1

REFUGEE RETURNS, CIVIC DIFFERENTIATION, AND MINORITY RIGHTS IN

CROATIA 1991-2004.1

Brad K. Blitz

ABSTRACT

Many studies on refugee returns tend to amalgamate the experiences of migrants and

concentrate on return as an end point of the refugee cycle. In reality, however, returnees do not

share the same experience and endure the effects of their displacement long after they have

returned. This study claims that a more useful tool of analysis is to consider both the paths of

dislocation and the challenges of return and reintegration. It introduces the concept of ‘civic

differentiation’ as a means of exploring patterns of return and reintegration in post-war Croatia

where returning migrants enjoy vastly different access to critical resources, above all housing

and employment. This study considers the relevance of ethnic identity, property ownership,

exit routes and time spent in exile on re-integration and describes five return scenarios: 1)

settlement as ethnic colonisation; 2) forcible relocation as a result of regional policies; 3) the

return of retirement; 4) settlement following property repossession; 5) marginalization and

exclusion.

1 This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in the Journal of Refugee

Studies following peer review. The definitive publisher-authenticated version Blitz, Brad K. (2005) ‘Refugee Returns,

Civic Differentiation and Minority Rights in Croatia 1991-2004’, Journal of Refugee Studies, 18/3, pp. 362-386 is

available online at: http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/18/3/362

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INTRODUCTION∗∗∗∗

In April 2004 the European Commission recommended that the European Council open

membership negotiations with Croatia.1 One important pre-condition to EU accession is the

integration of the Serbian community into Croatia and the return of approximately 200,0002

displaced by the Yugoslav war of 1991-95 (EU Opinion, p. 26). The existence of these

displaced Serbs, however, remains a major source of irritation for the Croatian government

since large sections of the public are reluctant to receive them back. Recent empirical research

concluded that 63% of respondents opposed the return of Serbs and identified them with the

former occupation of Croatia by the Yugoslav National Army (OSCE, Croatia’s Refugee

Challenge, 2004). 3 Structural factors, including lack of economic opportunity, have made

return an unattractive proposition and many Serbs complain that persistent discrimination in

public life, especially the judiciary, has further weakened the potential for long-term

sustainable returns (Blitz, 2003; Human Rights Watch, 2003, 2004a; Norwegian Refugee

Council, 2004; US State Department, 2004).

In spite of this spite of an unsympathetic public, displaced Serbs are returning to Croatia.

OSCE figures put the number of registered Croatian Serb returns at 110,000 (OSCE, July

2004). This raises the question, which categories of migrant are able to return and under what

conditions? This question has broader significance because, while there is a growing literature

on refugee return, there has been little discussion of the different typologies of return and

options available to returnees. Most studies tend to amalgamate the experiences of refugees and

concentrate on return as an end point in the refugee cycle (Toft, 2002). This approach has a

number of deficiencies. First, it only tells part of the story and ignores the challenges of

adaptation and social integration facing the returnee. In reality, returnees do not share the same

experience and do not enjoy equal access to resources in their home state. Second, the

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emphasis on return downplays sources of conflict which may persist in the form of ethnic,

national, and social cleavages even after the war has ended (Schmitter and Karl, 1996).

This study claims that a more effective means of examining the impact of return is to

disaggregate the experience of returnees and focus instead on opportunities for reintegration.

While refugees may be the product of state creation (Zolberg, 1983), the central premise of this

study is that returnees present a great challenge to the liberal state and its requirements of

inclusion and political equality. Return is thus an integral part of the state-building process in

Croatia. It begins with a review of relevant literature on return and introduces the concept of

‘civic differentiation’ which is used to evaluate social integration in post-war Croatia. It is

followed by an overview of the historical and legal barriers to return in Croatia. The second

section introduces the empirical findings and prepares the way for a discussion of the main

determinants of successful reintegration. This section is based on data gathered during two

research visits in June 2001 and April 2004 when semi-structured interviews were conducted

(n=48) with displaced persons, Croatian government officials, international relief agencies,

human rights monitoring organizations, non-governmental organizations, and legal authorities

in Zagreb, Split, Sisak, Knin, Vukovar, and Beli Monastir. The final section sets out typologies

of return in Croatia and evaluates the relevance of differentiation as an analytical concept.

NATIONALISM, CIVIC DIFFERENTIAION, AND RETURN

Scholars writing on nationalism tend to focus on the homogenizing effect of the

nationalist project (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992) rather than examining

the other side of the coin: the marginalizing effect it can have on minorities in the new state.

Recent attempts to create a third way and describe the existence of communities caught

between competing nationalisms as existing in a ‘triadic relationship’ (Brubaker, 1996) are also

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insufficient since they fail to recognize the persistence of conflict and the demands for

integration post-conflict. This study acknowledges that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia

took place before the installation of democratic institutions and that the issue of return is

therefore a critical marker of Croatia’s political development. In order to evaluate the impact

of return on Croatia’s transition to democracy, this study sets out a definition of civic

differentiation which may be described as: 1) a process of segmentation that occurs following

displacement and other forms of migration in states where nationalizing ideologies have yet to

give way to effective liberal institutions and democratic practices; and, 2) a observable fact of

inequality, where some categories of citizen enjoy less access to essential resources than the

majority group.

The concept of ‘civic differentiation’ is derived from the literature on social

differentiation as described in the sociological writings of Max Weber and George Simmel. In

their accounts, differentiation was a process which reflected changes in the social structure of

society and was marked by increased specialisation, above all in new divisions of labour. In

the context of this study, differentiation is applied to migratory flows and the challenge of

social and political integration in order to gauge the process of state transition and distancing

between particular groups in post-Socialist countries. One of the central claims of this study is

that civic differentiation is informed by reviewing the relative change in migrants’ access to

key social rights including jobs, information, housing, social services and benefits and the

extent to which their economic privileges have been redefined during the transition from

Socialist state control to market economy. For example, in Croatia the shift from permanent

employment to contractual labour and the loss of access to socially-owned housing has affected

particular groups disproportionately which, it is argued, is part of a much broader process of

national homogenization and ethnic discrimination (Human Rights Watch, 2004c).

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The concept of civic differentiation is especially applicable to Croatia. Although the

Constitution prohibits discrimination,4 in practice, there is considerable variation in the degree

to which citizens can lay claim to the right to non-discrimination; especially the 100,000

minority Serbs that have returned since the end of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2004a,

2004b, 2004c; OSCE, 2003b, US State Department 2004). There is also variation within the

minority group: some returnees have been well received back home in their original villages

while thousands are still waiting for permanent housing, and a minority languish in distant

collective centres with little prospect of resettlement. The variation in returnees experience

raises the question, what categories of migrant are most likely to return and re-establish their

lives in post-war Croatia?

In response to the above question, the literature on the return of economic migrants offers

some useful insights (Cerase, 1970; King, 2000). Returnees tend to have left the formal

workforce (return of retirement) and have portable pensions that they can draw upon in exile or

upon their return. Since both refugees and returnees can now move easily between

neighbouring states (Bosnia, Serbia-Montenegro and even Kosovo), until the issues of housing

construction and repossession are finalized across the former Yugoslavia, returns may be both

seasonal and temporary. One may also distinguish between types of return based on

motivation including: non-voluntary returns or forced repatriation, voluntary spontaneous

returns, and voluntary assisted returns that are organized in co-operation with international

agencies.

Return is also conditional on international policies and in reality refugees have little

autonomy over their migratory decisions (Black and Koser, 1999; Blitz, Sales and Marzano,

2005; Ghosh, 2000; Koser, 2002; Stein, 1997). Refugees may have one set of expectations at

the point of exodus but, over time, success or failure in the acculturation process dictates the

likelihood of return (Bovenkerk, 1974; Gmelch, 1980; King, 1986, 2000). For others, the trend

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towards compulsory return effectively limits their personal ambitions regarding settlement and,

for this reason, the issue of agency is particularly important to this study (Blitz, Sales, Marzano

2005).

THE END OF YUGOSLAVIA AND THE WAR IN CROATIA

The drive to separatism and eventual secession of Croatia was activated not by

disgruntled minorities in the periphery but from the political elites at the very centre in

Belgrade and to a lesser extent in Zagreb (Conversi, 2000, Magas, 1993). The response to

response to Slobodan Milosevic’s programme of increasing centralization of power was the

revival of the Croatian national project which polarized Croatia two main ethnic groups. The

election of the charismatic Franjo Tudjman in 1989 as leader of the newly formed Croatian

National Union (HDZ) further exacerbated inter-ethnic tensions and was quickly followed by

victory in the 1990 multi-party elections. These elections set the stage for Croatia’s bid for

independence from the Serb-dominated Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and while

Tudjman focused on reviving national symbols and chronicled Croatia’s past glories, Croatia’s

Serbian minority, which was concentrated in the Danube region on the eastern border with

Vojvodina and in the Krajina region became nervous and transferred its allegiance to the newly

formed Serbian Democratic Party (SDS). Serbian fears were escalated by the state-controlled

media based in Belgrade which likened the emergence of the new Croatian state to the

independent state created by the pro-Axis Croatian Ustashe, responsible for killing hundreds of

thousands of Serbs fifty years earlier (Thompson, 1994). Attacks on minority rights and the

formation of paramilitary groups further antagonized the rebels and in 1991 the Serbian

minority boycotted the referendum on Croatian independence (Tanner, 1997).

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Rather than participate in the new state, the local Serb population sought to secede from

Croatia and formed the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous Territory of the Krajina which

was endorsed by Belgrade but which received no other international recognition. The

Yugoslav National Army and leadership of the SDS had developed a strategy for redistributing

weapons collected from territorial defense units in Croatia and giving them to Serbs in and

around Knin. Conflict between the Serbian rebels and the Croatian military took place shortly

after the country’s declaration of independence on 25 June 1991. The separatists were assisted

by the Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA) which occupied one third of Croatia

and enabled them to create the ‘Serbian Republic of Krajina’ (RSK) with its capital in Knin.

The rebel Serbs were led by Milan Martic, a figure who was indicted by the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia for Crimes Against Humanity and Violations of

the Laws of War in 1995 and whose indictments was amended in 2000 and again in September

2003.

During the war, Croatia saw two major refugee flows. The first was in 1991 and followed

the initial attack and occupation of Eastern Slavonia and Krajina which expelled the majority of

the ethnic Croat population. Large numbers of Serbs were also expelled from Croatia proper

and sought refugee in Serbia and the Krajina region. The second refugee flow occurred four

years later when the Croatian government reclaimed three-quarters of the territory under Serb

control during two rapid military operations, Flash and Storm in May and August 1995,

respectively. Eastern Slavonia, the final pocket of Croatia controlled by Serbian forces was

transferred to the United Nations by means of the Erdut Peace Agreement of 1995 and was

formally returned to Croatian control on 15 January 1998.

Official sources estimate that during the first refugee flow, approximately 84,000 Croats

fled from areas under Serbian control and another 70,000 ethnic Serbs, who had been displaced,

settled in the Danube region. According to the Croatian government's former Office of

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Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR),5 approximately 300,000 Serbs had fled by the end of

the war. 6 Others left once territory around the Danube was transferred to the United Nations to

administer in 1995 and then when this region reverted to Croatian government control in 1998

(OSCE, 2001a).

International human rights authorities have recorded extensive evidence of war crimes

committed against civilians in areas under Serbian control, especially in the Danube region in

and around the city of Vukovar which was flattened by the JNA assault. The severity of these

crimes including the murder of hundreds of elderly Croats civilians who were removed from a

hospital in Vukovar, still resonates with the Croatian public and in spite of peace agreements,

there is widespread hatred of the Serbian minority which is blamed collectively for the crimes

carried out by the JNA and RSK forces.

It is important to record that crimes, including killings and the destruction of civilian

property, were also committed against ethnic Serbs both during and after the war, perpetuating

cycles of conflict.7 The most intense period of criminal activity committed against the Serbian

minority took place during ‘Operation Storm’ (4 - 7 August 1995) when local Serb civilians

were put at risk by the shelling of Knin and forced to flee as part of an organised military

campaign.8 Some characterised the exodus of the Serbian population of Krajina as the result of

‘ethnic cleansing’ since the migration of the local population was accompanied by attacks on

civilians and the use of other means of terror.9 Human rights authorities dispute the Croatian

government’s claim that Operation Storm was an ‘internal police operation’ and contend that it

was a non-international armed conflict which violated principles of international humanitarian

law (Rakate, 2000). This view has recently been upheld by the International Criminal Tribunal

for the Former Yugoslavia (See: ICTY Gotovina Amended Indictment, para 7.).

In the immediate aftermath of Operation Storm, revenge attacks were exacted against the

Serb civilians and hundreds elderly Serbs were reported murdered (Amnesty International,

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1998). In addition, there was also at least one instance of Croat-on-Croat crime that continued

for years as some key witnesses of war crimes were killed.10

A number of the generals

involved in the crimes in 1991 and 1995 have since been indicted for war crimes by the ICTY

including the commander of Operation Storm, Ante Gotovina.11

However, these indictments

seemed to exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions during the start of the Mesic Presidency in 2000

when, as a result of a backlash by provincial nationalists (Blitz, 2003), increasing numbers of

ethnic Croats were charged with war crimes for atrocities committed during the war in Croatia

and also Bosnia (Peskin and Boduszynsk, 2003). Although an amnesty was put in place in

1996 and was intended to cover those who engaged in ‘armed rebellion’, (i.e. participated in the

RSK Army), thousands of indictments were re-issued against ethnic Serbs from 2000-2002,

often with little evidence.12

Few of these indictments resulted in convictions but indictees were

nonetheless subject to arrest and denied compensation upon their release. The aim of the mass

indictment policy was both to block return and redistribute blame (Blitz, 2003).

DISCRIMINATION DURING THE TUDJMAN YEARS

The ethnic nature of the conflict from 1991-95 was reflected in many of the policies

introduced by the Croatian government (See Blitz 2003). In 1991, the government of Franjo

Tudjman introduced a law that sought to deny returning refugees citizenship in the new state

and barred habitual residents from returning to their homes on the grounds that they needed to

show five years continuous residence prior to application and thus deterred those who had been

displaced from returning. Those most affected were Serbs, Roma and Bosniaks.13

The first mechanism for the organised return of displaced persons was established in

1997 which facilitated two-way returns from and to the Danube region and limited the right of

return to a fraction of the population. All displaced persons were permitted to remain in the

10

houses they temporarily occupied before they could return to their homes or were provided

with alternative accommodation. This return mechanism broke down with the departure of the

UN administration, when thousands of Croats returned spontaneously to reclaim their homes.

Of the 90,000 people who had been displaced from the Danube region prior to 1995, only a

handful of Serb returns were facilitated by the two-way return mechanism. The majority of

Serbs displaced to the Danube Region left for third countries as a consequence of harassment

and psychological pressure (OSCE, 2001a, p.5).

After restricting returns to residents of the Danube Region, further regulations were

introduced limiting the right of return to ethnic Croat citizens and residents married to Croat

nationals. It was only international criticism that forced the government to adopt new revisions

to the restrictive laws mentioned above. Yet, the new legislation, known as the ‘Mandatory

Instructions’ and the more extensive ‘Program for Return and Housing Care of Expelled

Persons, Refugees, and Displaced Persons’ continued in the same vein by describing Serbs as

persons who had ‘voluntarily abandoned the Republic of Croatia,’ even though many fled

during periods of intense human rights abuses (Rakate, 2000). Under the threat of international

sanctions, new laws were introduced but they did not supersede the old discriminatory laws.

Critics within the humanitarian sector claimed that Croatia ‘ended up with a confusing mix of

contradictory laws that continued to stymie refugee and displaced person return’ (US

Committee for Refugees, 1999, p. 2).

After introducing laws that denied minorities their basic right to return, the Tudjman

government adopted a housing policy that left minorities further disadvantaged. The war had

destroyed approximately 195,000 homes and it was therefore imperative that a solution be

found, to ease the burden on the transitional state. To this end, the former Tudjman government

passed many laws regarding the take-over of private property and denied others the right to

former state-owned property. The most notable of these was the Law on Temporary Take-Over

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and Administration of Specified Property (LTTP) of 1995 (Official Gazette NN73/95, NN 7/96

and NN 100/97). Legal owners saw their rights curtailed by the 1996 Law on Areas of Special

State Concern which created the term ‘settlers’ and gave ethnic Croats private or state-owned

property for their use. Many Serbs were further dispossessed by the application of the pre-War

Law on Housing Relations, which gave the original owners an exceptionally short window of

90 days to return and reclaim their property. The vast majority of those dispossessed were

tenancy rights holders, residents of socially owned property who lived in apartments leased by

the state or state enterprises. Court hearings conducted in abstentia enabled the administration

to dispossess tens of thousands of Serbs in this way. According to Human Rights Watch, more

than 23,700 tenancy rights holders saw their rights to residency terminated through corrupt

court proceedings during this time (Human Rights Watch, 2003a, p. 34).

In 1998, a Return Programme was established for the repossession of property that had

been allocated to temporary users (Official Gazette NN 92/98). Municipal housing

commissions were created to administer the procedures but their decisions could only be

enforced on the basis of prior court decisions. More than 21,000 properties, mostly Serb-

owned, were handed over to housing commissions which frequently presided over corrupt

practices (OSCE, 2001a). Forms of abuse included: 1) backdating housing commission

decisions; 2) paying for evictions of illegal occupants by the rightful owners at a cost of 5,000

DM (sometimes police protected the illegal owner); 3) using the police to forcibly remove

occupants (sometimes Bosnian Croat settlers); 4) occupying multiple homes; 5) occupying

productive property e.g. barns which denied the rightful owners the right to re-start their

livelihood (A.B., F.C., interview with the author, 16 June 2001, Osijek; G.S., interview with the

author, 19 April 2004 Zagreb).

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CONTINUITY AND REFORM AFTER TUDJMAN

Following the ‘Knin Conclusions’ in March 2001, the new government committed itself

to addressing key problems, including the issues of return and integration. Important reforms

were brought in between 2001 and 2003, including a new Constitutional Law on National

Minorities (CLNM) which introduced clauses regarding the representation of minority groups

in the Parliament as well as educational provisions, and a Law on Areas of Special State

Concern (LASSC) that altered the way in which returnee issues were to be administrated. The

housing commissions that had frustrated the return of property to former refugees and displaced

persons were abolished and instead claims were to be heard by the Office of Displaced Persons

and Refugees (ODPR) which was instructed to prioritise owner’s claims of repossession over

tenants’ rights. On paper at least, the LASSC appeared to break with the traditions established

during the Tudjman era which discriminated in favour of ethnic Croats from both Croatia and

Bosnia over the Serbian population.

Croatian President Mesic and former Prime Minister Racan went on record, urging Serbs

to return and insisted that conditions were ripe for the reintegration of Serbs into Croatian

society. For Mesic, their return was a precondition for Croatia to become a serious state

(Agence France Press, 16 June 2003). Evictions of Bosnian Croats who had occupied Serbian

homes in the Krajina region started to take place in Spring 2002 (REF/RL NewsLine 6

September, 2002).14

In practice, however, the most positive reforms of this period were limited

to the establishment of a legal framework (European Commission Stabilisation Report, p. 10)

while the pace of returns slowed (OSCE, 2003). As for judicial matters, the Racan government

was exceptionally slow to react – for example in the refusal to arrest Ante Gotovina for crimes

committed during Operation Storm. Human rights authorities noted that during the leadership

of Ivica Racan (2000-03), the government adopted an ambivalent position due to the fragility of

13

the coalition and public opposition to minority rights and property restitution (See. Norwegian

Refugee Council Reports). For fear of upsetting the nationalist parties neither Mesic nor Racan

seemed prepared to tackle the issue of returns head on.

The return of the nationalist HDZ party in December 2003 and the election of Ivo

Sanader as Prime Minister raised a number of suspicions concerning inter-ethnic relations in

Croatia. These fears were in part placated by the government’s repeated statements on refugee

returns and the expansion of the housing and social care schemes in early 2004. In the

meantime, high profile indictees were not handed over to the ICTY and human rights monitors

including the US State Department and Human Rights Watch noted even in a persistent bias in

favour of Croats that runs throughout the justice system (Human Rights Watch, 2004a, 2004b;

Minority Rights Group International, 2003; US State Department, 2004).

CURRENT REALITIES

Official policies of discrimination and corrupt institutional practices present a number of

challenges to the idea of minority returns.

Demographic Trends and Economic Conditions

The demographic effects of the war had a profound impact on the ethnic composition

of Croatia which the amnesty has only partially addressed (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2002).

The Serbian minority in Croatia has been dramatically reduced from 12.6% of the overall

population (approximately 4,334,142 ) to just 4.5% (Subasic, 2002). The local economy of

Knin is considerably worse off than other parts of the country and this fact has deterred many

Serbs from attempting to return.15

The majority of returnees are elderly Serbs whose only

prospect is a state pension (U.S. State Department Report, 2003). By April 2003, approximately

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240,000 Croatian Serbs remained in exile, mostly in Serbia and Montenegro, and had

seemingly decided against return (UNHCR, 2003). By 2005, a minority of ethnic Serbs,

including returnees, were reported living in collective centres within Croatia. According to the

Office of Displaced Persons and Refugees (ODPR), as of 1 of January 2005, there were 46

collective centres still operating in Croatia. Of these, 10 have been categorized as IDP-refugee

accommodation facilities (Nebojsa Paunovic, email to Jeroen Jansen, 4 May 2005) and the

number of occupants is estimated to be less than 1700.

Repossession of Housing

The most significant barrier to the sustainable return of refugees and displaced minorities

remains the provision of shelter and the repossession of housing (Human Rights Watch, 2003a;

U.S. State Department, 2003, 2004). The problems associated with housing turn on: the

resolution of lost tenancy rights and to a lesser extent the reconstruction of destroyed property

and repossession of property still occupied.

The government has recently started to construct houses for Serbian residents and needs

to build an additional 27,000 homes by 2006 if it is to comply with the demand for permanent

shelter (European Commission Stabilisation Report, p. 10). Under current regulations,

returnees must confirm that they are prepared to live in the reconstructed property for at least

10 years and must have a lien on the property drawn up, to establish the value (even if it is

badly destroyed), before they receive assistance. The value of the property is then converted

into an interest-free loan which must be repaid or else the state will repossess the house. For

elderly Serbs living on pensions, there is a fear that they will never be able to repay the

government and thus pass on their homes to their children (A.J., phone interview with the

author, 13 October, 2003). The same applies to those without regular income whose property

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rights are conditioned upon staying in a depressed region for at least 10 years, irrespective of

local economic offerings.

Some Bosnian Croats have been evicted since 2002 but the process of repossession is

slow and has been marred with political influence in terms of judicial hearings, threats of

violence against returnees, and the looting and destruction of private property upon departure

(Human Rights Watch, 2003a; 2004a; U.S. State Department Report, 2003). In some instances,

returnees have been murdered and attacked (U.S. State Department, 2003). Many of the settlers

who occupy Serb homes are not prepared to leave until conditions have improved in Bosnia.

The loss of tenancy rights enjoyed by occupants of former socially-owned property is, by all

accounts, without an easy solution.

For individuals forcibly repatriated from third countries there is no obvious resettlement

path. Failed asylum seekers are not entitled to returnee status and would not be entitled to

temporary accommodation under the government return programme16

(Lunzhof letter to Nick

Swift, 13 June 2003). At present, a person who failed to apply for reconstruction assistance

before the deadline, or who has been denied reconstruction assistance, has no further options to

explore.17

Economic and Social Welfare

According to the government’s own programme, those who return voluntarily are entitled

to a welfare grant of 350kn per person, per month (approximately 50 Euro). In practice few

citizens can be supported on social welfare.18

One additional concern is access to state

pensions and the issue of convalidation – the recognition of periods of time spent in

employment. The government had introduced a number of schemes that made it difficult for

ethnic Serbs to claim past years of work, which should have contributed to their pension. The

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issue of convalidiation is particularly important because it relates to final pay pension schemes.

To secure a convalidation of one’s working papers, it was necessary to produce two witnesses

who were qualified as having worked with the applicant and whose own employment status had

been certified by means of convalidation. Given the social distance between ethnic groups, this

was especially difficult to achieve (A.J. and M.A., interview with the author, 19 April 2004.)

Returnees tended to rely on members of their own ethnic group for support and most were in

the same situation. Further, there were obvious practical difficulties since many refugees did

not have complete files and would not have copies of their employment log (stored in their

employer’s office) which they would have neglected when they were forced to flee.

Access To Employment

There is limited private sector activity in areas with the highest concentration of returnees

(Census, 2001). Levels of unemployment are significantly higher than the national average of

21% and there is considerable activity in the grey economy (European Stabilisation Report,

2003). Ethnic minorities have less access to the grey economy, which by its nature is

structured around personal ties. While many returnees have lost connections as a result of war

and displacement, that there is also widespread discrimination in the labour market such that

ethnic Croats who have an absolute monopoly on public sector jobs (Human Rights Watch,

2003a).

Discrimination and the Judiciary

One major source of discrimination against Serbs has been the inconsistent application of

the 1996 law on amnesty and the conduct of domestic war crimes (See Blitz, 2003, Human

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Rights Watch 2004a, U.S. State Deparment, 2004). In 2004, the U.S. State Department noted

that: ‘questions remained regarding the criminal justice system’s ability to conduct fair and

transparent trials in these complex and emotionally charged cases.’ (U.S. State Department,

2004, p.3). Trials operate on ethnic lines, 19

in terms of the appointment of judges, manner of

prosecution, and the nature of judgments brought to bear against the accused. (Human Rights

Watch, 2004a; U.S. State Department, 2004).

Some contend that judiciary is no longer an obstacle and hold out as evidence the

fact that relatively few Serbs have been sentenced for war crimes by a court of law and that

some incorrect decisions have now been overturned (Hedl, 2004)20

. However, extensive

irregularities at the pre-trial stage (Human Rights Watch, 2003, 2004a, 2004b; U.S. State

Department, 2003, 2004) in addition to procedural irregularities21

at the point of prosecution

and political scandals22

suggest otherwise. Witnesses called to present evidence in high-profile

cases have refused to make the journey from Serbia, for fear of physical attack. Death threats as

reported in the Lora23

and Gospic cases (OSCE, 2002b) have also been issued to returnees such

that one commentator surveyed ‘chronic witness intimidation’ and an ‘often a hostile local

public’ were hampering the war crimes process (U.S. State Department, 2003).

Media Reporting on Return

The media has repeatedly stirred up ethnic tensions which has only enhanced the Serbian

community’s vulnerability, especially during the Norac case and the 2001 demonstrations in

support of the ‘generals’. Hrvatsko Slovo and Slobodna Dalmacija have been identified as ‘the

main inciters of the extremist writings whose main purpose is dissemination of hatred and

intolerance’ (Croatian Helsinki Committee, 2001). International monitors also note the recent

expansion of speech which has fuelled public disturbances (OSCE, 2004c). The Helsinki

18

Committee further claimed that the ‘most extreme standpoints are being promoted with the goal

of cleansing Croatian space from others who think differently and spread their culture in these

regions’ (Croatian Helsinki Committee, 2001). Zadar local weeklies also continue to publish

articles attacking Serb returnees planning to return, accusing them with armed rebellion; such

reports ‘not only threaten the security of Serb returnees in the area but also dissuade others

from returning’ (Dokoza, 2003).

EMPRICIAL FINDINGS ON RETURN, INTEGRATION AND DIFFERENTATION

Methodology

Data informing this study were gathered during two research visits in June 2001 and

April 2004 when semi-structured interviews were conducted (n=48) with displaced persons,

government officials, international relief agencies, human rights organizations, non-

governmental organizations, and legal authorities in Zagreb, Sisak, Knin, Vukovar and Split.

Questions focused on: self-identification; status including property ownership; dates of

departure, circumstances of exit, and dates of return; actions taken to repossess home; problems

encountered and explanations for such problems. The participants’ responses were then

analysed and sorted into the following themes:1) migratory paths and patterns of settlement; 2)

relocation and personal identity; 3) acceptance and integration; 4) faith in government; 5)

community; 6) motivation and passivity.

Migratory paths and patterns of settlement

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Most of the Serbian participants interviewed had moved from Croatia to Bosnia, then

Western or Eastern Slavonia before returning home. The experience of the Croatian

participants was more varied and included settlers who had arrived from Bosnia. In almost all

cases, the participants who identified as returnees had participated in some form of convoy and

group exit during the war. The living conditions that greeted returning migrants upon their

return were markedly different from one ethnic group to another, and from one set of migrants

to another. For example, one Serbian couple, Rado and Mile, had been living in a one room

wooden cabin in a collective centre outside Sisak. The cabin was dark and the only décor to be

seen consisted of plastic soft drink bottles that have been filled with earth and turned into

hanging planters. By contrast, most of the ethnic Croat participants interviewed had been able

to return to permanent housing, often at the invitation of the Croatian government.

Some participants returned to formerly occupied but otherwise functional

accommodation; others waited in collective centres while damaged housing was reconstructed;

former tenancy rights holders lived in collective centres without a clear plan for the future. The

most fortunate were the Bosnian Croats who at the very least were housed in semi-permanent

structures complete with heating and double glazing which the OSCE mockingly described as

like ‘Club Med’. They and their neighbours owned cars and thus were able to move more

freely. Others were even more fortunate and had received formal invitation to settle. In Josip’s

case, the state authorities had offered him the possibility of securing temporary property which

he immediately followed up by requesting a temporary permit for housing from the municipal

authority.

Relocation and personal identity

20

Some participants challenged the use of terms ‘returnee’ which they felt had been

imposed on them by external parties.

We have been classified as returnees but I didn’t return anywhere. When I return to my

apartment, then I will see it as a return to normal life.

(Mile, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.)

The absence of ‘normal life’ was reflected in other conflicts, including confusion over

participants’ self-described identity and the occupational roles they had acquired since their exit

during the war. One middle aged couple who had been employed as an accountant and metal

smith before the war found themselves tending cattle in Eastern Slavonia to survive. Like other

older participants, they were able to accept the challenge of rural life and subsistence farming

more easily than younger returnees.

For others, it was not relocation but the change in local demographics that affected the

way participants identified. One man in his 60s claimed that his status as an ethnic Serb had

confined him to being a minority which had a negative effect on his self-esteem. His decision

to remain in Croatia during the war and not take up arms was of little consolation in post-war

society where his own individual claim to be a ‘remainee’ was subsumed by his membership of

a group whose collective identity was defined by the majority population. As he explained:

There is another problem for Serbs. For the first time in 200 years, they have become a

national minority. So I who remained here…I have a mortgage on my back that I am

discriminated against in general life. I don’t want to consider myself less valid because I

am considered a minority.

(D.C. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

21

Acceptance and integration

While the research participants fell into two main camps which could be defined by their

ethnic attachments, one participant in Vukovar noted that there was an important distinction to

be made between returnees who had experienced the pains of exile and loss, and those who

remained during the war (L.M., interview with author, 15 June 2001). Within the minority

Serb population, returnees were generally in a better position than those who had remained

during the war who were described by one participant as ‘civil victims of the war’ (NGO group

interview, Vukovar, 15 June 2001). Of all the minority groups, the Roma are the most

vulnerable and have been the least well integrated in the post-war era.24

In general, ethnic Croat returnees and settlers quickly found social acceptance and

opportunities for integration in post-war Croatia while ethnic Serbs did not. The lack of

opportunities for non-Croats was made evident by following account by a senior Serbian local

in Knin:

After Operation Storm, the political structures told me I couldn’t get a job because I am

Serb. Nobody here was choosing to which nation I was to belong. Now if you are looking

for a job, they are still looking at what type of blood is flowing through your veins.

(D.C. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

22

He claimed that since the war ended, there had been some obvious changes in policies towards

minorities but suggested that covert discrimination was now the rule. Contrary to the Croatian

constitution, he argued that:

Patterns of discrimination are not as direct as after Operation Storm but are more

‘hidden’… Still, there is obstruction that we feel in every aspect of life…property and

unemployment, rights of national minorities.

(D.C. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

His colleague developed the picture painted with some examples of local employment policy in

Knin where migrant workers are bused in to fill low level jobs. Her account sustained the

common view that the use of migrant labour was closely linked to the settlement programme of

the Tudjman and subsequent governments and that these policies only served to reinforce the

divide between Serbs and Croats of working age.

People are not employing Serbs. Here’s one example, a lady got a job in hospital. She

had 20 years of experience. But the very same day, the doctors signed a petition to say

they wouldn’t work with her. Another bad example… we have 16 teachers in secondary

school. Perhaps 8 are from Knin…the rest are from other parts of Croatia. While we

have others registered, there are 10 buses coming in on a daily basis with workers from

outside the city.

(D.M. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

Faith in government

23

All of the research participants questioned the government’s ability to carry out the

ambitious reforms regarding housing. For those living in collective centres, the confusion and

disbelief over the proposed housing reforms added to their own sense of powerlessness. As one

elderly man noted: ‘our word goes into the wind - we are common people’. After more than a

decade, some of the participants felt that too much time had passed and that the government

could no longer provide a meaningful solution to the problems of return, reintegration and

housing.

I sit doing nothing, waiting for good luck to arrive. It is like waiting for rain in the middle

of summer. They are always saying on TV it will be done but for 7 years they have just

been saying the same and people are dying in the meantime.

(B.C. interview with the author, 24 April 2004, Stirmca).

The reality of death and the banality of their displaced lives was a constant source of frustration

and undermined the participants’ belief in the state.

There’s always hope for better but now these hopes are nearing the end. Some people die

here like Iva Seselj. People need to have strong nerves not to think about what they went

through and not to think about why they cannot lead a normal life. I used to cry a lot

before but saw it wasn’t good for my health. This is survival basically, nothing more.

(Radojka, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.)

Some Serbian returnees noted the irony of the new housing and reconstruction plans and treated

death as a probably precursor to the resolution of their housing problems:

24

they are saying come work on the roads with us because this will be a road to your

graveyard.

(B.C. interview with the author, 24 April 2004, Stirmca).

Participants living in collective centres were especially dubious of the government’s

willingness and capacity to relocate them. Some focused on practical problems including the

many groups that needed to be satisfied in advance of their own needs.

first they will deal with private property, then property will be for war veterans and who

knows when…people say you have to wait for the law to change, then they say there is no

money.

(Mile, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.)

It’s a promise but we need something concrete. The new house is being built but it is for

people who have money to purchase it. For me it is a vicious circle but we are a bit tired

of this now. There are no steps forward. What is the benefit of talks with no outcome?

(Radojka, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.)

Others claimed that the root cause of the problems they were facing was political and had yet to

be addressed.

It’s not easy to build a house or a state. The Croatian state is still a baby, It’s not

democratic, not legal. It is still growing. When it is 18 years old, I don’t know how

serious it will be. Croatia is the first champion in signing agreements then not following

through with actual implementation.

25

(D.C. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

Community

For both ethnic Serbs and Croats, the concept of community provided essential support to

returnees and helped them cope with the daily challenges of unemployment and exclusion. For

two elderly sisters, having a small group of neighbours was a major factor in their decision to

return to their village (Marta and Doma, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area).

In the major towns, community institutions had been set up in response to international donor

activity which continues to provide assistance in the form of grants and training. In the city of

Knin, the Unemployed Association which has more than 4000 registered members has been

assisted by the Swiss Development Agency, CARE, and Austrian government. The

organization is experimenting with income-generating activities that seek to engage returnees.

According to the director, one glass recycling project in the wealthier city of Osijek is now able

to employ 200 people (M.J. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

For the ethnic Serbian population, cultural organizations that promote identity, provide

educational support, and access to books and music were especially valued such as the Joint

Municipality Council in Vukovar, and the Serbian Society of Knin. According to the director of

the Serbian Society, the organization was re-established in 1997 when the city recognised that it

could ‘nourish the national identity and contribute to the restoration of a multicultural society.’

The staff interviewed claimed that while the organization is only operating out of one room, the

provision of books and information on Serbian culture provides great comfort to a minority

community that has seen its numbers decline by more than 80 per cent

By contrast, those living in collective centres enjoyed no support from the broader

community and this had a marked effect on the quality of their existence. Most of the

26

inhabitants of collective centres had no family support and since aid agencies began

withdrawing from Croatia, there are no obvious economic opportunities or community-based

activities which might occupy them. An elderly woman now living in a collective centre that

houses mostly Roma and Serbs described the level of outside support she received:

‘We don’t have a group. There’s no support group. The only thing that happens in the

collective centre is an Italian NGO that comes – teenagers, bring gifts…they decorate the

centre. They come for Easter, Christmas, summer time.’

(Radojka, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area).

Active and passive responses

Both ethnic Croats and minority Serbs who actively searched out economic opportunities,

developed networks of support, and lobbied the state institutions saw their fortunes improve

faster than those returnees who waited for the state to provide for them. For Croats, while there

was massive unemployment, there were also functioning institutions that provided

opportunities to work in low level positions. For example, after many years unemployed,

Velijko, an ethnic Croat from Bosnia was able to resume work as an electrician. He identified

three preconditions for his success: support from his brother who provided housing, receipt of

Croatian citizenship, and having a trade which ultimately led to his employment. Among the

Serbian returnees, the most successful were young, well educated, and English speaking locals

who were able to find jobs in international agencies or non-governmental organizations.

Being pro-active, also seemed to benefit those who sought to repossess their homes and

in spite of persistent discrimination, some ethnic Serb respondents were able to secure

27

permanent accommodation. The key to their success was a clear understanding of the legalities

regarding housing repossession, unrelenting use of court instructions and procedures, and

persistent lobbying of municipal authorities.

First when I arrived in 1997, I submitted an application in the municipal authority office.

When I arrived in Belgrade I immediately wrote to the Helsinki Committee and

authorities in Knin (police, Ministry of Justice) so that I could be registered. I had heard

on Croatian TV that those who don’t claim property in time will lose them so I decided to

take action. I received application forms but as new laws were adopted, I always needed

additional documents. There was no organised system for submitting applications. For

some reason, ours was treated as the last application even though we had applied on so

many occasions. The number we were given was 192. Since 1999, when we returned to

the area around Knin, at least once a week I visited the housing commission.

(Natasha and family, interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin).

A change in housing policy ultimately enabled Natasha’s mother to press for repossession of

the house through the courts and in 1997, she had received a letter from the municipal

authorities announcing that with the abolition of the Temporary Housing Permit system, the

illegal occupant’s permit had been cancelled. It was at this point she saw a copy of the permit,

which gave the occupant the right to one apartment, not the whole duplex. In 2003, when she

could see no results Natasha’s mother started a law suit against the illegal occupant. On behalf

of the family, she sued on the grounds that, according to his Temporary Housing Permit, the

occupant had only been entitled to an apartment, not the whole duplex, nor the garage and

cellar which the occupant and his family were using illegally. The case was finally resolved

when the illegal occupant received alternative accommodation that he agreed to accept. In

28

March 2004, she was preparing to sue for compensation both from the occupant and Croatian

state for damages from 1997 to 2004.

Those who did not actively attempt to repossess their homes or press the state to provide

alternative housing saw little improvement in the quality of their existence. While Serbs were

considerably worse off than ethnic Croats from Bosnia, individuals and families from both

ethnic groups could be found living in collective centres for the best part of a decade. The most

disadvantaged included ethnic Serb tenancy rights holders such as Rado and Mile. With the

cancellation of their tenancy rights through the courts, there was little opportunity to appeal

through the courts as Natasha’s mother had done. One couple who had appealed to the

European Court of Human Rights, had been ill-advised by a local NGO which filed their case

before Croatia had ratified the European Convention. Consequently, they received a negative

decision and now felt completely dependent on the state to resolve their housing situation. In

the meantime, their existence in the collective centre was characterized by monotony and

loneliness. The mother described how she spends and average day:

We watch TV. Maybe we do some knitting. We play cards. It’s monotonous. We can go

out but we’re not interested in it. We go to Sisak, then return. It’s maybe two hours.

(Radojka interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area)

AGENCY, DIFFERENTIATION, AND THE PROSPECTS OF RETURN

The above findings raise two important themes for consideration: in the first instance, the

issue of agency and the prospect of return and integration must be reviewed; second, by

applying the concept of differentiation, it is now possible to draw some conclusions from the

return project and describe the return options available.

29

Agency: regional policies on eviction and repatriation

The three categories of migrant discussed above including returning refugees, displaced

persons, and settlers all exercised little control over their migratory paths. Regional policies as

well programmes on repatriation from third countries, have influenced a pattern of forced

returns to Croatia. As illustrated by their migratory histories, mass evictions of Croatian Serbs

and Bosnian Croats from parts of Bosnia have fueled the migration to Croatia and created two

distinct patterns of settlement structured according to ethnocentric policies and governmental

programmes.

The effects of the war on refugee flows and the political course of the conflicts in the

former Yugoslavia also conditioned the experience of refugees and their current options

regarding return and reintegration. Those who settled inside Croatia generally experienced

more dislocation than those who settled in Serbia. For example, those who fled their homes in

1991 were able to settle in Eastern Slavonia (where they enjoyed greater protection during the

Serbian occupation) but like Rado and Mile, given the course of the war, the liberation

campaigns waged by the Croatian Army, and the return of occupied land to the Croatian

government following the withdrawal of the United Nations, these migrants were ultimately

unable to put down extensive roots and develop networks of support. Moreover, since they

were not refugees, they were among the last to receive assistance from refugee organizations

and international agencies. Refugees who settled at least temporarily in Serbia, still have the

opportunity to go back and forth, and thus preserve the option of integration in Serbia or return

to Croatia. Given the structural constraints described above, the notion of being pro-active in

order to improve one’s lot is of limited value. As illustrated in the case of Natasha’s mother,

those who owned property were able to exercise their rights, albeit through lengthy and

30

complicated legal processes. However, those whose homes were destroyed as well as former

tenancy rights holders did not have these options.

The degree to which migrants can exercise control over their lives, make important

choices, and address problems such as securing permanent housing turn on a number of factors,

most important of which are ethnic identity, property ownership, and time spent in exile and

away from home. Property ownership and the lack of options abroad, are important factors in

the decision to return and the extent to which migrants are prepared to do battle with official

bodies. Other factors, including the extent to which migrants enjoyed family support, have

access to social networks, as well as the degree to which they have been able to participate in

community structures, events and programmes also play a critical role in the degree to which

returning migrants can exercise personal autonomy and improve their living conditions but of

course, these factors were often inter-connected with the primary determinants discussed above.

The most vulnerable tended to be minorities who neither owned property, nor had family

support, nor have much involvement in community-based associations.

Civic Differentation and Return Scenarios

The above findings demonstrate the variety of return and reintegration experiences in

Croatia and present an opportunity to consider the following return scenarios.

31

Resettlement as ethnic colonization

Bosnian Croats who fled conflict in Herzegovina and Central Bosnia, such as Marinko,

Vesna and Zelijko, have an altogether privileged status in Croatia. The settlers, with their

Croatian citizenship, have the right to work and vote, are fully integrated into Croatia and now

form the majority in some cities, such as Knin. The settlers’ dependence on the Croatian state,

their employment as migrant labour in place of local Serbs, and the fact that they have been

settled in defensive positions such as along the border with Herzegovina, has strengthened

Croatia’s historic claim to certain regions and may be considered a policy of settlement as

ethnic colonization.

Displaced Persons and Refugees Returning from Bosnia

Displaced persons who remained inside Croatia and refugees who settled in Bosnia have

altogether different experiences from refugees who fled to Serbia. Internally displaced Serbs,

especially those who self-identified as ‘remainees’ were generally worse off than refugees who

settled in Serbia. Internally displaced Serbs have generally been evicted or threatened with

eviction from parts of Croatia or from inside Bosnia and must rely on the Croatian state while

their final housing status is determined.

Return of retirement

The above findings serve to illustrate the statistics on return produced by UNHCR that

the majority of Serbian returnees are elderly and no longer in the workforce. These returns are

motivated by a mix of factors: the promise of a pension, lack of economic opportunities in

32

Serbia, housing ownership in Croatia, sentimental attachments, and regional return policies

(including compulsory evictions and restrictive laws prohibiting the ownership of secondary

homes throughout the former Yugoslavia) have influenced return. Thus, we can describe

another category, the return of retirement.

Settlement through repossession

As in the case of Natasha, we can discern a category of younger returnees who settle as a

result of housing repossession. While most retirees also return as a result of repossession, and

having few options other than return, the case of Natasha and her family highlights a particular

sub-group of former refugees who have been able to return only as a result of judicial

intervention and personal advocacy. This late stage in return, which is marked by securing

repossession of former property, tends to be complicated by other conditions including

persistent lobbying on the part of the rightful owner and acts of looting and vandalism which

may make any thought of permanent return untenable. It is important to note that cases where

the returnee is able to repossess his home without the need for further investment are rare.

No return – marginals and long term exclusion

There is a final category of migrants who are unable to return to permanent homes and

remain on the margins of Croatian society. This is the case of former tenancy rights holders

most of whom lack support structures and are especially vulnerable, for example Rado and

Mile.

33

CONCLUSION

This study records that during and after the war in Croatia, attempts to marginalize the

minority Serb population have effectively created a multi-layered society where different

groups of citizens enjoy varying degrees of access to essential resources including housing and

employment. From the above discussion we can describe three categories of migrant who have

sought or are seeking resolution to their status and claims to integration in Croatian society:

refugee-settlers (Bosnian Croats), cross-border returnees (former refugees); and, internal

returnees (Serb IDPs who settled inside Croatia).

While ethnic Croats from Bosnia have been fully incorporated into the Croatian state and

are able to make the transition from refugee to citizen, their situation stands in marked contrast

to the Serbian minority. Governmental support to Bosnian Croats in the form of invitations,

grants and aid, have all facilitated their transition and integration which may be characterized as

resettlement through ethnic colonization. This process of differentiating between the Croatian

majority and the Serbian minority has, however, also created further polarization within the

Serbian minority which is now divided on the basis of property ownership, time spent abroad,

family support, access to social networks, as well as the degree to which they have been able to

participate in community structures. The process of civic differentiation is most marked from

1998 onwards when there was an increase in international pressure and when the UNTAES

region was returned to Croatia. The migration of Serbs from the Danube region back to Krajina

and Western Slavonia coupled with increasingly vocal criticism from international donors

opened the door to a variety of return options and created new categories of returnee, as noted

above. Thus the process of confinement during periods of conflict and the reopening of

territory following international intervention also underscores the history of return migration

and civic differentiation in Croatia.

34

This study affirms the relevance of the concept of civic differentiation as a process that

operates during periods of intense national homogenization and post-conflict transition. It also

affirms the importance of disaggregating the experience of refugees and displaced persons in

order to capture an accurate view of the return process in Croatia. In the case of Croatia, the

process of civic differentiation is tied to the discriminatory laws introduced during the Tudjman

era. Civic differentiation is shown to exist in the varied experiences of refugees and displaced

persons and their different entitlements from 1991 onwards: while ethnic Croat settlers have

been given extensive privileges from the state, Serbian returnees and displaced persons were

considerably worse off – internally displaced Serbs who did not own property before the war

were especially vulnerable. This study further notes the following return scenarios: 1) ethnic

settlement as official policy; 2) forcible relocation as a result of regional policies on return; 3)

the return of retirement; 4) settlement as a result of property repossession; and, finally, 5) those

marginals who have no real opportunity to return and endure and long term exclusion from the

rest of Croatian society.

35

NOTES

∗ The author is would like to express his appreciation to OCSE and UNCHR staff in Zagreb, Sisak, Knin,

Vukovar; Croatian government officials, as well as several human rights activists who provided information and

logical assistance in support of this research project. I am especially grateful to Anton Hristov, Jeroen Jansen,

Olga Roberts, Momir Vukmirovic, Jasmin Mahmic, Tin Gazivoda and above all to my superb interpreter, Sandra

Popovic. I would also like to thank Matthew Gibney and colleagues at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of

Oxford for their insightful comments on earlier versions of this article and the two anonymous reviewers for their

helpful suggestions. 1 See: European Commission, Opinion on the application of Croatia for membership of the European Union, 20

April 2004, COM (2004) 257 final, Brussels. 2 The European Union estimates that during the conflict 950,000 people were displaced, including 550,000 Croats

who fled to other parts of Croatia and 370,000 Croatian Serbs who settled in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. By

the end of 2003, there were still 189,500 refugees in Serbia and Montenegro and 19,500 in Bosnia and

Herzegovina. 3 The two most pressing explanations for Croatian resentment of Serb returnees is first the perception that their

return would raise negative tendencies (46%) and second that the returning Serbs might start the war over again

(34%) (OSCE, Croatia’s Refugee Challenge, 2004). 4 The Criminal Code prescribes criminal responsibility for those who violate the equality of citizens on the basis of

race. 5 This agency has been renamed several times. It was first renamed the Ministry of Public Works, Reconstruction,

and Construction Office for Expelled Persons, Refugees and Returnees. It is now part of the Ministry of Tourism,

Sea and Development. 6 For an account of the challenges of providing shelter to refugees in the former Yugoslavia, see Sultan Barakat

and Sue Ellis (1996). 7 For example, in 1991 more than one hundred Serbs were killed near the town of Gospic in the Krajina region.

Masked groups of civil and military policemen under the direction of Croatian army generals gathered together

Serbian civilians who had been identified by locals and executed them. The Croatian general Mirko Norac and two

of his subordinates were eventually indicted, charged with the murders, and sentenced to 12 years by a Croatian

court in Rijeka in 2003 but not before a key witness was killed. 8 Major General Ante Gotovina, who was Commander of the Split Corps District, likened Operation Storm to

Desert Storm in the Gulf War. (See. Rakate, 2000). 9 See. The two reports published by the Croatian Helsinki Committee in 2000 on Military Operation Storm and Its

Aftermath in Former UN Sector North and UN Sector South. 10 For example, in August 2000 while the ICTY was investigating the 1991 murders in Gospic, in advance of a

possible indictment against Mirko Norac, local Croatian witness Milan Levar was blown up in his car and killed. 11 Specifically, Gotovina was charged with: Three counts of crimes against humanity (persecutions on political,

racial and religious grounds, deportation and other inhumane acts (forced displacement) punishable under Article 5

read with Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal); One count of crimes against humanity (other

inhumane acts, punishable under Article 5 read with Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal); Two counts of

violations of the laws or customs of war (plunder of public or private property and wanton destruction of cities,

towns or villages, punishable under Article 3 read with Articles 7(1) and 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal); One

count of violations of the laws or customs of war (murder, as recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the

Geneva Conventions of 1949 punishable under Article 3 read with Article 7(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal). 12

The Law on General Amnesty was introduced in response to international pressure. According to Human Rights

Watch, the Law grants amnesties all those who committed ‘criminal acts during the aggression, armed rebellion or

armed conflicts, in or relating to the aggression, armed rebellion or armed conflicts in the Republic of Croatia . . . .

During the period from 17 August 1990 to 23 August 1996’ but law expressly excludes those who have committed

‘flagrant violations of humanitarian law having the character of war crimes.’ 13 In addition to the residency requirement, minorities were also subject to language proficiency tests administered

in police stations where there was potential for abuse. See ECRI, 2001. 14 In 2003, Zagreb adopted a public housing programme where public funds would be used to rebuild Serbian

homes. 15 The total Serbian population is just 3,164 down from more than three times that before the war and the town of

Knin has largely managed to attract few but the elderly (European Commission Stabilisation Report, p.11). Of

more than 15,000 inhabitants (all ethnicities) in the city of Knin, only 3,103 were listed in the 2001 Census as

having permanent income from work. More than twice that number 7,219 were ‘without income’ Only 1, 463

persons received social welfare (Census 2001). In the neighbouring areas, the situation is even worse. For

example, in 1991 Gospic had a population of 28,732 persons, of whom 64.3 per cent were Croatian, 31.3 per cent

were Serbian, and 4.4 per cent were from other national groups. Since the war, the population has fallen and the

36

town itself has a population of 12, 980 of whom more than 90% are Croat. Only 625 Serbs were registered in

Gospic (2001 Census) 16 Lunzhof further notes that ‘UNHCR has never received a request for assistance from a returning failed asylum

seeker.’ 17 It is arguable that the deadline for reconstruction assistance of 31 December 2002 is evidence of state

discrimination since, not only is there no deadline for other ethnic groups, but the imposition of a deadline

infringes on refugees’ rights to freedom of movement and the principle of returns. 18 In the town of Knin where 15,000 people live, only 1, 463 persons were listed as receiving

social welfare (Census 2001). 19

This point is underscored by the findings of Human Rights Watch in 2004, which found that: There is

continuing ethnic bias in war crimes prosecutions. During 2002, for comparable offenses, the OSCE determined

that 28 of the 35 persons arrested for war crimes in Croatia were Serbs. Serbs also comprised 114 of 131 of those

under judicial investigation; 19 of 32 persons indicted; and 90 of 115 persons on trial. According to the OSCE, this

trend appeared to continue in 2003.47 While a perfect symmetry in the numbers of war crimes indictees from the

two ethnic groups—Serb and Croat—might not reflect the actual number of crimes committed, the disproportion

in the number of prosecutions brought against Serbs compared to Croats (a ratio of 5:1, on average) is so large that

it strongly suggests discrimination. By way of comparison, the Office of the Prosecutor for the International

Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has issued just over twice as many indictments against ethnic Serbs

as against ethnic Croats (a ratio of 11:5) for crimes committed in the Croatian war (Human Rights Watch, 2004). 20

See Drago Hedl, ‘Lora Retrial Eases Pressure on Sanader’, IWPR'S Balkan Crisis Report, No. 513, 27 August

2004. 21

These fears were augmented in February 2002 when a Serb returnee, Jovan Bosta, was beaten to death in

Benkovac near Knin and his attackers never captured. 22 See: Damir Piliæ, Chronicle of Brutal Torture of Captured Serbs in Military Prisons in Sibenik, Split and Zadar -

Violence in the Line of Duty, Feral Tribune, Split, Croatia .September 27, 1999. 23

The Lora case involved eight former members of the 72nd Military Police Company - Tomislav Duic, Tonci

Vrkic, Miljenko Bajic, Josip Bikic, Davor Banic, Emilio Bungur, Ante Gudic and Andjelko Botic - indicted for

war crimes against civilians between March and September 1992. The prosecution said the men humiliated,

abused and tortured their mainly Serb prisoners, causing the deaths of two, Nenad Knezevic and Gojko Bulovic,

and leaving two, Milosav Katalina and Djordje Katic, seriously injured. 24 According to the OSCE office in Vukovar, in 2001, there was only one Roma business in Vukovar and more

than 500 had left in that year.

37

REFERENCES

Amnesty International (1998), ‘Croatia: Impunity for Killings After Storm’, Document No. EUR 64/004/1998. 1

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Interviews

A.B., F.C., interview with the author, 16 June 2001, Osijek.

A.J. and M.A., interview with the author, 19 April 2004.

A.J., phone interview with author, 13 October 2003.

A.M, L.M., M.P. B.M, NGO group interview the author, 15 June 2001, Vukovar.

B.C. and M.R. interview with the author, 24 April 2004, Stirmca.

D.C. and D.M. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin.

G.S., interview with the author, 19 April 2004, Zagreb.

LM, interview with the author, 15 June 2001, Vukovar.

M.J. and Z.A, interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin.

Marta and Doma, interview with the author, 20 April, 2004.

N.C, interview with the author, 19 April 2004, Zagreb.

Natasha and family, interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Knin.

Radojka and Mile, interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.

Slavo, interview with the author, 22 April 2004, Knin.

T.V. interview with the author, 21 April 2004, Split.

T. and B.C., interview with the author, 20 April, 2004, Sisak.

Vesna and Zeljko interview with the author, 20 April 2004, Sisak area.