psychology's reality debate: a "levels of reality" approach

Psychology's Reality Debate: A "Levels of Reality" Approach

Jack Martin and Jeff Sugarman

Simon Fraser University

Abstract

For different reasons, some modern and postmodern psy-chologists are skeptical about the reality of psychologicalphenomena as irreducible, influential entities. Nonethe-less, much psychological inquiry presumes precisely sucha reality. We present a "levels of reality" approach topsychological reality that we believe can assuage some ofthe concerns of psychological skeptics. Our approachtreats psychological reality as inseparably embedded insociocultural, biological, and physical levels of reality,without being reducible to any of these other levels. Wedevelop our "levels of reality" approach in relation tofour different doctrines of realism, and elaborate itsimplications for understanding psychological phenomena.

As we enter the twenty-first century, we psychologists are havingtrouble with reality. Some of us who hold more or less traditionallymodern views with respect to psychological science want to treat psy-chological reality as if it were akin to physical reality (e.g., Matthews,1998) and are therefore anxious to reduce psychological phenomena ofinterest to their presumed neurophysiological, chemical, and biologicalcorrelates. Some of us who hold postmodern and related views withrespect to psychology as a human social construction are skepticalabout psychological and physical reality alike (e.g., Gergen, 1994),especially when psychological reality is asserted to be natural or essen-tial. To complicate matters, many of the reality-concerned of modernor postmodern persuasions appear to hold rather different conceptionsof realism.

In this article, we describe a "levels of reality" position that webelieve might illuminate and possibly resolve some of the confusionsand impasses in psychology's contemporary reality struggles. To setthe stage for our presentation, we first offer three different, traditionaldoctrines of realism and consider a variety of brief examples of howthese might play out with respect to various levels of physical andhuman phenomena. We then distinguish realism from related, but dif-ferent, philosophical doctrines of naturalism, essentialism, foundation-

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178 Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 19, No. 2, 1999

alism, and reductionism. We start this way because, on our reading oftheir works, many modernists, postmodernists, and others frequentlyconflate one or more of these doctrines or positions with realism or itsopposite, and in so doing, contribute significantly to our reality woes.However, proceeding in this way also makes it apparent that tradi-tional philosophical doctrines of realism may be inadequate withrespect to ascertaining the ontological status of psychological phenom-ena per se.

We therefore make one final preliminary move prior to presentingour "levels of reality" position and argument. This move consists ofintroducing a line of thought with respect to questions concerning real-ity that effectively rejects the entire debate between metaphysical real-ists and anti-realists as arising from a failure to understand human lifeand existence properly in the first place. This type of thinking takeshuman existence in the world as a basic, unitary reality that is not ame-nable to traditional metaphysical conjecture. It is available most origi-nally in the work of Martin Heidegger (1962, 1982), especially asdeveloped and extended by Charles Taylor (1985, 1995) and CharlesGuignon (1991, Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999). Of particularrelevance for our "levels of reality" position is the Heideggerian claimthat meanings are as much a part of the world as are gravitation andmass.

With these preliminaries in place, we turn directly to an explicationof our "levels of reality" position and argument and conclude by con-sidering some of its possible implications with respect to psychologicalinquiry. The point of all of this is to argue that psychological reality isneither as reducible as some modernists claim, nor as problematic assome postmodernists assert. Rather, psychological reality isirreducibly nested within physical, biological, and sociocultural levelsof reality, all of which both enable and constrain it. Further, whilepsychological reality is not fixed, nor knowledge of it certain, it also isnot so ephemeral and subjective as to escape psychologists' attempts tostudy it, so long as the conclusions from such studies are regarded ascontingent, fallible, and subject to revision.

WHAT IS REAL?

In philosophy, realism traditionally refers to two distinct doctrines.Of these, the one familiar to most psychologists is the doctrine thatobjects of sense perception have an existence independent of the act ofperception. This realist position (realisml) stands in opposition to thedoctrine of idealism, which holds that what is real equates withthought, or that the objects of perception consist of ideas. The secondphilosophical doctrine of realism holds that abstractions, generaliza-tions, and especially universals have a real, objective existence. Thissecond realist doctrine (realism2) is in opposition to nominalism, which

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Levels of Reality 179

is the doctrine that general or abstract words, or universals, do notstand for objectively existing entities. Nominalism holds that univer-sals are no more than names assigned to individual physical particularswhich alone have objective existence. Most psychologists, historicallyand currently, have tended to be realists in the first sense, as opposedto idealists, but have tended to be nominalists as opposed to realists inthe second sense. In other words, most psychologists believe that thereis a real physical and biological world that constrains their inquiriesand enables scientific progress, while eschewing abstract metaphysicaland conceptual framing of the objects of their inquires in favor of moredefined, operationalized formulations of same (cf., Koch, 1992).

In philosophy, there are many versions of the two philosophical doc-trines of realism and numerous middle ground formulations betweenrealisml and idealism, and realism2 and nominalism. These need notconcern us here, although some aspects of them will arise during thecourse of our argument. However, a related idea that requires imme-diate attention is that of objectivity as a criterion for what is consideredto be real. As already noted, realisml holds that objects of perceptionhave an objective existence in their own right. Many contemporaryphilosophers who believe in an independently existing external worldfind a requirement of absolute objectivity problematic. They mostlyconclude that human inquirers have no direct ("conceptuallyunfiltered") access to external objects but that their inevitable inter-pretations and actions of inquiry are nonetheless constrained by physi-cal and biological realities in ways that are independent of inquirers'perceptions and conceptualizations. Given their interest in humancognition and conation, many psychologists who are realists are notstrict objectivists.

Of course, when objective observation or direct perception areviewed as unachievable criteria for determining reality, it is unclear onwhat bases reality can be posited. One attempt to respond to thisproblem has broadened the criteria for what is real to include thatwhich exerts causal influence. Thus, transcendental realists like Bhas-kar (1989) posit two criteria for reality, one perceptual and one causal,and assert that entities are real, even if they are misperceived orunperceived, by virtue of their exertion of causal force independent ofthe activity of human inquirers (realism3). In physical science, Ein-stein's formulation of gravity as warped space provides a good exampleof exactly this kind of unobservable causal entity, the consequences ofwhich may be ascertained by experiment and/or theoretically informedobservation. It is important for current purposes to note that realism3is possibly quite compatible with realism2. In particular, the positingof abstracted, conceptual realities (realism2) is consistent with the pos-iting of causal relations at a generative, theoretical level (realism3).

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With the foregoing doctrines of realism in place, it is useful to con-sider how they might apply not only to physical and biological phe-nomena but also to sociocultural and psychological phenomena,especially in consideration of the human social and cognitive construc-tion of the latter. Recall that realisml requires existence independentof human perception. Because social institutions and practices andpsychological theories and beliefs obviously require human activityand construction, should one conclude that such phenomena are notreal? Stated in another way, can contingent phenomena (i.e., phenom-ena that could be otherwise, if the human activities that went into theircreation had differed) be considered real?

Let us consider a few brief examples. If you accidentally back yourcar over a cliff, you inevitably experience certain consequences, even ifyou fail to perceive the cliff, or upon doing so attempt to wish it away.Physical objects exist apart from, and may exert consequences (possi-bly in association with human actions) outside of human perceptionsof, or thoughts about, them. The same might be said of humanly con-structed objects such as bridges, even though these manufacturedobjects certainly are contingent, in the sense of requiring human activ-ity that could have been otherwise. Similar observations also seem toextend easily enough to humanly constructed physical objects whoseoperation requires human activity—e.g., "Oops, I didn't see the othercar coming when I pulled into the intersection."

But, what about abstract, less obviously physical, or only partiallyphysical, social constructions, such as social conventions and practices?Do not social situations and circumstances exert a kind of "causal"force on humans caught up in them (e.g., "I really didn't notice that Iwas spending too much money")? Moreover, do not the other individ-uals and social systems involved in such scenarios have a kind of realityoutside of one's individual perceptions of them or of their possible rel-evance to one's activities? And, can we also not extend this line ofreasoning to social practices and occurrences that have little sociallyconstructed physical support (i.e., unlike bridges, or systems and insti-tutions related to currency and its exchange)? For example, does notthe situation referenced in statements such as "I did not notice himstanding behind me when I said those awful things about him," have akind of reality outside of an agent's full perception or understanding ofit?

More generally, is it not apparent that all socially shared practicesand conventions have a kind of reality apart from the perceptions andunderstandings of individuals caught up in them, even though thesepractices and conventions are the contingent, historical products of col-lective human sociocultural activity? This being so, would not all suchpractices and conventions qualify as real phenomena, within the con-ceptual frameworks of realisml and realism3 as described previously?

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In other words, do not all qualify as phenomena that exist outside ofthe active perception of the individuals involved (realisml), phenom-ena that appear to exert "causal" influence on those same individuals(realism3)? Socially constructed artifacts and practices certainly arecontingent, and do require the active perception and participation ofhuman beings in their creation (e.g., bridges), maintenance (e.g., finan-cial systems), and realization (e.g., insults). However, it seems equallyclear that such constructions may exist as either objects or abstractionsoutside of the awareness of particular individuals who encounter, par-ticipate in them, and are affected by them. The basic point here is thatparticular individuals may be, and frequently are, mostly unaware ofmany of the sociocultural practices and interpersonal actions thataffect them, even though at a general, collective level, all such practicesand actions require human activity for their existence.

It is less clear as to whether or not the psychological states andprocesses of individuals within sociocultural contexts might be said tobe real. In this respect, a great deal turns on how psychological statesand processes are understood. For example, the internal, "hidden"mental structures and processes of cognitive psychology might be saidto have at best a hypothetical quality, whereas psychological phenom-ena considered in terms of ongoing, unfolding sequences of actions andstated reasons may readily be seen to be much more "out there" in thesocial context (cf. Taylor, 1985). Either way, it is obvious that many ofthe actions, experiences, thoughts, and emotional reactions of individ-ual humans can not be said to exist outside of human perceptualawareness as required by realisml.

And yet, psychological phenomena certainly seem to exert influenceon the actions and experiences of human agents. Arguments concern-ing whether such influence might best be understood in terms of causalrelations or "reason explanations" are well represented in the philo-sophical canon, and are far from resolved (Fay, 1996). Nonetheless, atleast some well-received work on this topic argues convincingly thatpsychological states and processes of "having reasons" may indeedfunction as causal explanations (e.g., Davidson, 1986), even if reasonsthemselves can not. Even if such quasi-functionalist conjectures can-not be sustained against Rylean (Ryle, 1949) or Wittgensteinian(Wittgenstein, 1953) counter-arguments that protest the positing ofspecific mental states associated with particular reasons, or against wellknown difficulties with the idea of efficient causation itself, especiallyin the realm of human affairs (e.g., Rychlak, 1997), it is difficult to denythe possible influences exerted by human intentions formulated andcontained within sequences of interpersonal interaction. Further,while it clearly is not the case that psychological influences can be saidto operate outside of the activity of those human subjects in which therelevant psychological and sociocultural (and presumably, the biologi-

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cal and physical) phenomena occur, it seems equally clear that suchoccurrences may have possible consequences for other humans whoare unaware of them.

For example, if the "awful things" that were overheard in a previousexample "caused" the target of these remarks to form and carry out anintention to harm the speaker, the latter might suffer significantly fromthe former's "feelings of being insulted," but be largely ignorant oftheir existence. Could not such a sequence of feelings, intentions, andactions then be said to exert influence upon the speaker outside of thatindividual's perception or conception of them? Relaxing the require-ment of strict causality in realism3 to the establishment of strong influ-ence in a sequence of personal and interpersonal activity mightusefully capture the "reality" of such psychological activities. Whatthis points to is the possible inadequacy of traditionally scientific con-ceptions of both reality and cause with respect to sociocultural andpsychological phenomena. Such phenomena do not exist outside ofthe activity of human agents, collectively and individually, but doappear to exert considerable influence.

In summary, many of the social and psychological phenomena ofinterest and relevance to psychologists possibly may be made to fitwithin traditional doctrines of philosophical realism, but only if somerather significant tailoring is permitted. To deny that such phenomenaare real seems inconsistent with the consequences that they seemundeniably to hold for those who participate in, and are affected bythem. As the foregoing illustrations and remarks are intended todemonstrate, there seems to be at least a prima facie case for enter-taining the reality of contingent, humanly constructed socioculturaland psychological phenomena. Indeed, this surely is the default posi-tion taken by most psychologists with respect to their research andpractice.

Why then, are many psychologists of both modern and postmodernpersuasions prone to skepticism with respect to the reality of thehumanly constructed objects of much psychological inquiry? Here, theopposition of some traditionally modern psychologists is relativelystraightforward. Such individuals clearly worry that if psychologicalstates and processes are considered to be real in ways that do notreduce them to more non-contingent, natural, physical and biologicalphenomena, their aspirations for psychology as a true science in themanner of physical science will be disappointed (e.g., Matthews, 1998).A further possible explanation: We believe that a number of anti-real-ist positions put forth by a few postmodern psychologists (e.g., Gergen,1994; Lather, 1992) tend to equate realism with related, but different,philosophical doctrines such as essentialism, foundationalism, and nat-uralism, about which there is very good reason to be suspicious.

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Realism as construed in realisml and realism3 above does not neces-sarily imply that real entities must be comprised of fixed, unchangingessences that are universal and ahistorical. Nor is it the case that enti-ties posited as real can be known with certainty. Further, there is noth-ing in these doctrines of realism that assumes that sociocultural orpsychological phenomena must be considered to be natural if they areto be thought of as real, or that the obviously contingent character ofmost such phenomena means that they can not be treated as real. Tosay that something exists and/or exerts influence outside of human per-ception does not mean that the thing posited is fixed essentially, know-able with certainty, or that it is natural and without contingency.

The historical fact that many doctrines of realism have sometimesbeen associated with larger systems of thought that are undeniablyessentialist, foundationalist, and/or naturalist does not alter these con-clusions. We believe that most of the anti-realism evident in the proc-lamations of some contemporary, postmodern psychologists (cf. Kvale,1992) arises from quite legitimate and defensible concerns about essen-tialism, naturalism, and foundationalist certainty. However, anti-real-ism is simply not necessary to avoid these excessively restrictive andpossibly inappropriate, related doctrines in the conceptualization andconduct of psychological inquiry. Moreover, the anti-realism withrespect to psychological phenomena that is reflected in more tradi-tional, reductionistic strategies within psychology is unworkable if suchreductionism can not achieve a full translation of psychological to cor-related neurophysiological and biological phenomena.

As Leibnitz pointed out many years ago, most such reductionismsmake the error of equating that which is to be explained with thatupon which it may very well depend. "Human life, Leibnitz said, wasbased on breathing, but this did not mean that it was just air" (Safran-ski, 1998, p. 30). Just, for example, as it is a mistake to equate musicalperformance with the architecture and properties of musical instru-ments, it is questionable to equate human actions and experiences withthose neurophysiological, chemical, and biological phenomena theyrequire. What is needed is a non-reductionistic consideration of theways in which different levels of reality are implicated in those psycho-logical states, processes, and activities of interest to psychologicalresearchers.

Our intention is to explain the location of psychological phenomenawithin a multi-level, nested configuration of physical, biological, andsociocultural reality and to articulate how these other levels of realityboth constrain and enable a more limited form of psychological reality.The primary goal of our "levels of reality" analysis is to establish akind of irreducible psychological reality nested within these otherlevels of reality. Such a reality is constrained by real sociocultural con-ventions and practices, and by biological and physical realities, to such

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an extent that it is accessible to the attentions of psychological inquir-ers, even as it continues to emerge, unfold, and change.

However, before proceeding with our articulation of the "levels ofreality" position we wish to promote, it is helpful to consider brieflyHeidegger's (1962) conception of "being-in-the-world" as an irreduci-ble reality which, for our purposes, helps to challenge some psycholo-gists' conceptions of psychological phenomena as existing onlyintrapsychically, in a manner divorced from the sociocultural practicesin which psychological individuals are embedded and develop. What isespecially helpful about Heidegger's hermeneutic realism (realism4),especially as revised and developed by Taylor (1985, 1995) andGuignon (1991, Richardson, Fowers, and Guignon, 1999), is that itlocates psychological phenomena in the historical, cultural world ofhuman existence at both collective and individual levels.

HERMENEUTIC REALISM

Heidegger's (1962, 1982) hermeneutic realism (realism4) avoids thesubjective-objective and mind-dependent/mind-independent turmoilthat, as we have seen, occurs all too easily when traditional doctrines ofrealism are applied to human activities in the world. It does this bydiscarding the ontological assumptions that are built into traditionalphilosophy from Descartes onwards. Heidegger undercuts the ideathat we are minds or subjects who somehow happen to be in contactwith an external world of material objects. For him, being in the worldis a unitary phenomenon in which self and world are intertwined insuch a way that there is no possible way of separating them. Heideggerstarts afresh with a description of our everyday agency. Our identity asagents is bound up with concrete situations within a world of practicesthat enable us to find things. Our practices of living largely predeter-mine how things show up in our lives. We require the world around usin order to be agents (Guignon, 1991). It is impossible for us toremove ourselves from the world, without ceasing to be human.

For Heidegger, our basic "being-in-the-world" constitutes the basisfor all our theorizing, yet this all-pervasive background of our every-day activity never can be fixed explicitly. There is no external vantagepoint to be gained from which we can comprehend our worldliness,and human activity keeps the world in constant change. Thus, Heideg-ger attempts to establish the possibility of an inescapable, dynamicworld relation in which humans are lodged at biological birth, and inwhich they develop as agents who are concerned about their own exist-ence, and prone to theorize about it. Heidegger's hermeneutic realismconsists of recognizing this state of affairs as given and ceasingattempts to sever the reality of our world relation. On this view, tradi-tional metaphysical and epistemological questions concerning reality,truth, and relativity should be set aside and addressed only after we

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have worked out a general account of our primordial reality—our situ-ation as "being-in-the-world."

Heidegger's project of clarifying our being as agents must proceed atthe level of attempting to understand particular problems in context.It should not be engaged at the level of attempting to establish knock-down, once and for all, arguments based on global assumptions thatlead to unanswerable questions concerning the existence of the worldand how we can know it. For Heidegger, the reality of our world rela-tion is given, and we should get on with understanding our being in thisrelation, in ways that do not obscure it.

For our purposes, it is useful to focus directly on the implications ofHeidegger's hermeneutic realism for human psychology. Charles Tay-lor (1985, 1995) points out that Heidegger helps us understand thatnumerous things that are not tangible or that exist only relative tohuman conception are nevertheless in the world in a straightforwardsense. Taylor asks us to step back from our scientific entanglementsand to see, that in everyday life, our values and meanings are exper-ienced as "out there" in the world, rather than as "in our minds."

What normal person could see a child hit by a car and notfeel that something bad had happened right there in thestreet, not just in somebody's mind? It is only a highlyspecialized and profoundly questionable characterizationof "reality" that could lead people to doubt the reality ofbadness, shamefulness or goodness in the world . . . Tay-lor wants to liberate us from the objectified view of real-ity and subjectified view of values that we get frommodern science . . . He has tried to show that we wouldnot be able to think and live as we do unless we grantedthat meanings, imports, significances and values have areal existence "out there." (Richardson, Fowers, andGuignon, 1999, p. 215)

With respect to the conduct of psychological inquiry, Taylor (1985,1995) makes a further point that, for our purposes, is useful. He claimsthat because of the irreducibly interpretive and meaning-laden charac-ter of many human phenomena, only someone who is embeddedwithin the relevant practices of an experiential world will be able tomake sense of what self-interpreting beings in such a "lifeworld" feeland do. Thus, in Taylor's view, psychological interpretation is possiblebecause psychologists themselves are self-interpreting beings who areco-participants in a shared linguistic and historical world. In otherwords, psychologists are "insiders" with a prior grasp of the meaningsand evaluations they set out to interpret.

With hermeneutic realism as a fourth possible conception of reality(realism4), we turn now to our articulation of, and argument for, our

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"levels of reality" approach to psychology's contemporary realitydebate.

LEVELS OF REALITY

Of the four levels of reality considered in our approach, physicalreality may be considered the most basic. While there is no doubt thatthe actions of human beings can affect the physical world (e.g., pollu-tion and over-population), the physical world came into existence firstand, in general, (with the obvious exceptions of dramatic events suchas earthquakes, volcanoes, and tidal waves) exhibits the slowest rate ofchange. Biological reality is contingent on physical reality, most nota-bly through processes of natural selection, and generally possesses thenext slowest rate of evolution. Both physical and biological realityexist outside of human collective or individual perception and con-strain (in the sense of limiting possibilities with respect to the develop-ment of) sociocultural and psychological realities.

Sociocultural reality consists of the systems of beliefs and practicesshared by members of human collectivities. Sociocultural realitydepends on human activity in the world and consequently varies withsuch activity, but always within real physical and biological constraints.By way of illustration, the vulnerability of the human biological infantto conditions of the physical world is such that any human society mustinclude some beliefs and practices concerning protective child-care.Such a requirement, contingent on physical and biological reality, maymanifest in a variety of ways across different societies located in differ-ent parts of the physical world, with relatively similar or dissimilar con-sequences. For example, societies that develop more elaborate, yetfeasible, conventions and expectations with respect to cooperative,communal activity in response to the requirement of child-care, maydevelop more effective, productive, and differentiated systems of com-munal responsibility in other areas of sociocultural life as well.

The psychological reality of individual humans (e.g., memories,intentions, imaginings, experiences, and so forth) emerges as a conse-quence of the immersion and participation of biological human indi-viduals in the societies and cultures to which such individuals are born,and within which they grow and develop. In this sense, the psychologi-cal reality of individuals is not only constrained, but is actually consti-tuted in large part, by socioculturally shared beliefs and practices.Because sociocultural reality is pluralistic, both across and within dif-ferent societies, individual psychological reality may vary considerablyfrom society to society, from individual to individual, and from time totime. In partial consequence, the rate of change and variation evidentin human experiences, intentions, and actions is generally muchgreater at the psychological level than the other levels of reality inwhich psychological reality is nested. Unlike physical and biological

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reality, sociocultural and psychological reality does not exist indepen-dently of human perception and activity. However, as the variousexamples given earlier suggest, this does not mean that they are notreal in the influences that they can exert on human collectives andindividuals.

While the most basic, historical line of influence in our model is fromphysical, to biological, to sociocultural, and finally to psychologicalreality, this pattern and direction of influence is only one in a muchmore interactive and reciprocal pattern of dynamic possibilities acrossthese various levels of reality. In particular, the actions of individualpsychological humans may have important consequences for humansociocultural reality.

Part of this dynamic interaction is reflected in the social construc-tionist argument that the psychological reality of individual humansarises from a life-long appropriation and internalization of the soci-ocultural, relational practices of the societies into which biologicalhumans are born and within which they develop. In this respect, theconversational practices of a given society are thought to be especiallyinfluential (e.g., Shotter, 1993). However, while social constructionismemphasizes the way in which the psychological is constituted and con-strained by relevant sociocultural reality, it says relatively little con-cerning the possibility of psychologically inspired, socioculturalchange. And yet, if the psychological agency of individual humanscould be reduced entirely to a hard social determinism, there would belittle possibility of explaining why societies themselves change andevolve over time, as they very obviously do.

To understand sociocultural evolution, it seems necessary to con-sider the effects of psychological agents on their societies. And, if sucheffects can push societies beyond prevailing sociocultural practices,means, and shared understandings, it must be the case that psychologi-cal reality, reflected in individual psychological agency, is not entirelydetermined by those same sociocultural conventions. Thus, it becomesnecessary to conclude, as has been argued recently by several herme-neutically inspired theorists (e.g., Martin & Sugarman, 1999; Richard-son, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999), that while the psychological reality ofindividuals largely derives from sociocultural reality, it is not entirelyreducible to these sociocultural origins.

Elsewhere (Martin and Sugarman, 1997) we present a developmen-tal argument establishing psychological reality as enabled and con-strained by, but not reducible to, sociocultural and biological realitywithin a real physical world. What this argument allows is that psycho-logical individuals, through their imaginings, intentions, and actions,are capable of influencing the societies that have spawned them inways that explain the evolution and change clearly evident in sociocul-tural history. Societies only exist as aggregates of biological and psy-

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chological individuals, and evolve only through their feats ofimagination and ingenuity. What is social and what is psychologicalboth arise within this dynamic process of ongoing mutable interaction.The psychology of any given individual is emergent within the life-spanof that individual, while the accumulation of the agentic actions of psy-chological individuals and the sociocultural consequences of same,means that societies and cultures are also in constant evolution. And,all of this sociocultural-psychological interaction occurs within biologi-cal and physical levels of reality that both constrain it and provide thebasic physical and biological conditions that make it all possible.

The fact that all four levels of reality are in a constant state ofdynamic evolution, due in large part to their interactions, is a clearindication of the potential inadequacy of any philosophical or psycho-logical system of thought that would assume fixed, foundational, essen-tial, or non-contingent categories of things. This conclusion isespecially apparent with respect to sociocultural and psychologicallevels of reality, which are highly nonessential and contingent in lightof the collective and individual actions of human agents. And yet,even at these levels of reality, things are not so ephemeral as to escapeentirely human attempts to inquire into them in ways that might yielduseful, even if inevitably temporary and contextualizedunderstandings.

After all, the inter-relational, communicative practices and conven-tions of societies and their members make available coordinating sys-tems of meaning and understanding that cannot be changedovernight—or sometimes, as many would-be reformers have discov-ered, even over years and lifetimes. For example, rules and meaningsof communicative exchanges among individuals in a particular societymay admit to several viable interpretations, but not to any interpreta-tion whatsoever. Further, systematic inquiry into relevant social prac-tices often can serve to limit further those viable interpretations toones that are more and less likely. While inevitably dynamic, nones-sential, and contingent, sociocultural and psychological reality admitsto being studied in ways that might yield worthwhile, if not timeless,knowledge of it.

The psychological reality (e.g., emotional experiences) of individualhumans is constituted developmentally from those collective, commu-nal practices that make up the sociocultural reality into which a humanbiological individual is born. It is within this dynamic that an individ-ual emerges as a psychological being, complete with personal theoriesand belief systems of its own. Once emergent, such individual psychol-ogy may be considered to possess a reality of its own, in relation tothose other levels of reality in which it is nested and continues tounfold. Psychological individuals are capable of exerting potentiallydetectable influence at intrapersonal, interpersonal, and sociocultural

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levels. For example, an individual who has come to hold a personaltheory of persecution may feel justified in acting aggressively towardanother who is perceived as a possible source of further unfair treat-ment. Depending on the social positions occupied by the actor andtarget individual in such a scenario, the social consequences of suchaggression may be more or less localized, and the chain of subsequentevents more or less complex and extended. Any such analysis of psy-chological influence depends necessarily on an understanding of psy-chological individuals as situated and interactive within relevant levelsof sociocultural, biological, and physical reality.

IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA

One of the most confusing aspects of the current reality debatewithin psychology concerns the previously noted tendency of somecommentators to treat reality epistemologically rather than ontologi-cally. Most often, this involves relating realism to the larger doctrineof objectivism. [Note that realism4 bypasses traditional epistemologi-cal difficulties by giving ontological matters primacy from the very startof any inquiry regarding human being and understanding.] Objectiv-ism (cf. Fay, 1996) "may be defined as the thesis that reality exists initself, independently of the mind, and that this reality is knowable assuch" (p. 200). The first part of the doctrine of objectivism, thusstated, obviously relates to realisml, and is concerned with ontology(i.e., with the existence of things). However, the second part of objec-tivism, stated in this way, is concerned with epistemology (i.e., withknowledge of things). The relevance of these observations to the pres-ent discussion is that an understanding of realism as objectivism com-mits the holder of such a view to both the ontological andepistemological doctrines of objectivism. In other words, by claimingthat something is real, one also is claiming that one can have certainknowledge of it, in the sense that one's knowledge of the thing in ques-tion corresponds to a thing-in-itself. The resulting equation of realismwith an unproblematic correspondence theory of truth is, however, amistake with respect to psychological phenomena.

Objectivity is affected by the nature of the phenomena studied andby the methods of study. In physical science, it is primarily the latterthat are humanly constructed. However, in psychology, both phenom-ena of interest and strategies of inquiry are human constructions.Human actions and experiences are unlike inanimate materials, chemi-cals, and atoms. Understanding psychological phenomena requiresinterpretation of the meanings of these phenomena within historical,sociocultural, and linguistic context. Psychological reality is con-strained by its nesting within physical and biological levels of reality,and it requires interpretation by virtue of its nesting within historicalsociocultural reality that includes language. To understand someone's

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experience of emotional upheaval during and after a domestic dispute,or someone's motives and intentions making a career change, is to pen-etrate the relevant interpretive contexts within which such emotionand action occur. Because of their embeddedness within sociocultural,biological, and physical reality, there is good reason to believe thatpsychological actions and experiences are far from chaotic, arbitrary,or fleetingly irrelevant. Such a psychological reality clearly is assumedin the vast majority of psychological inquiry, even if it is treated skepti-cally by some theoretical psychologists.

Human sociocultural and psychological categories are not arbitraryin that they are definite kinds, even if not natural. As Danziger (1997)argues,

Human kinds. . .are not natural kinds, but neither arethey mere legends. They do refer to features that arereal. But it is a reality in which they themselves are heav-ily implicated, a reality in which they are a part. (pp. 191-192)

Because human psychological beings are agents who are aware andreflective (even if never completely so), their courses of action andways of being are affected not only by the classifications of societiesand cultures, but also by their own conceptions of, and reactions to,such classifications. Thus, an individual's experience of being mis-treated, say for example, as a victim of police brutality, is not simply asocial construction, but is constituted in part by the individual's ownunderstanding of the significance of being a victim of police brutality.This latter understanding obviously reflects a life of immersion in soci-oculturally available practices, but also is based on a somewhat inevita-bly unique set of experiences of any psychological individual withinthose practices (cf. Taylor, 1995). Further, the reflections and actionsof classified individuals often result in changes in classification. Asmentioned earlier, the sociocultural and the psychological constructeach other (Fay, 1996; Martin & Sugarman, 1999). It is this sort ofongoing, mutual interaction between a classification and classified indi-viduals that Hacking (1995, 1999) calls the looping effect of human orinteractive kinds, in contrast to natural or indifferent kinds. WhatHacking intends to convey by this distinction is that human kinds affectpeople classified, but that classified people nonetheless are potentiallycapable of taking matters into their own hands, at least to some extent.

Within all of the dynamic flux that describes the ongoing mutableinteraction between societies and psychological individuals, thereexists a kind of non-chaotic, non-arbitrary social and psychologicalreality that is much more than linguistic. It is not simply a matter ofhow we decide to think or talk, as some postmodernists appear toclaim (cf. Kvale, 1992). For thought and language are richly wovensystems that will work their performative magic only when the neces-

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sary, relevant strands are engaged. When the jury says, "not guilty,"and the accused is released from the custody of jailers, an entire socialsystem of law, authority, and conceptions and practices of freedom(and the possible lack thereof) is invoked. The jury's deliberations andlanguage perform, because they fit into this multi-layered socioculturalreality. However, if a jury gets its thinking and expressive languagespectacularly wrong in relation to the relevant sociocultural system, orif a psychological individual attempts to command a physical force(e.g., commanding the tide to halt), both may end up "all wet." As the"levels of reality" position asserts, the physical, biological, and soci-ocultural world simultaneously constrains and enables the emergenceand interpretation of human psychological kinds.

The reality of psychological phenomena within other levels of realityallows psychologists to warrant claims concerning their interpretativefindings by tapping into, and participating within, systems of meaningand practice extant in relevant historical, sociocultural contexts. How-ever, the same reality ensures that our understanding of psychologicalphenomena never can be absolute, certain, or complete. [The enumer-ation of specific approaches to psychological inquiry that seern mostlyconsistent with the general epistemological situation outlined here,exceeds the aims of the current article. Discussions of such inquirystrategies may be found in Fay (1996), Greenwood (1991), Smith,Langenhove, and Harre (1995), Martin and Sugarman (1999), andRichardson, Fowers and Guignon (1999), among others.]

Postmodern psychologists (e.g., Gergen, 1994) are right to reject thefoundationalist idea that psychological and sociocultural reality is char-acterized by conceptually independent, ahistorical, unchanging formsor laws that can be apprehended objectively. However, on this basis,to conclude that psychological and sociocultural reality is nothing morethan a chaotic, random flux, the arbitrary ordering of which reflectsonly dominant positions and interests, goes too far. On the one hand,this conclusion fails to recognize the extent to which sociocultural andpsychological reality is nested within, constrained, and shaped by bio-logical and physical reality. On the other hand, it ignores the possibil-ity that, although clearly contingent and variable across societies andcultures, such human reality is far from chaotic or ephemeral. Rather,it consists of practices and structures that can be identified and under-stood in a warranted manner, within an epistemological frameworkthat allows for uncertainty and incompleteness in interpretation, butdoes not condone an anarchistic relativism. This clearly is the viewfavored by several contemporary philosophers and historians of psy-chology who resist a forced choice between modern scientism andpostmodern anarchism (e.g., Danziger, 1997; Hacking, 1995; Taylor,1995). There is room for warranted interpretive navigation betweenthe Scylla of essentialism and the Charybdis of ephemeralism.

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CONCLUSION

The aim of the "levels of reality" analysis presented here is to arguethat psychologists will be better positioned to advance their work ifthey adopt a modified doctrine of realism that respects the interactive,contingent, evolving character of their subject matter, than if theyaccept uncritically the too radical anti-realist stances of somepostmodern critics of psychology—positions which often conflate real-ism with other philosophical doctrines such as naturalism, essentialism,and objectivism. Moreover, a "levels of reality" analysis also makes itclear that the reductionist strategies suggested by some postmodernists(e.g., Rorty, 1979) and modernists (e.g., Churchland, 1979), whichwould reduce psychological phenomena to their presumed neurophysi-ological and chemical constituents, will not work. Such reductionsignore the sociocultural constitution and nesting of psychological phe-nomena, fail to recognize the irreducibility of psychological questionsto physical/biological questions, and achieve a "reality footing" for psy-chology only by eliminating it.

We believe that it is important to distinguish clearly our "levels ofreality" approach from the assumption of a continuum of reality acrossnatural and human phenomena that is favored in many traditional andcontemporary pragmatic accounts (e.g., Rorty, 1979). In our approach,psychological and sociocultural reality require physical and biologicalreality. Without the latter, the former would not be possible. How-ever, our approach resists any reduction of human to natural reality.To us, this is a crucial difference. In our opinion, to place human andnatural reality on a continuum courts the kind of reductionism that haspervaded much of psychology since its inception. Our "levels"approach does not confuse requirement with identity. Because thepsychological and sociocultural require the physical and biological inno way should be understood to mean that the psychological and soci-ocultural ultimately are identical to the physical and biological. Ourhope is that our strategy as set out herein can be developed into amore comprehensive approach that acknowledges and articulates, withincreasing rigor, dependencies and requirements across levels of real-ity, but which recognizes fully the need for different explanatory sys-tems associated with the different levels.

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Author Note

Correspondence concerning this article should be directed to JackMartin, Ph.D., Professor of Education and Psychology, Faculty of Edu-cation, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, V5A 1S6.

Preparation of this article was supported by Grant # 410-97-106 fromthe Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

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psychology's reality debate: a "levels of reality" approach

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