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David E. Firester Fall, 2014

Navigating the “Drones” Debate

Proponents of using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), otherwise referred to as

“drones,” argue that they are an effective tool of war that diminishes threats at nearly no human

cost for the force employing them. Opponents argue that the use of such a strategy entails

disproportionately high human costs at the receiving end, which ultimately tends to generate

more threats in the form of a recruitment tool for at-risk populations that are prone to dislike the

users of such technology. In one respect, this is a cost-benefit calculation, as are many decisions

about strategy selection. In another, however, there is a clear disconnect between advocates and

adversaries of UAVs. This paper will explore some of the extant literature on UAVs, in order to

synthesize the essence of the debate. The ultimate objective here, however, is to move in the

direction of explicating a research design proposal. The underlying intent centers on

understanding why “drones” are seen in such a negative light by so many civilians, despite their

more benign uses both inside and outside the combat milieu.

Defining the terms of the debate

When speaking about UAVs, it is common for the term “drones” to be operative in

popular literature. The term seems to denote some sort of robotic,1 nonhuman, element that

1 For instance, see Spencer Ackerman and Noah Shachtman, “Almost 1 in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot,” Wired

Danger Room, January 9, 2012; http://www.wired.com/2012/01/drone-report/ . As a noun, a drone is defined by

Merriam Webster’s online dictionary (accessed on November 29, 2014), sub-definition 3, as “an unmanned aircraft

or ship guided by remote control or onboard computers.” A robot is defined in the same source in two ways that are

relevant to this paper: “a machine that can do the work of a person and that works automatically or is controlled by a

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unleashes wanton destruction upon a hapless lot of (purportedly civilian) victims. When framed

in this manner, the technological tool appears mindless and cold in its calculating the death of

humans. This paper will refrain from using the term “drones,” as it feeds a narrative that needn’t

be fed. Rather, the term UAV will be summoned repeatedly. This is not because it reinforces

the image that a military user would like to conjure in the minds of the public, but because it is

more accurate in depicting the relationship between what the vehicle is doing and the physical

absence of its controller from the air itself. The U.S. Air Force prefers a more accurate label,

calling them Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPAs). For the sake of evenhandedness, the term UAV

will be used here; it seems a fair treatment that allows for the reader to imagine a quasi-robotic,

yet human-linked implement of warfare.

In thinking about UAVs, there are some important distinctions among them, which are

rarely conveyed to readers. First, most UAVs are not armed with a weapons package, although

that doesn’t mean that it is unable to direct other platforms with destructive capabilities on a

target. Contrary to popular belief, the typical UAV is engaged in ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance,

Reconnaissance) or RISTA (Reconnaissance, Intelligence, Surveillance and Target Acquisition)

operations. Intelligence is generally gathered in corroboration with other sources of intelligence

from a variety of platforms (human, or other technological) in order to form a more perfect

picture of an assessed threat environment. Reconnaissance is an active form of intelligence

gathering, whereas surveillance is a more passive form. Target acquisition, however, may take

more than one form. In the non-weaponized version, it is the mere ability to facilitate the

computer” and in sub-definition 1(a) as “a machine that looks like a human being and performs various complex

acts (as walking or talking) of a human being; also: a similar but fictional machine whose lack of capacity for human

emotions is often emphasized.” If one were to ask the average person what a “drone” is, one may find that they

come closer to defining something akin to a robot, performing the task of flying on autopilot, while remaining

emotionless. How an issue, debate, or question is framed matters.

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“sensor to shooter” link by providing grid coordinates, Global Positioning Satellite (GPS), or

laser guidance for ordnance derived from an alternative source. In the weaponized version, the

capacity to self-designate and destroy a target is collocated within, and endogenous to, a singular

platform.

Aside from UAVs there are significant unarmed, manned aerial assets that exist in the

inventory of the military and nonmilitary establishment outside of the Air Force and Navy. Such

techno-human devices have been used to great effect in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.2

They are built upon similar technology that has been used in other theaters, providing early

warning functions in places such as the South Korean border with North Korea.3 In an effort to

defeat insurgents’ use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) the U.S. military also introduced

a number of other unarmed, manned aerial platforms that had the capacity to anticipate IED

usage through “change detection” and the forensic capability to deconstruct (in reverse order) the

activities that led to the same. Some platforms don’t even watch, but simply listen and locate, or

emit certain forms of energy over a target area (among other more highly classified missions). 4

2 Such matters will be discussed later in this paper. However, it is important to bear in mind that many, but not all,

of these unarmed manned platforms can be migrated to a significant degree to the armed/unarmed and unmanned

platforms. The distinction will be drawn later. 3 For instance, ARL (Aerial Reconnaissance Low) was the predecessor to many unarmed manned platforms that

later were used in Iraq and Afghanistan. 4 Disclaimers: It is worth noting that this paper is not dealing with ELINT (Electronic Intelligence) or EW

(Electronic Warfare) platforms. Nor is it dealing with higher altitude aircraft, such as the U-2 or JSTARS, nor with

fast-movers such as fighter jets, or even the world’s fastest reconnaissance plane, the SR-71 Blackbird. Another

distinction to bear in mind here is the near-explicit focus on Full Motion Video (FMV), even though still capabilities

are often a byproduct and sometimes even a mission focus. FMV in military circles is always discussed as “near

real time” in its capabilities and will be treated as such here as well. Beyond the scope of this paper is any national

systems that orbit the earth (satellites). This paper is also limited to what has been stated in open sources, as the

author is still bound by federal legal obligations to guard classified information that has not yet been released to the

public. Another disclaimer is in order: the author is biased in favor of UAVs and other forms of similar apparatus,

as a result of having an intimate familiarity with their use in war. Further, an admission is in order to the effect that

the author is both trying to understand where the opposition to this technology comes from, in light of what he has

experienced in using it and trying to fill in some serious informational gaps in the literature that would make the

debate more accurate.

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Scope Conditions

This paper intentionally neglects the potential employment of UAVs on the domestic

front. While there is an important debate unfolding in the U.S. regarding “drone” usage at home,

scope conditions set herein must not exceed the available space, by engaging with a topic that

deserves much more attention elsewhere. For the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that air

space is either dominated by the UAV user, or partial air sovereignty is explicitly granted

through basing and usage rights by the host nation. Another assumption that may apply is the

tacit compliance of the host nation, or noncompliance and subsequent surreptitious intrusion by

the user. The operational environment consisting of contested air space is not considered here.

The types of platforms that are under consideration here are mostly unmanned armed/unarmed,

as well as some manned unarmed aerial vehicles. Sea, land and space-based platforms will not

be discussed. The author’s experience with both manned and unmanned aerial platforms

provides unique insight into the inner workings and actual use of such implements of war, versus

the sort of incidental “knowledge” one might glean in casually perusing the popular literature.

Literature Review

There is scant serious literature presently available on the use of UAVs. The majority of

it tends to come from three distinct areas. First, a miniscule portion flows from published

documents that are derived from military service schools. Such sources seem to suffer from a

bias that naturally “sciencizes” the topic, while ignoring or minimizing the topical choices that

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make popular literature more appealing. With this bias in mind, however, there is a qualitative

advantage. Namely, authors writing such articles or books are likely subject matter experts, who

are informed by personal experience and have benefited from access to more accurate

(classified) information.

A second strand of literature on UAVs is what some may describe as popular journalism,

found in magazines such as The Atlantic, or newspapers such as The New York Times. The

deficiency in these forms of media are that they draw on imperfect knowledge, owing to their

lack of access to classified material. They also tend to advance an agenda that comports with

their readership’s ideological hunger for material that is either damning to one party or evokes

the sensational imagery that sustains or enhances sales. This leads to the third, and perhaps most

damaging, literature base: activist pamphleteers. Such material is extremely one-sided, ill

informed, and appeals to the so-called legal or moral dimensions of force usage. It seems that a

fair amount of the data the so-called human rights activists acquire is heavily colored by their

desire to paint a picture of UAVs as “drones” that mindlessly kill civilians without regard for the

laws of war or the sanctity of human life.

This paper will necessarily review a sample of the literature emanating from the first two

communities of interest, with an eye toward clearing away some of the popular myths that bleed

over from the activist pamphleteers. The underlying rationale for such an exercise stems from

the need to focus on facts that are intentionally or unintentionally neglected, or otherwise

unknown. The significance of this endeavor is related to the need for honesty, which not only

accords with proper academic standards, but advances the establishment of an appropriate

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context within which such debates should be placed. In order to perform the function of a

literature review, this section will proceed by summarizing some of the authors’ specific

arguments, with particular attention to when they appear to be unfitting or fraudulent in nature.

The second task is exposing any fallacies that serve the ends of a dishonest debate. The effort

here is limited in that the entirety of each author’s argument is not dealt with unless it takes the

form outlined above. The reader will recall that a major aim here is to disentangle myths from

facts.

We turn now to a series of articles that appeared in the academic journal Parameters. In

the first article, W. Andrew Terrill discusses the use of American UAVs in Yemen.5 He focuses

on their military effectiveness, with some cautionary notes on their political costs. His analysis

is very much in keeping with the more professional literature on UAVs. He shines a light on the

fact that using UAVs is far superior to what U.S. ground forces might accomplish in countering

terrorists and establishes their role as a force multiplier for Yemen’s inability to accomplish the

same mission with either its army or its air force. He then goes on to discuss the political costs

associated with Yemeni domestic discomfort for U.S. UAV usage. What stands out here bears

similar features to the arguments made in other states experiencing UAV usage. The main issues

for Yemenis, according to Terrill, are the violation of sovereignty and the “widespread belief that

drones produce a great deal of collateral damage and that many innocent people have been killed

by these systems.”

5 Terrill, W. A. (2013). Drones Over Yemen: Weighing Military Benefits and Political Costs. Parameters,

42(4)/43(1)(Winter-Spring).

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Regarding the matter of sovereignty, it appears that the blessings of the outgoing and

incoming Yemeni leaders mattered little to the Yemeni people. If sovereignty is said to be

expressed by the leadership of one’s country, it seems curious that the people would view

America’s leadership-approved intervention as such an offense. This is especially bewildering

when one considers the depraved quality of al Qa’ida insurgents and the level of mistreatment

they unleashed against the population in the areas that they controlled. In other words, the

repugnancy associated with American armaments being remotely used outweighed the disgusting

treatment of civilians rendered by the militants on the ground.6

Collateral damage and the subsequent deaths of “civilians” is a claim that most anti-UAV

advocates tend to not only exaggerate, but actively fabricate.7 It seems that according to the

above outlined grievances, Yemeni citizens would be happier if their own ill-trained and ill-

equipped military were to engage in street battles (reminiscent no doubt of the sort that plagued

Yemen in the past). The result would be (and has been) disastrous. Not only is it extremely

more violent, even when a well-trained unit conducts missions on the ground, but adding indirect

fire (artillery and mortars) and inaccurate insurgent fire in large quantities (heavy machine guns

and Rocket Propelled Grenades [RPGs]) causes unnecessary harm to civilians in the area in

incalculable ways. Thus, to resolve Yemeni concerns about sovereignty and civilian deaths one

6 The terms “terrorist” and “insurgent” are somewhat interchangeable in this paper. The normal distinction between

the two is quite simple, however. A terrorist is likely best defined by the target(s) he/she intentionally attack. That

is, a purely civilian target such as a place of worship, a school, a market or café, not being used for military purposes

is assumed to be of such a sort. An insurgent is best defined as one who challenges all or some of an incumbent

governing regime’s authority or legitimacy within a given territory. There are many times when insurgents acts as

terrorists or vice versa. Consequently, they appear to be similarly regarded in this paper. 7 The numbers are relatively miniscule if one considers what the outcome of a ground battle would have produced.

What is more significant for this paper is the inability to discern what the numbers actually are (a point that will be

stressed later). A number of the articles reviewed here cite ranges that are unable to be verified and are produced by

advocacy groups whose cottage industry revolves around the fabrication and dissemination of disinformation that

advances their cause.

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would expect that the less harmful UAV engagement (a blood-saving tool) would be preferred

over the more harmful (bloodletting) ground battle.

In the same Parameters issue, Alan W. Dowd argued that the use of armed UAVs

(UCAVs- Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles) is harmful for American policy in that it produces

a cheap way of doing war that ultimately degrades the indispensable human decision making

feature of wars past.8 He also depicts the U.S. military as moving much further into the realm of

video game-like warfare that seduces policymakers with the promise of a relatively low cost/high

yield investment. His words of caution are not misplaced, particularly when he positions them

within the context of other governments seeking to bolster their own UAV capabilities. One can

draw from Dowd’s analysis the inference that the introduction of some revolutionary technology

has the unintended effect of causing others to want the same. Other states (or terrorist groups)

may want to acquire battlefield advantages. They also suffer from an insoluble security

dilemma. That is, the mere proliferation of weapons systems by one actor may inadvertently

ignite a desire for similar or better systems by another. This is said to occur despite the

initiator’s benign intent.9

In yet a third article appearing in the same Parameters issue, Jacqueline L. Hazelton

discusses UAVs as a form of power projection that can be viewed through the prism of air

power.10

One significant point that she makes is that the political context matters. For her, this

is a reference to the conditions under which UAVs are used. In other words, she wonders

8 Dowd, A. W. (2013). Drone wars: Risks and warnings. Parameters, 42(4)/43(1)(Winter-Spring).

9 For the standard depiction of how such a condition comes to exist see Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the

security dilemma. World Politics, 30(02), 167-214. 10

Hazelton, J. L. (2013). Drones: What are they good for? Parameters, 42(4)/43(1)(Winter-Spring).

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whether the political costs might change over time in the same theater of war, or in different

theaters of war and under varying degrees of permissiveness. In her words, “It is an open

question whether all drone strikes can be expected to have the same political effects at all times

and in all places.” This point resonates in ways that go beyond the scope of her concern. Two

matters seem to naturally emerge here. First, assuming UAVs are just another form of force

projection then they are part of the conversation regarding jus ad bellum. That is, if force is

projected as a means of furthering policy then, ceteris parabus, they are less significant and all

that matters is the ends served by the means. Secondly, if they have distinctive qualities that set

them apart from other implements of warfare then they become a topic for jus en bello.11

In this

instance, it may be said that an aircraft, whether manned or unmanned, is similar in kind. If that

is the case, then it seems to matter little what tool is employed in the furtherance of policy goals.

Yet, the buzz (pardon the pun) emanating from detractors of UAVs is that they are an

unacceptable means with which to accomplish a nation’s security objectives. Thus, in order to

disentangle the tool from its usage, two hypotheses can be tested by way of a series of survey

questions that isolate two variables; means (the tool used) vs. ends (the policy aim).

HYPOTHESIS 1: If UAVs are envisaged as a bad tool then one can expect a different tool might

be preferred, assuming the policy objective is held constant.

HYPOTHESIS 2: If UAVs are envisaged as just another tool in a state’s inventory then one can

expect that given differing policy objectives, the tool itself is irrelevant.

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The standard bearer in discussing these Latin-derived terms is Walzer, M. (2006). Just and unjust wars: A moral

argument with historical illustrations. Basic Books. From the legal-moral standpoint, jus ad bellum is a reference to

the justness associated with going to war, whereas jus en bello refers to the justness of one’s conduct during war.

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Testing these two hypotheses seems to be a good way to better understand why it is that

UAVs are so controversial as a means to an end. As an approach to better answering this puzzle,

one theoretical tradition to consult should include behavioral psychology. Particular attention to

conditioning and framing literature is advised. Conditioning12

may be achieved by the aggregate

negative affect people tend to experience in relation to anything inhuman conducting lethal

operations against fellow humans. That is, when science fiction appears to have crossed a

certain line, people get nervous. Framing may be achieved by elite promulgation of narratives

that satisfice in lieu of accurate information.13

The narratives that stick likely accord well with

people’s predispositions and serve the function of providing information and context where it

would be too costly for every individual to investigate on their own.14

In the more popular journalistic sort of literature, Mark Bowden made a couple of

important points about so-called “killing machines,”15

the standard impression that seems to

attach to UAVs, that deserve closer scrutiny. First, what seems to bother most folks about the

use of UAVs is the unfairness associated with one actor being able to rain death from above

without warning or a fair trial. He opens his article with the biblical David versus Goliath

analogy as the consummate story of the underdog defeating an overdog by harnessing the power

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The way in which this term is being used here is not exactly as it has been used in the psychological literature a la

Pavlov’s dog (Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. Simon and Schuster). Rather, for lack of a better

term “conditioning” here is meant to depict a circumstance whereby exposure over time to a particular narrative has

cumulative effects on how similar such narratives are understood. It’s possible that this category of psychology can

be subsumed under “framing,” but it seems to operate in a distinct fashion. For instance, it need not be explicitly

stated that aliens and robots taking human lives is revolting to the human conscience. Instead, one can detect that a

similar condition is afoot, thus evoking the appropriate consequent emotions. Then again, this may simply be a

description of “priming.” This last possibility is drawn from the discussion in Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (2010).

News that matters: Television and American opinion. University of Chicago Press. 13

See Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 10, 103-126. Framing is

perhaps best understood as the ability of the message-sender to indicate to the receiver what a particular topic/event

is a case of; thus ruling out alternative interpretations. 14

When elite discourse is in consonance with individuals’ predispositions, the effect may be both reinforcing and

galvanizing. See Zaller, J. (Ed.). (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge university press. 15

Bowden, Mark. "The Killing Machines." Atlantic. SEP 2013: 58-70. Print.

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of a simple, yet accurate, weapon system. Bowden’s point seems to be aimed at having the

reader sense the unfair advantage gained by the use of UAVs, viewed from the perspective of the

remote targeting agent, ensconced in a cocoon of safety far from the killing fields. He describes

a U.S. military member lamenting the fact that he has used his lopsided Goliath-like power, from

afar, against a David-like enemy and the accompanying remorse that he experienced in not

having been on the ground to face death. After exploring the David/Goliath dichotomy through a

lens of power disparity, it is not so clear which party is which in the example that followed.

This does not seem to be an appropriate analogical thought process. Rather, it is better

suited to the argument he then advances in explaining the inability of the people living in the

target state to defend against a perceived arrogant purveyor of death. Later in the article, he

goes on to discuss the latest terrorist actions in the U.S. and Europe as directly resulting from the

perceived misapplication of American power, as seen through the eyes of Muslims in general.

He cites the Boston bombing as an example, but he does so without pointing to the logical

fallacy this represents. Specifically, the Boston bombers were Chechen and U.S. UAVs have not

engaged Chechens in Chechnya (despite the fact that a number of Chechens have made it their

duty to fight on behalf of jihad in theaters such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria). As he is writing

about the impact UAVs are said to have in engendering a victim/villain relationship, he probably

should have mentioned that the relationship is indirect. That is, if A acts on B and C sees itself

as similar to B then it is indirectly associated with B. The fact that C is assuming B’s identity is

a given, but the distinction matters in portraying the causal linkage being made.

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Nonetheless, what Bowden is suggesting is probably correct and forms the basis of the

anti-drone camp’s raison d’etre. Namely, the assertion that an omnipotent state uses its might in

order to subdue or eliminate the allegedly oppressed is a powerful tool for eliciting a sense of

repugnance. Not only is this the claim made by inhabitants of the target state, but even more

forcefully made by members of their kinship class elsewhere. Such was the case with the Boston

bombing suspects. That is, they assumed a kinship identity, even as they themselves were never

subjected to the alleged mistreatment they claimed as the impetus for their terrorist actions.

What is nearly as important to note here is that so-called human rights activists are susceptible to

purchasing this argument wholesale. They do so with little actual knowledge of the target(s)

engaged, their quality with regard to combatant status, or the many hours of careful observation

and intelligence collaboration, that commonly precedes such strikes. Thus, anti-UAV advocates

begin without much accurate information to support their faulty assumptions of what it is that the

technology delivers. They proceed along a pathway that will lead, tautologically, to the

conclusion that suits their preordination. What is worse is that they harness the “evidence” that

accords with their program, while discounting all evidence to the contrary.

In recent decades, terrorists have acted against Western powers (primarily the U.S., some

European states and, of course, Israel) on behalf of their “victim” brethren. In declaring

victimhood, the claiming party must necessarily allege that another actor is the villain. The

narrative that has spawned terrorism is further fed when focus is placed on the use of UAVs as a

form of unfair oppression or outright murder of innocents, who have no recourse and are unable

to seek justice in any other way. In sum, Bowden (and others who make a similar assertion) is

right, but only if it is a truthful and accurate depiction of reality. Still, facts are not as important

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as perceptions in generating widespread discontent.16

Having sympathetic human rights NGOs

(Nongovernmental Organizations) and their activist ilk facilitate this narrative is bound to

increase the power of terrorists’ claims to justification for their own unlawful and immoral acts.

Bowden does a fairly decent job of countering myths by presenting some facts, but he

falls short of taking a particular side, likely because doing so would alienate a sizeable portion of

his readership. One allegation he makes, however, cannot stand. He states on page sixty six that

“For one thing, our military and intelligence agencies generously define combatant to include

any military-age male in the strike zone.”17

This is patently false and is a dangerous claim to

make. Therefore, it must be challenged on its face. The truth is that under the Rules of

Engagement (ROE), which vary according to theater and threat level, a Military Aged Male

(MAM) is distinguished from others in a more precise manner. Consideration of his activity

must place him within the range of “reasonable certainty” that he is engaging in a course of

conduct that directly poses a military threat to U.S., coalition, or host nation forces. To infer that

the sole purpose for engaging in lethal action rests upon one’s status as a MAM is wildly

16

It is often attributed to either Joseph Goebbels or Vladimir Ilyich Lenin that the persistent repetition of untruth

dons the cloak of truth at some point. Carried to a logical conclusion, when an untruth is taken as a truth a

foundation may form in which subsequent “truths” built upon it will not be questioned. The original untruth is even

further from scrutiny in this way. This cognitive psychological point has been made in a number of international

relations and domestic politics academic works that citing them all here is an enormous task. What is significant for

this paper is the power that perceptions have and the resistance predispositions forming around them have, even

when one is faced with contradictory evidence. 17

This line was cited in Dowd’s piece (footnoted above), p. 13 (fn. 37) when he cites Jo Becker and Scott Shane of

The New York Times in “Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” May 29, 2012. The exact

quote in which The New York Times asserts that President Obama decides on every strike, “acceding to a method for

tallying civilian casualties that ‘in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants… unless there

is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.’” Even an article advocating for the use of UAV

strikes made a similar claim, “… the U.S. government assumes that all military-age males in the blast area of a

drone strike are combatants –unless it can determine after the fact that they were innocent…” See Byman, D.

(2013). Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington's Weapon of Choice. Foreign Aff., 92, 32.

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inaccurate.18

One implication of the foregoing discussion is that when misinformation19

or

disinformation20

are actively portrayed as accurate information, it forms a foundation for further

inaccurate claims to be made. This point is related to the one made earlier regarding

conditioning and framing.

At present, it is rather difficult to locate genuine scholarly work regarding the actual

effect that UAVs have on U.S. foreign policy. Still, some scholars have contributed in a neutral

fashion to the debate. In a relatively thorough examination, James Igoe Walsh concludes that the

use of UAVs for counterinsurgency has been somewhat useful, but their best application, he

maintains, has been as a tool in counterterrorism.21

Essentially, he claims that counterinsurgency

strategies require a human presence, which an unmanned asset by definition excludes. What he

doesn’t explain to the reader is the manner in which UAVs (and other aerial assets) are able to

fill in the intelligence gaps and enhance battlefield effectiveness for the counterinsurgent ground

force.22

18

The danger of conflating a MAM with a MAM engaged in targetable offenses parallels the domestic conflation of

racial difference between a law enforcement officer and an arrestee (or decedent) as an automatic case of “racial

profiling.” The danger becomes obvious when one considers the disruption of domestic tranquility that

accompanies the death of black males when caused by white males (but not the reverse circumstance), despite the

overwhelming number of blacks and whites who regularly are killed by people whose skin color matches their own.

This argument is developed further by the author elsewhere, but the aim of mentioning it here is to demonstrate a

fitting analogy between international and domestic relations. 19

The term is being used here to denote one’s consumption and dissemination of incorrect information that may

have been acquired without any particular malice. 20

The term is being used here to denote one’s consumption and dissemination of incorrect information that has

likely been acquired with malice; that is, knowing something isn’t true but perpetuating its existence in order to

serve some end. 21

Walsh, J. I. (2013). The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns.

Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College. In this article, the terms denoting two distinct strategies are

“counterterrorism” and “counterinsurgency.” In general, the former seems to be viewed widely as designating the

application of force against an enemy for which there is no means of physical contact by way of ground forces.

Additionally, it is assumed that terrorists are the primary target. The latter term tends to be described as a

population-centric approach to resolving what is mostly a political issue, as it relates to the separation of insurgents

from the population. What is often not discussed is an enemy-centric approach to counterinsurgency. This paper

deals with such an approach by way of discussing Task Force ODIN’s mission. 22

The next section of this paper will attempt to fill in some of this missing content, while providing some context.

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Walsh points out, as this paper has time and again, that an accurate count of civilian

deaths is difficult to ascertain, particularly when combatants and noncombatants are one and the

same. That is, one may behave as a civilian by day and an insurgent by night (or vice versa). He

also notes, in consonance with this paper’s sentiment, that despite the low numbers of “civilian”

deaths, the propaganda value to terrorists/insurgents is quite high as a recruitment tool. Again,

the facts are less important than the manipulation of skewed images, which serve as a substitute

for accurate information.

In addition to Walsh’s work, Ulrike Esther Franke has authored a short review essay of

four books that are germane to the subject at hand.23

One of the books she reviewed, was

authored by an Islamic History professor and founder of a website (www.umassdrone.org) with

respect to the “drones” issue. She found that a central theme of this particular work centered on

the misperceptions that Pakistanis have regarding UAVs. That is, the civilian outrage that

attends UAV strikes on Pakistani territory is coupled with the ignorance they have regarding

their own government’s tacit approval for it. Another book that Franke reviewed was authored

by an anti-UAV activist. The activist’s views of UAVs are described by Franke as “’death

robots,’ ‘killing machines,’ and ‘killer drones.’”

In the summary portion of her essay, Franke identifies a literature gap and concludes that

“the debate revolves almost exclusively around the use of armed UAVs for lethal operations.

Unarmed UAVs, which have proliferated extensively over the last few years, are rarely, if ever,

23

(2014). Drones, Drone Strikes, and US Policy: The Politics of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Parameters, 44(1)

(Spring).

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discussed.” Two points are worth making here. First, when citizens, activists and scholars are ill

informed about the actual nature of UAVs, they tend to express disdain for the lethal

employment of this form of technology. Therefore, the layperson may form an opinion that

makes all or most UAVs appear not only to be deadly, but deadly toward civilians to the

exclusion of more legitimate targets. Secondly, as a natural consequence of an improper focus,

the casual “drone” reader has either a distorted perception at best or a strong dislike at worst.

Bearing these points in mind, we turn now to the missing context and the implications that

follow when such a context is established.

Placing the Debate in Context

Most of the debate regarding the efficacy of UAVs tends to focus on the least used,

weaponized, version of said technology. There is, however, significant unoccupied room in the

literature to discuss the benefits of using nonweaponized UAVs that serve to enhance the

selective application of force that ultimately may come from weaponized UAVs, although other

means of target engagement may be used. Thus far, however, such a discussion has yet to take

place. Therefore, some focus must divert from the lethal UAV realm in order to better

understand when, and under what conditions, their use is deemed effective.

Before discussing the micro decision to use force it is worth taking a macro view in

briefly distinguishing between indiscriminate and selective (discriminate) violence and the

implications that their employment in the battle-space tend to produce.24

One area of agreement

among scholars and laypersons seems to be that the indiscriminate use of firepower against a

24

The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis Kalyvas, (Cambridge University Press 2006).

17

pure civilian population is not only immoral, but also counterproductive.25

That is, one may

intend to punish an enemy state, but may unnecessarily embitter more civilians by the

misapplication of force against them. This effect can be multiplied where a population already

harbors resentment for the force user’s physical presence and/or war objectives. However, the

application of selective violence in pursuit of a target set consisting purely of armed combatants

is an exercise that falls within the scope of the laws of war. If this sort of legitimate force is

understood as such, it may generate less discontent locally and globally.

From the preceding discussion, we can deduce that if an enemy-centric application of

violence ensues, a more desirable military objective would be met with limited blowback26

from

the civilian populace. Under insurgency/counterinsurgency conditions, it could thus be said that

selective violence against insurgents is preferred as an enemy-centric approach to warfare.27

In

contrast, it could also be said that a counterinsurgency approach is largely population-centric,

except where insurgents are properly identified among the population. Since it is difficult to

disentangle insurgents from civilians a major focus for the counterinsurgent force is the

acquisition of intelligence.28

We turn now to the means of establishing accurate and relevant

intelligence by way of UAVs or other similar platforms.

25

Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War, Robert A. Pape, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,

1996). 26

This term is used here to denote the unintended negative consequences of one’s actions, despite any initial benign

intent that may have accompanied the decision to use force. 27

For an accurate depiction of how this interactive bottom-up intelligence war unfolds in a counterinsurgency

environment see Downs, M. L. (2008). Rethinking the Combined Force Air Component Commander's Intelligence,

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Approach to Counterinsurgency. AIR UNIV MAXWELL AFB AL AIR FORCE

RESEARCH INST. Special attention should be paid to pp. 7-10. 28

“Intelligence” is being used here as being distinguished from mere information in the following way: knowing

that a village has 500 inhabitants is mere information. Knowing that approximately 10% of them are insurgents is

more informative, but borders on vague intelligence. In order to verify this loose approximation and identify

insurgents with a degree of specificity, it is important to incorporate numerous intelligence tools that yield

actionable and accurate intelligence. In sum, kinetic action must be predicated on the most precise intelligence

available, not on the basis of mere information or vague intelligence.

18

Task Force ODIN29

: Humans Inside and Outside, Never Aside

In recent years, there has been a trickle of literature identifying Task Force ODIN as a

key player in the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As was described by former Secretary of

Defense, Robert M. Gates, the U.S. Air Force was not very interested in UAVs during the 1990s

because the concept didn’t fit with their organizational essence: manning aircraft in flight.30

When a robust insurgency hampered American efforts in Iraq, following a conventional military

success, the U.S. Army was hard pressed to find a means to accomplish its occupational duties.

The necessary instruments of occupation are ground units. The chief impediments were IEDs.

The U.S. Army decided it had to circumvent the Air Force’s objection to close air support by

supplying its own capacity. Hence, TF ODIN evolved to suit the task.

29

The acronym stands for Observe, Detect, Identify, Neutralize. Odin, was also the name of the Norse god of flight.

Sometimes this unit will be identified as TF ODIN. The author (Firester) was one of the first members of the unit,

as it was secretly established in theater during the summer of 2006. Additionally, the author was not only the first

soldier in the U.S. Army to hold the title “Air Sensor Operator” (ASO), but also the first enlisted soldier in the U.S.

Army to receive the Air Medal for combat performance in this role. Documentation supporting this claim is

available upon request. The first unclassified mention of TF ODIN seems to have appeared in an obscure 25th

Division public affairs release: Ball, C. A., & McCutchen Jr, L. C. B. (2007). Task Force ODIN Using Innovative

Technology to Support Ground Forces. 25th Combat Aviation Brigade Public Affairs, 20. The article was cited only

eight times, but tracing its citation history one can see that it forms the only means by which most authors have

come to have any knowledge of the task force and its mission. As evidence, see p. 258 in Price, S. C. (2009). Close

ISR support re-organizing the Combined Forces Air Component Commander's Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance processes and agencies (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School).

That the author of the paper you are reading was the first ASO of this unit and remained in it for a year adds to the

“actual” primary knowledge versus the sort of secondary and tertiary interpretive type of so-called knowledge that

others may proffer. 30

Gates, R. M. (2014). Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. See p. 128 for this

discussion. See also Ambinder, M., & Grady, D. B. (2013). Deep State: Inside the Government Secrecy Industry.

John Wiley & Sons, p. 141; Kirkemo, R. (2010). Embraced and Engaged: Grace and Ethics in American Foreign

Policy. Wipf and Stock Publishers, p. 110; for a description of the counter-IED mission that TF ODIN was initially

assigned. TF ODIN is also described in minimal detail in Singer, P. W. (2009). Wired for War: The Robotics

Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First Century. Penguin, p. 222; Potholm, C. P. (2010). Winning at War:

Seven Keys to Military Victory Throughout History. Rowman & Littlefield, p. 48; and Douglas, D. (Ed.). (2011).

The 9/11 project: A journalist's perspective (2nd ed.) Donovan H. Myrie, p. 469; for a brief mention of TF ODIN in

Afghanistan, see Farrell, T., Osinga, F., & Russell, J. (Eds.). (2013). Military Adaptation in Afghanistan. Stanford

University Press, p. 69; which is identical to the passage by Russell in Mumford, A., & Reis, B. C. (Eds.). (2014).

The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare: Warrior-Scholarship in Counter-insurgency (Studies in insurgency,

Counterinsurgency and National Security). New York: Routledge, p. 152.

19

What UAVs (as well as unarmed, manned U.S. Army/Department of Defense assets) did

provide that the Air Force was unable to fathom was a rapid “sensor to shooter” link. That is, the

platform itself didn’t necessarily have to be armed. Loitering over a target area revealed patterns

of behavior that could be confirmed as fitting within the ROE framework.31

Following a

confirmation and consequent lawful application of force against a target (or targets), the requisite

kinetic force could be summoned from elsewhere. This sometimes came in the form of a sniper,

an interdicting ground force, indirect ground-to-ground fire (e.g., mortars or artillery), or a

remote standoff platform such as a helicopter (endogenous to the army and contractor provided),

or occasionally armed jet aircraft (exogenous to the army). Each of these secondary aerial

platforms bore the capacity to release missiles that were guided by the initial platform analyst

making the positive identification.

The task force eventually became subordinate to the 25th

Combat Aviation Brigade

(CAB), within the 25th

Infantry Division (ID). Still, its assets were operational throughout the

Iraqi theater, far beyond the 25th

CAB’s Area of Operations (AO). Common operations

consisted of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), providing over-watch for ongoing

ground operations (cordon-and-search for U.S. Marines and High Value Target

extraction/destruction for the U.S. Army), Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), and a variety of

additional functions associated with identifying the implantation of IEDs.

31

Enhanced loiter time is commonly referred to as a “persistent stare” capacity, which few manned assets are able to

provide; especially of the sort that are beholden to constant refueling necessity and must exit the battle space

offshore (Navy) or extraterritorially (Air Force) to do so. For a brief history of UAV development and the need to

provide a persistent stare capability see Strickland, F. (2013). The early evolution of the predator drone: An insider's

Perspective on Innovation During Fiscal Austerity. Studies in Intelligence, 57(1; Extracts, March).

20

In using TF ODIN’s asset array as a means to counter the IED threat, some may question

whether every kill was a legal kill.32

Some may even try to incite in the reader’s mind the

possibility that not mentioning civilian deaths hints at the likelihood that they were numerous

and therefore have been covered up.33

In the absence of accurate information regarding targeting

decision making processes, such a ploy is quite clever. That is, deliberately calling attention to

so-called civilian deaths that are purportedly caused by unseen and unheard aircraft is perhaps

one of the most salient features of the anti-UAV movement. It is true that TF ODIN and other

units of a similar sort are relatively secretive,34

but that doesn’t mean that the secrecy exists as a

smokescreen for killing civilians at will.

Secrecy abounds for very practical reasons: to protect sources, methods and capabilities.

Much of the work done by UAVs includes the capacity to disconfirm what may have initially

been described as a potential threat. Revealing the mere fact that an area, an individual, a cell of

MAMs, or a particular house or vehicle was the center of an intelligence mission is dangerous

for a number of reasons. If a target area is being probed from the air, it is possible that attention

was drawn to it by a particular source. Without getting into the specifics or the multitude of

32

There was a constant effort to ensure that soldiers who would be designating targets were aware that they were

legally responsible for the resulting force used. Kills were not made on hunches, but on scrutinizing subjects

deemed to be threatening who were subsequently verified as targets. This verification process consisted of

consultation with either the landowning unit TOC (Tactical Operations Center) or their subordinate units in the field,

or both. 33

See p. 85 in Schwartz, M. (2008). War without end: The Iraq war in context. Haymarket Books. The author’s

words are deliberately provocative, “This military campaign was devoted to ‘hunting IED emplacers with unmanned

aerial vehicles, attack helicopters, and spotters in C-12 airplanes.’ A ‘senior army official’ told Washington Post

columnist Rick Atkinson that Task Force ODIN was killing an average of seventy-one ‘suspected’ insurgents per

week in 2007. He offered no estimates of the number of civilians (who let ‘insurgents hide in their house’) who

were also killed." This passage is doubly idiotic as it makes those who harbor insurgents seem as though they are

innocent, when their very actions modify their targetability insofar as the ROE is concerned. The other sleight of

hand that the author performs is to insinuate that when so-called civilians are not counted among the dead they are to

be assumed to exist. Hence, the reader could presume that the military is intentionally hiding the number of civilian

deaths, which one may presume to be very high if one is so inclined to imagine a worst case scenario. 34

Aid, M. M. (2012). Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror. Bloomsbury Publishing USA, pp.

75-76.

21

possible scenarios, it is perhaps sufficient to expect a reasonable person to understand that

human sources can be reliable, unreliable, or untested. In either instance, credibility can be

measured by the juxtaposition of the intelligence gleaned from one source with that of another

(whether human or technological).

How sources are compared and judged is the realm of methods. It should be obvious that

such processes must remain guarded. As far as capabilities are concerned, the typical display on

a UAV screen consists of altitude, azimuth to the target area and some very important data that if

revealed to the public would also inform the enemy. Again, it seems redundant to say so, but

some low-tech reverse engineering is all that is necessary for one to compensate for another’s

high-tech advantage.

In light of the forgoing discussion, it is possible to pose another hypothesis associated

with secretive technology as it relates to a perception of human destruction.

HYPOTHESIS 3: When the source and rationale behind the intentional death of a human

is patent, it is more tolerable.

The policy relevance for such a line of inquiry is undergirded by the assumption that had

one been able to judge for oneself that a target was legitimate it would not matter how they were

destroyed. In other words, if secrecy could be diminished then perhaps the adverse (foreign and

domestic) public opinion implications could be reduced as well.

22

The Core of the Debate

One common claim regarding UAV-based kinetic strikes is that they are an excellent

source of propaganda against the user. This seems to be related to the number of victims that

some claim are the result of UAV strikes. The problem with this line of argument is that it is

difficult to get an accurate body count35

and even more difficult to explain that the numbers

would be far higher if an alternative means of engagement were employed. Nonetheless, the net

effect seems to be that the UAV user is portrayed as unleashing indiscriminate violence on an

undeserving civilian lot.

In a recent article, Audrey Kurth Cronin makes the case that despite the fact that the

overwhelming majority of lethal violence against Muslims is perpetrated by their co-religionists,

the perception among Muslims seems to be that when the U.S. kills Muslims it is far more

disturbing.36

Again, facts are less important than perceptions. Hence, it is worth considering the

perversity of the following puzzle: If UAV strikes are more efficient and less deadly than other

forms of selective violence and if the targets of such strikes are Muslims who kill other Muslims,

then what accounts for the anger at the U.S.?

35

See Daniel Byman’s (cited above) discussion of the various organizations who “count” and report. He notes, for

instance how some consider everyone to be civilians. With regard to a strike in Pakistan he notes that “… militants

often cordon off the area, remove their dead, and admit only local reporters sympathetic to their cause or decide on a

body count themselves.” 36

Cronin, A. K. (2013). Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy. Foreign Aff., 92, 44. From a public

opinion perspective, there is some reason to be suspicious of this claim. In a dueling article form the same issue

(cited above), Daniel Byman notes that “Many surveys of public opinion related to drones are conducted by ant-

drone organizations, which results in biased samples.”

23

Although the following may appear to be mere speculation, a related mystery follows and

forms the basis of a testable hypothesis. Specifically, if the use of UAVs generate such

discontent then it is possible that this merely amplifies a negative predisposition. Therefore, if

an adverse predisposition exists, there is relatively little one can do to diminish it and introduce a

variable, which generates a condition akin to cognitive dissonance.

HYPOTHESIS 4: Where a perception exists that innocent human lives are lost, the

adverse reaction is amplified by the notion that the cause is technological in origin, rather than

human.

HYPOTHESIS 5: Where a perception exists that combatant lives are lost, as a result of

more technological and less human action, it is only moderately relevant how they died.

These hypotheses can be tested by isolating the technological element associated with

death. This may be accomplished by way of postulating two types of scenarios. In the first,

manipulating survey questions to hold constant an innocent civilian death rate, but progressively

modifying only the device causing the death, would reveal a point along the spectrum of techno-

human causes of death. For instance, in the first scenario one can pose a question regarding

civilian deaths that result from a range of intentional death-causing agents: other humans with no

armaments (striking, choking), with personal armaments (sharpened or blunt objects), with short

range standoff armaments (firearms), with very remote conventional armaments (tanks), with

even further remote armaments (indirect mortar or artillery fire guided by other humans), or by

way of a human-guided missile. The second hypothesis, in the form of a question, would change

24

only the “innocent civilian” death for that of a “combatant.” In this way, it may be possible to

uncover a human bias against technology, as it relates to war.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the use of UAVs and associated devices in combat. Although

there is a pronounced paucity of political science literature on UAVs, a brief overview of some

of the extant material reveals that it would be better supplemented by injecting a discussion of

how they have been used within the counterinsurgency realm. To date, discussions of UAV

usage center on theaters of combat where a U.S. ground presence is minor or nonexistent. This

has led to the portrayal of UAVs as being used exclusively as a counterterrorism tool. U.S.

warfighting doctrine has been plagued by a technology-driven mindset prior to the wars in Iraq

and Afghanistan. It has been supplanted by a counterinsurgency zeitgeist over the past several

years, in which a focus has centered on human-to-human contact. The danger now is a reversion

back to talk of high-tech solutions, which seem to the layperson to be devoid of human quality.

This is the reason that TF ODIN was introduced into the literature review; it was missing a

discussion of the central human element that controls the machinery of war.

When machines are believed to be killing humans at random, revulsion is natural

response. The adverse reaction this produces for civilians is the puzzle and the dependent

variable. The hypotheses generated herein are a means to test whether a bias against UAVs

exists because they are considered automatons that kill without conscience or judicious decision-

making processes. The theory that such hypotheses may stimulate is something that appears to

25

be related to the nature of the means employed in combat against fellow humans. However, such

a theory is not the only possibility.

It may be possible to propose that the true distaste for UAVs felt by civilians in both

Muslim majority countries and among some staunch U.S. allies has to do with something entirely

different. That is, a completely different independent variable might be the cause for anti-UAV

sentiment. Namely, when a powerful actor exercises its might it may cause other actors to band

together in condemnation. Presently, and likely not for long, the U.S. (excluding Israel) has an

overwhelming monopoly with regard to lethal UAV capabilities that are employed at great

distances. That is, as a means of power projection the U.S. stands alone among any would-be

competitors. Therefore, unchecked and uncheckable power may in fact be leading observers to

the conclusion that the use of UAVs are an unacceptable expression of power. It is entirely

possible that the depiction of the instrument of power as being less human is merely the window

dressing that masks the source of discontent.

An alternative research program might be better suited to this task. Ideally, it would take

the form of content analysis and survey questionnaires. In considering content analysis, one

would likely have to first codify terms denoting various gradations of power; from the more

benign, such as “influence” to more sinister uses having a god-like quality, such as “kill.” The

next task would be to consider media mention of UAVs in which these terms accompany their

mention. One likely impediment to such a research design is that the term “drones” is liberally

applied to UAVs and they are commonly associated with the United States. In terms of using a

survey technique, it would also be quite difficult to allude to a technology that would be devoid

26

of its primary user’s association. That is, attribution is built-in and affect is a given.

Nonetheless, it may be possible to look at other concepts related to power such as size, wealth, or

military might. Some have already undertaken such a task,37

but more work is needed in this

area.

Although some have argued that the U.S. is a benign hegemon, its quality of benevolence

may be eroding in the court of world opinion. Using technology that symbolizes power

projection by the world’s only remaining superpower is likely to evoke the imagery of a rabid

overdog, preying on underdogs everywhere. A sympathetic response to this perception may be

the causal mechanism that generates displeasure. The policy challenge for the U.S. is to

demonstrate that this is not the case and that force is being used cautiously and with regard to

legitimate policy aims. Getting at the heart of what pushes public opinion in one direction or

another is an important step in resolving this quandary.

37

Vandello, J. A., Goldschmied, N. P., & Richards, D. A. (2007). The appeal of the underdog. Personality and

Social Psychology Bulletin, 33(12), 1603-1616.