reflections on iran’s 2013 presidential elections

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Focus: IranProfessor Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Dr. Luciano ZaccaraReflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections

Dr. Rouzbeh ParsiEdging towards equilibrium –The presidency of Hassan Rouhani

Professor Dr. David MenashriHassan Rouhani:Iran’s New Hope for Change

Dr. Arshin Adib-MoghaddamWhat is power in Iran?The shifting foundations of the Velayat-e faqih

Saleh ZamaniNew Iran by the Moderates:An analysis on sociopolitical forces and government

Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur“The Mirror has Two Faces”:The Islamic Republic’s Dual Policy toward the Internet

Dr. Sanam VakilThe Iranian Women’s Movement:Agency and Activism through History

Arastu SalehiRethinking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions

Alexander NiedermeierBetween Cyber War and Arab Spring:How Iran’s Military and Security Forces ConfrontCurrent Threats and Challenges

David Ramin JalilvandRecent developments and challengesin Iranian oil and gas sector

Professor Dr. Fred H. LawsonRegional Impact of the Third Phase of Syria’s Civil War

Content

Abstracts ........................................................................................4

ARTICLES

Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Dr. Luciano ZaccaraReflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections ..........................7

Dr. Rouzbeh ParsiEdging towards equilibrium –The presidency of Hassan Rouhani .............................................15

Professor Dr. David MenashriHassan Rouhani:Iran’s New Hope for Change .......................................................20

Dr. Arshin Adib-MoghaddamWhat is power in Iran?The shifting foundations of the Velayat-e faqih ............................30

Saleh ZamaniNew Iran by the Moderates:An analysis on sociopolitical forces and government ..................38

Dr. Liora Hendelman-Baavur“The Mirror has Two Faces”:The Islamic Republic’s Dual Policy toward the Internet ...............44

Dr. Sanam VakilThe Iranian Women’s Movement:Agency and Activism through History ..........................................49

Arastu SalehiRethinking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions ............................................55

Alexander NiedermeierBetween Cyber War and Arab Spring:How Iran’s Military and Security Forces ConfrontCurrent Threats and Challenges ..................................................60

David Ramin JalilvandRecent developments and challengesin Iranian oil and gas sector..........................................................67

Professor Dr. Fred H. LawsonRegional Impact of the Third Phase of Syria’s Civil War ..............74

REVIEWS

Thomas PierretReligion and State in Syria.The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution .................................82

Mark N. KatzLeaving without Losing.The War on Terror after Iraq and Afghanistan ..............................84

Ronen A. CohenThe Hojjatiyeh Society in Iran:Ideology and Practice from the 1950s to the Present ..................86

New Publications .........................................................................89

Events ..........................................................................................91

Authors ........................................................................................92

Board / Board of Trustees ............................................................94

Imprint ..........................................................................................95

Editorial

Dear ORIENT readers,

Not only have the Iranian presidential elections ofJune 2013 changed the political landscape in thecountry, they may very well also bear far reachingconsequences for the entire region. The newpresident, Hassan Rouhani, is – unlike his pred-ecessor – a centrist who managed to win a con-siderable amount of the reformist vote. Whileclearly belonging to Iran’s political establishment,Rouhani has chosen a moderate tone since tak-ing office – first and foremost concerning the dis-pute about Iran’s nuclear program.

Rouhani, who is considered a protégé of formerpresident Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, seemsto be trying hard to end his country’s status as aninternational pariah. While Iran has asserted itselfas a regional power and an important player alsoin the Syrian conflict, western sanctions havetaken a heavy toll on the country’s economy: In-dustrial production is eroding rapidly and oil rev-enues are decreasing, while unemployment is onthe rise. With these and other internal challenges,Rouhani has good reasons to reach out to theUnited States and other western powers.

In their article, Professor Anoush Ehteshamiand Dr. Luciano Zaccara analyse the back-ground of the Iranian presidential elections andthe victory of Hassan Rouhani. Dr. RouzbehParsi provides an overview of the internal and ex-ternal challenges facing the new administrationafter the eight years of Ahmadinejad’s rule. Pro-fessor Dr. David Menashri is sceptical about theIranian system’s ability to change with the elec-tion of the new president and examines the prob-ability of a policy shift in key policy issues. Dr.Arshin Adib-Moghaddam unravels the founda-tions of power on the Islamic Republic’s system ofthe Velayat-e faqih and uncovers the trend to-wards a pragmatist-realist approach. Saleh Za-mani explores the role of social forces in Iran witha special emphasis on the new middle class. Dr.Liora Hendelman-Baavur analyses the IslamicRepublic’s policy towards the internet and itsprospects under the new administration. Dr.Sanam Vakil looks into the emergence and de-velopment of the Iranian women’s movement andits engagement in political campaigns. ArastuSalehi deals with Iran’s nuclear program andtackles western misperceptions regarding Iran’scurrent geostrategic and economic interests.Alexander Niedermeier outlines the Iranian mil-itary strategy with special regard to its capabili-ties in the field of cyber warfare. David RaminJalilvand reviews the recent developments in theIranian oil and gas sector and gives an overviewof the challenges ahead. And in conclusion, Dr.Fred H. Lawson analyses the most recent de-velopments in the civil war raging within theboundaries of Iran’s most important regional ally:Syria.

I wish you an enjoyable reading.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Gunter MulackDirector of the German Orient-Institute

3ORIENT VI / 2013

Editorial / Content

I. Context

Elections in Iran have come to occupy a centralplace in the regulation of power relationsamongst the country’s fractious political forces.Elections also serve two further important pur-poses: first, to determine which groups or fac-tion(s) take control of the levers of power; andsecondly to demonstrate the legitimacy and pop-ularity of the Islamist regime to the country andthe world. But above all, it is the way that variousgroups approach national elections (parliamen-tary, presidential, councils, for other key bodiesof the state) that matters, for factions competefor power in order to advance their personal andpublic agendas. Politics, as a consequence, hasbecome highly personalised and at the sametime polarised and polemical.

Nevertheless, the personalities who eventuallysecure permission from the Guardian Council(GC) to run for such high office as the presi-dency also represent certain political lines andagendas. As a result, following personalities pro-vides clues as to which faction or group is bid-ding for power. The role of the Leader and theGC are central in this balancing act as it is thelatter group (in indirect consultation with theLeader) that literally makes or breaks a cam-paign, determines a faction’s fortunes and, in theinterest of appearing objective, tries to spreadthe approved candidates across the patchworkof groups making Iran’s revolutionary powerelite. Thus, the elections are institutional affairsas much as they are personal and group-linked.Each election creates a certain degree of ex-citement because once the candidates havebeen selected by the GC it is really anybody’sguess as to how the campaigning pans out andwho ultimately wins. Each election, moreover,has a very direct impact on the direction oftravel; in domestic and foreign policy terms,each president has thus far pursued a differentagenda. Of course when elections have beenpolarised, as in 2005 and particularly in 2009,not only do the institutions of the state falter, notonly do factions unleash their full force againsteach other, but they also aim to monopolise asmany levers of power as possible as a way ofexcluding and marginalising their competitors.These practices have further polarised thepower elite of the republic and pitted individuals,and sometimes even organs of the state, againsteach other.

Of course when electoral tensions spill onto thecountry’s streets, as they did in June 2009, thenthe entire state, which banks its legitimacy on‘free and open elections’, faces a serious crisisof legitimacy; and, as we saw in 2009, also a cri-sis of identity. Equally importantly, electoral ten-sions of the kind Iran witnessed in 2009 alsodiminish the glow of the Leader – who carriesthe country’s highest religious and political bur-den, as the Vali-e Faqih. His weakness thus canweaken the entire edifice. Since 2009, of course,the Leader has found himself in a deep crisis –in his authority and judgement. The legitimacyof the Islamic state as a whole was questionedfor its violent and repressive response to thepeaceful demonstrations against the outcome ofthe June 2009 ballot. The popular challenge,which brought some three million people ontothe streets of the capital alone that summer, notonly diminished the standing of the Leader (forthe way that he so swiftly lined up behind the in-cumbent Ahmadinejad) but also for the first timegave impetus to the rise of a credible home-grown opposition movement – the Green Move-ment – led by two former loyal members of theestablishment. What the June protests showed,finally, was the significance of voter power, evenin controlled political environments. So, while theprotesters may have failed to change the out-come of the June 2009 ballot, they neverthelessput down a strong marker for the role that themillions of eligible voters can play in effecting,indeed changing, the outcome of even the mostcontrolled of elections. Once the election mathas been rolled out, it is the voters who tread onit, not the elite.

The regime also had many external challengesto overcome. Its image as a stable and ‘democ-ratic’ Islamic state in a region of dictatorshipsmay have been badly tarnished by the outcomeof the June 2009 elections, but bigger problemsresulted from the misguided strategy and poli-cies of the second term president. As a result,the stakes were already high as the country pre-pared for its 11th presidential elections in June2013. Clearly, the political system had becomedysfunctional, thanks to Ahmadinejad’s con-frontational stance and bureaucratic incompe-tence (which pitted him against the legislatureas well as the Leader). The country’s isolationfrom the rest of the world had grown immeasur-ably since 2005; his administration’s miscalcu-lations in the nuclear talks had dramatically

Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Dr. Luciano ZaccaraReflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections

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Professor Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Dr. Luciano Zaccara

increased the intensity of the international, mul-tilateral and unilateral sanctions on the Iranianeconomy and regime – undeniably biting into thevery fabric of Iranian society and state. And,most importantly of all, and to the frustration ofthe Leader and the conservative camp, therewas no clear way in sight to address these mul-tiple crises. All parties, in addition, were acutelyaware that no elite consensus existed as to whoshould succeed Ahmadinejad, who of coursehad been busy the previous months groominghis own candidate (Mashaei) for the country’stop executive post.

II. The candidates

The 2013 elections will be remembered, apartfrom the swift victory of Hassan Rouhani, for therejection of Hashemi Rafsanjani and EsfandiarMashaei, the two most awkward candidates forthe Leader, Ali Khamenei. While the former ac-cepted the rejection of his candidacy withoutmuch fuss, creating controversy,1 the latter hadthreatened, supported by a strong complaintfrom the outgoing President Ahmadinejad, towage a legal battle to have the Guardian Coun-cil review (i.e. reverse its decision) – somethingthat has only occurred once in previous elec-tions. Surprisingly, that final move never hap-pened, and both Mashaei and Ahmadinejadremained quiet, accepting the final decision ofthe GC and indeed the election’s surprising out-come. But Rafsanjani and Mashaei did not pro-vide the only shocks: Another surprise was therejection of another insider candidate, namelyManouchehr Mottaki, former Minister of ForeignAffairs, between 2005 and 2010. Bearing inmind his experience in foreign policy and closeties with the conservative camp, as well as Aya-tollah Khamenei, he would have expected tostand a good chance in the elections and prob-ably receive more votes than candidates suchas Jalili or Velayati. Ali Fallahian, former Ministryof Intelligence (1989-1997), Elias Hazrati andMohammad Kavakevian (members of Parlia-ment) were among the 678 rejected applica-tions, but none of them generated such acontroversy as Mashaei and Rafsanjani did.Although the name of the former reformist pres-ident Mohammad Khatami was mentioned as apossible candidate, he explicitly declined to par-ticipate in favour of Aref’s candidacy as the lead-ing (only!) reform candidate.

From the eight candidates finally accepted bythe Guardian Council, three had considerableforeign policy experience, above all relating tonuclear negotiations. This, together with the hy-pothesis that the final televised debate on for-eign policy defined the outcome of the election,demonstrated how important the regional and in-ternational environment has become for thecountry and for every Iranian.

For instance, Ali Akbar Velayati had been Minis-ter of Foreign Affairs for sixteen straight years,during the presidencies of Khamenei (1981-1989) and Rafsanjani (1989-1997), including thedifficult years of war against Iraq. HassanRouhani was Secretary of the National SecurityCouncil (NSC) between 1989 and 2005 and ac-cordingly served as the chief nuclear negotiatorwith the EU-3 group during Khatami’s presi-dency. Lastly, Saeed Jalili was the National Se-curity Council’s Secretary going into theelections, a position which he had held since2007, and was also head of the nuclear negoti-ation team in the protracted talks with the 5+1group.

Any one of these three would have been well re-garded by the international community as cred-ible presidents, the feeling being that it would bebest not to have to deal with an unknown quan-tity at this critical juncture in the nuclear negoti-ations, and in the region more broadly. Arguably,it was Velayati who, as personal foreign policyadviser to the Leader, would have most faithfullyrepresented the foreign policy thinking and de-cisions of the Leader, which would have theo-retically facilitated future rounds of negotiations.Based on that hypothesis, it is understandablewhy Velayati refused to withdraw at the finalstage of the elections in favour of other conser-vative candidates, such as (Mayor of Tehran)Ghalibaf, thus diminishing the conservativecamp’s chances of success. Their divisions inthe end enhanced Rouhani’s position. Suppos-edly, Bagher Ghalibaf (also a former presiden-tial candidate in 2005) and Gholam Haddad Adel(Majlis Speaker between 2004 and 2008, andKhamenei’s relative by marriage) had formed acoalition with Velayati in April, with the commit-ment that two would withdraw in favour of themost popular candidate during the last week ofcampaign, something that only Haddal Adel ac-complished.

1 Hashemi applied to stand knowing he would be rejected, but anyway he decided to apply to give the Leader the chanceto reject both himself and Mashaei, reducing Ahmadinejad’s room for reaction and saving at the same time the imageof neutrality of the Guardian Council and the Leader himself. With his political sacrifice he deserved the right to imposeRouhani (his closest ally) instead of Aref (closer to Khatami) in the final stage of the presidential race. If this hypothe-sis is true, then Rafsanjani’s move would be a master piece of realpolitik that helped him not only to survive the lasteight years without falling from grace but also to return to the main elite circle in the Islamic Republic with a consider-able amount of power over the elective and non-elective institutions of the state.

Another candidate, Mohsen Rezaei, had stoodfor the presidency in 2005 and 2009. In 2005 hewithdrew a few days before the elections, speak-ing out about manoeuvres aimed at undermin-ing his candidacy. In 2009 he condemned theresults but did not take part in the pro-Mousavidemonstrations. Although he is considered tohave had a big following among the Revolution-ary Guards (Sepah-e Pasdaran), the results in2009 and 2013 proved that such a base is in-sufficient for translating military support intovotes.

As already noted, the only candidate consideredas a ‘reformist’ was Mohammad Reza Aref, aformer minister and also vice-president inKhatami’s administration. Following the 2009post-electoral protests, many reformist politi-cians were imprisoned and given life bans frompolitical activity. Aref was thus one of few fromthe reform camp to be allowed to take part in thecontest. Aref’s chances of success in the presi-dential race were always seen as being small,but his presence did give the elections a widerbase at the same time as giving the reform campa voice and a reason to engagge with the elec-toral process. Despite a high degree of coordi-nation between Rafsanjani and Khatami, Aref’swithdrawal in favour of Rouhani was thereforenot too surprising and can be seen as a victoryfor Rafsanjani’s strategy of winning the presi-dency over the pure reformist camp championedby Khatami.

Final word on the last candidate, MohammadGharazi, who was the least known of the eightcandidates and in the end performed poorly inthe poll. Between 1981 and 1985 he had beenMinister of Petroleum in the Moussavi govern-ment, and Minister of Post and Communicationsbetween 1985 and 1997 during the presidenciesof Khamenei and Rafsanjani. Outside of politicssince then, he offered little new thinking or ex-perience in comparison to the other experiencedand active politicians, so his motives for stand-ing remained unclear. Moreover, bearing in mindthat some Iranian news agencies published hispast links to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisa-tion, a proscribed violent group in Iran that isseen as an enemy of the Islamic Republic,2 hischances of success were to be slimmer still.Gharazi seems to have been a supporterof the organisation in the years prior to the rev-olution, only to abandon it when it chose to allyitself with Saddam Hussein in the war againstIran.

III. The campaign

The regime made every effort to ensure that the2013 elections would take place peacefully andwithout protest or disorder. Thus, unlike the2009 elections, there were no massive ralliesand popular gatherings in stadiums and bigopen spaces. There were several mid-sizedgatherings in different squares and publicspaces (meydan) in most major cities at differenttimes of day, in Tehran in particular, thoughthese were peaceful and non-confrontational.Sometimes a gathering would be announced butthe presidential candidate himself would not bepresent: merely an aide or a close representa-tive of the candidate giving the main speech.The government’s efforts to try and prevent anymassive rally or demonstrations against the au-thorities proved successful, but the peace wasalso down to the leaders of the reformist oppo-sition, who managed to control their supportersin order to avoid any provocation that could jus-tify the repression and even the dismissal oftheir candidates.

The electoral campaign itself was also differentin 2013. Thus, unlike the 2009 elections, whenface-to-face televised debates were held amongthe four candidates, this time there were three‘marathon’ televised debates of around 4-5hours between all the eight candidates. These‘mass debates’, in the end, did help energise theelectorate and capture their attention. The firstdebate, on economic policy, which took place on31st May, for example, not only heaped criticismon the Ahmadinejad administration, but alsoshowed the differences at the heart of the eliteover economic policy and tools for addressingIran’s economic problems. The format of thedebates, based on closed questions to beanswered in a short period of time, created a lotof controversy and criticism among the candi-dates, and none of them seemed to be satisfiedwith the result of that first encounter.

The second debate, on cultural policy, was heldon 5th June, and the candidates managed tooffer their visions in a better way than previously.However, neither the first nor the second debateseems to have mobilised the voters, who con-tinued to view the elections in an abstract fash-ion and held the campaigns at arm’s length. Theapparent apathetic mood that existed barely aweek before the elections made a low turnoutlikely, especially in Tehran. It was difficult to findpeople convinced of the need or point of voting.

2 See http://www.iransview.com/everything-about-mohammad-gharazi-unknown-qualified-presidential-candidate/721/.

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Reflections on Iran’s 2013 Presidential Elections

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Above all, polls during the campaign showedthat few had made up their minds about who tovote for – none or all of the eight candidates hada chance to win. Low key was arguably exactlywhat the Leader’s strategists wanted, and theabsence of charisma in any of the candidateswas having the desired effect of an under-whelming but controlled election. As far as theconservative establishment was concerned, aquiet election would deliver one of their camp’scandidates to the presidential office and alsoundo any remaining influence of the reformcamp.

Things were about to change, however.

Ominously, on June 7th, the day of the epic, finalfour-and-a-half hour debate, evidence of a dra-matic shift in the tactics of the candidatesemerged. The foreign policy-centred subject ofthe debate enabled the candidates to reallyargue and also bare their teeth. Besides the di-rect accusations of foreign policy mismanage-ment against some of them, including HassanRouhani, Saeed Jalili and Ali Akbar Velayati – allthree of whom have held responsibilities in for-eign affairs in different periods of the Republic –several items of dirty laundry were also aired,chiefly related to the student repressions of1999, when Ghalibaf, as chief of police, was di-rectly responsible.

The debate left Ghalibaf weakened, and ex-posed Jalili, who on several occasions had dis-played his conservative credentials and alsoabsence of a vision for Iran’s place in the world.Absence of charisma also damaged his stand-ing. Indeed, as none of the conservative candi-dates had been a clear favourite, and neither didany seem to enjoy the direct support of theLeader, their divisions in this debate highlightedtheir disarray rather than the cohesion of ashared agenda.

The Leader’s tactic, who before recommendingone candidate to his faithful followers was per-haps waiting for one to stand out, could arguablyhave undone them. Ironically, not even the with-drawal of Gholam Haddad Adel3 from the racejust a few days before the election day itself im-proved the election chances of the remainingconservative candidates. The ‘coalition of three’(Ghalibaf, Velayati and Haddad Adel), with acommitment for two to withdraw so as to aid theone, had become null and void in the race to thebottom of the opinion polls. The showdown in

the debate between the conservatives meantthat the two who stayed in the race would haveno option but to fight it out, and in the process di-vide the conservative vote.

On the other side of the political equation, thosecandidates who in theory went in at a disadvan-tage benefitted enormously from the third (for-eign affairs) debate. Rouhani – who had nevercalled himself a reformist, but did enjoy theirsupport – and especially Aref – the only reformistcandidate – kept their calm and were those whoresponded best to the questions and criticismsof their rivals. On June 11th, just three days be-fore the elections, Mohammad Reza Aref with-drew from the race,4 giving his explicit backing toRouhani. In a move that stunned the conserva-tives, the two ex-presidents Hashemi Rafsanjaniand Mohammad Khatami also decidedthat Rouhani was their most preferred candi-date.

Were Rouhani to win, the former presidentsnoted, he would be best placed to muster thesupport of the more conservative sectors andeven some clerics at Qom.5 Moreover, he coulddo so without direct confrontation with theSupreme Leader, given that Rouhani hasbeen the Leader’s own representative on theNational Security Council. With this decision,Rafsanjani brilliantly brought to an end fouryears of political cavalierism and ostracism, in-stalling one of his closest allies within reach ofthe presidency.

The conservatives’ lack of unity or, better put,their longing to compete to become the Leader’spreferred candidate, undermined Ghalibaf, Jaliliand Velayati. Neither the opinion polls nor theresults mentioned them as the favourites of themajority of Iranians. Interestingly, nor did thepolls predict an outright winner in the first round.

The only poll that could be considered scientific,carried out by IPOS,6 did signal an upswell ofsupport for Rouhani after the debate. Frombarely 8.1% on 6th June, before the last debate,his support rose to 14.4% on 10th June (the dayAref pulled out), only to then climb swiftly to26.6% a day later on 11th June, and to 31.7% onJune 12th, the last day polls were conducted. Incontrast, his principal rival Ghalibaf’s supportplummeted following the debate. From 39% on6th June, he plunged to 24.4% on 12th June. Inthe following table, the trends of both can beclearly appreciated.

3 See http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/06/10/308193/haddadadel-quits-presidential-race/.4 See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22851764.5 See http://www.iransview.com/unified-iranian-reformists-behind-rowhani-the-worst-news-for-principalists/927/.6 See http://www.ipos.me/.

IV. Election day

Although the apathy was evident a week beforethe elections, the mood gradually changed rightup to election day itself, and it was possible toobserve the usual large queues in front of somesignificant polling centres, such as the Hos-seiniya Ershad, Tajrish or Saad Abad. By way ofcontrast, the usually crowded itinerant pollingcentres around Tehran University were not ascongested after the Friday prayers as they hadbeen in 2009 or 2005. Similarly with the pollingstations at the south of Tehran, they remainedempty during large parts of the afternoon andevening. The voting time was extended severaltimes, until 12 PM, and even then there were stillpeople queuing at polling centres, at least insome mosques in the north of Tehran.

Undoubtedly the debate, and especially Aref’sdecision to withdraw from the race, were themain factors that drove the vast numbers of un-decided voters to the polling stations on June14th. On 12th June – the final day of the cam-paign – it was clear that what had been a battlewas now a duel between Rouhani and Ghalibaf,although there was not the same pre-electoralpassion as in 2009. We believe the impossibilityof predicting the result was due, in this case, tothe fact that the decision to vote at all, and votefor Rouhani, was being made on the electionday itself. First-hand accounts show that it wasnot difficult to find individuals admitting that theyhad voted for Rouhani when a week before theyhad said they would not vote at all. The dynam-ics of the elections changed, to the surprise ofmost observers and even insiders, after the for-

eign policy debate, during which Rouhanidemonstrated his analytical prowess, respect forthe electorate and commitment to détente andimproving relations with the outside world. Ah-madinejad’s administration took a battering inthese discussions, which of course also re-flected badly on the conservative-leaning candi-dates. But it was Rouhani’s comprehensivedebunking of the outgoing administration’s poli-cies and behaviour which put clear water be-tween him and the other candidates, and whichalso made Rouhani a far more appealing candi-date. He sounded moderate, and without ap-pearing ‘reformist’ he used the language ofnormalization in advocating broader cultural, po-litical and social liberties.

V. Final voter data

Successive presidential elections with surpris-ing and unexpected results (1997, 2005 and2009) have now made clear to observers of allhues – academics, journalists and governmentsalike – that it is impossible to predict Iranianelection results. None of the analysis prior to theJune 14th elections took into account the possi-bility that the hojjatoleslam and doctor,7 HassanFeridon – better known as Rouhani – would winoutright in the first round. However, many did an-ticipate that in the inevitable second roundRouhani would compete and would have to de-feat the current mayor of Tehran, MohammadBagher Ghalibaf, or even that the latter mightwin in either the first or second round of voting.Some bolder analysts even asserted that SaeedJalili, the nuclear negotiator, could win, thanksto the direct support of Leader Ali Khamenei and

7 The controversy on the veracity of the Ph.D. degree obtained by Rouhani has been positively solved with acongratulation message published by the authorities of Glasgow Caledonian University. Available at:http://www.gcu.ac.uk/newsevents/news/article.php?id=59642.

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12 ORIENT IV / 2013


the Pasdaran, as in 2005 with Ahmadinejad. Theofficial results released by the Ministry of Inte-rior the day after the elections8 shows that72.7% of Iranians voted, much higher than ex-pected by many, and that Hassan Rouhani ob-tained a narrow victory by securing some50.71% of the vote, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Votes obtained by each candidate

Surprisingly, the same data sets released by theMinistry of Interior9 several days after the officialannouncement showed different numbers invotes obtained by each candidate, as Table 2shows. Thus, the initial figure for Rouhani’s voteof 50.71% of the total votes was revised up-wards to a more emphatic win with 52.43% ofthe valid ballots cast.

Table 2: Votes obtained by each candidate

Looking at the results more closely, according tothe same database, the province in whichRouhani obtained the highest proportion of votewas the distant province of Sistan va Baluches-tan, where he secured an astonishing 73.30%of the votes cast, followed by Kordestan with70.85%. In Tehran, supposedly the main strong-hold of the reformists, he obtained 48.51% –less than half of the votes cast – and in Qom,the clerical capital of Iran, only 38.70%.

Table 3: Proportion of votes obtained byRouhani, selected provinces

However, his nearest rival, Ghalibaf, only ob-tained a relatively important proportion of thevotes in the two provinces in which he was sup-posed to be popular, Tehran (where he obtained25.75% of the votes cast), and Khorasan-eRazavi, where his hometown is located, withsome 32.72% of the votes cast.

VI. What does Rouhani’s victory mean?

With an official turnout of 72% – less than the84% announced in 2009 – the 2013 presidentialelections managed to fulfill the first of the goalsestablished by the political class: re-legitimationof the political system, recuperation of the pop-ulation’s trust in elections and especially in elec-tion results, which was lost to a large extent in2009. As a result, the president-elect is also le-gitimate in the eyes of the international commu-nity, which lost no time in congratulating him for

Candidate NO. votes Percentage

Total votes 36,704,156

Invalid votes 1,245,409 3.39%

Valid votes 35,458,747 96.61%

Hassan Rouhani 18,613,329 50.71%

MohammadBagher Ghalibaf 6,077,292 16.56%

Saeed Jalili 4,168,946 11.36%

Mohsen Rezaei 3,884,412 10.58%

Ali AkbarVelayati 2,268,753 6.18%

MohammadGharazi 446,015 1.22%

Candidate NO. votes Percentage

Valid votes 35,574,211

Invalid votes 1,245,409 3.39%

Hassan Rouhani 18,651,668 52.43%

MohammadBagher Ghalibaf 6,083,553 17.10%

Saeed Jalili 4,177,326 11.74%

Mohsen Rezaei 3,943,139 11.08%

Ali AkbarVelayati 2,272,122 6.38%

MohammadGharazi 446,403 1.24%

Province %

Sistan va Baluchestan 73.30%

Kordestan 70.85%

Yazd 67.72%

Azerbaijan-e Garbi 67.09%

Mazandaran 59.82%

Kerman 59.33%

Gilan 58.62%

Fars 58.21%

Azerbaijan-e Sharqui 57.87%

Tehran 48.51%

Isfahan 45.80%

Khorasan-e Razavi 43.99%

Qom 38.70%

8 See http://www.moi.ir/Portal/Home/ShowPage.aspx?Object=News&CategoryID=cc1955c9-7610-428d-b15c-fafc947cc884&WebPartID=47942904-35b9-4ecc-bfc4-4d6d3bee26d8&ID=ab52b9a8-e2a6-41e4-bbcc-15665125a6b2.

9 See http://www.iran2013.org/.

his victory, as well as the Iranian people for theirchoice. That said, the narrow margin with whichRouhani won – barely 50.7% or 52.43% – willprobably not give Rouhani the necessary roomhe would need for independence of action totackle Iran’s myriad of domestic and foreign pol-icy problems. Instead, he will need the consen-sus of all the political sectors, and also thesupport of the conservative-controlled parlia-ment, to make a success of his administration.His slogan of ‘Government of Hope and Pru-dence’ has much to live up to. His initial pressconferences and speeches, and the round ofmeetings he has had since 16th June with otherpolitical leaders, leads us to the tentative con-clusion that his room for maneuver is rather lim-ited and as such one should expect limitedprospects of substantial change taking placequickly. While President Rouhani has been clearabout what needs to be done domestically andin foreign policy terms, and although his cabinetappointments give clear indication of his prag-matist instincts, he is nevertheless tied to theprinciples that the Leader has for so long es-poused, and Rouhnai cannot change theseovernight – and certainly not without undermin-ing his own position in any case. So, while hecan explain to the Iranian public (as in his firsttelevised address on 10th September) that Iran’seconomy suffers from the disease of stagflation,he also has to announce that the problem is noteasily curable. His options are limited becausehe cannot choke off the credit lines to domesticbusinesses who need the cheap cash for sur-vival, yet he has to cut back on governmentspending to reduce the government deficit asmuch as to try and reduce the country’s crippling40% annual inflation rate. With these optionsclosed off, his most obvious path for curingstagflation would be to raise taxes, not a popu-lar policy and certainly not one that would bewelcomed by the Padaran-controlled para-statalbusinesses whose control of the key sectors ofthe economy has only grown under Ahmadine-jad, and with more intensive sanctions. He willhave to increase the financial burden on theIranian people (through higher taxes) and at thesame time manage the inevitable counterattackfrom the Pasdaran as he tries to bend their busi-ness interests to the economic imperatives ofthe country as a whole.

So, domestically, the president has his handsfull, for he will need the support of the Majlis forthe structural changes that Iran’s economyneeds. Thus, change, improvements indeed,can only be gradual and incremental at best.

Therefore, while it is good news that fifteen ofhis ministerial nominees won an outright confi-dence vote in the Majlis in August and three re-maining ministries are being run by caretakerministers, which shows a high degree of confi-dence in his emerging administration, this in it-self does not mean that the president hasmanaged to line up all his ducks domestically toensure a sustained process of reform at homeand détente abroad. He is, however, makingsome significant changes, which should berecognised: for example, transferring the nuclearfile from the NSC to the Ministry of Foreign Af-fairs – in other words under the direct control ofthe executive and in the hands of his Western-educated and trusted foreign minister, Dr. Mo-hammad Javad Zarif; and appointing anexperienced pro-reform former defence minister(Admiral Ali Shamkhani) as the Secretary of theNSC.

Also, the worsening regional dynamics, particu-larly the deepening national security crisis inSyria, have distracted Iran’s attention, as well asmuch of the international community’s awayfrom the necessity of restarting the nuclear ne-gotiations. As Rouhani has secured the Leader’sexplicit support for pursuing a diplomatic solu-tion to the crisis (albeit for a limited period), hewill be under pressure to produce results as ev-idence for the virtues of détente. But, ironically,this can only materialise through meetings andconcerted dialogue, which will require the atten-tion and energy of the diplomatic corps of Iranand those of the 5+1 group.

The Syrian crisis is also making it difficult for thenew administration to rebuild confidence withIran’s Arab neighbours, most of whom remainsuspicious of Tehran and wary of its role in theArab world – whether positively or negatively,the Islamic Republic is seen as a key player fromBahrain to Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

VII. Final reflections

The victory of Rouhani represented the defeatof the most peripheral groups in the Iranian po-litical spectrum. In a day, we would say, Ah-madinejad and his supporters arguably lost allof their clout and popular appeal. The supportthey had amassed during the previous eightyears apparently melted away, with no-one inthe end making a fuss about the rejection ofMashaei’s candidacy for the presidency. Thispattern was also evident in the municipal elec-tions held jointly with the presidential race, in

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ORIENT IV / 201314

which the candidates linked to Ahmadinejad’scamp obtained only nominal support. Where didthe neo-conservative base disappear to? Whatare the longer term implications of the routing ofthis once powerful political and military campfrom the Iranian corridors of power? How willthey regroup and how will they reorganise them-selves? These are all issues to monitor in themonths ahead.

We can also say that this election result providesevidence for the hypothesis that in Iran popularsupport towards a particular candidate is, in theend, not ideological but highly circumstantial,and, rather like the United States, personality-driven. Public sentiment drove support forKhatami in 1997 and Ahmadinejad in 2005, andplayed its role in the voters’ support for Rouhaniin 2013. The political ground shifted very quicklyin all three elections once the final victor hadmanaged to make a positive impression on theelectorate. Also, in this instance, there was an-other struggle going on: that between the Leaderand the urban voters. In supporting Rouhani’scandidacy, the latter wanted to send a strongmessage to the Leader to the effect that theywere against the policies implemented by theprevious government, which he had so emphat-ically endorsed. More than a supporting vote for

Rouhani, therefore, voters were arguably just asmuch punishing Ahmadinejad’s backers in theestablishment in lining up behind Rouhani.Though himself doubtlessly an establishmentfigure, Rouhani nevertheless came to representan alternative to the order created by theprevious Leader-endorsed administration. Thus,when asked about their electoral preferences,many Iranians simply replied that they selectedtheir preferred candidate on the basis of how‘different’ they managed to be when comparedwith the incumbent president.

In June 2013, voters may have chosen wisely,for the period before and after the confirmationof Rouhani’s government has shown that he istrying to be accommodating, gradualist in im-plementing internal reforms, seeking consensusamongst the political elite for the critical choicesto be made, and studiously avoiding languageor behaviour that would antagonise the conser-vative camp. So far so good, but the trick will behow to avoid confrontation with the conservativecamp (and bring them along), while avoidingalienating the masses and expectant reformistcommunity, whose vote ultimately put Rouhaniin the presidential palace. The months aheadwill be crucial, as Rouhani begins to mix the dyethat will set the colours of his term in office.

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