Buddhist Ethics: A System of Checks and Balances

Marie-Louise Friquegnon

William Paterson University

Buddhist ethics is based squarely upon the doctrines of annica and annata.

Annica, the belief that all things are interdependent and therefore have no

independent existence implies annata, the view that there is no

independent, permanent self or ego. Everything is part of an ever-changing

flux. The names we give to things are mere conveniences. The chair one sits

on, for example, is never the same from moment to moment. But of course it

is impossible to have a different name for how things are at every instant.

So names are convenient designations of sets of similar states.

The situation is the same with the self. For Buddhists, there is no

separate permanent self. There is only the flow of mental and bodily

experiences. This point was illustrated in the Milindapanha iwhen King

Milinda (Menander), a Greek king ruling in India, confronted the Buddhist

monk Nagasena. He accused Nagasena of duplicity, for both denying the self,

and, at the same time, denying he was equivalent to any of his bodily parts

(fingernails, etc.), yet asserting that monks could acquire merit and

demerit. Milinda said, "If a man were to kill you, there would be no

murder.” and insisted further, that if there is no self, no one achieves

merit or demerit. Nagasena replied, "How then did you come, on foot, or in

a chariot?." The king said, "I came in a carriage.”. Nagasena asked “Are

the wheels the carriage? The spokes? etc.?" To each question Milinda

replied it was not. So Nagasena said "Sir, you are king over all India. Why

do you lie? You did not come in a chariot." Milinda answered that he did,

but the word chariot was a convenient designation for all the parts taken

together. Nagasena replied that his name "Nagasena" similarly was a

convenient designation for all his skandhas, (bodily parts, volitions,

ideas, etc.) taken together.

So words are just conventions, practical designations which impose an

unreal permanence on things. The pie of reality can be cut different ways.

We as human beings, because of our practical needs cut it up into objects

and persons.

This is not wrong, - in fact it is necessary. But we must realize that

these names do not stand for what is ultimately real. Ultimate reality has

been characterized in many different ways by Buddhist philosophers

throughout history. Some see it as a flow of atoms, - others as a flow of

ideas, still others, as totally beyond conception.

If the self has no substantiality, then we are all in the same flow as

everyone else. Surely we are more similar to our peers than we are to the

zygotes we once were. As Santideva says, in the Guide to the Budhisattva's Way of

Life, "If I can identify with the drops of sperm and blood from which I

originated, why can't I identify with the people around me?"

If one views one's own interest as equal to those of others then in

realizing that no one wishes to suffer, one should wish to free all people

from suffering. Compassion arises along with a sense of equality and

identity with others.

The goal of Buddhist morality is the cessation of suffering. There are two

types of ethics designed for two types of people, ordinary ethics and path

ethics. Understanding that most people are mainly concerned about what they

consider their self-interest to be, ordinary ethics sets out to convince

people that they will have better lives if they live decently. For example,

Santideva argues that if you control your anger, people will be less likely

to become angry with you. So they will be nice to you and it will be easier

for you to be happy.

Those tormented by the pain of anger

Will never know tranquility of mind-

Strangers they will be to every pleasure;

Sleep departs them, they can never rest.

From family and friends estranged,

And shunned by those attracted by their bounty,

Men of anger have no joy,

Forsaken by all happiness and peace.

The Way of the Bodhisattva, Patience: 4 and 5.

For people on the path of dharma, ethical behavior is exactly that way of

acting which will lead them and all beings to enlightenment. Path ethics

makes possible the transformation of all experiences into something

positive. Santideva delineates this beautifully. An enemy, for example,

comes to be seen as a friend because when someone harms us, he or she

affords us an opportunity for practicing patience.

Within the context of modern philosophical concerns, one may ask whether

following rules (deontological ethics), considering consequences

(teleological ethics), or virtue ethics, is a correct ground of ethical

judgment from the point of view of Buddhist dharma. Since Buddhist ethics

is a practical path aiming at enlightenment, it might seem one would opt

for consequentialism. On the other hand, Buddhists have always believed in

the usefulness of following rules. The five prohibitions of the eightfold

path regarding moral conduct, not to kill, steal, lie, misuse sex or become

intoxicated seem to endorse rule following. Could one then characterize

Buddhist ethics as a form of rule utilitarianism? One should follow the

rules chosen in relation to the goal of helping all sentient beings to

achieve enlightenment, and thereby the cessation of suffering. This is not

far from the truth, but Buddhism holds that rules can be broken out of

compassion to avoid very bad consequences. So, for example, a Buddhist

could lie to save a life. There is even a story of a Bodhisattva who killed

a pirate to save five hundred people from shipwreck.

But rules may be broken only with great caution. It is too easy to fall

into what Kant called "the natural dialectic," that is, to set up a

smokescreen of apparently ethical reasons to cover up one's motive of self-

interest. One can, for example wind up verbally abusing or even harming

someone one dislikes on the pretext of protecting someone who really does

not need protection at all or at least not that much.

Rules must not only be broken with great caution, but also with wisdom and

compassion. One must not practice stupid compassion, such as shielding a

vicious murderer from the authorities. In order to become the kind of

person who will have both the wisdom and the lack of selfishness in order

to know when it is best to break rules, one has to develop one’s character

through the acquiring of virtuous habits. The development of a strong moral

character is an excellent preparation for dealing with moral dilemmas.

The virtues that have been traditionally enjoined in Buddhism are

generosity, patience, effort, good conduct, concentration and wisdom. . All

of these virtues are rooted in the denial of a permanent unchanging self or

soul that is capable of existing independently of an interconnected ever-

changing universe. In the light of this view, selfishness is seen as

absurd.

Each of the virtues is described by Santideva as having both a practical

and a dharmic aspect. Patience, for example, is seen at the ordinary level

as useful for achieving one's goals. At the path level, it is seen as a

method of overcoming clinging. At the highest level, it is practiced as a

result of the insight that all that exists is a manifestation of

enlightenment. Generosity at the ordinary level is practiced to make one's

own life and the lives of others more pleasant. One the path level, it is a

reflection of the conviction that there is no sharp distinction between

oneself and others. On the highest level, it is a reflection of the wisdom

and compassion that is the basis of all that is.

These virtues, of course, are, at least in the beginning, not easy to live

by: The four immeasurables are designed to make virtuous activity easier.

They can be seen as forming a balanced quatrad:

compassion

acts of loving kindness joy joy in the joy of others

equanimity

Deeply felt compassion can be unbearably painful. Sometimes just reading

the newspaper, reading about all the atrocities in the world, can make one

want to scream. In Buddhism, compassion is balanced by equanimity. This

equanimity is a result of the calm and insight achieved in meditation. This

allows the practitioner to be completely compassionate without being

overwhelmed with despair.

Selflessness leads Buddhists to want to work unceasingly for others, to

fill all their days with acts of loving kindness. This can be exhausting.

Practitioners are warned not to commit themselves to more then they can

handle, so that they will not become bored and tired and give up. One

method of avoiding this is to become accustomed to rejoicing in the joy of

others. For example, a mother may slave over holiday preparations, shopping

for gifts, and cooking. Yet she is well-rewarded by the joy in the faces of

her children and relatives. This unselfish joy is invaluable in preserving

motivation. The nuns of Mother Teresa's order are seen to have this joy.

They labor unceasingly for others and seem very happy.

The highest source of virtuous behavior, however, is bodhicitta itself. This

is the enlightened mind which experiences spontaneously the overwhelming

sweetness of the welling up of compassion mixed with wisdom. This produces

what Kant calls a holy will. No effort is needed to do good. The

enlightened person intuits the best thing to be done in every circumstance

and does it as unconsciously as breathing, without any motive whatever. How

is this possible?

The answer comes from an examination of the deepest ethical questions in

Buddhism. Already in the Dhammapda it is said that the enlightened being

is beyond good and evil. The discerning "eye" of enlightenment goes beyond

distinctions. Then why doesn't a Buddhist dispense with ethics? As long as

one does no harm out of excessive attachment and bears no ill will out of

ego-centeredness, why not just enjoy Nirvana and not lift a finger to help

anyone? Why cannot one just feel helpful if this is useful to one's own

salvation, but not do anything about it? Why cannot one just experience the

oneness of all being and not act on this at all?

The key is in the experience itself. An analogy can be made between a

mother and her only child. The mother will spontaneously help the child. Is

this selfish or unselfish? The situation transcends the distinction between

selfishness and altruism. Buddha said to treat all beings as one's only

child. It seems that realization producing the awareness of the

interconnectedness of all beings, simultaneously produces the impetus to

help them, to see them as being our cherished child.

Let us return to a more detailed consideration of rules, virtues and

consequences. Rational absolutism was introduced by Immanuel Kant in the

eighteenth century. It was an attempt to make morality both objective and

discoverable through the intellectual effort of each person. It could be

compared to a mathematical system like Euclidean geometry. If you

understand the system, you will arrive at the same answers to geometry

problems as every other student who solves the problem. As in mathematics,

the key notion in Kant's ethics was consistency. Kant believed that if a

person wants to know what is moral, he or she need only ask what can be

willed consistently for all rational beings. For example, if one wants to

know if stealing is acceptable, one needs to decide whether everyone may

steal or not. One need merely imagine how one would feel about having

others steal from oneself. Clearly it is more rational to will that no one

steal. Kant formulated this principle of consistency in the following way:

So act, so that the principle or the maxim by which you act can be willed

universally.

The major problems with this view are that (a) moral rules can conflict

and, (b) carrying out the rules can sometimes have terrible consequences.

For example, what if one must lie to save someone's life? Or, what if one

must break a promise in order to avoid causing someone's death. Kant's

theory does not seem to allow one to do this. The rules are always binding.

Further, if the moral agent universalizing the rule is not a good person,

the rule he or she decides should be followed may be different than the

rule a good person will derive.

Act utilitarianism, introduced by Jeremy Bentham in the nineteenth century,

insists that there is only one moral rule: So act, so that for the greatest

number pleasure is maximized and pain is minimized. This view is supposed

to be close to common sense, but there are difficulties. Suppose, for

example, torturing one person to death gave great pleasure to 10,000

people. The happiness of the "audience" of 10,000 might outweigh the

unhappiness of the tortured victim. Further, there is no room for justice

on Bentham's view. Consequences in terms of pleasure and pain are the only

factors to be considered.

Much contemporary ethics attempts to derive a moral theory that preserves

the good elements of Kant's and Bentham's views without the difficulties

these views imply. One of these compromises is rule utilitarianism. As

stated before, this is the view that the point of having moral rules is to

benefit human beings because following these rules generally results in

increasing happiness or decreasing suffering. This still, however, does not

tell us what to do in a particular case when we know that following a rule

might cause great suffering. We seem to need a rule to tell us when we may

break rules.

Buddhist ethics represents a compromise between rule-following and

concern with consequences in terms of human suffering and happiness, a

compromise achieved by means of an ethics of virtue. The ultimate goal of

Buddhist ethics is the overcoming of suffering. Yet human beings cannot

always know what will overcome suffering in the long run. We are limited by

(a) ignorance of all the circumstances involved in a moral decision, and,

(b) our own tendencies toward self-deception. For this reason, Buddhist

ethics has always recognized the importance of moral rules, such as those

forbidding killing, theft, lying, sexual misconduct, etc. These rules are

meant to protect us from our own ignorance and protect others from our

mistakes in judgment. Thus moral rules are to be respected.

There are, of course, as I mentioned before, cases where moral rules must

be broken; - cases where considerations of compassion may require that they

be broken. We must sometimes lie to prevent dire consequences. In such

cases, however, the rules should be broken reluctantly because one cannot

be absolutely sure that one has correctly judged the consequences.

Moral rules are to be understood in terms of compassion and not social

convention. Social conventions ought to be respected only insofar as it

would be uncompassionate to flaunt them. Some cultures, for example, would

consider it a case of sexual misconduct for a male doctor to examine a

woman. Yet a doctor should do so anyway to save her life, but discretely.

For example, in a fundamentalist religious society in which men are not

allowed to look at the bodies of women other than their wives, he should

allow his patient to be modestly covered except for the areas that must be

examined,

Buddhist virtues are listed in various ways. A common way has been

mentioned previously: generosity, patience, effort, concentration and

wisdom. A virtuous person is less likely to be self deceptive when breaking

rules. Such a person should have the generosity and wisdom not to act for

selfish reasons or trivial reasons.

Do we then have a complete picture of Buddhist ethics? It seems to

function as a system of checks and balances, similar to the United States

government. There are rules, and these are like the legislature. But the

rules may be broken to prevent very bad consequences. This is like the

executive branch. And virtues are needed to guide one’s judgment of the

consequences. This is like the judiciary.

There is yet another aspect of Buddhist ethics that needs exploring, -

the reciprocity criterion outlined in the Sigalovada Suttantaii. In a scant

three pages, Buddha outlines an entire plan for society, indicating that

the obligations of some are contingent on others fulfilling theirs. The

most significant case involves the reciprocal obligations of husband and

wife. The husband should respect her, show courtesy, be faithful, hand over

authority to her, and provide her with adornment. When the wife is thus

ministered to by her husband, she will love (show love) in the following

way: by performing her duties well, by hospitality to the kin of both, by

faithfulness, by watching over the goods he brings, and by skill and

industry in discharging all her business. The role of the wife expressed

here is very significant because people had been following the Hindu laws

of Manu which stipulate that a woman is first subject to her father, then

her husband, and, should he die, to her son. In the Buddhist view there is

no mention of obedience. And even the role ascribed to the wife is

contingent on the good offices of the husband. Similar reciprocal roles are

outlined for parents and children, teachers and students, among friends,

employers and employees, and priests and parishioners. Since Buddha was

directing his teaching to a young man, his role is cast in the form of

duties. According to the interpretation of Bhiku Bodhi at Bodhi Monastery

(New Jersey, USA), Buddha expresses the young man’s duties in the optative

mood (should) and predicts the others responses in the indicative. Those to

whom the young man has duties, will naturally respond in a useful and

positive way to his actions. If Lord Buddha were speaking to the wife, for

example, he would have spoken to her in terms of duties and described the

good behavior of her husband as a natural development from her conduct. I

interpret this as an implied reciprocity. How does this system of

reciprocal duties fit into our system of checks and balances? There does

seem to be a sort of rule utilitarianism implicit in this text, for the

duties outlined are clearly intended to produce a harmonious society.

At first sight justice seems to be absent in the list of Buddhist

virtues. Perhaps this is, as Hume suggests, because justice is needed

precisely where virtues are lacking. But as the Sigalovada Suttanta explains,

reciprocity, which is a kind of justice, is important for a peaceful and

happy family and society. In this sense reciprocity is part and parcel of a

concept of justice that fits very nicely into a Buddhist system of ethics.

And so the theory of checks and balances between rules, consequences and

virtues is complete.

Conclusion:

This Buddhist synthesis of three types of ethical theories,

deontology, rule utilitarianism and virtue ethics can support some aspects

of multi-culturalism without supporting such cruel practices as selling

children into slavery. It is also an alternative to colonial ethical

systems, which try to impose a Christian ethic on a non-Western population.

Practices in any society must be judged by whether or not they are

consistent with virtues such as generosity, and whether they can be

practiced compassionately. They must be fair in the sense that they are in

accordance with explicit or implicit agreements among the people affected.

But the practices considered acceptable may nonetheless vary from society

to society. In a European country, for example, women may insist on

performing the same tasks as men. In other societies, women may not on the

whole wish to do this. There is room for tolerance towards different

cultural traditions while opposing those that violate the spirit of

compassion. Of highest importance for Buddhist ethics are compassion and

loving kindness which are ultimately the wellspring from which any truly

moral conduct must emerge. Without this there may be only heartless and

rigid regulations. Surely kindness and compassion are the saving nectar for

our turbulent age.

i The Questions of King Milinda, translated from the Pali by T.W. Rhys Davids, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,2003, pp. 40-45ii The Dialogues of the Buddha, T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids (eds.) Discourses of the Buddha, Pali Text Society,London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977,Part III pp 183-184.,

Note: I would like to thank my teachers Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche, Khentrul Tsewang Dongyal Rinpoche and my husband Raziel Abelson, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, New York University, for their advice and encouragement.

Article for Lithuania: Śāntarakṣita on Veridical PerceptionAbstract:Śāntarakṣita, an eighth century Indian Buddhist philosopher united the Cittamātra and theMadhyamaka views into a single system. Consistently following Nāgārjuna, from the point ofview of absolute reality he proclaimed all things to be empty, beyondconception, From the pointof view of the conventional, we should understand everything as awareness. Nevertheless, whenanalyzing Cittamātra views on perception, he found them all to be inadequate.Buddhism is usually described as based on two pillars, direct experience and inference. GivenŚāntarakṣita’s sharp critique of the veracity of perception, upon which inductive premises arebased, how are we to make sense of knowledge on the conventional level? I will attempt toanswer this question through an analysis of the ideas of the eleventhcentury philosopherRongzom, and the nineteenth century philosopher Mipham I will also show the relevance ofŚāntarakṣita’s critique of perception today, by comparing it with contemporary western cognitivescience.Śāntarakṣita on Veridical PerceptionMarie FriquegnonWilliam Paterson University

Śāntarakṣita has been described as the Kant of the East. Like Kant, he carefully considered allthe views on knowledge and reality current in his day, and created a consistent synthesis betweenthe most promising ones. True, he was never awakened from a dogmatic slumber as Kant wasawakened by Hume. He seems to have been born into his philosophic position, and there is noevidence that his views ever underwent significant change. But the substantive similarities arethere. Both philosophers understand the world in terms of predispositions to understandphenomena in certain ways, for Kant in terms of categories such as space, time, number andobject, and for Śāntarakṣita in terms of habitual tendencies, reborn in place at the time of birth.Although it is difficult to be precise about Bengali history in the seventh and eighth centuries, itis usually believed that Śāntarakṣita was living in Bengal around that time, and was associatedwith the Gopala dynasty. Bengal at that time was subject to Tibetan raids, and so there wereprobably Tibetan cultural influences. Bengal was a center of MahāyānaBuddhist studies, andspecifically Vajrayāna. There is some evidence that a view similar toDzogchen or Ati Yoga wastaught in the monasteries, and that this may have influenced some of the songs and dance of theregion, significant because music and dance were an integral part of Śāntarakṣita’s tantricphilosophy .At some time during the eighth century, Śāntarakṣita entered the university monastery ofNālandā in Northern India, described by Bhattacarya as the “Oxford ofthe East”. This seat oflearning had very high standards, and it was necessary to pass a rigorous exam in order to beadmitted. The Chinese pilgrim Huan Tsang described it as follows:“After making every allowance for oriental exaggeration, it is evident that the Sangharama

at Nālandā must have been the most magnificent university in the eastern world. If the barestatement may be accepted that ten thousand monks and novices were lodged within thewalls, an idea of vastness is found which can hardly be realized. It may, however, beremarked that the site was regarded as the holiest in all Magadha…Again, the institutionhad not been founded by a single king, but had been enlarged, embellished, and endowed atintervals by a succession of pious sovereigns, extending possibly over a period of ninecenturies from Aśoka downwards. Towers, domes and pavilions rose above a paradise ofshady trees, secluded gardens, and sparkling fountains. There were six large blocks ofbuildings four stories high, in which inmates were lodged. There werea hundred lecturerooms in different branches of study. There were other large halls for conferences. Thewhole was distributed in eight courts. Every necessary was gratuitously supplied to the tenthousand inmates, including vestments and medicines as well as lodging and board.In this splendid retreat, far away from the busy turmoil of the courtand capital, the monks andnovices pursued their daily studies without cares and without distractions. Theand gardens, but for the learning of its pupils, and the high intellectual caliber of its masters. Themonks in general belonged to the great Vehicle; but all the eighteen sects of Buddhism wererepresented within the walls; and besides the religious books all thesciences were studied, evenmedicine and arithmetic.” 1Nālandā monastery was known for its broad scope, and all branches of Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophy were taught and debated there. Śāntarakṣita had asuperb knowledge ofboth the orthodox and non-orthodox schools of Indian philosophy. He discusses all of them in his

writings, and presents their arguments fairly and accurately. Śāntarakṣita’s ideas aboutperception are discussed in both the Tattvasaṁgraha[TS] and the Madhyamakālaṁkāra[MA},but since the latter is more concise, I will concentrate on that.Śāntarakṣita’s views on perception are clearly encapsulated in The Ornament of the Middle Way,(Madhyamakālaṁkāra) and its auto commentary Madhyamakālaṁkāravrtti [MAV]. (Accordingto Je Tsong Khapa, the MA and the auto commentary, MAV were originally one work, becauseonly the vrtti contains the homage to Manjushri which would have been included in every classicMahāyāna abhidharma text.)My goal in this paper is to answer the question as to why Śāntarakṣita spends such a greatamount of time refuting the early Buddhist schools’ (atomist) and theCittamātra (idealist)schools’ views on perception, and in doing so, to show Śāntarakṣita’sunderstanding of theimportance of appearances in reaching enlightenment, while at the same time rejecting bothmatter and mind as having inherent existence.In order to analyze Śāntarakṣita’s views on perception, it is useful to place them in the broadercontext of his argument throughout the work. The key to the argument lies in Śāntarakṣita’sconcern with the mereological notions of one and many. These are mutually exclusive andexhaustive as applied to everything. This being the case, if one can show that something cannotbe considered as either one or many, then it cannot possibly exist.Śāntarakṣita applies this method in analyzing material substance. Thematerial universe couldnot be considered one single undifferentiated unity, because then it could never change. Norcould it be considered as being composed of many indivisible parts (atoms as understood by theGreeks and others in ancient times).For if the parts are indivisible,they cannot have sides andthus could not combine to make larger objects.

Having disposed of atoms, Śāntarakṣita turns to awareness, which cannot be denied withoutusing the same awareness one is trying to deny. Self-awareness [Tib. Rang rig Skt: svasamvedanaaccompanies every cognition. This is easily misunderstood. As James Blumenthalhas recently pointed out, the generally accepted mistake in interpretation was begun by Je TsongKhapa’s Geluk disciple, Gyel Tsab who claimed Śāntarakṣita was asserting the existence of asubstantially existing self:“On the issue of self=cognizing cognition, it appears that the Geluk critique is aimed at the waythat position is held by Yogācāras, rather than the specific way it is asserted by Śāntarakṣita .” 2“In turn, the great nineteenth century scholar Mipham Gyatso (Mi-pham-rgya-tsho) (1846-1912)has defended Śāntarakṣita’s position in his commentary dbU Ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad ‘jamdbyangs bla ma dgyes pa’I zhal lung with full knowledge of the arguments put forward byPrasaṅgika scholars such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva. He argues thateven their rejections of theconcepts are only a rejection of its ultimate existence and not that self cognizing cognition is nota viable concept for conventional understanding.” 3Śāntarakṣita was only saying that at every moment of awareness of an object there is theunderstanding that this is one’s own experience. The traditional analysis of action in terms ofsubject, object and activity do not apply in the case of self-awareness, because the self is not anobject about which one is aware.17. Because its nature is unique and partless,It is impossible for it to have a threefold nature.Therefore self-awareness does not haveThe property of subject and object. (MA)(The early philosophers say) the object of self is able to establish its own aspect. It is acause and can elicit knowledge of its own form. And consciousness of the nature of thestipulated object is produced. Thus the knower, the known, and the manner of knowing

together are produced by the object which is said to be like this in its own nature. But selfawarenesscannot be established as an object in this way, because this consciousness…isnot the producer, the producing, and what is produced. In this manner, the knower, theknowing and known are not different modes of awareness perceived in the threefold way.It is not perceived in this manner. (MAV)But although self-awareness is not awareness of itself as an object, How are we to characterizeawareness of objects? What is one aware of and how is one aware? Again Śāntarakṣita turns tothe dichotomy between one and many. Awareness must either be one withits object, or distinctfrom it. Śāntarakṣita first addresses the issue of veridical perception with relation to the twoearly Buddhist philosophical schools, the Vaibhāśika and the Sautrāntika ., that believe thatsubject and object are distinct.These choices, namely that subject and object are either the same or distinct, represent two formsof the Cittamātra philosophical schools. Those that believe subject and object to be the same arecalled False Aspectarians [sems tsam rnam dzunpa]. Those that believe subject and object aredistinct are called True Aspectarians [sems tsam rnam bdenpa]. There are three sub schools thathold the True Aspectarian tradition. They have their counterparts in early Buddhist philosophy aswell; the difference is that in the early Buddhist schools the aspects are material objects, while inthe Cittamātra schools, the aspects are mental objects. Śāntarakṣita takes aim at all of theseviews. His purpose in so doing is to show that if perception must take place in the present (wecan’t perceive the past or future), then all possible models of perception, whether of a materialobject or a mental one are incoherent.It is important to understand that, following Nāgārjuna, Śāntarakṣitaunderstands the presentmoment to be indivisible. Any duration of a positive length can be divided onto the previous,

present and future instant. So the present moment has a duration of zero. If perception must takeplace in the present, then there is not enough time for the mind to apprehend the subject. All ofŚāntarakṣita’s attacks on the theories of perception of he various philosophical schools are basedon this.Critique of the early Buddhist Theories of Perception:Śāntarakṣita first aims his critique at the Vaibhāśikas. The Vaibhāśika were naive realists,Who believed that we had direct knowledge of the object of perceptionwhich was composed of atoms.The object of perception is not only distinguishable but is also separable from the mind. Śāntarakṣitaargues against this view for the following reason.21. For those who do not assert that consciousnessIs transformed by the aspect of the object,Then (in their system), there would be no knowledgeOf the existence of the external object.Because the object of knowledge is by nature unknowable, one’s object of awareness isdistanced from the object itself. It is not correct to attach a label if one does not accept the reflectionthat is caused by the relationship. If this is so, it is not correct to say that the object in itself cancorrelate with consciousness. This cannot be the case. (MAV)Śāntarakṣita concentrates his critique of the early Buddhist theoriesof perception on that of theSautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas, like the Vaibhāśikas believed that the material world wascomposed of atoms. But while the Vaibhāśikas believed that the sensesdirectly perceived thematerial object, the Sautrāntikas believed that what is apprehended is a mental mirage-like objectgenerated in the mind through the interaction of the atoms in the object and the atoms in thesense organs. There were three sub schools of this Early Buddhist view. The first held that onesingle unified state of knowledge apprehended the object as a single unified object, neverthelesswith all its diversity apprehended as a unity: Śāntarakṣita rejects this:

“22. (If you claim) one cognition is not many, thenThere cannot be many images.But then the view of mind as a unity,Has no power to establish many objects.Because consciousness is not distinct,Not becoming other than the object,If this is so, by the power of that,One cannot have knowledge of the object. (TS2036)In a consciousness which perceives a single painting unfurled etc. without doubtrepresentations originate equal to aspects, such as blue, yellow which are gatheredtogether within range. If so, a single cognition will not correspond to a plurality. Thiscould not be said to be established. (MAV)The second Early Buddhist view considers there to be many aspects of mind that match theaspects of the perceived object:31. If you say when one sees the surface of a drawing, since there are many aspects,There are as many thoughts (in a single moment) as there are parts to the painting.In what way could this happen through one (mental state) alone?This is how such mental states arise together.But then [Śāntarakṣita replies]:32. In that case, how could whiteness and so forth, which are known in a single way,Have a great number of parts, such as a top, middle and bottom?Each of these would have to become distinct objects of knowledge,Which is impossible.Thus similarly.[patches of] blue and white, etc., are compound objects. They are asserted(by opponents) to be one, but they have opposite sides and a great number of parts. Thusknowledge of this manifold must be diversified. Thus having asserted a manifold, if in thatcase one claims to grasp only a small particle without branches (indivisible), then in thatcase, having distinguished with certainty the (smallest postulated) divisions of each of theaspects of these branches of the object, this cannot be perceived even by those with verysubtle insight.This sort of perception cannot be experienced.33. A bit of white etc., atomic in natureIn itself, single and partless,Which appears to anyone’s consciousness,I do not feel exists. (MA)31. If you say when one sees the surface of a drawing, since there are many aspects,There are many thoughts (in a single moment) as there are parts to the painting.In what way could this happen through one (mental state) alone?This is how such mental states arise together. (MA)But then:

32. In that case, how could whiteness and so forth, which are known in a single way,Have a great number of parts, such as a top, middle and bottom?Each of these would have to become distinct objects of knowledge,Which is impossible. (MA)Thus similarly. blue and white, etc., are compound objects. They are asserted (byopponents) to be one, but they have opposite sides and a great number of parts. Thusknowledge of this manifold must be diversified. Thus having asserted a manifold, if in thatcase one claims to grasp only a small particle without branches (indivisible), then in thatcase, having distinguished with certainty the (smallest postulated) divisions of each of theaspects of these branches of the object, this cannot be perceived even by those with verysubtle insight.This sort of perception cannot be experienced. (MAV)33. A bit of white etc., atomic in natureIn itself, single and partless,Which appears to anyone’s consciousness,I do not feel exists.This position dove tails nicely with the view current in brain science that there is a part ofthe brain that recognizes shapes, recognizes colors etc. (read mind for brain). Śāntarakṣitaquestions how this could result in knowledge of a unified object. This problem has notbeen solved by brain scientists today.The third view holds that at each moment of time one state of mind ata time apprehends anaspect of an object, but this happens so quickly that it seems simultaneous. It is known as the halfegg theory because one thinks of each moment of perception as the unity of mental subject andmaterial object in the same way as the parts of a hard boiled egg sliced in half, in contact, form aunity.24 (You say) perception of white and so forthHave arisen gradually.Because they arise quickly, foolish peopleThink they know them simultaneously . (MAV)The gradual arising of thoughtIs like a firebrand whiled aroundBecause of the speedIt appears in the mind simultaneously. (TS 124)Similarly,(they say) as when piercing the one hundred petals of the utpala flower, one can

say one knows a single object gradually but quickly, just as one 'sees' the circle of fire.Because one sees it quickly, one says one sees a single circle of fire. . (MAV)Today we would say that the brain produces an after image which results from many sequentialimpressions.If this is so [Śāntarakṣita replies],25. The sound of the word ‘vine’ (lata),Arises very quickly.If (the syllables) were perceived simultaneously,Then why would not (the syllables) be heard simultaneously (also tala).Through the aspect of the sound, the word ‘vine’Similarly arises very quickly by the operation of the mind.By the precision of simultaneityHow would not the reverse arise? (MA)Lata (vine) and tala (palm tree), sara (lake) and rasa (flavor) etc., as they are called,when one investigates these objects, these letters (syllables).one sees similarly that theyarise very quickly. Thus because they arise quickly, they cannot be known (veridicallyperceived), because how could they be simultaneous like a single drawing? (We could notdistinguish between tala and lata if they seemed to appear simultaneously. Similarly withblue and yellow, if arising quickly and perceived as if simultaneous, the picture would bemixed up.)Similarly, if the cause and effect are distinct, the causal sequence cannot be said to resultin perception (because there would be no discernible pattern, given the half eggpresuppositions)Mipham has a very clear explanation of this point:“With regard to the impression of instantaneous completion arising from the rapid,successive cognition by the mind of the syllabic components of the word lata whichmeans a twig, and tala , which is the name of a kind of tree, the difference between thefirst syllable of the word lata and the first syllable of the word tala (in the order ofsyllables) is annihilated.” 4Further, the perceptual process cannot be gradual because perception is understood astaking place only in the present instant.:As previously conclusively explained, because the cause [no longer] exists.It is not correct that one sees the circle of fire.28. A firebrand whirled about onceAppears [deceptively] as a wheel.

Although it appears clearly,It cannot be connected by perception[because perception must be in the present moment].The position that the perception is produced by memory:29. In that way (they say), the joining of the boundariesIs done by memory [not perception].Because there is no perception of the past,There is no perception of the object [the circle].[They say], memory is what connects the boundaries which produces an object, becauseperception does not apprehend (zin) it and, has no ability to make connections. What isthe consequence of this?The rejection of this position:Śāntarakṣita considers the possibility that the rapid apprehension ofaspects producesa memory. He denies this is possible, because the experience of the circle of fire, forexample, is very bright, not like a memory which is not so vivid:Similarly memory does not perceive clearly a substance which is in front of it. Understoodin this way, similarly, it is correct to say that the circle made by the firebrand itself oughtto be seen. The firebrand which appears so clearly, really appears. [It is not controlled bymemory, because it is clear.]The Cittamātra Views of PerceptionHaving dismissed all three of the early school theories of perception, Śāntarakṣita turns hisattention to the Cittamātra views. (According to Mipham Rinpoche, this is the preferred view ofDharmakīrti.)5Let us consider the True Aspectarian view first, that is the view that subject and object, albeitthat they are both mental, are different from each other.. The first sub school is called gzung‘dzin grangs mnyam pa, or equal numbers of subjects and objects. If we remember thatŚāntarakṣita never mentions the brain as the seat of the mind, probably unknown at his time,nevertheless, this view bears a striking resemblance to modern ideas in cognitive science. Todaywe know that certain parts of the brain’ tell’ us about shapes, others about colors etc. Accordingto this view, each of the features of the mind apprehend a separate feature of the object in a

single present instant. This Cittamātra view understood the external object as mental.Śāntarakṣita argues that whether material or mental, the object is infinitely divisible intoseparate features. To hold that in a single present instant the partsof the mind are able toapprehend this infinite display is absurd:49) If according to the number of reflected features,One accepts states of consciousnessThen (states of) consciousness would be as numerous as the atoms,This analysis would be difficult to circumvent.[Features like blue are accepted as atomic].If the atom with no space in between, by nature is non-existent, then if all the manyconsciousnesses are similarly without anything in between at a time, then the sameanalysis we have performed in relation to the atoms will be true of these consciousnesses.Similarly if one asserts that aspects of consciousness are similar to partless particlessurrounded by other particles, then what could be the nature of a partless aspect thatfaces one aspect and is to the other side of another?Without consciousness holding many similar atoms without gap, then it will be mistakenas a single gross lump. What particulars are here? Blue and so forth appears without gap.If some people accept this as atomic, then it will not be beyond the same fault (as foundwith atoms):Nor does Śāntarakṣita accept the view that one mental state grasps instantaneously all thevarious aspects of the object.Thus [their view] is that consciousness, like the onyx, (is but one, but) appears variegated.This cannot be accepted in the way spoken of in this doubtful system.50 part 2 Multiplicity cannot have the characteristics of one,Similar to the way a multifaceted jewel is not one.This variety of aspects should be made of distinct features. If this is actually so, then thiscontradicts the nature of oneness. Thus many of these objects have the nature of oneness.As much as there are features, there are that many natures. Having differentcharacteristics means being different things.51) But if one [a Cittamātra] holds that a manifold’s true nature is singleBut appears to have a multiple natureHow could these many qualities happen?Such as veiled or unveiled and so forth.If jewels like the agate had an intrinsic self nature mixed into one, then this wouldcontradict the variety of aspects that appear.] The self-nature of the objects [as theyappear] is no illusion. Otherwise the various aspects of the jewel would be identical. Ifone were hidden, all would be hidden. Similarly all realizations would become one state ofmind.

Thus Śāntarakṣita rejects the Cittamātra version of the half egg position as well, but notfor the same reasons that he rejects the Sautrāntika half egg theory.As explained to meby Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche, the Sautrāntikas are speaking of the unity ofmental states with material objects. Since the two states are different in nature, it makessense to speak of them as coming together. But to say that mind comestogether with partof itself, and to say that the two parts are different, would involveone in a contradiction.46. If the external aspects are real,Consciousness would become a manifold,Or (these aspects) would become one.This (conclusion) is difficult to avoid.The following view is also flawed.If the object is not completely distinct [from consciousness] and is the same in nature toconsciousness, than if the object is a manifold, consciousness must also be a manifold. Orif consciousness is one, then it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that the objects ofconsciousness must also be a singularity [rather than a manifold.]. Since thesephenomena are ultimately opposite in nature, from the ultimate point of view,consciousness and its objects must really be different.Mentioning further mistakes:47) If the aspects are not different ,Then moving and not moving (opposites) and so forth,If one is moving, all would move.This would be an absurdity difficult to answer.Not different, means it will be shown it is one. But if this is the case, then why wouldn’tone grasp that all objects move with a single motion? If one thing is yellow, everythingwould become yellow etc. This theory about aspects and their attributes similarly isshown to be absurd.48) Also in the case of any doctrine that objects exist externally,If the aspects are not separate,All phenomena would be one.It's unavoidable.If those things remaining in the phenomenal world are contradictory/notharmonious/heterogeneous, then they will be different and distinct They say that twominds do not arise from both former and later moments, but only as a single(simultaneous)mental state. (But I argue) these are happening as opposite types. (All are

like waves of water) It is not logical that two (opposite) minds come togethersimultaneously, a contradiction difficult to remove. These are done by the power ofripening states of consciousness. If you say that two different minds are coming together,you are contradicting scripture. You cannot avoid this.Finally let us turn to the view of the False Aspectarians., those whobelieve that theappearances are one with the subject.52) If they believe the perception of forms is in error,And that forms do not exist independently.This is because forms do not exist on the ultimate level.Therefore the perception of forms is a mistake.As to consciousness, from the ultimate point of view,it is like a pure crystal. Clearly, whatthey say is incorrect. Thus said.If ultimately forms are consciousness like a pure crystal etc, distinct aspects such as bluewould not exist. Likewise from beginningless time under the power of ripening erroneoushabitual tendencies, the eye is confused by mantras etc to see pieces of clay as elephantsand horses. .Śāntarakṣita continues:53).But how could it be that [forms] do not exist [apart from mind]When we clearly perceiveThat they are different from one another,And [according to this Cittamātra view] knowledge is not like this?Clearly this knowledge is not appropriate. Why is this so?54.Since there is no thingThere cannot be any knowledge of that.Just as there is no pleasure in what is unpleasant,And no white in what is not white.55) In such a way there is no appropriate meaning to knowledgeBecause it lacks the self nature of knowledgeSince in themselves, these aspects do not exist.Anymore than a sky flower and so forth, could.Because how would the experienced characteristicBe related to knowledge?Being non-existent it is not knowledge,And also could not arise (in consciousness).Thus the self nature of knowledge is non-existent.[Thus these features are notveridical]). If the features do not exist, consciousness does not exist since theyare the same. Knowledge cannot arise from what is non-existent in nature,because the arising would be produced from what is non-existent in nature. Ifit arises it must exist from what is previous and then the result is subsequent. Ifso, it is not simultaneous and thus cannot be the same as the knowledge.6

Also, knowledge at the same time would be of an imaginary object.58) If there is no cause whatsoever, one cannotExplain why (aspects) arise occasionally.If there is a cause,The mind cannot avoid being controlled by others.Because (if as you say) the aspect/image does not exist, it is uncaused. If there is no cause,it is not possible (for changes) to arise occasionally. They could not be apprehended. Ifyou proclaim this mistake about the arising of causes and conditions, then (this is toproclaim) the mistake that something comes from nothing If one mistakenly accepts this,then if there is no interdependent origination, these aspects cannot arise from the power ofanother .If it does not rely on the power of another it cannot come into existence. To existis to arise from conditions. There is no other way.(If there is nothing that exists separately (from consciousness)) then there is nothing thathas the power to arise from what is non-existent. There is nothing in existence that doesnot arise from the power of causal conditions (the twelve links)).Furthermore we say that it is a fault to accept a non-existent object.59) (If you say) the object does not exist, but only the mindWithout an object, developing by itself, thenLike a pure crystal glass,Mind would not perceive at all.If the nature of eye consciousness etc. is lacking the blue object etc. which is on a surface,if nonexistent, like a pure crystal ball, it would not be a representation. If the external andinternal aspect does not exist, there is nothing else which would have the power toproduce an image. It would not exist moreover just as an illusion etc. do not exist. Onemust accept that this is a refutation.Śāntarakṣita concludes that a consciousness that is one with its object could not change. Theremust be an external cause that brings about successive states of awareness:60) Then if you think all cognitions are illusory,How is this illusion perceived?If images arise in the mind by the power of this illusion,Then it is still the power of another. (MA)For example, the eye when afflicted with disease (jaundice) sees what does not existthrough seeing the object such as a white conch as yellow, and similarly knowledgethrough the force of habitual tendencies, mistakenly will assert clearly the truth of theyellowness. The mistaken perception occurs through habitual tendencies. Should one thinkthis way?These arising characteristics are connected, because they arise as interdependent coorigination,

and therefore this is due to the power of another. Others say that theaccumulation of habits from beginningless time produces deluded states. If so, this is thepower of another. If there are these arising characteristics then it is tendril,(interdependent origination). If the characteristics that arise are in combination, then thatitself is interdependent co-origination. Therefore it is dependent on another power. Thiswould be hard to refute. (MAV)For Śāntarakṣita the causes of mental changes are the habitual tendencies maturing frombeginningless time. (This accords with his belief in reincarnation.) But then Śāntarakṣita aims afatal dart at the Cittamātra view because these very causes, which heaccepts as necessary toaccount for change, are nevertheless unreal, because the cause and effect occur in differentmoments of time and hence will never come in contact. Following Nāgārjuna, he is a thoroughgoing Madhyamaka.So on the absolute level, all is beyond conception, beyond perception. On the conventional levelone apprehends the ordinary world through awareness. This awareness is ‘programmed’ byhabitual tendencies from beginingless time. But emptiness is not a black hole, is not nothingness.But there is a logical problem here. If emptiness is beyond conception, how can we speakmeaningfully of it in terms of emptiness and compassion, the hallmarks of enlightenment? Wecannot directly. But one could observe that the buddhas and high bodhisattvas, after realizingemptiness, spontaneously manifest great wisdom and compassion and appear very peaceful andhappy. So it would seem that these states and not their opposites areconnected with the ultimate.Rongzom and the Divine Nature of Apperances:Śāntarakṣita in his tantric text Tattvasiddhi argues that the happiness obtained from music, danceand union with a consort, when enjoyed without grasping and dualisticconceptions can produceenlightenment. If there was a difference in kind between appearance and emptiness this would

not be possible. From the absolute view there cannot be a difference,for the nature of both isemptiness. If this is the case, then appearances themselves must be in an enlightened state. Thisis the very position taken by Rongzompa in his Establishing Appearances as Divine. He arguesconvincingly against some Madhyamaka philosophers who downgraded experiences andelevated the absolute. According to Rongzompa, if there is no duality, then appearances areequal to the absolute.In summary:Madhamikas traditionally have distinguished between conventional understanding of the worldof appearance, and ultimate reality which transcends appearance as well as linguistic description.Śāntarakṣita argues that appearances, as well as space and time cannot be ultimately real. To dothis he applies the method of one and many.Śāntarakṣita concludes that the ultimate must completely transcend all duality.But what about the duality implicit in the distinction between the conventional and the absolute?This must also be overcome in order to experience enlightenment. But how?In the Tattvasiddhi, Śāntarakṣita admits that there is no logical way toestablish the possibility ofexperiencing the ultimate. But he does believe that through logic onecan show that it is possible.He bases this on the inseparability of the ultimate with appearances,and the way in whichcausality functions on the relative level. Even though there is no logical way to establish theconnection between cause and effect, nevertheless we know from experience that certain resultsfollow certain preceding conditions and not others. Planting an acornmay well be followed by anoak, but not by a rose bush. There are also ways of altering conditions in such a way as toproduce special results. For example, a certain kind of tree, the syu ru ra, produces sour fruit. But

if the seed is soaked in milk or molasses before it is planted, the tree that follows from that seedwill have fruit that is sweet. Śāntarakṣita argues that worldly enjoyments that are experiencedwithout duality and grasping will produce the experience of enlightenment.Śāntarakṣita argues that those who believe the experience of enlightenment is produced throughharsh ascetic practice are wrong, because similar causes produce similar effects. The acorn issimilar to the oak but not to the rose tree, so it will not produce arose tree.Rongzom has a similar argument. If the ultimate is non-dual, and if all appearances areultimately empty, then there is no difference between the ultimate, or enlightenment andappearances. Rongzom explicitly attacks those Madhyamikas who condemnappearances asimpure. For Rongzom all appearances are divine, that is, they are pure because they are alreadyin the enlightened state:Appearances of course are mental, so how can they be considered in the purity/enlightenmentstate? Śāntarakṣita’s defense of the mental nature of the conventional provides the answer.Appearances are not the result of perception. Strictly speaking, nothing is ever perceived.Appearances are generated by maturing habitual tendencies (modern cognitive scientists mayread ‘programming’ here). As Rongzom explains:“One might wonder how the habitual tendencies cause these [appearances] to appear. [First ofall] there is the habitual tendency of the two types of apprehending which manifest as object andsubject...Furthermore, the habitual tendency of believing in a self causes oneself and the divinecontinuum to appear different from each other and causes a raw split between [oneself and] theobjects. The habitual tendency of full expression creates the appearance of different attributes

The habitual tendency of the links of existence creates the appearance of the nature of birth, yetthe exhaustion of all habitual tendencies without exception will not bring about the appearance ofthe utterly pure field of experience. One may, likewise, examine whether the mundane wisdomof pure enlightenment is existent or nonexistent, but [in fact] it isan inconceivable quality.”7Thus the elimination of habitual tendencies could not bring about liberation, because they arejust that which is established as divine. But how can these appearances be both mind anddivine/ultimate reality? Rongzom explains this by analogy with a reflection in a mirror:“The deity of complete purity can be set forth in two ways. A reflection in a mirror may, byvirtue of being a quality of the mirror, be said to pertain to the mirror, and by virtue of being thereflection of one’s face, it may be said to pertain to the face. Likewise the appearances of divinebody, speech and mind are perceived by the power of realizing the intrinsic nature by wisdomand by the force of compassion and aspiration prayers. Therefore theyare distinguished bywisdom and the intrinsic nature. The divine appearances are, however,also the appearances ofthe features of the mind and its habitual tendencies, and therefore they also come down to[simply] mind.”8What then are we to make of notions such as the path, view, meditation and action? Strictlyspeaking none of these make sense from an ultimate point of view, )asLongchenpa pointed out).If all is a manifestation, how can one follow a path, since there is no distinction between the pathand the non-path? How can one meditate if there is no difference between meditation and postmeditation?How can one do anything at all, if there is no doer? How can there bea view? Forthere is no distinction between the viewer and what is viewed.

These are difficult questions and beyond the scope of this short paper. My own way of makingsense of them is a follows:Establishing appearances into the divine requires a perspectival shift. This shift is different thanthat involved in Wittgenstein’s switch from seeing a drawing as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. Inthat case there is a subject that is seeing the object differently. What would it be like to achieve atotal perspectival shift that dissolved the distinction between subject and object, that did notinvolve grasping at the object, and that was perfectly selfless? And how would it be possible?We cannot say what it would be like without achieving enlightenment, or at least a high degreeof realization. But if appearances are divine, they themselves shouldprovide the clue as to whythis happens. Buddha’s teachings are appearances. So are the teachings of the enlightened ones.So is everything. Heidi Koppl notices an apparent contradiction in Rongzom’s position. Heargues that all appearances are pure, yet rejects the duality betweenpure and impure:“Notwithstanding his commitment to purity, Rongzom here appears to relinquish the notion ofboth pure and impure appearances. We might interpret his statement asimplying an Atiyogaperspective where, due to the fact of primordial purity (ka dag), any conditioned appearance ofpurity as perceived on the path is still an adventitious experience and thus not the actualization ofthe primordial condition (gdod ma’I gnas lugs).”9Now what does Koppl mean by ‘adventitious’? It can mean, not inherent, extrinsic, accidental,among others. I think she means ‘not inherent’. Then the actualization of the primordialcondition would be inherent. Perhaps one could interpret this to meanthat the flow ofappearances as unestablished as divine, that is, ordinary experiences, are nevertheless

primordially pure, although the unenlightened mind does not view themthis way. Thus, whenone achieves enlightenment there is no more suffering because one is totally dissolved inappearances as divine. As has been said, the path is the result. It is primordial purity that isgenerating the experience of enlightenment. As Rongzom says, “Even the mind of an ordinarybeing is naturally characterized by complete purification.” 10But it would be a mistake to conclude that ultimately the establishment of appearances into thedivine is a result of cause and effect. As Śāntarakṣita explains in the Tattvasiddhi,:“In the three realms without exception, all is like a magical display. Like magic, it can be seenand touched, yet it cannot be veridically perceived. In this manner, not having conceptions, theyogi through the practice of mudrā, is able to purify all three realms by this special mind.” (TATFolio 58 #29B)Thus Buddha said in the Buddha Yoga Tantra (Sangye Naljor):With really joyful effort [mngon brtson pa], maintaining this connection [nonconceptualenjoyment], the yogi will direct his or her efforts in this way. His or hermind, completely in a non-conceptual [state], will reflect all forms from the mirrorof wisdom. If aspects are perceived in this way, arising from the mirror of wisdom,with one’s own mind free of conceptions, all aspects are [reflected] from the mirrorof wisdom. The mirror-like display is similar to a [collection of] magic dreams, orbubbles of water, and optical illusions [all non-substantial]. When one perceivesthis way, as the Buddha said, one is declared to be a master. (TAT Folio 60(#30B))[But how could] liberating knowledge arise from subject and object when it arises fromdualistic thinking [which makes use of conventional signs]? This offers no proof of the nonconceptual,because the object itself is a hindrance. Through logic one cannot achieve any resultthrough (working with) objects in this way, because the cause and effect are really unconnected.Duality and non-duality exist at the same time, so one cannot be the cause of the other. And ifthecause is gone, the result cannot come.Nor can it be known through invisible reasoning [Logic of nonapprehension or invisiblereasoning – ma dmigs pai rtags [e.g. If there were an elephant on the table, I would see it. I do not

see an elephant on the table. Therefore there is no elephant on the table.]], because the subject is notthe sort of thing that could be perceived [because non-conceptual]. Thus as previously said,reasoning will not work. Reasoning about cause and effect is not correct, This is true, becausesincethere is no cause, there is no result. Thus nothing is produced. If the cause is not gone, the result willnot be produced. Because things arise instantaneously, time does not tarry. If there were no change,everything would be permanent. If there were no instantaneous activity objects would be like skyflowers. How could they arise? Thus for instance, [as Nāgārjuna says]:If the seed is not gone, how does the sprout arise? It is said by omniscient Buddha that allresults arise like magic.Thus, whatever Buddha the protector said about the birth, arising, and transitory nature of sentientbeings is a temporary truth.In the absolute state, nothing is developing or existing. [Therefore, although we cannot say exactlyhow non-conceptual wisdom arises from the transformation of experience, there is no proof that thisis impossible]. Because production and producer are not in contact [lit. are not agreeable] cause andeffect do not really exist. It [the nonconceptual] is very hidden [mysterious] and cannot be logicallydemonstrated. (TAT. Folio 72 (#36B))A Vajrayāna ritual text, notably in the bodhicitta section relating to compassion, puts the issue ofenlightenment succinctly. “Saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are the same. It is the perspective that is thedifference.” It is a perspective that encompasses both subject and object. It is a perspective that isnot on anything, but is a transformed experience of appearances.Śāntarakṣita’s Philosophical WorksŚāntarakṣita composed many Buddhist treatises. His philosophical works are:Commentary on (Jnānagarbha’s) Distinction between the Two Truths (Satyadvayavibhaṅgapanjika)Commentary on the Vada-Nyaya of Dharmakīrti (Vāda-Nyāya-Vipancitārtha)Compendium of Suchness (Tattvasamgraha)Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṁkāra)

Commentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way (Madhyamakālaṁkāravritti)Attainment of Suchness (Tattvasiddhi)Investigation of the Ultimate (Paramārthaviniśkaya) (Lost)All of them were translated into Tibetan. English translations of The Ornament of the MiddleWay and The Compendium of Suchness have been published. English translations of the AutoCommentary on the Ornament of the Middle Way and The Attainment of Suchness will soon bereleased.Notes1 Wheeler, 270-271.2 Blumenthal,181.3 Ibid, 223.4 Mipham, Padmakara translation, 210-211.5 Ibid, 101.6 cf Blumenthal, 131.7 Rongzom, 106.8 Ibid.9 Ibid, 160, note 272.10 Ibid, 107.References:Quotations from Madhyamakālaṁkāra and Madhyamakālaṁkāravritti (MA and MAV)are froma forthcoming translation by The Śāntarakṣita Translation GroupAll translations of the Tattvasiddhi (TAT) are from The Tattvasiddhi and theMadhyamakālaṁkāra with Commentaries by Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche and KhenpoTsewang Dongyal Rinpoche, edited with an introduction by Marie-Louise Friquegnon,forthcoming in the series on Buddhist philosophy, edited by Robert Thurman, ColumbiaUniversity Press.Blumenthal, James. The Ornament of the Middle Way, Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2004.Longchenpa. The Precious Treasury of the Basic Space of Phenomena trans Richard Barron,Junction City CA: Padma Publishing, 2001.Mipham, Jamgon. The Adornment of the Middle Way tran, Bythe Padmakara Translation Group.Boston: Shambhala, 2005.Rongzom Chozang. Establishing Appearances as Divin,. Ithaca: Snow Lion, 2008.

Śāntarakṣita. Tattvasamgraha with a Commentary by Kamalasila trans. Jha,Ganganatha, Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1986.J. Talboys Wheeler. India from the Earliest Ages, vol. 3, Delhi : Cosano Publications, 1977.Wheeler, J.Talboys. India from the Earliest Ages, vol. 3, Delhi: Cosano Publications, 1977.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations, London: Macmillan, 1958

Tantric Realization and the Cittamatra Aspect of Santaraksita’s Philosophy

Marie-Louise Friquegnon

Santaraksita rejects the materialism of the Hindu Nyaya-Vaisesikas and theBuddhist Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas all of which are atomists, on thefollowing grounds: Since the atom (paramanu) is defined as an indivisibleobject, it is, unlike the modern atom, not separable into parts. Since whatis indivisible even theoretically cannot have an extension (zero is theonly indivisible number), atoms cannot add up to anything, such as a table(zero plus zero equals zero). Further, a partless atom would not havesides, so if they were to combine they would occupy the same space and notincrease in size.

If matter does not exist, then the next most likely candidate for realitywould seem to be mind. It is certainly the case that we do seem to be awareof something, irrespective of these appearances being real. This is thebasis of his acceptance of the Cittamatra/Yogacara on the relative level.For Santaraksita, unlike Descartes, this does not imply the existence of aunitary ego, but rather a flow of experiences that come ready made with the

tag of ‘belonging to oneself’. There cannot be an unchanging self becauseif there were, it could not be affected by various perceptions etc.

But although the experiential may be true on the relative level, it cannotbe the ultimate truth for the following reasons:

1) Veridical perception is impossible.Mind and its object are either the same or different.

a) If they are the same, then there would be no explanation for mentalchanges. A thing cannot change itself. It needs a cause for change.b) If mind and its object are different, there are threepossibilities:(1) A single aspect of mind knows all aspects of a mental objectinstantaneously, as when one sees a flowered cup. But a single aspectcannot contact many things, for in doing so it would be altered and becomecomplex.(2) Many aspects of mind know each of the aspects of the mental object,e. g. the flowered cup, in a single instant. But again, since the aspectsof the cup are infinitely divisible, this would be impossible.(3) A series of perceptions follow one another, each knowing an aspectof the cup. But this happens so rapidly that it seems that the perceptionis of the whole cup all at once. For example, when a torch is whiled in acircle a circle of light exists. But this is an illusion. There is only thetorch at each point. Since perception is possible only in the present, theperception of the circle of light is an illusion. 2. There is no real knowledge of any mind. If one tries to know the mind,one must then try to know the mind that knows the mind, and then the mindthat knows the mind which is knowing the mind and so on. This is of coursean infinite regress.

Since the mind cannot be identified as ultimate reality, what can? Acandidate is the system of cause and effect, or as it has been termed bymany Buddhist philosophers, the system of dependent arising. Mind,according to Santaraksita “is dependent on the power of another”, namely oncauses that are habitual tendencies.. But it is at this point thatSantaraksita identifies himself as a Madhyamaka philosopher. As Nagarjuna

before him, Santaraksita criticizes the coherence of causality itself.There are two possibilities:

1) Cause and effect are the same. (This is an unusual view today, butin Santaraksita’s time it was held by the Samkhya Hindu philosophers whoclaimed that prakriti or nature was the cause of everything and the result ofeverything.)Santaraksita rejects this possibility for the followingreasons:a) If cause and effect were the same, everything would happen at once,which is absurd.b) If cause and effect were the same, since food is the cause ofexcrement, then when we ate food we would eat excrement, which is absurd.

2) Cause and effect are different. If this were the case, a cause precedes aneffect and thus occupies a different moment of time from the effect. Ifthis is the case, the cause and effect could never co-exist in the samemoment, which is the present moment, so the cause could not bring about theeffect.

If cause and effect cannot be substantiated, how does this orderly worldcome about? Santaraksita says that all these things are happening as if bymagic. He also says that we cannot fault him, because (on the ultimatelevel) he does not assert anything to be true.

Does this mean that Santaraksita believes that anyone who follows hisarguments and holds them to be correct, will have reached enlightenment?This issue is addressed in the Tattvasiddhi, particularly in folios 74 and75. In folio 74, Santaraksita, holds that meditation is the way tounderstand reality. Nevertheless, in the worldly way, correct understandingfollows from the analysis of appearances from the net of concepts and whatarises from them Following Dharmakirti, the great fourth century logician,in the worldly way, correct understanding can be gleaned from logicalanalysis in terms of subject and object. Santaraksita explains this asfollows:

Folio 75 CHECKOne explains everything through realization of the particularity of

the cause and the particularity of the effect. Nevertheless, afterexamining names and categories, grasping and excluding [inference], there

may be complete agreement or clarity [about concepts such as the nature of,is due to logical analysis. Therefore names and categories aredistinguished and are clearly apparent. Different from worldly knowledge,the direct perception of enlightened the compounded [impermanence],nevertheless the appearance of subject and object are not clear andmanifest. Renowned Acàrya Dharmakrti also taught that in samsara, whateverknowledge arises appearing clearly, following from the careful distinctionsof subject and object is non-dualistic and does not rely on conventionalcharacteristics, etc.] Acàrya Dharmakrti taught that one must thoroughlyanalyze subject and object, through analyzing names and categories, relyingon the perfect knowledge of subject and object, which arises fromexperience of objects. Then if one confirms this with categories ofestablishing and reversing, becoming accustomed to this type of experience,[through meditation], then one must agree this will not block clearperception of reality. *

Yet this liberation from the net of concepts is not enough. It is a merenegation of concepts, as well as an understanding based on an analogy witha reflection. One is still in the net of words. Again from Rinpoches’commentary: REFERENCE

Thus Santaraksita states in folio 75 what at first seems contradictory towhat he says in folio 74. In folio 75 he states that the mind cannot betransformed by transcendental wisdom if this has been achieved through thenet of concepts. As he said in Madhyamakalamkara, there is no proof ofenlightenment. He can only argue that special causes can bring about aspecial effect.

If the mind cannot be transformed by the net of concepts, how can one reachenlightenment? Throughout the Tattvasiddhi, Santaraksita has argued that themind becomes transformed by that with which it is familiar. So, forexample, one learns to become expert at the piano by practicing again andagain. After a time, one does not have to think about the notes. The musicflows naturally from one’s fingers. So after a great deal of non-conceptualmeditation, one becomes familiar with experience that is free from subjectand object. One becomes more and more expert at the progressive stages ofmeditation, (which are outlined very clearly by Santaraksita’s student,Kamilasila in the Bhavanakramana.

* A..(Establishing )If there is smoke, there is burning.There is smokeTherefore there is burning.

B. (Reversing)If there is burning, there is smoke..There is no smoke.Therefore there is no burning.

Finally one melts into the ultimate state which cannot be describeddirectly. Yet as Santaraksita says, in the enlightened state, there is somesimilarity to non-dualistic experience. (Madhyamakalanlara, Sloka 70.)

Further, logical analysis, pushed to the limit, self-destructs. The net ofconcepts then is seen as illusory, and will not block yogic perception.When I am reading a book, I am the subject, and the book is the object.Looking at this reflected in a mirror, the mirror image contains neithersubject nor object. One must view appearances in this way. Then there is nograsping.

So the apparent contradiction between folios 74 and 75 can be resolved inthe following way. As logic self-destructs, we see the net of concepts tobe deceptive, and the distinction between subject and object to bedeceptive as well. Subject and objects are best viewed as reflections of areality that is beyond appearances. The net of concepts viewed in this wayis a kind of relative ultimate, an ultimate that can be indicated as logicself-destructs, but not experienced directly.

The absolute ultimate is reached by a parallel process, in which meditationalso self-destructs. As one becomes more and more familiar with meditation,

and achieves higher and higher stages (or bhumis), one becomes transformedby wisdom, or rather there is just wisdom, for the illusory self isexperienced no more.

As Santaraksita explains at the end of folio 75:“Some say, when all conceptions are gone, only emptiness is there. Youshould answer them thus. By the accumulation of thought constructionsexisting in the natural continuum of sentient beings through logic, andthrough the power of familiarization through meditation, the completetransformation of thoughts is obtained One becomes united with that withwhich one is familiar, and becomes, through this, very powerful. So if verypure holy ascetics meditate, remaining in this great state, there isneither stain nor cleaness, and the three realms will all be theirenjoyment”.

This analysis should clarify Santaraksita’s for asserting theCittamatra/Yogacara system to be true on the relative level, when he findsit ultimately incoherent. In His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s recentcommentary on The Diamond Cutter Sutra and Nagarjuna’s Seventy Stanzas.* he argued thatthe relative level works for us as long as we neither impose cleardistinctions nor insist that what we know is ultimately real. As long as weview natural processes this way, just as experiences to which we givenames, then through the conventions of language, we can make sense ofcausality, as well as the rest of the furniture of our ordinary world.

*Radio City Music Hall Oct. 12-14, 2007

We can also put this conventional world to use, because, although illusory,it is inseparably joined to reality. Because of this, Santaraksita believeswe can make use of it to achieve enlightenment. Reality is covered by theconventional as, to use Nagarjuna’s example, a piece of gold is embedded inore. Because the nature of the mind is emptiness, when you purify the mind,

you recognize emptiness. If the absolute were not really always with us, wewould be unable to discover it. The method of doing so is to be found inthe techniques of meditation and yoga.

Santaraksita also states that, since the experience of emptiness ishappiness, great bliss, dewa chenpo, then in order to reach this bliss oneshould practice ordinary bliss in a special way. Just as through logic oneuncovers emptiness, through transforming ordinary bliss one achievesultimate bliss. Since ultimate reality is always with us, and we need onlyto recognize it, then since the experience of ultimate reality is blissful,by uncovering the true nature of ordinary bliss, one is able to follow aneasy and pleasant path to the ultimate.

As Rinpoches say:In the outer yoga, the Kriya Yoga, one is advised to practice purity, suchas through bathing often, eating pure white food and living in a very cleanenvironment. It is believed in that way, the mind will be purified. It isbelieved that practicing this outer purity on the relative level willproduce absolute purity. Santaraksita in Tattvasiddhi is more concernedwith the inner tantras, and not with external purity. Shedra on the OuterTantra, Summer 2007. In Santaraksita’s system, practicing music, dance and contacting aconsort, performed without grasping and a sense of duality, will produce abliss that resembles the bliss one experiences when achieving the ultimatestate of recognizing reality. This resemblance itself is so powerful,enlightenment is achieved.

And again in folio 57:

The object [body] is only a hindrance to those who lacking skillful meansand wisdom are completely clinging with desire. They do not know theteachings about total grasping, and they cling to ego. They do not know atall the teachings about how to bring about this transformation of thisspecial touching. Such people grasp completely without understanding thisspecial kind of contact, - touching objects. Thus, objects having been

(grasped in this way) may lead to rebirths in the lower realms.

Buddha also said

To a fully ordained monk who is still clinging to phenomena, or one who clings to

old traditions, or an intellectual, one should not show how to make contact with

the true nature. Buddha considered it an obstacle for them. [From the (Guhyasamàja

].

The path of the ten virtuous actions are for those that give up non-dual wisdom.

One should have the wisdom to accept desires. So it has been said.

And again:

Folio 57 (#29A) Striving diligently for bodhicitta, the yogi will become a deity through complete

self--abandonment. And not through the torments of asceticism. Only by

experiencing bliss can you capture bliss. This (yogi) is the future Buddha.

This not attained by unnecessary baths and vows, nor is doing difficultascetic practices necessary, nor ascetic vows. One will not succeed throughascetic practices, but rather one will gain bliss through enjoyment. #60Therefore clearly as to attachment nothing exists to which one can beattached. But when one views reality as magic, through having this specialenjoyment through the complete arising of this perfect bliss thoroughlyperfected by this view of reality, one obtains completely a special fruit.Why would one not accept this? One relies on the insubstantiality of allthings, which are just appearances. By the force of practicing thesespecial meditations, and becoming accustomed to them, you will gain bliss

and a happy mind etc. A special result is generated, the unsurpassableresult. How could anyone disagree about this cause of true nature. This isfound in the First Glorious Tantra. Through this accomplishment, through thegaining of true nature, one becomes Buddha and also all the heroes. Throughidentifying with the deity, through this happiness, one will succeed, butharsh ascetic practices will dry up one’s very bodies. These sufferingswill disturb one’s mind, and it will become distracted. Rather if the mindrelies on (the bliss of) the body, it will be transformed by this bliss. Itwill not be disturbed by suffering. Because sufferings will cease, the mindwill transform.

What argument can be given for accepting this as true? To return to theidealist position, one should recall a classic problem. Imagine a blackcat. Now turn this imaginary black cat in your mind’s eye into a white cat.This is easy. Now try turning the chair in front of you into an elephant.One can’t do it. But if all is mind, it should be equally easy. Why isn’tit? The Buddhist idealist would answer that one’s mental habits involvingimaginary objects are very flexible. Our mental habits, our habitualpatterns, which concern what we consider to be real, are far more rigid.Even if, convinced by the idealists, that what we see is only mind, ourhabits are usually too hard to break. An exception is the Buddha or a highbodhisattva who has to a large degree purified these mental habits so thathe or she can suddenly produce for example, a jeweled tree, Our minds arelimited by our grasping and attachment. When these dissolve we are free.

This view would explain the Buddha’s omniscience in a new way. The earlyphilosophical school, the Sarvastivadins believed that if Buddha isomniscient and knows past, present and future, then past, present andfuture must always exist. But then how would the passage of time bepossible? Sarah McClintock believes that all that is meant by the Buddha’somniscience is that he knows all things to be empty of intrinsic reality.But Kamalasila has an idea which does justice to the idea of Buddha’s

omniscience relative to ordinary events without committing oneself to theperpetual existence of the past and present. He suggests that Buddha knowsall things as in a dream. In other words, because the Buddha has purifiedcraving and duality, he can now whatever he likes because it will arise inhis mind in the present through interdependent co-origination.(Madhyamakalankarapanjika)

Does Buddha then, as subject, know all of relative existence as an object?Santaraksita would reject this, because he does not accept the possibilityof perceiving an object There is no subject and no object. All of realitywould arise in the awareness of Buddha as a reflection. And to repeat, whenone sees someone doing something in a mirror, there is neither subject norobject per se.

Santaraksita refused to assert anything as true on the absolute level, forthis level is beyond propositional knowledge (beyond words). Yet at thesame time, achieving non-conceptual awareness of this emptiness is theultimate religious goal. This raises the following problem: What hasemptiness to do with religion?

Santaraksita's religious vision is best understood in relation to the co-founder of Tibetan academic philosophy, Guru Padmasambhava. GuruPadmasambhava focused on Dzogchen, the Great Perfection, which understandsthe highest form of Buddhism as a perspectival shift, where afterappropriate spiritual training, the student is able to see all of realityin a new way. This view is experienced in such a way as to produce an all-encompassing experience of compassion and bliss. It also makes the studentwiser, even in the ways of ordinary life.

Enlightenment for both Santaraksita and Guru Padmasambhava consists inexperiencing the world in a non-dualistic way, free from attachment. In

this state, there is no sense of a separate subject and object. Theinterconnectedness of all sentient beings is also directly experienced. Allseems bathed in the clear light of bliss.

Just as a lover of art can see a painting, not only in terms of its beauty,but also in terms of its weight and height, sages who have experienced non-duality can still also understand how ordinary people experience reality,and have great compassion for their suffering. This is the connectionbetween the Madhyamakalankara and the Tattvasiddhi. The key to bothphilosophical understanding and tantric awareness is non-duality.

Santaraksita explains how it is possible to gain this experience in theTattvasiddhi. On the relative level, all things happen through cause andeffect. Special causes can bring about unusual effects. For example, acertain seed will generally produce a tree with sour fruit. But if onesoaks that seed in milk before planting it, the fruit of the tree will besweet. Similarly, objects of attachment involve craving and hencesuffering. But if these objects are used with special techniques, this willbecome a form of meditation, which will lead one to enlightenment, ratherthan away from it.

But in order to understand how this can happen, the mystic vision of theTattvasiddhi must be understood in relation to the philosophic analysisprovided in both works. The one aspect that is real on both the ultimateand relative level is awareness. The reason it is real is not asconventionally designated awareness, but rather in its true nature which isemptiness.

Thus although Santaraksita is a Madhyamaka philosopher, he accepts theYogacara (Mind Only) emphasis on the mind for two of their reasons: First,awareness is indubitable. Second, awareness can be transformed from one

that is enmeshed in concepts, duality and attachment to awareness that isuntouched by the illusions brought about through habitual tendencies. Themain point under examination here is the claim that it is possible to reachan awareness of ultimate reality through these methods. Santaraksitaspecifically rejects the possibility that the ultimate can be known throughdirect perception. The ultimate, being beyond duality is not a perceptibleobject.

In Santaraksita’s day, one of the commonly accepted forms of perception wasyogic perception. This included perception of the thoughts of another,perception of past lives and of the future, as well as perception ofinvisible beings. Whatever Santaraksita thought about this yogicperception, it seems clear to me that this is not what he meant by reachingthe ultimate. Nor could one find the ultimate through reasoning. It couldnot be known analytically, that is through an examination of the meaning ofthe word. For example, we can say that if X is a circle, it is round. Theultimate cannot be known in this way, because it is non-conceptual. Nor canit be known through reasoning through cause and effect. As Hume believed,Mahayana Buddhists also believe that causality is a mere mental habit thatcannot refer to a necessary connection between cause and effect. Sincecauses are not ultimately real, ultimate reality cannot be produced by acause. But neither can ultimate reality be disproved through ‘invisiblereasoning.” (For example: If there were an elephant on this table I wouldsee it. I do not see an elephant on the table. Therefore there is noelephant on the table.)

Acceptance of the conclusion of the hypothetical syllogism is a hallmark ofthe Svatantrika. Adherents of another school, the Prasangika, rejected suchsyllogisms. For example, they believed that accepting the conclusion of theargument:’ If there is smoke there is burning; There is smoke; Thereforethere is burning’, committed them to accepting the intrinsic reality ofburning, a ‘no,no ‘ in Mahayana metaphysics. Prasangikas accepted onlyreductio ad absurdum arguments as valid. In fact I have not been able to finda single instance where Santaraksita argues for a metaphysical position on

the basis of a hypothetical syllogism. He explicitly state that he cannotbe faulted because he does not, on the absolute level assert anything to betrue. Yet he uses Dharmakirti’s division of reasoning as based on directperception and inference in order to show that these types of argumentscannot be used to demonstrate the ultimate. Invisible reasoning, however,shows one cannot disprove the ultimate just because it is not the sort ofthing that can be perceived, and so cannot be disproved on the basis of notbeing perceived.

Thus the Yogacara position wins by default. The only way to attainemptiness is to transform awareness. And this must be done so as to producean awareness that is both non-dual, non-conceptual, and without attachment.The special techniques for doing this are described in the tantras.

The word tantra (gyud in Tibetan) means protector of continuity. Thisrather cryptic definition may be taken to mean a protection of the internalprocess of transformation of experience leading to enlightenment. This isnot the place to dwell on the fascinating forms these techniques take. Butthe ones Santaraksita mentions are interesting because they all involvenon-duality. He specifically mentions tantric union, music and dance.

The union of two lovers has been characterized by a sense ofinseparability, of loss of self in the other. It is said that in advancedpractitioners of the tantra this can occur not only through sexual union,but also through the touch of a hand, or even a smile. Further a musicianlost in the complexities of a Bach fugue may have no separate awareness ofhimself. Similarly as Yeats said, “ How can we know the dancer from thedance?”

The dancer herself often cannot. Dancers even when injured may be unawareof pain. They are lost in the dance. The proper forms of tantra, however,

are also marked by nonattachment, yet not without loving kindness,compassion and joy.

These non-dual, non-conceptual experiences are inroads to ultimate reality.Understanding the bliss of union in all these cases is, for Santaraksita,an inroad to the understanding of ultimate reality. But this is just anapproximation. Santaraksita does say, however, that the approximateultimate and the true ultimate have some similarity. How can he justifythis statement?

Although he does not say, I would hazard a guess that he was an enlightenedbeing who experienced ultimate reality and recognized that it indeed boresome similarity to the proximate ultimate he knew before he becameenlightened. Whether or not we believe him is a personal decision.

There is however another way of looking at the matter. For Mahayana Buddhism,

nirvana and samsara are not two different realms or substances, but rather two

different perspectives on the same reality. We are of course indistinguishable

from the real in our ultimate being. For the Mahayanist, the conceiving, dualistic

mind encloses us in the veil of Maya or illusion, and obstructs clear vision. If

we can use the tantric techniques to unblock this vision, the enlightened state

will shine forth.