are geared towards the southern
lifestyle. This was also supported by Coldevin's early study (Coldevin, 1979: 130-131). In 1980 Coldevin
and Wilson (1983) noticed an increased awareness of national and international issues. This was greater
among settlement Inuit than Iqaluit residents (adolescents). Students from small, isolated settlements had
higher levels of internal control and an increased ability to adapt to change than students from the
regional center. The regional center had seen a higher speed of change and information transfer and, as a
result, experienced greater problems of adjustment (Coldevin and Wilson, 1983: 92-93). The authors
drew comparisons to the education system and concluded that schooling had formalized a process of
cultural replacement which television extended to the home. Both have been instrumental in reinforcing
a sense of helplessness, a tendency to "give up" which emerges from the perceived lack of control over
one's life which is closely related to low self-esteem.
The survey in 1983 (Wilson, 1987), however, indicates a northern reorientation, continued strength
for the northern lifestyle and a decreasing gap concerning the locus of control between settlement and
Iqaluit students (Wilson, 1987: 122-125). He explains this to be partially the result of Inuktituk
programming by IBC. It seems to also reflect the maturity stage of television diffusion.
Southern society brought a materially superior lifestyle - more of everything - accompanied by a
more sophisticated technology. Carpenter (1972: 31) observed that the main thing that impressed Inuit
about western culture is machinery. Yet this was accompanied by a de fhcto loss of control over their
lives and a devaluation of the human element
Television brought an increased visual knowledge of the outside world, but often without the
necessary accompanying comprehension of its verbal and cultural components (Roth, 1982: 69). Forbes
(1980: 20) found that for Alaskan native people television had its greatest effect on those concepts where
people had no alternative sources of information, such as black people or other nations. On village life,
white people, and Alaskan native peoples, television did not have measurable effects since fmt-hand
information was readily available. Studies in non-Western countries also indicate tendencies of enforcing
stereotypes from a western perspective (Beltran etal., 1979).
The older monolingual Inuit are not so much affected because they barely understand English and
are still rooted in a way of life which is radically different from the one presented on screen. Generally
they don't show a great interest in television unless it has some meaning for their life, like Inuktituk
programming and news and current affairs. Yet children and young adults are more drawn to the
effective and enjoyable instrument of acculturation.
In the typical Inuit household where family conversation is still carried on in Inuktituk, the
television set is a powerful teaching machine, particularly for children, to learn and use English. Adults
unable to speak Ehglish are undoubtedly frustrated by their inability to comprehend the audio-component
of the broadcast It explains why very often, the volume is turned down and the radio on.
Graburn (1982:13) reports about children and adults in the Central Arctic who are able to recite
jingles of ads and well known characters even when they do not understand what they are saying. The
ease with which infants and preschoolers, who hardly speak Inuktituk, pick up English with its familiar
phrases and accents has forced the parents to adapt to their children. On the othef hand, grammatical
improvements are notable among all age groups (Roth, 1982: 70).
Graburn (1982: 14) fears that even if the CBC injects additional hours of Inuktituk language
programs into its service, it will be doubtful whether this will make much difference. The present CBC
native programs are directed at the older generation and concern matters such as recent social
developments, traditional techniques and history. Among the children the few @BC-produced Inuktituk
language programs are the least popular. Inuit therefore argue that it is d l the more important to use
Inuktituk in all spheres of life and to also to provide their own children's programming in Inuktituk, to
capture their interest and to provide role models in line with Inuit culture (see chapter Bght). / To properly interpret the moving pictures on the screen, people have to learn television literature.
In particular, the two-dimensional, narrowly-framed, rapidly and abruptly shifting images have to be
translated into the three-dimensional, widely framed. slow-moving everyday world (Granzberg, 1983: 34).
In the Western world, learning about the difference between reality and fiction occurs quite easily, yet this
distinction is not readily available to Inuit The oral tradition conditions people to expect that television
events are truthful, representative, unstaged, and contain personally meaningful practical messages as is
the principal purpose of storytelling. The oral culture has been a successful teaching and
culture-preserving method to transfer information from one generation to the next There has been no
concept of sheer fantasy and fiction. Initially, many people took the broadcast as reality and were upset
when it was not They felt tricked and only slowly understood the alien concept of entertainment without
any social meaning.
In the Canadian North neither the environment, nor the language, nor the culture of the native
peoples is representative of the dominant white urban majority from whom television broadcasts originate.
As a result, messages are interpreted differently.
We do not really see with our eyes or hear with our ears. If we all saw with our eyes, we should see pretty much alike. ... We differ more widely than this because we can see not only with our eyes but with our midbrain, our visual and associative centers, and with our system of incipient behavior, to which almost all visual perceiving directly leads. (G. Murphy, in Sjoberg, 1975: 13)
It took people some time to discover that television "can lie" and that it is necessary to develop a
healthy scepticism, including an awareness of the Hollywood ethos and the misrepresentations that occur.
"Entertainment for the sake of entertainment is resented" (Cassirer, in Granzberg, 1983: 42).
Katz (1977: 114) reports that some countries have understood the need to incorporate local
communications traditions, such as using old legends to teach concepts of integration, or shadow plays,
dance theatre, puppeteering and traditional theatre to inform and entertain. These forms are also used in
native programming (see chapters eight and nine) but not usually employed by southern television in a
way that is culturally relevant to the Inuit
The clash between expectations of honest, personally meaningful reporting and its lack on southern
television c o n f i i previous experiences with western technology and broken promises, be it equal access
to communication services or the claim that formal education will lead to wage employment.
Inuit culture has been subject to a massive assault by exposure to the images, ideas, and
advertisements created for the "middle class masses of North America" (Graburn, 1982: 12). Of course,
television is not the only exposure to the cultural rules and content of life in the South, but is
accompanied by schooling, wage work, government institutions, comic books and the like. Whereas most
of these influences affect adults, children are particularly exposed to the impacts of television and
schooling. What has been found in the U.S. may also become true in the Arctic. By the time children
have finished school, they have spent more hours watching television than they have in school. In the
north the problem will be exacerbated because television is viewed more continuously and school
attendance is generally lower and shorter.
Southern commercial television established itself as a new change agency, as a new institution
which influenced motivations and decisions in a desired direction. It transfers new dimensions of political
orientation in the form of a one-way flow of information encouraging consumerism. The commercial
context of the programming with emphasis on buying power further pushes people towards the value
system of an industrial society, where sharing, respect for elders and group orientation have no place.
When you see something, you want it, especially when you are exposed to it on a daily basis. I think the older people realize you can live without these things. But the people are so fhmily oriented. We live our lives* our children. And what our kids want we try to give it to them. I think this is where the problems arise. When the children see it, they want it and the parents try to make the extra effort to give it to their kids. (Vince Teddy, Tuktoyktuk)
Particularly since the introduction of southern Canadian and U.S. commercial stations, where nearly
a quarter of the time is spent on advertisements, it is evident that programming cannot be separated into
isolated elements of shows and ads but has to be approached as general cultural form. Valaskakis (1983
(b): 9) argues that western society, as reflected in the programs, stresses the subject, achievement and
success, whereas Inuit society emphasizes the more humanistic values of oneself within the environment
It is not suggested that all cultural products of southern origin follow this single-minded fashion to
impose the model of the industrial market with its commodity relations. There are critical voices
addressing social realities. But the contradictions are not made explicit Together with all the other
southern influences, television provides images that further encourage the existing trend of acculturation.
It reinforces the demand for all the goods, gadgets and expectations of the media-presented lifestyle.
Sjoberg (1975: 11) points out that the television offered in the North is not only a problem of the
programs viewed but similarly of the programs never produced The lack of local or regional access and
control precludes lateral communications.
The unchallenged extension of television services has led to a serious deflection of resources, manpower and money way from the real and expressed communication needs. (Ibid.)
Scholars like Williams and Carpenter argue that particular roles can be assigned to the electronic
media by virtue of their existence. Williams (1975) points out that one has to distinguish between
television as a technology, that is a receiver that can be turned on or off, and the cultural form, that is the
content transmitted over the technology. This involves separating the mere material existence from the
cognitive perceptions. He emphasizes the limitations of media effects studies because they only examine
the symptoms of the otherwise unexamined operations of an agency (Williams, 1975: 125-126).
Carpenter (1972: 63) argues that television with its messages becomes an encompassing environment that
goes deep into the mind, into the subconsciousness, where it influences people in a way that evades verbal
classification
To summarize, the literature pointed toward impacts of southern television on 1) raising
expectations for consumer goods and lifestyle (Valaskakis, 1975); 2) tendencies of homogenization by the
dominant culture; 3) the threat to identity and integrity of native northerners (Sjoberg, 1975: 20); 4) the
loss of self-esteem and feelings of helplessness (Coldevin and Wilson, 1982; Forbes, 1980); and 5) native
language loss (ITC, at CRTC interventions).
Results of southern electronic media research show the implications for native identity and cultural
integration from a point of view that highlights the Inuit empowerment in this process of adaptation (e.g.
Valaskakis, 1983 (b)). Valaskakis outlines five critical phenomena that occur within the native
communities: 1) two simultaneous, nonmmplementary information systems; 2) a variance in individual
and settlement acculturation levels; 3) an increasing amount of information reflecting the dominant
southern culture; 4) a widening generation gap; and 5) a shift in native perceptions of traditional concepts,
values, and lifestyles (Valaskakis, 1976).
Her model of synthesized behavior (see chapter two) interprets the Inuit response as a form of
restoring Inuit control and identity. Change is thus not uni-directional and linear, but includes shifts in
perception of what is traditional and how to internalize the two different information systems. For
example, the super-masculine image is chosen by young male Inuit not only because it is gleaned from
southern media but also because it helps to counteract the sense of lost power (Valaskakis, 1983: 13).
At the same time there is a tendency of middle-aged Inuit to return to traditional values of family
and cultural heritage. This group is actively involved in native broadcasting and other cultural and
socio-political activities. They use modem technology and institutions to participate in northern
development to reenforce traditional cultural values within structures of Inuit self-government,
Television Promamming Diversity and Communication Policv: Conclusion
Since television was introduced, Inuit have been asking for relevant native programming,
restrictions on the percentage of foreign content in programming and aid in developing indigenous
modem-media services. They are insisting that they have the right to defend themselves against the
control of information by non-native society.
The priority in communication policy has been the promotion of technology that permits an
extension of broadcast markets and an expansion of broadcast receiving capacities on the international
market rather than domestic programming content Substantial govemrnent subsidies have been
forthcoming to stimulate technology development For programming content, however, subsidies have not
been increased proportionally. The claimed rationale of serving northern needs has ranked secondary to
national policies. Anik did not reverse the trend of electronic media reinforcing conditions that
traditionally have undermined native authority. Anik became a symbol of the "technical nationalism"
(Valaskakis, 1982: 2). There was no expressed concern in government about the lack of native access to
broadcast technologies or the impact of southern television programming on native languages and cultures.
Whereas previous innovations have been slower , and people consequently had time to adopt and to
formulate a response, southern television spread rapidly, much faster than the snowmobile, despite
television's low utility factor (Wilson, 1987: 184). Also, the Inuit had a flexible enough time schedule to
watch i t There was no "reinvention," it simply burst onto the scene. This chapter intended to show
that there was no informed decision where people were fully aware of the short and long term
implications. The suggestion in development communications literature that development may grow from
enhanced communication must be modified. Development may occur, "but only if the communication
has utility" (Wilson, 1987: 178).
The CRTC and CBC have stated their concerns about the cultural implications. However, their
verbal responsiveness has not resulted in changes in the policy of introducing southern television. The
CRTC has used its broadcasting license renewal powers to encourage, rather than to enforce, an increase
in northern and native programming. CBC North Television, as part of the national netwo%k, established
its service with the structural arrangements and journalistic approaches appropriate in the south. In
response to native complaints about its inconsiderate attitude towards the northern cultural and social
particulars, the corporation has significantly improved communication. Yet changes are limited because
the Northern Service has remained part of the English network which sets the general parameters of
programming.
The ineffectiveness of northern content policy can be seen as an extension of Canada's own cultural
dependency. The DOC and CRTC have been more responsive to economic arguments of broadcasters
and distributors than to cultural concerns. The CBC has been criticized for years for its lack of northern
television programming, yet the CRTC did not refuse a license or a network renewal. Recommendations
thus had no power to be implemented. Cancom similarly still has not fully implemented its commitments
to northern and native broadcasting, yet was granted the addition of U.S. and pay-television channels.
Communication policy has not been successful in establishing an efficient Canadian aqd northern
content policy, and even less so for VCRs. There is no policy in place to address their cultural
potentials, such as the use of subcarriers on satellite transponders or interactive television are not
encouraged or enforced, as they do not promise attractive economic returns.
Neither the positive potential of video films, such as NFB programs, nor the actual influence of
commercial video cassettes have drawn any particular attention in research or communication policy
although they play an important role in northern media consumption. This neglect can wreak havoc on a
national and northern communication policy. Inuit consumption of southern, i.e. primarily US.,
commercial television and video tapes indicates a need for more diversity which could be acquired
through other means within the broadcasting system more relevant to the North. The final chapter of this
thesis will address the issue of institutional changes to more effectively employ the potentials of southern
audiovisual media.
In the 1980s, the important role of strengthening Inuit culture and identity through indigenous
broadcasting to successfully integrate Inuit as a distinct group into Chmiian society has been recognized
in federal policy. The following chapter will discuss government initiatives and policies to support
nativecontrolled broadcasting.
CHAPTER VII
NATIVE BROADCASTING POLICY
It is particularly important that Native people have access to communications giving the aboriginal perspective during a time when such issues as self-government, aborigrnal title and equality rights are being debated. (Hon. Benoit Bouchard, DSOS, in NACS, 1986 (a))
There are many reasons for the special policies and provisions made for Canada's indigenous
people, culminating in the recognition of native rights in the constitution Chapter three addressed these
special rights in political development, education and language use. This chapter, as outlined in Table
7.1., addresses the special role of the Inuit in Canada's cultural and broadcasting policy. It compares the
Inuit position on northern broadcasting with government native broadcasting policies and analyzes the
historical development of policy formation and implementation procedures. The final part assesses the
effectiveness of Inuit participation in policy formation and regulatory development Case studies of
experiences with television production and distribution under Inuit control in the Eastern Arctic through
IBC and in the West through ICS will be analyzed in chapters eight and nine.
As the previous analysis suggests, telecommunications and broadcasting for and by northern natives
have been a secondary consequence of government-supported initiatives to serve national md northern
interests. It is therefore important to note that the native broadcasting projects described in this chapter
are the exceptions, constituting successful initiatives of the Inuit that, for the most part, were excluded in
the development of telecommunication and broadcasting services until the early 1980s.
In recent years, a considerable amount of descriptive documentation on northern native
broadcasting has become readily available. A series of task forces were established and evaluation studies
commissioned that investigated northern communication services and the effectiveness of government
- programs (CRTC, 1980; Lougheed, etal., 1986; Stiles, 1985,1986; DSOS, 1986; DOC 1986). Yet this
- literature, as Stiles (1986: 6) points out, contains generally littie reference to a theoretical framework,
except experiences of broadcasting technologies for development and education either using or criticizing
the usefulness of the dominant development paradigm (Wilson, 1987).
Table 7.1.
Adopting Television: huit Broadcasting Corporation
Government Industry
Needs
Strategic Interests Inuit Context
Special Status Inuit Promo. LangJCulture
Underlying Approach Cultural Strength
Policies
Regulation
Institutional Arrangements
Experiences
Impacts
Testing Applications Licensing IBC, ICS Support: NNBAP, NCP Access, Distribution Interim Funding
Access/Distrib. Licensing
CBC, CANCOM Distribution
Gov. Involvement Control
Inuit Control of TV TV in Inuktituk
Cult Identity Promo. Lang./Culture Control Cmns System
Cultural Strength
Particip. Projects Partic. Policy Dev. Long-term Funding Conaol Distribution Language Rights
Particip. ~egulation
IBC, 16s Mandate, Goals Pol. Independence
Origin, Goals Program Prod. Funding Training Content Audience Preferences Distribution
Goal Achievement Self-Government
Audience surveys provide a primary source of assessing the impact of native controlled
programming on indigenous languages and cultures. However, the short time period of one or two years
between surveys limits the analysis of impacts over time. Also the studies focus on the productions of the
native communications societies and generate some general socio-cultural data, but do not address a
broader range of cultural implications based on a theoretical model.
Native Broadcasting Rinhts
Realizing that television is there to stay, the Inuit are determined to put the medium to positive use.
They have used it to strengthen the social, cultural and linguistic fabric of their society by informing,
teaching and entertaining with the images and languages of the north. While rejecting an increase in
southern television, they have requested broadcasting services in their native languages within in a
communication system under their control. It is seen as an important means to achieve self-determination
in political, educational, judicial and cultural matters. The Inuit want long-term guarantees for the
protection and preservation of aboriginal languages, entrenched in the Canadian law, and subsequently for
the right to have fair and reasonable access to print, radio and television media in their own hgmges.
They want to receive media services produced by independent native communication societies.
Inuit require institutions like the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, dedicated to the enhancement of Inuit language and culture. ... By virtue of their Aboriginal status, Inuit have as much right to special measures designed to promote the use of their language as francophone Canadians. In practical terms, special measures must include provisions for an Inuit broadcasting service, given the influence of mass media in the North today. (IBC, 1985: 5-6)
Audience surveys, conducted to determine the need for native communication services, revealed a
great diversity of needs and preferences among the different regions, mainly depending upon the nature
and extend of services already available. For example, because of the availability of CBC Inuktituk radio
programming in the NWT, both IBC and ICS opted for television production. In Labrador and the
Mackenzie Valley there is a strong preference for bilingual services and both native-originated radio and
television production.
Northern native audiences want, in order of priority, community services, regional services and @
national broadcasting services in their own languages. Where available, native newspapers are an
important source of regional news and information on native issues. In general, radio is the major source
of information about community and regional activities (Stiles, 1986: 18). Southern television
supplements information about the nation and the world.
Native groups also want to increase the use of other communication technologies, such as video or
micro-computers, primarily to serve their educational needs. In recent years, the territorial department of
education has made significant efforts to increase its media use. Today schools commonly use videos and
micro-computers, which have also revolutionized the development of native-language reading materials,
as described in chapter three. , I \ / !, \[
Eventually, the special rights of native people in cultural and communications policy were 1 '
wb c recognized. In its recommendations, the Cultural Policy Review Committee cited three main reasons why
native people deserve those rights. First, the native peoples' cultural traditions are uniquelymoted in this
country. Second, the federal government has a special responsibility for the well-being of these people
through law, treaty md specid custom. Finally, md most importantly, the original dmd trr:ditiom
have a set of values and aesthetic standards which have not been easily accommodated within the
structures and practices of established cultural institutions (Cultural Policy Review Committee, 1982: 11).
In addition, native cultural expression has to be recognized as contemporary and not as expression of a
dead culture.
These reasons also reflect the rationale for federal programs. The special status of native people is
now enshrined in the Canadian constitution and government policy has adopted the view that the key to
- survival of native people in the Canadian society is the adoption of a pluralistic approach that promotes
multicultural and particularly aboriginal identity (Multiculturalism Canada, 1985).
In the 1982-83 fiscal year, federal government departments and agencies provided more than $7
million in direct funding to native communications organizations (Indian, Inuit, and Metis), and spent a
further $7 million to provide communications services for native people. Provincial and territorial
governments spent an additional $2 million, mostly in foam of grants and contributions to native
organizations involved in communications (DSOS, 1983: 3).
There is no one agency in the federal government to which Parliament has assigned the
responsibility to improve communication services for native people. The Secretary of State has the
principal responsibility to enhance native involvement in Canadian society and in communication services
in particular. The DOC focuses on the technological aspects, providing assistance in field trials of new
communication technologies. It also develops the principal communication policies which influence the
cultural provisions made for Canada's aboriginal peoples.
In 1982/83 the Employment Development Branch contributed about $1 million to the development
of Inuit communications through its mandate to create jobs in areas of high unemployment (DSOS, 1985:
7). The Industrial Training Program has also signed $1.5 million worth of contracts with native
communications organizations to provide training in communication skills (DSOS, 1985: 7).
Inuit established their own communication societies or departments within their political
organizations for four reasons: (1) explore media applications through a series of projects, experiments,
and field tests using conventional communication technology - HF two-way radio, FM radio broadcasting,
portable VTR, and 16mm and Super 8 film - and the new satellite technology1; (2) mitigate potential
negative effects through indigenous controlled communication services; (3) use communication
technologies for community organization and development purposes; and (4) establish permanent native
broadcasting institutions. These experiments were all carried out in the Eastern and Central, not the
In the following, it is not intended to provide a detailed description of Inuit projects, which have already been documented elsewhere, in particular Hudson, 1974; Roth 1982, Valaskakis, 1977; Valaskakis etal. 1980, 1984 but to present the major findings and recommendations that were important for policy formation and implementation and indigenous broaddasting developments.
Western Arctic (adapted from Roth, 1982: 93-95).
The Northern Pilot ProJiect (1971-1974, Hudson, 1974), Naalakvik I(l978); Project Inukshuk
(1978-1981; Valaskakis etal. 1981), and Ndakv ik I1 (1981) tested the viability of new equipment and
explored alternative forms of communication in the North.
The National Filmboard Workshops ("Challenge for Change", 1972-1975); the Nunatsiakmiut
Television Project (1975- 1985), and the Pond Inlet Community Television Project (1977-1983) intended
to mitigate the potential negative effects of southern programming on native culture.
The television community projects and Inukshuk (Mayes, 1972; Roth, 1981; Valaskakis, 1976,1982,
1986) were associated with the use of community media for organization and development purposes.
IBC and ICS reflect the establishment of permanent native communication organizations and the
institutionalization of special government funds for these services.
The government-sponsored projects
served to act as the mainspring in the development of indigenous communication endeavors. As well, these experiments also pregared the foundations for new federal policies and programs which now determine present native communications activity (Valaskakis and Seaton, 1984: 7).
The Early Work of the National Film Bwrd
The negative impact of southern television on native cultures was a particular concern to NFB staff.
Anticipating a more intelligent use of television than in southern programs, it sought to help Inuit produce
their own programming by organizing workshops to train native people in the use of modem electronic
media. The conflict over different approaches that emerged during the workshops'(see Roth 1982: 1lOff)
reflected the different underlying philosophies of the role of communications in the native environment.
The media research department was primarily preoccupied with the philosophical question of the
negative impact of television on indigenous cultures, and investigated alternative appropriate forms of
communications. The animation d e p m e n t emphasized teaching the Inuit to express themselves and
their culture and world. The aim was to establish a more native-oriented medium. Animation was
initiated by an outside agency with its understanding of training, content, and professionalism, advocating
the definition of film as an art product and film-making as a specialized and professional activity.
Secondarily it wished to facilitate cultural preservation by making historical and cultural records for the
people.
In contrast, the 'Challenge for Change' program, which not only comprised NFB staff but also
other federal agencies, centered on community development and the relationships among media and
community organizations. Stated objectives were improving communications, greater understanding,
promoting new ideas, and provoking social change (Roth, 1981: 113). Portable media were perceived as
organizing tools used by a social animator to help resolving problems and assuring promised action The
use of the media was process-oriented, intended to raise media consciousness and promote social change.
The role of the producer was seen as a technician who looked to the community for directions of the frnal -
product. The conflicts were eventually solved.
The NFB has helped to faciliaate film ~s~tautian, spaasred prodlu~om md provided technim!
supervision. It developed into a southern institution support base for communication endeavors in the
North. Yet in recent years, due to budget restraints, NFB assistance to native film and video groups has
tapered off. In the new five year plan there is no mention of special services to native Canadians (Stiles,
1985: 36).
Video Projects and Community Television
During the late 1960s new compact, portable video technology emerged which became an effective
tool for community and social development. As part of the Northern Pilot Pro&ct, the Inuit of Baker
Lake employed portable video-recorders. Project animators trained people to use video technology which
proved most effective for documentaries of hunting and community events and for training purposes. The
project reflected the need for communication systems that integrate personal and mass communication at
local and regional levels. The evaluator considered it important to have access to resource people for
assistance in technical ,matters, license applications, program production and skill development As much
training as possible should be done within the North, if possible within the immediate region (Hudson,
1974: 204-205). Highly recommended was an extended training period, after a formal term, in which
resource people would be available. Government funding was recognized as a crucial factor. Yet the
recommendations warned:
To avoid the potential dangers of dependency upon one government agency, communication organizations should attempt to find diversified sources of revenue (Hudson, 1974: 210).
The Pond Inlet Community - Television (PI%- W) project began in 1977 and gained particular
prominen~e.~ It grew out of the community's own perception of the need to mitigate the effects of
southern television. Pond Inlet, a small community on northern Baffm island, was the first Inuit
settlement to establish its own community radio service in 1964. Ten years of experiences in community
radio programming defined the community's expectations for television, when the ACP aption was offered
to the community in 1975. The hamlet council demanded that local access be made available on a regular
basis. It established the PIC-TV Society, a non-profit educational society, and used the CBC license
hearings in Winnipeg in 1976 to convince the CRTC and the CBC to support a community television
project. MAC committed itself for the training of a television coordinator (Roth, 1982: 125-126).
The society expected that the rate of Inuit cultural erosion would be slowed by offering a more
balanced cultural channel that included broadcasting in Inuktituk. Community programming could
represent a forum where a comparison of non-native and native value orientations could take place.
Local programming offered opportunities to provide background information on local and regional news,
discuss political, social, and organizational problems, and encourage local entertainment It was thought
that in developing a media consciousness Inuit could, in turn, explain to their children the distinction
. between news and fiction programming and the implications of southern value promotion within a
northern context PIC-TV Society hoped to improve and increase lateral communications with other
The following information is based primarily on Roth (1982) and interviews with various people .in Pond Inlet who were involved in the project.
Arctic settlements through eventual television program exchanges (Quasa, in Roth, 1982: 127-128).
Super 8 equipment was used when portable equipment was necessary and then transferred to
videotape. The community supported the project through generous donations of time, space, training, and
money. The ITC Communications group and NFB also lent their support through some basic training
and advice. DSOS and private foundations provided the operational money.
It was important to Inuit political and community groups a m s the Arctic that PIC-TV be successful since the project represented a break in CBC policy, a willingness on its part., ... to permit local access to a transmitter in the North. It was, early in the process, perceived by Inuit communication groups that PIC-TV's success or failure as a project could influence the direction of local access policy within the Northern communication sphere for years to come. (Roth, 1982: 130)
Yet like community radio, PIC-TV had to survive on a shoe-string budget There were no funds
for a trained technician, new equipment or further training. Every time some equipment broke down, it
had to be sent south for repair. Finally, funding and training became a such major problems that the
crew could not be paid anymore. The project fell apart in 1982 when funds ran out, caused by some
mismanagement of the moneys and insmcient technical maintenance. Also, IBC had begun b broadcast
on a regular basis. Plans to merge with IBC failed and IBC's programming replaced the broadcasts of
PIC-TV. But during the time of its production, PIC-TV was considered a success.
The Nunatsiakmiut Community Television Society was another local Inuit television project, based
in Iqaluit It was incorporated as a non-profit organization in October 1975 and produced thirteen
15-minute Inuktituk programs per year to complement CBC's 15-minute program in Inuktituk,
"Taqravut " The corporation paid $1,000.00 for each of the productions (Northern Communications
Conference, 1978: 36). Although small in scale, it was one of the few regular productions in Inuktituk
produced by Inuit.
In later years Nunatsiakmiut faced increasing structural, management, and financial problems. It
continued production until 1986, when it became inco~porated into IBC because the DSOS would only
Information is based primarily on Roth (1982) and interviews made in Iqaluit
274
finance one society to avoid overlaps. IBC was considered the principal service provider and
Nunatsiakmiut now comprises their drama unit
Only in these two instances did the CBC permit local access to its television transmitter. With the
regular broadcasting of IBC, community access is not available in any of the settlements. The vision of
local television has not been realized
The Hermes and Anik B Pro&cts
In 1977 the Hermes satellite was launched and provided the means for three native experiences
with interactive communication. Inuit in Northern Quebec and Cree Indians in Northern Ontario used
the technology for interactive community radio. The third experiment, ProJiect Ironstar, was undertaken
by the Alberta Native Communications Society and added the medium of video to interactive
communication (see Desmeules, 1977).
The Anik B satellite program had four goals: 1) to determine the availability of telecoqnunication
services to meet identified public service requirements; 2) to develop knowledge and expertise to better
utilize the 12/14 GHz satellite techraslogy; 3) to develop expertise and create awareness of the potential of
telecommunications to deliver new services; and 4) to contribute to policy development, i.e. to influence
northern communications policy concerning Inuit services (Valaskakis, etal, 1981: 27).
The program was used in two major projects to introduce Inuit of the Eastern Arctic to interactive
television. Between 1979 and 1981, TNI launched its Naalakvik Nproject whereby five communities
were linked via Anik B in an interactive communications network with program production and
transmission facilities in Salluit Until then, the Inuit had flatly rejected television service. Equipment for
production, reception, and transmission had to be installed, Inuit trained in production, and preparatory
work conducted within less than one year. Inuit productions were put together to provide about seven
hours per week of native broadcasting, focusing on public affairs and local organizations, traditional skills,
and also educational children's programming. They were complemented by CBC network programs from
the south. 'IT6I also translated the national news into the local dialect. It helped to fill a wide
information gap and served to justify the introduction of television in Arctic Quebec (Foy, 1981: 62-63).
TNI reserved the control over what it took from the network and the timing of programs in order to not
interfere with community activities.
Despite its success, Naalakvik 11 came to an end in summer 1981 when funds ran out. The project
demonstrated TNI's ingenuity in the broadcasting field and the importance of controlling program
contents and scheduling and led to the creation of an Inuit-controlled regional radio service and a
television production facility in Salluit as part of IBC's network.
Like most learning experiences, Naalakvik 11 was in itself an important learning experience which, among other things, made the project participants well aware of the enormous expense and effort required to produce television programming of educational value to the Inuit of Northern Quebec and of sufficient quality to compete with entertainment programs for the southern networks (Stiles, 1984: 26).
ITC made its participation in the Anik B projects dependent upon the provision of high-quality
telephone service in all communities and a pan-regional involvement in training programs, workshops and
information dissemination to sustain widespread and ongoing interest in the project
Called Inukshuk after the human-like stone cairns that were among the first Arctic aids to
communication, the $1.9 million project took place between 1978 and 1981. Funding was provided by
INAC to cover the direct costs involved in constructing studios and production centers, training Inuit staff,
distributing the videos, and costs associated with the interactive experimentation phase of a one-way video
and two-way audio teleconferencing network. Five of the six communities involved in the interactive
programming had local broadcast transmitters to rebroadcast the signal to individual homes. Igloolik
limited reception to the hamlet office, adult education building and the school, as it stdl refused to receive
live-television.
The interactive phase of the project lasted from September 1980 to April 1981. During this time
Inukshuk was on air 16 1/2 hours each week with a combination of teleconferencing and television
programming. By far the greatest proportion of programming was devoted to public affairs and current
issues (Valaskakis, etal., 1980: 304). Inuit in all six locations enjoyed watching interactive meetings (Ibid:
387). Vaiaskakis (1983: 134) later noted:
The community-level use of interactive technology may allow Inuit a realistic opportunity to adapt social institutions to respond to the problems in their communities. ... The social history of the North clarifies the importance of understanding development as a participatory process, a process in which local people control the pace and direction of the changes affecting them. Inuit interactive experiments suggest that specific media can play an important role in the self-development of northern communities.
Despite its success, Inukshuk was as short lived as Naalakvik II, when funds ran out in 1981 and
Anik B was put to commercial use. Yet, while brief, the projects marked the beginning of a new era in
native communications. They demonstrated to federal authorities that indigenous people could manage
complex broadcasting projects and adapt sophisticated technology to meet their communication needs.
The experiments increased Inuit involvement in northern communication policy issues and, most
importantly, led to the creation of the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation.
The Therrien Committee and the Licensing of Native Bradcasters
*
More than any other factor, the successful involvement of Inuit in testing satellite applications
helped the government recognize the need for continued support of native broadcasting. The Therrien
Committee provided an important means for the Inuit to express their demands for an Inuit
communication system For the frrst time an Inuit was appointed as member of the committee which
proved to be generally sympathetic to native concerns. The committee received nearly four hundred
briefs and held public hearings in Ottawa. Baker Lake, NWT, and in two northern communities in the
Yukon and Labrador.
ITC proposed the establishment of a special fund to support an Inuit broadcasting system that
would share one satellite channel with the CBC Northern Service. Between 25 and 35% of the television
. day would be assigned to Inuit programming and each community would have access to the local
transmitter. There was no desire for elaborate technology. Rather, basic reliable facilities of a camera
and a microphone for news and interviews, with playback equipment to deliver this local programming
during time-slots in the regular schedule would best serve the northern needs. The use of videotapes was
planned for education and community development programs using download options of unused
transponder time (signals received From the satellite during non-broadcasting hours would be recorded for
later replay). All local residents would have access to the local equipment The government was to set up
a special fund, starting with $2 million and rising to $5 million within five years. Service would be
extended to all communities which would control the delivery of additional channels by satellite. (CRTC,
1980: 23; Roth, 1982: 153).
The Inuit of Northern Quebec repeated their priority for a system of community-owned and
operated radio stations, backed by a regional program production unit They further suggested the
establishment of a special Inuit broadcasting planning committee to design the development of television
programming for all Inuit communities and to advise the CRTC on their needs and preferences (CRTC,
1980: 24).
The CBC again acknowledged the "need for northern regional communication programmingn
(CBC, 1980 (c): 10) Besides plans for increased in-house northern production, it promised access to the
extent atat time was available on its satellite channels for native production groups (CBC, 1980 (c): 12). It
recommended to make native communications a top priority for federal government funding. The NFB
also stressed that the preservation and development of native cultures was a national trust that should not
be compromised; local access to television should be controlled by the community; and native
programming should be encouraged an alternative to southern programming (NFB, 1980: 7).
The report of the Themen Committee cleared the way for future northern and native broadcasting
policy by recommending that
- Canada must fulfill its obligation to provide opportunity for its native people to preserve the use of their languages and foster the maintenance and development of their own cultures through broadcasting and other communication.
- Funding programs for native communication societies should be developed in consultation with the societies and the appropriate provincial or territorial governments.
- The approved budgets of the CBC and NFB should be supplemented to be used exclusively for the
development and support of broadcasting services by and for the native peoples.
- License applications from native communities or organizations be encouraged and predominantly native communities be given the right to decide on the channels to be delivered locally (DOC, 1980: 21-22).
On April 14,1981 the CRTC issued network broadcasting licenses to ITC on behalf of the
soon-to-be incorporated Inuit Broadcasting Corporation and the Council of Yukon Indians and Dene
Nation for an independent communication society. "The implementation of this television network
operation is predicated on the applicant obtaining the necessary f m c i a l resources and satellite
transmission capability." (Decision CRTC 81-255: 2). The CRTC recognized the interim nature of
access to the CBC facilities "until such a time as government funding can be obtained for a dedicated
northern satellite channel which would then be shared by the CBC Northern Service and the Inuit
broadcasting operationw (ibid.).
In Decision CRTC 81-252, licensing Canam, the commission required the satellite distributor to
make certain commitments to support native broadcasting: to 1) provide one video and two audio-uplinks
in northern locations suitable to native groups for native-produced programming; 2) substitute up to ten
hours of nativeproduced television programming, to be distributed at appropriate times; and 3) consult
with native communication societies and assist their members in developing their own local programming.
The vagueness of the required commitments has had serious implications for native organizations. They
could not enforce the installation of uplink facilities or get adequate air time in Cancom's program
schedule at regular and convenient time slots.
Cancom's applications to add U.S. channels and pay-television to its service package raised strong
concerns among the Inuit Southern commercial interests were given the attention of.the CRTC, but the
clearly-stated requests of the Inuit seemed to remain unheard, despite the CRTC's claims that it sensitive
to the broadcasting needs of northern natives. In her presentation at the CRTC hearing on the tiering of
pay-television services on 1 December 1982, Rosemarie Kuptana, President of IBC, referred to the long
history of native interventions and characterized stated government and CBC intentions as "ineffectual
goodwill." The Inuit had lobbied for Inuktituk television and radio as a primary, single channel service,
and not as an afterthought
From the Therrien Committee you moved quickly to licensing of the CANCOM four-channel, wholesale, satellite service .... Then came the pay-TV licenses last spring. Now we have more CANCOM and this hearing on tiering and universal service. The 1979 need for "an appropriate and adequate first service," the priority for a native service for natives, got lost in the shuffle ... In the CANCOM decision, we were reduced to the status of being thrown scraps from the CANCOM table ... We do not want our television to be the "concomitant responsibility" of southerners. We want to undertake that responsibility-with our own facility for distributing our own programming to our own people. ... We are still doing "experimental things" under "interim arrangements" at "certain mutually agreed upon periods" as somebody else's "concomitant responsibility." (Inuit Arctic Policy Review, 1983: 3)
The IBC Parition Paper on Northern Broadcasting
When the DOC called for submissions on northern and native communications to develop a
comprehensive northern broadcasting policy, IBC responded with a detailed position paper which said its
greatest communication need was the creation of a comprehensive Inuit communication system, including
both radio and television. IBC's goal was to establish a television system that would provide the North 3 i)
with 25 hours per week of Inuktituk programming designed and produced by Inuit It would*require
production facilities in all Inuit regions from Labrador to the Western Arctic (IBC, 1982: 2). 1
IBC's long range goal was to consolidate all Inuktituk broadcasting operations, including those
carried out by the CBC, under IBC. In the short term, the CBC was requested to significantly upgrade its
native language radio programming by producing a minimum of 50 hours per week Inuktituk broadcasts
(IBC, 1982: 5). IBC identified the biggest communication need as the establishment of an efficient Inuit
news network that would also include community radio stations (IBC, 1982: 6). The greatest obstacles in
television were the lack of long-term funding and an efficient distribution system IBC asked to use an
underused satellite transponder which was not yet put to full commercial use, until a dedicated northern
transponder was set up (IBC, 1982: 9-11). IBC also requested community access and regular community
television.
In a revised position paper in 1985, IBC confirmed that it was not opposed to the extension of
southern television services to the north per se, that it did not wish to see Inuit isolated from the rest of
the world.
What we object is the indiscriminate proliferation of southern programming without a corresponding balance of Inuktituk programming, and without controls at the local level. (IBC, 1985: 33)
Access to local transmitters for the purposes of limiting or substituting programming should be
guaranteed. Inuit should have the "right to exclude from their television southern programs containing,
in their view, violence, profanity, pornography, or other elements that they may consider harmfuln (ibid.).
Establishment of S~ecial Native Pr0p;famminq Funding
The Native Communications Program (IvCP)
In 1973 Canada took a leading role in establishing a special Native Communications Program
(NCP), administrated by the Native Citizens Directorate of the DSOS. Its objective has been enable
native people to develop and control modem communication networks. The NCP provides contribution
for (1) operating costs of native communication societies; (2) special communication projects; (3) training
of staff of communication societies; (4) community radio maintenance; (5) media workshops; and (6) the
aquisition of capital assets ((DSOS, (c): 1). The program was based on the assumptions that native
citizens could not develop their own communications networks without financial support, and there were
significant communication needs to be addressed (DSOS, 1985 (c): 2).
In 1985/86, core funding for maintaining operations and programming capabilities reached
$2,578,061 (Lougheed, 1986: 1-5). Further funds were geared towards community rhio, media
workshops, and local "media related projects." The development of NCP funding since its initiation in
1974 is outlined in Figure 7.1. and the average contribution per society in Figure 7.2.. Until 1986 the
NCP provided a total of $31.9 million (NACS, 1986 (b): 1) and thus has been essential to support native
communication programs.
*.
I
, Figure 7.1.
Total NCP Fundig from 1974 to 1986
(in Thousands oi Do!:ars)
Figure 7.2.
Average NCP Funding per Society
(in Thousands of Dollars)
Source: hugheed, 1986: 1-7.
Since its initiation the NCP has undergone some changes. Several evaluations noted the value and
importance of the program, but also pointed to a number of deficiencies. Delays in the delivery of funds
and the resulting huge bank overdrafts create a drain on the societies' financial and human resources.
The funding review process involves about 20 stages, many of which perform no obviously useful
function. The elaborate approval structure seems difficult to justify when core funds are distributed
annually in the same amounts to the same recipients. There is a lack of established performance
indicators, and the insecurity of yearly renewals of the NCP's mandate has made long term planning
difficult, if not impossible (DSOS, 1985 (a): 11-13). At times, societies had to close down until funds
were renewed The cutbacks also forced services to be terminated, as for example, ITC's magazine Inuit
Today and its broadcast information service Inuit Nipingat (ITC, 1986: 10). On the other hand, the NCP
allows the societies to determine their own communications priorities to better express regional
differences.
Lougheed (1986: 5-2) concluded that "the present system fails both as management tool and as a
device for assisting senior management in making decisions." It is mitigated by the dedication of staff to
devote considerable time to the societies and to apply whatever assistance is at their disposal. Yet it
cannot compensate for the frustration native groups feel about the lack of functional communication
between the regions and Ottawa decision makers.4
The evaluations also indicate the need for enhanced training and more competitive salaries and the
development of channels to exchange ideas and information between societies (DSOS, 1985 (a): 12-15;
Lougheed, 1-14/15).
Lougheed (1986: 1-33) cites as an example a letter from the Minister to a society which had been cut back by over $100,000. The letter made no reference to the cutback. Instead, it read "I am pleased to inform you ..." and ended with "I would like to congratulate you ..."
The Northern Broadcasting Pdicy of 1983
The potential of new communications technologies to serve the regional, linguistic and cultural
integrity of northern native peoples was finally recognized in a government policy on northern
broadcasting, announced on March 10,1983. It was based on the five principles that northerners should
1) have access to an increasing range of programming choices; 2) actively participate in determining the
character, quantity and priority of programming broadcast; 3) have fair access to the broadcasting
distribution systems to maintain and develop their cultures and languages; 4) have programming relevant
to their concerns; and 5) be involved in establishing broadcasting policies which affect their cultures
(DOC, 1983 (a): 3).
The ranking of priorities did not reflect the priorities of northern native people. The first principle
of increased program choice was not a priority among the Inuit, who continually rejected further southern
channels while northern programming remained grossly inadequate. There were no implementation
procedures outlined to achieve the second principle other than the existing, though not very effective, - route of briefs and presentations with only advisory character. There was no reference to the demand to
have a native person as CRTC Commissioner and on the CBC board. The third principle of "fair access"
was not explained and subsequently caused many disputes and headaches as to what comprised fairness in
terms of access to the distribution system (see below). The policy paper referred to the established
distribution arrangements via CBC and CANCOM which the native organizations considered
dissatisfactory. The repeated demand of native organizations for programming relevant to native concerns
ranked only fourth in the policy paper. The last principle indicated an openness of government agencies
to consult native groups in the policy formation process, yet it did not outline any implementation
procedures.
The Northern Native Access Program
To implement the objective of providing relevant northern native programming, DSOS established
the Northern Native Broadcasting Access Program (NNBAP). Its primary objective was to "contribute to
the protection and enhancement of native languages and cultures in the North," with the related sub-goals
of the "development and active use of native languages and their transmission to native children and
youth; native knowledge and appreciation for their linguistic and cultural heritage; and maintenance and
development by northern native peoples of a positive sense of their linguistic and cultural identities"
(DSOS, 1985 (b) Appendix 2).
The second main objective has been to "facilitate the participation of northern native peoples in
activities and developments related to the North." More specifically, it aims to support the "exchange of
information and ideas within native societies about activities and developments related to the North" and
the "acquisition by northern native peoples of appropriate skills for cultural, economic and social survival
in the North" (DSOS, 1985 (b) Appendix 2: 9). A secondary objective is geared to the "provision of
employment opportunities and experience for native people in the North and professions and trades
related to communications" (ibid).
To be eligible for funding under NNBAP, groups must serve an audience located north of the so
called "Hamelin linews which cuts roughly through the top half of the provinces from British Columbia to
Quebec. The federal government thus created a policy and funding program that was exclusive for the
North. Federal officials anticipated enriched funding from DSOS for a complementary program for
southern native peoples (Stiles, 1985: 27). However, due to federal spending restraint, this did not
materialize. As a result, native organizations in mid- and southern Canada were left out and some groups
had to create a separate northern association to receive funding for broadcasting in their northern region.
It is a geographical line across the north which Louis-Edmond Hamelin (1971: 7-21) defined as the boundary of the north.
The NNBAP was allocated $40.3 million over four years to thirteen native communications
societies (DOC, 1983 (b)), as shown in Figure 7.3.. These funds have assisted northern native
communication societies in producing up to five hours per week of television and 20 hours of radio
p~ogramming.~ The program is unique and crucial and it is questionable whether there would be
substantial native programming without this support
The NNBAP is essentially a fund to produce regional network programming and thus does not
support community radio or community television. Program administrators believe that this would be too
costly and would not have the desired impact on indigenous language development (Stiles, 1985: 27).
When the NNBAP was established, staff at DSOS saw the program as an initial step that would
help establish communication societies and produce native broadcasting. They realized that $40.3 million,
spread over 4 years to 13 groups, would not be enough to produce twenty hours of radio and five hours of
television programming per society. They anticipated that the NNBAP would continue and funding
increase in response to expanded programming (Florence Woolner, DSOS, Ottawa). Their anticipations
were shelved with the general restraint program.
People involved in the establishment of the program also recognized the lack of funding for
training and the unrealistic production costs of $5,000 per hour for television compared to about $15,000
for one hour of CBC production. Yet they feared that the government would not approve anything
beyond $40 million (John MacDonald, INAC, Igloolik). The actual hourly cost of television production is
closer to $12,000 - $14,000 (Lougheed, 1987: 2-14).
A 1986 review of the program generally appraised the value of the program and its importance for
native broadcasting. It also pointed to several shortcomings. First, the division into "major" and "minor"
regions,' reflects an inconsistency. Under the terms of the NNBAP, minor regions get funds for only one
These benchmarks are considered the minimum requirements for maintaining language and culture.
According to the NNBAP, a minor is one where the target audience is less than 5,000 people. -
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medium. Second, as societies progress and demonstrate a general competence, some of the current
funding conditions and the respective role of the government should be relaxed and reflect the maturity
and expertise of the native broadcasters. Third, access arrangements and distribution funds are
inadequate the meet the needs of the societies (Lougheed, 5-5). Fourth, funding delays have remained a
constant problem and energies are directed to survival rather than to production. Fifth, there is a
generally acknowledged, yet not met need for training. And finally, performance indictors are too
narrowly defined Production levels are by no means the most useful method for monitoring success.
Quality of product and audience reaction are no less valid Other aspects, that should be considered, are
the societies' general development, reflected in issues such as training, staffing, and decision-making
processes (Lougheed, 5-8/9).
Over the four year period, the NNBAP suffered several cut-backs and finally amounted to about
$36 million In April 1987, the end of the program, there was no policy in place to renew the program no
find alternative sources of funds. However, staff at DSOS felt that unofficially there was a policy in place
to maintain the program at current levels but nor enhance i t Cost alternatives were outlined and
improvement programs highly recommended, but apparently this was not considered a valid alternative at
the ministerial level (Staff, DSOS). The minister approved only W o of the last budget until a principal
decision was made.
On 29 May 1987, DSOS announced the continuation of the NNBAP on a permanent basis, with an
annual budget of $13.2 million, i.e. the previous year's level with no indication of increased funds for
expanding production to achieve the goals of 5 hours television and 20 hours radio (DSOS, 1987 (a): 1-2).
The permanent basis of the program reflects the final recognition of native broadcasting as a principal
service and not a project Yet there is no change in the design or major criteria of the program. The
renewed program is based on $8,500 per hour of television production, up from the previous $5,000, yet
well below actual costs of $12,000 - 14,000. No allowance is made for specialty programs, such as
children's programs or drama. And neither training nor fair access to the distribution system are
addressed.
Two study teams of the Nielson Task Force, (Indian and Northern Programs, Culture and
Communications) concluded that the NCP and NNBAP were both substantive programs with valid
objectives that were being met, albeit a high per capita cost. In light of certain administrative problems
and the inequity of funding between the north and south, a merger of the NNBAP and NCP should be
considered, with a view towards establishing a single aboriginal communication policy and program.
An independent review of the NCP and NNBAP in 1986 was also supportive of the two programs,
emphasizing their achievements. Consideration should be given to a unified policy and program for
aboriginal communications in order to address current funding and program delivery inequities, and to
improve overall program administration (Lougheed etal., 1986: 5-11/12). A merger was postponed until
the release of a new comprehensive broadcasting policy in fall 1988.
Inuit Partici~ation in Policv Formation Re~ulation
Inuit Requests fbv Participation
The shortcomings in communication policy formation and implementation emphasize the need for
improved native involvement in policy matters affecting broadcasting in the North. This includes regular
consultation in the administration of native broadcasting funding programs, information about ongoing
activities, and participation in the development of policies and regulations. For years, the communication
societies have also advocated the appointment of a native person to the governing boards of the CRTC,
CBC and NFB. Except the CBC Northern Service, with one Inuk, there are no Inuit at the management
decision-making levels of any of these agencies. The appointment of an Inuk to the Thenien Committee
was an exception. For nearly two decades the Inuit lobbied to have a native commissioner appointed to
the CRTC and native staff in influential positions within the CRTC, DOC and DSOS in order to develop
northern broadcasting policy. These demands still need to be fulfilled. The Inuit also suggested the
establishment of a permanent advisory council, consisting of representatives selected by native
broadcasting societies, to assist the CRTC on matters pertaining to native broadcasting (Stiles, 1985: 33).
Support of the C R k was imtrumental in launching native broadcasting and is now crucial to address the
access and distribution problems.
It is sometimes discouraging to Inuit to see how little impact the CRTC has had in the past on matters of concern to Inuit. (IBC, 1985: 34)
The guaranteed regular consultation, as outlined in the northern broadcasting policy of 1983, has
been well-intended yet meaningless without guidelines. IBC (1985: 35) points out that too often
"consultation" serves the interests of those seeking information with little regard for the individuals or
groups consulted. It refers to experiences with the CBC preparing its northern broadcasting plan.
Consultation amounted to a one-way flow of information. IBC was never invited to sit in on any CBC
policy discussion. IBC demands that consultation and research concerning Inuit broadcasting be
participatwy, whereby Inuit are involved in the design, implementation and follow-up.
Increased Inuit participation also implies tougher regulations and more incentives for northern
broadcasters to carry native programming. IBC asked the CRTC to not put native broadcasting policy in
the same framework as ethnic broadcasting but to recognize its special status with entrenched native
language rights.
It is our hope that entrenching representative Aboriginal-language broadcasting in the Broadcasting Act will give the CRTC the authority it now lacks in regulatory matters concerning native access and control. (IBC, 1985: 37)
National Aboriginal Communication Societies (N ACS)
Because of the prohibitive cost of travelling in remote regions, only special conferences and
consultation meetings brought native communication societies together to discuss issues of common
concern. With increased involvement in broadcasting activities, native people realized they would benefit
from a national representative organization, and in May 1986 21 native communication societies founded
- NACS. Aside from the exchange of news and information, the organization keeps members informed
about changes in government polices and programs which affect them, and represents their interests in the
formation of regulations and policies. NACS helps individual groups overcome their isolation and
coordinates their efforts to increase their political clout. A national office was established in Ottawa,
based on funding from DSOS.
Inuit Participation in Distribution Access Pdicy
The Northern Broadcasting Policy promised northern native people "fair access to northern
broadcasting distribution systems" through the CBC and private broadcasters, without further specification
what this meant. Cancom's license requires the corporation to provide one video and two audio uplinks
in the North and to substitute up to ten hours per week with northern native programming. The NNBAP
provided the funding for programming production, but did not guarantee distribution. As a result, the
societies have to negotiate with the CBC or CANCOM for adequate time dots on the regional networks,
and many native societies experience great difficulty in gaining sufficient access. The CRTC "expects"
current licensees to donate airtime but has not come forward with any enforcement. Even in 1980, the
Therrien Committee pointed to the rapidly fdling transponder usage of Anik D and the urgent need to
make arrangements for northern distribution The tilting of the Anik C series would not provide a
satisfactory solution to problems of northern broadcasting (CRTC, 1980: 7)
The Inuit have repeatedly argued for a dedicated northern transponder to be shared with the CBC
Northern Service. In December 1984, the CRTC responded by establishing a Northern Native
Broadcasting Committee to help develop a more comprehensive CRTC policy on implementing the
objectives of the broadcasting policy (Public Notice CRTC 1984-310). The committee held public
hearings and encouraged organizations to comment on, among other things.
1. the criteria for "fair access" to northern distribution systems and northern broadcasting services;
2. the role of the CBC and private broadcasters for the provision of services to the native population; and
3. the measures to be taken to ensure native participation and consultation in the CRTC's ongoing development of northern native broadcasting policies (Public Notice CRTC 1985-67: 9-10)
IBC responded with an updated Inuit broadcasting policy position paper that outlined the
corporation's broadcasting needs and requirements. The four-year old broadcasting corporation requested
legislative guarantees for Itruit language broadcasting services (IBC, 1985: 17). public broadcasting status
rather than a discrete service (p. 19), improved and guaranteed access to the distribution system to be t I I shared with the CBC and other native communication societies, and the use of time slots on
under=-utilized satellite transponders (p.23- 26). I
We continue to support the concept of a single channel basic service in Inuit communities and propose the continued use of CBC transmitters for local distribution. As far as television is concerned, we see no justification for two local transmitters with separate services. Again, we see ourselves as responsible broadcasters in partnership with the CBC in providing one relevant public broadcasting service to Inuit communities. (IBC, 1985: 26)
A dedicated northern transponder was seen as the principal solution. It would be shared primarily
by northern native communications societies and the CBC Northern Service, and administered by a
national consortium of native broadcasters to control, operate and determine scheduling priorities. IBC
rejected the idea of a native transponder because two local transmitters would be too costly and further
fragment audiences and ghettoize native programming. IBC also rejected off-hour downloading because
it would rule out the corporation's participation as an equal partner in a northern public broadcasting
service. Also, it would not allow the distribution of both time-sensitive news and current affairs shows
and phonein shows. IBC emphasized the need for partnership with the CBC. The position paper
confirmed the long-stated request for local access to the transmitter, as is the case for community radio.
It further urged the CRTC to develop a comprehensive native broadcasting policy that would guarantee
long term funding for production, distribution and training.
The Inuvialuit Communications Society in the Western Arctic also supported the idea of a
dedicated northern transponder and stressed the need of a video uplink in Inuvik or Yellowknife for
lateral communication and livecoverage of events. Adequate access was not yet a major problem because
ICS was just beginning to broadcast its programs, currently 30 minutes per week. ow ever, it encountered frequent problems with CBC's preemption policies due to national sports events which
made it difficult to build an audience for a particular time slot A major concern importance for ICS, like
the Okalakatiget Communications Society in Labrador, was the designation of its area as a "minor region"
withresulting lower funds.
Regional Access for native communication societies began in earnest in 1982, when the CBC
Northern Service started sharing its television schedule with IBC and the Northern Quebec Service (now
part of the Northern Service) and provided native groups with access to CBC satellite and shortwave radio
transmission facilities. The CBC now provides regional access to 11 of the 13 northern native
communication societies (Stiles, 1985: 31).
In 1984, together with its Northern Regional Plan, the CBC came forward with a native access
policy that was based on the following principles.
1. Independent native access programs must not replace key network and regional programming. Native programming is seen as a discrete, local program service, not mixed with the regional output.
2. CBC retains the final responsibility to decide on specific times for access broadcasts, i.e. the right to preempt native access programming with CBC programming that is deemed to be of national interest
3. The NNBAP goals of 5 hours television and 20 hours radio per week is seen as a guideline, not a guarantee.
4. CBC negotiates access requests on a case by case basis. Access time will depend on several factors, including the level of development of the native communications society, the size of the native population being served, existing services in the area, and the flexibility of the distribution system being considered.
5. CBC does not exercise editorial or journalistic control over native access programs (CBC, 1984 (a): 44-48).*
The CBC admitted that it should provide its own native programming proportionate to the
population served. Independent communication societies should offer alternative services so that the
public could benefit from a choice of differing media perspectives. Private broadcasters should also bear
their share of social responsibility (CBC 1985 (b): 14).
The suggestion of using the CBC Northern Service during off-hours to transdt native programs to
predominantly native communities for later transmission or replay was not considered a practical solution.
Not only would it require a technician at the network center to control the uplink switching operations,
but also operators in the communities or remote and automatic control mechanisms to supervise the
* However, the CBC requires native broadcasters to have a $1,000,000 of indemnity insurance.
recording. These mechanisms were considered cumbersome, unreliable and expensive and the autor
control system would need further study as to the exact mechanical details and costs involved. A
dedicated northern transponder would be a long-term and satisfactory solution (CBC, 1985 (b) 17-18).
An alternative, currently emplayed by IBC, is occasional-use time to be leased from Telesat Canada
on its Anik D 1 channel "Fw transponder. Depending on the amount and period of time required, the
hourly tariff ranges from $230 to $840 (CBC 1985 (b): 2CF21). However, occasional use does not
guarantee continuing access. A full time customer can displace the native programming and bump it onto
Anik B. This requires a completely separate receive earth station for the 14/12 Ghz transmission of the
satellite.
In accordance with its licence, Cancom provides two audio uplink facilities and 25 hours per week
to each of two native communications societies in the Yukon and Mackenzie Valley region. Cancom has
yet to meet its obligation to provide a video-uplink as well as to substitute up to ten hours per week of
native-produced television programming on its schedule. Instead, with provincial and federafun&,
Cancom has put together an English language program about the Canadian north which it assumes to be
of interest to both northern and southern residents (Cancam, 1985: 7). This is aired weekly over CH€H
Toronto. Consequently those communities not subscribing to the channel are unable to receive the
broadcast Also, Stiles (1985: 42) refers to a survey which indicates that only 30% of native respondents in
metropolitan Toronto knew about the program, 18% of whom watched it once a month or more, while
37% never viewed the program (data for the North are not available).
According to Cancom, there is no independent English language native programming of broadcast
quality available that could be distributed. There would have been only two serious* requests (Cornell,
Cancom, Toronto, interview). If over the years native programming should become available exceeding
ten hours, Cancom assumes the right to select on an
equitable basis that which is most appropriate for its national service and which strikes a fair balance between the contributing native communications groups. The Company takes the position that it must retain control over the selection and scheduling of available native .television programming. This control is essential from both a regulatory and commercial
standpoint (Cancom, 1985: 8).
Cancom questions the appropriateness of native languages, insisting that native programming on its
network be in English. It fears that indigenous language programs could have negative responses in the
predominantly non-native communities served by the Cancom service and "unduly disrupt the viewing
patterns of the main body of its subscribers who support the service" (ibid p.8). This would negatively
affect its ability to sell its signals.
Grafting a native communications component to broadcasting services designed for non-native audiences can be both disruptive to such audiences and create a hybrid service which is unlikely to be satisfactory to either native or non-native broadcasters. For the latter, problems of scheduling, program continuity and the maintenance of commercially viable programming are all inherent in such an approach. (Cancom, 1985: 2)
Cancom argues that radio is "a more appropriate and efficient means of reaching minority
audiences with diverse linguistic needs," whereas television "is more appropriate for addressing larger
audiences with wider interests." Thus it would be difficult to justify the high costs of satellite television
facilities for the "narrowcasting" purposes. Native language radio, on the other hand, could - be more
easily distributed as a subcarrier. The audio channel could be subleased for broadcasting purposes from
satellite users with a full transponder or directly from Telesat Canada at about %40,000 (Cancom. 1985:
This emphasis on the national non-native character of its programming is in direct contrast to its
original application, when the needs of northerners were to be given first priority for licensing reasons.
Once established, Cancom could afford to express its real priorities, i.e. to capture and expand the
southern market It appears that native programming unduly interferes with "revenue producing
programming." Broadcasters should not "be expected to set aside access periods in their schedules where
the programming available is of poor quality," according to the standards of commercial television.
Cancom suggests native broadcasters to make use of off-hour down-loading options, an option the
CBC rejected for technical reasons. More importantly, it neither permits the distribution of timely
information, nor does it recognize native content as an essential part of programming in the north.
In December 1985, the CRTC issued its Northern Native Broadcasting Policy Framework, which
shared the concerns of native people about the insufficiency and quality of access the . The CRTC
specifically criticized the preemption of native programming for national or regional broadcasts, the
CBC's relegation of native shows to late night time-slots, and the neglect of native programming by
private broadcasters. However, the CRTC was vague in suggesting solutions. It stated that native access
programs should be scheduled at appropriate and convenient times for the intended audiences, but did not
say exactly what this meant or how it could be implemented. It encouraged government to extend
television access to the smallest communities, and it confmecE the need to provide additional uplinks. It
said the CBC, private broadcasters and Cancom should take the responsibility of serving the diverse
needs. A caseby-case approach should be applied, using the 20 and 5 hours a week as appropriate
benchmarks. Cancom was requested to permit access to whatever is currently available. The commission
confmed that it "will, when necessary, take appropriate measures to ensure that native programs are
given the opportunity of reaching their intended audience." It adopted a "flexible approach for the
formulation and implementation of its principles," by "relying, in the fmt instance, on consultation and - goodwill rather than the imposition of conditions of licence or generally applicable regulations" (Public
Notice CRTC 1985-274 12- 28).
The CRTC also pointed out that the footprints of the Anik C series (14/12 Ghz, DBS power) did
not extend into the far north. The only appropriate satellite to distribute programming to northern
audiences was Anik D which rapidly approached full capacity. Therefore, the CRTC considered it
essential that funds be reserved immediately in order to secure a fully-dedicated northern transponder
(Public Notice CRTC 1985-274: 31).
In March 1986, the CRTC announced the establishment of an "Action Committee" on the problems
of fair access (Public Notice CRTC 1986-75: 1). It carried out the Commission's promise that "if
self-regulation proves ineffective the Commission is prepared to impose a more stringent approach"
(Public Notice CRTC 1985-274: 31). The committee is comprised of representatives of NACS, the
broadcaster involved, the CRTC and DSOS. A representative of the CRTC chairs and co-ordinates the
activities. However, by the end of 1987 experiences with the committee had not been satisfactory for the
native societies. For example, the regional CBC station in northern B.C. continues to refuse to carry more
than one hour of native broadcasting per week. The station offers to send out the native programming on
a side transmitter to specified communities, yet this is rejected by the communication society because it
does not duly recognize the role of native broadcasting and confines it to a ghetto place in the public
system (Jeff Baer, NACS, Ottawa). The Action Committee was not able to find and enforce an acceptable
solution.
In 1986 the territorial government initiated a committee to develop options for a northern television
service, based on the urre of a dedicated northern transponder, that would include the programming of the
various native communication societies, the territorial governments and the CBC Northern Service. The
main problems to be solved were the organizational structure, scheduling of the programming, and
funding for the maintenance of the hardware.
A proposal for Television Northern C d a (TVNC) developed distribution alternatives .d. for
northern Canada, yet did not make any reference to mid-Canada, which faced similar problems. Costs
for minimum requirements were assumed to be $800,000 for a television uplink, and $1,250,000 for 50
TVRO modifications at $25,000 each. If a switching system was included it would increase costs by a
further $1,776,000 (Smith, 1987: 54). For 1987-88 the study estimated 19.5 hours per week of dedicated
northern television service, increasing to 32.5 hours for 1989-90, based on repeats in different language
versions and at different time slots, to best serve the different time zones and geographic regions (Smith,
1987: 29). On the basis of repeats and some acquisitions, TVNC members project that 11 hours of daily
programming could be provided by 1989/90 (House of Commons, Standing Committee on
Communication and Culture, 1987 (b): 11). The break even point, at which it is as cheap to lease a full
satellite transponder as it is to rent one on an occasional basis, is 6.6 hours per day.
TVNC could act as a common carrier, simply distributing (and perhaps even scheduling) broadcast
time for the members who would provide the programming. TVNC would finance its programming
distribution partially through NNBAP funds and CBC Northern Service distribution contributions,
including the CBC providing at least one uplink (Smith. 1987: 59).
The renewal of the NNBAP in May 1987 did not address the issue of a northern transponder and
DOC has postponed a response until it comes forward with a general comprehensive broadcasting policy.
In July 1987 TVNC sought permission to develop and operate a small network and control center,
and recommended that it be on the same channel as the CBC to share the facilities already available in
the communities. This would cost between $2.5 million and $2.9 million a year to operate, assuming that
TVNC could fmd transponder space on the same satellite as the CBC (House of Commons, Standing
Committee on Communications and Culture, 1987 (b): 14). The native groups expect that by 1989/90 the
northern transponder will be in place and interim solutions no longer necessary.
The Request fbt a Public Native Brwdcusting Network
Tied to the issue of fair access is the request that the Broadcasting Act be amended to recognize the - special status of Aboriginal languages in the Canadian broadcasting system. A number of Task Forces
and Royal Commissions were also in favor of this request, such as the Cultural Review Committee of
1982, the Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, and the Territorial Task
Force on Aboriginal Languages, which defmed Indian and Eskimo as official languages. Most recently
the Task Force on Broadcasting Policy recommended the entrenchment of the right of native peoples to
broadcasting services in aboriginal languages where numbers warrant and where public funds permit
(Task Force. 1986: 519). The Standing Committee on Communications and Culture also supports this
request (Standing Committee, 1987 (a)).
IBC argues that it provides a service within the public broadcasting system which the CBC is
- unable to offer and sees its role tied to the devolution of the CBC.
We see ourselves not as a private sector production house for the CBC Northern Service, but rather, as an equal partner in the provision of one northern public broadcasting service. (IBC, 1985: 19)
As a public broadcasters, Native broadcasters can claim long-term direct public assistance, much in
the same way as the CBC is supported
IBC has been an "experimentn for too many years. We wish now to "graduate" from the NNBAP, a program designed more to launch new Aboriginal broadcasters than to sustain experienced broadcasters. We require a new relationship with the federal government (IBC, 1985: 21)
In the discussions about a new Broadcasting Act, the Minister of Communication makes only a brief
reference to the northern service, and does not address the native language issues or the establishment of
public native broadcasting. Aboriginal language protection in a new Broadcasting Act is seen as
problematic because of the possible costs involved Yet native broadcasters argue that "the inclusion of
this protection four our languages is essential to the survival of our broadcasting systemsn (Baer, in
Standing Committee, 1987 (b): 7).
Summarv - and Conclusion
Communication satellites have demonstrated their potential for major advancements in
sociw&turd developmenG but only if native people have access t~ them on a permanent md sufficient
basis. The high costs of advanced communications technologies mitigate against their widespread use
among native communication groups. The accessibility of information, as Stiles (1984: 36) notes, is as
much a concern as is the accessibility of the technology itself. This points to the importance of the
software, i.e. the production of culturally appropriate media contents, and of local input and control.
The debate on the implications of satellite-transmitted television and uses for northern native
people spans almost two decades. Since the introduction of southern television, Inuit have lobbied for
native programming. The government's consistent reluctance to permit and support native access in the
early period of northern broadcasting made the emergence of native communications all the more urgent.
The Inuit's intense and persistent lobbying against the introduction of southern television without local or
regional access for native programming hindered a smooth extension of service policy and forced the
government and the CBC to pay more attention to the northern native broadcasting needs. Yet, northern
native broadcasting policy has developed on an ad-hoc basis in response to overriding national concerns,
including Canada's leading role in the aerospace industry and maintaining cultural sovereignty.
The Inuit could exploit Canada's pioneering efforts by participating in government-sponsored field
trials. Through these projects they gained awareness of and developed expertise in the use of new
satellite-supported communication technologies. The projects proved highly successful and set the stage
for future northern and native broadcasting activities and influenced northern communication policies.
The Northern Broadcasting Policy of 1983 was the first federal policy to specifically address these
needs of native people and reinforce regional linguistic integrity. The policy is clearly based on a cultural
imperative, that is to "maintain and develop their cultures and languages." It was implemented through
the establishment of the NNBAP, which specifically set the protection and enhancement of native
languages and cultures as principal objective. Both the NNBAP and the NCP reflect an important step in
the federal government's recognition to support native culture through col~bmunications and are crucial in
the development of native broadcasting services.
The interpretation of these objectives, and consequently the implementation strategies, reflect
principal differences between the Inuit and the federal government Whereas the Inuit base the demand
for communication services on a principal right, federal government agencies base their support on a
cultural mandate.
Using native language and cultural programming as basic rationale for supporting native
broadcasting can be procrustean and runs the risk of marginalization. It is the funding agency that defines
native culture which may be limited in its willingness to accept changing cultural and linguistic realities of
northern communities. A case in point is the requirement of native language programming. This can
cause difficulties if the majority of the population has already lost the ability to understand and speak
their mother tongue. The dynamic nature of culture and the realities of social history have led to a
redefinition of traditional culture among most native nations. Stereowes of the "real Inuit" are causing
, problems for the identity and self-esteem of younger Inuit without these traditional skills. The
authenticity of contemporary Inuit cannot be based on standards for previous generations of Inuit
Native broadcasters have to couch their programs in cultural terms. The federal government has
been willing to allow broad interpretations within the cultural mandate, yet it has been reluctant to
entrench a principal right to native broadcasting services.
The federal government has repeatedly stated its good will of supporting native broadcasting, which
is reflected in the establishment of the NNBAP, the NCP and the support of groups like NACS. Yet it is
questionable whether the chosen strategies has resulted in actions that most effectively address the
concerns of the native people. The funding programs for native broadcasting have been essential, without
them there would rarely be any production. The NNBAP encourages programming responsive to regional
needs, for example, through its requirement of having board members from the region the programming
is geared to. With four full time fieldworkers, the funding program provides valuable support and direct
communication between the societies and the administrators in Ottawa. *.
Yet the NNBAP is geared to traditional broadcasting with emphasis on quantitative output The
development of innovative nonconventional broadcasting services is not further pursued Some
communication societies have stressed the development of regional native broadcasting and the
establishment of a netwo~k of community radio stations and eventually could get financial support for this
network through the NNBAP. ICS and IBC, on the other hand, have not - yet - gotten involved in radio
production In contrast to the Inuit in Northern Quebec, who provide their native radio programming
besides the CBC, IBC argues to get the CBC Northern Service under the control of native people as part
of public native broadcasting service. So far, this strategy has not proven successful and it seems doubtful,
if it will be in the foreseeable future.
The NNBAP provided the principal framework for supporting native access to the mainstream
media. Reviews have shown the importance and success of both the NNBAP and NCP yet they also
reflected shortcomings, such as insufficient funding, training provisions and distribution arrangements.
Despite the good intentions of government agencies, in reality native broadcasting has never gotten
out of its marginal role. The discussions about "fair access" to the distribution system reflect this
tendency of keeping native language broadcasting in a ghettoized position. This is particularly evident for
commercial broadcasters and distributors who fear that the broadcasting of native language programming
might negatively affect the size of their audience and thus their revenue situation.
By tying program distribution to the conventional system, options and flexibility for innovative
broadcasting became very limited. Having to rely primarily on the CBC and in some cases on Cancom,
limits the quantity and quality of access time and thus the variety and scope of native programming.
Many groups, like ICS, have less than one hour per week access time, which makes open-ended
discussions through phone-in shows nearly impossible.
With its policy of industrial self-regulation, the CRTC has not enforced binding measures but
rather relied upon voluntary cooperation. However, to get unlimited access does not necessarily lead to
programming that serves the sociO-CU1tural development of the native people. Like countries in the Third
World, native broadcasters are faced with having to fill airtime. The discussion about the programming to
be distributed by a dedicated northern transponder reflects this problem. In the Canadian Arctic, where
the different timezones span four and half hours, repetitions of programs to reach people at prime time is
a valid solution.
With the establishment of the NNBAP as an ongoing program, the federal government recognized
native broadcasting as part of the broadcasting system, yet it did not address the issues of training and
distribution. To become an equal partner, native broadcasting requires guaranteed long-term funding and
structures to encourage the autonomy of native communication societies. The distributors have to accept
native broadcasting as an equal element in the broadcasting system and not just an obligation that is best
- moved to a separate service outside the general public system. Suggestions of using subcarrier options to
specifically designated communities, nightly downloading or a native channel separate from the public
northern service all reflect an approach of native broadcasting as a minority service, ghettoized and
F- ir,
dependent upon the well-meaning of the mainstream broadcasters.
Public and private broadcasters alike should be mandated through their licences to carry a certain
amount of native programming which reflects the percentage of native population in the region they serve.
The provision of sufficient aboriginal programming depends upon substantially increased satellite access,
preferably a dedicated northern transponder and northern uplink facilities.
Northern native people have asked for a basic service with emphasis on northern programming, but
more than ten years after the launching of Anik, this request is still not fulfilled Rather the available
service has developed into a one-way flow of a multitude of southern Canadian and U.S. channels,
including pay-television. With the licensing of a commercial enterprise responsible to distribute southern
programming in the north this development was predictable. For an entrepreneur like Cancom, the
North is not the main reason for existence but rather a convenient rationale to get the initial license.
Once this was secured, the real priorities of servicing the more populated areas of Canada could be
pursued As a result, native broadcasting constitutes only a fraction of the daily program fare available in
northern communities.
At the same time, Cancom continues to resist the realization of its obligations towards native
broadcasting by not providing the promised video-uplinks or the ten hours per week free television access
at convenient time slots.
The early native broadcasting projects, like experiences made in developing countries, show that
interactive media are most effective in stimulating participation in development and social change.
However, as a result of the satellite system, the lack of available uplinks, and insufficient distribution time
the full potential for interactive programming is not realized. .Whereas IBC is in the advantageous
position to have a satellite in Iqaluit, none of the other societies has this option available. They are thus
precluded from producing any live or interactive broadcasts.
Despite financial constraints and a resulting tendency of pooling resources, IBC set up a network of
regional production centers. . Through this decentralization it intends to allow as much regional and
community input as possible. The initial demand of Inuit organizations for interactive intra- and
inter-regional communications based on local access to the television transmitter is currently not actively
pursued Lobbying efforts changed from community based communications to quality productions
through decentralized production centers. Once this decision was made, the Inuit broadcasters have
efficiently followed this route and concentrated their efforts on improving their production skills.
The decision for quality programming involves substantial costs for production and training. The
federal government made clear that this could not all be provided through its different departments and
that native groups would have to find outside resources. This issues of dependency on government
funding was already brought up in the Northern Pilot Project in the early 1970s, where the evaluator had
emphasized the importance of diversified sources of revenue.
Under the current anangements of the NNBAP, each society is responsible to put together -. its own
training package. Most training funds are provided through the CEIC with occasional outside resources.
Yet this has not been wdl coordinated with the NNBAP. Generally, the funding program works in
isolation from other federal and territorial initiatives with similar goals, such as the Department of
Education or cultural institutions.
Government funding remains a crucial factor and should not be made dependent upon the political
mood of the day. The provided training funds reflect good intentions, yet inefficient coordination causes
delays and jeopardizes the realization of stated goals. Whereas DSOS administers the NNBAP, CEIC
provides the training funds. Each agency operates according to its own mandate and priorities.
Evaluations (Stiles, 1987) and native groups suggested to either include training in the administration of
- the NNBAP or have the CEIC shape its funding criteria in accordance with the specific northern
requirements.
The native broadcasting societies argue that a recognition of native programming as an integral part
of the public broadcasting system could achieve stated programming goals. Underlying this conflict is the
issue of native peoples maintaining ongoing and long-term cultural self-expression through
communication, not as a project but as an ongoing process.
New developments in satellite technology have greatly enlarged capacities, and regulatory changes
have increased direct access to broadcasting services, including the provision of specialty or nanowcast
services. In this context native broadcasting increases in both vulnerability and importance (Valaskakis,
CHAPTER vm NATIVE TELEVISION IN THE EASTERN ARCTIC: THE INUIT BROADCASTING
CORPORATION
This case study of the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) analyzes the adaptation process of
television broadcasting by the most experienced native broadcaster in Canada. It discusses the
corporation's historical development, institutional context and production experiences, analyzes its
implications and assesses its effectiveness and efficiency achieving stated goals.
Because of the high profile of the early satellite projects and IBC's pioneering role, there is
substantial descriptive material on IBC, including briefs and presentations about the corporation to various
government institutions. Audience surveys and evaluations of the NNBAP and NCP also provide
information on IBC that could be included in the case study. The literature research was complemented
by interviews with IBC staff, and field observations.
%..
Origin and Goals
IBC grew out of the communications arm of ITC after years of intense lobbying to initiate native
television. Two successful satellite broadcasting projects, Inukshuk and Naalakvik 11, as well as several
other projects led to the establishment of an Inuit broadcasting service.
In April 1981 the CRTC granted a network television license to be held by ITC until an Inuit
broadcasting system could be formed On 27 July 1981, approval was given for the incorporation of
Canada's first native television broadcasting system, the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation, which is
independent from any Inuit organization. INAC granted two years interim funding of $3.9 million, to be
shared with TNI, for broadcasting producti~n in the NWT and Northern Quebec (IBC, 1981).
Figure 8.1. The Inuit Broadcasting Corporation
Within weeks of its inauguration, IBC set up its central production facilities in Iqaluit They house
the network uplink centre, which was already set up during the Inukshuk project Space for the station
was provided free of charge from the Adult Education department of the NWT. Two small community
production units in Igloolik and Pond Inlet (the latter closed in 1983) were also integrated. In Baker Lake
volunteers built a studio to serve the Keewatin region. An additional two-man production crew was
based in Eskimo Point In Kitikmeot (Central Arctic) the hamlet of Cambridge Bay donated a building
for a two man production team.
IBC's Mandate
IBC's mandate is to provide more than 20,000 Inuit in Arctic Canada with a television programming
service in the Inuktituk language through production centres located in the North, and to ensure that Inuit
produce their own programming and obtain training as an ongoing process in all centres (IBC 1986 (a): 5).
The incorporation paper also stresses the mandate to protect and enhance Inuit language and culture,
permit an active interchange between Inuit groups, and thereby strengthen and enrich the cultural,
political, social and economic fabric of the Inuit people (IBC, 1982 (a): Appendix). More detailed objects
were developed from this mandate, hcludng:
to provide a forum and vehicle by which Inuit people can exercise their right to freedom of expression;
to provide a cultural passage between all Inuit groups;
to interpret local, national and international issues and events to Inuit people in the context of their own understanding;
to strengthen and enrich the cultural and social fabric of the Inuit;
to provide a popular and accessible channel of communication directly between northern communities and from northern to southern communities;
to provide balance and differing views on matters of public concern using predominantly Inuit creative resources;
to contribute to the flow and exchange of cultural and regional information and entertainment;
to train and employ Inuit people in the planning, production and distribution of their own television programs;
9. to promote the learning, understanding and day-to-day use of Inuktituk;
10. to popularize and, thereby, strengthen the Inuit culbural identity, language, mythology, social patterns and features which define and give meaning to being Inuit;
11. to provide the Canadian link in the human and cultuIal exchange between circumpolar countries having Inuit populations;
12. to be a symbol of the Inuit determination to take their own place as active participants in the Canadian nation; and
13. to provide a vehicle for the free exchange of ideas toward the objective of Inuit cultural survival (IBC, 198qa): 5-6).
To meet its objectives, IBC has established annual and five-year operational goals, according to
audience needs and the availability of funds. They are developed by the television producers, senior
management, and the president and then submitted to the board of directors for approval.
In 1983 IBC decided that it was necessary to consolidate the present efforts until funds were
available for M e r expansion and that emphasis would be put on providing quality programming and on
lobbying for an improved Inuit communications system (Brisebois, 1984: 12).
In 1986 IBC presented its most recent 5-year operational plan in response to decreased funding. It
called for consolidation and completion of expansion projects already in progress and outlined the
envisioned development and related staffing and production requirements until 1992 (IBC, 1986(a). For
1986/87 it set as main operational goals:
Programming and Distribution: To increase its own programming and production to five hours per week, at least three of which should be in prime time to ensure the largest available audience. The three-hour prime time segment would include children's programs.
StaffDevelopment: To establish ongoing training programs for present personnel; to establish a training program in conjunction with Arctic College to accommodate entry-level broadcasters; to provide development and leadership training for the board and management; and to move towards salary scales which are comparable to those of CBC northern broadcasters.
Administration: To compile operations and managers' manuals as well as provide a more comprehensive administrative policy.
Funding: To raise an additional $450,000 for IBC operations with the help of a full-time fund raiser; to generate additional income an employment through contract work; and expand private business through the wholly-owned subsidiary, Inuit Communication Systems Limited (ICSL) (IBC, 1986 (a?).
Orsmizational Structure Administration
Under the terms of the NNBAP native communication societies have to be non-profit, independent
and governed by native board members of the native population of the coverage area. IBC membership
includes all members of Inuit regional political organizations and regional communication societies.
Six board members are appointed by the representative regional organizations of the six regions
IBC broadcasts to. In 1986, the board also included a member from the Western Arctic and one from the
former Nunatsiakmiut board. Chairperson is the president who is employed in a full time position.
Initially board membership changed frequently but lately it has become stable and the work of the board
more efficient Because of the increasingly complex nature of IBC's operation, the directors need to
upgrade their skills and knowledge in broadcasting, financial management and effective political
involvement IBC has provided some special training workshops and plans to continue these efforts.
The president would like to see a more active role of the board members in community~elations by
visiting the respective regional production centers once or twice a year. Yet due to the vast distances,
travel freezes, and h e constraints of directon this is not realized. Direct feedback is therefore limited
Management and Staff
IBC has a staff of about 56. The executive director coordinates IBC operations and directly reports
to the president. The three managers for finances, training, and production in turn report to the executive
director. Special projects, which include two tern positions of a fund raiser and a children's television
coordinator, and secretarial staff report to the executive director (see organizational chart in Figure 8.2.).
These management positions are located in the Ottawa office. It allows better access 'to information and
the government for lobbying purposes but removes management from the production centers. The
executive director sees this closeness to the decision-maker as one of the reasons IBC did not have as
many funding problems as other organizations: "We can sit on people's doorsteps until we get it" (Debbie
Brisebois). The trade-off is that except for the president, the positions are all held by non-native people.
Figure 8.2.
IBC Organizational Chart
A N N U A L GE NERAL MEETING 1
I BOARD OF GOVERNORS I
\Executive Director 1
Managers Li-l Trainees ri m-
Producer Producer
I Ttoducert / 1-1 Producers
Technical Producers
Inuit capable to fill these management positions are not willing to make the sacrifice of leaving the north.
Three regional managers in Iqaluit, Cambridge Bay and Baker Lake are responsible for
programming and northern administration, and report to the production coordinator in Ottawa It is part
of IBC's policy to maintain decentralized structures and to keep as much administration and decision
making as possible in the region.
IBC's Inuit staff has increased rapidly with 38 Inuit production staff in 1985/86, compared to 23 in
1983184 (Lougheed, 1986 (b): 19). Additional staff are required to improve news and current affairs
programming, technical maintenance and public relations. Of the total of 56 full-time staff, 16% are
non-native and 84% native employees. The number of non-native employees has stayed fairly stable
since 1982/83 when IBC had employed seven non-native staff, compared to nine in 1985/86. Initially
management of the corporation was in the hands of non-native people, yet over a period of 5 years IBC
replaced all management positions outside Ottawa with Inuit.
This has been a challenging task because it requires managing young, often inexperienced Inuit and
dealing with technically complex television production, decentralized production, a shortage of
infrastructure supports, and a rapid expansion to a staff of over 50. Some staff members, schooled in
broadcasting journalism, have experienced difficulties in the transition to supervising staff, enforcing
disciplines, handling paperwork and other administrative and managerial responsibilities. IBC provides
some in-house management training and sends people to special workshops. Yet funding has remained a
problem (see section on training).
Initially IBC had problems of high staff turn-over, but in the last few years the attrition rate has
dropped to less than 10%. However, difficulties in training and the low wages make it difficult to attract
and keep qualified people. For example, a producer's move from CBC North in Montreal to IBC means
a wage cut of $7,000 a year. He justifies his decision by working for an Inuit organization that is leading
in the development of indigenous children's television. The high dedication of the staff has contributed to
their willingness to stay with the organization, despite low wages and many hours of unpaid overtime.
Many of the skills acquired at IBC are transferable. If CBC Northern Service begins television
production in the Eastern Arctic, it is likely that D C will lose some of its most qualified and talented staff
(IBC, 1986 (a): 10). People are willing to work for a low salary for a certain time, yet IBC has reason to
fear that eventually they will get fed up and "decide to go where the bigger bucks are" (Debbie Brisebois,
Ottawa).
IBC has to regularly report to DSOS and the other funding agencies with their controls
mechanisms. These required reports are not part of the planning cycle but rather "treated as a necessary
obstacle between the societies and their depleted bank accoun~" (Lougheed, 1986: 3-17). Monitoring so
closely the societies' operation and approving their budgets is seen as interfering with-the authority of the
IBC board. The intended function of the liaison committee has been to provide assistance. However,
because the mandatory membership includes government departments, this raises feelings of interference.
In an independent evaluation (Lougheed, 1986: 3-17/18) a liaison committee member referred to the
problem of well-intended government involvement and advice having the unintended effect of inhibiting ..-
the process of native self-determination.
Community Relations
Through decentralized production at five centers and board membership originating in six regions,
IBC intends to serve and reflect the varied regional interests and dialects. During the Inukshuk projects,
all communities were connected on a daily basis, mainly with interactive programming. However, the
design of the satellite system, as was pointed out in previous chapters, makes interactive communication
very expensive and the limited access to the distribution system does not permit frequent open-ended
programs. The monthly phone-in show is currently the main form of local input into programming.
Production teams try to visit the communities, but the general travel freeze has made this a rare
event. People in the communities ask for local production centers, as was available under the Inukshuk
project, yet this raises questions of financial resources and of program quality. The trade-off is between
local orientation, with its amateur character, and professional production, comparable to commercial
quality, and IBC has opted for the latter.
Constant Search for Monev: Fundine, Ex~eriences
We will never be taken seriously in the broadcast world, nor will we be able to realize our full potential, until we escape the stigma of federal "programw status. (WC, 1985 : 21)
IBC is funded by DSOS through the NNBAP and NCP and also receives funds from CEIC for
training. On occasion, the GNWT, Telefilm Canada and private foundations provide monies for special
projects, such as the children's television project IBC also hiired a special fund-raiser in April 1986 and
expanded its contract production to meet the high costs of operating the corporation. The distribution
agreement with the CBC does not permit IBC to generate revenues from commercial advertising.
IBC's gross revenues for the fiscal year 1984/85 totalled $2,235,000. $1,610,000 came from the
NNBAP, $383.00 from CEIC, and $243,000 from other sources, including the N O . Until 1985 IBC was
relatively free of funding problems. Unlike other communication societies, IBC's funds were not cut
between 1984/85 and 1985/86. However, delayed payments had forced IBC to postpone s&
productions. The ftnancial coordinator was able to diversify funding sources and thus maintain a
sufficient cash flow during most of the funding delays.
In 1986 IBC requested $3.2 million from DSOS through the NNBAP and NCP to proceed with its
consolidation as outlined in its 5-year operational plan. An additional $300,000 was sought through
outside funding (IBC, 1985 (b)). However, it got only 1,8 million approved Costs had risen, and in order
to cope with the funding shortage, IBC imposed a travel freeze, cut the current affairs department in
Iqaluit, and froze all salaries and benefits.
During the first four years of the NNBAP funding was based on a figure of $5,000 IBC per hour of
original programming. By comparison, CBC northern service spends approximately $26,000, not including
the costs of headquarters administration and capital assets (Lougheed, 1986(b): 16). Using the $1.6
million programming funds, divided by 119 hours of original programming, yields costs of approximately
$13,500, including headquarters administration.
Even though we have demonstrated that we are capable in producing quality programming and that we are able to manage the corporation quite well, in the bureaucrats' and federal government's minds there is still that mentality that we are a prokct. It's kind of hard to live with because you never get enough support for what yozc are trying to do. (Rosemarie K u p t a ~ , president, IBc)
Increasingly, IBC has had to supplement its funding through private foundations and commercial
enterprises. As of March 1986, IBC had written, produced and broadcast programs for fees totalling
$370,000 (hugheed, 1986 (b): 13). IBC income is increased and staff get to work on large scale
productions. Often a special producer is hired, and the staff get additional training opportunities. IBC
would like to increase its commercial work because the additional money enables it tabuy new
equipment However, the corporation already faces a shortage of human and technical resources and
cannot afford to pull producers off their regular work.
In 1983 the private business venture, Inuit Communications Services Ltd. (ICSL), was created as
an independent arm of IBC because of the required non-profit character of the corporation. In 1985186
ICSL grossed $414,000 and paid $33,000 to IBC. It is expected to increase in importance.
Broadcast Production
Programming Gads
Since the Inukshuk project and the beginning of IBC a number of marked changes have occurred.
The Anik B project emphasized interactive programming. IBC still stresses decentralized production, yet
also professional quality. to the detriment of community-based interactive television. IBC's first programs
were almost entirely concerned with current affairs and hunting, trapping and fishing activities.
Meanwhile, annual production quotas are set in a number of categories, including news and current
affairs; cultural productions; entertainment; programs about hunting, fishing and camping; drama;
children's television, and instructional programming. In the past two years, IBC has undertaken a number
of complex projects, such as docu-dramas, with subsequent panel discussions and phone-in shows and live
reporting from major events.
In November 1986 IBC came forward with its most recent +year operational plan that took note of
the decreased funds available and set production goals at 8 112 hours per week. Distribution is as follows.
Current affairs 3.5 hours Cultural programming 2.5 hours Documentary 0.5 hours Children's Television 0.5 hours Phone-in shows 1.0 hours outside (Greenland, Alaska) 0.5 hours
Total: 8.5 hours
IBC plans to increase the news and current affairs sector in volume, scope and depth:
One of the first priorities of the IBC is to reflect Inuit culture; programs on traditional skills and arts make up more than half our programming. But culture is not static and IBC is not an electronic museum displaying cultural artifacts. Il3C news and current affairs coverage records, analyzes and reflects the face of today's Inuit culture. (IBC, 1986 (a): 8)
The +year plan also emphasizes training for both entry-level and professional staff (see below),
and wage parity with CBC Northern Service salaries and benefits. Generally, the plan emphasizes the
consolidation of existing operations and completion of growth steps already in progress. Each production
center is allocated a certain amount of programming and the character of programming at a given time
slot. For 1986/87 the time slots for the regional production centres, were allocated as follows:
Baker Lake: We 22.00 25'50 Su 10.00 28'50 Sa 00.25 28'50 Entertainment
Eskimo Point Fr 23: 57 28'50 Sa 00:25 28'50 * Entertainment
Iqaluit Tu 22.00 25'50 Qagik Fr 22:OO 25'50 Qagik Sa 00:25 28'50 Entertainment SU . 22: 15 28'50
or 86'30 Phone-in Show once a month
Igloolik Th 18:OO 28'50 Sa 00:25 28'50 Entertainment
TNI Mo 22:OO 25'50 Th 22:OO 25'50 Su 22:43 28'50 Su 23: 12 28'50 (Once a month preempted).
One entertainment program every four weeks
Editorial. and Production Pdicy
IBC has developed an editorial policy which outlines its approach to journalism. The policy
contains features that reflect the unique Inuit value system. For example, producers should be considerate
and sensitive to the feelings of the people featured in the programs, yet also insist upon the public's right
to knov whet they interview pdfticims md public semants, Inuit values sf respecting someone else's
feelings are to be balanced against the public's right to know. Values of the Inuit audience should be
respected No one should broadcast a show about someone who died recently. News items about people
charged with or convicted of a crime should not be presented in a sensationalistic manner and be used
only if the case is deemed directly relevant to Inuit interests (IBC, 1987 (b): 5).
Because IBC grew out of ITC, its political independence needed to be firmly established. In the
beginning IBC faced some problems. Inuit organizations came with requests as to what the corporation
should broadcast
Some got angry, saying that we are their communications arm but once we were over that hurdle, most Inuit organizations have respected us for what we are, as public broadcasters, and they send us notices of their meetings and ifour producers deem it as important to our viewership, they'll cover it. But in the beginning that was a bit hard to overcome. (Rosemary Kuptanu, president, IBC)
IBC provides the single Inuit broadcasting service, and distributes productions of TNI and
Okalakatiget Society. Yet each society remains responsible for its programming content and quality.
These distribution arrangements mean that the programs reach the widest possible audience and people
hear about Inuit and their activities in other regions. However, the other societies are not recognized as
distinct entities and IBC is held responsible for the quality of all programs.
People expect a certain level of production quality. ... The northern audience is probably one of the most sophisticated audiences, because there aren't that many alternatives in the winter fw other activities. A lot of people watch at least jive to six hours of television a day. So you are looking at a pretty sophisticated audience that comments to Inuit leaders about this w that program. (Rosemarie Kuptana, Ottawa)
IBC Facilities and Equipment
One difficulty in the transfer of television technology is the provision of appropriate facilities and
equipment Originally, all the buildings which housed IBC operations were loaned or donated, reflecting
the community goodwill. Yet it limited the extent to which the corporation could expand or improve its
facilities. Since 1982 IBC has modified or secured production facilities at a rate of one location per year.
Although facilities have drastically improved since incorporation, they are generally inadequate, with
cramped space, low ceilings and poor ventilation because normal ofice and housing space had to be
converted. In Iqaluit, IBC is spread over three buildings with resulting inefficiencies and duplications,
because it does not have the money to build a center according to its needs.
IBC has slowly upgraded its industrial quality equipment left from the Inukshuk project Between
July 1981 and March 1986, it invested $395,000 in communication equipment (Lougheed, 1986 (b): 23).
Yet it still needs to undertake substantial improvements at several locations. Because the equipment was
designed for closed-circuit industrial use, it offers neither the quality nor durability .of professional
broadcast gear. Cold temperatures and travelling over rugged terrain also cause excessive wear. Often a
lack of back-up equipment has caused serious production problems. The more complex technology is
also more prone to damage. It costs IBC significantly in downtime, replacement and maintenance costs.
One technician, who has to maintain all the equipment in the centers, cannot possibly handle the work
load.
The studio in Igloolik, for example, is a simple room in the hamlet office. It has no special
production facilities, such as sound proof walls or a ceiling light It houses the editing equipment (two
editing machines), the production equipment, consisting of two cameras and a few other utensils, a
typewriter, a desk, and shelves filled with tapes which have accumulated since the Inukshuk project in
1980. Inserts or pictures to be filmed are taped at the few empty spots on the wall. In spring 1987 three
people were working here: a producer, a narrator an8 a trainee. A second producer was on a four
months' filming tour of a dog-team trip to Greenland and had taken the new camera. The crew was left
with an old camera from the Inukshuk time, held together by tape. Over the years people have learned to
fix it because it was the only camera they had. With only one camera, editing became very difftcult
The production unit in Iqaluit (excluding the children's television with its own new facilities) has a
studio that was redesigned from office space. Thus, the room is small, not sound proof, and the ceiling is
low which makes lighting very difficult The single proper functioning editing suite for current affairs and
drama production is shared among three technical producers and one senior producer to produce three
Mf-hour weeldy shows and the dramas. It makes for a tight production schedule and frequent
bottlenecks. Equipment in a second editing room is old, not properly functioning and only used as last
refugee. On occasion the control room, which principally serves for the uplink, is also used for editing.
Because of these shortages, the editing process is unnecessarily time-consuming and causes many
fmtrations for the technical producers. In summer 1987, IBC shut down its production for two weeks to
repair and replace some old equipment and relied completely on reruns. By 1991 IBC plans to have a
properly equipped production center.
The Programs and Production Experiences
Northern broadcast history was made at midnight on 11 January 1982, when IBC aired its first
program: a ninety minute special show about the new network (IBC 1982 (b)). Since then a number of
programming with its reporting about the NWTs plebiscite on division.
During 1982 and 1983, IBC developed the format for its current affairs program "Qagik," a
magazine format of short and varied segments. It accounts for approximately 30% of IBC's programming
and originates from all three administrative regions. In 1983 IBC increased its on-air time from three to
six hours per week, with a nightly time slot at 10.05 p.m. rather than midnight
IBC's broadcast season consists of 39 weeks of ori@ programming and a 13-week summer season
with one half original programming and one-half repeats, which totalled 155 hours in 1983/84; 169 in
1984/85 and 185 in 1985/86. The increase of repeats from 2% to 18% is largely due to a shortfall in TNI
programming. In 1984 Labrador entered the IBC network through productions of Okalakatiget, the Inuit
communications society in Labrador. In 1985/86, including contributions From TNI and Okalakatiget, the
IBC network broadcast a total of 243 hours, an average of 4.7 hours per week. IBC has an agreement
with the CBC for 5.5 hours per week, yet delays and preemptions have reduced the actual broadcast time.
The corporation faced a major challenge when it acted as host communicator for the third Inuit
Circumpolar Conference in Iqaluit in July 1983 and produced fifty hours live-programming From Iqaluit
and seventeen hours of commentary, analysis and interview. TNI and CBC North helped to realize the
extraordinary effort
One of the most obvious changes in IBC's programming the shift from interactive productions
during the Inukshuk project to professional quality broadcasting. This improved quality is one of the
most mentioned achievements of IBC by the Inuit audience. Yet it is primarily one-way broadcasting.
Compared to Inukshuk, IBC has adopted a model of television production, more closely resembling
southern professional television while stressing its decentralized character.
One has to remember that the largest town for IBC's reception is a community with a population of
less than 3,000. As a result, the staff are more closely connected with their audience than any southern
broadcaster and in many cases the audience knows not only the producer but also the people featured in
the shows. It makes for a broadcast that maintains elements of the close co~~lmunity-oriented
communication otherwise found only in local programming.
The editorial policies a f f m the emphasis on quality of programming and reporting. IBC will not
increase the amount of programming unless quality can be maintained. (IBC, 1987 (b): 6). This policy
has been accompanied by increasingly specialized production procedures and responsibilities. Originally a
program would be filmed, directed, produced, edited and scripted by a single producer. Usually a second
crew member would help. However, demands for improved quality and efficiency led to the
establishment of crews with specified responsibilities. By 1986, IBC had developed six production-related
positions (IBC, 1986 (b): 9).
"I am glad to work for an Inuit organization and not for white menw characterizes the general '
enthusiasm of staff working for IBC. They are proud of pioneering new forms of native television
programming, serving the needs of their audience and learning many new skills. This commitment is at
the root of IBC's success.
The dedication of our people and the development is phenomenal. They are proud in what they are doing. They work a lot of overtime without payment because they fie1 they contribute to the growth oflBC. (Airno Nmbcdawk, Senior Prsducer, Iqaluit).
Production experiences vary considerably within IBC, depending on the nature of the program, the
facilities of the production centre, and the experience of the producer. The production crews in Iqaluit
emphasize current affairs reporting, because the regional capital hosts a lot of meetings and public events.
Although there are similar time pressures found at any southern broadcasting corporation, the production
rooms generally do not reflect the same hectic or competitive atmosphere.
In the small production center of Igloolik the producer has experienced a lack bf feedback
concerning programming ideas, particularly when the second producer left for an extended film uip. "We
are @st expected to produce some'cultural programs that go on air at the agreed upon time slot" (Zack
Kumuk, Igloolik). For that time, production again became nearly a one-rnan show, with a new trainee
assisting and the narrator writing the script
r2
Producers in the larger centers have better opportunities to discuss their ideas and problems with
senior producers and the regional manager. On the other hand, producers in the small centers enjoy their
independence and remoteness from the main broadcasting center. The Igloolik team has produced
excellent programs, despite the poor production facilities, which won a special award for outstanding
cultural programming.
The tight budget forces crews to remain in the communities and to ask for a lot of free support.
Although IBC has established a fee scale it pays to performers, there are many occasions where the
producers have to rely on volunteers.
We have trouble buying songs. The money we oflr is so low. b t year a Japanese guy came to Iglodik. He paid a good price fw songs and drum dances. So when we came and asked them, they said no, that is not enough money. So it is difjicult &ding people. We . pay $ 2 . fbr interviews, independently of the length. Sometimes a twenty minute tape, sometimes an hour. We get a lot of infbnnation out of a person. The price is too low. (Zack Kumuk, Iglodik)
Producers in Iqaluit have difficulties finding cultural themes because the travel freeze does not
permit them to go to outpost camps. Consequently programming suffers. Also, the prod~&on of quality
and sophisticated entertainment requires special technical equipment and people with skills to produce
special effects. Some producers feel the pressure of reaching their quota with insufficient resources and
think that IBC is in too much of a rush to get more time on air. Time always seems to be in short supply:
We never have the time. We have to go on air. There is no time to experiment. (Henry Nowlack, Iqaluit) ... We edit as we go along. There is no time to make exact logging of tapes. (Zack Kumuk, Iglodik)
Particuiars of Native Lunguage Production
A piece of paper with some drawings, Inuktituk words and arrows beside the.editing machine in
Igloolik reveals a common process of script writing for many of the cultural programs produced at this
center. The narration simply follows the sequence of drawings without a pre-written script Most of the
programs have little narration and it is done as the production goes along. However, for news and current
affairs and productions with substantial scripts, producers write their stories. Here the language issue in
the technology transfer becomes particularly evident While English literacy training has been well
developed, there is nothing similar for producing native language literacy. In many cases, people write
their script in English and sight-translate it into Inuktituk during production.
Knowledge of English and English literacy was debated when IBC hired new trainees. To learn
and use the skills of journalism, read background material and interview English-speaking people requires
a basic knowledge of the language. Yet often the better people are in the mastering of the English and
their ability to write, the less they are fluent in Inuktituk. IBC is therefore providing Inuktituk language
courses to improve native language literacy.
Training
An essential element in the technology transfer process is acquiring information and skills to use
the technology and thus become self-sufficient in media production.
Training Format
In developing its training programs, IBC has to consider the particular circumstances of its trainees
and the lack of training opportunities in the north. It employs a full-time training-coordinator, who
recruits the trainers and fine-tunes the curriculum to the needs of the specific training program. His
position reflects the emphasis given to training. The quarterly training reports help to evaluate
experiences and contribute to the revision of the principal curriculum. While the coordinator is stationed
in Ottawa, training is carried out in the production centers.
Until 1983 training was conducted ad hoc with little planning and evaluation. IBC's priority was to
develop producers with a broad range of skills. Training was concentrated, usually lasting one year.
However, it became evident that this was too short and the approach flawed. The graduates knew
something about almost all aspects of production but did not have a sufficient level of expertise to
function as a production team. In the early years of IBC, when the corporation operated with a much
smaller staff and budget, it needed flexibility. Yet to achieve high quality products required
specialization.
W e found that ifeverybody was a producer, it was an unmanageable system. When d l producers were working on their own programs, there was no praducer who would ever get a crew. ... W e came out with some very goai stuff, but our attrition at that time was very high and I think one of the reasons was that we were demanding that everybsdy masters every aspect ofwnalism production. (retry Rudden, Ottawa)
In the beginning, when a society starts and has few resources, it relies heavily on trainees already
contributing to the regular production of programs. This is inevitable when NBBAP funding
arrangements require the societies to produce and distribute programs within the first year of financing.
It does not allow any length of time for training without the pressure of production.
Some staff had worked for CBC radio before moving to IBC and needed training in television
production. Some had attended the NFB film workshops in the 1970s and then participated in the
Inukshuk project. They constitute IBC's present senior and executive producers and regional managers.
However, in most cases. IBC's new staff start with entry-level training. Due to the sue of the corporation,
there is usually some training going on at either Iqaluit or Baker Lake so people can be sent there.
Nwedays we me to separate training #om production to a much larger degree and we monitor training to a much larger degree than production. So if our training finds fdl through our training fdls through but not our production. (Terry Rudden, training coordinator, Ottawa)
In 1983 IBC started a largescale, detailed, structured and specialized training program, based on a
two-tier approach of entry level and skill upgrading. Entry level training was expanded to two years. In
the first year training focused on general journalism skills and in the second year on the development of
specialized production shills. Subsequently IBC has specialized its training for producers and journalists
already in the first year of training. In the first six weeks they rotate through different departments, and
then they split into technical and production groups.
In the past the trainees were earmarked from the beginning for a special type of programming, but
in 1987 IBC began with a general training program for technical producers in cultural programming,
current affairs, and drama. Half way through the program they specialize in the program category of
their choice. Although a hands-on approach is stressed, training is clearly separated from the production
process and housed elsewhere. In the second stage trainees assist senior production employees. At the
end of the program the trainees are hired full-time as technical producers, producers or production
assistants.
The second tier of training is to upgrade the skills of the existing employees through professional
development, using seminars, workshops, exchanges with other broadcasters, college or university courses
and on-the-job training under the direction of supervisors. Further external workshops will become
available through the Coordinating Group for Inuit Management Development, Atti, of which IBC is an
active member (Stiles, 1987: 80). Funding will come from CEIC through its indirect purchase option1
Second tier training operates separately from entry-level training. It addresses a variety of topics,
such as advanced production techniques, television journalism, computer use, and Inuktituk language
training. The trainers of senior producers also spend some time in the production centers togrovide
training in specially required skills, such as cultural script writing and production In 1987 IBC also held
few intend management workshops for training in p!&rrg, supemisim, managkg dlfEdt ernp10yees
and creative problem solving.
In additional, a great deal of informal, unstructured training takes place through the full-time
trainer, the trainer-coordinator and senior staff members who share their knowledge and experiences.
With producers working for the organization for three to four years, they have now become valuable
internal training resources. Yet IBC is reluctant to use them for this purpose. They want to produce and
continue to learn, rather than move into adult education. However, since 1985 these producers have also
worked as resource people in seminars and workshops and IBC is thus less reliant on outside resources.
CEIC pays for defined number of placements in a training course.
Training Funding and Expenditures
Training is extremely expensive and costs in excess of $60,000 for each job created. Northern
communication groups have pointed out for years that there is a need for institution-based training
facilities located in the North (IBC, 1985: 40). In fall 1987 this was finally implemented with the
establishment of journalism courses through Arctic College. Yet IBC will still need further specialized
in-house training programs for senior producers and managers and to train new graduates for IBC
production. It has therefore requested an annual training supplement amounting to 20% of its annual
operating budget (IBC, 1985: 40).
Funding for training is provided through the CEIC which imposes a rationale that is more suited to
southern industry needs and CEICs own mandate, i.e. short term training to provide employment .
opportunities. IBC has to tailor its training programs to fit the criteria set by the government department.
For example, CEIC funds only oneyear training programs which are insufficient to develop competent
program or technical producers. There are no multi-year funding programs. Consequently, IBC has to
reapply for funds each year, resulting in substantial delays, unnecessary duplication of information, and
loss of valuable staff time. Typically six months pass between the submission of a funding application and
the time IBC receives its first money.
CEIC support for IBC production training has been substantial. Without it the corporation could
not have expanded so quickly. In 1984/85, CEIC contributed an amount that equaled 24% of the money
from MAP. Yet it decreased to about 10% in 1986/87 because training funds available to the NWT
had been cut back from $15 million to $10 million. IBC estimated its training costs at about $700,000,
whereas CEIC contributed $200,000.
IBC has not obtained sufficient training funds for professional development and management
training. When the NNBAP was up for renewal in spring 1987, IBC urged the DSOS to come to terms
with the training issue.
We cannot cheat our staff or our audience by cutting back on our training, and we have . already cut back on production to support i t If the renewed program does not contain
provision for training we face further sacrifices in production, layoffs, and the possible closure of a production centre. (IBC, 1987 (b): 2).
CEIC programs pay up to 75% of the actual training costs and 6Wo of the trainee's salary but do not
cover certain necessary administrative, housing and travel costs. Money has to be found elsewhere and
TSC, like the other communication societies, has to reallocate production money for training. As CEIC
funding diminished, IBC increasingly used its operational funds for training, which violates DSOS funding
rules. By 1986, reports Stiles (1987: 9) DSOS had become the single largest supporter of native
broadcasting training.
Table 8.1. indicates that over the last five years, IBC has spent more than $2.5 million on training.
This includes estimates of all IBC's informal training costs and training administration expendim, plus
all direct training costs of IBC's formal programs (Stiles, 1987: 81). According to the data in Table 8.1.,
about one third of the money comes through NNBAP/NCP operational funds, that represents 9% of
NNBAP/NCP funds.
The difficulties with adequate training monies point to the general problem of Inuit representation
Although northern native people provide most of the broadcasting training, they have no Input or access
to the federal and territorial body responsible for the allocation of training funds in the NWT. For years,
IBC has argued that the NNBAP pay for training and streamline the funding. However, with little
success. The renewed program still does not address these problems.
Issues in C r m ~ Cultural and Bilingual Training
Among the factors that affect the training of native broadcasters and the production of indigenous
programming are the English and Inuktituk literacy and potential perceptual differences between Inuit and
the southern non-native trainers concerning their journalistic approaches. This issue was already
discussed in the analysis of CBC's journa9istic approach in television production. It also emerges in the
communication societies.
Table 8.1.
IBC Training Expenditures
1983/84 1984/85 1985186 1986/87 1987/88
Total
Total exn Ex~end. of fed. Ex~end. NNBAP/
on Train. funds o~erational training
funds &) - income (ooer.)
% NNBN'?
NCP income
for train. --
Wo 15% 6% 4% 11%
9%
Source: Stiles, 1987: 81.
Most of the trainers came to IBC as former broadcasters and producers. They were highly skilled
and well recognized in their field, yet knew little about training in a native context or adult education.
They required some introduction to the special cross-cultural context, particularly the language problem.
Teaching in English when people speak Inuktituk as their mother tongue has been a problem and
will only be resolved when a few of the senior producers decide that they want to teach. IBC trainees are
required to have a certain fluency in English, particularly the production trainees. IBC tried to train
unilingual Inuit but had little success. The necessary competency levels were not achieved. The
unilingual people simply had difficulty in understanding technical terms and consequently did not develop
the competency in the required skills as did the bilingual people. The assessment showed that training in
this situation was occasionally uncomfortable and frequently frustrating. Unilingual people found it very
. hard because they felt constantly responsible for slowing down the training process. Everybody had to
wait until the translator was finished. Often the vocabulary was really technical and there were no
Inuktituk words for many terms. Everybody in the course was trying to help, but they never made it to
When the NFB Challenge for Change held its workshops in the 1970s it was very concerned not to
translate values but to simply transfer neutral skills. However, through movies and occasional exposure to
southern television, people had already developed an idea of how television looked. Trainers
consequently got much less careful about transferring southern broadcast ideals and values. Also, the
audience was getting used to the standards of commercial television. Thus both producer and audience
adapted to the southern television style. Watching a caribou skinned, a seal shot, or the proceedings of a
meeting carried the Inukshuk project and the IBC productions for a while, but with time it started to pale.
Within the chosen framework of one-way broadcasting, peGle still wanted to have television reflecting
the traditional way of life, but presented in a professional style.
Inuit trainees generally do not stress the hard-line, aggressive journalistic approach with emphasis
on controversial political items and the importance of time. Having been raised in a traditional cultural
way, where it is considered inappropriate to mind someone else's business, the trainees tend to have
difficulties in questioning someone's lifestyle or actions. They also show great concern to not hurt
feelings. Native people tend to put more emphasis on training by observation. Also, as Kidd (1987: 19)
points out, if you live in a small community with a great deal of knowledgeable occurrences, there are
fewer questions to ask. She observed in a Cree Indian context that some of the trainees did not find an
easy translation of the standard "who, when, where, what, why" questions. Trainees with some
experience in southern media did not have these difficulties and were generally more used to what was
considered newsworthy and efficient use of time.
The producers, who have been with the corporation for years, increasingly master the technology.
They have become able to develop their own style that reflects their culture but is also rooted in western
society- shaped investigative journalism.
Children's
The development of IBC's Children's Education Program is a good example of a particular
technology transfer, whereby II3C took great pain to develop its own program content and not simply
translate available material into Inuktituk.
Television plays a significant role in the early education and development of Inuit children, who
watch approximately between four and five hours, and in some instances as much as eight hours each day.
IBC argues that many of the southern children's programs undermine traditional values of child rearing,
family structure, humor and cooperation. Unless Inuit children have a good foundation in their fmt
language and a positive self-identity, they are likely to face great difficulties in adjusting to the changing
northern environment Audience surveys also indicate a high preference for children's programming.
In 1982 IBC began its lobbying efforts for funds to research, develop and produce Inuit educational
children's television. Based on experiences with the Children's Television Workshop and its development
of "Sesame Street," IBC spent three years of preparatory work before the first of its series went on air in
We are well aware of the challenge we face in mounting a children's educational service. We will have to develop a specialized team of producers, directors, writers and researchers to put together programs of professional quality that can compete with the increased influx of slickly packaged programming from the south (Kuptana, in: Stiles, 1984 (b): 1)
Three 15-minutes shows were produced and tested concerning the design, content, and format of
the programming and the effectiveness of different production techniques. An evaluation of the audience
response helped to develop guidebooks for the producers and writers and to train Inuit in the production
Child development specialists were consulted to pinpoint educational needs and complement native
language and cultural instruction experiences in the classroom.
In 1985 the project received approval from CEIC. IBC set up facilities in a new building in Iqaluit
In spring 1986 IBC hired four technical and three producer trainees and a trainer. Special workshops
were held for the trainees to learn particular skills. The IBC trainees made the puppets, wrote the scripts,
directed and produced the studio and outdoor segments, and edited the videotapes. Difficulties with one
trainer had led to a backlog of work and generally undermined the confidence of the trainees in their
work. When the replacing trainer started in January 1987, no scripts were written, yet programming was
to start in April that year. It meant immense pressure to produce the 21 shows.
What I had to do initially was to draw out their confidence, to bring down the fiar &tor, to establish confidence. "Yes, you can do it, you are ddng it". And suddenly the dam burst. It was simply a matter of confidence in their skills and abilities. They were overwhelmed by all the work that needed to be done. And they have done wonders. @on Cumming)
Each of the three producers was allocated the responsibility for seven programs. In the middle of
this, one trainee-producer dropped out, because he was terrified by the immense performance and time
pressure. He was replaced by a woman who had worked before on a free-lance part-time basis as a
puppeteer for IBC.
The enthusiasm for their pioneering work has helped people to cope with the pressure and to
devote many hours overtime.
They are being part of a ctucial phase. They initiate the program, set the direction, are the first to do it. They work long h w s , but get p i d only seven h w s a day. They m dedicated and want to see a good outcome. (Aimo Naokiaguuk, executive producer, Iqaluit)
The senior producer trainee, a former kindergarden teacher, and a technical producer, who had
previously worked for the CBC, have played important roles and are now in leading positions in the
production process. The reliance on the trainer has consequently decreased.
In April 1987 Talacginai (meaning "Look here") made its debut. It goals were to reinforce
traditional beliefs in the family structure and lifestyle, while illustrating daily events of a typical modern
Inuit child. The twenty-one 15 minute shows were broadcast three times a week and then the cycle was
repeated before the summer holidays. It was the fmt native children's television program series ever
produced in North America and has marked a principal stepping stone in IBC's development
IBC has adopted a format similar to Sesame Street with principal puppets and a host An audience I
survey of the first series indicates the success but also people's preference for more activities with children
and the puppets, and less studio production (Bell, 1987: 2).
Initially, the 15-minute shows ran at 3 p.m. in order to allow children in school to watch the show
together. In fall 1987, IBC got a new half-hour time slot in the evening, so that the program could be
watched in the family setting. The first 15 minutes are for a new series and the second for a repeat of the
previous year's production.
The project has become a major success. The audience survey show the appraisal of the audience
and the tapes are also requested in Alaska and Greenland. It serves as a model for projects of other
native societies. However, the special status and high profile, which was important for the enormous
effort to get the shows finished in time, put other crews somewhat in the shade, and it might take some
time and effort to integrate the department into the IBC Iqaluit production center.
Midnight Television Audience Res~onse
Program Distribution
Nature made our land the Land of the Midnight Sun: it took the C.B.C. to make us the Land of Midnight Television. (Kuptana, in Brisebois, 1984: 8).
On 11 January 1982 IBC aired its first program - at midnight In 1983 the corporation was able to
move its programming to 10 p.m., which still makes for a late night Optimum access is considered
between 7:00 and 9:00 p.m. to reach the majority of television viewers in all three time zones served by
IBC. Children's television occupies the 6.30 to 7.00 p.m. timeslot on weekdays and 10.00 a.m. on Sundays.
The CBC Northern Service offers IBC access to its transponder free of charge. To connect to the
CBC distribution system from Iqaluit, reaching 44 CBC, GNWT and community-owned ground stations
in the NWT, Northern Quebec and Labrador, IBC rents a satellite uplink from Telesat Canada for
$158,000 per year. TNI and Okalakatiget pay IBC $725 per hour for broadcasting their programs, to
compensate for part of the uplink costs and the use of IBC staff. Because of the low status of IBC
programming, the shows are prone to delays and pre-emptions for broadcasts deemed of national
importance. Hockey, football, or Reagan's speech to Parliament are all considered to be of overriding
significance. Changes to time slots offered to IBC are common, often with little advance notice. In 1985,
for example, 20 programs had to be reedited to fit new time slots (hugheed, 1986 (b): 15). These
changes have become a serious problem, particularly for IBC's current affairs programming. The
time-sensitive material becomes useless if it is not broadcast right away and valuable information is not
conveyed to the audience. It also undermines the morale of IBC staff who have done their best to
produce a program and then see it shelved due to CBC's decision. And audiences cannot rely on regular
schedules.
Audience Response to IBC Programming
In 1984 and 1985 IBC undertook two audience surveys that indicated the popularity of IBC's
pr~gramming.~ About 83% over the age of nine, interviewed in the 1985 survey, stated they watch IBC
programs at least one to three hours per week (of the 5.5 hours possible). Older Inuit often watched three
to five h ~ m (Valaskakls, Wilson, 2985: 291, Abut half (55.2%) of the resp~ndents were content with the
broadcast time slots for IBC programs. The proportion of those who felt it was too late increased among
older viewers and was highest among those aged 46 to 60. Preferred time slots were for the prime-time
evening hours (ibid.: 30).
Of the twenty programs surveyed, the ones most watched and enjoyed were the current affairs show
"Qagik," a music festival, the Kuujjuaq caribou crisis, and other programs related to traditional hunting
and fishing activities. Among the programs least seen and enjoyed were a program on learning and
- hearing, and the land claims series (ibid.: 52). Elders preferred programs related to history and old
traditions, whereas younger people enjoyed themes of contemporary life.
The' limitations of these audience surveys are discussed in Appendix 2.
Preferences for additional programs indicate that seven program types are especially popular:
hunting, sports, traditional Inuit skills, Inuit language, Inuit drama, Inuktituk music, and religious
programs (ranging between 55 to 40.2% in preference). 31.8% are strongly interested in northern news and
37% in international news; 32.8 % are somewhat and 25.8% strongly interested in programs about Inuit and
northern organizations (ibid, 72-75).
Inuit from all age groups stated that they acquired new information from watching IBC programs.
About 5Wo learned about Inuit and northern organizations and issues as well as national and international
news. About 44% indicated they learned new Inuktituk words, particularly the younger audience, and
about 37% learned about making things (Valaskakis, Wilson, 1985: 110).
The researchers concluded that IBC plays an important role in transmitting information and that
IBC's emphasis on traditional activities, practical information and northern news makes it totally
non-competitive with CBC programming (ibid: 115). The survey results also revealed that IBC's
programming appealed mainly to adults, a trend that was intended to be reversed through IBC's children's
programming.
The surveys did not address more qualitative aspects of program impacts that evolve out of IBC's
objectives, such as providing a cultural passage between Inuit groups. They also did not particularly
address the question of interactive communication to investigate to what degree this is still a concern.
Im~lications of Native Broadcasting Policy on IBC's Develwment
IBC's program production is affected by several important factors:
lack of availability of skilled personnel and need for further staff development;
requirement to expand services and facilities in the different regions;
emphasis to upgrade quality rather than quantity;
interim character of funding; and
access to the distribution system.
IBC pioneered in its training initiatives. Over 50 Inuit have graduated (Stiles, 1987: 83), which is
important in a region that suffers from high unemployment and low formal education rates. For many,
the training has meant the beginning of a new career and a switch from menial work or unemployment to
a professional job that brings self-esteem and self-confidence.
IBC's program curriculum has gained wide recognition and is guiding other native co~unica t ion
societies, the CBC and other training programs. It is praised by the funding agencies and independent
evaluations (Stiles, 1987: 84). The quality and quantity of training has allowed the expansion of program
categories and regional production and is responsible for the technical and content improvement of its
broadcasts.
The need for extensive training is acknowledged by NNBAP program management and the '
societies, yet not by the responsible minister who continues to say this is CEIC's responsibility. Training
levels have dropped to onehalf of previous levels. For 1986/87 IBC could get only one third the amount
it had applied for to mrry out its training plan. The establishment of journalism courses through Arctic
College will lessen the training burden, yet IBC wil l always be faced with needs to upgrade skills. IBC
needs an ssu~red training component in its fimdhg. BC cexibers 10% 2 b ~ W its N_NBAP budget
adequate for ongoing professional development
Experiences in other communication societies with high staff turnover indicate that the lack of
effective training, together with low wages, are main reasons for high attrition rates and the difficulty
attracting and keeping qualified personnel (Lougheed, 1986 (a): 3-21). Staff retention is also dependent
upon increases in salaries and benefits. Compared to other communication societies, who pay "poverty
line wages" (Lougheed, 1986 (a): 3-21) IBC pays higher salaries, yet it has remained well below the
average when compared to the CBC or government Through its training initiatives, IBC was able to
progressively increase the percentage of Inuit employed in administrative positions. However, these are
skills very much in demand. The risk that people might move to much better paying positions in
government or industry is therefore particularly high.
From the Inukshuk project XBC rapidly expanded its service with very few resources. To set up
facilities in the Central Arctic and integrate Northern Quebec and Labrador into its network required
investments in facilities and human resources. It also put enormous pressure on the staff. The initial
high turnover rates indicate the difficulties of people adjusting to this pace. The staff had to cope with a
steady work situation, wage work and - in most cases - their residency at a regional center rather than
their small settlement with its communal support system. Without the enthusiasm of people, the
successful expansion would not have been possible.
IBC's industrial quality equipment was sufficient for a temporary project but not a professional
service. To move from an experiment to an ongoing service required professional technical and quality
standards - yet this involved major capital expenditures.
The funding conditions under the NNBAP have emphasized the quantity of production over
quality. DSOS' principal measurement of performance has been the weekly number of hours of television
broadcasts. It is a convenient indicator because it can be easily measured Yet it is misleading because it
omits other important standards, such as quality, audience reach, skill acquisition, effectiveness of training,
organizational develspmenf public kmwledge of northern issues, arad c o m ~ t y linking (bugheed,
1986: 2-26/27). IBC adapted to this policy, yet the pressure to increase output without the proper
technical and human resources has reached its limit and is resented by some of the production teams.
They feel they have no time to put the proper care into the programs and produce the quality they are
capable of. The important question is how an audience can be attracted and maintained. With southern
television and video films widely available and the audience requesting more Inuktituk programming, IBC
faces a formidable challenge.
The NNBAP has been crucial in the development of the organization. The funding mangements
for indigenous programming are unique and not known in other countries with aboriginal populations.
However, six years into its existence, IBC has still not been able to advance from its project status to a
recognized public broadcaster. This is reflected in distribution options, funding arrangements and
justification and control mechanisms. - I
To be successful, the transfer of a technology must include not only the physical transportation of
hardware from one location to another, but also the transfer of knowledge, skills and financial means to
operate, maintain and administer the equipment The Inukshuk project clearly had an experimental
character. In contrast, IBC wants to be recognized as an established public service with permanent
funding arrangements, including those for training and distribution. I I
IBC has thus remained in a state of dependency. As in 'other socio-political sectors, there is the
principal good will on part of government representatives toward native needs for communication facilities
and the broader demand for self-development and self-government Yet there are also tendencies within
government, often at the mcial decision-making times, when the government is unwilling to transfer
control.
When the NNBAP became permanent in 1987 a major obstacle was overcome. Yet it has frozen
the funding level and training is still not part of the program. There is no indication that ~ ~ ~ C E I C will
provide the necessary monies.
Program distribution has remained a serious problem, although the Themen Committee and native
groups had already indicted in the early 1980s that access to existing distribution systems could be only an
interim solution. The proposal for Television North Canada, based on the use of a dedicated northern
transponder, will provide the necessary distribution arrangements and a balanced service in terms of access
time by different northern native groups and the CBC Northern Service.
Summary gcJ Conclusion
Independent evaluations confirm IBCs great success. It has proven its ability to successfully
manage broadcasting technology, pioneer in new programming forms, establish itself as a permanent
institution and deliver a much needed public service. It has won a loyal audience and developed into a
broad-ranged service from children's programs to news and current affairs.
IBC produces over 90% of Inuktituk television in the NWT. It is not an additional service in an
already well provided for environment, but provides a basic service to its audience. Without funding
through the NNBAP and NCP its activities would be extremely limited. To improve program quantity,
variety and quality depends on expanded flllil~lcial resources. IBC has recognized that it cannot solely rely
on taxpayers' money, but that it need to raise funds from private donors and commercial income. IBC's
decision to diversify its funding sources and increase its commercial revenues through ICSL has been a
successful step in this direction.
In presenting news and programs on Inuit issues from an Inuit perspective, 1BC fulfills its principal
mandate. IBC's programming is appreciated and the audience wants more of i t Through native '
broadcasting, Inuit have been able to express their views as a collective group that previously remained
unheard. On an individual basis, the right of freedom of expression using the media is harder to
implement, similar to the situation in the South.
During the Inukshuk phase, the interactive element played a major role in programming.
It was unique in that it attained its stated objective of allowing Inuit to define what an Inuit television network in the north should be and how best it could be achieved. (Valaskakis, Seaton, 1984: 15)
However, the design of the satellite system and the distribution arrangements limits interactive
television. Teleconferencing costs are almost double that of a satellite network service. In some cases, as
Valaskakis and Seaton (1984: 16) point out, other telecommunications facilities, such as telephone
conferencing, may be able to do the same job more efficiently. Yet this has not been employed, either.
IBC currently provides interactive broadcasting in form of a phonein panel discussion once a month.
Together with the emphasis on regional production centers, these are attempts to maintain audience
involvement However, in contrast to the Inukshuk project, feedback comes from private homes rather
than communal places.
Also, to maintain its audience attraction, IBC requires more sophisticated production techniques
than were employed during the Inukshuk phase. The success of the Inukshuk and other projects was
largely based on the support and involvement of the target audience and users, who felt like active
participants rather than passive observers. With the emphasis on professional quality IBC adapted more
of a southern style of television broadcasting, arguing that the program quality of the interactive
programming would not satisfy audience expectations. The novelty of simply broadcasting the
proceedings of a meeting or people's feedback has worn out. It is a tendency that is generally observed
for local programming in cable systems which cannot maintain'the people's attention against the slick
commercial broadcasts available on the other channels of the cable system.
On the other hand, community radio in the North indicates the importance of the local audience
being actively involved. Quality thereby plays only a secondary role. The request in audience surveys for
local television production facilities indicates that there is a need for this type of programming. In its
briefs IBC requests the right for local access to the transmitter but has not made it a high priority in its
lobbying efforts. What was transferred was not only the hardware but also the structure and contents
format of the southern medium.
IBC is viewed by all age groups and in all regions except the Western Arctic (which is mainly a
language, but also a political-cultural problem). Younger people tend to watch contemporary issues,
whereas elders prefer traditional, historical themes, a tendency found elsewhere in the world.
Nevertheless, IBC helps to somewhat bridge the gap by presenting both the old and new Inuit way of life.
Its children's television has proven a successful tool to reach out to young Inuit Programs from the
different regions serve to contribute to a feeling of unity. IBC also exchanges programs with Greenland
and Alaska, which widens the perspective of cultural belonging as Arctic peoples.
Audience surveys indicate loyalty to Inuit programming. However, the government's approach to
evaluate the efficiency of its funding by the amount of programming and by audience ratings, as in
commercial broadcasting, ignores the role of native broadcasting for Inuit identity, self-esteem and
self-government NNBAP administrators are aware of the inadequacy of this approach, yet they are
similarly under pressure to reduce expenditures and justify these in narrow terms of efficiency.
NNBAP objectives focus primarily on the need for programming to support native languages and
culture. IBC's programming clearly supports these goals. Yet IBC argues that this objective is only part
of a larger one, that is the need to provide a balanced public service in Inuktituk to its Inuit audience. It's
role in language retention is considered complementary to other initiatives.
The principal media are part of a matrix of cultural expression consisting also of written and spoken language, music, and other media. These initiati3es occur through the efforts of schools, homes, governments, and a number of native cultural organizations (Lougheed, 1986 (a): 5-7.
IBC has made use of the Canadian government's multicultural policy and willingness to suppol?
native cultures and languages. This support has helped IBC to start its service. However, it limits the
role of the corporation by having to justify broadcasting services with promoting culture rather than the
need for communication services.
Television is a technology of the urban industrial world with a tremendous power to diffuse the
dme of its oxigin. If the dmal content is replaced by Inuit media content, this power can be wed to
benefit Inuit needs and aspirations. The case study shows that this is not simply a question of replacing
one program by another. The whole structure and organization of television programming reflects a
cultural form. IBC intends to develop eventually into a network service that is not constricted by narrowly
defined funding criteria and limited distribution arrangements, but one which provides unique, truly Inuit
programming in form and content The question is who defines what is uniquely Inuit, IBC or the Inuit
community at large? The early experiences with interactive broadcasting indicate that direct, interactive
community input should be part of a truly Inuit service.
CHAPTER M
NATIVE TELEVISION IN THE WESTERN ARCTIC: THE INUVIALUlT COMMUNICATIONS
This case study of the Inuvialuit Communications Society (ICS) analyzes the transfer and
adaptation process of television broadcasting of a native organization that only very recently ventured into
television productioal In contrast to IBC, ICS developed in a region, where people had already been
strongly influenced by southern customs and goods, including Commercial television. The chapter
analyzes the organization's historical development, the institutional context, production experiences, and
assesses the implications of federal native communication policies on the effectivenessaf ICS to achieve
stated goals.
In contrast to IBC, ICS produces only half an hour of weekly television but also a monthly
newspaper to fulfill its mandate of serving Inuvialuit communication needs. Whereas IBC grew out of the
communications arm of ITC, which had been actively involved in satellite television projects, ICS took
over the principal communication services of the Committee for Original Peoples' Entitlement (COPE),
which had no previous broadcasting experiences. COPE had produced a monthly newsletter and a
quarterly magazine and a trail radio support project COPE had also recorded old-time stories and
legends in Inuvialuktun, and aired these tapes by arrangement with the CBC. Television was included,
after the organization existed for nearly two years.
As a result of intense southern influence, Inuvialuktun has become a second language. In contrast
to the Eastern Arctic, Inuvialuit have generally readily accepted and often keenly awaited southern
television, despite complaints about its cultural irrelevance.
Much of the information in this chapter has been conversation with management and staff and can not the case study written for ICS by Koebberling in 1986, supplemented by the ICS monograph of Lodgheed, 1986 (c).
collected through field research, through always be referenced. A rnaior source is
Figure 9.1. Inuvialuit Communications Society Target Area
L.. ': YUKON '. i NORTHWEST TERRITORIES
Source: Lougheed, 1986, Appendix. - 3 4 2 - Lougheed and Associates 8 / 8 6
Origin and Goals
The rapid political and economic development of the Western Arctic brought a need for improved
communication links. The Inuvialuit felt overrun by the frenzy of oil exploration and began to organize
politically and express their need to gain control of the media which served the region. COPE set up its
own communications arm which coordinated and stayed in close contact with the communications branch
of ITC in the Eastern Arctic. Language and political-economic development seemed too distinct to have
one organization represent the whole Arctic.
On 25 October 1976, the Inuit Okangit Inungun Society (101) was founded as an independent
organization from COPE in order to get funding through the NCP. IOI's goal was to develop a
communication system independent from COPE, producing a magazine and supporting an HF trail radio
network. However, I01 was never able to receive any funding. For two years its president lobbied
extensively with DSOS for recognition and monies but was finally turned down in January 1979. DSOS
argued that the Inuvialuit were already represented through the Dene Indian Communicatio& Society in
Yellowknife and rejected it as unique group worth its own communication services. Yet the department
came forward with a $20,000 grant to support COPE'S communication projects. Money could also be
secured for a trail radio maintenance program to support hunters and trappers.
In 1981 COPE hired a communications officer who particularly focussed on the language issue. He
established the successful COPE language project and eventually took it over as project coordinator. A
new non-native communications officer was hired to help publicize the land claims negotiations and
increase native communication activities.
In 1982 the DOC indicated that future funding of native communications in the Western Arctic was
- possible. In March 1983, at the annual general meeting of COPE, a communications society was
reestablished to prevent the I01 inauguration from lapsing. A board of directors was formed and the
name changed to Inuvialuit Communications Society. Registered shortly thereafter in the NWT as a
non-profit independent organization, ICS applied to DSOS for funds to research the broadcasting needs 1 B
of the Inuvialuit
Mandate and Gads
ICS' mandate and goals are, as its predecessor 101:
1. To improve communications for the Inuvialuit in the Western Arctic through the use of newspaper. magazines, television, radio, tapes, films and other means in written or spoken word in the languages of English and Inuvialuktun;
2. to carry on the activities in the six communities of the Western Arctic; and
3. to become administratively and financially independent (101,1978: 6).
While not detailed, they are consistent with the M A P and NCP objectives. ICS took over the
communication activities of COPE and planned to expand into radio and television. The fi~st step was to
develop an organizational structure, to hire and train people, and to find the necessary funding.
By November 1983, the regional magazine Inuviufuit was overhauled and transformed to a monthly
newspaper. ICS spent a grant of $45,000 from DSOS on an audience survey in early 1984 that indicated a
preference f ~ r expanding into television rather than radio. In March 1984 the board decided to start
regional television production. In 1985 ICS also ventured into graphic arts. In contrast to IBC, the
Inuvialuit had not been involved in any satellite television projects and lacked basic facilities and
experiences. ICS relied on non-native people who strongly influenced the decision-making process.
In summer 1985, when ICS had expanded to a peak of 23 staff, the goals and future direction of the
organization were discussed in detail by the managers. Listed as priorities for the next two years, besides
the mandatory goals of promoting indigenous language and culture, were the development of Inuvialuit
skills, management and leade~ship abilities, more involvement by the board, consolidation of the new
- organization rather than continued rapid expansion, and discussion of issues and institutions of concern to
the Inuvialuit (ICS, 1985 (b). ICS's Programming/Editorial Policy had set as target to produce 70% of the
television programs in Inuvialuktun, provide a balance of programming and coverage from each
community, and with an emphasis on reaching children who are in danger of losing their native tongue.
ICSs priorities are regional television with emphasis on cultural programming, regular newspaper
service and the development of graphic design services, followed by community radio. These priorities
are reflected in ICSs annual work plans. For 1986-87 the goals are as follows:
to maintain the current newspaper production level;
to increase television programming to one hour by the fall of 1986 and to 1 112 hours by J a n w
1987 (if adequate training funds are received);
* to continue training and working towards economic self-sufficiency through marketing and sales by
the graphics department; and
to continue providing assistance (without direct involvement) to community radio societies (ICS,
1986 (c)).
Oraanizational Structure
ICS membership includes all Inuvialuit The annual general membership meeting generally
expresses the concern from the communities. It is attended by the board of directors, ICS management
and one or two additional delegates from each community.
ICS is supervised by a board of six directors who represent each of the six Western Arctic
communities. In 1985 a policy was implemented for all Inuvialuit eighteen or older to not elect the
directors at the AGM but at the community level for a period of two years. Some communities have had
difficulties finding nominees. As a resulf one candidate wins by acclamation. To allow some continuity,
three communities elect their members one year and the other three the alternating year (ICS, 1985 (d)).
The directors meet at least three times a year, rotating among the communities. They elect among
themselves a president, vice-president and secretary/treasurer. The president acts as the principal link I
between the board and the management and staff. In contrast to IBC, the ICS president is not a fully
salaried position.
*
The board sets the overall policy, confirms all new appointments, establishes all major production
goals and priorities, and reviews recommendations brought forth by the management committee. The
president is also involved in long-term planning and priority-setting workshops.
Given the small population size of only over three thousand Inuvialuit, ICS could rarely find board
members with a background in broadcasting or print, which seriously affects the decision-making power.
The president had worked many years at CBC radio in Inuvik and brought some expertise in production
and management issues. As with IBC, ICS members have gained knowledge and experience in
production, administration and management, and over the years their work has become more efficient
Consequently, they do not have to rely as much on the advice of the non-Inuvialuit executive director as
before. Like IBC, ICS needs to train its board members and has held short term workshops on reviewing
budgets and financial statements, and on administrative and managerial skills.
Management and Staff
In spring 1986 ICS had a staff of twenty (see organizational chart in Figure 9.2.), of whom 15 were
native and 5 non-native. The three departments of Newspaper, Television, and Graphic Arts were
supported by a central administration
The executive director holds the senior administrative position and manages the day-to-day affairs
and planning of ICS, including fund-raising, budgeting, supervision of personnel, hiring, training, and
implementation of directives and policies. Until April 1988 this position was filled by a non-native
contract person. Two previous attempts to hire an Inuvialuk had failed because the candidates were not
yet ready and skilled for the demands of the job. An assistant executive director was trained for a year.
but when funds under the CEIC were terminated, the position was eliminated.
The three managers for television (program director), newspaper (editor/trainer), and graphic arts
(manager/trainer), as well as the contract trainers, report to the excecutive director, who is thus in a
central and influential position.
Figure 9.2.
Inuvialuit Communications Society Organizational Chart
All Inuvialuit LJ Board I
E~ccutivc Director + I 1
Assislniit ~ c c u t i v e Director
I I
I
I'clcvision m TuniitcIii;~t Grnpliic Dcsign
I
M;~ringcrflrai~icr
Trairiccs I I Editor I
Scriior Rcpoiter E Rcportcr D
Source: Lougheed, 1 9 8 6 ( c ) , p . 1 2 .
To have an executive director from a different culture with no knowledge in the indigenous
language leading an organization that is dedicated to the promotion of native language and culture created
some difficulties in management and administration, which will be discussed in the context of
cross-cultural training and production experiences.
The television program director, a position established in January 1986 and held by an Inuvialuk, is
responsible for the general administration of the television broadcasting operation. This includes stafTing,
production, programming, day-to-day operations, record keeping, planning and final prograuming
control.
The position of the newspaper editor was held by a non-native person until. 1987. when a former
staff member took over after one year of training on the job. When he left, ICS could not find an
Inuvialuk and the position needed to be taken by a Non-Native. The number of reporters and
reporter-trainees has fluctuated significantly because of a high attrition rate and the substantial changes in
funding through CEIC for training in newspaper production.
Tumitchiat Graphic Design is staffed with a non-native manager/trainer. Here as well ICS has
faced a relatively high turnover in trainees and a great fluctuation in the number of trainees, due to the
changing funding provisions and personal decisions to move onto something else.
ICS has experienced problems with a high staff turn-over. In the early years it was 33%. in
contrast to 12% at IBC, 14% at TNI and 31% at NCS, the Dene group in Yellowknife. Low salaries and
difficulties in providing training have contributed to this high rate.
Organizational Contrds and Pdicies
ICS managers report regularly to the board of directors through three to four board meetings and
regular phone contact. Most of the board members consider these opportunities of participation
sufficient:
I believe that the best way is let them [stad have a go at it, as long as the pdicies are carried through. I don't think that the directors should be over somebody's back all the time. ... Isee my invdvement as adequate. (Peter Green, Pauiatuk)
In 1985 ICS approved guidelines for board-management relations. They specified the duties of the I
1 board, the president and the executive director (ICS, 1985 (c)). The latter position carried most of the
power, due to the rapid expansion of ICS in its formative years, the time pressure with which decisions
have had to be made, and the strong involvement of the executive director. This created some dispute.
The president, meanwhile, had relatively little involvement The AGM decided in 1986 that he should
spent three days each quarter at the offices in Inuvik and to take over more of the external
responsibilities, such as maintaining contact with other native organizations and government departments.
ICS is considering holding a region-wide election to create a full-time position for the president
Attending board meetings often is a major problem. Some board members still follow their
traditional pursuits of hunting and trapping, and are not willing to sacrifice opportunities to prearranged
schedules. Also, some board members are involved in other regional or communal projects. As a result,
when candidates for the position of the executive director were interviewed in early April, 1986, neither
the president nor the other two bard members W ~ Q were approached c ~ d d attend.
ICS has established several formal administrative procedures and policies. ICS' Programming
Policy, approved at the AGM in February 1986, outlines the society's procedures concerning personnel,
working conditions, travel, salaries and benefits (ICS, 1986 (a).
Bi-weekly, the executive director holds a general staff meeting which is well attended and helps the
staff to gain a broader perspective of the developments that affect their work and their organization and to
support work morale. A Management Committee, consisting of the managers, the book-keeper and a
staff member from each the newspaper/graphic arts and television department, meets once a week. It is
an attempt to decentralize the decision making process and spread responsibility from the executive
director to the whole management so that everything is not dependent upon one individual.
External control is exercised through regular reports to the DSOS with its numerous funding
applications and review procedures.
Cornmunit y Relations
The most important means to bring community concerns to the organization, as well as to inform
the community about developments of ICS is to have each board member from a separate community.
Other ways are viewer/audience visits in Inuvik, letters, phone calls, audience surveys, and the rotating
annual general meeting so people in the host community can drop in easily. Television and newspaper
crews that come to the communities to report about events are a well received and important means to
keep in touch. Like IBC, ICS television production does not permit community television, i.e. local
productions by non-ICS staff to be fed into ICS program, or Inukshuk-like interactive programs. t h e
society argues that in order to produce high quality programming, this has to be done by its trained staff.
Audience surveys indicate that community reports in the newspaper play an important role for
regional information dissemination of local news. However, IC5 has had difficulties in maintaining
regular reporters, despite a $30 per report fee. Another problem is to fund relatively capable reporters,
and at times had to call on grade six and seven students to help out Funds were once made available to
train community reporters, but the money was urgently needed to finance the production of the
newspaper and other funds have not been forthcoming.
ICS also offers advice, and in one case $1,000 to set up a community radio station. It supplemented
the CBC's technical and general assistance. As pointed out in chapter five, the community radio
movement in the Western Arctic has not been ve j successful.
With a few exceptions, feedback is considered satisfactory. The delegates at the AGM from one
community in particular said that information and feedback between the communities and the
organization needed to be improved yet recognized the financial constraints (ICS, 1986 (b)).
The Search for Monev: Funding
ICS began from a base of interim funding that was lumped together from various grants. It took
ICS more than a year after its inauguration to convince DSOS of the merits of its existence and be
included in the NCP and NNBAP. In the meantime, applications were submitted through COPE
Communications for funding to begin training and expansion. In June 1983 a $100,000 training grant
from CEIC allowed ICS to hire and train people in newspaper production and administration.
In 1984 ICS increased its budget rapidly from $45,000 in 1983184 to $750,000 in 1984185 with
moneys from DSOS and CEIC. In 1985186 it increased to nearly $1,127,000 (Koebberling, 1986: 50). A
major part of ICS' operating budget is spent on Axed costs - salaries and operating costs - and relatively
little is left for production (See Figure 9.3. ICS Revenues and Expenditures 1984185). In 1985186 ICS
drastically experienced the fiscal constraint policy of the federal government which reduced its planned
income by $56,000. In 1986187 it faced further cut-backs of both DSOS and CEIC grants and
consequently could not implement its production and training plan. When a newspaper reporter was
leaving the position was not refilled. In 1987188 the situation eased when a major training got approved.
Although funding expanded drastically in the first few years. ICS has remained significantly
underfunded. Under the terms of the NNBAP, ICS serves a "minor region," that is a target audience of
less than 5000, and receives money for producing only one broadcasting medium. The bottom line of
$520,000 for 1986187 which ICS was asked to submit, was unrealistic to meet the envisioned one hour per
week production quota by September 1986 and ninety minutes by January 1987. Also, the late approval
and payment of funds created serious cash flow problems. For example, in 1984 the organization had to
close down for a month because there were virtually no monies to produce the newspaper and pay
salaries. In late spring 1985 ICS faced another bottleneck because it had to wait for two months to get
NNBAP funding. NCP assistance for the newspaper was threatened by delays in extending the program
and the approval and issuing of monies delayed three times. Four months into the fiscal year, ICS still
did not know what total funds to expect for the year.
Figure 9.3.
ICS Revenues and Expenditures
I
Revenue 1
NNBAP
CElC
@ S e l f - Generated
NCP
Y Excess
Expenses Total: 5794,000
Salaries
Operating
@ Capital
of Expendit
Source: Lougheed, 1986 (c): 17. _
I think we all recognize how much NNBAP and NCP have done to foster native communications - they are good programs with g d intentions, and without them ICS could not exist. But there are ma@ problems with the way these programs are delivered which make it very hard on the groups. ... It is the uncertainty that hurts most because we can never make long or even short term plans, and our stafis never w e of where they stand. There are no guarantees of training finds under either NNBAP or NCP and this is a potentially @a1 paw. The whde program will fail dramatically unless ma@ training can be guaranteed. We /icst can;t seem to convince the people that count of how important it is to provide ongoing training in the north. (Greg Smith, Inuvik)
Broadcast Production
Programming Gwls
An audience survey, undertaken in early 1984, indicated that given a preference, 64.6% of people
surveyed wanted ICS to start with television before radio, because there was no Western Arctic televisibn
programming. The most preferred program categories were traditional lifestyle (68.5%); regional news
(66.9'30); hunting, trapping, fishing (64.5%); legends, myths, old time stories (51.9%) and community events
(41.6%1).~ The survey indicated a demand for both news and current affairs and cultural programming. In
order to do both, ICS would have to develop expertise in both investigate journalism and cultural
progammkg. Thls would provide a balance of p s o g d n g types, yet required that production staff
learned a range of skills unique to each production style. This is not normally expected from professional
broadcasters.
To concentrate on current affairs would guarantee that important events were covered. However,
the cost, lack of expertise and the distribution arrangements did not allow the coverage of fast-breaking
items. Radio coverage through CBC could lead to a situation where ICS news would always be outdated.
ICS therefore decided to concentrate on culkal programming, knowing that initially it would also have a
captive audience for its broadcasts, given the strongly expressed need for this type of programming. An
additional problem was that if ICS broadcast only in Inuvialuktun, some of its potential audience might be
missed, thus the board said there should be some English language programming. It also agreed that the
People were asked to list their four most liked programs.
quality of programming was to be a primary consideration. Increases in quantity were to occur only if the
quality could be maintained. Commercial production, in both television and print, was to be undertaken
only if it did not jeopardize the regular work and the society's main mandate. Producing interactive
television was not considered
After this principal decision was made in summer 1984 the AGM approved a number of priorities
in spring 1985. Because it was the year ICS began training and production in television programming,
they included management training for Inuvialuit staff., getting into regular television production by fall
1985; taking over all production and artwork of the newspaper from outside agencies; setting up a training
program in graphics arts and design; working on the collection of oral history; having -the newspaper
come out more often; and generating revenue from sales and services (ICS, 1985 (a): 4). The broadcasts
were to be mainly in Inuvialuktun, promote native languages while also broadcasting in English to reach
all parts of the audience.
ICS could not achieve its television production goals of one hour by fall 1986 and one ,and ninety
minutes by spring 1987 because it lacked funding and training opportunities. By fall 1987 ICS was still
producing only half an how per week originid programing. The board decided that quality was to be its
primary concern. Increases in quantity would only &ur if the quality could be maintained. Commercial
production, both in television and print, was only to be undertaken if it did not jeopardize the regular
work and the society's main mandate.
E d i t d and Production Pdicy
ICS is an independent, non-profit corporation, not allied to political bodies or the communication
branches of other Inuvialuit organizations. However, individual ICS staff may also function as board
members of Inuvialuit political and economic organizations and when they do potential conflicts of
interest may arise.
What underscored the urgency of developing an editorial/programming policy, however, was a
newspaper report in January 1986 about a policy charge against a well-known and respected Inuvialuk
who was president of one of their organizations. Many Inuvialuit were upset about what they felt was
negative reporting in their own newspaper.
W e learn on the territorial news (@BC) who is in @il etc. anyway. There are lots of things happening in the communities worth reporting, not bad gossip. @omthy Arey, bard member, Aklavik)
The discussion revealed the different perceptions of journalism. Whereas southern, non-native
media emphasized the hard news and feel an obligation to inform the public about wrong doings of their
leaders, the Inuvialuit rejected this approach. They put up with in white man's media, but not in their
own. However, the non-native editor was of a different opinion, although aware of the cultural conflict:
There are certain stories which I would do, and they wouldn't; &st because it is a sensitive issue they wouldn't talk about and I was insensitive to it. And secondly, if we decide to do a story, I would handle it in one way and they would handle it in a difirent way. It has nothing to do with education, with the ability to write in a newspaper style. It is strictly a cultural question., Yet there is a certain style of writing a newspaper story and there are certain questions one has to ask to make it a complete newspaper story. This is a very dificult thing, I think, to make that integration between what is necessary if you are going to be a goai newsman and still acccnnmaiate a certain cultural situation @avid McNeill, Inuvik)
The AGM in 1985 mandated ICS to develop a comprehknsive editorial policy, which would include
that ICS's reporting would not ostracize the Inuvialuit, and not report court or personal litigation news.
Editorials should be packaged in such a way that they would not question the credibility of Inuvialuit
corporations, unless criticism is justified. But it should not be damaging to any individuals, companies,
societies and organizations which are partially or fully owned by Inuvialuit corporations (ICS, 1985 (b)).
During 1985 ICS drafted a policy that was approved at the general meeting in 1986. With regards
to the disputed issue of reporting, the policy states that
... Stories or programs, to the best of journalistic abilities, should be handled in good taste, honestly and with regard to the law and values of the Inuvialuit..
ICS should not sensationalize news involving persons charged with or convicted of a crime. Such a person would only be mentioned if his or her case is deemed to be directly relevant to Inuvialuit interests. In individual cases the matter may be discussed by the ICS management group to decide how the story should be treated. (ICS, 1986 (a))
ICS staff admit that the editorial policy is vague, that it is an evolutionary process and still needs
further refinement Once an Inuvialuk heads the newspaper production, the judgement is no longer one
of cultural origin but personal judgement
The situation has become complicated since production staff joined boards of political and
commercial organizations. Whereas the president sees this as a potential conflict of interest that could
jeopardize the independence of the organization, staff consider their board membership an additional
source of insight
It's really hard to go into a meeting as a board and walk out as a press person. Because it's really sensitive when you sit in thme meetings and people rather not talk abmt issues around me and Dennis. I kind of felt that, but now the board has opened up. Now they know that they can trust us, that we are not @opardizing the Board decision, that we are n d deliverin2 it to the press. With IRC, we ask them if we can write the story. We really find the inside ,
of the story when we are in this meeting and we usually ask the board ifwe can write it and they usually say yes because that means we get a better story. (Elaine Carpenter7 Inuvik)
For the television production with its emphasis on cultural programming this has not yet become an
issue. However, with a decision to also produce news and current affairs, the question of pol~tical bias
and independence and investigative journalism will emerge.
ICS Facilities and Equipment
When ICS began, at that time still functioning as COPE'S communication arm, it shared an office
with another COPE staff member. In fall 1983 ICS moved into a laundry building where production
facilities for the newspaper were limited. Stories were written in the Inuvik office. Yet photos had to be
developed at the Inuvik Research Laboratory's darkroom, half a kilometer away until ICS finally installed
its own equipment All typesetting, lay-out and printing was done in Yellowknife, 900 kilometers south.
In summer 1984, when ICS was approved under the NNBAP, it began to expand rapidly and sublet
space in a new building to set up its television production facilities and to house the administration. A
year later the graphics department was established and the whole print offices moved into a larger, newly
renovated office, with improved darkroom facilities and a computer typesetter.
In summer 1987 ICS bought a building at the outskirts of Inuvik to house all its production in one
place. Because of the high monthly rents for ofice space - e.g. $7,900 a month for the television and
administration space, of which $2171 paid for leasehold improvement (hugheed, 1986 (c): lo), the move
was considered economically justified.
ICS has quality equipment which is in relatively good condition. It keeps an annual allocation for
upgrading and renewing equipment because of the high costs associated with maintenance and repair. To
depend on high technology in a remote area, far away from suppliers and maintenance resources, has been
a problem particularly in the graphics department
Ordering the equipment was a real shocker. That was when I began to realize how far we were jiom civilization and what the business mentality was like in Edmonton and Vancouver. ... When we do have a problem, it becomes a ma& problem and this is something that southern suppliers are not sympathetic with. As an exumple, we still have problems with the typesetter. In late January they sent someone up to fix it. It was &st a waste of time .- because the individual didn't have the experience fw this type of equipment.(Graharn Brown, Inuvik)
Three months later the typesetter still was not working properly. Staff try to do simple repairs
themselves, like the senior producer who is technically skilled. Routine equipment maintenance or
emergency repair is done by a technician in Vancouver which costs $1.000 in return airfare, plus expenses,
and $55 per hour for labor.
ICS has bought basic, yet reliable equipment Because it started out new, it did not carry over old
equipment as was the case for IBC. Similarly it lacks more sophisticated technology for television
production, and technical options are limited. Funding allows for some annual upgrading yet the more
sophisticated technology also requires appropriate skills for its use and greater reliance on southern
technicians for maintenance and repair.
The Television Programs: Tamapta = 'All of Us'
On 18 September, 1985 an Inuvialuit woman was telling her story about muskrat trapping in the
Mackenzie Delta - a story she had probably told many times before. The difference this time was that it
was on television. It was the first program ever produced by Inuvialuit and aired on CBC's northern
channel.
When ICS staff decided to label its show Tamapta, meaning 'all of us,' they wanted to express the
team spirit of producers and those featured on television who are part of the Inuvialuit community. It
was meant to indicate that it is the people's program, although only the ICS-trained staff produce
programs, whereas people in the communities are featured but not involved in the design or actual
realization as producers.
In the 1985/86 season, seventeen quarter hour and twelve half hour minutes' broadcasts had been
aired on Wednesday evenings at 8 p.m.. Four times the show was preempted for coverage of live events,
like hockey, Arctic winter games or a major political event Since spring 1986 ICS produces 30 minutes
weekly except from June to August, when CBC is on its summertime schedule and rebroadcast shows.
ICS keeps its programming goals of at least 70% production in Inuvialuktun, with the choice of
language often depending on the theme and the ability of the producers to speak the native language.
Three of the television staff speak Inuvialuktun fluently, the others have working knowledge that allows
them to more or less carry on a conversation, and people help each other in script writing and translations.
The programs cover a wide range of topics, dealing with culture, language, lifestyle, social and
political issues. Like IBC, ICS aims to show the Inuvialuit culture as a living culture, something that is
still practised and enjoyed by all generations.
Background music is rarely used. Narrative parts are also sparingly employed and short, compared
to southern television. Besides the fact that the producers are still relatively new to the field and still
learning, one has to also keep in mind, that the target audience is very small and most people know each .
other or the activities feahned Interviews are edited very cautiously. Rephrased questions, laughing, and
even blowing a nose, are not edited out and reflect less emphasis on efficient time use.
Using a leisurely or fast pace is as much a question of skills as of chosen topic, cultural preference
and age.
The way p n g people edit programs and what they say is more outspoken than that of the dder trainees. Where I notice it is in the editing room. The young ones have grown up with television and they have a faster pace to the picture than the dder, who take a more leisurely, story telling apprwch. (Ab Douglas)
Presently, IBC's programs are not available in the Western Arctic except Holman Island, which
applied to receive both the CBC eastern and western feed Other communities have not asked for the
service. IBC has offered to integrate the western production into its network yet ICS has preferred to
maintain present arrangements and remain independent A main reason is the difference in dialects
which makes it difficult if not impossible for a lot of Inuvialuit\to understand the eastern dialects.
Pmduction Experiences
There is some specialization, but much less than at IBC with its various program categories.
Usually, the producer of a show is director, producer, editor, and script writer. A second crew member
helps with the production. There is some specialization in that the senior producer uses his technical
skills, works more in the editing room and does more demanding shooting, while others employ their
skills in production, interviewing and script-writing.
People are very dedicated and enthusiastic about their work. However, at times the program
director has experienced difficulties in work morale, particularly after sudden unexpected cutbacks or at
the end of a budget year when funds ran out. Also in the spring most families are out in their camps
fishing and hunting, and people fmd it hard to work inside. A lack of management skills and differences
in personality and cultural background of the non-native executive director contribute to discrepancies
and difficulties in supervision. Also, the threat to leave is very powerful as trained staff are aware how
much ICS depends on their skills. With an Inuvialuk as executive director, the cross-cultural
discrepancies are eliminated.
When I started working, I was out of schod for over twenty years and then I went here, I had a hard time because I had @st grade 7, but I had a lot of help #om Debbie (andher trainee), she encouraged me. A few times Ifelt like quitting .... and she had helped me over it, she encouraged me. Without that I wouldn't be here today. (Renie Arey)
After only one year of training, two of the former television trainees took over senior staff
positions, while the other six (one trainee had dropped out) became producers. It was only possible
because of the tremendous support people were giving each other, and the presence of a non-native
training/production resource person.
It's good, the crew really works together. Whenever someone is stuck, we all listen to each other and we encourage each other. (Debbie Gordon)
Everybody likes to produce in the communities or bush camps. Yet the tight budget forces hews
to produce more shows in Inuvik, to ask for a lot of free support and to fall back on studio productions. \
Inadequate funding severely limits the production morale and the development of program ideas. In early
1986, at the end of a budget year, production was very slow because funds had run out
We have to watch every ddlar, we need everphing *pee, it's like being a bunch of par^ handlers ... I did a show on whaling. But I had to find someone to do it on television fbr pee. ... Someone wssjlm'ng them end then they hecud the guy sdd the show, that there were programs all over the world, without telling the people. Now they tell everybody 'don't do it for flee.' So I had a hard time to convince them. Finally I had a couple of guys. After we started shooting they all went into it. ... It was a bit more than we w e d , the weather wasn't too goai. (Willie Stefansson)
Commercial productions, such as shows for Expo 86 or for the Department of Health and Welfare,
provide additional work and training opportunities and much needed income. These productions allow to
hire a professional broadcaster which also gives the producers a much needed opportunity for further
on-the-job training.
Training
Funding
When ICS ventured into television production, it had no staff with previous broadcasting
experiences, as was the case for IBC.
The NNBAP, as pointed out earlier, finances only production and requires ICS to be on air within
the fmt year of funding. Monies weren't approved until summer 1984 and ICS was expected to produce
by March 1985. Yet ICS also had to develop a training plan, design offices and studios, purchase and
install production equipment, seek out training funds and recruit trainers and trainees. In November 1984
ICS received approval for $353,000 for basic the basic one-year television tr@ng through CEIC to hire a
trainer and nine trainees. With training starting in January, it was unrealistic to be on air with own
productions by March 1985, as the NNBAP required It was postponed until September 1985, when the
first programs were ready to be aired
Problems of funding under CEZC with its emphasis on employment after one year of training,
already discussed f ~ r E, also emerged for ICS. h 1986 the organization applied for a $500,000 training
fund to recruit and train three new television and two print staff for one year and to provide fifteen
months of professional skills training through workshops for the existing broadcast production and
management staff. Approximately one-half of the producers' time would be devoted to training. A
training coordinator was hired to organize the training program and to provide help and advice in
television operations management. After only one year of training the producers clearly needed some
more support and a resource person for problems in production and production management Half a year
later, in summer 1986, ICS got its training money, but it was less than a third of the original plan,
$135,000, which left no money for a trainer and only occasional workshops. The producers, themselves
only one-and-a-half years in television production, had to provide on-the-job training for the three new
trainees. A translator-narrator was hired to help out with script writing.
In 1986/87 ICS spent a total of $162,100 on training, including four trainees and an instructor. 83%
were CEIC funds, and $27,000 (17%) from NNBAPINCP operation funds. The decline in CEIC funds
was thus partially offset by an increase in the amount of NNBAPiNCP operational funds used for
training, despite its contravening funding regulation. Stiles found that for all northern comrnuniyitions
groups funded under the NNBAP/NCP, in 1986/87 60% of the training funds came from DSOS,
compared to only 19% in 1983/84. Whereas CEIC money drastically decreased, the NNBAPrNCP
operational income increased to 60%. Overall this was only an increase from 11% to 13% of the total
NNBAP/NCP income spent on training (Stiles, 1987: 28-29): The greatest drop 09 CEiC funds occurred
in 1985/86 when it introduced the Canadian Job Strategy based on significantly reduced funds. For
1987/88 the situation improved significantly. ICS received $250,000 to hire eight trainees and two
instructors for television and newspaper production.
ICS's training experiences confirm IBC's position that it takes television trainees at least two years
to develop the basic competencies, because during the fmt year much time and effort is spent on skills in
writing, but also on work habits. Even after two years of entry-level training, ongoing skill development
is needed to develop professional broadcasters.
The CEIC training funds have been crucial for the development of ICS. Yet the funding
conditions have some drawbacks that negatively influence the effectiveness of the program. CEIC
regulations command that only new employees can be hired and not people who would like to return to
the organization or shift from one department to another. At times ICS has cheated to hire people it
considers well worth the training. Also, because the training funds is geared towards employment, the
trainees have to be out of work 24 of the last 36 weeks. Although this allows long-term unemployed
people to find a new career, it has drawbacks. People who fit the requirements may also have poor work
habits (Bill Grossman, ICS).
Apprwch to Training
For years the newspaper work had to be learned on-the-job. The pressure on trainer and trainees
had contributed to a high employee turnover rate. A training initiative by the editor fell apart because of
the pressue to produce the newspaper. It was not until 1986 that training programs could be provided.
From the beginning, television training was based on a formal training approach, due to the greater
complexity of the medium. ICS trained its staff for nine months before its first broadcast went on air,
which is still a very short time, particularly when considering that the trainees had no background in
journaiism Training followed a detailed curriculum, including &story writing, newspaper and radio
production, different programming areas and then focused on the particular technical and production
aspects of television programming. Like IBC in the early years, ICS training included all aspects of
television production and did not specialize trainees for particular tasks. This allowed ICS to put teams
together easily. There is still too little money to pay highly specialized personnel. The producers enjoy
this all-round training, because it helps them to understand "how the other person feels" being at the
camera or writing out a script "She might have a hard day writing a script and we can relate to that"
(Reflie h e y ) Over h e , however, the producers have become more specialized in the journalistic or
technical side of television production.
Many trainees and producers had little writing experience and some had never used a typewriter.
Suddenly they were introduced to computers and high technoiogy broadcasting equipment. For some the
technology was particularly intimidating.
At first, when I started working, it was really scary to touch the machine and all the buttons. I was so scared to edit. You fear yozr might do something wrong or it might explde. But it's good that we learned it. (Renie Arey)
Issues in Cross-Cultural Traininn and Production
Most of the ICS trainers were skilled broadcasters and producers yet not always experienced in
cross-cultural adult education, except the fust year television trainer. Working in a cross-cultural,
small-town context, the non-native trainers and managers encountered attitudes significantly different
from production experiences in the urban south, sych as extreme sensitivity to one another's feelings.
This is reflected, for example, in a story featuring a well respected, yet blind, Inuvialuk. During the
editing, the producer did not include the conversation about'the adjustment to losing his eye sight
Although the trainer pointed out that this might be an interesting aspect for the viewer, the producer was
concerned to not hurt feelings and not broadcast issues that could be emban&&. -Also, people that are
brought up to respect their elders and political leaders are hesitant to use an investigative journalish that
seeks to point out mistakes of Inuvialuit organizations entrusted by the people.
Another point that I recall is a great deal of reluctance if p interview someone. They are very lwth to interrupt at any point in an interview because they feel this person h a consented to talk and so they let the person talk until they are jhished. And they jkel particularly strong abtmt this as far as elders are concerned. (Ab Douglas).
!buthem j ~ ~ s r n starts with what is considered the m a t important story or aspect, independent
of being "good" or "bad" news. Native people tend to rather begin with a cheerful story. Another
cultural taboo, also mentioned in IBC's programming policy, is broadcasting shows that feature someone
who just recently passed away. There is a great deal of sensitivity of bringing back sad memories by
seeing a dead person on television.
When people started the training, they had only a vague idea of what was involved, how much
work went into it, how difficult it could be to write a script or narrate a story. For most trainees, handling
the equipment seemed to come easier than the organizing and writing of ideas according to a foreign
literacy concept
Ifelt like 'what am I getting into, this is not my way of doing it.' ... W e got it all backwards ... Now that it has been done, I jnd that without the trainer I wouldn't have learned the proper process of writing. (Ann Kasook)
The issue of literary styles, including what is considered the proper way of developing a story,
shows the problem of transferring the skills of story-writing. This explain why script-writing was
considered the most difficult thing to learn. As was already discussed for IBC, people raised in small
traditional communities are less likely to raise a lot of questions and are more reluctant to address
sensitive issues or criticize their own leaders Western journalism, or southern journalism for that matter,
is based on a literary style whereby the model story tends to have a common shape, as Kidd (1987: 18)
points out The story or interview is focussed around one idea of a continuing sequence of cause and
effect, where an active subject leads the object. CBC now offers its journalists special "Focus Workshops"
where this emphasis is taught Yet it is not an easy concept for most native people to pick up. They have
been raised in a culture with a holistic rather than linear approach to the world, and time has a different
meaning. Consequently, it took the Inuvialuit much time and effort to adopt this literary style.
For Inuvialuit in their twenties, thirties or even forties, training has not been easy, particularly as
their cultural upbringing has taught them to express criticism cautiously. Nobody likes to be corrected.
The newspaper editor was less sensitive initially and soon recognized that "a wall was going up for any
more training and rigorous corrections" (Dave McNeill). The television trainer, on the other hand, could
afford a more relaxed attitude because he was not under the immediate pressure of production.
Initially, the presence of non-native trainers was a hindrance to open discussion, because there was
an ingrained feeling from the colonial past that white men have all the answers and Inuvialuit would not
challenge them. At fmt, trainees were reluctant to offer each other constructive criticism.
The question of sensitivity also emerges in the daily administration. For example, it is considered
inappropriate and insensitive to discuss in a management meeting problems of staff members with
absenteeism or alcoholism unless they attend the meeting. First, the person cannot present his or her
point of view. And second, it is not considered to be every manager's business to know what happens in
the private life of a staff member. With Inuvialuit replacing non-native managers the cross-cultural
conflict will be reduced. It will permit ICS to experiment with more culturally acceptable solutions.
Remonses from the Audience
With half an hour per week
/
original programming, ICS has not yet encountered distribution
problems. Its time-slot on Wednesday evenings has been occasionally preempted on short notice, to the
frustration of the organization. However, because ICS is not yet producing regular cunent affairs and
news programs, a rescheduling does not create the same problems as IBC's time sensitive broadcasts.
In fall 1986 ICS asked audiences and readers for their reactions to the television programming and
the ne~spaper.~ Television is nearly universally available. 44.7% overall, 60.5% of the oldest age group,
receive CBC north plus three or more other stations. Only 11.4% receive only CBC North. Inuvik is the
only community where the Cancom channels are not community-wide rebroadcast. (Wilson, 1987 (a):
17-18). With only 0.5 hours per week of Inuktituk programming, the northern native broadcast
contributes only a negligible percentage of the northern program fare.
Tamapta Programs
ICS has a loyal audience that likes the program fare and want it to be longer. Elders and adults
usually watch every Wednesday night unless they are tied up in meetings or other community activities.
Teenagers and adolescents generally spend more time out in the recreation hall. Consequently, fewer of
the youngest and younger groups watch the show at 8 p.m. than do the other groups.
Of the fourteen Tamapta shows surveyed, Northern Games and the Holman Island Jamboree were
the most popular overall. Of those who said they saw a particular program, no less than 93% liked or
liked it somewhat (Wilson, 1987 (a): 30). Generally, over 20% of the survey sample do not respond to a
particular question.
Around hockey-season, when the games are carried on a non-CBC channel, Tamapta gets strong
Concerning the criticism of purely quantitative analysis of measuring audience response, see Appendix I.
competition, yet sometimes people switch over to the ICS p~ogram.~ People would prefer that the two
programs do not overlap. If Hockey Night on CBC falls on a Wednesday, the Inuvialuit show is
preempted anyway. Therefore, in May 1986 no Tamapta shows were aired. In Aklavik, where radio
bingo was played for nearly a year over the BCTV television channels everybody's attention was drawn
from 7.30 to 10 p .a A prolonged break between games would allow them to switch over to the ICS
program.
VCRs are fairly common and people often tape the show and make it available to those who missed
i t Reruns in summer also give ICS a chance to reach its target audience. 47.3% indicted that they would
be interested in buying cassettes with Tamapta programs (Wilson, 1987 (a): ~ 2 3 ) . *
The principal objective of the NNBAP is to contribute to the "protection and enhancement of
Native languages and cultures in the North." According to the audience survey, 33.9% of the surveyed
people learned new Inuvialuktun words, although the older respondents knew the language already well.
46.9%0 of all respondents felt stimulated in their interest in cultural pursuits and language through the
programming, as Table 9.1. indicates. (Wilson, 1987: 34).
In terms of program preferences, people indicated a highest interest in hunting and trapping,
followed by cultural programming, including history, heritage, language. There was less interest expressed
in news and w e n t affairs, a role attributed to the newspaper, which is read by 45.8% usually and 23.3%
sometimes. Overall 47.7% found the reporting about Inuvialuit organizations fair, 24.4% didn't know, and
22.3% didn't answer. 0.4% found it too critical and 5.5% responded the paper was not critical enough
(Wilson, 1987 (a): 45-46). In conversations, many people, particularly those involved in Inuvialuit
organizations, would like to increase the information role for both television and the newspaper.
The survey did not indicate the days when viewing behavior was observed and thus could not indicate programming conflicts.
Because the local radio transmitter was broken, the community hooked its local radio station into the audio channel of BCTV. To listen to community radio, people had to tW on their television set
Table 9.1.
Interest Gained -- No Response ~ w 3 w 3 e Culture Both Same Less Interest
Inuvialuit Interest Gained in Language and Culture \
Row Total
Column Tot 36.3 34.1 29.7 100.0
Source: Wilson, 1987 (a): V21.
In the past few pars we are beginning to communicate. With the finding situation it is hard fbr our people to develop communications. ... We need communications, because it will help ow people planning our Nure. We are not getting input #om all the people. Through ,KS we are able to communicate with the people. @illy Dayt f m e r president, COPE).
Imdications of Native Broadcasting Folicv on ICS Pronramming n - -(
6-c~-c-, " r14., :7C
ICS is one of the newest northern native communication societies, producing a monthly newspaper
and half an hour weekly television and providing graphic arts services. Within two years ICS developed
from a one-man inauguration staff to the present size of about twenty. It has emphasized quality
production over interactive programs and been able to achieve quality standards. Its development has
been considered successful in providing some basic communications infrastructure to the Inuit
Similar to IBC, ICS's training and television production has been affected by:
* availability of skilled personnel and the need for further staff development;
expansion of services; and
insufficient funding.
Staf Development and Training
ICS has achieved outstanding results, considering the shortage in training funds and the short
training period. More recent programs could well pass standards of ~0nmercial television production.
They have achieved a quality level which usually comes only with years of training.
The CEIC-financed training programs have been essential for ICS's development and expansion.
The high staff turn-over of 33% (Stiles, 1987: 34) makes ongoing training absolutely necessary on both the
entry and advanced skill development level of senior staff. The high pressure of quickly moving from
training into production and management positions, with correspondingly high responsibilities yet
relatively low wages, has contributed to the high turn over. It is highest among 'trainees, who
underestimate the work and commitment involved or who have difficulties adjusting to the larger t6wn of
Inuvik or the regular work-schedule.
ICS needs an assured training component to provide both entry level and ongoing training so that it
can maintain its present services and expand its weekly television production. ICS had to rely heavily on
non-native managers, yet has been successful in replacing most of the positions with Inuvialuit Training
funds for administration and management are absolutely essential to support those in leading positions.
For some time in the future ICS will continue to rely on ongoing training funds.
Expansion of Services and Financial Resources
Funding levels have always been a problem. Because of the cutbacks and funding freezes, ICS has
been unable to achieve its goal of 1 1/2 hours weekly television production. When ICS discussed its
programming policy, it expressed fear that moving too quickly into commercial production to create some
much needed income might draw away too many resources and interfere with its mandate. ICS therefore
took a cautious approach. The short and long term solution to the financial constraints is to secure public
funds, find support from private organizations and move into commercial production. The few projects
that were taken on directly served ICS' mandate, kept staff busy when there were no production funds
left, created some income for productions, and provided additional training as the former trainer was hired
to oversee the production. The provision of graphic arts services has also provided opportunities for
business income. Yet here as well, it has taken time to train Inuvialuit, amact business and take on more
complex projects.
Funding through DSOS and CEIC has been crucial in the development of ICS. These programs
need to be coordinated and established as ongoing program. For ICS, as for the other native
communication societies, the goal is to be recognized as part of a public native broadcast service because it
gives the principal right to service provision and is not restrained to a cultural mandate.
Evaluation Conclusion
We have two cultures that go side by side, that can go side by side .... Right now I think that with all that new techndogy, people can use it to get what they really want to have done. Something is given to us and once we lean how to utilize it we can contrd it, use that tod to make it go our way. (Randi Pokiak, Tuktoyczktuk)
'An independent evaluation (bugheed, 1986) confumed ICS' achievements in providing essential
communication services to the Inuvialuit Because of the rapid development in the Western Arctic, ICS
has played an important role in information transfer from a native perspective as a politically independent
organization. This is particularly important in the context of implementing the claims settlement with its
million dollar investments.
I think the rde of ICS ... is to make people aware of what is going on, on the progress of our claim, the progress of the interest that is being generated and where there is a lack so that we can start to concentrating on the weak side. ... You can't see that until it is communicated to you through ow communication system. (Randi Pokiak, Tuktoyczktuk)
With its emphasis on cultural production, ICS' television programs have given this role of news and
current affairs reporting a secondary role. Although it was an expressed need in the audience survey
initiating ICS, the second survey did not indicate a similar strong interest This may be explained by
people commenting on what is available rather than what may be offered Also, the lack of a
video-uplink in the Western Arctic makes timely information difficult
Comments about the newspaper stress the importance of information, especially about huvialuit
organizations. The television department has not yet taken on this role of news and current affairs. With
limited resources, ICS has focused on newspapers and television and is not involved anymore in the trail
radio project. Support for community radio is limited because of ICS own financial comt~aints and
programming priorities. Like IBC, it has emphasized quality programming and followed the model of
representational broadcasting where people are featured but do not directly participate.
ICS achieved its second goal of producing about 70% of its programming in Inuktituk. As pointed
out earlier, there is often a trade off between formal education and native language use. Those with
higher grades are less able to speak Inuktituk. The audience is generally sympathetic to the efforts of the
producers to speak their native language, recognizing that they are trying their best and still learnipg.
Because people have a strong tie to their dialect, the first things recognized and criticized is having them
mixed up. Evidently, there is a need for more language training and practice.
Programming in Inuvialuktun, as the audience survey and personal comments indicate, encourages
viewers to learn and use the language. CBC's daily native language programming plays an important role,
as many Inuvialuit regirlarly tune in to these programs. Ye: broadc.asting can only cootrib~te to a generd
survival effort and never be its basis.
One must keep in mind that the Inuvialuit consider their language the essential element of their
culture. The drawback is that people not fluent in it feel that they have lost their culture and thus culhual
identity even though they might lead a traditional way of life. It was pointed out in chapter three that
language is an important element of a culture but not the only one. Conversely, the ability to speak it
does not prevent people from experiencing the loss of their cultural identity and being caught in the gap
between the traditional and the western cultures.
Most of the young girls fiom the community I come fiom are attached to their culture and they don't want to leave the place. They are talking about the dd days. They quit schod and work fot the coop. But at the same time they are not learning the traditional way of life. They don't know ifthey should continue the traditional ways or juther their education and get a Jiob and a career. So they are caught. And they are losing the people who are able to
. teach them. Theyfind themselves in their late twenties, not knowing how to hunt, to live off i
the south. To most effectively serve goals of native self-go~ernment, valaskakis argues, federal /
communications poky
must allow native nations to determine the cultural relevance of indigenous media products. Aboriginal broadcasters may go way beyond the pre-contact phenomenon non-natives tend to legitimize as 'native culture' to include the communal element of radio Bingo, the creativity of local rock bands, or the involvement of municipal elections (Valaskakis, 1986: 16).
Cultural programming thus cannot be restricted to a museum of traditional artifacts, folk-dances
and songs. Framing the services within the context of cultural programming, undermines the general
right of native people to receive and provide information and runs the risk of marginalization as an exotic
group at the fringe of Canadian society. To base Inuit communication services on a cultural mandate is a
subtle, but nonetheless effective, element in the continued marginalization of native peoples. To
overcome these dependency structures, native communication groups demand recognition as public
broadcasters, and the right to define their goals outside the narrow cultural frame.
To assess the impact of native television programming on native participation in activities and
developments related to the North is premature because ICS has not been broadcasting for long and only
half an hour per week. The daily northern radio programming of the CBC plays an important role and
allows more active involvement through its message service. Community radio plays only a small role,
but when it was functional in some communities, it provided a well-used means for discussion of local and
regional events. Together these services provide greater access to information relevant for
decision-making purposes. This has helped people to better understand northern issues and events and
increased inter-regional knowledge and understanding of Inuit culture and lifestyles. How this has
affected participation remains open to speculation.
To be most effective, indigenous language broadcasting has to be part of a-northem policy that
stresses the value and use of native languages and the dynamic character of present indigenous culture.
Native television can play an important role disseminating a wide range of information, reflecting the face
of today's Inuit culture. It allows them to establish communication links across the polar region and I -
provides role models that help the Inuit to strengthen their self-esteem and their ability for ,
' i
self-government.
CHAPTER X
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN THE NORTH: ASSESSMENT
Previous chapters discussed each technology separately, using the framework of analysis developed
in chapter two. For each medium, they analyzed the needs, strategic interests, institutional arrangements,
experiences with the actual transfer, and implications for the Inuit communities. This chapter compares
the different technologies in terms of serving specified needs, the role of technological choices,
institutional arrangements, appropriateness of policies, transfer mechanisms and experiences. The final
section puts the socio-cultural implications for northern native peoples into the broader national and
international context.
Conflicting Goals of Government, Industrv and Inuit
The examination of the communication technology transfer process in the Arctic showed divergent
values and objectives which influence the decision making process and the control over communication
resources.
Policy analysis and the literature on value conflicts in technology transfer point to the importance
of addressing explicit and implicit interests and goals of the different actors. This study showed that the
objectives of the principal stakeholders for northern socio-political and communications development
reflect different goals or conflicting interpretations of goals. These conflicts are rooted in different value
systems and resulting approaches to the development of the North. In particular the conflicting goals of
industrial economic vs. socio-cultural development are noted.
The federal government entered the arena with its own set of strategic, economic and cultural goals.
Sovereignty interests were superseded by goals of industrial development of the North and developing a
leading high technology industry. The federal government provided direct support through subsidies,
incentive programs and direct involvement. It claimed that its national goals also served the interests of
, /
the Inuit As a result of Canada's industrial strategy, the North turned into a laboratory in the search for
new communication applications that could be sold abroad. Stated rationale was the provision of services
to northern residents. The thesis showed that this claim was more rhetorical than guiding government
actions and ranked only secondary in implementation.
However, the Inuit could exploit Canada's policy of promoting multi-culturalism when participating
in communication projects. And the establishment of special communication programs and policies,
which were based on a cultural mandate, became crucial for developing Inuit controlled communication
services.
The study provided evidence of the conflicting interests and attitudes within government
departments from paternalistic to liberationist - in the sense of supporting self-government - approaches.
In recent years the federal government has paid more attention to the development goals of the Inuit, yet
actual implementation shows that there is a reluctance to fully transfer responsibility.
The objectives of the providers of commercial telecommunications and broadcasting services are
essentially economic. Therefore, their strategies incorporate cultural elements only if these contribute to
increased use. The common carriers try to respond to the northern requests, yet only to the degree that
this does not negatively affect their revenue position and their control over the technology and its
utilization. Basic telephone service was extended into the remote communities only after the carriers
secured government subsidies.
For commercial broadcasters the North has similarly a very limited market value, given the small
population size. Cancom has a monopoly to deliver distant broadcasting signals to specific communities
designated by the CRTC as Cancorn's "core market," that is those communities receiving two or less
television signals by conventional means. The economically marginal operation of Cancom until recently
has meant that the company must concentrate on reducing its costs and on developing as quickly as
possible the markets for its program packages in the larger urban centers it is permitted to reach.
Consequently, there has been little tolerance for carrying unprofitable, minority-interest programming
services such as the programs of the northern native communication societies, although &age of
native-language programming was originally required by the CRTC as part of the licensee's mandate.
The CBC Northern Service is mandated to extend service to all Canadians and to serve the
particular northern regional needs, while being constrained by national network objectives and
Parliamentary funding allocations. Because it must get its Iicence from the CRTC, it has to respond to the
Inuit's stated needs, at least verbally. In the radio sector it has been able to significantly increase its
northern production, yet northern television programming has been woefully inadequate for years.
In contrast, the goals for a native controled communication system, as stated by the Inuit include a)
the proyision of sufficient access to the communication system to pennit effective feedback from the Inuit
to the local and regional political institutions concerning their development goals and plans; b) horizontal
and vertical communication links at all levels of Inuit society; c) the establishment of local and regional
media support mechanisms for cultural preservation that supplement national initiatives; d) the provision
of relevant information concerning employment, training, development projects and opportunities, and
implications of decisions that affect Inuit life; and e) the fostering of attitudes and motivations that
contribute to socio-cultural development The goal of self-government includes control over their
communication system and patterns of technology transfer that overcome historical d'ependencies.
To support the communal non-hierarchical communication structures, northern native people have
stated their preference for HF trail-radio, AM over FM transmission, the interconnection of the different
technologies and local production centers for radio and television programming. These demands contrast
with a one-way transmission system emanating from one or a few central sources which encourages
centralized institutions. Centralization is fiuther encouraged when the institutions have to pool resources
because of serious financial constraints.
Inuit society is not homogenous and value conflicts are similarly reflected on an individual basis.
People find themselves increasingly incorporated into a value system based on the rationality and ethic of
western industrial efficiency and profitability, and hence increasingly remote from other social groups in
their society that maintain a more traditional orientation. It gives them a sense of belonging to two
camps: on the one side the traditional world and on the other the "modernized" world of industrial
development. It causes people to be tom between two systems of representation and social norms. The
study used the school system as an example to show that native control over education does not
necessarily eliminate the underlying value conflicts.
Presence or Absence of Conscious Technolonical Choices and Its Im~lications
Innis pointed out in his writings that the communication technologies of a society determine who
can speak to whom, over what distances and with what possibilities of feedback. He-used the term
"monopoly of knowledge" to indicate that the messages of a society are shaped by the media they ire
transmitted through as well as being creations of the institutional structure of the society. Therefore
careful attention needs to be paid to the form of the communication technology that is installed or, in
other words, the technological choices that are made.
Ideally, technological choice is based on the assumption that "all change ought to be as harmonious
as possible with any society's cherished values so as to minimize its human costs and to foster participation
by the people in development decisions and their implementation" (Goulet, 1971: 149). For each choice
the consequences for the society should be outlined, and the decisions made be consistent with objectives
of socio-cultural development.
Historically, the Inuit have not been in a position to make conscious choices. Rather, technologies
were introduced by non-native people, without consulting with the northern population, to serve their
own purposes. For example, the establishment of southern controlled administrative and communication
structures introduced techniques of political organization which undermined established native power
structures and imposed alien forms of representation. The experiences with settling claims and
developing new constitutionai StruCNeS reflect the dificulties in modifying already established patterns to
better meet native interests and cultural values. The communal vs. hierarchical corporate decision making
process and the influence of Vders vs. young, southern educated Inuit are illustrative examples.
Education and the imposition of the English language were described as another example where a
technology has been forced on the native culture and tended to undermine the prospects for promoting
cultural identity. In recent years a more culturally responsive approach has influenced the education
system, based on a transfer of administration to the North. The next step was then to transfer
responsibility from non-native experts to the Inuit in the different regions. The Inuit have been
successful in native language curriculum development, native teacher training and a reduction in truancy
and -out rates. Yet the philosophical gap between the southern and the traditional education
approach has remained
In the communications sector the study referred to the technical set-up of the satellite system which
reflects a principal lack of Inuit decision making power. Although the structural deficiencies were pointed
out prior to the launching of the Anik system, the government did not alter its plans. Established
structures of southern service provision were simply transferred to the north. Technical options and
service provisions more appropriate to the northern conditions were excluded. Charges continue to be
based on distance although satellites have made this cost factor obsolete.
Experiences in the telecommunications sector also reflect the lack of choice. Inuit requested an
integrated system of interactive local and long distance communication, including the connection of the
HF trail radio with the public telephone network. Initially, Inuit had little influence on the quality of
service and on the northern rate structure.
Another area of concern is the need of the Inuit for adequate information and training to
strengthen their technological capacity in order to use, maintain and modify, and thus to "unpackage," the
new technologies, to use the term from the technology transfer literature. This means to break down
complex techniques into separate steps that can be carried out by local people. The introduction of
telephone services reflects these problems of unpacking the technological system because of insufficient
information. It is a general concern of developing countries which have to buy unnecessary technology
just because it comes as a coqplex package. Often they don't even know what they are paying for.
Chapter four discussed these inadequacies in information transfer which are reflected in: a) Inuit paying
phone bills they could not understand because they were written in the language of the supplier; b)
services being made available and charged for that were not explained; c) disconnection and advance
payment policies being inadequately explained; d) reimbursement policies remaining unclear; and e)
locating repair crews in regional centers rather than training local people.
Generally, the commercial character of the technology was underestimated. The necessity to pay
monthly bills forced people to either generate cash income or not to make long distance calls - in which
case people preferred not to have a telephone at all. The income from the traditional economy is
seasonal. Although wage employment has increased, with 32% of the Inuit neither employed in the
modem nor traditional economy, financial resources are low while phone bills are on the average three
times as high as in the South. For short distance communication, community and trail radio and direct
communication can compensate for the lack of telephone access.
The introduction of southern television without any relevant northern programming, despite
resistance from the Inuit was the most evident example of an enforced technology transfer. The concerns
of the Inuit were ignored unless they entered the strategic plans as unintended influerkes that could not
be ignored, such as the unexpected massive intervention of Inuit organizations at CRTC hearings.
Technological choice was limited because initially the communication agencies rarely consulted with
individual communities or native organizations on how new technologies might best serve Inuit interests
before their actual introduction. The entire range of satellite services was simply made available, and the
communities could either accept or reject them and rush to regulatory and political agencies to make their
alternative proposals known. Preferred technological choices, such as local access to the television
transmitter were continuously rejected.
Like people in southern Canada and Third World countries, Inuit not yet exposed to television had
high expectations of the potential educational and information value of television and video. From the
very beginning they stressed the need of employing these technologies for urgently needed education
However, the programming that made its way into the communities did in no way match these
expectations. In contrast, it encouraged a passive audience and reinforced a consumer culture which the
cash income of wage work had made possible. Inuit have attempted to reverse this trend by exploring
and experimenting with different forms and styles of programming. They want to express their unique
skills and cultural values, exercise greater control over the actual use of the technology, and thus make it
more responsive to their needs. Yet the parameters for unique programming are limited because of
limitations in production and distribution.
The literature on cultural dependency has emphasized the danger of communication technologies to
destroy cultures by adopting imported sociO-CU1tural models and establishing a homogenous consumer
culture. However, condemning the industrial culture, and its partial adaptation by the Inuit, as inroads
into the destruction of the indigenous culture runs the risk of ethno-centrically judging socio-cultural
impacts.
Conscious technological choices have also been made that directly served Inuit communication
needs. Community and HI? trail radio were both introduced by southern pe~ple who came to the North,
yet were quickly taken over by the local people and adapted to their needs and traditional communication
forms. The use of community radio does not require high technological skills, and the social context of
bush radios fits well into the communicative and social structure. Negative experiences only relate to
failures of the machinery or poor reception.
The decision to produce professional quality television programming was partially imposed by the
set-up of the Anik system with its high cost for interactive links, the denial of access to local transmitters
. and the distribution by the CBC with its established program format. In addition, the competition of
- several other commercial channels and video biases the programming choice for following established
formats. Also, the initial reliance on non-native experts supported decisions for programming that
conformed to the dominant broadcasting style. The decision to produce quality programming was then a
conscious choice by Inuit political leaders. Once this principal decision was made, the Inuit have been
successful in pioneering a variety of programs in a very short time, requiring massive efforts and strong
dedication.
At the outset the two case studies of IBC and ICS indicated a remarkable difference. Inuit in the
Eastern Arctic had been involved in television projects and thus knew, at least to some degree, what was
involved in establishing a permanent television service. The board members at ICS made the choice for
television production without this general understanding and thus were much more reliant on non-native
experts making principal decisions they could only approve. The experience with the Inukshuk project
helped IBC to develop at a faster pace by building upon the expertise of some of its staff for production
and training. Yet in both cases the organizations ended up with decisions for programming formats,that
reflect the standard television model. Community access was recognized as important but not considered
a major part of lobbying efforts.
The field trials with Telidon are an example where the Inuit had an opportunity to test a
sophisticated interactive data-network and to explore its usefulness of Arctic interactive information
exchange. Yet the costs involved for a regular service were above the finamid means of ]Inuit
organizations. Other services in the telecommunication sector, such as telefaxing, are also very useful.
Yet the system and pricing structure is designed for high density, short distance trafic, not the northern
condition of low density and long distances. The per-mileage charge excludes communities from using
technologies that are standard communication means for southern businesses. In addition, information
about new interactive voice, audio-visual and data networks often is simply not available, or the associated
software, though available, has little relevance for Inuit communities.
On the other hand, new intermediate technologies, such as retransmitters for HF radio networks
and cellular radios, have proven useful, but have not been further supported or pursued. Federal policy
has emphasized high technology developments for communication in the North, yet it is questionable
whether a technological option like MSAT will serve Arctic communication needs effectively, both
because of the footprint of the satellite and the high user charges requested by the carriers.
A~~rmriateness of Communication Policies
The Inuit, in a situation where economic under-development, social uncertainty and cultural
retention are important issues, have emphasized that communication services play an essential role in
establishing self-government They consider the CRTC's regulatory and the government's communication
policies well-intended, yet inadequate, and seek the cooperation of federal and territorial governments
and the CRTC for opening new approaches to the long-standing problems of northern communications.
Issues they want to solve in particular are a) access to affordable telecommunication services; b) support
of native language broadcasting through funding of training, production and program distribution; c)
access to and distribution of native language programming; and d) native participation in the decision
making process.
Canada's northern policy has shifted from a predominantly colonial approach to one that allows
limited participation. There remain tendencies and structures in the policy formation process that
subscribe to and enforce strategies of southern control and that deny meaningful participation. The limits
within which native people can exercise control are set by southern agencies.
Federal telecommunications policies and regulatory decisions reflect the recognition of telephone
service as a necessary infrastructure to support economic and social development However, chapter four
showed that the implementation of policies was more effective when geared to serve economic and
political-administrative requirements than the social needs of remote communities.
The northern broadcasting policy with its implementation programs of NNBAP and NCP has been
unique and essential for the development of native communications. The advantage of the NCP is its
broad criteria that cause no restrictions for the societies in pursuing their communications aspirations. Yet
the administration of the program reveals several shortcomings: approval structure, lack of communication
between the regions and Ottawa and delayed funding. The NNBAP's deficiencies relate primarily to the
freeze of funding levels, the lack of training funds, the unsolved issue of distribution arrangements and the
limitations inherent in supporting regional but not local production. It denies funding local transmitters
on the grounds that their combined local and regional uses may risk diffusing the impact of the NNBAp.
Native groups argue that linkages with community related communication activities would rather enhance
than hinder regional broadcasting (Lougheed, 1986: 5-5).
Despite the NNBAP's prohibition of using operational funds for training. an examination of
training experiences (Stiles, 1987) points to the increasing role of DSOS funds for training purposes
because CEIC sources have been reduced. The case studies of IBC and ICS reveal the shortcomings of
unrealistic expectations that jeopardize the realization of objectives. IBC has been able to separate
training from production, yet new societies like ICS have to include training within regular production
schedules. The results have been a strain upon the energies of trainees, trainers and producers, low work
morale, a high turn-over rate and postponement of service expansion.
Continued government involvement in native broadcasting thus gives rise to both high
commendation - without government support there would be no native broadcasting - as well as to
criticism of the government's effort to meet its obligations, because ministerial funding decisions do not
recognize the NNBAP's inherent developmental character.
The two case studies show the importance of ongoing training which goes well beyond the issue of
mastering the technology and learning journalistic skills. Maintenance and repairs, the introduction of
digital control room equipment, administration and management of expanding organizations, legal aspects
brought about by changing communication technologies and policies, the role of satellites and ground
stations to distribute native broadcasting, regulatory and political decision making agencies, all play an
important role in native communications. If the goal of training native media personnel is to be able to
manage and define the information sources to help indigenous peoples achieve self-development, then
these political, technical, legal and financial aspects have to be part of the training process. Ignorance or
lack of knowledge of the connections and the broader context can severely limit the options available
native people to develop their own communication system and perpetuates their dependency on southern
institutions.
The reliance on the CBC for distributing native programming reflects ongoing dependency
structures rather than a recognition of equal partnership. A northern transponder, to which the native
communication societies and CBC North have equal and fair access, is envisioned for 1990 and represents
a major step in the transfer of control and responsibility to the native groups. Through the recognition of
native language broadcasting in a new Broadcast Act the Inuit hope to secure the institutional support for
self-development in the broadcasting sector. It is not only doubtful whether this right will be
institutionalized but also whether this recognition will actually change the support for native language
services. The government refers to cost considerations and the difficulties of guaranteeing the right to
fifty-three aboriginal languages. And as always, there is the underlying issue of transferring control to
native people themselves.
The liaison committees of the NNBAP, originally established to provide necessary assistance and
infonnatioa, are recognized by the conxxnunication groups as well htended and helpw, yet they
perpetuate historical structures of dominance. As native groups outgrow their advisors in experience,
assistance turns into a bureaucratic hindrance and is perceived as another control mechanism.
Finally, the rationale for the federal government supporting native communications is based
primarily on national cultural objectives, such as multi-culturalism and support of traditional cultures, not
on the principal need for indigenous communications. It locks Inuit communications into a cultural frame
whereby services have to be justified according to an understanding of Inuit culture that is defined by
southern agencies. Consequently, native communications are marginalized from general communications
as a special cultural pursuit.
Government policies stress the importance of socio-cultural objectives having equal status with
economic and political goals. Yet the overall implementation of cultural policies leads one to assume that
d h l r e is more a rhetorical value, whereas economics are the real meat of communications policy.
Requirements for northern and native productions within the southern based broadcasting system are
sacrificed to maintain the revenue levels of southern broadcasters. Native television programming has
also been undermined in its role through the dependence on CBC and Cancom distribution systems by
being subject to preemption and late night time-slots.
This implicit priority of national policies is also reflected in the local programming sector.
Community broadcasting has remained a fringe activity in the broadcasting system despite its crucial role
in the communities. McNulty evidenced similar tendencies in national community radio and television
policies in general. She argues that unless the socio-cultural objectives are given higher priority in the
total system
the Canadian broadcasting system will fail dismally to meet the goals set by the Broadcasting Act. It will have failed also to provide a fair opportunity for local programming to be developed by people in Canada in accordance with their own locally determined and locally appropriate objectives. (McNulty, 1976: 269-70)
Transfer Mechanisms Institutional Amnaements
Both the literature on technology transfer and political economy of communications point to the
importance of analyzing institutional structures. This requirement was also supported in this study by
analyzing the implications of current structural arrangements and constraints.
Transfers of technology are made through a wide array of institutions and mechanisms. The most
important institutional arrangements found in the North have been: 1) branches of foreign, i.e. southern
enterprises, such as Bell Canada servicing the remote North; 2) wholly-owned southern subsidiaries, such
- as NorthwesTel; CBC North can also be subsumed under this category in that it has a greater autonomy
- than a branch plant; 3) local ventures with foreign contractual agreements, such as CBC access agreements
with local radio stations; and 4) local ventures, such as native television and community owned radio
stations. Mechanisms of technology transfer generally found in the North are 1) the import of entire
service provision; 2) the purchase of equipment; 3) the employment of non-native experts and
consultants; and 4) the education and training of local people.
This study emphasized the implications of particular institutional arrangements for the application
of new communication technologies in Arctic communities. The telephone system of the common carriers
treats information exchange as a market commodity that follows the rules of price and demand, although
complemented by government incentives and subsidies. The telephone system is not approached as a
public good based on the right of people to access a most vital communication service. The decision to
provide telephone services in the Western Arctic through a crown corporation has had little effect on the
implementation of social programs because IWTel's decisions are based on narrow economic criteria and
not on the need for socio-economic development Consequently, services developed along major strategic
and economic routes where there was the greatest demand or an obligation imposed by the government
The development of a reliable regional communication network was not realized. In that way NWTel is
not essentially different from the private common d e n . The decision of when and where to provide
what services was made outside the control of the local population
On the other hand, the private carrier, Bell Canada, pioneered new technologies ahat were
particularly useful for the North, such as the single sideband HF radio. This technology was then
adopted by CNT and introduced in its service area. The provision of service through a crown corporation
or a private carrier has thus made little difference. It will be interesting to see the future development of
NWTel. If a consortium of native development corporations and the Yukon and NWT governments will
be permitted to buy the telephone company,the institutional structure would significantly change. It
remains to be seen whether this will result in a service that is more responsive to the needs of remote
communities.
The nature of Telesat Canada's ownership structure has also affected service provision in the North.
The federal government, owning half of Telesat, employs the corporation to promote a high technology
industrial strategy. It also wants to see the satellite system used for social benefit, especially with regard
to the extension of broadcasting services. The major carriers, which own the other half of Telesat, use
their influence to emure that Telesat does not provide services competitive with those already provided by
the telephone companies. Telesat's interpretation of its mandate was to be a "carrier's carrier." Since a
CRTC decision in May 1986, Telesat can now compete against the telephone companies in the provision
of some services, such as the lease of partial transponders with a resulting reduction in charges.
To keep the HF trail-radio network separate from the telephone system was another institutional
arrangement that directly served the interests of the common carriers. Potentials for a cost-efficient
integrated communication system were not realized. The Inuit have to use expensive teleconferencing
services provided by Bell and NWTel or rely on the HF trail radio which is limited to interactive
communication in relatively close proximity.
The lower telephone penetration rate in the North than in the South, despite the telephone's high
utility value, indicates that the socially desirable quantity of information exchange fails to be generated.
What is considered an economic benefit and what an "externalityw outside the cost-benefit analysis is
important The value of access to the network, benefits received through telephone calling, enhancement
of WCM, golitid, e c ~ n ~ n i c and cultural activities, induced growth effects and the coqiementary role cf
the telephone to other infrastructure components are treated as externalities.
The case study of Bell Canada's northern rate structure shows the implications of this dispute for
the Inuit When development factors are excluded the price structure will not reflect social benefits.
Technological potentials fail to be realized because they are not considered economically viable. On the
other hand, government subsidies, such as the NCAP, were based on social and cultural benefits of
extending of telephone services and vital in providing telephone service to small remote settlements. Yet
- this principle has been reflected in rate regulation only to a very limited degree.
However, the regulatory process has provided the main forum for exposing operational deficiencies
and for requesting services at appropriate quality. Bell Canada and NWTel invested in improvements of
telephone quality and customer service only after complaints recurred and the carriers felt rate increases
- r.
might be refused if these basic requests were not met
Teleconferencing at affordable prices has been a repeatedly stated request of the Inuit Technical
options are available, however, the costs involved are substantial. For historical reasons teleconferencing
is exceptional in the North American telephone system in general. The installed telephone system makes
conference circuits more expensive than a series of individual two-party calls (Parker, Mohammadi, 1977:
184-185). Yet this need not have been the case when satellites and related systems were introduced in the
remote northern regions. Through HF radio, conference facilities were already in place. They were
cheap and heavily used The carrier-operated HF radio-telephones were replaced by satellite supported
phones and the trail-radio system was never interconnected
Once operational, the MSAT system will allow teleconferencing. However, because the foodrint
covers the U.S. and southern Canada service in the remote North will be of only marginal quality. The
service will be provided by the common carriers and it seems unlikely that pricing will reflect northern
social and economic development goals.
In the public braadcasting sector, national priorities have shaped service development in the North.
This is particularly evident for television. CBC North is a branch of a southern based corporation which
sets the principal conditions in terms of funding, time schedules, journalistic standards and program
format The CBC headquarters have been reluctant to transfer responsibility to the North. The only
control over service northern residents have had was to agree to or refuse the installation of a television
uansmitter. Over the years, native influence on CBC's northern television has only marginally increased.
The situation is significantly different for radio broadcasting. Early developments of CBC North
radio are examples of centralization tendencies by integrating the northern stations into the national
network, replacing local with network broadcasting. In recent years, CBC Northern Service has
considerably increased northern originated English and native language programming. Native people
secured influence on the Northern Service's regional program decisions. This is more so the case in the
Eastern Arctic, because the native population is relatively homogenous and in the majority, and Inuktituk
, is still the predominant language. With the establishment of an Inuit Services Committee the influence of
Inuit within CBC North further increased
The commercial broadcasters do not provide northern and native oriented programming in the
Arctic because of the small population size. The economics of mass production rule that the mass
entertainment market profits most through a maximum dispersion of the information because the costs of
replication are extremely low. The market economies of advertising do not aim to restrict access but to
promote the dispersion of information in a one-way flow of information (Melody, 1981: 0-7). With
satellites the additional costs of transmission to more geographical locations are reduced to the costs of the
receiving terminals. The North is a relatively unimportant extension of the southern market at little costs.
Cancom, the commercial distributor of television channels, has its prime target in denser populated
southern urban and rural markets. Consequently, it sees native language programming as a potential
threat to its audience size and thus its revenue situation. Cancom has not yet realized its license
obligations of providing two video-uplink facilities and ten hours of access time to the distribution system
and may only do so if further postponement jeopardizes the license renewal.
Technological developments have increased the comunrication networks which people may take
advantage of. However, with the exception of community and HF trail radio, these developments have
also displaced a significant portion of traditional communication systems. Except for a few professional
broadcasters and journalists, network broadcasting restricts most people's freedom to speech because they
have no direct access to the system. As a result they speak less and spend more time as part of the mass
listening and viewing audience. This is as much the case in the South as in the North. It also affects the
programming options of native communication societies.
The glossy programs of commercial broadcasting have become the norm against which the
productions of the native communication societies are measured This pressure to compete with
sophisticated commercial broadcasting supports a tendency to replace amateurs by skilled personnel so as
not to lose the audience to commercial programs. This emphasis on focusing on a limited number of
especially skilled native television producers has led to the production of high quality programming that
meets industrial standards. Yet this emphasis has been to the detriment of direct community involvement.
IBC's decision to maintain regional production centers allows some decentralized decision making and
programming that reflects the regional particulars. IBC requests in its policy statements local access to the
television transmitters. Yet this does not have a high profile in its lobbying efforts.
The development of communications in the North reflects the shift in information processes from a
public resource to a commercial product The electronic media have provided more rapid and cheaper
information flows hence the optimal channels or methods for people acquiring information altered. In
this process the market value was discovered of many kinds of information that previously were not
provided through formal market systems and therefore not considered an economic activity. For example,
traditionally Inuit have freely shared information about land and animals. However, their knowledge
became a demanded and exploited resource in the fur trade, and to some degree in subsequent industrial
development Traditional information transfer through storytelling, dance and songs, has also been drawn
into the broadcasting market: people are paid to tell their stories, perform or provide information, even to
Inuit broadcasters. It is part of the general industrialization process of the North and the increasing role
of cash income to make a living.
I suspect that the most significant change between technologically advanced society today and the oral tradition of the Greek city state - still practiced by some native cultures today - is not the role of information in society, but in the way that information processes have been institutionalized. The dominant form for information creation and exchange has shifted from oral discourse flowing outside the bounds of formal market arrangements to the institutionalization of information generating organizations, the commoditization of information, and its sale through markets. (Melody, 1981: C7-6)
The critical literature on technology development, technology transfer and diffusion of technologies
points out that the costs of acquiring technology go beyond the strictly monetary and loss of control
aspects. There are also significant social costs involved in the technology transfer that need to be
considered. In particular, the social costs that relate to the degree of compatibility of technology
acquisition with development goals, i.e. the quest for greater autonomy and self-government
Indeed, technology transfers impose a very high price in cultural dependency, a price which can be minimized by deliberate policy measures only if cultural homogenization is recognized as a serious danger inherent in uncritical technology transfers. (Goulet, 1977: 137)
The technologies have diffused rapidly. Within one year after the introduction of television,
ownership was nearly universal. The diffusion of telephone increased rapidly after the introduction of
local exchanges, and then again after the introduction of satellite supported services. Yet it has stayed
below the national average. Potentials are not realized and the telecommunications options available to
small, remote communities do not reflect their unique needs.
The most efficient telecommunication system for their needs has been cannibalised in the , creation of the technologically advanced system. (Melody, 1985 (b): 5)
This has resulted not only in higher costs for satellite supported information exchange but also in
social costs in terms of reduced interactive communication.
The structural arrangements and the mechanisms of the communication technology transfer have
had said and human cam that are not readi!y measurable and often not easily detected, yet a l s study
has argued that they are not all inevitable, either. Because the three technologies of satellite supported
telephone, radio and television were all introduced about the same time, impacts cannot be related to one
medium only, or even to communication technologies only, but have to be seen as an integral part of the
overall socio-cultural change of the Arctic in the last two decades.
A variety of implications are evident in most Inuit families. For example, information seeking ) /
behavior has changed. The role of elders in passing on information has decreased and children turn to \ .J
their school teachers or southern media. The literature and my own field research point to an increase in
learning through mass media over direct personal information. There is also a tendency for individuals to i concentrate on home or family based activities to the detriment of communal gatherings. And school )
\ teachers report about an increase in play-fights and other violent behavior. As pointed out earlier. these 1
impacts cannot be solely attributed to television but are a result of the broader social change of the North. 3 Both telephone and television had unexpeaed implications for communication patterns in the
community by significantly reducing visiting with its slower paced information exchange. Once the
curiosity of the new technologies passed, visiting has increased again but has not reached levels of
pre-satellite time.
With television the English language and western culture invaded the last bastion of Inuit culture,
the private home. The study could not present quantitative da:ta, yet comments from individuals and the
literature indicate that the commercial character of television has contributed to tendencies of passive
media consumption and consumerism of goods, made possible by regular cash income: Reference was
made to branch awareness of former staple products, and the demand for exotic - and at times useless - goods in the Arctic. Parents point out that what their children want - much of which they see on
television - they try to obtain and work harder to create the necessary income. Generally, goods and cash
income have negatively affected cultural values of time use, sharing and equality.
h ~ & Control in the Communication Techndow Transfer
The introduction of native controlled broadcasting developed out of continuous rejection of
government responsibility to address the cultural concerns of northern native people. The Inuit could
only react to a development they did not particularly want. To regain some influence, they had to lobby
for financial support in order to develop their own programming and gain adequate access to the
distribution system. They still lobby for the full implementation of these goals while new technological
advances permit the reception of an abundance of southern commercial channels.
Native controlled television started on an experimental basis, with interim funding arrangements.
The complexity of the technology and the short time frame imposed by the funding arrangements to
acquire the technical skills required heavy reliance on southern experts. They would influence the
character and contents of programming. However, because of the strong dedication to native control, the
societies have been successful in slowly replacing non-native management with Inuit
From the beginning the Inuit have stressed maintenance of original communication systems based
on the oral tradition. In particular, they have emphasized the interactive component of communication
structures, the general sharing of knowledge, non-hierarchical social arrangements and the importance of
tradition. To maintain these characteristics of ordity requires alternative organizational models because
those of established mass media correspond with the hierarchical structures of formal and regulated
communication. Direct communication emphasizes the process rather than the product and a different
relationship between producers and audience in order to initiate public information exchange rather than
to deliver a finished product The development of unconventional communication systems, like the ,ones
established during the Inukshuk and the Northern Pilot Project, can be seen as an attempt to maintain the
human element The success of these projects was largely based on the support and involvement of the
audience. Stiles (1983: 14) points out that "in interactive dialogue and the sharing of information lies the
seeds of social action and change." The continuing importance of HI? trail-radio and coriununity radio in
settlement life supports this role.
Both IBC and ICS follow the representative model, i.e. producing programming for and about
fellow Inuit This organizational structure was partially dictated by the federal government which
required that native communication societies be politically independent as well as by the structure of the
satellite system However, in situations where the political organizations stress decentralization and the
delegation of responsibility, while following tendencies of centralized planning, managing and decision
making, the issue of access to interactive communication structures remains highly important
In contrast to commercial broadcasting, native broadcasting is not characterized by the profit
seeking motive and the pressure to appeal to the maximum audience. Yet several factors put similar
pressures on product rather than process orientation: a) native broadcasting has to justify its existence
through quantitatively measured viewer rates; b) reliance on CBC distribution sets a framework of
structure, timing, and quality into which native broadcasting has to fit; c) the structural arrangements of
the satellite system make interactive, teleconferencing-style programming extremely expensive; d) the
facilities of regional production centers rather than community stations do not permit the closeness to and
involvement of the audience realized in earlier projects; and e) the increased abundance of southern
commercial channels further shapes viewer expectations and preferences to which native broadcasters
have to respond.
There is also the broader influence of communication technologies on social structures. Studies on
the influence of transnational communication corporations on national cultures point to the influence of
these corporations on the social hierarchy through changes they introduce to the economic base (Reiffers,
1982: 103). Polarization, enclaving, stratification and disintegration are commonly used to describe
increasing gaps between the western or transnational and the traditionally oriented parts of society. The
western culture spreads into all spheres and gradually incorporates the indigenous culture. The
acceptance of "modemw values is further reinforced by the diffusion of the western way-of-life with its
consumption patterns, political institutions of representative governing, and forms of productive
organization. Reiffers (1982: 109) points out that in many cases traditional cultures are so fvmly rooted
that when other cultures are absorbed they will merely overlay them, with little communication between
them.
In Inuit society this is reflected in the continuance of the subsistence sector, i.e. the economic and
spiritual reliance on living off the land and the increasing involvement of Inuit development corporations
in industrial projects and stock market investments in the North and abroad. These investments improve
the services available to northern residents and provide the necessary cash income for the corporations,
yet these activities are beyond the understanding of many Inuit Investments in the stock market do not
affect their daily life as directly as industrial projects in their homeland. Thus the importance of these
activities needs to be communicated to allow public participation. If the Inuit wish to remain in control of
their evolving economic, political and social structure and development goals, they need a consciously
planned response in which communication and education play a major role.
s*
The establishment of permanent native broadcasting societies itself is a major success. They play
an important role for information exchange, integration and language and culture development The
diffusion of a preferred language and belief system, together with the spread of common artistic
expressions and relevant information, can strengthen the bonds of regional consciousness, cooperation and
cultural identity. Yet surrounded by an abundance of southern commercial channels, native programming
faces a formidable challenge. The benefits of indigenous controlled broadcasting may be undermined
when the programs constitute less than one percent of the daily program fare that is available.
The promotion of computer technology which relies on access to southern resources may further
aggravate problems of information disparities and inappropriate content The experiences with Telidon
indicate the immense costs involved in developing a data-base of relevance to the North and in
establishing interactive data-transmission networks. The Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an
international organization of Inuit, has stressed the need for a reliable cost-effective communication link
for news and information exchange (Stenbaek, 1982). Yet many of Telidon's promised features failed to
materialize because the equipment broke down frequently and entering and editing information proved
more difficult than expected. In the end, the high costs gave the death blow to a policy of promoting
teletext
Consultation with the Inuit has significantly improved over the years, but this has not resulted in an
increased power to influence the decision making process or the strategic planning of the
telecommunications and broadcasting industry. Rather, the Inuit feel abused in a one-way street of
information provision, whereby their knowledge of the local conditions is highly appreciated, yet where
they are excluded from the decision making itself, After nearly two decades of active lobbying they still
lack a strong voice in telecommunication and broadcasting decision making. Except for the Therrien
Committee, there has been no native representation on task forces addressing national and/or northern
communication issues. There are no native commissioners or staff members at the CRTC in either the
telecommunication or the broadcasting field; there are also neither native people at the management level
of the telephone companies, nor at influential levels within the DOC and DSOS and only one in the entire
The Therrien Committee is a good example of the influence and limitations of native
representation. In its report the committee emphasized the needs of native people, reminded the
government of its principal obligations and outlined possible institutional solutions. Yet the committee
had only advisory character. The subsequent CRTC decision opened the way for native broadcasting
corporations but also for an abundance of southern television channels. The CRTC expressed reflected
good intentiovut remained vague in how stated goals could be achieved. As a result, funding and
distribution problems persited for years.
The last chapter will address whether and how these well-intended initiatives tin become more
efficient and effective. Before developing guidelines for culturally responsive communication policies it
seems useful to address the broader national and international constraints which also affect the North.
National International Context: Communication Technoloaies Self-Develmment
The analysis of communication developments in the North within the Sroader national Cimadiarr
context showed the regional replication of national dependencies on the U.S.. These smctures of
dependency are similarly found in Third World countries where attempts are made to reverse historical
patterns through a new international information order (NIIO). To address the problem from a global
perspective provides helpful insights for developing a communications strategy in the Canadian North
which is based on self-reliance. The NIIO shows that because information is a packaged and
internationally marketed consumer commodity, national identity and cultural autonomy gain in importance
and become an integral part of exercising sovereignty and territorial integrity (Unesco, 1982: 61). The
Canadian Arctic can be approached as a reversed dependency relation of the South on the North.
Studies on the transfer of communication technologies stress the importance of indigenous control
in order to overcome cultural gaps within society and strengthen unity and cultural identity. Depending
on whether or not the dependency relation is approached as one of structural arrangements, the question
of whether and how "authentic cultures [can] survive new media" (Katz, 1977: 113) leads to significantly
different strategies. This thesis showed the importance of addressing institutional arrangements and
policies, and thus of treating communication developments not as a technical-economic but as a
political-cultural issue.
Canada's emphasis on pioneering the development of hardware, particularly distribution
technologies, without giving similar consideration to the contents that is transmitted by these technologies,
has led to a serious threat of Canadian contents. A major underlying theme in the range of Canadian
communications issues has always been that of Canadian identity. Instant World,.the report of the
Canadian Telecommission Study (1971: 961, emphasized the importance of cultural identity within ,
unequal relations:
This holds that cultures which may be intrinsically rich and satisfying but which are relatively weak in contemporary terms, can neither assimilate inexpensive foreign-produced media content, nor afford to produce material of equally commanding audience impact on their own.
Eight years later, the report of the Clyne Committee again urgently asked the Canadian
government to preserve Canadian sovereignty by developing a new defence against the swamping of
foreign broadcast programming, and by capitalizing on opportunities in the communications industry. The
Committee recommended that Canada should exploit its position at the forefront of competitive
technological developments where it had been successful in selling its data communications and
telecommunications technologies on the international market
Yet there is a trade-off between establishing a system based on national needs and one those
geared towards the international market Reviewing Canada's industrial strategy of promoting
communication technologies, Mansell (1985: 160) argued that these dual objectives are essentially
incompatible in their present form. The eventual outcome will be a Canadian industry in name only. Its
industries will procure systems that bear no distinctive Canadian characteristics.
The design of hardware of components will reflect the requirements of British and American based multinational firms. The technical versus economic 'trade-offs' will have been optimized in light of objectives of these firms and their market characteristics .... This policy will produce employment opportunities in the Canadian space manufacturing sector but they will be clearly paid for by the Canadian users of satellite services (ibid).
Government policy initiatives, she concluded, have not been successful in balancing export vs.
domestic market needs in a way that ensures the development of communication systems that are designed
to meet Canadian conditions (Mansell, 1985: 161).
In this study A d c C and MSAT were used as examples indicating the implications for native
people in the North. The satellites are tilted away from Canada's North to serve U.S. and southern
Canadian customers and to profit the common carriers organized in Telecom CanaW This approach
conflicts with the federal government's financial support designated to provide satellite services to remote
areas of Canada. Agreements towards liberalizing communication flows may make Canada even more
dependent upon U.S. satellite applications, while northern Canada (including the northern part of the
provinces) will receive weaker satellite signals. The legitimate objectives of Telesat-Telecom seem to
conflict with the social and cultural objectives of the federal govesnment. With each generation of new
satellites launched, the gulf Setween the promise =f the techndogy and &e threat to cultura! ideotity
appears to be increasing.
The evaluations of new applications show little concern for cultural implications (Davies, 1978 (b);
Paghis, 1978, DOC, 1982 (a)). Evidence that the satellite program is not meeting its original
socio-cultural objectives is covered over by a persistent optimism arising from the provision of new
services. Many of the educational, medical, commercial and public service experiments, though
considered successful, have not been implemented. There has been an emphasis on creating and
launching new technologies at high costs, yet not on establishing services at affordable rates. Also,
because of the institutional arrangements of the telecommunications sector, the present technologies are
under-used and are priced so far out of reach that many organizations cannot use them Melody (1979
(a): 4) therefore concluded:
The history of satellites is one of wasted technological potential and outrageous economic inefficiency in order to preserve the near monopoly market dominance of the established telecommunication carriers. Thus, the further development of satellite communications, technically, economically and for social applications, will produce a wider gap between the potential and realized benefits of satellites.
Despite Canada's successful pioneering, only 10% of its hardware sector is Canadian-owned
(McPhail, 1987: 272), making that industry a branch plant operation which imports or manufactures
hardware in Canada via subsidiaries of multinationals. In the literature, the terms "cultural imperialism"
and "cultural dependency" have been used to characterize the reliance of countries on foreign software,
such as databases, information sources, television and video programming, satellite services, as well as the
communications hardware.
Content regulations and subsidies have proven unsuccessful. Cultural sovereignty and content
issues, as the study attempted to show for the northern context, ultimately depend on economic factors.
There has been a tendency to treat these issues with either defensiveness by using Canadian content
regulation or with the economic expediency of ad hsc subsidies. Both do not principally alter the
underlying structure that causes the problem. In the wake of increased foreign program reception via
VCRs, satellite dishes, home-computers, and digital mb1e systems, it will be impossible 10 regdate
national content in the future. Melody (1983: 7-8) argues that careful attention should be paid to the
speed of change because disparities created in society will be exacerbated.
Studies of broadcasting in developing countries (e.g. Katz, Wedell, 1977; Nordenstreng, Varis,
1974) similarly evidence continuing dependencies. They point out that "the technological refinement of
even basic equipment for production, transmission, and reception of radio and television programs
requires research and development resources available only in highly industrialized countries," (Katz,
Wedell, 1977: 110). The resources are usually provided by major transnational corporations (TNCs).
Consequently, the introduction of broadcasting institutions has had two principal effects: first, "it has
added a substantial burden to the foreign-exchange resources that the developing countries have to raise";
and second, "it has made them dependent upon a small group of industrialized countries capable of
providing the advanced technology required for broadcasting services" (ibid).
Additional problems occur in the area of training. Often managers, program producers and
technicians are trained abroad and adopt the technical knowledge and philosophical approach appropriate
for the developed countries. They have adopted an approach to technology and acquired skills which are
not appropriate for stimulating their imagination for solving information and communication problems
trpical of the social and political environments of their home countries. They have to come up with
solutions other than purchasing expensive high technology equipment, the route chosen in industrial
countries.
A major problem in communication development is the lack of a comprehensive~communication
and cultural policy. Canada has developed its industries, agencies and strategies in an ad hoc and pat hoc
manner to positively influence the Canadian political-economic and cultural development Federal task
forces and many other studies have documented the failure of this ad hoc approach (e.g. Task Force on
Cultural Policy, 1982; Roth, 1982). Roncaglio (1985: 375) similarly finds for Latin American countries
that national communication policies are non-existent in an explicit form, based on stated development
objectives and related implementation strategies. There is a need for comprehensive communications arrO
cultural policies and strategies which address both the threat to national sovereignty and identity and the
opportunities on the international market. A comprehensive communications policy must include all
forms of communication (from the traditional to the most advanced) and be consistent with principal
political-economic and sociwcultural development goals.
Development Objectives and Communication Strategies
The basic goals for national communication and information policy, as outlined in the NIIO, can be
summarized as: internal decentralization and democratization of communication, national self-reliance and
intra- and inter-regional cooperation. To respond to the challenges of international information and
communication development, Reiffers (1982: 1lOff) distinguishes between defensive and offensive
national policies. Defensive responses, for example, tend to stress the regional character of
communication services and the resistance to foreign languages and cultural values. Offensive strategies,
on the other hand, stress the counter-measures of disseminating information, regaining control over the
communication system and strict control of advertisements, media content and language use. Often this is
combined with an effort to focus on small-scale complementary media. Yet this strategy also has to
tackle the problem of how to employ the benefits of high technology without increasing dependencies. A
key step is the formulation of policies that allow more equitable and adequate communication patterns by
decentratizing and " delinking " or "dissociating" from global structures while extending cooperation among
Third World ~ountries.~
The NIIO has been criticized as being essentially reformist, aimed at improving the existing
mechanisms yet not changing the existing structures (Sauvant, 1978; Hamelink, 1983). These critical>
authors point to the insmciencies in planning to control TNCs while expecting them to play a crucial role
in the development of the Third World. None of the suggested policies aims at the international
decision-making mechanisms, that is at the actual locus of control over decisions relevant to the
reallocation of resources.
In contrast, a strategy based on self-reliance refers ts the ability ts protect the society from the
incursions of TNCs, to promote indigenous hardware and software production capacity, to choose and
control areas of partial technological dependency and to generate and adapt the use of technological
systems to meet social needs (Ernst, 1981: 169; Mansell, 1985 (b): 331). Delinking, or dissociation, does
not mean autarchy but "inter-independence" (Hamelink, 1983: 96), based on a selective choice of
acquiring strategic technologies with significant multiplier effects for self-reliance. This selective
delinking is basic needs oriented and, admittedly, a long and painful process of internal social
transformation. It requires long range planning in response to national goals and cultural values and must
be supported by a general policy of decentralized control to extend services and equal communication
Meanwhile there is an extensive literature on the NIIO. See, for example, references in Hamelink, 1983. The intention here is not to provide a synopsis of the debate and its elements, but to present those ideas and issues that are also relevant in the northern Canadian context
patterns in the remote hinterlands. Centralization, in contrast, makes it difficult for a large portion of the
population to participate in the political, economic and cultural development of the country (White,
McDonnell, 1983: 17).
In many developing countries, radio is considered the most effective medium to promote this
decentralisation and interactive communication, because it is relatively economical and transistor receivers
are commonplace. Local radio stations have developed a variety of formats to serve the informational,
educational (especially radio schools), community development and peasant organization needs in an
attractive, entertaining manner (White, MdDoMell, 1983: 15-16). The important issue, as Pavlic (ad.:
17) points out, is not simply how to achieve better information within a nation but. how this politically
relevant information can be translated into socio-political action. This is also a highly relevant issue for
native communications.
From the point of view of social development such a onedimensional concern for information may in the long run prove not only counter-productive but perhaps even disasterous, considering the kind of technology that is available in this sphere and the processes of centralization and concentration of power it enables. (Pavlic: 17)
Another problematic area is the treatment of sophisticated technologies. For many countries it
appears very attractive to leap immediately to very sophisticated satellite communications and advanced
computer technology to most efficiently address their socio-economic and communications problems.
However, experiences in Third World countries indicate that unless there is already a broader
infrastructure of local communication which the more sophisticated technology can build upon, this
approach will simply ma@@ the imbalance.
The Third World countries need clear publieinterest oriented planning and decisive public
controls. This includes a plan for allocating available funds for the development of facilities to produce
and distribute information. Training must be recognized as an essential element and provided within the
country or culture to avoid the risk of having the information systems dominated by a few highly
specibized media professionals who live apart from the people they serve. Linked with decentralization
efforts is the requirement to deprofessionalize public media and other information systems so that a
broader sense of competence for the use of media can develop (White, McDonnell, 1983: 22-23).
Implementation of these plans goes beyond the means of individual countries and requires cooperation
and support among regions with countries or societies of similar cultural origin.
Transferred to the northern context, this approach requires that the specific goals for native
controlled communication systems support the principal aim of self-government, and that the strategies
are consistent with the choices made for politid and economic development For example, the decision
to promote regional development through small scale, renewable resource based projects requires
communication technologies that serve the needs of people out on the land. Encouraging local initiatives
needs complementary communication systems that permit local access to the netyork but also reliable and
affordable long-distance access between suppliers and purchasers.
The difference between the northern Canadian and the international context is that Canada's Arctic
is an under-served region within an industrialized country. The federal government provides substantial
transfer payments which allow a level of communication infrastructure and social service provision not
available in Third World countries. Within the northern region, the Inuit are a majority yet they
comprise a small minority within Canadian society. From this viewpoint they are comparable to the
so-called "Fourth World," i.e. the native peoples in Third World countries. These native peoples have in
common that their cultural distinctiveness is threatened. However, Canada is one of only a few countries
that have established special funding programs for aboriginal communication services.
The following chapter will develop recommendation based on the assessment outlined in this
chapter.
CHAPTER XI
CULTURALLY RESPONSIVE COMMUNICATION POLICY: CONCLUSIONS
Our dream is to develop an Inuit communications that will enhance the strength and dignity of our people. We can imagine, for example, our children learning about their culture and history through audio-visual material prepared by Inuit educators and fed via satellite to Inuit homes and schools. We can see Inuit children exploring their own environment and the environment beyond through educational and entertainment programming broadcast in Inuktituk. (IBC, 1985: 43)
This study of the application of electronic communications in Inuit communities indicates that an
analysis of communications transfer policies and adaptation processes cannot just look at increased
efficiencies in long-distance communication, but must also address the influence of such policies and
processes on power structures and the significance of information transfers for pohticd participation,
social development and cultural identity. The study provided evidence of the need for measures to
protect the cultural realm from disruptive intrusion. The impacts of new communication technologies
cannot be contributed solely to communication developments but have to be seen in the broader context
of social development. After briefly summarizing the major findings of the study, this last chapter will
develop recommendations for federal telecommunication and broadcasting policies and Inuit strategies to
achieve sdf-government.
Approaching the introduction of communication technologies to Inuit communities from a
technology transfer approach has led to a discussion of the principal stakeholders operating in the North -
the Inuit, government departments, common caniers and broadcasters - and their specific interests. The
reasons for being in the North are overlapping but not always compatible. The study shows that although
government objectives for communication services in the North reflect Inuit interests, the interpretation of
these goals differ from that of the Inuit. Consequently the implementation of policies do not fully address
the needs of the northern native people. An example was the federal government support for native
controlled broadcasting services based on a cultural mandate vs. the right to an Inuit controlled
broadcasting service.
a t times government objectives reflect Inuit interests only partially. This study provided evidence
that northern objectives rank secondary to the overriding national objectives. It used the Anik satellite
system as an example of Canada's overriding industrial policy that aims for selling its aerospace
technology on the international market This policy has been to the detriment of developing a
communication system specifically geared to national communication needs, including those of remote
regions. When their needs fit national goals, such as testing satellite applications, the Inuit were
successful in getting requested services. However, in some cases applications were tested and had proven
useful in pilot project, but then they were marketed abroad and not further diffused in the North because
of lacking economies of scale.
The study shows the importance of different values systems underlying the transfer of
communication technologies into the North. Goulet (1971: 171) points out that the transfer itself is not
merely a technique, but a valueladen political act with far-reaching implications.
The analysis showed the problem of developing a synthesis of meaningful values and rules for
action in the context of social change and referred to the importance of respecting the core values while
limiting adaptations to the outer boundaries. Oniy after social problems emerged and native people
hindered the smooth diffusion of southern-controlled services by lobbying intensively for
native-influenced or -controlled services did the federal government recognize the central role of these
cultural values. The major issue has been the selection of technology and control of its attributes so that
change can be contained within bounds and parameters set forth by the recipient society.
The experiences of the Inuit indicate a general openness and curiosity to new technologies and an
expressed will to employ the potentials and adapt the new technologies in a way that fits their needs and
accommodates their cultural particulars. The study also shows that in this adaptation process, the culture
structure changes accordingly.
The Inuit experiences show that the new technological forms contain a development model and
social structure that support centralization. Often, the incorporation of a technology, which is beneficial
for the satisfaction of specific needs, also generates conditions which in turn require new technologies,
such as extensive technical, journalistic or administrative knowledge and skills. As a result, the society is
getting increasingly interwoven with the foreign market mechanisms of which such technologies are a part
For example, the decision for quality television programming - according to southern standards of
professionalism - requires sophisticated technological equipment which induces communication societies
to upgrade and expand and to train people in their use. The standard and pace is set by the hardware
industry and the commercial broadcaster.
The case study of the transfer of television technology made further evident that hardware and
contents cannot be treated as separate issues. Particular standards and formats of content come with the
technology as if they were part of i t Therefore special efforts have to be made to modify or "unpackage"
the technology. This becomes particularly evident when communication technologies are transferred into
a different culture.
This study provided evidence of the importance of different institutional structures: public vs.
private ownership; wholly-owned vs. subsidiary; local or regional vs. national organization; decision
making power in the South vs. decision m n g power in the North; as well as differences in funding
arrangements, such as federal and territorial grants and subsidies, market relations, donations by the
public, and volunteer work. These arrangements shape the communication services significantly.
Whether potentials are realized or not depends largely on the effect of these applications on the
established service providers. This explains why in some cases well-intended government policies have
failed to achieve their goals.
For example, through its regulatory power of licensing the CRTC can impose conditions that
correspond to northern needs. At the same time, it has to pay attention to economic viability. The study
makes evident that the political clout of the Inuit, their actual influence on the decision making process,
greatly influences the regulatory decisions. Inuit participation is limited and the regulatory agency shows
an overriding concern for the economic interests of the service providers. Recommendations which would
have significant implications for the carriers and broadcasters have therefore not been enforced. The
failure of the CBC to provide an adequate northern television service, the postponement of Cancorn to
provide two video uplinks in the North and the persistent rejection of the carriers to consider
socio-economic factors and come forward with a special northern rate structure were used as obvious
examples. Reference was also made to the institutional structure of Telesat which has resulted in
foregone opportunities for satellite applications. With each generation of satellites, the gap increased
between potentials and actual service provision.
Only in rare cases, as Schmucler suggests, is the technology adapted to the social structure into
which the new technologies are introduced, because of the institutional arrangements. In the northern
communications sector this has been most evident in the request for a combination of HF-radio, ,
telephone and community radio to maintain an interactive intra-regional network. Such an integrated
network is technologically possible but transgresses the institutional arrangements within which
telecommunications and broadcasting services are provided. The interactive network was not realized
because it would have interfered with the interests of the common carriers to maintain the monopoly over
interactive inteI-regional communi~tion. For teleconferencing the Inuit have-to use the service of the
carriers. The study made frequent reference to the implications of the Anik satellite system that severely
limits inter-regional interactive communications. The study showed that Canada's national institutional
arrangements and international market relations impose constraints that also affect the North. These
constraints have to be taken into account when developing recobendations for culturally responsive
communication policies.
The new technologies have improved and increased communication over long distances. Yet this is
accompanied by a decrease in communication over short distances and a further integration of
communication services into market relations. Using the cultural dependency approach the study shows
how the institutional structures serve to maintain dependency relations and contribute to cultural
homogenization processes. To reverse this trend requires not just reforms but more fundamental
structural changes that enable the Inuit to pace, influence and direct the development
In the following sections ideas and recommendations for the different telecommunication and
broadcasting technologies will be developed On a first level possible improvements within the existing
structure will be analyzed. Yet these reforms are insufficient to solve the underlying structural problems.
On this second level, larger institutional changes will be addressed, discussing what seems possible and
what practical steps can support this change.
The Need for a Commehensive Northern Communications Policy
The evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a comprehensive policy that links
developmental goals with technological choices, media content and institutional struchres is lacking.
The request for native self-government is based on a bicultural development strategy. In the
analysis of political and education developments in the North, this study questioned to what degree this
goal is achievable in the near future. It was shown that even though Inuit have gained some control over
local and regional affairs, the gap between the philosophy of industrial and traditional society has not
been bridged A comprehensive communications policy will have to consider this.
Also, the boom-bust development of the northern Frontier indicates the need for a diversified
economy. Development strategies have to recognize the parallel existence of different exchange relations,
of a commercial wage and a non-monetary economy based on the informal sharing network. To support
large industrial and small decentralized activities requires a communications infrastructure that serves not
only the needs of heavy industrial users, but serves similarly the small economic activities, be they
commercial or non-monetary in character.
This requires to shift emphasis from developing an infrastructure based on the most sophisticated
technologies to intermediate new technologies which will have significantly lower access costs and are
simpler in use and maintenance. For example, decentralized small-scale economic activities require
interactive intra-regional and inter-regional communication systems at rates the small businesses
operating in the North can afford.
Communication policies for the North have developed out of national policies that address specific
areas of national concern, such as technology development for international marketing or economic
integration of the northern frontier. The northern needs are At into these national priorities. A
comprehensive communication policy for the North has to reverse the order and the national and regional
needs must become the starting point
To enforce a development in this direction requires meaningful participation of the northern
interest groups in communication policy development and implementation. This thesis clearly
demonstrates the limited influence of Inuit organizations in the decision making proceSs. Often it is a
one-way street of information provision that serves to co-opt native organizations rather than increase
participation. To reverse this trend native people must be represented in the government departments
and agencies at decision making positions. This will significantly increase Inuit influence in policy
formation and implementation. However, the effectiveness of this participation is limited through
principal structural constraints. For example, the evidence provided in this study shows that it does not
matter for the development of a regional telecommunications system whether basic telephone service is
provided by a private carrier or a crown corporation. In both cases social factors are treated as
externalities and regulatory decisions did not enforce a principal change.
The problem of controlling a branch or subsidiary of a large corporation with decision-making
power outside the affected region also emerges on the national level. Reference was made to the New
International Information Order and the limitations of control because suggested strategies do not touch
the decision-making and operating power of the transnational corporations. The discussion of
international relations points to the need of delinking from the international market and to focus on
national and regional needs and cooperation among Third World countries. Applied to Canada, this
means a shift in industrial policy towards prioritizing national and regional needs before international
marketing.
Policies for Telecommunication Services
The analysis of telecommunications in the Arctic indicates that telephone services improve both the
quality of life and the overall efficiency of remote economies. They allow emergency services, easier
social interaction, more effective delivery of services, improved planning and feedback, all without having
to travel. They provide a relatively cost-effective means of providing personal contact of a relatively brief
conversational type over long distances where spontaneous travel is impossible. And they allow the users
direct access to each other, using their own language.
Just as education, public health or other infrastructure facilitate development so do investments in
telecommunications . The upgrading of the network to fulfdl the quality and technical needs of data
transmission provides new and useful applications for oral, written and visual long-distance
communication. Yet it also encourages centralization tendencies, as these services are only available in
the regional centers and often very costly, so resources have to be pooled
Audio-teleconferencing is highly valued for information exchange, emergencies, general
participation and problem solving. It is particularly useful in an environment where people know each
other already. Video-teleconferencing, as realized in the Inukshuk project, is useful in complex
communication situations, stressing interpersonal group communication. However, because users have to
rely on the services offered by the common caniers, the service is too expensive to be used by native
organizations on a significant scale.
With the merging of computer, broadcasting and telecommunication technologies and the increased
distribution via satellites, a wide variety of technological options are now available. However, often the
native organizations do not even know about these options and learn about them by mere accident
- Getting information about new services to the northern groups helps to make informed technological
choices. Provision of this information should therefore become an integral part of the south-north
information exchange.
The major constraint in expanding the telecommunication services is financial. The carriers argue
that they cannot increase cross-subsidization without negatively affecting southern customers. Service is
not expanded or charges reduced unless the government comes forward with special subsidies.
Because some services, like teleconferencing, telexing or telefaxing are prohibitively expensive for
remote settlements, there is a lack of identifiable demand - which does not mean there is no need. With
the Inuit moving towards greater self-government, they will need these technologies. But this need will
not translate into a demand which can be met economically: people are too few and too dispersed to
justify the installation.
In the absence of such a demand, two strategies can be envisaged. The fkt, usually followed by
the common carriers, is to simply wait until the need translates into an effective demand. For exahple,
the discovery of oil and gas in the Beaufort Sea made the provision of the most sophisticated information
transfer feasible, i.e. the oil corporations were willing to pay the high price for service delivery. Viewed
in this perspective, telecommunication services are merely a consequence of development
The other strategy is to view telecommunications as one of the creative instruments of economic
and socio-cultural development and to provide such services in anticipation of a yet insufficient economic
demand. The assumption hereby is that supply will create its own demand. Providing adequate facilities
at affordable prices will contribute to the build-up of an effective demand. It reflects the developmental
character of telecommunications (Pierce, Jequier, 1983: 74). The aim is to set up an infrastructure which
may contribute to greater self-reliance and more efficient self-government
The important role of telecommunications has been recognized for some time, reflected in
government subsidies of the NCAP of 1979 and in CRTC statements requiring the common carriers to
consider the particular northern situation. Yet recognizing a point is one thing, translating it into effective
policies is another. The CRTC showed oveniding concern for the profit situation of the Bell Canada,
although the suggested calling zones would only have a very small impact on the carrier's overall income.
Recent statements by the govement concerning telecommunications policy also stress the need for
universal access to basic telephone service at affordable prices, the goal of fair and balanced regional
development and the equal distribution of benefits of technological progress to all Canadians (Flora
McDonald, 1987:6). Yet the DOC has not specified how these principals will affect northern services.
To more effectively realize the potentials of telecommunication technologies, investments in this
sector should be treated as paxt of incentives for socio-economic development and coordinated with other
programs, such as those offered for regional socio-economic development If telecommunications are
viewed as an instrument of development, then the conventional financial criteria of return on investment
or ratio between investment costs and subscription revenues are insufficient These are important
yardsticks, yet they need to be complemented by decisions regarding the investment in
telecommunications and other public services, such as education, health services or transportation
infrastructure. The northern experiences indicate that national planners and regulatory agencies have not
considered affordable - in the sense of matching the national average - basic telephone and other
telecommunication services as crucially important investments. As pointed out earlier, the treatment of
economic socio-dtural benefits as externalities leads to underinvestment If these factors are taken into
account, investments are immensely more profitable than has been documented until now. The literature
indicates that the evidence is still very incomplete and not yet supported with exact quantitative data
(Pierce, Jequier, 1983: 74), yet it is sufficiently strong to warrant much higher investments in
telecommunications infrastructure.
To implement the government's stated policies of affordable service and equal distribution of
benefits of technological developments thus requires changing the existing rate structure and the
introduction of toll free calling zones. Distance should be abandoned as a basic cost factor in service
charges, because satellites have made this argument obsolete. Telecommunications developments have
made it possible to build relatively inexpensive high quality telecommunications networks even in most
remote regions. Yet to set up these networks requires to examine the parameters of a satellite system
which allowed the common carriers to exploit their monopoly position.
CNCP has been successful in breaking the monopoly position of the telephone corporations for a
variety of services. So far, this has not benefited the North to a substantial degree. A main reason for
lost opportunities is the continuing inclusion of distance as a principal cost factor, despite the fact that
satellites have made this argument obsolete. If this cost factor was eliminated northern rates would be
drastically reduced and a variety of service become available that are now prohibitively expensive.
A shift in federal industrial policy towards national communication needs, as Mansell (1985: 349)
points out, must be based on strategies that seek to maximize differences between national and global
communication systems. The primacy of export criteria will continue to contribute to further cultural and
economic dependencies. New markets are created by advances in technology. Federal policies should
create incentives that direct benefits to the domestic economy rather than only increase export sales and
thus only benefits a few industries.
The MSAT-system was used as an example, where technological options were directed towards
serving international needs. To better serve the North, the satellite needs to tilted differently. However,
that does not solve the principal problem of offering an interactive inter-regional mobile communication
service +&ough a common zarrier. Mces fm ttre new service will likely be too high for m y potentid
northern users.
Rather than focussing R&D efforts and government subsidies on developing flagships of most
advanced technology, new intermediate technologies, such as applications of cellular radio and
interconnection of intra-regional interactive communication systems with the telephone system should be
pursued Intermediate, relatively cheap technologies for serving remote regions can also be internationally
marketed.
To shift government priorities and incentives from export orientation to national communication
does not necessarily imply a reduction in economic benefits. Rather, this shift means a redistribution of
profits from a few transnational Canadian companies to the public at large. Affordable
telec~mmunication services facilitate social and economic development and thus will reduce subsidies that
are otherwise necessary to support northern development This study made reference to experiences
documented for Third World countries which show how improved rural telecommunication services
directly benefited national economic growth and facilitated a more balanced development
The history of telephone regulation indicates that recommendations to provide reliable and
affordable telecommunication services have little chance to be implemented unless more substantial
structural changes take place. For example, it seems worthwhile examining whether a takeover of the
telephone service in the North by northern organizations and governments would not provide a service
that is more receptive to the special northern needs. The early development of telephone services in the
prairie provinces shows that when social objectives are treated as important factors, service provision will
improve drastically and create a demand that can be met economically. At present it remains specylation
if a joint venture of native development organizations and the governments of the NWT and Yukon will
be permitted to take over NWTel and if so, whether this change in ownership will bring the envisioned
service improvements.
Policies for Local and Regional Radio
Since the mid-1970s diffusion research has joined the critical literature and stressed participatory
social change as model of development Though it was shown that the model has not altered its principal
approach of promoting western industrial development, diffusion research - like the literature promoting
self-reliance - stresses the importance of radio in development communications. The basic radio
broadcasting technology is relatively simple and easy to use and the administration, maintenance and
program production thus relatively easy for people without extensive professional training. This makes
- the technology easily accessible to the public and allows direct audience involvement It provides an
essential service that builds upon the oral culture of the audience and does not require literacy or English
language knowledge. It functions as "the voice of the voiceless," (White, McDonnell, 1983: 16),
responding to the local cultural and communication traditions.
4.
I
~~tive-controlled regional and community radio can go beyond what is possible in a professional
system in terms of interactive communication. It can support tendencies of decentralized information
distribution and increased information provision, while it does not enforce changes in information seeking
behavior or communication patterns. And it can contribute to local and regional unity and cohesion
Despite its importance, community radio has played only a minor role in northern native and
national broadcasting policies. And f11liill.M support is limited. In contrasf Quebec has set up a
communiity media program, with the result that the number of stations doubled within five years.
Community radio in the NWT shows the mixed success of Inuit maintaining control over
community radio. Stations that were taken over by the national broadcaster andintegrated into the
hierarchical network lost their characteristic element of spontaneity and general access. Yet CBC access
or afffiation agreements have been crucial for the survival of the community stations even as they
imposed rigid time schedules.
CRTC regulatory policies have encouraged community radio which developed its s ~ t u s as a distinct
alternative service. Yet the continuous struggle for survival and desperate need for upgrading equipment
and facilities reflects the continued m a g i d role and the inadequacies of regulatory measwes.
Financing and distributing community programming axe two most important issues. Community
broadcasters have several sources of f~nancing, including a limited amount of advertising, direct and
indirect government programs to aid local broadcasting, and support fiom the local community through
memberships, fund drives and volunteer work. By definition, community radio is a sector of voluntary
initiative and full public subsidization would simply be an extension of the public sector, undermining the
self-reliance of the local service. Nevertheless, further sources of support need to be made available.
Whereas CRTC regulation permits limited advertising, this option is not available for the stations
with CBC access or affiliation arrangements. The Task Force on Broadcasting Policy (1986: 497) refers to
experiences in Quebec where advertising contributes about a third of the total income. To allow for
similar arrangements in the NWT requires a change in CBC community access policy. It is against the
CBC's principal of providing a radio service free of advertisements. Yet it can improve the financial
situation of the small stations without having to rely on government coffers.
Northern native stations depend heavily for funds on such local support as bingos, on-air
campaigns and membership fees. Yet because of the low income of native families, the f~nanciai sources
within the community are limited and insufficient to raise the funds necessary to secure the operation of
the stations.
Federal and territorial financial support includes direct financial aid, the tax-spending embodied in
charitable treatment of community broadcasting organizations, job-creation programscand other social and
cultural programs which indirectly aid local radio. However, this support has been low and communities
have not been able to maintain and upgrade their equipment and facilities.
Community radio must play an increasingly important role as a forum for local expression. This
could be achieved by acknowledging not-for-profit community broadcasting in the Broadcasting Act,
besides the already existing public and private elements. The special recognition would provides a
stronger basis for financing community broadcasting and improving distribution arrangements. These two
issues are currently most important for local radio.
For the Inuit of the NWT, community radio is limited to the local level. Other regions, such as the
Inuit and Cree Indians of Northern Quebec and the Dene Indians in southwestern NWT, have gone a step
further and maintained intra-regional links through a network of community programming that is well
appreciated and successful for information transfers (Stiles, 1986: 31; Task Force on Broadcasting Policy,
1986: 494)). Native societies argue that native regional radio functions best when it is based on a solid
foundation of community radio. Societies like ICS or IBC do not have strong feedback mechanisms
which the interconnection with community radio could provide.
The lack of a network of community stations is mainly an outcome of insufficient distribution
arrangements. The Inuit in the NWT rely entirely on the CBC. Television distribution facilities are not
used for distributing community radio. Cancom and local rebroadcasters or cable operators should,
therefore, be required to support community radio by providing distribution facilities. New transmission
possibilities, such as television subcarrier channels and the steady increase in cable systems, can benefit
the community sector because they provide the means for reaching small audiences at low costs. A
northern satellite transponder, envisioned to become functional in 1990, seems especially suited for
distributing community programming. However, the discussion has focussed on the distribution of
northern television and has not explored possibilities for intra- and inter-regional radio programming
through television subcarriers. For example, in the western NWT, the Dene Indians use Cancom for a
network of community radio and the distribution of their o m regional broadcasting. This option should
also be explored for Inuit-controlled radio.
With increased access to the distribution system and interconnection to a regional system, the local
radio stations muld expand their educational role. Under present time limitations this role ii only
negligible. This study provided evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of the formal education system
and the general need for education. Like Third World countries, the North requires massive training and
education programs. The potential of radio broadcasting for the delivery of education programs should
therefore be developed.
A variety of resources are already available. For example, cooperation with the territorial
Department of Education provides access to a variety of already existing audio tapes in English and
Inuktituk. Programming material from provincial educational broadcasting services can also be broadcast.
The interactive education service Learn/Alaska which was highly successful - yet terminated in 1986
because of government cutbacks - provides another model of educational radio broadcasting that could be
adapted in the NWT. And experiences in Latin American countries with radio schools show that, in
combination with adult education study groups and print media, radio can be a successful means for
continying education and community involvement.
With the intrusion of more programming, primarily of U.S. origin, local services can provide the
antidote to the production values of U.S. broadcasting. As Canada seeks to strengthen its national
programming content, community radio can make an important contribution.
The developmental potentials of radio broadcasting are reduced when professional standards and
hierarchical structures are imposed because they eliminate the accessibility of the medium. The
establishment of CBC northern regional production centers and their interconnection with the national
network are an example of these tendencies of replacing comqunity involvement with formal broadcasting
structures.
CBC North Radio plays an important role in native language broadcasting and the dissemination of
information relevant to the North. For indigenous people, native language broadcasts are not only a link
to other similar communities and the outside world, they are also a major "bulwark against the erosion of
their languages and cultural valuesw (Task Force on Broadcasting Policy, 1986: 287). With its focus on
distributing regional and national information of relevance to the North, it contributes to regional and
cultural identity. Because of this substantial amount of programming produced by the CBC northern
regional centers, both D C and ICS have opted to develop native television before expanding into radio.
Although the importance of its northern service is generally recognized and praised, the CBC has
faced serious financial cut-backs, which have been felt in its northern service. Production has been
reduced, travelling to the communities severely restricted, and the envisioned establishment of a
production center into the Central Arctic indefinitely posqmned At minimum the CBC radio services
should therefore be spared any further budget cuts.
While people rely on the service and appreciate the native language programming, they resent the
persistence of traditional paternalistic structures of control. By keeping the northern service as a part of
the English language network with headquarters located in Ottawa, the principal decision making power
remains with the southern national network. This restricts Inuit influence in management positions and
maintains dependency structures.
One option is to establish a public native language service similar to the English and French
network in which native people play a major role. It is related to the establishment of aboriginal language
programming rights in the Broadcasting Act The government fears unforeseen costs, whereas native
groups stress the importance of establishing a right and shifting political control. Clearly, the native
language service would have to work within financial limits determined by the general fiscal restraint
program. Native people have proven that they can provide a valuable contribution to the Canadian
broadcasting system and the socio-cultural development of the country by producing indigenous programs
at a much lower cost than established broadcast institutions. -
The creation of a public native language service will alter the institutional structure of the current
public broadcasting system. It is not surprising that there is a strong resistance within the CBC to
substantially res&ucture responsibility and control. The corporation argues that the northern production
centers provide a substantial amount of native programming, though not proportionate to the population
served. Independent native communication societies should provide alternate services. This would allow
choice' and differing media perspectives.
Though this argument has its appeal, financing two services primarily out of public coffers means
committing additional public funds. It does not seem likely that under the current fllli~lcial restraint
program these monies will be made available. However, radio production is substantially cheaper than
television production, and increased distribution possibilities through television subcarriers allow a
cost-efficient combination of native controlled regional and community radio. Local productions can be
patched via telephone line into a regional broadcasting center to form a network of community
broadcasting.
When considering the costs one should also keep in mind that the loss of aboriginal languages does
- not directly translate into dollars, yet it reflects an important loss. This trend might be reversed and costs
for social support systems reduced if the means for language and culture preservation and
self-government are made available. The federal government's - though hestant - recognition of political
rights of self-government needs to be complemented by similar rights to self-controlled broadcasting
services. For radio this does not require substantial funds. If additional financial sources, such as
sponsorship and advertising, are permitted, reliance on public funds will be minimal.
Native Language Television and Video
The development of video technology in the 1970s has strongly influenced production and
consumption of audio-visual media in the North. It has opened not only new potentials for
northern-originated production but also a one-way street of information from the South. The study
pointed to the importance of the pre-diffusion phase when needs are perceived and initial decisions made.
Because of its attractiveness, television can effectively promote cultural values and indigenous
languages and thus support native efforts to strengthen their cultural identity and self-reliance. Portable
video production technology is easily accessible and the basic skills for productions can be acquired in a
relatively short time. No extensive training is necessary and reliance on outside support therefore small.
Technological developments have miniaturized the equipment and the battery operated cameras are now
easily transportable and thus useful for the northern conditions.
Native people were not against southern television per se, but against a one-way flow of
information in which they had no input and no chance to balance the southern cultural products with their
own productions. Since the early 1970s they have demanded federal support to develop a native language
broadcasting system under their control.
In his review of diffusion research, Rogers (1976: 22) argues that people must be allowed to assume
greater responsibility for self-government Development activities should be decentralized as much as
possible so that participation at the village level can take place. Evidence of this study also supports the
argument that the principal objective for native broadcasting should not be limited to the promotion of
language and culture but should support self-government
Like people in most Thkd World countries, Inuit had high expectations for the role of television
that never materialized. Traditionally there is no distinction between information and entertainment in
Inuit society. Acquiring television literacy has often been a frustrating process of recognizing that there is
no deeper, socio-cultural meaning to be learned from the broadcast than the promotion of violence and
greed - and thus a valuable opportunity is lost
Yet the experiences with regional and national television presented in this study also indicate that it
is not the potentials that are unrealistic. Rather, the structural arrangements underlying service provision
do not fulfill the expected education, information and participation needs. The CBC, like commercial
stations, aims at capturing mass audiences to justify public funding. Yet in contrast to commercial
broadcasting which nearly exclusively focuses on the densely populated areas the c B ~ has the mandate to
also serve remote regions.
License requirements for the CBC to provide programming in representative aboriginal languages
and of relevance to the North have had little effect The analysis provided evidence that this is partially
due to a lack of special funding for program production in the North but also due to government and
CBC decisions emphasizing distribution over content Servicing the North has been a by-product of
internal CBC requirements for using satellites to transmit network feeds.
Servicing the North with additional southern programs was useful for Cancom as corporate goal in
order to gain entry into the distribution market Yet the company's primary objective in the long term
was to access the more densely populated southern areas.
Native-controlled television production began with community television on a trial basis. Initially,
Inuit settlements made local access to the television transmitter a condition of accepting southern
television in their communities. Yet they did not succeed in realizing their request The importance of
the local element was evident Erom the beginning but did not translate into policies. The development of
community television was hindered because the CBC did not develop a community access policy as it had
put into place for local radio.
IBC has maintained its request for local access, yet has not given it a high priority in its lobbying
efforts. There is currently no community television in Inuit communities in the NWT. In contrast, in
Quebec community television is well developed because of provincial government support to community
television associations. It is considered highly successful. By complementing local radio in its
programming it provides citizens with information necessary for decisions on matters of local concern.
Similar support has not been provided by the GNWT.
To enforce a shift in policy formation and implementation strategies several options are available - though not all very likely to be realized.
CRTC regulation requires cable operators to support local television and pro~ide access time
through a community channel on their cable networks. The few cable operations functioning in the Arctic
are very small and do not have to llfrll these requirements. Also, regulating cable operators does not
help the many Inuit settlements with no cable system.
The important role of community television, recognized in cable regulation, should be extended
particularly to remote regions, where there is no local or even regional reflection in the public television
programming. Cancom has to replace up to ten hours of its broadcasting with nativeproduced television.
The company has successfully ignored its obligation and maintained that the distribution of native
language programming would negatively affect its revenue situation. At least this requirement needs to be
implemented. Yet further steps should be taken. Similar to cable regulations, both the CBC and Cancom
should be required to provide administrative and financial support as well as access to their low-power
transmitter during periods on the schedule when network programs are least likely to appeal to local
interests. Features developed for access to community radio could similarly applied.
Financing northern native programs is a second area that needs to be addressed. Experiences in
Quebec point to the importance of the government in establishing a program which coordinate funds,
grants and other programs directly influencing the development of community broadcasting. This study
pointed to the lack of coordination among the different support programs. Combining and coordinating
these efforts would improve efficiency without requiring additional funds.
As part of communify broadcasting, comunity television should be recognized in the Bradcasting
Act as an essential not-for-profit local service (besides public and private services) and should be given
access to the local low-power transmitters. The Task Force on Broadcasting Policy recognized this right
for Francophones and Anglophones, arguing that programming to official language minorities (such as
Francophones outside Quebec) lacks local content and flavor (1986: 504). The situation is even worse for
native people where there is none or only a marginal amount of television programming in their
languages, although they comprise the majority in many northern communities. This right of local
television access should therefore be extended to aboriginal language groups.
Financing community television requires complementary financial support programs similarly to
those outlined for local radio. Advertising, local sponsorship, fundraising campaigns, membership fees
and volunteer work have a self-help character that reduce the dependency upon government funds.
A drastic measure to impelement communication policy objectives is the CRTC's refusal of
renewing the CBC's or Cancorn's license until the corporations have fulfilled their license requirements.
For years the CBC's license has requested the public corporation to produce a daily pan-northern current
affairs show. At present, CBC North is unable to produce and distribute a timely information program
because of a lack of video uplinks Cancom was requested, yet failed to provide, two video uplinks. To
threaten with a refusal of license renewals could force the companies to act, yet seems not very likely.
An alternative, already discussed for radio services, is the establishment of an autonomous
aboriginal-language service within the CBC, as there are now distinct French and English services. To
make the provision of native-language services a part of the mandate of the public national broadcaster
would give the Northern Se~vice a much higher profile and foundation within the CBC.
This implies a greater influence of native people in the public broadcasting system. Native
communication societies would be an integral part with an equally important role in p~oduction.
Independent and CBC-produced native language programming would be complementary allowing
different perspectives within one service.
In contrast to radio, television production is expensive. Funding two competing services, as
suggested by the CBC, through the provision of a CBC Northern Service and a separate native-controlled
service, is costly and seems unrealistic under the current fiscal restraint program. The long-term solution
is to provide one public native-language service based upon an equally important role of the CBC and
native communication societies. Placing all independent and CBC native language productions on a
separate satellite distribution system solves the problem of CBC network requirements on the northern
service. In this arrangement the English-language service is provided by another transmitter. The
autonomous native-language public service can be more receptive to the special needs of native
communities, and, for example, allow community access to the local transmitters.
However, the CBC estimates the cost for an autonomous nativelanguage distribution system to be
approximately $23.3 million capital and $5.5 million in annual operating costs (Task Force on
Broadcasting Policy. 1986: 521). These substantial costs are not yet justified, given the relatively small
volume of programming anticipated in the near future. However, in the long term, as native-language
productions increase, this arrangement effectively addresses long-stated native commdcation needs.
As an interim measure a dedicated satellite transponder, shared by northern native communication
societies and the CBC Northern Service, can relieve many of the distribution bottlenecks, would give the
CBC Northern Service greater flexibility for expanding northern regional television programming and
would give native communication societies an increased role in decisions about distributing northern
originated programming. The estimated $2 million to $3 million annual costs for this shared-transponder
option should be provided by the govemment.
In contrast to community television, there has been substantial support for regional native
controlled television through the NNBAP.
The federal government's support of aboriginal creativity through television reflects a concept of
broadcasting that is in contrast to the international arena. There political support from the developed
countries has focused on the informational and educational role of promoting modernization in
underdeveloped countries. However, in the last decade, Canadian decision makers have paid particular
attention to the role of broadcasting for cultural identity, stressing the traditional element However,
culture needs be understood in a dynamic sense, not as an electronic museum of historical artifacts,
limiting the role of indigenous broadcasting. Rather, native communication societies should have the
right to establish their own programming priorities.
Yet there are limitations to the adaptability of traditional elements. In the oral culture, storytelling,
singing, dancing and drumming as an art form, which are primarily associated with festivity, have been
sufficiently routinized to fit into the time-slots and production formats of radio and television. They seem
to bridge traditional and modem media However, Katz (1977: 118) confesses a major problem in using
modem media to propagate classical arts. The repertoire of some art forms is limited because it is built
upon a small number of classical themes which are rapidly exhausted by broadcasting. IBCand ICS, for
example, point out that they can show traditional hunting, trapping and fishing only once in a while to
maintain the audience's interest To succeed in broadcasting the presentations must have modes of
refreshing themselves through the inclusion of modern elements.
This study showed that entertainment needs to be taken seriously, particularly in light of the strong
preference of Inuit audiences for particular soap operas and the abundance of southern commercial
channels available. Northern native societies, like Canada as a whole, can thereby draw from experiences
of many Third World countries that also struggle to maintain and promote a national culture through the
use of modem communication technologies, while being swamped by culturally alien commercial
programming:
If broadcasting is to be harnessed to the goal of promoting indigenous values, it is important to understand how entertainment works. That means understanding what message is implicit in 'Hawaii 5-0,' what people perceive in it, what they enjoy, what it 'gives' them, and then, by contrast, analyzing the experience with homemade broadcast entertainment and with entertainment in traditional culture. (Katz, 1977: 117)
Katz (1977: 119) argues that one has to go beyond the specific programs and address the sameness
in the style of television and radio presentations that seem to come packaged with the technology "almost
as if the microphones and camera came wrapped together with instructions for presenting a news program,
or variety show" (ibid). Inuit television programming claims that this need not be the case. The Inuit
producers base their idea of native broadcasting on the concept of translating tradition and traditional
values into the language of broadcast media. Opinions differ whether the end result is a variation of
southern professional one-way broadcasting based on Inuit values or a genuinely different service,
encouraging active involvement rather than passive reception.
Initially Inuit produced programs stressed community involvement yet over years shifted towards
quality productions that meet industrial standards to capture the audience in light of an increasing number
of competing southern programming. Professional quality television programming requires sophisticated
technology and highly developed technical skills. None of these were available when Inuit began to
produce regional television. Thus funds needed - and need - to be made available to set up facilities and
- upgrade the industrial quality with professional quality equipment, to train people in the use of these
technologies and develop new program formats.
The NNBAP and NCP provide an important financial source and without these programs regular
native television would not be possible. Yet the freezing of funds severely hampers expansion in terms of
establishing new production centers, extending broadcasting hours and training new staff.
The strong reliance on government funding makes the communication societies highly dependent
upon decisions made by a southern bureaucracy. The initiatives of the societies to base their funds on a
variety of outside resources and to increase commercial involvement have been successful and need to be
further developed. This development reflects increasing independence and self-reliance.
At present NNBAP funding levels, native broadcasters have to balance the need for relatively
inexpensive information and entertainment programming with the need for costly educational
programming. The development of Inuit children's educational programming was a successful example of
developing a professional programming series responsive to special Inuit needs and preferences. The
study alw showed the immense work and financial resources that go into educational prw-g.
The better fit the northern needs, the NNBAP funding criteria should be reexamined to determine
whether the program's developmental goals are realistic in light of the funding levels and distribution
arrangements. If the NNBAP continues to be seen as a vehicle for cultural and language development - and this study argued it should be expanded and seen as a vehicle for Inuit self-development - the
program should become more flexible to support a wide range of community-based communication
services of non-traditional broadcasting and allow community involvement
The criteria of the NNBAP need to be broadened and include programming @pacts other than
language and interest in culture, i.e. community cohesion, community involvemenf and initiatives for
self-development This in turn requires to alter the Northern Broadcasting Policy which is the underlying
basis the NNBAP by shifting its focus from one-way broadcasting to interactive networks. Increased
flexibility in distribution arrangements and enforcement if license obligations of both the public " . broadcaster and the private program distributor are necessary first steps.
The goal of the commercial television industry is continuous broadcasting. It has pressured
governments and societies to import foreign and culturally alien programming to broadcast every day for
as many hours as possible. The criteria of the NNBAP similarly emphasize quantity to the detriment of
developmental issues such as community involvement Katz (1977: 120) argues that perhaps television
should be less continuous but for those on-air times be particularly creative and responsive to the
broadcasting needs of the audience. The native communication societies have similarly stressed the
importance of quality over quantity. At the same time, they aim for a full program day distributed by a
northern transponder. They recognize that with a variety of commercial channels available at any hour of
. the day, native programming needs to have a prominent profile.
The evidence presented in this thesis puts a cautionary note on this goal of providing a full-day
one-way broadcasting service because it reinforces passive reception to the detriment of active community
involvement Options of interactive and local programming should therefore be included in a northern
broadcasting service distributed by a dedicated northern transponder.
With the establishment of permanent services and the emphasis on professional quality, training is
not only required for production, but also for administrative and managerial skills. Ongoing trainkg has
become an absolute necessity so as not to jeopardize the success of the communication groups. However,
the cutbacks in CEIC funds have reduced training options and have forced the societies to use operational
money for training that should go into production.
The most critical training issues were identified as: 1) insufficient training funding; 2) no
cooperation among funding for production and training, resulting in a lack of coniistent, multi-year
training funds; and 3) too restrictive criteria of funding under CEIC. 2
The separation of training from the NNBAP and its administration through CEIC, which bases its
funding criteria on training needs found in southern Canada, indicates a serious incoherence in policies
and implementation strategies. To allocate training funds under the NNBAP would allow better
coordination between production and training policies and a greater sensitivity of training funds towards
the special northern needs.
For example, CEIC's requirement of employers to contribute 40% to the training costs has resulted
in the need to channel already thinly stretched production funds to training and the risk of jeopardizing
objectives of improving programming quality and quantity. To be most effective, training should be
either financed and administered by DSOS, with new or redirected resources, or CEIC should coordinate
its funds, including multi-year training with the societies' production and DSOS funding plans. To
overcome the present illegitimate use of DSOS monies, the NNBAP should specifically allow societies to
use operational moneys for training until alternative training funds arrangements are available.
Training native people in managerial and administrative skills is also crucial for other northern and
native organizations. Therefore, coordination efforts to improve the cost-efficiency of training should be
supported. Also, distant learning and Arctic College courses can standardize entry-level journalism
courses and coordinate and combine resources for professional development training.
One area that has been neglected in research and policy development is the use of commercial
video tapes. In the North, as in many Third World countries, video tapes have played an i m p o h t role
in introducing southern values and role models. In contrast to television, it has come in through the back
door, with little public attention. Consequently, by ignoring this significant medium in communication
policies, initiatives in the broadcasting s e w are jeopardized.
Video is an excellent medium to widely distribute culturally relevant programming. Currently this
is done on an individual basis, i.e. schools or private people taping IBC's and ICS's p,rogramming. The
school system has also made available a wide selection of tapes that can be used in the schools. Tkese
efforts could be further expanded by making available in the local distribution outlets a substantial
selection of native language and northern oriented programming, such as broadcasts of the native
communication societies, IWB films, territorial government productions and the like.
Throughout this thesis it was made evident that communication technologies are only one of many
tools for social development of the North. Consequently there is a need for a comprehensive policy that
includes political, economic, social and cultural goals. This requires close coordination among various
government departments and organizations that are involved in the social and cultural development of the
Inuit In the plea for a communication policy serving socio-cultural goals of self-reliance and cultural
identity, the need for decentralization and deprofessionalization should be recognized and the local
population should be involved in communication policy development and implementation.
This study showed a stated good-will on part of the government to support native broadcasting yet
ineffective implementation to fully meet the claimed objectives. Often this was caused by national
priorities, reflected in industrial policies which reduce cultural policies to rhetorical statements. The
above mentioned recommendations are reforms to improve the efficiency of program delivery and service
provision Yet many of these problems and possible solutions are already known by the responsible
government departments and agencies. More sweeping changes in the institutional structure seem
therefore necessary.
A retuning issue throughout this study was the necessary shift in national policy from prioritizing
the international market demands to emphasizing the national communication infrastructure. The
literature addressing dependency relations points out that the differences between international and
national communication systems must be emphasized in order to support objectives of national identity
and control. For example, a comparison between experiences in the Eastern and Western Arctic shows
the important role of a different language to serve as culfuoll~screen.
The federal government has accepted its responsibility for helping native communities help
themselves. The Anik B and Northern Pilot projects explored interactive structures, based on community
involvement in program production and information exchange. The success was possible because the
native organizations did not have to pay commercial rates charged by the common carriers for
teleconferencing facilities. However, the project evaluations also emphasized that decentralized
communication systems alone do not guarantee general participation. Rather, special efforts have to be
made to maintain this participatory element
This study provided evidence of a general trend towards increasing the range of reception while
narrowing the range of access to distribution. This trend needs to be reversed. One policy option is to
make better use of the local license holders which rebroadcast the Cancom feed - often these are local
communication committees - to influence program choices. Currently the communities can only decide
which channels to take but not select individual programs. During the Hermes project, TNI insisted on
having this choice and also determining the time of distribution in order to not interfere with communal
activities. Giving the communities this power of selection will reduce the current trend of only widening
the range of reception while narrowing the range of access to distribution. A crucial step, as already
mentioned, is gaining access to the local transmitter. Yet experiences with interactive projects in Canada
and elsewhere indicate that it is also crucial that the license holder for the local system shares power with
the community to select the programming that is distributed in the community.
One possibility to establish community influence on programming choices is to establish a
broadcasting advisory committee that represents a cross-section of the community to make this program
selection. IB@s success as regional broadcaster in terms of expanding and diversifying progra&g
content and replacing non-native contract people with Inuit is based on a strong leadership of the board
members. They are political leaders, often with experiences in media use, and are familiar with the white
man's world. The case studies of IBC and ICS showed that this fact contributed to an orientation of Inuit
broadcasting to follow the southern model concerning basic programming formats. This trend to have
board members who are familiar with non-native values and standards needs to be complemented by
Inuit living in remote villages who have retained traditional values and cultural pattern.
To conclude, access to local transmitters, replacement of southern programming with local and
regional production and a network of audio and some video satellite uplinks that do not have to pay the
commercial rates of common carriers are essential means to encourage the participatory processes.
Financing Recommendations
Enacting the outlined policies requires financial commitment. Given the limited amount of funding
available, priorities have to be set However, many of the recommendations outlined above do not
require additional funds but rather a reallocation of public monies and a redistribution of revenues.
The study showed that intermediate new communication technologies, such as trail radio
retransmitters, have been very successful though not very expensive. Yet in contrast to the sophisticated
high profile technology and its applications, the intermediate technology has only played a marginal role
. in policy formation and implementation. A shift in government priorities to promote intermediate
technology appropriate for remote regions gives priority to national needs of balanced development in the
hinterland. This may not bring the revenues that are realized with high technologies on the international
market. yet this shift can reduce the costs for social services that arise from the lack of stable economic
opportunities and unbalanced socio-economic development
At the same time, low cost and easy to use technologies are also of market value abroad.
Promoting these technologies is still in line with Canada's objective of developing its export market In
many ways the Canadian Inuit's socio-economic and communication problems are similar to those of
Third World societies. Technical achievements and solutions for Canada's North can also be marketed
internationally, particularly in those countries emphasizing rural development Yet this means a
reallocation of revenues fiom a few leading Canadian based transnational corporations that have stressed
high technology development to those involved in intermediate technology development
The discussion of local and regional broadcasting made evident that it is less a question of . additional public funds than a question of more efficient use of available resources and of sharing of
responsibility among public and commercial corporations operating in the North. Highest priority for the
allocation of public funds must be given to the development of services that enable the communities to
participate effectively in communication and socio-economic development and reduce tendencies of
centralization. The discussion of community and native-controlled broadcasting showed that these h d s
do not necessarily have to come from public coffers but can be raised through commercial production,
advertising, volunteer work and fund-raising in the communities.
In setting priorities for communication services, the developmental character of political, economic
and cultural initiatives must be recognized. Skills are transferable and an increasingly skilled labor force
is crucial for general socio-economic goals of self-development and self-reliance. Thus, training
programs should not be evaluated from a short-term perspective of current employment opportunity.
Rather, it is necessary to assess the long-term effects of an increasingly skilled labor force.
Finally, it is important for northern groups to reduce the reliance on federal funding sources. Inuit
organizations, like IBC and ICS, have slowly, but successfully, ventured into commercial production. This
sector can be increased and further exploited. Allowing the native broadcasting sector more options to
increase their financial basis supports goals of self-development without relying on public funds.
Suggestions fir Future Research
Technology is developing with accelerating speed and there is the potential for many new
applications to serve Inuit needs. Yet there is also a lack of information about these developments and
often Inuit learn about new technologies and services only by accident To make conscious technological
choices is dependent upon an understanding of the technology, its intended and unintended effects and
possible alternative solutions. There is thus a need to investigate advancements in telecommunication
developments and their possible applications in Inuit communities. There is a need to research innovative
approaches in other polar and Third World countries and potential applications in Cayda. Also,
computers have begun to diffbse throughout the North. Yet there is no research that analyzes potentials
and actual experiences, and their implications. With the Inuit becoming increasingly involved in
socio-economic development, the use of telecommu8ication and computer technology will gain in
importance. The Inuit need to know the short -and long-term implications to make conscious and
informed technological choices.
While there exists considerable research on the impact of southern broadcasting on native cultures,
there is no qualitative long-term research undertaken which addresses the impact of nativecontrolled
communication. With Inuit broadcasting having become an established factor in northern
communications, qualitative long-term research is essential for both government funding agencies and
Inuit broadcasting societies to assess the effectiveness of funding programs and performance of the
broadcasters to meet objectives of cultural identity and self-development This is of particular importance
in light of an increasing abundance of southern commercial programming and continued rapid social
change. Yet both the Inuit an sympathetic non-native people trust the Inuit's ability to face this
challenge. - .
Their fierce desire to retain their own culture can only intensify as industry, technology, and communications forge a more deeply pervasive mass culture, excluding diversity of every kind. ... Native peoples everywhere insist that their own culture is still the vital force in their lives; the one fixed point in a changing world is their identity as Natives. (Berger, 1976: 176)
\ ,)
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h
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APPENDIX 1: ETHICAL GUIDELINES AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCES IN NORTHERN
RESEARCH
The Scientists Act of the NWT requires that anyone carrying out scientific research in the NWT
have a scientific research license. In the application, the purpose and objectives of the research, itinerary,
funding agencies, and arrangements for accommodation and transportation must be outlined, and the
written consent of affected communities presented. In addition, Ethical Principles for the Conduct of
Research in the North, adopted by the Association of Canadian Universities for Northern Studies in 1982,
sets out further guidelines for culturally responsible research.
Historically, many researchers worked in northern native communities with l&le or no regard for
the people who lived there. Communities were disrupted and essential local resources used without
consultation. It led to conflicts and to an increasing resistance of research subjkcts to be studied. The
conduct of social inquiry in native communities, as Brinininski (1982) analyzes, was characterized by
methods of collecting social data by non-native scientists as if they were at home in the laboratory
studying some natural object Data were extracted and published elsewhere. It was a one-way flow of
information from the North to the South.
The ethical principles for northern research intend to democratize the process of inquiry, let the
subjects have some say in the research, force the researcher to consider the consequences for the group
under study and to carry out the research with a minimum of social disruption. The guidelines aim to
promote cooperation and mutual respect between the researchers and the people of the north.
I. The research must respect the privacy and dignity of the people.
2. The research should take into account the knowledge and experience of the people.
standards of the community.
3. The person in charge of the research is accountable for all decisions on the project, including the decisions of subordinates.
4. No research should begin before being fully explained to those who might be affected.
No research should begin without the consent of those who might be affected.
In seeking informed consent, researchers should clearly identify sponsors, purposes of the research, sources of financial support, and investigators responsible for the research.
In seeking informed consent, researchers should explain the potential effects of the research on the community and the environment
Informed consent should be obtained from each participant in research, as well as from the community at large.
Participants should be fully informed of any data gathering techniques to be used (tape and video recordings, photos, physiological measures, etc.), and the use to which they will be put
No undue pressure should be applied to get consent for participation in a research project
Research subjects should remain anonymous unless they have agreed to be identified, if anonymity cannot be guaranteed, the subject must be informed of the possible consequences of this before becoming involved in the research.
If, during the research, the community decides that the research may be unacceptable to the' community, the researcher and the sponsor should suspend the study.
On-going explanations of research objectives, methods, f~ndings and the interpretation should be made available to the community, with the opportunity for the people to comment before publication; summaries should also be made available in the local language.
Subject to requirements for anonymity, descriptions of the data should be left on file in the communities from which it was gathered, along with descriptions of the methods used and the place of data storage.
All research reports should be sent to the communities involved
All research publications should refer to informed consent and community participation.
Subject to requirements for anonymity, publications should give appropriate credit to everyone who contributes to the research.
The question of informed consent is tricky in this cross-cultural context To get consent I wrote to
the principal native organizations as well as the communities I planned to visit Yet only on rare occasion
did I get a written response. Rather, consent was obtained through several follow-up phone-calls. Often
no one in the hamlet office could recall that I had written The letter was buried under all the other
. notices, brochures, pamphlets and requests that swamped the office. No response did not mean
disapproval, but made it very difficult to fulfill the requirement of the Scientists Act of the NWT.
However, the hamlet secretaries were very supportive in obtaining a formal verbal agreement from the
hamlet council once I made the follow-up calls.
The more I became aware of how extensively the Inuit had been over-studied, and how they
resented yet another researcher rushing through their community in order to write an academic paper, the
more I felt uncomfortable. I was tolerated in studying "them". Support depended very much on
individuals who helped me to make the necessary connections and suggested interview partners to begin
with. They in turn would suggest further people. This allowed people to talk with the referee before
consenting to an interview. On an individual level, informed consent was thus achieved through the
willingness of the interview partners to talk. As I returned to communities for a second or third time in
the role of the researcher for an ICS study or the field administrator of the audience survey, people were
very supportive.
Initially I stayed in non-native households. My travel budget was seriously limited and I had to
rely on free accommodation. For the follow-up travels in the Western Arctic and the field research in the
Eastern Arctic sufficient funds were available to pay for accommodation in a private native home. It was
a natural process to make friends with some of the hosts, and at times this became an ethical concern.
The role as researcher was an invitation to duplicity bemuse of my interest in the other person as a friend
and as a research subject As friends we shared intimate details of our lives. It was to my discretion to
use or not to use this information. In some cases people stated explicitly that this should not be used in
my research. Generally I treated this information as personal and discrete and not as infbnned consent to
be used.
The double role also emerged when I was working for the ICS report. People freely shared their
information on the basis that this was senring their communications organization. In doing research for
ICS 1 was often seen as someone #om the organization. Generally, I pointed out the difference but how
clearly was this understood? The work as principal investigator for the ICS study also provided invaluable
insights for my dissertation. Although I mentioned that this research also benefited my thesis research
leading to a university degree, I wondered how well this information was understood.
At times, native and non-native people's interpretations of issues differed drastically, particularly
when it involved possible failures or shortcomings of individuals. This can be explained by the opposing
culhual frameworks of what is made public. The Inuit are reluctant to point out failures or mistakes of
their own people. The discussion of journalistic guidelines for IBC and ICS, discussed in chapters eight
and nine, also reflect the conflict of respecting this cultural norm and the need to know. I felt that trying
to pursue some issues was like attempting to air dirty laundry. For example, given the communication
problems between Inuvialuit development corporations and the Inuvialuit at large, I did not consider it
appropriate for me to make these organizations a target of my study. To deal with the application of new
electronic communication technologies by these corporation would inevitably bring to surface the conflicts
concerning their information policies. This should come from within the Inuvialuit society or be based on
requests for an outside assessment Under these circumstances it seemed also doubtful that I would gain
substantial inside information.
Explaining to people what I was doing brought further awareness of the limitations of truly
informed consent The term "thesis" or dissertation is not understood by many elders who have only
limited experience with the formal school system. A book is usually published but not so a dissertation.
Time was also an issue. I began my field research in spring 1985. A report would normally be finished
within iyear. I don't think I could properly communicate the required time frame of my research and
the completion of the thesis.
A second major area of concern has been the question of Inuit participation and benefits to the
communities and communication societies. Negative experiences with the feedback of research results has
led to the requirement under the Science Act of preparing a short report in non-technical terms to be
distributed to the interested and affected organizations and institutions. The ethical guidelines # 14 to 18
further require the researcher to provide an on-going explanation of research objectives, methods and
findings and their interpretation, the filing of descriptions of data and methods in the communities, and
the provision of all research reports.
To provide a copy of articles published in academic journals cannot be considered adequate
feedback to an oral culture. The CBC radio stations in Inuvik and Iqaluit Gave been supportive by
allowing and encouraging me to discuss my research projects and expected results. I used the broadcasts
to announce my research and travelling plans to the communities and later to convey results of my
research through follow-up interviews by CBC reporters. Finally, civil servants within INAC and DSOS
offered to help duplicate and mail the dissertation to interested institutions and organizations.
My experiences with feedback reflect the reluctance of the Inuit to express direct criticism. Also,
the requirement for feedback has turned into its opposite. People are overwhelmed with meetings and
information and do not have the time or interest to respond. Inspite of this there remains suspicion about
the kind of decisions that axe made without proper communication, and the benefitsefor native people are
questioned.
The question of benefits for the Inuit, and my role as a researcher with the primary interest of
pursuing an academic career, brought me close to giving up my research. I could not and still cannot see
direct and immediate benefits. On occasions, this became more obvious. For example, one community
radio society was very supportive in providing information about its local station. It was in desperate need
for money to move from the overcrowded hamlet offrce. Applications to federal and territorial
government institutions for financial support had to be written. Could I help them to get money?
Unfamiliar with applications for government grants and under time pressure to continue my field research
in other communities I said no.
Similarly, during a discussion on the local radio about the introduction of television I pointed out
that I could only collect comments and make these known to people in decision making power, but could
not initiate changes myself. One listener therefore said my primary interest was academic and lacked
direct benefits for the community. My comments of caution were intended only to prevent unrealistic
hopes of facilitating change in the near future. Yet it also made people wonder why they should
cooperate and -volunteer information. Measured in terms of political effectiveness I can only agree.
Academic research does not appear to be a particularIy efficient option.
On the rare occasion I would encounter the criticism of another white person studying the buit
Why not have an Inuit doing the principal research? Unfortunately, the financial support for both my
academic research and the ICS study did not permit the employment of Inuit in the research conduct,
except as translators. Information had to be given on a voluntary rather than a commercial basis. Had I
to make the decision again, I would not choose a topic so closely related to Inuit issues unless it was
identified by northern residents as important to their social, cultural and economic well-being or
requested to be carried out, or if it was sponsored by the government with the understanding to actually
influencing policy formation by the research results.
APPENDIX 2: THE VALIDITY AND VALUE OF QUANTITATIVE, AUDIENCE SURVEYS
The audience surveys on native broadcasting need to be used carefully. As a field administrator in
one audience survey, I became aware that people sensed the role of this survey was to support their
organization. Inuit are known for their politeness and sensitivity. Rather than expressing direct
disagreement or opinions the other person might not like to hear, they tended to respond with indecision,
stating "I don't know." Some people tended to respond in a way they thought was in the interest of the
communication societies. Also, people asked for examples to clarify the question, which might have
influenced the response.
The surveys are required by DSOS to measure the ability of the funding program to achieve its
goal: to reach the audience and promote language and culture; in other words to teach the audience native
language words and cultural activities. The value of IBC's and ICS's broadcasting was thus only measured
in m o w quantitative terms that were developed in the context of commercial broadcasting without any
theorizing. Also, the surveys worked a lot with "somewhat," "very much," "like it" and "a iittle," which
leaves ample room for personal interpretation.
The questionnaires lacked a theoretical basis and did not address issues such ai the broader
socio-political context, the role of television in northern development For example, experiences in other
countries or regions with the introduction of television show different stages of diffusion. In the first
phase of fascination television is consumed extensively and uncritically. This is succeeded by a saturation
phase and finally by an age of reasoning, where people approach television with a critical attitude. The
user returns to usual social activities which now include limited television consumption as a new activity.
This is based on a social awareness of the implications of television consumption (Perrot, 1986: 2). In the
North, these phases of television consumption were somewhat reversed, with an a priori rejection that
continued while television was introduced, an actual fascination and finally a moderate usage that reflects
a critical attitude towards the new medium.
high interest and appreciation for native broadcasting, yet also imlicated a similarly high interest for
certain southern programs that are contrary to native values and images. The survey approach does not
lend itself to provide an explanation for these observed pattern.
The surveys structure the native public according to sex and age groups. The results show viewing
patterns among various age groups, yet do not say much about the effects concerning the support for
community cohesion or the reduction of the generation gap. These are objectives of Inuit programming,
yet they cannot be measured and assessed through strictly quantitative surveys. They must be explored
through qualitative analysis. For example, the surveys should be supplemented by focused user group
interviews to reveal the media's impact on language and socio-cultural development