croatia - freedom house
TRANSCRIPT
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Croatia By Andrija Henjak
Capital: Zagreb
Population: 4.22 million
GNI/capita, PPP: US$ 21,730 (2015)
Source: World Bank’s World Development Indicators
Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
National Democratic
Governance 3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
Electoral Process 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00
Civil Society 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
Independent Media 3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25
Local Democratic
Governance 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
Judicial Framework
and Independence 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
Corruption 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25
Democracy Score 3.64 3.71 3.71 3.64 3.61 3.61 3.68 3.68 3.68 3.71
NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. If
consensus cannot be reached, Freedom House is responsible for the final ratings. The ratings are based on a scale of
1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an
average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the
author(s).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The year 2016 was likely the most politically dynamic year in Croatia since the end of the war. The
beginning of the year brought a new government into office. This new coalition government pursued
policies that quickly resulted in increased societal polarization. Tensions between the coalition partners
very soon paralyzed the government, while a conflict of interest case brought down both the government
and the leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), Tomislav Karamarko, in a dramatic sequence of
events. New elections followed soon after, and brought about a relative victory for the HDZ with a new
leader, Andrej Plenković. Plenković took the party and government down a more moderate path, bringing
relative if temporary stability to the political system after almost a year of turbulence.
Elections in 2015 and 2016 saw several new parties appear, competing on a platform of anti-
establishment appeals including criticism of the existing economic policy and the party elites governing
Croatia since independence. In the 2015 parliamentary elections, three new significant political
organizations emerged: the Bridge of Independent Lists (Most), Human Blockade (Živi Zid), and Stranka
rada i solidarnosti (better known as BM365). These parties occupied the space left by the electorally
marginalized Labor Party and ORAH, presenting a third option to voters dissatisfied with the two principal
ideological blocks.
The first government of the year was composed of a HDZ-led coalition of right-wing parties and
Most, a new party formed just before the elections. This new government took office in January and enjoyed
the support of several smaller parties in parliament. Because Most was unwilling to accept HDZ leader
Tomislav Karamarko as prime minister, a little-known Croatian-Canadian businessman, Tihomir
Orešković, was selected as a non-partisan prime minister.
A number of radical right wing parties entered parliament under the HDZ umbrella. These parties
immediately demanded legislation lustrating former functionaries of the communist regime and the removal
of the legacies of communism from public spaces. The demands also included calls to reduce funding for
civil society groups, changes to cultural, education, and media policy, as well as personnel changes in a
number of independent regulatory bodies and public media outlets. These developments further deepened
ideological divisions across society beyond the level seen in previous years.
Despite a declaration of support from the government, members of the working group on curricular
reform resigned, effectively hailing the end of education reform. This triggered a response in the form of
countrywide protests and widespread criticism from civil society groups. These events demonstrated that
ideological divisions–based on tradition, religion, modernity, and interpretations of Croatia’s Second World
War legacy–permeated across civil society, media, and educational institutions. While ideological divisions
have shaped Croatian politics since independence, educational establishments had thus far been relatively
unaffected by such debates.
Soon after the government formed, tensions arose within the HDZ-Most coalition relating to
personnel changes in public companies, police, and the intelligence service, as well as over the national oil
company, INA. The dynamics of intergovernmental relations were not favorable to Most from the
beginning, as their electoral support came from voters dissatisfied with party politics. Most therefore had
to balance its role as a minority partner in government with trying to keep its electorate satisfied by opposing
HDZ policies. Most found support in this in Prime Minister Orešković, especially after he asserted his
independence–first by delaying the dismissal of the intelligence chief and later by appointing a candidate
not supported by the HDZ leader, Tomislav Karamarko.
Nevertheless, as a result of this impossible position, support for Most plummeted in the months
after the new government took office. A new conflict between coalition partners emerged after revelations
came to light that Tomislav Karamarko had a conflict of interest regarding his official position as deputy
prime minister and HDZ leader, and his wife’s business affairs. Following the confirmation of these
revelations, and after the opposition asked for a vote of no confidence in Karamarko, the HDZ and Most
split. Karamarko resigned from the deputy prime minister’s office, and the party initiated a vote of no
confidence against its own government, which succeeded with the opposition’s support. After failing to
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form a new government, Karamarko resigned as HDZ leader, parliament was dissolved, and new elections
were called for the fall.
The HDZ elected a new leader, Andrej Plenković, a centrist and strongly pro-European Member of
the European Parliament. Under Plenković’s leadership, the HDZ managed to win parliamentary elections
in September, achieving a relatively narrow victory with 36.3 percent of the vote and 61 seats from the 151-
seat chamber, against the 33.8 percent won by the Social Democratic Party (SDP) led coalition, which won
54 seats. Most was again the third party, winning 10 percent of the vote and 13 seats, while the coalition
around Živi Zid achieved 6.2 percent of votes and 8 seats. After the elections, the HDZ managed to form a
new coalition government with a resurgent Most. The new government did not include more radical right
parties, which failed to gain any seats in parliament, and it did not include some of the divisive and
controversial ministers from the previous government.
Following the September elections and the HDZ leadership change, tensions and polarization
reduced–at least on the surface. The new HDZ leadership discontinued the politics of polarization and
restricted the influence of individuals identified with polarizing positions by replacing them with moderate
figures, triggering loud protests from the right. The new government, however, was not free from tensions
between Most and the HDZ, which continued to hold divergent positions on a number of issues. However,
under the year’s second government, these issues were less pronounced, and the government seemingly
managed these conflicts better. At the same time, the main opposition party, SDP is to elect a new leader
amid an atmosphere of uncertainty about its future direction. While retaining sizeable support, it faces
necessary internal restructuring and the need to forge a new identity.
Score Changes:
Independent Media declined from 4.00 to 4.25 due to the politicization of the public broadcaster
under the year’s first government, and violent threats against journalists.
Outlook for 2017: Despite efforts to reduce polarization under the year’s second government, ideological
divisions affecting politics and civil society will continue, and political actors on the conservative end of
the political spectrum will push ahead with their agenda despite the setback suffered with the change of the
HDZ leadership. Issues of historical interpretation, education, media regulation, LGBT and abortion rights,
and civil society financing will continue to be relevant, but with the HDZ’s new leadership oriented towards
more inclusive politics, a decrease in polarization can be expected.
Local government reform remains an important issue for the new government, but is dependent on
the HDZ and Most’s ability to compromise. Tensions between Most and the HDZ will likely continue, as
the former seeks to preserve its electoral viability by emphasizing its independence. Corruption cases
initiated several years ago will continue to grind slowly through the court system. The principal opposition
party, SDP, while holding on to sizable support, is to elect a new leader in an atmosphere of uncertainty
about its future direction, and faces the need for internal restructuring. However, it is unlikely that the party
will achieve this in 2017, and it will face challengers from the left in the local elections, which might result
in a realignment of left voters from the SDP if other liberal parties achieve electoral success.
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MAIN REPORT
National Democratic Governance
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3.25 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50
The government that formed following lengthy negotiations in early 2016 was made up of an uneasy
alliance between a collective of smaller right wing parties led by the Croatian Democratic Union
(HDZ), and Most, a coalition of independent lists that transformed into a political party during the
negotiating process. Most and the HDZ reached a compromise, selecting the non-partisan Tihomir
Orešković as prime minister and head of government. Most demanded–and received–control of the
Interior and Justice Ministries, indicating a desire to prevent the HDZ from controlling the police,
courts, and prosecutors.1
Leading figures of the HDZ-led coalition, including party leader Tomislav Karamarko and the heads
of junior partners Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) and Croatian Growth (Hrast), continued to advocate
the lustration of Croatia’s communist legacy. The coalition supported the removal of the symbolic
legacies of communism from public spaces, as well as changes to the media and financing of civil
society and cultural organizations.2 The coalition’s anticommunist campaign contributed to increased
polarization between the left and right blocs in Croatian politics, an increase that gained momentum
following Karamarko’s ascension to the HDZ leadership in 2012.
Relations among the coalition partners, and between the HDZ and the coalition’s non-partisan prime
minister Tihomir Orešković, became tense over local government reform, appointments to the public
service and state-owned enterprises, and leadership changes in the police force.3 The HDZ’s leader
Karamarko and Prime Minister Orešković came into conflict following the dismissal of the head of the
state intelligence agency, when Karamarko was prevented from appointing a new intelligence chief of
his own choosing.4
Most found itself in a difficult position: as a new political party, it was elected to promote change;
however, Most lacked the sufficient leverage to force the HDZ to accept significant political and local
governance reforms.5 This led Most to oppose a range of HDZ initiatives, triggering an effective
blockade of the government and a sizeable loss of support for Most.6
The principal conflict between the HDZ and Most developed over the oil company INA, jointly owned
by the Croatian state and a Hungarian oil company, MOL. The HDZ advocated Croatia’s unilateral
withdrawal from arbitration concerning the company’s managerial rights and investment obligations–
a proposal Most and a majority of opposition parties rejected as damaging to the national interest.7 The
conflict led to a major split between Most and the HDZ, which only deepened when Karamarko was
found to have a conflict of interest due to his wife’s business relationship with MOL (see Corruption).
In an unprecedented development, the opposition called for a vote of no confidence in Karamarko, who
subsequently resigned from government.8 In turn, the HDZ called for a confidence motion against
Prime Minister Orešković–a move also supported by the opposition. After failing to secure a new
parliamentary majority, and less than a month after being reelected to the HDZ leadership, Karamarko
resigned, and the parliament dissolved in June.
After the parliament’s dissolution, new elections were held in September amid a relatively calm
atmosphere. In the elections, the HDZ dropped the small radical-right parties from its coalition, while
the Social Democrats broadened its coalition with the Croatian Peasant Party (HSS). Having toppled
Karamarko, Most regained its electoral support, while a new party with a populist bent, Živi Zid,
significantly increased its base. The result was a new coalition government comprised of the HDZ and
Most, under the stewardship of the HDZ's new leader, Andrej Plenković. The new government was not
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dependent on the support of radical-right parties, had better relations with national minorities, and took
a more centrist and inclusive position on a range of issues.
As the party that saw the largest relative increase of votes, Živi Zid represents a new phenomenon in
Croatian politics. The party emerged from a civil society initiative established to block evictions from
repossessed properties, hence the name Živi Zid, or Human Blockade. The party also opposes loans
denominated in foreign currency and the monetary policy of Croatia’s central bank, HNB. This
initiative turned into a political movement when one of its more prominent members, Ivan Vilibor
Sinčić, ran in the 2015 presidential elections on an anti-NATO and anti-EU platform. Sinčić’s campaign
also criticized political elites, monetary policy, and regulatory policy towards financial institutions.
Sinčić won 16.4 percent of votes cast in the 2015 presidential elections, providing significant visibility
to the initiative and a boost to Živi Zid; this visibility ensured that Živi Zid secured 4.2 percent of votes
and 1 seat in the 2015 parliamentary elections. Živi Zid had much greater success in the 2016
parliamentary elections, winning 6.3 percent of the vote and eight seats. On social issues, the party
holds broadly left and libertarian views, combined with antiestablishment sentiments.9
In another important development, a major reform of the school curriculum was effectively halted
despite the government’s declared backing, due to a lack of logistical support from the ruling coalition,
and opposition from conservative parties, activists, and some academics. Opposition to the reforms in
turn provoked a negative reaction from civil society and the public, who generally supported the
changes. The curricular reforms were significant, as they marked the first comprehensive effort to
modernize the curricula of elementary and secondary schools in Croatia. The proposed new curricula
emphasized key generic skills, including critical thinking and problem solving, as opposed to the older
system of education based on the absorption of facts. The reform was also the first public policy
initiative to give elementary and secondary teachers a significant role in the framing of policy.
However, conservative parties and activists criticized the curriculum reform for its alleged left wing
value bias,10 while some academic circles were dissatisfied with their lack of involvement in the policy
formation process.11
Electoral Process
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.00 3.00
The parliamentary elections held in September saw a relatively close race between the two main parties,
the SDP and the HDZ (and their coalition partners), the resurgence of Most, and the success of the new
party, Živi Zid. With only 54.35 percent of voters participating, turnout fell below 60 percent for the
first time since Croatia’s independence, indicating significant dissatisfaction with politics among an
electorate heading to the polls for the second time in less than a year. The only party to experience a
sizeable increase in support compared to the November 2015 elections was the coalition around Živi
Zid, which increased its absolute number of votes by almost a quarter and gained seven seats more than
in the previous election.
Elections contested 10 equally sized electoral districts–each electing 14 MPs–as well as a district for
citizens living abroad and a special minority district. For the second time in parliamentary elections,
voters could preferentially vote for candidates on a party list, enabling a candidate collecting 10 percent
of the total votes for the list to be ranked according to the number of preferential votes received. Voters
widely embraced the preferential system, and for the most part understood how preferential voting
worked–having previously used the system in elections for the European Parliament, and in earlier
parliamentary elections. Preferential voting also enabled candidates to run personalized campaigns, and
to be elected even when placed low on the party list. As such, the system benefitted candidates who did
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not enjoy their party leadership’s favor, while some candidates used preferential voting to demonstrate
the strength of their support among party voters.12
There were no disturbances or major contentions during the parliamentary elections, which passed
following a relatively subdued campaign. Similarly, no questions were raised about the electoral
process or the electoral results, nor were any complaints made about the role of the media.
In January, the State Electoral Commission (SEC) referred allegations of electoral fraud arising from
the 2015 elections to the prosecutor’s office for investigation as a matter of standard procedure.13 The
allegations related to HDZ leader Tomislav Karamarko’s accusation that the party’s vote was
undercounted during the final tally, resulting in the HDZ receiving six or seven fewer parliamentary
seats than it should have.14 Karamarko alleged that APIS, a company that oversaw IT support during
the election, underreported the number of votes that the HDZ’s coalition won.15 Karamarko further
accused APIS of being managed by leaders appointed under the previous SDP-led government, and
that the company was working in the SDP’s favor.16 However, Karamarko’s claims were unsupported
by evidence, and strongly denied by APIS. In July, the state prosecutor dismissed the case and
confirmed that no fraudulent behavior had occurred.17
Civil Society
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
2.75 2.75 2.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75
Civil society organizations remained vibrant in a number of fields, particularly during the first half of
2016. This activity encompassed a number of controversial issues dominating public debate, including
abortion and LGBT rights, privatization, international trade agreements, and educational reform.
Despite some initiatives’ best efforts, civil society follows the general pattern of ideological
polarization between the left and right that permeates Croatian society.
In May, the team leading the elementary and secondary school curriculum reform resigned after
complaining about a lack of sufficient administrative and financial support. Right-wing members of the
governing coalition, and some conservative non-governmental organizations, opposed the education
reforms.18 The resignation led to the mobilization of a large number of civil society organizations,
organized under the initiative “Hrvatska može bolje” (Croatia can do better). Unions, employer
representatives, advocacy groups, educational groups, parents’ associations, and others rallied under
the banner of the initiative.19 Hrvatska može bolje organized one of the largest protests in Croatia’s
modern history, indicating that the modernization of education had broad public support.
The protest reflected the general pattern of strong opposition between left-leaning and right-leaning
civil society organizations over a range of issues, one of the more prominent being the introduction of
civic education in high schools.20 However, polarization also developed over the issue of public
financing of NGOs,21 with conservative organizations calling for a reduction of funding. At the same
time, a range of organizations warned that changes to the financing rules would likely have serious
consequences for the long-term viability of numerous civil society organizations and their programs,
especially organizations that provide services to vulnerable social groups.
Several months after the HDZ-led government took office, war veteran groups ended a 555-day protest
against the former SDP-led ruling coalition. The organizers attributed the end of the protests to a more
favorable environment for the introduction of a new law on war veterans, thus removing the reason for
the protests.22
In February, the Minister of Culture, Zlatko Hasanbegović (HDZ), discontinued public subsidies for
non-profit media and abolished the commission in charge of allocating funds to not-for-profit outlets.23
The government also halved the share of funding for organizations promoting the development of civil
society through revenue from the national lottery. A share of this revenue is used to fund organizations
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involved in non-profit activities ranging from sport, social security and care, to culture and education.24
A number of CSOs complained that this funding cut would reduce their organizational capacity to apply
for funding from other sources, including the European Social Fund, and would hamper their ability to
deliver services to vulnerable groups.25
Relations between the Orešković government and labor unions were difficult, lacking substance and
agreement on a range of issues. Throughout much of the year, the government and the unions were
unable to establish an effective dialogue.26 The main point of contention was the cancelled collective
agreement for public services and a public sector wage increase; wages were frozen at the beginning of
the crisis after a sharp drop in GDP in 2009. The implementation of the agreement and the wage increase
were supposed to take place after GDP growth reached 2 percent for two consecutive quarters. The
government rejected the increase on budgetary grounds, despite GDP growth having reached the
requisite level for the wage rise. Unions have announced a lawsuit against the government’s decision.27
Despite continuing disagreements, the new government formed in September forged a better
relationship with the unions, and an agreement about public sector wages was close to being concluded
at the end of the year.
Independent Media
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3.75 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25
The ideological divisions permeating all levels of Croatian society in 2016 were perhaps most
pronounced in the media. Soon after taking office, the year’s first government, headed by the HDZ and
its partners, proposed the dismissal and replacement of members of the Council for Electronic Media
and the Agency for Electronic Media, alleging irregularities in their operation.28 The Croatian
Journalists’ Society (HND) and the Council itself described the move as unjustified and political.29
Soon after, the Council’s president resigned, citing political pressure as cause for her resignation.30
The country’s public broadcaster, Croatian Radio Television (HRT), faced similar pressure. As one of
its first acts, the year’s first government replaced the broadcaster’s director-general, Goran Radman,
citing irregularities in his appointment, interference with programing, and alleged pressure on
journalists.31 Deputy Prime Minister Tomislav Karamarko and a range of critics on the right were on
record criticizing the HRT’s ideological orientation.32 Opposition parties, journalists’ associations, and
other groups criticized Radman’s dismissal–and the appointment of a temporary replacement close to
the HDZ–as a political move aimed at taking control of the national broadcaster.33 Following the
appointment of a new director-general, a wholesale replacement of editors in the radio and television
branches resulted in a significantly altered editorial structure.
In January, the Council for Electronic Media ordered a two-day ban for the television outlet ZI for hate
speech, following one of its anchor’s on-air “warning”. Journalist Marko Jurič “warned” mothers and
children passing a central Zagreb Orthodox Church that the Orthodox priests might slit their throats.34
ZI television supports radical right-wing views in some of its broadcasts, and some veterans’
associations and individuals associated with right-wing parties and organizations held a protest march
in front of the Council for Electronic Media’s office.35
Similarly, some war veterans’ associations demanded the removal of the leadership of the Croatian
Audiovisual Center (HAVC), an institution supporting media production. The veterans’ associations
allege that HAVC supported anti-Croatian filmmakers,36 leading the Minister of Culture, Zlatko
Hasanbegovic (HDZ), to initiate an inspection process against the Center. This move triggered
suspicions that the HDZ-led government was planning to replace HAVC’s director and management.37
The new Minister of Culture, Nina Obuljen Koržinek, an independent, did not act further on the issue,38
despite the demands of representatives from some veterans’ groups, who continued to pressure HAVC
throughout the year with press conferences and protests.39
8
While incidents of violence against journalists are rare in Croatia, journalists were routinely subject to
political pressure, dismissal, threats from political extremists, and charges of alleged ideological
biases.40 The HND frequently warned of threats against journalists,41 and demanded that the relevant
authorities take proper actions.42 In October, the HND’s chairman, Saša Leković, reported to police that
an attempt had been made on his life after the wheels of his car were allegedly sabotaged, but no further
information regarding this incident was forthcoming.43
While private broadcasters continue to enjoy a relatively high degree of independence from political
pressure, economic pressures–including a difficult financial environment and sparse employment
opportunities–hamper journalists’ ability to work. Economic interests further influence editorial
policies, as outlets are dependent on advertising revenue and other funding channels, although the exact
extent of this influence is difficult to assess. Politics continued to impact public media, and public
television outlets in particular, especially where political decisions intertwined with economic
considerations. After a number of public grants were withdrawn in January, the HND warned that
journalists in smaller independent media outlets would likely lose their jobs.44 Journalists were also
affected by the decline of newspaper circulations and advertising revenue, which negatively impacted
their work conditions and economic security.45.
Local Democratic Governance
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
Local government reform was an important issue in Most’s political program, which attempted to place
the issue high on the Orešković government’s agenda.46 The proposed local government reform would
focus on reducing the number of local government units and the number of counties, in order to increase
efficiency, reduce costs, and improve economies of scale in the provision of government services.47
This proposed local government reform immediately became a contentious issue between the HDZ and
Most during the brief term of their first coalition government. As a party with significant regional
penetration, the HDZ retains control in most counties–and therefore could be threatened by any
reorganization. Opposition to the reorganization of the number of counties and their structure also came
from officeholders at the county level, where resistance to the changes crossed party lines.48 The fall of
Orešković’s government stemmed the reform process without producing even a blueprint of how the
changes should be shaped.
Most also demanded a reduction in wage expenses and the number of employees in local government
units, but were unable to put this demand into practice. The structure of local governments is often
considered bloated, with too many local government units–some of which are incapable of fulfilling
their basic functions.
After the 2016 elections, Most demanded during coalition negotiations that maximum expenditure on
wages in local government could not surpass 15 percent of the local budget. This would be a significant
reduction from the current 20 percent and would likely result in a decrease in the number of employees
in local government, and thus opportunities for local-level clientelism.49
The conflict over local government reform emerged during by-elections in the city of Vrgorac. Most
and HDZ candidates were pitted against each other, not only for positions in the local government, but
also over how to approach the reforms themselves. Most won the Vrgorac mayoral by-election in a
close race after a contentious campaign where candidates of two parties traded heavy accusations
against each other.50 Most criticized the previous local administration led by HDZ as clientelistic,
negligent, and self-serving.
The new HDZ and Most government coalition that formed following September’s parliamentary
elections continued to place importance on local government reform. While Most favored this agenda,
9
reform plans were less pronounced and less detailed than under the previous government, and no
defined proposals were advanced.
Minister of Finance Zdravko Marić (HDZ) proposed an income tax reduction that would likely reduce
revenue for local government units. The minister proposed that the real estate sales tax, which would
also reduce slightly, be turned into a source of revenue for local government units. The minister also
suggested that a property tax be introduced as a source of revenue for local government.
Judicial Framework and Independence
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50
In June, just ahead of parliament’s dissolution, the legislature elected 10 justices to the Constitutional
Court. The new judges were needed for the court to function in the then-upcoming parliamentary
elections, replacing justices whose terms in office were about to expire.51 The judges were appointed
following significant delays caused by the inability of the HDZ and SDP to agree on suitable candidates.
The appointment of several candidates was controversial, due to allegations of academic plagiarism
and the alleged assumption of false identities in business transactions. All candidates were considered
to be politically linked to either the HDZ or SDP and their partners.52 The election of the constitutional
justices was only made possible by a deal between the HDZ and SDP that secured the two-thirds
majority in parliament necessary for the appointments to be effective. The two parties justified their
compromise by the need to have a full constitutional court in place before the elections, so that the court
could adjudicate possible complaints arising from electoral proceedings.53
The Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA) stated in a report prepared for the president and the prime
minister that 20 judges posed a threat to national security and were engaged in potentially corrupt
practices.54 The Agency’s report did not specifically name judges, but indicated that problems exist in
judicial system. While this was unprecedented, the report did not meet any significant reactions or
denials. In fact, the Minister of Justice stated that the report suggests that corruption in the judiciary is
a minor problem, as it only highlighted a small number of judges.55 The report arrived in the context of
several allegations of inappropriate contact between judges and interested parties in 2015 and 2016,
including Constitutional Court judges deciding the constitutionality of certain laws. However, the
significance of the report is hard to assess from media reports, as most comments related to external
influences on the judiciary and were mostly conjecture, given that there were no proven or verifiable
links with actual corruption cases.
Following the parliamentary elections in September, the new government announced plans to
implement several judicial reforms. These changes aimed to improve the efficiency of case
management in the county and commercial courts, as well as to provide greater mobility for judges.56
Under the proposed reforms, the Supreme Court’s role in standardizing court practice was to increase;
the changes also sought to professionalize some posts in the State Judicial Council.57 However, the
Minister of Justice did not provide an analysis of the reasoning behind the changes or an implementation
timeframe.
Corruption
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
4.50 4.50 4.50 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25
The year 2016 saw a series of high profile corruption cases against senior politicians go to trial. Perhaps
the year’s most important event was a decision of the Commission for the Prevention of Conflict of
10
Interest, an independent anticorruption watchdog, against deputy prime minister and HDZ leader
Tomislav Karamarko. In June, the Commission found that Karamarko had a conflict of interest relating
to his advocacy for Croatia’s unilateral withdrawal of a complaint against the Hungarian oil company
MOL. Together with majority shareholder MOL, the Croatian government managed an oil company,
INA, and it was over the management of INA that a complaint arose. The Commission revealed that
MOL’s chief lobbyist in Croatia had hired Karamarko’s wife for various public relations services. The
Commission found that Karamarko had tried to influence a government decision in a manner favoring
MOL, while the MOL lobbyist was engaged in a business relationship with Ana Karamarko’s PR firm,
Drimia. An administrative court subsequently rejected Tomislav Karamarko’s appeal of the
Commission’s findings in September.
In a related development, reports emerged that under Karamarko’s leadership, the HDZ received a
donation from foundations associated with Russian-owned energy companies interested in doing
business in the EU market. While the donation was legal, even some HDZ members suggested it might
have been linked to unwarranted political influence.58
After three attempts, a court confirmed an indictment against the former head of Croatia’s Chamber of
Economy (HGK), Nadan Vidošević, and opened the way for the case to proceed to the trial phase. In
November, after several attempts, the Zagreb county court approved indictments against the former
transport minister and mayor of Zadar, Božidar Kalmeta, two former deputy ministers and several
managers of the Croatian Motorway Company (HAC), and the managers of construction companies for
money laundering.59 Prosecutors also indicted Kalmeta in another case related to a payment made to
the public relations company Fimi Media, which was involved in money laundering and illegal
financing for the HDZ during the tenure of its former leader, Ivo Sanader.60
Corruption cases generally take a long time for procedural reasons, as courts need to approve
indictments for trials to proceed. In most cases, defense attorneys use the process to challenge the
prosecution’s case before trial by appealing to county courts and then the Supreme Court. This creates
sizable delays between the investigative phase and actual trials.
In one of Croatia’s most complex corruption cases, the former Minister of Economy and deputy prime
minister, Damir Polančec, was acquitted with seven codefendants in a case related to the takeover of
the food company Podravka through the alleged use of company assets to raise capital for the move. In
the same trial, but on a separate count, four of the defendants were found guilty of illegally providing
a loan to a private company using Podravka’s financial assets.61
The trial of Marina Lovrić Merzel, an SDP parliamentarian and the former head of the Sisak Moslavina
county, was postponed after prosecutors demanded that the judge presiding the case recuse himself.
The judge had dismissed the prosecution’s main evidence against Merzel and rejected the plea bargain
between prosecutors and one of the defendants.62
Prosecutors did not charge Josipa Rimac–the former mayor of Knin and a former HDZ member of
parliament–and her husband for gaining possession of property to which they were not entitled under
law. While the prosecution elected not to press charges due to a lack of evidence, it did charge the
official responsible for enabling the couple to gain possession of property.
The Zagreb County Court did not confirm an indictment against the mayor of the capital, Milan Bandić,
and his associates. The court ruled that the prosecution’s evidence–obtained by wiretapping–was
inadmissible, as warrants were not substantiated to the standard required by law.63 The prosecutors will
appeal to the Supreme Court, but until the appeal is concluded the case will be on hold.
During the 2016 election campaign, documents obtained from a car burglary alleged that a PR company
(Grizli komunikacije) working for Most was involved in influence-selling, promising their clients
access to government ministers and media in order to facilitate the favorable resolution of a commercial
dispute.64 No evidence emerged that Most ministers took any action in relation to the ads, or that they
tried to influence the media in favor of the PR company’s clients.
Throughout 2016, the police and prosecutors investigated several corruption cases against individuals
at comparably lower political positions than those involved in cases opened in previous years. Court
11
proceedings against many of those investigated or arrested in previous years are proceeding slowly,
with appeals requiring superior courts’ intervention, and often resulting in situations where
prosecutorial evidence was found inadmissible or faulty.
AUTHOR: ANDRIJA HENJAK
Andrija Henjak is an assistant professor in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Zagreb.
1 “Službeno potvrđeno: Tihomir Orešković kandidat je Mosta i Domoljubne koalicije za mandatara!” [Officially
confirmed: Tihomir Oreskovic is Most and the Patriotic Coalition’s candidate for prime minister!], Večernji list, 23
December 2015, http://www.vecernji.hr/izbori2015/dok-traje-sjednica-nacionalnog-vijeca-hdz-a-milan-bandic-na-
istome-katu-sastanci-s-lekom-1047076 2 “KARAMARKO: ‘Lustracija nije lov na ljude, nego distanciranje od vrijednosti iz komunizma’”
[KARAMARKO: ‘Lustration is not a hunt for people, but a distancing from the values of communism’] Jutarnji, 23
January 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/karamarko-lustracija-nije-lov-na-ljude-nego-distanciranje-od-
vrijednosti-iz-komunizma/90547/; “Tomislav Karamarko poručuje kako će HDZ-ova lustracija biti demokratska te
da se branitelje proganjalo kao vještice” [Tomislav Karamarko says that the HDZ’s lustration is to be democratic
and that veterans have been persecuted like witches], Telegram, 24 January 2016, http://www.telegram.hr/politika-
kriminal/tomislav-karamarko-porucuje-kako-ce-hdz-ova-lustracija-biti-demokratska-te-da-se-branitelje-proganjalo-
kao-vjestice/
“Karamarko: Lustracija? Nećemo formirati istražna tijela koja će kopati po tuđoj prošlosti” [Karamarko: Lustration?
We will establish an investigative body that will dig into someone else’s past], Slobodna Dalmacija, 24 January
2016, http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/novosti/hrvatska/clanak/id/299899/karamarko-lustracija-necemo-formirati-
istrazna-tijela-koja-ce-kopati-po-tuoj-proslosti 3 “TIMOV TIM Premijer nakon eskalacije sukoba Mosta i HDZ-a udijelio ukor Karamarku, Petrovu, ali i ministrici
Šikić: ‘Tako se ne radi!’” [After the escalation of tensions between Most and the HDZ, the Prime Minister
reprimanded Karamarko, Petrov, and Minister Šikić: ‘That’s not how it’s done!’], Jutarnji, 22 April 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/timov-tim-premijer-nakon-eskalacije-sukoba-mosta-i-hdz-a-udijelio-ukor-
karamarku-petrovu-ali-i-ministrici-sikic-tako-se-ne-radi/4048329/; “SUKOB U VLADAJUĆOJ KOALICIJI Ovo su
tri moguća scenarija za rasplettrenutnih napetosti između HDZ-a i Mosta” [Conflict in the ruling coalition Three
possible scenarios for the resolution of current tensions between the HDZ and Most], Jutarnji, 3 March 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sukob-u-vladajucoj-koaliciji-ovo-su-tri-moguca-scenarija-za-rasplettrenutnih-
napetosti-izmedu-hdz-a-i-mosta/27283/; “VIJEĆE ZA SURADNJU MOSTA I HDZ-A VIŠE NE RADI!
Domoljubna koalicija: ‘Mi još nismo ni preuzeli vlast...’ [THE COUNCIL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN
BRIDGE AND HDZ does not work! Patriotic Coalition: ‘We have not even taken power...’], Jutarnji, 3 March
2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/vijece-za-suradnju-mosta-i-hdz-a-vise-ne-radi-domoljubna-koalicija-
mi-jos-nismo-ni-preuzeli-vlast.../27028/ 4 “SUKOB U VLADAJUĆOJ KOALICIJI Ovo su tri moguća scenarija za rasplettrenutnih napetosti između HDZ-a
i Mosta” “ [Conflict in the ruling coalition Three possible scenarios for the resolution of current tensions between
the HDZ and Most], Jutarnji, 3 March 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sukob-u-vladajucoj-koaliciji-
ovo-su-tri-moguca-scenarija-za-rasplettrenutnih-napetosti-izmedu-hdz-a-i-mosta/27283/ 5 “Jurlina Alibegović: HDZ nije za reformu javne uprave” [Jurlina Alibegović: HDZ is not for public administration
reform], Večernji list, 25 August 2016, http://www.vecernji.hr/izbori2016/jurlina-alibegovic-hdz-nije-za-reformu-
javne-uprave-1108741; “SUKOB MOSTA I HDZ-a POSTAJE SVE ŽEŠĆI! Petrov: ‘Ove optužbe su sramotne’”
[MOST AND HDZ CONFLICT: It is getting rough! Petrov: “These accusations are shameful”], net.hr, 11 May
2016, http://net.hr/danas/hrvatska/sukob-mosta-i-hdz-a-postaje-sve-zesci-petrov-mikuliceve-optuzbe-su-sramotne/ 6 “VIJEĆE ZA SURADNJU MOSTA I HDZ-A VIŠE NE RADI! Domoljubna koalicija: ‘Mi još nismo ni preuzeli
vlast...’ [THE COUNCIL FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN BRIDGE AND HDZ does not work! Patriotic
Coalition: ‘We have not even taken power...’], Jutarnji, 3 March 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/vijece-
za-suradnju-mosta-i-hdz-a-vise-ne-radi-domoljubna-koalicija-mi-jos-nismo-ni-preuzeli-vlast.../27028/ 7 “Arbitraža oko Ine nacionalni je interes iza kojega moramo svi stati”[Arbitration around INA is a national interest
behind which we must all stand], Večernji list, 24 April 2016, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/arbitraza-oko-ine-
nacionalni-je-interes-iza-kojega-moramo-svi-stati-1079069; “PUCANJE ODNOSA NEZAPAMĆENA
POLITIČKA DRAMA Kako je sukob oko INE doveo do potpunog sloma Vlade” [Unprecedented political drama:
12
how the conflict over INA led to the complete breakdown of the government], Jutarnji, 3 June 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/nezapamcena-politicka-drama-kako-je-sukob-oko-ine-doveo-do-potpunog-
sloma-vlade/4128651/ 8 “Kronologija sukoba koji je doveo do krize vlasti” [Chronology of the conflict that led to the crisis of power], N1,
3 June 2016, http://hr.n1info.com/a128319/Vijesti/Kronologija-sukoba-koji-je-doveo-do-krize-vlasti.html 9 “Živi zid: socijal-populizam na hrvatski način” [Živi zid: social-populism, the Croatian way], tportal.hr, 21
January 2015,http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/komentari/366478/Zivi-zid-socijal-populizam-na-
hrvatski-nacin.html 10 “Konzervativna desnica udara na kurikularnu reformu: GROZD u ofenzivi protiv zdravstvenog odgoja”
[Conservative right-wing attack on curricular reform: CLUSTER on the offensive against health education],
novelist.hr, 11 November 2016, http://www.novilist.hr/novilist_public/Vijesti/Hrvatska/Konzervativna-desnica-
udara-na-kurikularnu-reformu-GROZD-u-ofenzivi-protiv-zdravstvenog-odgoja 11 “Ovo su najvažnije primjedbe znanstvenika ‘Pilara’ u recenziji kurikularne reforme” [These are the most
important objections of scientists from ‘Pilar’ in a review of curriculum reform], Večernji list, 24 May 2016,
https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/predlozena-reforma-jos-bi-vise-opteretila-i-dake-i-profesore-1086662 12 “POBJEDNICI PO MJERI BIRAČA Tko je sve ušao u Sabor zahvaljujući preferencijalnim glasovima, a tko je
očekivao ući na takav način, a nije uspio” [Who entered parliament through preferential voting – and who though
they would, but didn’t?], Jutarnji, 12 September 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/izbori2016/izborne-vijesti-
2016/pobjednici-po-mjeri-biraca-tko-je-sve-usao-u-sabor-zahvaljujuci-preferencijalnim-glasovima-a-tko-je-
ocekivao-uci-na-takav-nacin-a-nije-uspio/4688117/ 13 “DIP podnosi kaznenu prijavu DORH-u zbog Karamarkove izjave o krađi mandata” [The SEC filed a criminal
complaint in the State Attorney’s Office because Karamarko’s statement about the vote theft], Telegram, 25 January
2016, http://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/dip-podnosi-kaznenu-prijavu-nakon-karamarkove-izjave-o-kradi-
mandata/ 14 “OPTUŽBE HDZ-a ZA KRAĐU MANDATA Apis: ‘Karamarko se izblamirao. Ili ne razumije postupak obrade
glasova ili svjesno izmišlja’ [HDZ CHARGES FOR THEFT OF OFFICE. Apis, ‘Karamarko either contradicting
himself, does not understand the process of processing votes, or is consciously lying’], Jutarnji, 15 February 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/optuzbe-hdz-a-za-kradu-mandata-apis-karamarko-se-izblamirao.-ili-ne-
razumije-postupak-obrade-glasova-ili-svjesno-izmislja/99958/ 15 “Karamarko: Istražiti ulogu APIS-a u izbornoj noći” [Karamarko: Investigate the role of APIS on election night],
tportal.hr, 24 January 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/413409/Karamarko-Istraziti-ulogu-APIS-a-u-
izbornoj-noci.html 16 “Tvrtka APIS, koju je Karamarko optužio za krađu glasova na izborima, odgovorila je šefu HDZ-a” [The
company APIS, which Karamarko accused of stealing votes in the elections, responded to HDZ’s boss], Telegram,
25 January 2016, http://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/o-karamarkovim-optuzbama-o-pokradenim-izborima-
oglasio-se-i-prozvani-apis/ 17 “DIP traži uništenje izbornih listića jer HDZ nije pokraden” [Because the HDZ wasn’t robbed, the SEC will seek
the destruction of ballots], N1, 22 July 2016,
http://hr.n1info.com/a138912/Vijesti/DIP-trazi-unistenje-izbornih-listica-jer-je-DORH-zakljucio-da-HDZ-na-
zadnjim-izborima-nije-pokraden.html 18 “TKO SU STVARNI PROTIVNICI KURIKULARNE REFORME Gotovo svi tvrde da je podržavaju, ali...”
[WHO ARE THE REAL OPPONENTS. Curricular reform – almost all claim to support it, but...], Jutarnji, 4 June
2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/tko-su-stvarni-protivnici-kurikularne-reforme-gotovo-svi-tvrde-da-je-
podrzavaju-ali.../4129305/ 19 “Treba prekinuti sadašnju situaciju u kojoj su učitelji birokrati, a djeca bubaju podatke” [“The current situation in
which teachers are bureaucrats and children pay bribes for data should be stopped”], Dnevnik, 31 May 2016,
http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/kurikularna-reforma-prosvjedi-za-reformu-obrazovanja-bez-stranaka-i-politike---
438887.html 20 “GROZD žestoko protiv građanskog odgoja: To je ideologija!” [CLUSTER is vehemently against civic education:
It is an ideology!], tportal.hr, 15 April 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/327361/GROZD-zestoko-protiv-
gradanskog-odgoja-To-je-ideologija.html 21 “Otvoreno: Treba li Vlada rezati novac za udruge civilnog društva?” [Panel: Should the Government cut money
for civil society?], HRT Vijesti, 4 June 2016, http://vijesti.hrt.hr/324475/otvoreno-treba-li-vlada-rezati-novac-za-
udruge-civilnog-drustva
13
22 “555% ZA HRVATSKU Branitelji pojasnili zašto baš sada odlaze iz Savske” [555% for Croatian Veterans
explains why it is just now leaving the Sava], Dnevnik, 26 April 2016, http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/zavrsen-
braniteljski-prosvjed-u-savskoj---434862.html 23 “HASANBEGOVIĆ OTKRIO ZAŠTO JE RASPUSTIO POVJERENSTVO ‘Iskreno, uopće ne znam što su mi
napisali iz ‘U ime obitelji’ [HASANBEGOVIĆ EXPLAINS WHY HE DISSOLVED THE COMMITTEE:
“Honestly, I do not even know what they wrote from’ On behalf of the family”], Jutarnji, 2 May 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/hasanbegovic-otkrio-zasto-je-raspustio-povjerenstvo-iskreno-uopce-ne-znam-
sto-su-mi-napisali-iz-u-ime-obitelji/95716/ 24 “Na telefonskoj sjednici Vlade donesena uredba o raspodjeli novca od igara na sreću” [At the telephone session,
the government adopted the regulation on the allocation of money from gambling], Večernji list, 22 April 2016,
http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/na-telefonskoj-sjednici-vlade-donesena-uredba-o-raspodjeli-novca-od-igara-na-
srecu-1078578 25 “Građani od Vlade traže spas civilnog društva” [Citizens seek the salvation of civil society from the government],
tportal.hr, 9 May 2016, http://m.tportal.hr/vijesti/427768/Gradani-pred-Banskim-dvorima-Za-snazno-civilno-
drustvo.html 26 “VLADA NE FUNKCIONIRA? Ministri nisu došli, sjednica GSV-a otkazana” [Is the government not
functioning? The ministers did show up, the ESC session was canceled], Dnevnik, 6 June 2016,
http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/na-sjednici-gsv-razgovarat-ce-se-o-zaposljavanju---439467.html 27 “Orešković se već dogovorio s Petrovom: ‘Jasno je da novca za povećanje plaća ove godine nema’” [Orešković
was already in agreement with Petrov: “It is clear that there is no money for salary increases this year”], RTL
Vijesti, 20 March 2016, http://www.vijesti.rtl.hr/novosti/hrvatska/1937017/oreskovic-se-vec-dogovorio-s-petrovom-
jasno-je-da-novca-za-povecanje-placa-ove-godine-nema/ 28 “VLADA Predložena smjena Vijeća za elektroničke medije” [THE GOVERNMENT proposes changes to the
Council for Electronic Media], nacional.hr, 10 March 2016, http://www.nacional.hr/vlada-predlozena-smjena-
vijeca-za-elektronicke-medije/ 29 “Evo što Vijeće za elektroničke medije kaže o svojoj smjen” [Here’s what the Electronic Media Council says
about the changes], tportal.hr, 10 March 2016, http://m.tportal.hr/vijesti/419843/Evo-sto-Vijece-za-elektronicke-
medije-kaze-o-svojoj-smjeni.html 30 “Mirjana Rakić: Nad Vijećem je proveden politički pritisak” [Mirjana Rakić: Political pressure has been exercised
over the Council], N1, 10 March 2016, http://hr.n1info.com/a109763/Vijesti/Mirjana-Rakic-za-N1-Nad-Vijecem-je-
proveden-politicki-pritisak.html 31 “Smjena Radmana s čela HRT-a i njegov vjerojatni nasljednik top je tema svih medija, a ovo je 12 stvari za znati”
[Radman’s shift from the forefront of the HRT, and his likely successor, is the media’s top topic: here are 12 things
to know], Telegram, 3 March 2016, http://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/smjena-radmana-s-cela-hrt-a-i-njegov-
vjerojatni-nasljednik-top-je-tema-svih-medija-a-ovo-je-12-stvari-za-znati/ 32 “HND će se znati ponašati u skladu s prijetnjama” [HND will be known to behave in accordance with threats],
tportal.hr, 16 February 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/416394/HND-ce-se-znati-ponasati-u-skladu-s-
prijetnjama.html 33 “OVO JE SCENARIJ ZA SMJENU GORANA RADMANA Prvo će saborski Odbor za medije srušiti izvješće o
radu HRT-a” [THIS is the SCENARIO FOR the dismissal of GORAN RADMAN. First, will the Parliamentary
Committee on Media shoot down the report on the work of the HRT], Jutarnji, 20 February 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/ovo-je-scenarij-za-smjenu-gorana-radmana-prvo-ce-saborski-odbor-za-medije-srusiti-
izvjesce-o-radu-hrt-a.../102142/ 34 “Prosvjed za Z1: Bujanec Mirjani Rakić poklonio četničku kapu” [Protest for Z1: Bujanec gives Mirjani Rakic a
Chetnik cap], N1, 26 January 2016, http://hr.n1info.com/a99537/Vijesti/Prosvjed-za-Z1-Bujanec-Mirjani-Rakic-
poklonio-cetnicku-kapu.html 35 “Branitelji u prosvjedu potpore Z1 televiziji, Bujanec Mirjani Rakić poklonio četničku kapu” [Veterans protest in
support Z1 television, Bujanec gives Mirjana Rakic a Chetnik cap], RTL Vijesti, 26 January 2016,
http://www.vijesti.rtl.hr/novosti/hrvatska/1913718/branitelji-u-prosvjedu-potpore-z1-televiziji-bujanec-mirjani-
rakic-poklonio-cetnicku-kapu/ 36 “Braniteljske udruge traže smjenu ravnatelja HAVC-a, Hasanbegović će tražiti očitovanje Hribara” [Veterans’
associations seek the dismissal of the Director Audiovisual Center, Hasanbegović will seek comment from Hribar],
Jutarnji, 12 May 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/braniteljske-udruge-traze-smjenu-ravnatelja-havc-a-
hasanbegovic-ce-traziti-ocitovanje-hribara/3745176/
14
37 “Hrvoje Hribar i HAVC sljedeća su Hasanbegovićeva meta” [Hrvoje Hribar and Audiovisual Center are
Hasanbegović’s next target], nacional.hr, 11 February 2016, http://www.nacional.hr/hrvoje-hribar-i-havc-sljedeca-
su-hasanbegoviceva-meta/ 38 “HAVC je najbolja kulturna reforma koju smo napravili” [HAVC is the best cultural reform we have made],
tportal.hr, 30 October 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/450616/HAVC-je-najbolja-kulturna-reforma-
koju-smo-napravili.html 39 “Nina Obuljen Koržinek i Hribar na optužbe udruga iz Domovinskog rata: Sve su to laži i klevete” [Nina Obuljen
Korzinek and Hribar on Homeland War Crimes Accusations: They are all lies and libel], HRT Vijesti, 12 October
2016, http://vijesti.hrt.hr/355964/dio-udruga-iz-domovinskog-rata-protiv-nine-obuljen-korzinek 40 “Petrov obećao raspravu o prijetnjama novinarima” [Petrov promised a debate on threats to journalists], N1, 24
October 2016, http://hr.n1info.com/a157813/Vijesti/Petrov-obecao-raspravu-o-prijetnjama-novinarima.html 41 “HND NAJOŠTRIJE OSUĐUJE NAJNOVIJE PRIJETNJE SMRĆU I POZIVE NA NASILJE PREMA
NOVINARIMA” [HND STRONGLY CONDEMNS THE RECENT DEATH THREATS AND CALLS FOR
VIOLENCE AGAINST JOURNALISTS], HND, 30 September 2016, http://www.hnd.hr/hnd-najostrije-osuduje-
najnovije-prijetnje-smrcu-i-pozive-na-nasilje-prema-novinarima 42 “HND upozorava na govor mržnje i prijetnje prema novinarima” [HND warns against hate speech and threats
against journalists], index.hr, 1 November 2016, http://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/hnd-upozorava-na-govor-
mrznje-i-prijetnje-prema-novinarima/929329.aspx 43 “Šefu HND-a prepilili vijke na kotaču auta” [The head of the HND sawed the bolts on the wheel of the car],
tportal.hr, 28 October 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/450346/Sef-u-HND-a-prepilili-sarafe-na-kotacu-
auta.html?utm_source=clanci&utm_medium=manual2&utm_campaign=clanci_manual 44 “HND: 280 novinara neprofitnih medija ostalo bez prihoda” [HND: 280 journalists from non-profit media remain
without income], tportal.hr, 1 October 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/446745/HND-280-novinara-
neprofitnih-medija-ostalo-bez-prihoda.html 45 “Opsežno istraživanje: Provjerite koji su najgori poslovi u 2016. godini “ [Extensive research: what are the worst
jobs in 2016], srednja.hr, 17 October 2016, http://m.srednja.hr/Novosti/Korak-do-posla/Opsezno-istrazivanje-
Provjerite-koji-su-najgori-poslovi-u-2016-godini 46 “Ministrica nam je rekla kad kreće reforma lokalne samouprave” [The minister discusses implementation of the
reform of local self-government], tportal.hr, 27 April 2016,
http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/426075/Ministrica-nam-je-rekla-kad-krece-reforma-lokalne-samouprave.html 47 “Kreće velika reforma javne uprave, a ovo je 9 stvari koje o tome trebate znati” [There is a big public
administration reform, and these are the 9 things you need to know about it], Telegram, 18 February 2016,
http://www.telegram.hr/politika-kriminal/krece-velika-reforma-javne-uprave-a-ovo-je-9-stvari-koje-o-tome-trebate-
znati/ 48 “Župani protiv reforme lokalne samouprave Ministarstva uprave” [Mayors Against the Ministry of
Administration’s Local Government Reform], tportal.hr, 1 July 2016, http://m.tportal.hr/vijesti/434851/Zupani-
protiv-reforme-lokalne-samouprave-Ministarstva-uprave.html 49 “Moguća izmjena zakona zabrinula građane: ‘To bi mi se jako odrazilo na standard’” [Citzens concerned by the
possible amendments to the law], Dnevnik, 11 October 2016, http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/nize-place-u-
jedinicama-lokalne-samouprave---453232.html 50 “Pranić, prvi gradonačelnik Vrgorca koji nije HDZ-ovac” [Pranić, the first mayor of Vrgorac not to be a HDZ
member], N1, 19 June 2016, http://hr.n1info.com/a131613/Vijesti/Most-slavi-pobjedu-u-Vrgorcu-Imamo-
gradonacelnika.html 51 “KRAJ TRAKAVICE Izabrano 10 kandidata za Ustavni sud, petero dobili maksimalni broj glasova” [End of the
tapework: 10 candidates for the Constitutional Court selected, five voted unanimously], Jutarnji, 3 June 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/kraj-trakavice-izabrano-10-kandidata-za-ustavni-sud-petero-dobili-
maksimalni-broj-glasova/4127133/ 52 “MOST: ‘Među 6 kandidata pokušalo se ugurati neke koji ne ispunjavaju uvjete’” [Most: there was an attempt to
slip unqualified persons among the six candidates], Dnevnik, 2 June 2016, http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/most-
konferencija-za-medije-o-izboru-ustavnih-sudaca---439168.html 53 “Sabor potvrdio 10 novih sudaca Ustavnog suda!” [Parliament confirms 10 new judges of the Constitutional
Court!], Jutarnji, 3 June 2016, http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sabor-potvrdio-10-novih-sudaca-ustavnog-
suda/4128015/ 54 “ALARMANTNO UPOZORENJE SOA-e: Dvadeset hrvatskih sudaca ozbiljno ugrožava nacionalnu sigurnost
zemlje!” [ALARMING SOA WARNING: Twenty Croatian judges seriously jeopardize national security of the
15
country!], net.hr, 5 July 2016, http://net.hr/danas/hrvatska/alarmantno-upozorenje-soa-e-dvadeset-hrvatskih-sudaca-
ozbiljno-ugrozava-nacionalnu-sigurnost-zemlje/ 55 “‘Spominjanje 20 sudaca u SOA-inom izvješću pokazuje da nije korumpirano pravosuđe u cjelini’” [‘That 20
judges were mentioned in the SOA report shows that the judiciary as a whole is not corrupt], Jutarnji, 10 July 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/spominjanje-20-sudaca-u-soa-inom-izvjescu-pokazuje-da-nije-korumpirano-
pravosude-u-cjelini/4513286/ 56 “Pravosudne reforme kreću na trgovačkim sudovima” [Judicial reforms to start in commercial courts], Slobodna
Dalmacija, 28 April 2016, http://www.slobodnadalmacija.hr/misljenja/zona-sumraka/clanak/id/310787/pravosudne-
reforme-krecu-na-trgovackim-sudovima 57 “Šprlje potvrdio: Sprema se velika reforma u pravosuđu” [Šprlje confirms: there will be a huge reform of the
judiciary], tportal.hr, 3 August 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/419491/Sprlje-potvrdio-Sprema-se-
velika-reforma-u-pravosudu.html 58 “NOVA KARAMARKOVA AFERA - HDZ ruskom donacijom platio IFO institut 2,6 milijun kuna?” [New
Karamarko Affair - HDZ paid IFO institute 2.6 million kuna from Russian donation?], Dnevnik, 12 July 2016,
http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/hdz-ruskom-donacijom-platio-ifo-institut-2-6-milijun-kuna---443036.html 59 “Potvrđena optužnica protiv Kalmete i još 12 okrivljenika u slučaju Remorker” [Indictment against Kalmeta and
12 other defendants in the ‘Tug’ case], Večernji list, 10 November 2016, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/afera-
bozidara-kalmete-potvrdena-optuznica-u-slucaju-hacremorker-1127442 60 “USKOK podnio novu optužnicu protiv Kalmete: Oštetio Ministarstvo za više od 600 tisuća kuna” [USKOK files
new indictment against Kalmeta: he swindled the Ministry of more than 600,000 kuna], Večernji list, 21 November
2016, http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/uskok-podignuo-novu-optuznicu-protiv-kalmete-ostetio-ministarstvo-za-vise-
od-600-tisuca-kuna-1130003 61 “POLANČEC OSLOBOĐEN KRIVNJE! Samo će jedna osoba završiti u zatvoru zbog afere ‘Spice’”
[POLANČEC acquitted! Only one person will end up in jail because of the ‘Spice’ affair], Jutarnji, 18 July 2016,
http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/crna-kronika/polancec-osloboden-krivnje-samo-ce-jedna-osoba-zavrsiti-u-zatvoru-
zbog-afere-spice/4538510/ 62 “ODGOĐENO SUĐENJE ‘Sada vidimo da sve što Uskok servira sudovima više ne prolazi bez upita’” [Trial
postponed: “Now we see that all that Uskok serves for the courts no longer passes without asking”], Dnevnik, 17
May 2016, http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/pocinje-sudjenje-marini-lovric-merzel-2---437319.html 63 “AFERA AGRAM: Odbačeni nezakonito prikupljeni dokazi” [Agram Affair: Illegally collected evidence
rejected], Dnevnik, 30 March 2016, http://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/afera-agram-optuznica-protiv-bandica-pred-
optuznim-vijecem---431634.html 64 “HDZ: I mostovci se zgražaju nad aferom Grizli, zašto Orepić šuti?” [HDZ: The minions are grieving over the
Grizli affair, so why is Orepić silent?], tportal.hr, 13 June 2016, http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/432362/HDZ-
I-Mostovci-se-zgrazaju-nad-aferom-Grizli-zasto-Orepic-suti.html