more than tolerance: ethics for a multicultural society

PreliminaryCommunicationUDC17:316.73ReceivedJuly25th,2011

Patrick GiddyUniversityofKwazulu-Natal,SchoolofReligion,PhilosophyandClassics,HowardCollegeCampus,

ZA–[email protected]

More Than Tolerance: Ethics for a Multicultural Society

AbstractContemporary multicultural societies for the most part frame themselves in terms of a pro-cedural rather than substantive ethics, by emphasizing rightness rather than goodness, and elevate tolerance to key value. But this cannot of itself replace a substantive and motivating norm of the good life and can be experienced as a loss, disaffecting citizens. It will also fail to confront the limits of acceptable action, the unconditionality associated with the moral point of view. The classical tradition in ethics, proposing a norm of human flourishing, can be re-expressed to bring out this unconditionality. I point to the counter tradition of ethi-cal reasoning in terms of proportionality, exampled in the case of war ethics, as useful and draw on an alternative concept of democracy in terms not of formal or substantive rights but of an ethic of participation.

Key wordsethics,classicalGreekphilosophy,rightness/goodness,multiculturalism, tolerance,Spae-mann,unconditionality,proportionalistreasoning

1.

Contemporarymulticulturalsocietiesseemtocallforaproceduralratherthanasubstantiveethicalframingofpublicdebate.Thestatemustnotaffordanyoneversionofthegoodlife–say,oneputforwardbyaparticularreligion–preferenceoveranyother.Therightsofallindividualsmustbegivenequalconsideration,andthestatemustbeneutralwithrespecttoparticularculturalpractices.Inhisreactiontotheatrocitiescommittedby“culturalChristian”AndersBreivik,theNorwegianPrimeMinisterreiteratedhisgovernment’scommitmenttoapolicyoftoleranceofallculturalandreligioussocialex-pressions.A good example of the importance of this is the case of SouthAfrica,whichhastransitionedfromanon-democraticstatewithonenorma-tivereligious tradition,Christianity, toademocraticmulti-culturalsociety,andintoleranceof“theOther”isstronglyproscribed.Inamanualforteach-ers distributed to schools nation-wide,whereas previously “ChristianNa-tionalEducation”hadbeenthepolicy,now“toleration”isputforwardasthekeyvalueofthenewsociety.Inthe2003governmentpolicyonReligioninEducation,“parityofesteem”ismandatorytowardallreligionsandworld-views.In spite of the obvious and uncontroversial good points in this kind ofprogress,Iwanttoarguethattheproceduralapproachisinthefinalanaly-sis inadequate to copewith religion as a permanent factor in the social

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA54(2/2012)pp.(363–376)

P.Giddy,MoreThanTolerance:EthicsforaMulticulturalSociety364

life.1“Tolerance”asavaluecannotbear theweight it isgiven– it isonlyintheorythatcitizenspresentthemselvesasrationalindividualsdisengagedfromanyparticularmoraloutlook.Thedesiretobuildandtakepartinacom-munityconstitutedbycommonbeliefsaboutcommonvalueswouldseemtobetherebynature.Thedegreeofdifficultyofthisinamulticulturalsocietyshouldnotdeter.InthecaseofSouthAfrica,again,theexplicitinclusionofsubstantivegoods(housing,education,healthandsoon)intheConstitutionhasnotsucceededinfosteringaparticipatorycitizenship,inthejudgmentofarecentcommentator.2Itisclearthatnotenoughthoughthasgoneintohowthismightbeachieved.Inevitably,atanyrate,societyhastoconfrontissuestodowithtoleranceoftheintolerant.Atthisstage,andinordertoavoidtheinadvertentcreationofghettoswithin the dominant culture, some public judgmentmust bemadeaboutqualitiesofcharacterorvirtues,amongwhichisthevirtueoftoleranceorforebearance:thelattershouldbefosteredamongallcitizens,regardlessofreligiousorculturalconvictions.Howevermuchthiswouldseemtoruncountertoliberalintuitions,thesecularstatehastotakeonboardthequestionofwhatconstitutesauthenticreligiouspracticeandwhatmustfromtimetotimebejudgedasfallingoutsideofthis.Inpointoffacttheproceduralstatealreadyhasanimplicitcommitmenttoasetofvalues,asubstantiveviewofhumanflourishing.Itcannotavoidsuchaframingnorm,anditispreciselythis, critically developed, that can serve to anchor its approach to religionin thepublicsphere. Ithas tomakeanappeal to the religious traditions toarticulatethemselvesinawaythatisenhancingofourcommonlifetogether.Ithastoinvitethesetraditionstojointhepublicdebate,ifitisnottospawnextremistfundamentalistgroups.3InthispaperIamconcernedwithhowsuchdebatecanbestbeframed.Soaproceduralapproach,foregroundingtheequalityofworld-views,doesnotwork. In thefollowingSectionIdiscuss theoversightsassociatedwithsuchanapproach–theneedtomakeacallonwhatinfactisthesubstantivehumangoodofwhichtoleranceisoneusefulvirtueamongotherscontribut-ingtothisgood;andsecondlytherelatedproblemforanyproceduralethicofmotivation:onlyanethicframedintermsofasubstantivegoodthatmakessensetocitizenswillhaveanychanceofbeingefficaciousandnotsimplyatheoreticalideal.Section3thendevelopstheideathatthereisnooptionbuttoexpresstheethicsofthepublicspaceintermsofasubstantiveviewofthehumangood.Anyethicworthyofthenamewouldseemtomarkoutlimitsbeyondwhichonecannotgo:thereisanunconditionalaspecttoit,andtheproceduralapproachstressestheinalienabilityofhumanrights.Iamsuggest-inghoweverthatthiscannotdealwiththeneedtopronounceonasubstantiveidealofcharacterwhenconfrontedwiththeattitudeofintolerance.Anyabso-lutenessinethicsseemstobeabarriertoitsacceptancebyall(thereseemstobesomebedrockoffurtherunjustifiedprinciples,whichothersnotbelongingto this particularmoral traditionmight not find intuitively appealing).Butin thealternativeapproachIamsuggesting this ideaofunconditionality isrephrasedintermsofanethicofproportionality(nottobeconfusedwiththeverydifferentconsequentialistkindofethicalreasoning),whichdrawsonanotionofhumanflourishingwhichputsitselfforwardasinprinciplecommontoallcitizens.Iillustratethis(Section4)byreferencetotheethicsofwar.Inmydiscussions Iwilldrawonsome littleknownwritingsofRobertSpae-manninhisrethinkingoftheclassicalhumanflourishingapproachtoethics,inordertodemonstratethatthereisnothingarbitraryaboutit(andtherefore



inappropriate foramulticultural society),asmightbe thought.This ties inverywellwithanovelinterpretationoftheideaofdemocracyIfindinthewritingsofpoliticaltheoristClaudeLefort.

2.

TheaporiafacedbyapublicethicguidedbytoleranceascentralvalueiswellexplainedbyPaulVanTongeren.Hegivestwoargumentsfortheself-defeat-ingnatureoftheattitudeoftolerance,inotherwordsoftheattempttoaccepttheotherculture,andtheotherperson’sperspective,asnecessarilyofequalvalueasyourown:1. Ifalldifferenceinculturalperspectivecanbereducedtochancecircum-

stances, inotherwords if there isno really relevantdifference, I err ingivingthesedifferencesasignificancetheydonothave.Itwouldnotbeintolerance,butratherunjustdiscrimination,ifIwerenottotreatallcul-turescompletelyneutrally.Inpointoffact,thisispreciselywhatpeopleoftenmeanbytolerance.Andtalkof“tolerance”canbeasubtlewayofpromotingthevaluesofourowndominantculture(i.e.byclaimingthatnoculturaldifferencesaresignificant),inotherwords,keepingthestatusquo.

2. Inpromotingthevirtueoftolerance,arewenotsecretlyaffirmingthattheforbearancethatcharacterizesourowncultureandconvictions,marksoutourcultureassuperiorinsomeway,asmoreenlightened?Itiswe,afterall,whounderstandthatnosinglelifestyleistruerorbetterinsomeabso-lutewaythantheothers,andthusweunderstandmorethanthosewhostillbelieveintheobjectivetruthoftheirconvictions(2003:115–116).

VanTongerengoesontosuggest that theattitudeof indifferencetocultur-allydetermineddifferences,iftrulyacceptedforone’sownculturetoo,canbecomeanattitudeofcynicism.Ifoneinterpretstoleranceratherintermsofforbearance,itisrevealedasavirtuewhichassumesanideaofourpositive,commonmoralgood,ourtiesorbondstooneanotherinspiteofourdiffer-ences.4Again,somethinglikeanormativeideaofourcommonhumanflour-ishingisdrawnuponheretoresolvethedifficulty.

1

See Küenzlen, 2010. He is referring to thenewpowerofIslamintheEuropeanculturalmake-up.

2

BobMattes(2011:94).Hegivesevidencetoshowthatforthemajorityofcitizens,“democ-racy”meansbetterjobs,betterhousing,equaleducation–andnotsomuchfreedomtocriti-cize the government, for example.The pro-ceduraldimension to justice is largelyover-looked,andalongwiththat,thevaluingoftheattitudeoftolerance.Theideaofasubstantiveconcept of justice was firmly brought in bythe1996ConstitutionoftheRSA,entrench-ingnot simply the standard liberal rights offreedomofspeechandsoon(whicharetheretoguaranteeequalityofvoice)butalsoforex-ampleanon-harmfulenvironment,adequatehousing,justadministrativepractices.

3

AsdidthepreviousgovernmentintheUSAinthecaseofbioethicsdiscussions,aprogram-me,ThePresident’sCouncilonBioethics(seethecollectionHuman Dignity and Bioethics,2008), unfortunately halted by Obama. SeethediscussionofthisinEvans(2010).

4

PointedoutbyBartVanLeeuwen(2001:771;mytranslation):“Itisconceptuallyimpossibleto determine what humiliation is independ-entlyof an ideaof themoralgood.Respectfordifferenceshouldnotthussimplybeun-derstoodastheavoidanceofhumiliation.Thenegativeformulationofrespectfordifferencepoints indirectly toadistinguishingmarkofthehumanconditionthathasapositivemoralsignificance,andthatis,ourbondstoonean-other.”



Wecanalsoappreciatethataproceduralpublicethicfacesaproblemofmo-tivation.ThisiswellillustratedintheattemptofSouthAfricanauthoritiestomoveawayfromasubstantivepublicethic.IntheHandbook for Professional Ethics for Educators(2002),distributedtoschoolsthroughouttheprovincesofSouthAfrica,theauthorsfocusontheideaoftheuniversalityofhumanrights.While trying to instil a senseof professional ethics in teachers, theauthorsoftheHandbooktakeveryseriouslythemulticulturalcontextofoursocietyandthedangerofmoralorreligiousabsolutism.Itisarguedthatanyethical framework, religious or otherwise, from utilitarianism through toegoism,fromChristianitythroughtoBuddhism,iscompatiblewithfollowingtheethicalcode foreducators (2002:120).Theprinciplesexpressed in thecode, articulatingbasichuman rights, arepresented asautonomous of anymotivationalframework.TheHandbook takes theposition that, inamulti-cultural society, there canbeno reasons convincing to everyonegiven theparticularmoralhierarchiesintheirvarioustraditions.Butwecanaskacriticalquestionhereaboutwhyanyagent,inthiscasetheeducator,shouldbemotivatedtofollowtheparticularprinciplesinthecode.Surelythecodehasbecomenecessarypreciselybecausethemoraltraditions,giving identity, are in disarray (havebeen for some time!) andneed to beinsomewayre-invented.What isbeingpresentedhere,on thecontrary, isastartingpointbeyondanymoraltradition.Andwithoutreferencetoone’ssenseofmoralidentityasacrucialelementitisdifficulttoseethecodebeingefficacious.Thefirsttopickuponthelossofapublicdiscourseofhowsocialplayersaresubjectivelymotivated,ismorethanlikelytobeanovelist.Theinterestofthereaderofthenovelliesinseeinghowaparticularcharacterconfrontsandmeets,orfailstomeet,thechallengestogrowinself-understandingascircumstancespressuponthem.Butthetemptationofamulticulturalstateistoassumetheattitudeofbeingaboveallsuchsubjectivestruggles,anysuchparticularworld-viewsorreligiouscommitments,soastoadjudicateamongthem by means of a politically constituted set of further unjustified moralrules,orrights.Theinnerlifeisneglected,atleastinthepublicdomain.ThenovelistJ.M.Coetzee(1999:35ff) highlightsthetendencyofasocietywithgreattechnologicalandorganizationalpowertohaveablindspotwithregardtothisneed,inourcommonworld,togivelivingspacetoothers,toappreciate“whatitisliketobe”them–otherlessadvantagedpersons,othergenerations,othercultures,otherspecies.Hefocusesonourattitudetotheenvironment,bringing to light theextent towhichourhumanexistence is a sharedone,andbecauseofthistherearecertainboundaryconditionstotheexerciseofour freewill andcompares the Jewishholocaustwith themeatproductionsystemassociatedwithourownsocieties’abattoirs–avirtualnon-issueincontemporarypublicspace.Heisconcernedtoquestiontheattitudethatwecandoanythingwewant,and,ashisprotagonistputsit,“comeawayclean”.Weare,seeninthislight,acertainkindofcreature,ourfeelingsarestructuredinaparticularway,withaparticularorientation, towardsthefulfillmentofournaturalneeds.MarilynneRobinsonisanotherwriteroffictionwhoalsoremarksonthewaypublicdiscourseelidesthissenseofwhatmakessensetous,whichsheidenti-fieswithabroadlyreligiousattitude.Whatshecallsparascientificaccountshavelaunchedanattackontheself,“thesolitary,perceiving,andinterpretinglocusofanythingthatcanbecalledexperience”(2010:7).(ShehasinmindtheusebywriterssuchasDanielDennettandothersofevolutionaryscience



tomakepronouncementson lifeasawhole.) It is this thatWilliamJamesidentifieswithasenseofreligion.Themodernmalaise,Robinsoncontends,isnotbecauseofourmulticulturalandself-criticalsociety,butrather,inpart,becauseofthe“exclusionsofthefeltlifeofthemindfromaccountsofrealityproposedbytheoddlyauthoritativeanddeeplyinfluentialparascientificlite-rature”(2010:35).Theexampleofoneparascientificwriter,StevenPinker,is illustrative.Heargues that the reason thatpeopleexpress themselvesbymeansofaninnernarrative,andtrytolivebyit,isbecausetheyhaveatoohighestimateofthehumanmind.But,heclaims,theyaredeluded.Therearebasic“imponderables”which,arguesPinker,wemustadmitassuch:Robin-songiveshislistofthese:“consciousness,inthesenseofsentienceorsub-jectiveexperience, theself, freewill,conceptualmeaning,knowledge,andmorality”!Pinkerclaimsthatitisprobablethatthesearenottrickybecauseirreducibleormeaninglessandsoon,“butbecausethemindofHomoSapienslacksthecognitiveequipmenttosolvethem.Weareorganisms,notangels,andourbrainsareorgans,notpipelinestothetruth”(inRobinson,2010:128).Suchclaimsareneedlesstosayself-contradictory–or,moreprecisely,self-stultifying:Pinkerthinkshereachesthetruth,evenifhisbrain,asanorgan,cannotofitselfdothis.Itisalossofthissenseofwhatwearethatishighlightedinwritingsasdiffer-ent(inotherrespects)asC.S.Lewis’The Abolition of Man, andHorkheimerandAdorno’sDialectic of Enlightenment.Thissenseof“howwefitin”isanormativeexigencetowhichtheproperresponseisanattempttobalancele-gitimatedemandsandaspirations,bothourownandthoseofothers.Withoutthisbalance,ourhuman rationality couldamountmerely to anexerciseofunbridledpoweroverothers,andarationalizationofsuchpower,forexamplethroughtalkofmoralityand“rights”.5

3.

Ihavebeenarguingthatwecan’tgetawayfromtheneedforsomeoverarch-ingnormativenotionofhumanflourishing.6Theattitudeofthetradition-freedemocraticindividualislikelytobethatapartfromthesocialrulesnecessitat-ingrespectforthefreedomofothers–conventionalrules–thereisnothingholdingbacktheindividualintheirpursuitofwhatsoevermeetstheirdesires.ThisresonatesverymuchwiththeproblematicthatspurredSocratesandoth-erstoarticulateatheoryofwhatistrulyfulfillingofhumanpersons.Wecanrecall, as as Spaemann does (2002,Ch 14), Plato’s classic attempt, in theGorgias, to refute theargument thatmoral rulesaremerelysocialconven-tions. In this dialogue, Socrates invokes the idea that for almost everyonecertainrealizationsofourfreedom(oneexampleisthatofthefreedomofa

5

Thiswasthecaseinthepre-1994ApartheidSouthAfrica,aspointedoutbyDavidDyzen-haus. He writes that what mattered duringApartheidwas“whether the legalorderwascommittedtoasubstantiveormerelyformalconception of legality or the rule of law”(2011: 235).What was heartening was thatthere were indeed lawyers and judges whodidnot accept that“theprincipleof legalityimposes requirements of form alone.” Andit is important now not to think that formalonematters.Courtshavetojudgewhether

anyparticulardemandonthestatetoprovidethesearereasonableornot,i.e.proportional,giventhelimitationsonresourcesandsoon(2011:234).

6

Thelastfewdecadeshaveseenasignificantrevival in English-language philosophy ofthis(reformulated)classicalapproachtoeth-ics, associated with the names of AlasdairMacIntyre(1981),CharlesTaylor(1989)andothers.



catamitetorealizehisdesires)areconsidereddegradingtoourhumanityandthusunenviable(Gorgias494e).7Socrates’argumentseemsconvincing.Ethi-calreasoningisframedwithinacertainalreadygivennormativeideaofwhatitistobeahumanbeing,whatwetodaywouldcalloursenseofidentity.Thatframework,however,shouldnotbethoughtofassimplyrelativetoculture,butasessentiallyacross-culturalnormativeidentity:whenwefeelsomethingismorallyunacceptable,wethinkthatthisisthecaseforanyoneinthatsitu-ation,otherthingsbeingequal.I am not suggesting that this negative aspect, this boundary condition, isthewholeofethics.Rather,itpointstothenormativeaspectofouridentity,puttingusundercertainguidelines,tobecalleduponinmomentsofdecision.Wearebiologicalbeingswiththerestrictionsassociatedwiththat,butalsowehaveasocialidentity,andthismeansweareorientedbythemeaningweattachtoourvariousneedsandtheneedsofothers,andbythemeaningwegivetoourgoalsandthegoalsofoursociety.Andthuswearethekindofbeingthathastotakeresponsibilityforitself,andthisresponsibilityexhib-itsacertainnormativestructure:opennesstogreaterself-understandingandwillingnesstogrowinresponsetosuchdevelopinginsights.Thissenseofre-spondingtoandtakingupone’sidentityunderstoodasanethicalframework(andyetonewhichinthecourseofone’sresponsegetsfurtherdeveloped)addsatrulynewdimensiontotheclassicalhumannaturetraditioninethics.While for the classical thinkers, human essencewas a part of unchangingcosmos,forcontemporarythinkinghumanityisaculturalproduct.Thislatterapproachcanhoweverbeseentobeincontinuitywiththeclassicaltradition(onthesideofSocratesratherthanofSophistssuchasCallicles)whenthenotionof“identity”isforegrounded.Wespeak,inethicalreasoning,withinatraditionthattosomeextentreflectsthenecessarynormativestructureofanyperson’smoralidentity.Inconsideringtheappropriatemeanstobetakenintheparticularsituation,weworkoutfurtherimplicationsofouridealsunderchangingconditions.Ethicalreasoning,then,makessenseonlyifoneconsidersthatthereisasenseinwhichcertainkindsofbehaviourarecompletelyunacceptable.Thispointislinkedtothefactthatethicaltheorycomesintoplaywhenmoraltradition,delineatingwhatisacceptableandwhat,innormalconditions,isnot,ischal-lenged,andthetraditionisindisarray.Thisisthecasewiththedevelopmentof the theoryofutilitarianismandofdeontologicalethics,and thesame istruealsooftheapproachweareconsideringhere,usingtheideaofthekindofbeingweare(ourplaceinnatureandournormativelystructuredsenseofidentity,moreor less reflected inour traditions.)TheGreekSophists, andalsoPlatoandAristotle,turnedtotheconceptofnature,physis,asananswertothosewho,discoveringthewidediscrepancyamongmoralrulesindiffer-ent cultures, questionedwhether custom,nomos, could have any criticallyjudgedworthfortheindividual.Orareperhapscustomssimplyconventions,opposedtohowthingsareby nature (asCalliclesargues,Gorgias 483),either imposedbythemajoritytopreventthestrongfewfromcompletelyoverridingtheirinterests,orbytherulingminoritytopreventthemajorityfromassert-ingtheirplaceinsociety?PlatoandAristotleattemptedtoshowthatnatureand convention are not contradictory. What Socrates attempts to convincehiscriticsof,includingthelimitcaseofatrulyunenviablebutunforcedex-erciseofthefreewill,isthattheabstractconfrontationofanindividualistic,free,asocialhumannaturewithsocialconventiondoesnotcorrespondtohowthingsare.Ifthewishofhumanstosurviveandtolivewellis“onlyattain-



ableinalifeinsociety,thensociabilitybelongstohumannature”(Spaemann,2000:159).Andthismeansthatwereasonethicallyfromthestartingpointofcertaingiventraditions,articulatingthatsociability.Thekindofthingweare,ourplacingwithinagreaterwhole,isnotlimitedtoourstructureofnaturalinstincts,includingsocialinstincts.Wealsolivebymeaning.So“natural”and“rational”arenotopposites.Traditionandcustomareneededifwearetobeabletorelyonothersandsohavespacetodevelopourreasoningabilities.Itisintermsofthisfunction oftraditionsthattheycanofcoursebecriticized.Wecandistinguishbetweenrationalandirrationalconventionsbecauseconven-tionassuchisnotirrational.8

Anethicsofresponsibilitymightatfirstsightseemtoundermineouroriginalsuggestionthatethicalreasoningonlyreallymakessensewhenonecanrefertosomebehaviourwhichisthoughtofascompletelyunacceptable,degrad-ing toourhumanity.Spaemann (2000:viii)notes that theapproachwhichaims at thebest possible realizationofvalue, the eudaimonistic approach,“alwaysleadstomerelyhypotheticalrulesofprudence,whichmakestheun-conditionednessofmoralitydisappear.”Itishoweverinourabilitytodiscernandputintoactionthetrulygood,andtheconditionsforthisagency,thattheunconditionedness re-appears. This is because our choices can sometimesnotrepresentwhatwereallyare.Theideaofour“real”wantsiscrucialhere.Thenotions of “right” and “wrong”have at least twomeanings. If actionis defined as the intentional bringing about of something, then that actionwhichrestsuponerror(Idrinkpoisonthinkingitislemonade)appearstobecounterfeitaction(bydefinitionitisnotbringingaboutofsomethingbythepersonquaagent).AccordingtoPlato,everymorallywrongaction(this isthesecondmeaningof“right”and“wrong”)hasthischaracterofcounterfeitaction.

“Whatispresupposedbythisideaisthatthereissomethinglikeafinalintentionofacting,alastfor-the-sake-of-whichandthatthisforwhichouractionstakeplaceisnotitselftheresultofachoice,butratheritdefines“bynature”ourbeing-for-something.”(Spaemann,2000:4)

7

Callicleswouldrathernotconsiderthese,forhim, extreme cases. “Are you not ashamed,Socrates, to drag our discussion into suchtopics?” It is difficult to find a present-dayequivalentpreciselybecausetheideaofsomenormative“goodlife”hassolittlepurchase;howeverthenotionofbeingpsychologicallydisturbedor ill (and therefore“unenviable”)would tend to be applied to, say, someonewho claimed they enjoyed living in the ex-tremeconditionsoftheghettosorconcentra-tion camps inNaziGermany (we can thinkoftheperformanceofCharlotteRamplinginNight Porter depicting someone seeming toenjoybeingdegraded.)

8

An alternative approach is suggested byMarthaNussbaum(1997),namelytobypassparticular conventions through adopting aStoic cosmopolitanism. Seeing oneself as a“citizenof theworld”wouldmean identify-ing oneself with rational humanity ratherthanany localgrouporculture.Tomywayofthinkingthereisnodoubtthatthispicture

ofhumanidentityhasmuchgoingfor it.Totheextentthatitconvinces,however,thejobwould still remain to show how one’s ownparticulartraditiondoesindeedreflect(orsosomeextentfailtoreflect)thisvision.Whatneedstobeemphasizedishowanyparticularcase requires the agent tomake a reasonedjudgmentaboutthevaluesatstake.Ifthein-junctions collectedunder the rubricofwhatis “politically correct” (according to Nuss-baum (1997:23) an idea unjustly maligned)doindeedgiveexpressiontosuchvalues(inparticular thevalueofequalrespectforall),thentheyshouldofcoursebefollowed.Whatwehaveemphasizedisthatthereisnoshort-cuthere,andthemoraleffortwhichgoesintodiscerning what is truly worthwhile doingisat thesame timecreativelyadvancing thetradition. Without this creative engagement(theneedforwhichwehaveminedfromtheclassicalmoraltradition)thedangerisanun-thinking imposition of ideas which then getlabelledas“ethnocentricvestigesofWesternimperialism”(Nussbaum1997:24).



Andwecanbemistakenaboutthis,andthemeanstogetit.Astandardex-trinsictooureffortswouldnotbeofrelevancefortheseeffortsbutherewehaveoneimmanentintheseefforts.Thefalsenessliesinthefactthatwhatwetaketobetheultimateandforwhichwestriveisnot,intheend,ourultimatedesire.Andsowefallintocontradictionwithourselves.Wewantwhatwedonotwant.Soourideacanstillholdgood,thatethicsonlymakessensewhentherearesomethingswhicharethoughtofascompletelyunacceptable,thereisanunconditionalityinethicalreasoning.9

4.

Idonotthinkthereisanyknock-downargumentforthekindofframingofethicalquestionsIamproposinghere.WecanrecallMichaelSmith’sdepic-tionofany“humanflourishing”substantiveratherthanproceduralethicas“simplyamobforcingitscommonlyagreedstandardonanothergroupwhoseagreementtheydonothave”(Smith,1994:91).AndVanTongerendescribeswellthedominantproblemwithanyoneholdingtoonespecificsuchethic:itseemstogohandinhandwithanattitudeofintolerance:

“Wecallthoseintolerantwhoholddogmaticallytothecorrectnessoftheirownconviction,whofailtosee,ordonotwanttosee,therelativityoftheirownperspective,andwhotherebyshowthattheyarenottrulypartofthemodernworld.Becauseifonethingcharacterizes(post)modernmenandwomen,thenitispreciselytherealizationthatourconvictionsarehistoricallyandcul-turallylimited,thatthetruelifestyledoesnotexist.”(2003:114–5;mytranslation)

Bethatasitmay,Iwanttoarguethatwhenonebringsinthefactofaninitialsituationofunequalpower,thecaseineverypresent-daysociety,decisiveval-uejudgmentsarecalledfor,which–onehopes–holdtrueforall,objectively.Themostprominentexampleisthatofwar.Totheextentthatglobalculturehasbecomeself-consciouslymulticulturalandliberal,therehasbeenamarkedpreferenceforabroadlyutilitarianethicalapproach.ThisismodifiedbyKan-tiandeontologicalprincipleswhichissueinasenseofthefundamentalrightsofeachindividual.Inthecaseofwar,however,averydifferentkindofapproach,thatofthe“JustWar”,isadopted.10Wecanalsonote,inthesecondplace,thatinboththe(reformulated)classicaltraditionandthemodern(broadlyliberal)approachthereisacleardistinctionbetweenparticularideasofwhat,concrete-ly,ismorallygood,andhowweshoulddecideonwhatismorallyright.Dif-ferentculturesmightholddifferingideasonthecontentofthegood,butcouldagreeonproceduralgroundsforethicaldecision-making.Iwillnowarguethatthisgoodness/rightnessdistinctioncan throw lightonwhy, incontemporaryrefectionontheethicsofwar,adifferentapproachtotheusualisadopted.Iwanttosuggestthatthe“justifiedwar”approachispreferredtotheutilitar-ianpreciselybecauseofthegreaterdangerhereofthe abuse of power(andthisisathemewhichwewillbearinmindbelow.)Theindividualiscalledupontodosomething–destroyproperty,takehumanlife,perhaps–whichseemsatfirstsighttogoagainstthenormalsocialconditionsfortheexerciseofindividualhumanrightsandindividualautonomy.Theprincipleofdoubleeffect(thebasisfortheJustWaridea)distinguishesbetweenconsequenceswhicharedirectlyintended(thedeathofasoldierwhoisalso,forexample,somemother’slovedson,somesmallchild’sadoredfather)andoneswhicharenotintended(whatisintendedissimplyanendtoinjustice)butarefore-seenasalmostinevitable(nothingelsewillstoptheunjustenemy’sadvance).Thelatterarepermissibleiftheharmresultingisnotdisproportionatetotheresultinggood.



Problemsimmediatelyoccurtoone.Whojudgesthattheenvisagedresultis“good”?Howisthedeathofonemother’ssontobecompensatedforby,say,anyamountofpoliticalfreedom?Thisrhetoricalquestion,however,isnotinthelineof“JustWar”thinking,forwhichthestartingpointisnoteachindi-vidual’sautonomybutratheravisionofthegoodlife,inwhichindividualsandthenormalconditionsfortheirhappinessareindeedtakenintoconsidera-tionbutforthemostpartandnotinabsolutelyeverycase(conditionsjustify-ingwarwouldbeanexception).Whateverthecultureorparticulartraditionofthosegroupsinvolvedintheconflict(letussupposeweareinamulticul-turalcontext),itisclearthatwhatisbeingassumedinthisapproachissomecommonalityofvisionofagood,peacefulandjustsociety,inotherwordsofa“justend”(thefirstJustWarprinciple:thattheendbejust.)Onlythencouldoneask,Arethemeansproportionatetotheend?Inotherwords,howgraveistheinjusticebeingcommitted,andperpetuated?Ethicsisnotseenintermsofformalprinciplesofmoralreasoning(rightness)nomattertowhichsub-stantialvisionofthegoodlifeonesubscribes.Foritispreciselytheextenttowhichtheimplementationofthissubstantialvisionisbeingmadeimpossiblethatcallsfortheuseof(proportionate!)justifiedforce.In a culture dominated by thinking along the lines of ethical principles ofrightnessratherthangoodness,thecaseofwaristheoneexception:weas-sumethatallpartiescancalluponsomeoverarchingideaof thegoodlife.Tosomeextenttheissueisobscuredthroughlegalisticinterpretationsofthebasicprinciples–forexamplethestipulationthatthejudgmentthatthein-justiceisindeedverygravemustbenotoneindividual’sversionofthisbutapronouncementbytherelevantauthoritieswhoalsohavetoensurethatnon-violentmeanshavebeenexhausted.(Ofcourseonehasto judgethat theseparticularauthoritiesdoinfacthave(morally)legitimatepoliticalauthority.)Furthermore,whatis“proportionate”inwagingwarisfurtherstipulated:in-tentionalkillingofnon-combatantsisneverproportionatetothepoliticalgoodofjusticeandpeace.11Still,itisclearthattheseprinciplesarebindingbecausetheyareseenasexpressingwhatisobjectivelytrueaboutthenatureofthehuman good, and this good limits one’s freedom of legitimate action, cir-cumscribingtheideaofresponsibleagency.Noteverythingispermissibleinachievingotherwisejustgoals.12Andtheprincipleof“justintention”requiresthattheagentshouldcarefullyconsidertheirownmotivationorintentionin

9

SeeSpaemann2000,esp.Ch15.ForfurtherclarificationofhowthisideaofresponsibilityrelatestoreligiousfaithseeSpaemann,1994.ForgeneraloverviewsofSpaemann’scentralphilosophical approach see Zaborowski, H.2001;Madigan,A.1997;Duhamel,A.1999.

10

Both sides to the conflict in Libya – theGaddafiregime,andtheUNforces–arguedintermsofJustWarconditions,inparticularevokingthecriterionofproportionality.

11

InhisexcellentsurveyofmoralatrocitiesinthetwentiethcenturyJonathanGloverchoosestobasehisjudgmentson“thesenseofmoralidentity”(Glover,2001:406).Thushejusti-fies thedirectly intendedkillingof (a smallnumberof)civiliansfromNorwaywhenthe

aimis thepreventionof thedevelopmentofnuclearweaponsbut(inconsistently,fromourpointofview) regrets thebreakingdownofourmoralbarriersintheintentionalharmingof theGermancivilianpopulationthroughanavalblockade.

12

TheconsensusreachedintheTruthandRec-onciliationCommissionamountstoasimilaridea.Thefactthatallpartiestriedtoshowthattheiractsofviolencehadakindofrationaleto them, in the minds of those perpetratingthem,shows,ascommissionchairmanBishopTutu,notes“thattheydoacceptthattheuseof force is subject to moral judgment anddistinctions.”(TRC,VolI,Ch1,53)Inotherwords,somekindofproportionalistapproachtoethicsisaccepted.



undertakingtheproposedaction.Inthefinalanalysisthehopeisthatprotago-nistsconsidertheiractioninthelightofthesharedvaluesofthesocialworldcommontoallthoseaffectedbytheiractions.Certainultimateends(implicitratherthanexplicit)arethereforepresupposedbytheprinciplesofdecision-makinglaiddowninthisapproach.Furthermore,becauseinamulticulturalsocietysuchends–summedupinanormativeviewofourhumanity–mightbegivenexpressioninverydifferentkindsofwaysbydifferentgroupsitisprudenttolookmoreattherightnessoftheactionthanthegoodnessofthepersonorhowtheactionreflectstheidealofthegoodlife.Foraneffectiveapplicationofthe(reworked)classical“humannature”tradi-tion,then,thegoodness/rightnessdistinctioniscrucial.Thefocusisonensur-ingthattherightthingcontinuestobedone,thatitmakessensetodebateonethicalissueseveninamulticulturalsocietywithdifferentideasaboutgood-nessoraboutwhatmakesuptheconcreteidealofhumanliving.Thusaphysi-cianwhodevelopsanewtherapeuticdeviceofgreatbenefittopeoplemightbemotivated by selfish reasons.His act is, then,morally bad butmorallyright.13Thepersonwhogivesalmswhereitisdesperatelyneededbutdoessobecauseofthedesireforpraise,tousetheclassicexample,isdoingtherightthing,andshouldnotbetoldtostopdoingitbecauseitisinoursensestrictlyspeakingamorallybadact,asthecriterionofgoodintentionisnotmet.Therightness/goodnessdistinctionmight,however,beunderstoodinaverydifferentway.Itcouldbethoughtthatoneshouldoptforafocusonrightnessratherthangoodnessbecauseoftheassumptionthatinamulticulturalsociety,therecanbeno reasonsconvincing toeveryonegiven theparticularmoralhierarchiesintheirvarioustraditions.Thereisasenseinwhichthisisthecaseinthepresentemphasisonrecapturingasenseofthemoralorethicaldimen-sioninpublicandprivatelifeincontemporarySouthAfricansociety.Ethicalhandbooks forprofessionals tend to focuson“ethical competence”,whichmeansbeingabletodefendone’smoralchoices,inaccordancewithoneorotherethicalframework,sayutilitarianordeontological.14Intheabsenceofaproperunderstandingofitsimplicitassumptions(mentionedabove)thepos-siblecontributionoftheclassicalhumannaturetraditiontosocialproblemsinvolvingethicaldecision-making,mightbelost.15Iwanttosuggestthatthekeyelementinthisapproach,thatoftherequirementthattheagenttakere-sponsibilityfortheiractions(bothintentionandresultsarehighlighted),isanecessarycorrectivetomuchethicaldiscoursewhichsidelinesthepowerdi-mensioninoursocialinteractionandthusgivesappliedethicsthereputationofbeingmerelyarationalizationfordoingwhateveronecangetawaywithandwouldhavedoneanyway.

5.

Theproceduralpublicethichasswayincontemporarydebates,astiedintotheveryideaofdemocracy.Butawayofconceivingademocraticethosmoreconsonant with our intuitions has been developed by PhilippeVan Haute(1994)withreferencetotheideasofFrenchpoliticalphilosopherClaudeLe-fort(1998;2000).VanHautearguesagainsttheideathatthestrugglebetweendifferentconvictionsandopinionsshouldberesolvedsimplyonapragmaticbasis,achievingharmonywiththeleastrestrictionpossibleofindividualfree-dom.Rather,heargues,whatishappeninginademocraticculture(inparlia-ment, community councils, etc.) should be understood as a kindof “ritualofreconciliation”(verzoeningsritueel)wherebythedifferentprotagonistscanacknowledgeoneanotherasequal.Whatmakesthispossibleisacommunal



rejectionofatranscendencethatescapesus(andthus,inourterms,arejec-tionofintolerance).“Theotherinthedemocraticdebateisrespectedpreciselybecauseandinsofarasit isrecognizedthathetoostands‘beforethelaw’”andnotsimplyundersomemeasurewhichescapesothers(VanHaute,1994:181).AndwhatvanHaute,orLefort,meansbythisisthatthereissomething,anought,towhichwemustsubmit,andwhichdoesnotnecessarilycoincidewithoursubjectivewishes.Thisideacanbedevelopedbynotingthatonthisaccount therewouldseem tobenothingstopping thewholeprocessgoingcompletelywrong,ortakingawrongturn:inotherwords,peopledemandingcompletelyinappropriate“rights”.Whatwouldseemineffecttopreventthisarethepractisedvirtuesoflisteningtotheotherandseekingthetruth.Theexigenciesofrationalitytiedintothedirectionofourcommonlife,arenotabandoned,astheyseemtobeinthecaseofapurelyformalinterpretationofdemocraticprocedures.Werespecttheotherpreciselyassomeonewhocanlikewiseparticipateinintelligentconsiderationoftheproposalsputforwardinthedemocraticdebate.Weloserespectinsofarastheotherappearstousassimplyanopportunist,seekinghisowninterestsandunlimitedself-realisa-tion.Thisunderstandingwouldhaveadirectimplicationforourunderstandingofourownproblematic,modifyingtheideaofproportionalitytomeantakingintoaccounttheimportanceofallowingthedemocraticprocesstocontinue.Itwouldrefernotsimply toapragmaticcompromisebut to theattempt toachieve,tothebestofone’sability,whatactuallyismostjustandofvalue.Thefurtheringofthealwaysfragiledemocraticethoswouldbepartandpar-celofwhatisaimedatintheprocess.Thiswouldhaveimplicationsfordeci-sionsintheappliedethicsofvariousspheres,wheretheresponsibilitywouldbetofurtherthisethos,tiedinasitistoseeingpersonsasmorallyresponsible(“beforethelaw”),notsimplynegotiatingtheirowninterests,butnegotiatingtheir just interests.Wecould think, to takeaprominent example in recentBritishpubliclife,ofhowthiscouldframethevalueofpressfreedom:what-everbroughtdownthisrespectforpersonscouldarguablybesaidtobenotinthe“justinterests”ofthepress.Itmightbeargued,forexample,thatthetraditionof the“page threegirl”devaluedasectionof thecommunityandthuswouldnotnecessarilybeaproportionatemeanstothenecessaryandjustinterestsofthepressinmaintainingareadingpublic.Similarlywithtelephonehacking.Thejusticetobediscernedherecannotbereducedsimplytoaques-tionofvoluntaryconsent(ofreadersandwriters,orconsumersandproduc-

13

SeeHoose 1987: 46. I am indebted for thispartof thepaper tohisdiscussionongood-nessandrightness.

14

TotakeSouthAfricanexamplesonly,forex-ample,DavidBenatar(2002);LucasOosthui-zen (2002);DeonRossouw (2002); also theSACE Handbook (2002), discussed below.Rossouw takes MacIntyre’s analysis of thecurrent malaise in ethics as uncovering ourassumptionsaboutmoralrelativism.Butlackofmoral consensus,Rossouwargues (2002:68),doesnotimplyarelativism,andadefi-niteprocedure(theRIMSstrategy)canassistresponsible debate. I support the procedurebutsuggestadifferentframeworkforit;my

understandingofMacIntyre,andthepossibil-itiesforethicstoday,ismorealongthelinesoftraditionalAristotelianethics.

15

As is thecasewithDeonRossouw’s (2003)extra-ethicaldefinitionofthepurposeofbusi-nessenterprises (in sayingbusiness“createsvalue”heequivocatesontheuseoftheterm“value”).Ihavearguedthat theideaofpro-portionalismintheJustWartraditionprecise-lyrulesoutanyextra-ethicaldeterminationofone’sdecisions.Proportional reasoningonlymakes sense within a tradition of (implicit,neverfullyarticulated)commonunderstand-ingofourorientingvalues.



ers).Wecouldthinkalso,totakeanotherfairlyarbitraryexample,ofthesaleofbodyparts.Thereisanexpressivemeaningherewhichmightalsodevaluethekindofethosthatisatstakeinademocraticculture,inwhichnooneistobethoughtofasmerelyameanstotheadvantageofanotherperson.Butthereisalsoapurelypragmaticreasonfortheoutlawingofthesaleofbodyparts,whichmightbethoughtofalongthemodelofwillingsellerwillingbuyer,andthatisthatsuchsalewouldgiveadditionalreasonstoapersontocommitacrime,evenmurder,tomakeaprofit,andthusoverlytaxthealreadystretchedpoliceforces.Theendinmind,namelythelegitimatefreedomofcommercialtrade,doesnotseemtowarrantsuchameans,thevalueatstakeherebeingdisproportionateorunbalanced.WhatVanHautebringsoutisthatourethicalframeworkinademocracyhasmuchtodowithourbeingbroughtintoparticipation.Therebywecouldsaythatwearetogetherconstitutingthe“moralauthority”inourlivesthatwasperhaps differently expressed in other political and social systems, or elsepositivelyunderminedbythosesystems.Itisanethicsofresponsibilityverymuchinlinewiththeclassicalconcernwithasharedworldofcommonvaluesbutthat“sharing”hastobemoreself-consciouslyanddeliberatelypursuedinourownmulticulturalcontext.Itisanapproachthatofnecessitybringsintothepublicdiscussion thesubjectively-validatedculturalandreligiouscom-mitments that actuallymotivatecitizens.Butwehave suggested that thereismuchtobelearnt inconstructingstandardsforsuchdiscussionfromtheclassicalethicsofhumanflourishing,inparticularasunpackedbymeansofthe key idea of proportionality. “Tolerance” as key value is too thin to besustainedinthelongterminmulticulturalsocietiesbutherewehaveawayofframingethicsthatdrawsuponoursenseofbeingpartofsomethinglargerthanourselves,inwhichwemakeourway,anditpreciselythis–areligiousorsubstantivenorm,ifyoulike–thatmotivatestheattitudeoftoleranceandregardfortheother.

Literature

Benatar,D.2003.“GuestEditorialonMedicalEthics”,Continuing Medical Education,21:7–8.

Coetzee,J.M.1999.The Lives of Animals. Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Duhamel,A.1999.“Spaemann,R.Bonheur et bienveillance”,Philosophiques26:159–163.

Dyzenhaus,D.2011.“PastsandFutureoftheRuleofLawinSouthAfrica”,inShapiro,R.andK.Tebeau(eds.)After Apartheid. Reinventing South Africa?Charlottesville,Va.:UniversityofVirginiaPress,234–268.

Evans, J.2010.“Science,BioethicsandReligion”, inP.Harrison (ed.)The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,207–226.

Glover,J.2001.Humanity. A Moral History of the Twentieth Century.London:Pimlico.

Hoose,B.1987.Proportionalism. Washington:GeorgetownUniversityPress.

Horkheimer,M.andT.Adorno[1944]1972.Dialectic of Enlightenment.Tr.J.Cumming.London:AllenLane.

Küenzlen,G.2010.“TheOtherSideofGlobalization: theNewPowerofReligionasaCulturalandPoliticalChallenge”,Synthesis Philosophica24:219–231.

Lefort,C.2000.Writing: The Political Test.Durham,N.C.:DukeUniversityPress.

Lefort,C.1988.Democracy and Political Theory.Cambridge:PolityPress.



Lewis,C.S.2001.The Abolition of Man.ZondervanPublishingHouse.

MacIntyre,A.1981.After Virtue.London:Duckworth.

Madigan,A.1997.“RobertSpaemann’sPhilosophischeEssays”,Review of Metaphysics51:105–132.

Mattes,R.2011.“ForgingDemocrats”,inShapiroR.andK.Tebeau(eds.)After Apartheid. Reinventing South Africa?Charlottesville,Va.:UniversityofVirginiaPress,72–104.

Nussbaum,M.1997.“KantandStoicCosmopolitanism”,The Journal of Political Philo-sophy,5:1–25.

Oosthuizen,L.2002.Media Ethics in the South African Context.CapeTown:Juta.

Plato1989.The Collected Dialogues(ed.Hamilton,E.andH.Cairns)Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress.

President’sCouncilonBioethics.2008.Human Dignity and Bioethics.Washington,D.C.

Rossouw,D.2002.Business Ethics in Africa.Oxford:O.U.P.

Rossouw,D.2003.“BusinessisnotjustWar.TransferringthePrincipleofDoubleEffectfromWartoBusiness”,South African Journal of Philosophy22:236–246.

Smith,J.1994.The Moral Problem.Oxford:Blackwell.

Taylor,C.1989.Sources of the Self.Cambridge,Ma.,HarvardUniversityPress.

UnileverEthicsCentre,2002.Handbook to the Code of Professional Ethics for Educators.(CommissionedbytheSACE)Pietermaritzburg:UnileverEthicsCentre.

Robinson,M.2010Absence of Mind.NewHaven,Ct.:YaleUniversityPress.

Spaemann, R. 1994. “Christian Ethics of Responsibility”, inGormally, L. (ed.)Moral Truth and Moral Tradition. Essays in Honour of P. Geach and E. Anscombe.Dublin:FourCourtsPress.

Spaemann,R.2000.Happiness and Benevolence.(tr.J.Alberg)Edinburgh:T&TClark.

Truth and reconciliation commission of South Africa final report.1998.www.polity.org.za/govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/.

VanHaute,P.1994.“Tussenrelativismeenabsolutisme:democratieenmensenrechten”,Algemene Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte86:165–182.

VanLeeuwen,B.2001.“Erkenning,IdentiteitenVerschil.Demorelelogicaachtermulti-culturalisme”,Tijdschrift voor Filosofie63:751–784.

VanTongeren,P.2003.Deugdelijk Leven.Amsterdam:SUN.

Zaborowski,H.2001.“R.Spaemann,Happiness and Benevolence”,Studies in Christian Ethics14:109–118.



Patrick Giddy

Više od tolerancije: etika za multikulturno društvo

SažetakSuvremena multikulturna društva velikim se dijelom okviruju u smislu proceduralne prije nego supstantivne etike, naglašavajući ispravnost umjesto dobrote, te uzdižu toleranciju kao ključnu vrijednost. No to ne može sâmo zamijeniti supstantivnu i motivacijsku normu dobroga života te se može iskusiti kao gubitak, otuđenje građana. Isto tako neće uspjeti suočiti se s granicama prihvatljivog djelovanja, neuvjetovanošću povezanom s moralnim gledištem. Klasična tradicija u etici, koja predlaže normu ljudskog blagostanja, može se ponovno izraziti kako bi iznijela na vidjelo ovu neuvjetovanost. Ukazat ću na korisnost suprotne tradicije etičkog rasuđivanja u vidu proporcionalnosti, primjerice u slučaju ratne etike, te razmotriti alternativni koncept demokra-cije ne pod vidom formalnih i supstantivnih prava, nego etike participacije.

Ključneriječietika,klasičnagrčkafilozofija,ispravnost/dobrota,multikulturalizam,tolerancija,RobertSpaemann,neuvjetovanost,proporcionalističkorasuđivanje

Mehr als Toleranz: Ethik für multikulturelle Gesellschaft

ZusammenfassungGegenwärtige multikulturelle Gesellschaften gestalten sich zumeist unter dem Aspekt der eher prozeduralen als materialen Ethik, indem sie die Richtigkeit anstelle der Güte herausheben, und werten die Toleranz zum Schlüsselwert auf. Dies per se vermag es immerhin nicht, die materiale und motivierende Norm des guten Lebens zu ersetzen, dagegen kann es als Verlust, als Bürgerentfremdung verspürt werden. Es versagt desgleichen in der Konfrontierung mit den Limits des akzeptablen Handelns, mit der moralitätsbetreffenden Bedingungslosigkeit. Die klas-sische Gepflogenheit in der Ethik, welche einen Maßstab der Menschheitsblüte nahelegt, kann wieder dargetan werden, um auf diese Bedingungslosigkeit Nachdruck zu legen. Ich deute auf die Nützlichkeit einer Gegentradition der ethischen Erwägung hin, aus der Perspektive der Proportionalität, exempli causa in der Angelegenheit der Kriegsethik, und stelle ein alternatives Demokratieschema auf, nicht im Sinne der formalen bzw. substantiven Rechte, sondern von der Ethik der Partizipation her.

SchlüsselwörterEthik,klassischegriechischePhilosophie,Richtigkeit/Güte,Multikulturalismus,Toleranz,Spaemann,Bedingungslosigkeit,proportionalistischeErwägung

Plus que la tolerance : l’éthique pour une société multiculturelle

RésuméLes sociétés multiculturelles contemporaines construisent pour la plupart leur cadre en termes d’éthique procédurale plutôt qu’en termes d’éthique substantielle, en soulignant la justesse plu-tôt que la bonté, et en élevant la tolérance au rang de valeur clé. Mais cela ne peut pas en soi-même remplacer la norme substantielle et motivante de la vie bonne et peut être vécue comme une perte, la désaffection des citoyens. Cela ne parviendra pas non plus à mettre les limites à l’action acceptable, l’inconditionnalité associée au point de vue moral. La tradition classique dans l’éthique, qui propose une norme de l’épanouissement humain, peut être ré-exprimée afin de faire ressortir cette inconditionnalité. J’indique que la tradition opposée du raisonnement éthique en termes de proportionnalité, par exemple dans le cas de l’éthique de la guerre, est utile, et je fais appel à un concept alternatif de démocratie en termes non de droits formels ou substantiels mais d’une éthique de participation.

Mots-cléséthique,philosophieclassiquegrecque,justesse/bonté,multiculturalisme,tolérance,RobertSpaemann,inconditionnalité,raisonnementproportionaliste

Patrick Giddy

Patrick Giddy

more than tolerance: ethics for a multicultural society

Documents