mimesis and the representation of reality: a historical world view

ERNEST MATHIJS and BERT MOSSELMANS

MIMESISAND THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY: AHISTORICAL WORLD VIEW

ABSTRACT. The representation of reality is a fundamental concept in theperception of the world. Its historical consideration leads to an understandingof historical and contemporary culture. In this paper we specifically investigatethe anthropometric stage of cultural development as a historical world view. Wedefine this stage on the basis of René Girard’s hypotheses on the origin of culture,and we isolate its principles. Next, we consider the function of art as the repre-sentation of cultural values. We investigate the three major motives of artisticrepresentation in the anthropometric stage, i.e. beauty, dramatization andmimesis.We show how and why these motives play an essential part in the obfuscation andexplanation of the origin of culture. Finally, we show how these developments aredealt with in the aesthetics of Plato and Aristotle.

KEY WORDS: cultural anthropology, aesthetics, literary criticism, art history,philosophy, art criticism

. . . Whenever the tragic deed, however, isdone within the family –when murder or the like is done or mediated by brother on brother,by son on father, by mother on son, or son on mother– these are the situations the poet should seek after

(Aristotle,Poetics, 13–15)

A screaming comes across the sky.It has happened before, but there is nothing to compare it to now

(Thomas Pynchon,Gravity’s Rainbow)

1. INTRODUCTION

The representation of reality requires a historical consideration. Thestudy of its function and meaning in historical cultures not onlyenables the understanding of specific examples of representation,but links them to their respective world views, even if these world

Foundations of Science5: 61–102, 2000.© 2000Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

62 ERNEST MATHIJS AND BERT MOSSELMANS

views remain largely unconscious. More important, an analysis ofhistorically unconscious motives in the representation of realityallows for the conceptualization of these world viewsashistorical,as ‘stages’ in the development and evolution of culture.

Such an analysis, however, must be based upon a concep-tual framework. For our purposes we rely upon the argumentsof René Girard. His work develops a method for the analysisof historically unconscious motives through ‘close reading’ andpsychological insights. Originally, Girard developed this methodin literary critiques. Later, he also employed it in anthropologicaland psychological research (Dumouchel, 1988; Tijmes, 1995, 1997;Van Heeswijck, 1997). Through Girard’s writings we would like toemphasize the unconscious motives of the history of the representa-tion of reality. First, we shortly discuss Girard’s key concepts of theorigin of human culture: the founding violence and the scapegoat-mechanism. Next, we identify the ‘anthropometric stage’ as a periodof cultural development, leading to the ‘obfuscation’ of this mech-anism. In a subsequent section we concentrate on the classicalconcept of art in this stage, as a special instance of the represen-tation of reality. The formalized motives of beauty, dramatizationandmimesisintroduced a new way of looking at and understandingcultural reality. We specifically analyze this in our discussion ofdramatization, both in comedy and tragedy. We isolatemimesis, withits ability to legitimize fiction, as the pivotal motive in the represen-tation of reality, and we will emphasize its historical significance.Finally, we discuss the thematization of representation andmimesisin the works of Plato and Aristotle.

2. GIRARD, MIMETIC DESIRE AND THESCAPEGOAT-MECHANISM

A psycho-anthropological hypothesis on the origin of human cultureand its consequences for the origins of society, intellectual thoughtand art has been developed by the French literary critic and philos-opher René Girard (Girard, 1972, 1978, 1982). He bases thishypothesis on the assumption that human culture arose as the restric-tion and suppression of ‘mimetic violence’ between individuals.According to Girard, all humans are intrinsically equal, and every

MIMESIS AND THE REPRESENTATION OF REALITY 63

human is subjectively empty (of meaning and property). However,man’s ability to desire what is shown to him, threatens this equality,revealing itself in what Girard calls amimésis d’appropriation(liter-ally: mimetic appropriation): a profound desire to possess whatothers have, not so much because of the desire for the property itself,but for the status this property is connected with. Girard calls itthe conflict between subject and model. Because of the intrinsicallyemptiness of a subject, a model is required to provoke the desire.It is mimetic because the subject mirrors himself to or imitates themodel’s behaviour to acquire such properties. Such mimetic desire,present in all humans, consequently led to unbridled violence; ina violent attempt to acquire both property and status (an later on,only status), the subject attacks the model. Even when the prop-erty is consequently obtained, the desire is not tempered, leading toeven more mimetic violence. The changing roles of both subject andmodel (being subject in one conflict, model in another) ensured thecontinuity of the violence. Vergote calls this mimetic desire a hope-less search for differentiation (Vergote, 1996: 135). Girard observesthat after a while it became apparent that several persons tended tojoin forces in these mimetic conflicts, directing their violence to onesole person. This evolution changed themimésis d’appropriationinto a rivalité mimétique(literally: mimetic rivalry), a mimeticconflict. The person to which the violence is directed hence becomesa scapegoat. The selection of this scapegoat is essential. He has to bedifferent from other people, to be able to be identified as the sourceof the mimetic violence. Because of his difference, he is blamedfor the origin of the mimetic violence. For this he is executed or,in a later phase, expelled. The expulsion of the scapegoat reunitesthe subjects and his horrible fate halts the process of mimeticviolence, at least temporarily (although, Girard argues, it remainsa suppressed ability in every individual). This unique process makesthe scapegoat at the same timemaléfique(evil, representing mimeticviolence) andbénifique(good, reuniting people). In an even furtherphase, the suppression of mimetic desire becomes institutionalized;instead of suppressed it becomes repressed. Since the expulsion ofthe scapegoat has the effect of a miraculous liberation of mimeticviolence, this liberation will be celebrated. Themaléfiqueaspectwill lead to a set of prohibitions, preventing any regeneration of


the mimetic conflict. Thebénifiqueaspect leads to a continuous,perperual celebration of the re-unification. According to Girard, thisis the origin of the rite. In rites, the re-enactment of the expulsionfunctions as the celebration of the origin of culture, of the unifyingprinciple of human individuals. The connection is very strong: thesacrifices of the rite are as real as the original expulsion or execution(including the real execution of a sacrifice), in situations as similaras possible (dances resembling the chaos of the situation of mimeticviolence) (Girard, 1978: 32–46).

The scapegoat-mechanism thus leads to a cultural order, basedupon three foundations: the rite, a set of prohibitions (Girard callsthem interdits) and the myth (Tijmes, 1996: 34–38). The rite re-confirms the scapegoat-mechanism as the foundation of culture.A victim, resembling the original scapegoat, commits several actsthrough which he differentiates himself from the group. He is thenexecuted or expelled. His expulsion resembles that of the originalscapegoat, leading to its re-enactment. Through this re-enactment,the necessity of theinterditsbecomes clear. They function as preven-tions of the mimetic violence, and provide the cultural order with aset of differences between individuals. Such differences lead to aninstitutionalizing of incomparability, preventing any re-occurence ofmimetic violence (there is nothing to compare to now). Incest andmurder are two main examples of suchinterdits. The myth functionsas the representation of the origin of culture and as legitimationof the cultural order. The myth describes the decay of differences(possibly leading to mimetic desire) in terms of a social and culturalcrisis. It treats the origins of this decay (differentiality) as crimes,and points out scapegoats that are ‘objectively’ guilty. As a case inpoint, Girard analyzes the Oedipus-myth. Thebe is devastated bythe plague, at first instance leading to a situation of undifferenti-ality in which mimetic desire is possible. Oedipus is singled out asresponsible for the plague since he obtains different characteristicsthat fall under theinterdits, having married his mother and killed hisfather. Thesecrimes indifférenciateursare so terrible that they blurthe distinctions that govern the cultural order and will be regardedas the source of the plague. Moreover, they connect the collectivewith the personal, making scapegoating possible. As cripple, amonarch and a stranger (having been raised as an abandoned child


outside Thebe), Oedipus also possesses other characteristics thatenable him to be identified as the source of the collective crisis.Girard calls thesesignes de sélection victimaire. Oedipus is thenfound guilty of the plague. In Sophocles’ depiction of the myth,Teiresias accuses Oedipus: “You are the cursed polluter of this land”(Sophocles, 1947: v353; Girard, 1982: 37–47). Myths describe thescapegoat-mechanism from the point of view of the perpetrators (theexecutioners of the scapegoat), thus hiding the arbitrary character bywhich the selection of the scapegoat takes place.

Any status or position of prestige that incorporates differencesfrom other people is thus viable for scapegoating. But, wheneverthe scapegoat succeeds in postponing his execution or expulsion,he transforms this position of prestige (maléfiqueas well asbéni-fique) into religious power. Themaléfiqueaspect is objectified inthe sets of restrictions and prohibitions, which obtain a natural,permanent character. They prevent other people from obtaining thesame powerand they veil the arbitrary character of the process ofscapegoating. The regulation of these processes occurs through the‘religification’ of thebénifiqueaspect, in the person of the celebratedmonarch/scapegoat or under the more abstract form of Gods, appar-ently legitimizing culture from outside. Religions obtain a higherdegree of transcendence as the original functions of rite and mythfade away (Girard, 1978: 47–68). Pieter Tijmes writes:

Gods are sacrificed scapegoats. The ambivalent sacred aspect is externalized fromsociety, but it is present in the figure of the god or goddess. (Tijmes, 1995: 680–681, our translation)

As the mechanisms that regulate the obfuscation of the foundingmimetic violence intensify, the myth no longer functions as its sole‘explanation’ or ‘re-presentation’. Concepts that address the tran-scendant character of religion become necessary. Such new conceptsare, contrary to the rite, theinterdits and the myth, no longer‘enactive’ but rather interiorized theoretical constructions of reality,detached from the direct actions of execution or expulsion. Thisprocess of depersonalization of the representation of culture startswith the Ionic philosophers in around 600 B.C. While the mythstill personifies the forces that create a culture, philosophy tries todevelop an ‘abstract mean’ that dissolves the direct contact betweenhumans and force of nature. Herman De Ley describes this evolution


as essential: in the myth, the relations between personified forces areconstructed as human interactions (for instance in the duel or sexualacts). In the philosophical considerations such relations are dealtwith in a more mediated, abstract manner, through a metaphysical‘third term’. This term is not yet pure conceptual. Examples includeterms as ‘fire’, ‘water’ or ‘air’, representing a more balanced type ofrelation between actions. As a result, the founding mimetic violencebecomes even further obfuscated (for an elaborate considerationof this evolution in science and philosophy, see: Mosselmans andMathijs, 1998a, 1998b, in press).

3. THE ANTHROPOMETRIC STAGE: A HISTORICAL WORLD VIEW

Girard’s main hypothesis is provocative. It assumes a direct connec-tion between unconscious human actions and thoughts and theirtangible cultural and societal implications. It also assumes a methodof research that links cultural facts with psychological and anthropo-logical hypotheses. Moreover, it incorporates an attempt to explainthese facts and hypotheses historically, within the framework ofa historical world view. The construction of such a world viewis, to say the least, no taken for granted concept. It can easilydillute into unscientific holism. This disclaimer notwithstanding,Girard’s hypothesis provides support for the construction of ahistorical world view. To begin with, it is not entirely new. Ithas been present in several philosophical treatments of the originof human culture. Girard specifically dicusses Freud’s anthropo-logical discussion of the same hypothesis in hisTotem und Tabu(Girard, 1972: 235–304; Freud, 1934), and Lévi-Strauss’ struc-turalist elaborations on the evolution and rules of marriage indifferent cultures inLa pensée sauvage(Girard, 1972: 305–345;Lévi-Strauss, 1962). He also frequently mentions the philosophicalconsiderations of Malinowski’sThe Father in Primitive Psychologyas support for his hypothesis (Girard, 1972: 90–93; Malinowski,1961, 1963). Other authors have also discussed the origin of culturein similar terms, particularly Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucaultand Herbert Marcuse. InL’ ordre du discours, Michel Foucaultfocuses on the rules which control social discourse, including thosewhich separate true from false. In his eyes, the establishment of truth


in discourse has gone through many historical transformations. Forthe Greek poets of the the 6th century B.C., true discourse wasritual action in which destiny was seen and justified. A centurylater, Foucault argues, by a shift from action to speech, the truthof discourse was to be found in the correspondence between theform of a statement and the object to which it referred. Since then,correspondence between word and reality remained important:

Un jour est venu où la vérité s’est déplacée de l’acte ritualisé, efficace, et just,d’énonciation, vers l’énonce lui-même: vers sons sens, sa forme, son objet, sonrapport à sa référence. Entre Hesiode et Platon un certain partage s’est établi,séparant le discours vrai et le discours faux. (Foucault, 1971: 17)

In his later work, Foucault analyzes repression, concentrating on theconditions of sexuality and madness. Both unite the possibility tocreate differencesand dissolve them, argues Foucault. He empha-sizes the role of sexuality and madness in shaping the relation-ship between individual and collectivity, as well as in the societalconstruction of differentiality (Foucault, 1978). The link with sexu-ality is also presented by Nietzsche, in hisGötzen-Dämmerung(Nietzsche, 1988: 80–81). His very brief synthesis of this line ofdiscourse is also one of the most far-reaching accounts of theorigin and development of culture, and impossible to synthesize. InDie fröhliche Wissenschaft, Nietzsche explicitly links the origin ofculture with the founding murder of Gods in his famous aphorism125 (Nietzsche, 1976: 140–141). Girard comments on Nietzsche’sdiscussion of sacrificial religions, by pointing out that its emphasison the prevention of the sacrifice has led Nietzsche to view Chris-tianity as the religion “revealing the collective murder” (Girard,1988: 227–246). Finally, Marcuse’sEros and Civilizationalsocontains several argumentations on the origin of culture. Marcuseparticularily elaborates on the Freudian concept of repression, forwhich he tries to find psychological as well as anthropological argu-ments in history (Marcuse, 1962). Yet, all these discussions do nottake on the magnitude that Girard’s interpretation of the origin ofculture offers. Girard’s construction of the argument allows severalelaborations beyond the limited scopes of psychology, philosophyand anthropology. It sheds light on evolutions in science, societyand art as well. Girard frequently refers to these evolutions. Wewould therefore like to broaden the scope a bit by elaborating on


some of the evolutions Girard mentions, and, more importantly, bypresenting his main hypothesis on the development of culture asa historical world-view, as an essential stage in the evolution ofculture and mankind.

In his analysis of concepts in the development of human thought,Philip Mirowski distinguishes between three stages: the antropo-metric, lineametric and syndetic stage. These stages differ from eachother through their specific uses of the body-, motion- and value-metaphors of measure. In the anthropometric stage these three meta-phors are undifferentiated. The value of an object is indissolublyconnected with its location in time and space and his/her owner. Inthe lineametric stage these metaphors diverge into abstract concepts(restricted to a certain class of objects), and in the syndetic stagethey are re-united in the abstract concept of ‘energy’ (Mirowski,1989). The term ‘anthropometric’ expresses the act of concretehuman beings using themselves as standard of measure (man as themeasure of all things). This is of course best exemplified by the useof body-measurement (e.g. the foot). Since every human being isdifferent, these measurements differ from person to person. Sucha situation was not regarded as unfair or unnatural, since peoplewere regarded as incomparable to each other by nature. The actof measurement therefore also represented the individual character-istics of the measurer. The right and option to measure was part of aperson’s political and cultural status (Kula, 1986). Mirowski pointsout that the criterions and standards used in the anthropometric stageare not transferable, since no abstract and unifying principles (likethe metric system) are used. No abstract fields or sets are used.The act of measurement was exclusively used in particular contexts,with the intention of developing a particular relation between partic-ular objects. In a culture founded on the natural inequality ofhuman beings an abstract measure, equally applicable to all, hasno meaning (Kula, 1986; Mosselmans and Mathijs, 1998a, 1998b).It implies criteria that are transferable to situations other than theones used for a particular measurement. Because of the connectionbetween the measure and the measurer, and their mutual incom-mensurability such a transfer proves to be impossible. Examples ofsuch antropometric reasoning are most notably present in Aristotle’s


works on ethics and economics (Mosselmans and Mathijs, 1998a,1998b).

The concept ‘anthropometric’ thus signifies a stage in whichhuman beings use themselves as measurers for the world. As astage it does not refer to a well-defined historical period, but toa culture, governed by a hierarchical order, institutionalizing theprevention (through rite,interditsand myth) of the re-occurence ofthe founding violence. As such it refers to a mentality, a collectiveunconscious world view, much in the tradition of what MichelVovelle called the ‘histoire des mentalités’ and of Orvar Löfgren’s‘research perspective’ (Vovelle, 1982; Löfgren, 1981). Accordingto Löfgren a world view relates to the collective unconscious of asociety. It is present in daily life, language, thought, acts and socialstructures. Conceptions of normality, equality, hierarchy, time andspace belong to its objects of study. He writes:

In this situation the concept of world-view has been used, not as a sharp analyticaltool, but rather to denote a certain research perspective in the study of culture.The term directs our attention toward the cultural organization of knowledge andvalues, to the ways in which cultural experiences are structured, often on a uncon-scious level. A world-view perspective emphasizes the need to study the basicand often hidden premises of a given culture, which are found behind more overtideological expressions or value statements. The most interesting aspects of sucha study are perhaps not the basic cosmological thoughts or moral principles whichform part of a world-view, but rather the assumptions made about normality andhuman nature. These assumptions are embedded in the ways in which everydaylife and knowledge are organized: how individuals learn to categorize, order andinterpret experiences, how they conceive of time, space, order and hierarchy.(Löfgren, 1981: 22)

Girard’s analysis of the origin of culture perfectly fits this definition.His key concept of mimetic desire also points out the most character-istics aspects of the anthropometric world view. The anthropometricstage constitutes a society dominated by what Girard and Mertenscall a hierarchical, religious order (Mertens, 1981, 1984). This orderis the result of the channelling of the mimetic desire, through thescapegoat-mechanism. The channeling of this desire is twofold.First, existing differences between individuals make comparisonsless likely to occur. ‘Natural inequality’ is an unconscious premisseof the anthropometric stage. Its society is based upon hierarchicaldifferentiation, in which every individual has a proper (or ‘natural’)


function, and in which transfers from one group to another onlyseldom occur (Achterhuis, 1988: 121–128). Arthur Lovejoy refersto this as a ‘Great Chain of Being’: the hierarchical order is charac-terized by a continuity, in which one element only differs from thatabove or below it in the smallest possible manner (Lovejoy, 1936:58–60). Apart from this differentiation between societal groups,rules exist which restrain unbridled accumulation within a group.For instance, the selling of land, and trading in general, are limited(Pekary, 1979: 7–19). The antropometric stage is thus identified bya static and hierarchically differentiated society, in which all entitiesoccupy a natural place. The natural inequality functions as a basicprinciple to suppress the mimetic desire.

This order is not only a sociological feature. It also governhuman intellectual thought. The rational and philosophical foun-dation of this order contains a similar structure, exemplified by‘the principle of self-determination’. According to this principleevery element of reality is classified in mutually incommensurablegroups; although these groups are hierachically structured, they aretoo differentiated to be compared with each other. Moreover, ashas been pointed out, no unifying concept exists to compare themwith. Natural inequality thus forms the basis of hierarchical differ-entiated thought. It also restrains the search for universally humanprinciples (which would contradict its foundation). Like Mirowskiand Kula pointed out, in the anthropometric stage a regularity onlymakes sense when it is connected to a particular context; the partic-ularities of the participating subjects (natural inequal), have to betaken into account in every human act, resulting in its incommensur-ability (Mirowski, 1989; Kula, 1986). The evaluation of situationsalso occurs from particular viewpoints, avoiding the necessity foruniversal measures. Every ‘self’ (every human body with his/hercorresponding position in society) forms the basic metaphor forhis/her own measure, thus determining every act (Kula, 1986). Sincehumans judge their surroundings from their particular contexts, theyare to a large extent undifferentiated from it. In other words, manand world are almost one. The numerous anthropomorphic charac-teristics of ancient theories (Mesopotamian, Greek, Egyptian) are,in that respect, no accidental conceptualizations. Rather, they areexpressions of this undifferentiation. Aristotle, for example, never


distinguishes between functional and intentional acts, seeminglyunaware of such difference (Charles, 1991: 101–128). As has beenpointed out by Mirowski, this undifferentiation also governs theuse of the metaphors of ‘body’, ‘motion’ and ‘value’. Any motionoccurs in correspondence with the body’s movement; with its aspira-tion for the Aristotelian final cause. Motion is thus inextricableconnected with the body. The value of certain good depends on aperson (body), aspiring for this final cause (motion). Body, motionand value are indistinguishable. Similarily, any ancient ‘scientifictheory’ is limited by this world view. Abstract systems, for instance,occupying the characteristics of decimal numbers, do not exist; nordo theories of physics (in a newtonian sense), in which an abstractconcept of ‘force’ would govern motion. Motion, in an anthropo-metric sense, is the specific realization of a body’s unique and essen-tial features, with the ‘impetus’ that affects it possessing its ownspecific characteristics (Mirowski, 1989). In logic, the variables ofthe syllogism cannot be isolated from their particular contexts. Theyfunction as ‘parking places’ (De Pater and Vergauwen, 1992: 97–99). Variables in Euclidian geometry function similarily (Michel,1950: 51). Space is no abstract conception, governed by a universalconvention, but rather an expression of the conrete human percep-tion of the earth, providing it with the same absolute characteristics.The term ‘space’ does not even occur in the works of Euclides andArchimedes that are known to us. Greek mathematics attempts todefine concrete orders, of which the principles are laid bare. Theargumentation constantly appeals to intuition and is to a large extentbased upon drawings of concrete diagrams. Euclide’s analyses startfrom concrete observations, and only later take on an abstractcharacter (for instance he first defines a circle and only later itsperimeter; Michel, 1950: 51–57). In the classification of animals, noabstract concept of ‘species’ occurs, preventing the development ofany evolutional theory (Pellegrin, 1985: 95–115). In economics theabstract concept of ‘value’ remains absent (Soudek, 1952: 45–75;Zimmerman, 1987: 48). . . The incommensurability of the principleof self-determination prevents abstraction in the anthropometricstage.


4. REPRESENTATION AND ART IN THE ANTHROPOMETRICSTAGE

Let us now move to the representational arts in the anthropometricstage. Around the 5th century B.C. a number of evolutions occur,profoundly changing art and its relationship to society. Most text-books on the history of Western art describe these evolutions asleading to the foundations of classical art, defining the classicalpremises for literature, poetry, and theatre, for sculpture, paintingand architecture all within a relatively short period of time. Simul-taneously, a philosophical foundation of representation arises, in theform of aesthetics. Textbooks refer to this period as “an awakening”(Gombrich, 1959: 46), “The Greek miracle” (Gombrich, 1972: 113),as a “revolution” (Kultermann, 1987: 20), as a “profound influ-ence” (Stokstad, 1995: 153), as “the most extraordinary floweringof artistic and intellectual activity the world has ever seen” (Honourand Fleming, 1982: 104), or “one of those rare times in humanhistory when circumstances in one small city produced [. . . ] a stun-ning range of universally acknowledged masterpieces” (Beye, 1987:97). Marylin Stokstad writes:

in the relatively short span from around 900 BC to around 100 BC, Greek artistsexplored a succession of new ideas to produce a body of work in every medium[. . . ] that exhibits clear stylistic and technical progression. (Stokstad,1995: 153)

This ‘sudden progress’ or ‘revolution’ is only rarely explained.Most works suffice to mention some sort of anthropomorphism,or anthropocentrism as its basis. In this respect, Gombrich speaksof a change in mentality (Gombrich, 1972: 114). Other authorssingle out the technical progress and new materials (Stokstad, 1995:153). However, a far more thorough explanation can be provided byemploying the antropometric stage and its Girardian characteristics.

The evolution in the arts shows striking resemblances with that ofGirard’s consideration of the origin of culture in the anthropometricstage. As has been pointed out, the impossibility for an effective‘re-enactment of the hidden premisse’ (founding mimetic violence)led to an order legitimized by the philosophical principles of naturalinequality, hierarchical differentiation and self-determination. Thishierarchical order, obfuscating the representation of the foundingmimetic violence through rites, myths andinterdits also governs


artistic representations. Originally, the arts fulfilled a practicalfunction in the rite (the re-enactment of the origin of culture).Art produced magical objects possessing a ritual function in thisre-enactment, providing it with meaning and structure. With theconsolidation of the hierarchical order, and the subsequent diminish-ment of importance of the rite (the actual re-enactment) and themyth (the representation of the origin of culture), that role becamesuperfluous. Consequently, the arts, like science and philosophy,were re-legitimized in function of the newly consolidated order.Aesthetic formalism became the principle of legitimation for thearts. This formalism has several mutually connected and specificmotives: beauty, dramatization, andmimesis. A specific investi-gation of these motives reveals their functions in re-presenting thefounding violence.

The motive of ‘beauty’ plays a remarkable role. In classical andmodern art history beauty is regarded as a determining character-istic of art. Yet, beauty is not directly connected with the originof art. The actual re-enactment of the origin of culture, in whichart originally functioned, focused on direct experience instead ofrepresentation. It had to be as pure as possible, without any distor-tions. Beauty, with its imminent goal to embellish, played no rolein this re-enactment (Kaptein and Tijmes, 1986). In a sense, thisis still apparent in the works of Homer and Hesiod (8th centuryB.C.). With the evolution of culture, the tools with which its originwas re-enacted obtained an important function. But, the experi-ence of the raw re-enactment became too direct. Therefore thetools were designed to make the re-enacment bearable. Beautyplayed an important role in this, making knives look like jewels,or decorating sacrificial stones as altars. The decoration of there-enactment was the first step towards embellishment. It also intro-duced the emotion of pleasure in the rite, enabling delight in there-enactment for its decorative function instead of for its functionasre-enactment. However, it also led the way for the development offiction. The discovery that even a re-enactment does not re-createbut re-presents, allows for variations in the re-enactment (in factbecoming re-presentations). In the poetical works of Homer andHesiod the difference between what is true (what happened) andwhat is not true (what did not happen) is indistinguishable. It can


be assumed that both Homer and Hesiod wrote about the truth, butthat they ‘disguised’ or, as Ernst Gomrich has it, ‘illustrated’ thistruth (Gombrich, 1972: 99–125). The act of illustration can serveas an accompaniment to truth but can also replace it, in favour ofmere embellishment. The possibilty for fiction, as a derivation fromor variation on truth, is thus created (see further). The evolutionof the concept of beauty in classical Greek art shows a shift from‘accidental beauty’, still emphasizing truth, to ‘essential beauty’,when representation completely replaces truth (when a knife wasno longer regarded as a weapon but as an ornament). From then on,conventions in representation will continue to dominate the appreci-ation of art. By the 6th century B.C., ‘beauty’ has become a centralmotive in the formalization of the arts. This replacement of truth(contents) by formal variation (form) is mirrored in the aesthetics ofPlato and Aristotle.

The motives of dramatization andmimesisare more complex, andrequire elaborate discussions. First we will consider dramatization.Although we argue that a similar evolution occurs in all arts, we willconcentrate here on drama (on Girard’s treatment of tragedy and oncomedy). Within drama, myths and rites occur as motives, especiallyin tragedy: the tragic themes are derived from the myth, the formal-ism is derived from the rite. In Girard’s discussion of tragedy, theconnection with myth and rite prevails. In comedy, the connectionwith the rite is more direct. Eventually,mimesisbecomes the pivotalcentral motive by which artistic anthropometric representation islegitimized. Because of its importance, our consideration ofmimesiswill also include examples from the visual arts and architecture.

5. DRAMATIZATION AS MOTIVE: TRAGEDY AND COMEDY

In La violence et le sacré, Girard exhaustively discusses the origin ofdramatization, concentrating exclusively on tragedy (Girard, 1972:102–129). According to Girard, this basic form of literature isderived from rites and myths. When rite and myth no longer func-tion as explanations or re-enactments of the origin of culture, thisrole is adopted by drama (Kaptein and Tijmes, 1986). Such aninterpretation is not new, as far as the rite is concerned: severalauthors have mentioned it. The works of Gilbert Murray, James


George Frazer, Francis Cornford and Mary Douglas all contain thisreasoning (Murray, 1912a; Murray, 1912b; Frazer, 1978; Cornford,1961; Douglas, 1966). Cornford, following Frazer, considers therite of fertility, with the departure of the dead, the conflict betweensummer and winter, the recognition of the old and young monarch,and death as its main characteristics. Implicitly, Cornford thus pointsout the scapegoat-mechanism as foundation of drama (Cornford,1961). Frazer even makes explicit mention of the scapegoat, butdoes not place it in an artistic context. Furthermore, his view onthe scapegoat is constantly determined by its connection with therite of fertility (Frazer, 1978: 177–184). Douglas also mentions itsexistence, and even links it to the symmetrical dissolution of differ-ences, but fails to associate it with the process of mimetic desire(Douglas, 1966). Moreover, Douglas also questions the suitability ofliterary works for the interpretation of culture. In her eyes, literarycriticism can enlighten the understanding of myths, but can go nofurther (Douglas, 1975: 153–172). For Girard, such explanationsare inadequate. InLa violence et le sacréhe fulminates againstthem. Literary criticism and ethnology, according to Girard, do notacknowledge the bond between tragedy and myth:

la tragédie fournit une voie d’accès priviligiée aux grand problèmes del’ethnologie religieuse [. . . ]. Les scientifiques sont d’autant plus enclins à voirdans l’oeuvre littéraire une “mauvaise fréquentation” que leur volonté de rigueurdemeure plus théorique. Les hellénistes sont toujours prompts à crier au blas-phème dès qu’on suggère le moindre point de contact. (Girard, 1972: 85)

and further on:

La critique littéraire ne s’intéresse qu’a la tragédie; le mythe demeure, pour elle,un donné imprescriptible auquel il n’est pas question de toucher. La science desmythes, par contre, laisse la tragédie de côté; elle se croit même tenue d’afficherà son égard une certaine méfiance. (Girard, 1972: 109)

Girard also criticizes the reduction of the contents of the tragedyto the rite. He calls it a misunderstanding of the importance of thepharmakos, the Greek version of the scapegoat. The key concepts ofthe scapegoat and mimetic desire are eliminated in such a discourse.However, there is nothing, writes Girard

dans la nature, qui puisse dicter ou même suggérer un type d’immolation rituelleaussi atroce que celui du pharmakos. (Girard, 1972: 139)


Ignoring the magnitude of mimetic desire is therefore a mistake.And Girard goes even further in his criticism:

Voir dans la tragédie une reprise et une adaption de rites saisonniers, une espècede sacre du printemps, c’est de toute évidence l’amputer de tout ce qui fait d’ellela tragédie. (Girard, 1972: 139, his italics)

In his analysis of dramatization, Girard provides support for theconnection between tragedy and myth. He analyzesOedipus RexbySophocles (430–401 B.C.) as a case in point (Girard, 1972: 102–129; Kaptein and Tijmes, 1986: 74). In short, Girard’s argumenta-tion amounts to this: in Sophocles’ tragedy the same mechanismsare at work as the ones that determined the institutionalization ofthe expulsion of the scapegoat, albeit not so direct. The tragedyplays a subversive role in displaying the content of the myth byexpressing ultimate, mutual violence. Such expressions lead to ablurring of differences, to an indifference between Oedipus andothers. But, since all violence is ascribed to Oedipus, it also createsa new difference: that of his monstrosity. This is the foundation fora treatment of Oedipus as scapegoat. The position of Oedipus asscapegoat explains his actions throughout the tragedy (Girard, 1972:110–129).

Girard fails to see yet another connection between myth andtragedy: that of a formal accordance. As the hierarchical order inwhich the scapegoat manages to delay his sacrification becomesinstitutionalized, the rite (as re-enactment of the origin of culture)becomes superfluous. Its meaning, captured in the formal arrange-ments of the re-enactment is passed on to the myth. Historically,rite and myth occur in the same period, and there is no evidencefor the one preceding the other. But logically the rite precedes themyth. The myth clearly represents this violence from the point-of-view of the perpetrators (the executioners of the scapegoat). Thispoint-of-view already presupposes a certain opinion on it, a certaindifferentiation. The rite, on the other hand, expresses no such point-of-view. In the formal structure of the re-enactment of mimeticdesire and its violent consequences, the opinionof it is absent. Whenthe myth logically succeeds the rite, this aspect of the rite is alsopassed on to the myth, albeit distorted (conforming the functionof the myth). The evolution from myth to tragedy, which Girardanalyzes, contains a further distortion, coinciding with the further


institutionalization of the hierarchical order. Nevertheless, tragedy,as an heir to the myth, also adopts the formal characteristics of therite. Girard seems to realize this when he discusses the symmetricalindifferentialities in the tragedy. His analysis ofOedipus Rexrefersto this process, but he does not explicitly point it out. His attempt tolink the formal elements of the rite to the tragedy (through the myth)without resorting torites saisonniersis elaborate but confusing(Girard, 1972: 105–106). Yet the explanation is simple. The subtletyof the tragedy lies in its regulation of a violent, mimetic conflictbetween equal individuals (subject and model). During this battlethe differences between subject and model are temporarily erased.Whenever the differences between the characters are stressed, aswhen Teiresias enters the stage, the chorus interrupts the action toexplain his role (Girard, 1972: 105–106; Sophocles, 1947: v281–406). It is easy to interpret these interventions as breaks in thedevelopment of the plot, delaying the ultimate blurring of differ-ences or the exposition of the scapegoat. But their function ascomments on and interpretations of the dialogue is more relevant.The numerous platitudes and generalizations of the chorus put thebattle in perspective. Moreover, they also regulate the communica-tion of the content, reminding the public of interests and intentionsof the characters. As such, the chorus serves as the projection orrepresentation of a presupposed public on the content of the play.Thus, the chorus ‘watches over’ the characters’ actions, preservingthe symmetrical structure of the battle and commenting upon severalactions, explaining them or putting them into perspective. Theformal aspects of symmetry (in verse) and choral intervention regu-late the battle. Exactly the aspect of symmetry was, in slightlyother forms, essential to the rite. Throughout the actual re-enactmentof the origin of culture (also a battle between equals ending inthe expulsion of one scapegoat) it gave meaning to it, making there-enactment with its sacrifices bearable for the public. The aspect ofthe chorus is derived from the myth. It explictly points to the point-of-view of the perpetrators. As regulated formal characteristics, asmotives, they both fulfil the same role in tragedy: they make thedramatization of the origin of culture bearable (Beye, 1987: 134).

The function of formal motives in tragedy is remarkable whenwe compare it with comedy. Comedy also functions as a represen-


tation of culture, in a similar way as tragedy. But the reaction tothe comedy is laughter, to the tragedy it are tears. Accordingly, bothforms of dramatization address the scapegoat-mechanism in anotherway. The main differences occur in the characters and in their effecton the judgement of the audience. The tragedy portrays life-like,complex characters for whom the story leads towards their death (atleast for one of them). Because of their complex characteristics theyare distinguishable from ‘other people’ (the public, us), and becauseof their otherness they are sacrificed (they die at the end). In comedy,the characters are far more flat, less sophisticated, but more likelyto identify with. In tragedy the selfconscious human being is themain character (a monarch or authority), in comedy it is an indis-tinguishable type. In tragedy, the scapegoat is pre-determined (thedistinguishable character), in comedy it can be anyone (the indis-tinguishable type). For these reasons, Girard regards the comedy asmore reminiscent of the arbitrariness of the scapegoat-mechanism,reminding us that in fact anyone can be scapegoated; because itaddresses everyone and puts everyone in the same indistinguish-able position, the comedy is more insolent than the tragedy. Severalplays exemplify this. In the comedies of Aristophanes, the mainexponent of the ‘old comedies’, the sarcastic tone and the mercilessdepiction of the era are omnipresent.Frogs (405 B.C.) andClouds(423 B.C.) depict contemporary actions, filled with comtemporarydetails (making it not always possible to interpret), absurd situationsand obscenities in word and image, closely related to the reli-gious celebrations of Dionysos. As in the tragedies, these comediesstage symmetrically structured battles between equal individuals;the battle between Aeschylos and Euripides inFrogs, and betweenthe Right and Wrong Logic inClouds. In Clouds, the battle betweenStrepsiades and Pheidippides, between father and son is fought ona basis of indistinguishable equality. Both characters have gonethrough the same education (Socrates’ school) before they engage intheir duel. In comedy, the result of the battle is less predetermined,because of the inability to distinguish between the antagonists.Whereas the characteristics of Oedipus practically determine hisfaith, this is not so for neither Strepsiades nor Pheidippides. Theresult of their battle seems more arbitrary. Apparently, the audienceregarded this arbitrariness as evident, and pleasurable. The subtlety


of the tragedy, veiling the scapegoat-mechanism through formaldevices, is striking. Cornford even makes mention of an abstractconception of plot (Cornford, 1961: 184). The pre-determination ofthe character’s faith is incorporated in the “know yourself” or “knowyou’re no god” of Aeschylos’Persae, the oldest surviving tragedy(Aeschylos, 1971). In this tragedy, Darius explicitly states that thedevelopment of the story is determinated but conceiled (Aeschylos,1971: v739–744). For the audience, this confession makes thedramatization of the story bearable: they know now that not theybut one of the characters, preferrably a distinguishable monarch orcommander, will be pointed out as guilty and will be sacrificed. Thechorus will function as their guide, preventing them from identifyingwith these characters, while at the same time respecting them fortheir sacrifice. This proces is celebrated in the culmination of powerin the character of the monarch or authority. In the tragedies ofEuripides,Phoenician Women, HecubaandTrojan Womenthe samedetermining devices are also present (Euripides, 1986, 1988, 1991).The dominance of formalism is even greater here, the disguise ofthe scapegoat-mechanism even more thorough. It led Aristophanesto criticizing Euripides inFrogs, in which he reproaches him witha decay of moral principles (!). Moreover, Aristophanes blamesEuripides for holding up a mirror to his audience.

In comedy as well as in tragedy it is remarkable to noticea continuing submission of content to formal structure. Throughthis submission the elements of the scapegoat-mechanism and there-enactment of the origin of culture are obfuscated. At the sametime, the formalization of these key concepts does not prevent themfrom appearing in almost every artform. In drama, symmetry inverse and choral interventions function as essential parts of thedramatization of the origin of culture. They also provide an expla-nation for a logical evolution from rite over myth to tragedy andcomedy. As such, they reflect the ongoing changes in the repre-sentation of reality. In both comedy and tragedy, the characters aresubmitted to formal pre-determination, albeit to different extents.In short, the motive of dramatization provides us with the linkbetween the explanation of a culture’s premises and its abilityto formally institutionalize these premises without abandoning orcontradicting them. However, one essential element of this process


remains unexplained: the reason for formalization to acquire aprominent role in the representation of culture. How is it possiblethat formalization, enabling fiction and disguising truth, does notresult in an unbridgable gap between what is represented and what isrepresentation? How can the origin of culture still be recognized informal representations? To answer this we must direct our attentionto another motive:mimesis.

6. MIMESISAS A FUNDAMENTAL MOTIVE

Mimesisalmost seems a ‘magic word’. It is constantly referredto whenever the issue of distinguishing between ‘real’ (or ‘true’)and ‘fiction’ (or ‘false’) arises. Particularily with regard to art, theterm is widely used to explain and discuss evolutions, processesand means of representation. In his edition of Aristotle’sPoetics,D.W. Lucas devotes an entire essay to the meaning of the word(Lucas, 1972: 258–272). In its most literary, stock translation, theword mimesismeans ‘imitation’. Yet, the first instinct accompaniedwith that meaning is to reassure that the word is not ‘mere copying’.As Lucas observes, copying is a promiment feature ofmimesis, butfar from the only one. Even among the ancient Greeks, there wereseveral uses for the word, leading to confusion surrounding its useand meaning. According to Lucas, this confusion:

is due not so much to the associations of this word as to the absence of any otherwhich can express the idea of imaginative creation (. . . ). To translate it we usein different contexts ‘imitate’, ‘represent’, ‘indicate’, ‘suggest’, ‘express’. All ofthese can be referred to the single notion of doing something which resemblessomething else. (Lucas, 1972: 258–259)

It was not until Aristotle’s use of the term in hisPoetics, thata straighforward application of the term became common (seefurther). And it was no sooner than the middle-ages thatmimesisbecame a well-defined concept. Today, the seemingly differentexplanations ofmimesisall point in the same direction. Apart fromthe literal translation as ‘imitation’, it is most often referred to as‘representation’. This term incorporates the most obvious functionsof mimesis. It refers to its imitative aspect, as well as its reproductiveand creative characteristics. Its recurrent use also emphasizes its


importance throughout history, eventually enabling an a-historicaldiscourse. A fine example for this incorporation and importance intoan a-historical treatment is provided by Kendall Walton’s compar-ison of mimesisto children’s use of make-believe. Walton focuseson the meaning ofmimesisin representational arts. But his researchgoes beyond that limits. His conclusion that the act and discourse ofrepresentation is one of the most essential in daily life, emphasizesthe importance ofmimesisin language and action (Walton, 1990).Another similar example is Nelson Goodman’s discussion of repre-sentation as “classifying objects and actions rather than of imitatingthem, of characterizing rather than of copying” (Goodman, 1969:31). Goodman discusses representation as ‘denotation’, ‘imitation’,and as ‘depiction’ to show its importance in what he calls “themaking of the world” (Goodman, 1969: 6). However, these worksdo not succeed in providing an answer towhy and how mimesisobtained such an important and central role. For that, we need ahistorical re-consideration.

The basis for the importance ofmimesisas a concept lies in theorigin of art as mimetic. Gombrich refers to this origin as a shiftin the pictorial representation of reality.Mimesiscame to functionas an artistic tool to make art look like reality. An understanding ofthis shift is facilitated when the meaning of the term is interpretedas ‘depiction’. According to Jos Mertens mimetic art is depicting“cultural realities” (Mertens, 1984: 84).Mimesisis the proces ofdepicting cultural realities, those things that are real according toa certain point of view. This point of view is provided by thecultural order. Mertens prefers the term ‘depiction’ over ‘imitation’or ‘representation’. It emphasizes the act of showing somethingof reality through formal imitation, and it also implies an altera-tion of the piece of reality it is re-presenting; mimetic depictionencompasses the act of showing an imitative alteration of reality,according to the standards of a given cultural order. The depiction ofcultural realities throughmimesishas as a central characteristic thatit assumes to beaboutreality, by re-presenting it. A mimetic workof art is regarded as realistic. It literally states: “thisis that” (Nagy,1989: 47). Evidently, a work of art can never be what it re-presents;it is a depiction of a piece of reality, and not that piece of realityas such (Mertens, 1984: 86). Of course, not many people actually


believe that a representation of realityis that reality. Even the ancientGreeks could tell the difference between an object or an event,and its depiction. They realized that they were not ‘presenting’ or‘re-presenting’ reality, but imitating it through a depiction.

But there is more. The possibility for confusion between thedepiction, and the reality it depicts is part of the ongoing obfus-cation of the origin of culture (founding mimetic violence andthe scapegoat-mechanism). It has been mentioned above that thisorigin should remain unconscious if any subsequent cultural orders(like the hierarchical order of the anthropometric stage) are to besuccesful.Mimesis, depicting reality, without presenting it, providedthe possibility to move from a causal link between depicting andreality (like in the re-enactments of the rite) to an incidental link. Ifthe connection between depiction and depicted could be regardedas incidental, there would remain no reason to regard the depic-tion as real as the depicted. It enabled a way of depicting reality,without having to resort to direct links with its meaning. Whetherone refers to mimetic art as ‘depicting’, ‘imitating’, or ‘representing’reality was then no longer relevant. In Girard’s terms, mimeticart thus disguises the reference to the founding mimetic violenceand the scapegoat-mechanism as a reference to a contemporarycultural order, by both remembering it and regulating it (keeping itsremembrance in accordance with the changing cultural order, thuslegitimizing that order).Viewed as such, the entire story of anthro-pometric art becomes the story of the introduction ofmimesisas amotive in that regulation. We should, at this point, avoid any confu-sion between the different usages of the termmimesis. Initially,Girard seems to use the term in another context, that of a strugglefor possession and status. However, Girard’s argumentation on theregulation of the violent origin of culture corresponds to that ofthe classical interpretation ofmimesis. His consideration of tragedyshows this. Most of the time, Girard uses the termmimesisin itsadjective form, to refer to the violence between model and subject.The regulation of the mimetic struggle results in the foundation ofhuman culture. This is remembered in rite and myth, and finallyin art, through tragedy and comedy. Girard explicitly linksmimesiswith the function of art (in his case the tragedy) in representing thescapegoat-mechanism and the origin of culture. The only way in


which tragedy can continue to fulfil this function is through a formalmimetic representation. As has been mentioned above, the elementsfor such a formalization are offered by the tragedy’s connectionwith the rite, especially through symmetry. Roel Kaptein and PieterTijmes aptly paraphrase Girard’s argumentation. They write:

If we were to describe the art of tragedy in one sentence, then we would emphasizethe contrast of symmetrical elements. The all-encompassing symmetry of thetragical dispute and dialogue is formally arranged in the way the two main char-acters reply to each other through verse. (Kaptein and Tijmes, 1986: 70–71; ourtranslation)

The symmetrical structure of the dialogue displays the non-differentiality of the mimetic struggle, pointing out the randomnesswith which scapegoats are selected. The relation between rite andtragedy, providing the latter with the formal possibilities to mimet-ically represent the origin of culture, thus leads to the introductionof mimesisas a motive in tragedy (Nagy, 1989: 47).

A look at the evolution of the visual arts and architectureprovides further arguments. In asking the question why for instanceBabylonian or Egyptian art did not reach the same level of artistryas the Greek, Gombrich discusses the motivations of the artistsfor pictorial representation. According to Gombrich, Egyptian orBabylonian artists were not interested inmimesis. Apart from thefact that they did not possess the same materials or insights, theseartists did not have the intention or the mentality to strive formimetic representation. They failed to see the incidental connectionbetween reality and its representation. Egyptian artists have alwayshad a great attention for details as far as animal depictions areconcerned, yet they failed to represent people in the same accurateway, depicting them almost as caricatures, and making mistakes inthe representation of even some of the most obvious proportions.The reason is simple: these artists still made a causal connectionbetween a depiction and the depicted. Therefore, the result of thedepiction of a person (of anything possessing a status) was to beidentical to the original; it had tobe that original (to posses thesame status). Therefore it had to possess the most characteristicfeatures of that person. This is why the head, the torso, the legs,the arms were portrayed from the side that characterized them most,explaining the unnatural hinge points between the several limbs.


To put it bluntly: the Egyptian Sphinx is no depiction of a god,it is a god itself. And after he took over the throne, Nefertite’sson had all portrayals of his mother removed to destroy her as aperson. The Greek artists, however, learned to view the connectionbetween depiction and depicted as incidental, as governed by rules.For the Greeks, a portrait is a depiction, an artistic reproduction of aperson which can in no way represent that person, let alonebe thatperson. It is a mere depiction of a person through what Mertens hascalled the “illustrative, observational moment” (Mertens, 1984: 85;see further). When this change in mentality came through, aroundthe 6th and 5th century B.C., it led to an accelerated evolutiontowards the perfect depiction of humans (Gombrich, 1972: 125).When Gombrich compares two versions ofThe Judgment of Paris(one from 600 B.C., another from 480 B.C.), or two Apollo-statues(Apollo of Teneafrom 600 B.C., andApollo of Piombinofrom 500B.C.) the speed with which this perfection in depiction occurred,becomes clear (Gombrich, 1972: 100, 110). Such perfection isessentail in the shift from “re-enactments” of the origin of cultureto “re-presentations” of it. In his classic work on aesthetics, G.W.F.Hegel observes a similar evolution in architecture. The introductionof mimesisis essential in this evolution. Hegel first distinguishes anorganic architecture, of which the explicit objective is both utility(as a house) and worship (as an object). This function is similarto the re-enactment of the rite, in which no clear difference betweenobjects and their representations exists. Second, Hegel distinguishesa symbolic architecture (or anorganic sculpture), of which themeaning lies not in another objective, but in the architecture itself.Such architecture is no longer serving goals, but contains “worksthat are erected in the name of the unity of a nation or a people”, assymbolic examples of a cultural order. Their function is similar tothat of the myth (symbolizing the cultural order). The Greeks are thefirst to break with the geometrical rectilinearity of this architecture,replacing it with what Hegel calls a “anthropomorphic” tendency.So, even in architecture, man uses himself as measure. Influencedby the principle of ‘natural inequality’, the differentiation of themembers of the community enables them to distinguish themselvesfrom each other, leading to different buildings, yet all based onmankind. This tendency enables the transition from symbolic to


classical architecture.Mimesisbecomes the guiding motive of thecultural order that uses this architecture (Hegel, 1989: 266–329;Gelernter, 1995: 36–68).

Finally, mimesis legitimizes even fiction, what Philostratuswould call phantasia, or imaginative creation (Lucas, 1972: 258).Gombrich uses the term ‘illustration’ to demonstrate this. Accordingto him, the illustration is the perfect example of the way inwhich fiction is introduced as a means of representation. Origin-ally, illustrations were the visual accompaniments of stories, visu-ally depicting scenes or actions from those stories and graduallybecoming comments upon them. In either case, the connectionbetween story and illustration was one of direct resemblance, orimitation through another medium. However, in the illustration theartist can also allow himself some freedom of representation, aslong as the direct link with the story remains evident. Eventually, itbecame clear that many illustrations used stories only as vehicles, asarguments for their own definition. This is when, Gombrich argues,fiction was born. Gombrich not only sees this evolution in the visualarts, but in literature and drama as well, by interpreting the formaldistortions in for instance Homer’sOddyseyor Aeschylos’Persaeas fiction. For Gombrich, fiction is the distortion throughmimesisof original stories. It is the main reason why the ‘how’ of a repre-sentation came to replace the ‘what’ (Gombrich, 1972: 108–111).In our discussion of dramatization we have also argued for sucha consideration, linking it to the institutionalization of the repre-sentation of the origin of culture and the scapegoat-mechanism.D.A. Russell also explicitly refers tomimesisin the literary andperformative arts. When the connection between the depicted andthe depiction (between the represented and the representation) isfounded onmimesis, the artist or depictor can also create depic-tions (or representations) that refer not to reality but to his/herown frame of reference. This ‘own frame of reference’ contains thepossibility to use not an original story as source, but other stories oralready distorted depictions, such as images or his/her or someoneelse’s ‘imaginations’. The result is a depiction or representation inwhich only an “accidental connection with the main sense of theword” still occurs (Russell, 1981: 112). In drama this means thatnot only the characters that have a connection to reality (historical


characters) appear in plays, but that new characters can be created.Greek drama frequently uses this possibility. Even in Aeschylos’Persae(the oldest surviving tragedy) we already find a messengerbesides the main historical characters. And every tragedy contains,of course, the chorus, to which we have extensively referred in ouranalysis of dramatization. These fictional characterscan be inter-preted as mere embellishment, or as mere plot-devices (speeding upthe development of the plot), but, as we have argued, they also playan important role in the obfuscation of the scapegoat-mechanismand its adherent elements. Moreover, in theirmimeticform they alsorefer to reality itself, providing the audience with comments uponthat reality. A similar and even more obvious function is found isthe visual mimetic depiction of fiction, most notably in pictograms.In this context, Gombrich refers to the well-knownBusiris vase.This specific case of a pictogram provides a look on the evolu-tion of mimetic representation at different instances. TheBusirisvase displays the adventures of Herakles among the Egyptians. Thefigures on the vase clearly resemble ancient Egyptian pictograms,representing the characters in a narrative way (not everything onthe vase happens at the same time). As such these characters arenot ‘snapshots of reality’, no longer anonymous symbols. Instead,they refer to concrete human beings, to fictional characters, slain byHerakles (Gombrich, 1972: 115–116). The appearance of the minorcharacters is a perfect example of visual fictional representation.With the introduction of mimetic fiction in art, the possibility offiction becoming ‘real’ also arises. The motive ofmimesisenablesthe diguise of fictional elements as ‘realistic’. ‘Realistic’ in thissense means: conforming the present, hierarchical order (also seeGoodman, 1969: 6–7, 34–40).

Did Greek art, then, become a mere collection of mimetical‘snapshots’, of historical and contemporary ‘realisms’, true as wellas fictional? It did not. The depiction of a historical figure throughmimetic art, contained a reference to its original, and could henceproduce a corresponding emotion (recognition, happiness, fear,respect,. . . ). The same goes for fictional representations, albeitthat their referent never exists. Art can thus become a pretensionfor marvelling or contemplation, rather than a search for truth.This is exactly the reason why Plato disliked his contemporary


art. For Plato, the arts (and the visual arts in particular, withtheir convincingly realistic mimetic depiction of fiction) shouldbe banned from his ideal state for succeeding to blur the distinc-tion between truth and fake. In the eyes of Plato, visual art was a“man-made dream produced for those who are awake” (quoted inGombrich, 1972: 7). Plato’s view on art is not exceptional, sinceit is routed in a particular kind of reasoning in aesthetics. Beforeturning to aesthetics, however, it is time to recapitulate. What is therelation betweenmimesisand the mimetic desire-annex-scapegoat-mechanism? When the scapegoat succeeds in delaying his sacrificehe transforms his guilt into actual power. This transformation iscelebrated in the rite (through a re-enactment of the sacrifice) andin the myth (through a re-presentation from the executioner’s pointof view). Both rite and myth, together with a set of prohibitions,constitute a hierarchical order. Natural inequality and hierarchicaldifferentiation form its sociological and intellectual foundations. Inart, this order is exemplified through a formalization of the elementsof rite and myth. From the rite, art derives its interest in symmetryand structural comment. From the myth, art derives its content. Thiscontent is represented mimetically, through a proces of imitationand illustration. Mimetic representation also enables fiction, thusshifting the emphasis in art fromwhatto how. This effect also leadsto the origin of a philosophy of art, to aesthetics.

7. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTHROPOMETRIC AESTHETICS

Two legends on the role of the artist span the anthropometric stage.By contrasting them, an accurate image develops of how art andits intellectual discussion evolved within this stage. The first legendis presented by Homer in the 8th century B.C. It concerns thepivotal and mythical figure of Daidalos. He is credited with theorigin of Greek art and the first intellectual approach to art (Homer,1994; Kultermann, 1987: 18; Morris, 1992: 9–16). Daidalos was theinspirer of Hephaistos, the manufacturer of the shield of Achilles.Hephaistos, himself a god, owes his skills as a blacksmith to the factthat he producesdaidala, crafty/artistic objects (Morris, 1992: 13).The emphasis in this story is on the practical aspects of Hephaistos’craft. The function of Daidalos is no more than that of an inspirer.


A second, and more recent legend on the origin of art, that ofPygmalion, is of a completely other magnitude. It is presented byOvidius, in hisMetamorphoses. Pygmalion produces a female statueout of stone, and is so moved by the resulting image, that he falls inlove with it. He becomes so entranced by the statue that he is nolonger able to make the difference between the image of the womanin the statue and the image of the woman as such. Eventually, thegoddess Venus fulfils his wish and she transforms the statue-imageinto a real woman (Ovidius, 1971). In his analysis of classical arttheory, Udo Kultermann considers this legend to be the metaphoricalbasis of any intellectual treatment of art (Kultermann, 1987: 2–3).Gombrich also mentions the legend of Pygmalion to stress its impor-tance in the intellectual approach to art. It shows that any intellectualconsideration of art should encompass more than just imitation ofnature and the practical use of crafty tools, but also “the secret hopesand fears that accompany the act of creation” (Gombrich, 1972: 80,93–94).

What do both legends represent? When they are compared, theyshow a fundamental shift in the thinking on art. Even more: theyexemplify the essential roles beauty, dramatization andmimesiscame to play in this stage. With their introduction and theirconsequences the creative and perceptive roles of both artist andperceiver of art are also foregrounded. In other words, in the periodbetween Homer and Ovidius, the aspects of beauty, dramatizationandmimesishave enabled art to comment upon the world througha formalization of its foundations. It is interesting to see howancient thinkers and philosophers have struggled with this evolu-tion. For the pre-socratic philosopers art is limited to craftsmanship(technè), imitating or copying reality. According to Lucas, the taskof this craftsman was “to reproduce phenomena in words or colours”(Lucas, 1972: 259). The pre-socratic philosophers do not considerart to have creative and/or pleasurable causes or effects. Kultermannpoints out that before the 6th century B.C. the Greeks did not havea word for art in its theoretical meaning, and that the concept of“creative originality” was unknown to them (Kultermann, 1987: 19).As a result, they were unable to develop any aesthetic thought, nosystematic and critical reflection on art. However, in the 5th centuryB.C. the situation changes. It is the period in which the motives


of beauty, dramatization andmimesisoriginated. With an artisticpractice employing these motives, the necessity arose for theirtheoretical consideration, according to the principles of the hierach-ical order. The objective of the first aesthetes was twofold: one theone hand trying to show that art still functioned as a representationof the origin of culture (in other words: trying to preserve the ritualfunction of art), and on the other hand trying to structuralize thepossibilities for variation and fiction.

The oldest remaining attempts to deal with mimetic art wererather conservative: the new possibilities of art create mistrust andconfusion, so the old explanations are (still) emphasized. This posi-tion towards art is especially visible in the work of Plato. Plato hasnot considered art exclusively, nor has he treated it separately fromhis other concerns. Yet he frequently discusses it, for instance inthe construction of his ‘world system’ and the ‘ideal state’. As aresult, most of Plato’s remarks on art are found in his so-calledpolitical works, like thePoliteia (“The Republic”) and theNomoi(“Laws”). In these texts, Plato mentions the imitative elements inpoetry and music (Politeia, 392–402), the development of a theoryof poetry and the famous comparison between a carpenter, a painterand the work of God (Politeia, 595–608), education in connectionwith the criterium of art (Nomoi, 653–660), the degeneration ofmusic (Nomoi, 700–701), the danger of musical innovation (Nomoi,796–804), and the choice between music and poetry for educationalpurposes (Nomoi, 810–813) (Plato, 1875: vol. 3, 193–519; vol.5, 193–543). The different artistic issues Plato deals with alreadysuggest his mistrust in any consideration of art solely on the basisof its own merits. Only in relation to education Plato seems tovalue art. It is no surprise, then, that Plato’s aesthetics does notregard the evolution towards mimetic, anthropometrical art (withits introduction of fiction) as very useful. In his philosophy on art,Plato attempts to incorporate beauty,mimesisand truth in a coherentsystem: that of his philosophy of ideas. According to Plato, thecentral element in art is its attempt to imitate or copy nature. Inthat respect, art is not considered very relevant since the subjects artimitates or copies are, in themselves, already imitations or copiesof the world of ideas. This world is in a constant situation of suchperfect harmony that nothing can be substracted from it nor added to


it. Plato also emphasizes this point in his dialogueTimaeus, in whichhe tells the story of two models and the maker (Plato, 1875: vol. 3:601–676). Because of their inability to ‘reflect’ the world of ideas,art works can hardly contain any truth; they do not produce ideas,nor do they produce adequate material reflections of it. Beauty, inthe sense of variations meant to embellish or please the mind, isan even futher distanciation from the truth. Plato’s emphasis on thecontent of art (representing the truth) also leads him to consider anyformalization of art works as dangerous. In the world of ideas, allthings are definite, perfect and invariable. As we have argued above,the introduction of beauty, dramatization andmimesisimplied theintroduction of variations. These are unacceptable in Plato’s philos-ophy, and he refers to them as ‘trickery’. Fiction is the most extremeexample of trickery, since it introduces elements that refer to nothingtrue. In general, Plato disapproves of all art that attempts to obfus-cate the truth. Therefore, only Homer’s works, in which almostno distortion of the reality-report occurs, are approved of. It isremarkable to see the similarities between Plato’s discourse and theevolution Girard describes. With the introduction of mimetic art,the origin of culture is further obfuscated. The truth about ourselves(mimetic conflict, scapegoating) becomes hidden under formalistconventions. As a philosopher, Plato tries to unearth the originalmeaning of life. Any concept blocking the understanding of thatmeaning is hence disapproved of (Pochat, 1986: 41–45). Gombrichalso links Plato’s denounciation of mimetic art with this discourse:

The very violence with which Plato denounces this trickery reminds us of themomentous fact that at the time he wrote, mimesis was a recent invention.(Gombrich, 1972: 99)

There are, however, several instances in which contemporaryart can be approved of by Plato. They concern his remarks onthe insipration of the artist and his objectives. These remarks alsoprovide a better understanding of Plato’s aversion of fiction. Theremarks are fromIon (533–536) andGorgias (501–505) (Plato,1875: vol. 1: 246–250; vol. 2: 380–385). In these passages Platomentions the pleasing function of beauty, seeking no truth butmerely trying for delight. We have already referred to this as theobfuscation of the difference between truth and beauty. Accordingto Plato (speaking through his favourite character Socrates), such


an obfuscation can only be legitimized when the poet is “out of hissenses, and the mind is no longer in him” (Plato, 1875: vol. 1, 248).Plato here refers to a state of divine inspiration, in which he situatesHomer when he wrote. Plato also writes:

For in this way the God would seem to indicate to us and not allow us to doubtthat these beautiful poems are not human, or the work of man, but divine and thework of God; and that the poets are only the interpreters of the Gods by whomthey are severally possessed. (Plato, 1875: vol. 1, 248)

A similar remark can also be found in the dialoguePhaedrus:

there is a madness which is the special gift of heaven, and the source of thechiefest blessings among men. (Plato, 1875: vol. 2, 121)

Only when he’s under such an inspiration, the poet can make thetruth visible through art. This divine inspiration, occurring throughthe medium of the muse, also disconnects the artists from theireducation: when under inspiration they do not work according tothe rules of art. The education in art contained a classification of thearts, implying the choice of the artist for his own formalism. Whenunder divine inspiration, the arts in general are addressed, and thechoice of one form is not by the artist, but by the inspiring medium(God, or the muse). When artists are under divine inspiration it doesnot matter whether they express themselves through music, painting,poetry, epic verse of hymns of praise for “not by art does the poetsing, but by power divine” (Plato, 1875: vol. 1, 248). In Plato’sview, the artist does not make art, by choosing a formalism for hiscontent, but by putting forward the divine content itself. In inspiredart, formalisms cannot stand in the way of the truth. On the otherhand, when the artist is not out of his senses, and thus able to choosehis own methods and formalisms, he distorts the divine truth. Platoelaborates on his opinion on art inGorgias, when he allows Socratesand Callicles to discuss the higher and lower arts (Plato, 1875:vol. 2, 380–385). In this paragraph, the arts which only considerpleasure, which do not address the goal of artistic representation (thetruth), and do not consider the difference between good and bad arelabelled as flattery (Plato, 1875: 380). Socrates and Callicles thusclassify a wide range of arts (including music, poetry, tragedy) asflattery, since they are meant to please. Even without considering theformalisms or the medium in which the content of art is reproduced,


these distinctions (address of the truth, difference between good andbad) stand as evaluations of art, as is evident from Plato’s discussionof rhetorics. However, Plato does make an exception for the artist,who, like the true rhetoric, only pronounces what is good, who:

disposes all things in order, and compels the one part to harmonize and accordwith the other part, until he has constructed a regular and systematic whole (Plato,1875: vol. 2, 383)

Although he does not explicitly mention it, it is clear that art whichcomplies to the difference between good and bad, and addresses thetruth is not flatterous.

It is easy to think of Plato’s discourse as outdated, even whenit was written. But, on the basis of the considerations made, hisview on art should be qualified. First of all, Plato was in fact oneof the first to consider his contemporary art from the viewpoint ofthe hierarchical, cultural order. He attributes the power of art to asemi-abstract force (a God), which assimilates truthand form, thelatter being subjected to the former. The function of art then is toenlighten people through the mediation of truth. However, Platodoes not go all the way with this: he refuses to regard the possi-bilities of mediation and representation as leading to fiction. Platois not against art when this art is the result of divine inspiration,directly equipping the artist with a sense for truthfulness, and whenthis inspiration leads to a well-ordered and harmonic product, inwhich this truth is prominently visible. As such, it is clear that Platois concerned for the morality of art. It is remarkable then that Platouses no criterium of reality by which this morality can be judged. Apossible explanation is provided by the fact that Plato’s condemna-tion of art on the basis of moral depravity or repulsion is specificallypresent in his later works, not in his earlier ones. At this stage, Platowas not interested in art as ‘correct’ representation, but only in theway art fitted in his moral concept of ideas (Mertens, 1981: 642–698; Beardsley, 1966: 45). Still, the functions of art as Plato sawthem were rarely employed. By the 5th century B.C. art had alreadydisconnected itself from its obligation to represent only the truth ofthe origin of culture. Through the motives of dramatization, beautyand especiallymimesis, art had created the libertry to deal with thistruth in fictional ways. And that was exactly what Plato reproachesart with: the obfuscation of the truth.


According to Lucas, the Greeks have always struggled with thephilosophical discourse of art until Aristotle arrived (Lucas, 1972:258). In Aristotle’s aesthetics, many of the elements Plato wasconcerned with re-appear. Like Plato, Aristotle does not discussart exclusively. His aesthetics should be seen in the light of hisattempt to construct a general philosophical system. And, similarto Plato, it is the supposed place of art within this system whichleads to its consideration. However, an important shift occurs inAristotle’s discussion of art, especially when compared with Plato’s.This shift mainly occurs in the different ways both philosophersvalue beauty andmimesis. Contrary to Plato, Aristotle does seemable to appreciate art in its depiction of reality, in its function as mererepresentation. That these representations cannot replace the truth-fulness of reality, does not seem to bother him. Aristotle realizesthat the cultural order in which artistic representations are producedhas evolved. Art no longer functions within the framework of riteand myth, as a literal or even symbolical explanation of the originof culture. Instead, it requires a treatment on its own terms, withoutexplicit references to the origin of culture or the cultural order. Themotives of beauty, dramatization andmimesisenable such a treat-ment. This is exactly what Aristotle pleads for. In his aesthetics, heattributes the legitimation of art to its formalisms. A closer look athis aesthetics reveals how this legitimation is achieved. Especiallythe main remarks on the nature and function of art in the first partof Aristotle’s Poeticsillustrate his point of view (Aristotle, 1924).The Poeticsopens with a remark on the nature of the arts and thenecessity of creating possibilities to classify the different forms andkinds of art. Aristotle mentions that the arts are:

viewed as a whole, modes of imitation. But at the same time they differ fromone another in three ways, either by a difference of kind in their means, or bydifferences in the objects, or in the manner of their imitations (Aristotle, 1924:cap. 1–3).

The arts are not determined by their object of reference (in casutheir relation to reality), but by the way in which the referencesto reality areshaped. In elaborating on these differences, Aristotleunderlines that a work of art is not more or less artistic if it containsbetter or worse characters as man himself (Aristotle, 1924: cap.1–3). In the part of thePoetics, devoted to ‘the origin of poetry’,


Aristotle discusses the concept ofmimesis. It is placed at the centreof his entire aesthetical discourse, and he also links it to the culturalorder. To avoid any misunderstandings it is recommended to quoteAristotle extensively here:

It is clear that the general origin of poetry was due to two causes, each of them partof human nature. Imitation is natural to man from childhood, one of his advan-tages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature inthe world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight inworks of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: thoughthe objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realisticrepresentations of them in art, the forms for example of the lowest animals andof dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in a further fact: to be learningsomething is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to therest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight inseeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning – gathering the meaningof things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has not seen the thingbefore, one’s pleasure will not be in the picture as an imitation of it, but will be dueto the execution or colouring or some similar cause. Imitation, then, being naturalto us – as also the sense of harmony and rhythms, the metres being obviouslyspecies of rhythms – it was through their original aptitude, and by a series ofimprovements for the most part gradual on their first efforts, that they createdpoetry out of their improvisations. (Aristotle, 1924: cap. 4)

This paragraph clearly marks the shift between Plato and Aristotle.Whereas Plato still maintained his view of art as the representationof the truthfulness of reality, and only legitimates art which succeedsin establishing this relation, Aristotle putsmimesisat the centre ofhis legitimation of art. The object of reference is not so important forAristotle, for it can even contain “the forms of the lowest animals ordead bodies”. What is important is that the representation is realistic;that it is based on the convention ofmimesis. In his discussion ofAristotle and artisticmimesis, Mertens emphasizes the same point(Mertens, 1981: 642–698, 1984: 83–91). Mertens acknowledges thatAristotle’s conceptualization ofmimesisdiffers from that of Plato.Both Plato and Aristotle discuss mimetic art from a teleologicalpoint, but their discussion of the function of the mimetic work ofart is radically different. Plato still tends to emphasize the imita-tive function ofmimesis, referring to true reality – to the origin ofculture. Aristotle, on the other hand, treatsmimesisas a convention,a motive of form, based on and legitimized by a “cultural reality”(Mertens, 1984: 84). For Aristotle,mimesisrefers to a contemporary


cultural order, which he calls a “natural order” (Aristotle, 1924: cap.4). Hence, it no longer explicitly refers to the origin of culture, butstill implicitly contains this reference. But there is more. Comparedto Plato, Aristotle not only shifts the emphasis in the function ofthe representation of reality, he also puts forward a different goalof the mimetic work of art. Mertens and Lucas underline that, sinceAristotle, artisticmimesisshould be regarded as:

a material representation that is aimed at for its own causes, for its illustrative,observational moment as such (Mertens, 1984: 85; our translation)

Plato would like art to represent truth as complete as possible.Aristotle is satisfied with a representation, a depiction of that truthfrom a characteristic angle. The choice of the angle, and the relationbetween it and the represented, hence becomes incidental: it is basedon the formal motive ofmimesis. The goal of the work of art thenno longer lies in its depiction of truth, but in its depiction throughformal motives, through thetechnè. Ultimately, this goal will leadto the pursuit of effective beauty and drama, trying to appeal tothe perceiver’s emotions. Aristotle goes to great length to legitimizethis appeal. He views two main explanations for the occurence ofemotion when perceiving a mimetic work of art. The first lies in itsrealism. When a depiction resembles the depicted, even in its mostpainful moment, we still delight in the depiction. When we recog-nize the depicted through the depiction we delight in the recognition.The second reason lies in the particular emotion of instruction theperception of the depiction creates. Even when we have not yet seenthe depicted, or cannot imagine it (for instance in the case of fiction)we can still marvel at the harmonious and rhythmical constructionof the depiction. This emotion will please our instructive curiosity,by showing us whatcan be possible (even if, in reality, it isn’t).The literal remembrance of the founding violence through art isreplaced by a substitute emotion. The relation between what is realand how it is re-enacted, re-presented and depicted thus shifts from acausal link between reality and depiction to an incidental link, a shiftfrom content to form. The possibility to discover the contents in theformality, produces a corresponding emotion in the perceiver. In theremaining parts of thePoetics, Aristotle discusses several examples,and tries to classify them. With this discourse, Aristotle created the


possibility for an intellectual discussion of the arts, leading the wayto aesthetics and art criticism.

Finally, Girard too perceives the shift between the evocation oftruth and its formal depiction as essential. He explicitly ponderson the issue when he asks himself why the connection he makesbetween myth and tragedy has not been discovered before:

Cette division du travail remonte, en vérité, à Aristote qui, dans sa Poétique, nousapprend que le bon auteur tragique ne touche pas et ne doit pas toucher auxmythes,parce que tout le monde les connaît; il doit se contenter de leur emprunterdes “sujets”. C’est cet interdit d’Aristote qui nous empêche encore de confronterla symétrie tragique avec la différence mythique et qui protège, ce faisant, aussibien la “littérature” que la “mythologie”. (Girard, 1972: 109–110; our emphasis)

Girard’s quotation implies here that, with the development of thehierarchical, cultural order of the anthropometric stage, mankindwas not supposed to be remembered of the original mimetic violenceand the arbitrary character of the scapegoat-mechanism, if theexisting and developing structures were to remain intact. In such aview, an obfuscation is essential. The motives of beauty, dramati-zation andmimesisprovide such an obfuscation in the artisticrepresentation of reality. The development of aesthetics legitimizesit.

8. CONCLUSION

Departing from the work of René Girard and his hypotheses on theorigin of culture, we have tried to provide arguments for the histor-ical consideration of the representation of reality. First, we haveprovided an outlook on the origin of culture by employing Girard’skey concepts of mimetic violence and the scapegoat-mechanism.The evolution towards a regulation of violence and scapegoatingled to the origin of culture. The obfuscationand the remembranceof what really happened became an essential part in the legiti-mation of that culture. Next, we have defined an anthropometricstage of cultural and intellectual development, in which ‘naturalinequality’ and ‘hierarchical difference’ function as two main prin-ciples, preventing the re-occurence of mimetic violence, and furtherobfuscating the scapegoat-mechanism. At first, these principles ofscience and society were as concrete as possible, as was shown by


examples from mathematics, economics, logics and philosophy. In alater development, they became ever more abstract. Throughout thisstage, art is an essential explanation of culture. It is credited with therepresentation of reality, first through the actual re-enacment of themimetic violence in the rite, second through its re-presentation in themyth. Both rite and myth are regarded as monuments in the remem-brance and obfuscation of the origin of culture. With the installation,around the 5th century B.C., of a culture founded on philosophicalreason, the function of the arts also changed.

In the anthropometric stage, the representation of reality throughthe arts changed profoundly. An abstract means occured in theprocess of representing objects or actions. Through this means,the direct contact between the representation and the representeddisappeared. As such, the raw experience of the origin of culture,until then permantly present in representations, became obfuscated.We have singled out three motives of representation as essen-tial in this evolution: beauty, dramatization andmimesis. Beautyenables the embellishment of the representation, making its percep-tion pleasurable. It also provides a legitimation for incidental linksbetween representation and represented. The motive of dramatiza-tion, also extensively discussed by René Girard, links the myth withthe tragedy. Although both anthropologists and literary critics haveobstructed to such a relationship, it shows how the re-presentation ofthe origin of culture in the myth has its resemblances in the contentsas well as in the formalism of the Greek drama. Both in comedy andtragedy it is possible (and indeed easy) to find examples of how themyth resounds in these tales. The symmetry of dialogue, the appear-ance of the chorus and of fictional characters, and the features of themain characters, which we have grouped under the term dramatiza-tion, provide the basis for such a relationship. The content of myth isthus imminently present in drama.Mimesisis the most fundamentalmotive in the representation of reality through art. It is here thatour emphasis on the historical consideration of the representation ofreality proves to be essential. As a convention,mimesisenables boththe resembling depiction of something real, and the disconnectionfrom the main features of the real object.Mimesisis not only imita-tion, or representation, but also depiction: it re-presents an objectunder fundamentally different conditions, disposing of several of the


represented’s main characteristics, while preserving the impressionthat it is about reality. Throughmimesis, the causal link betweenreality and representation became incidental, based on convention.Mimesisthus also enabled the introduction of fiction, the ability touse the conventions of depiction to create something new, to add toreality. We have illustrated this evolution with examples from thevisual arts and architecture.

The understanding of the impact of the motives, as exemplifiedin the legends of Daedalus and Pygmalion, led to an intellectualconsideration, resulting in the development of aesthetic thoughtand art criticism. We have analyzed the contributions of Plato andAristotle to this discourse, and confronted them. Plato still seemsto hold to the old function of art. He viewsmimesisas ‘imitation’,through which the truthfulness of reality must prevail. The inabilityof artistic representations to compete whith the original, ideal truth,leads Plato to a condemnation of his contemporary art. Aristotle,on the other hand, puts the motive ofmimesisforward, to discussrepresentation’s incidental link with reality. He also links it withthe emotion of perception, through which some of the original truthis still passed on, albeit obfuscated. Finally, we have, with Girard,tried to show the inevitablity of the obfuscation of the content ofthe work of art in favour of its formal depiction. A direct reminderof the arbitrariness of the origin of culture would lead to the decayof the principles on which society is founded. The representation ofreality through convention, emphasizing incidental links with realityinstead of causal connection, prevents this. The representation ofreality thus functions both as a legitimation for art, and as foundingprinciple of society in general.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the following for criticism andcomments: Hubert Dethier, Leo Van Hove, Ann-Sophie D’hondt,Jan Maeyaert and the editors ofTijdschrift voor Filosofie(forproviding the opportunity to publish earlier considerations of thistheme).


REFERENCES

Achterhuis, H.: 1988,Het rijk van de schaarste. Baarn: Ambo.Aeschylos: 1971, A. Sidgwick (ed.),Persae. Oxford: University Press.Aristophanes: 1970, K.J. Dover (ed.),Clouds. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Aristophanes: 1971, W.B. Stanford (ed.),FrogsLondon: MacMillan.Aristotle: 1924, I. Bywater (ed.),Poetics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Beardsley, M.C.: 1996,Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present. New

York: MacMillan.Beye, C.: 1987,Ancient Greek Literature and Society. Ithaca: Cornell University

Press.Charles, D.: 1991, Teleological Causation in the Physics. In L. Judson (ed.),

Aristotle’s Physics. A Collection of Essays. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Cornford, F.M.: 1961,The Origins of Attic Comedy. Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press.De Ley, H.: 1983,Geschiedenis van de wijsbegeerte der Oudheid. Brussel:

universitaire publicaties.Denniston, J.D (ed.): 1971 [1924],Greek Literary Criticism. London, Kennikat

Press.De Pater, W. and R. Vergauwen: 1992,Logica: formeel en informeel. Leuven:

Universitaire Pers.Douglas, M.: 1966.Purity and Danger; an Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and

Taboo. London: Routledge and Kegan.Douglas, M.: 1975,Implicit Meanings: Essays in Anthropology. London: Rout-

ledge and Kegan.Dumouchel, P. (ed.): 1988,Violence and Truth; on the Work of René Girard.

Stanford: University Press.Euripides: 1991, C. Collard (ed.),Hecuba. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.Euripides: 1988, E. Craik (ed.),Phoenician Women. Warminster: Aris &

Phillips.Euripides: 1986, S.A. Barrow (ed.),Trojan Women. Warminster: Aris &

Phillips.Foucault, M.: 1971,L’Ordre du discours. Paris: Gallimard.Foucault, M.: 1978,The History of Sexuality; Volume I: An Introduction. New

York: Random House.Frazer, J.G.: 1978, M. Douglas (ed.),The Golden Bough. London: Rainbird.Freud, S.: 1938,Totem and Taboo: Resemblance between the Psychic Lives of

Savages and Neurotics. Harmondsworth: Penguin.Gelernter, M.: 1995,Sources of Architectural Form; a Critical Study of Western

Design Theory. Manchester: University Press.Girard, R.: 1961,Mensonge romantique et vérité romanesque. Paris: Grasset.Girard, R.: 1972,La violence et le sacrée. Paris: Grasset.Girard, R.: 1978,Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde. Paris:

Grasset.Girard, R.: 1982,Le bouc émissaire. Paris: Grasset.


Girard, R.: 1988, The Founding Murder in the Philosophy of Nietzsche. In P.Dumouchel (ed.),Violence and Truth; on the Work of René Girard. Stanford:University Press, 227–246.

Gombrich, E.: 1959,The Story of Art. London: Phaidon Press.Gombrich, E.: 1972,Art and Illusion; a Study in the Psychology of Pictorial

Representation. London: Paidon Press.Gombrich, E, J. Hochberg and M. Black: 1984,Art, Perception and Reality.

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins.Goodman, N.: 1969,Languages of Art; an Approach to a Theory of Symbols.

London: Oxford University Press.Hegel, G.W.F.: 1989,Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik(Vol. 2). Frankfurt a.M.:

Suhrkamp Verlag.Homer: 1994, A.F. Garvie (ed.),The Odyssey and Iliad. Cambridge, MA:

University Press.Honour, H. and J. Fleming: 1982,A World History of Art. Basingstoke:

MacMillan.Kaptein R. and P. Tijmes: 1986,De ander als model en obstakel; een inleiding in

het werk van René Girard. Kampen: Kok Agora.Kula, W.: 1986,Measures and Man. Princeton: University Press.Kultermann, U.: 1987,Kleine Geschichte der Kunsttheorie. Darmstadt:

Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.Lévi-Strauss, C.: 1962,La pensée sauvage. Paris: Plon.Löfgren, O.: 1981, World-Views: A Research Perspective.Ethnologia Scand-

inavia11.Lovejoy, A.O.: 1978,The Great Chain of Being. Cambridge and London: Harvard

University Press.Lucas, D.W.: 1972, Mimesis; Appendix to Aristotle’s Poetics. InPoetics. Oxford:

Clarendon Press.Malinowski, B.: 1961,Sex and Repression in a Savage Society. Cleveland:

Meridan Books.Malinowski, B.: 1963,Sex, Culture and Myth. London: Rupert Hart-Davis.Marcuse, H.: 1962,Eros and Civilization; a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.

New York: Random House.Mathijs, E. and B. Mosselmans: 1997, Van herbelevende waarheid naar afge-

beelde schoonheid: de versluiering van het oorspronkelijk geweld bij Plato enAristoteles. In L. Pijnenburg (ed.),Vijandbeelden in de filosofie; Acta van de19de Nederlands-Vlaamse filosofiedag. Wageningen: Landbouwuniversiteit.

Mathijs, E. and B. Mosselmans: 1998, Van Daedalus tot Pygmalion: kunst enmimesis in het antropometrische stadium.Tijdschrift voor Filosofie60.

Mathijs, E. and B. Mosselmans: 1999, Art and Science in a Fragmented World;Einstein Meets Magritte as a Forum for Communication. In D. Aerts, E. Mathijsand B. Mosselmans (eds.),Science and Art; the Red Book of Einstein MeetsMagritte. Dordrecht-New York: Kluwer.

Mertens, J.: 1981, De artistieke mimesis bij Plato.Tijdschrift voor Filosofie43.Mertens, J.: 1984, Ars imitatur naturam?Tijdschrift voor Filosofie46.


Michel, P.: 1950,De Pythagore à Euclide. Paris, Les Belles Lettres.Mirowski, P.: 1989,More Heat than Light. Economics as Social Physics, Physics

as Nature’s Economics. Cambridge: University Press.Morris, S.: 1992,Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art. Princeton: University

Press.Mosselmans and Mathijs: 1998a, René Girard, het zondebokmechanisme en het

denken van Aristoteles.De Uil Van Minerva14.Mosselmans, B. and E. Mathijs: 1998b, Natuurlijke ongelijkheid en hierarch-

ische differentiatie in de antropometrische wetenschappen van Aristoteles.In M. Hoenen (ed.),Metamorphose; Acta van de 20ste Nederlands-Vlaamsefilofosiedag. Nijmegen: KUN.

Mosselmans, B. and E. Mathijs: in press, Science and Philosophy in the Anthro-pometric Stage.Proceedings of the Congress of History of Science.

Murray, G.: 1912a,Four Stages of Greek Religion. Oxford: University Press.Murray, G.: 1912b, Excursus on the Ritual Forms Preserved in Greek Tragedy. In

J. Harrison (ed.),Themis. Cambridge: University Press.Nagy, G.: 1989, Early Greek Views of Poets and Poetry. In G.A. Kennedy (ed.),

Classical Criticism(vol. 1). Cambridge: University Press.Nietzsche, F.: 1976,Die fröhliche Wissenschaft/La Gaya Scienza. Stuttgart:

Alfred Kröner Verlag.Nietzsche, F.: 1988, Wie die ‘wahre Welt’ endlich zur Fabel wurde. InGötzen-

Dämmerung, oder wie man mit dem Hammer philosophiert. München-Berlin:De Gruyter.

Ovidius, N.P.: 1971, F.J. Miller (ed.),Metamorphoses. London: Heinemann.Pekary, T.: 1979,Die Wirtschaft der griechisch-römischen Antike. Wiesbaden:

Franz Steiner.Pellegrin, P.: 1985, Aristotle: A Zoology without Species. In A. Gotthelf (ed.),

Aristotle on Nature and Living Things. Pittsburgh-Pennsylvania: Mathesis.Plato: 1875, B. Jowett (ed.),Dialogues of Plato(5 vol.). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Pochat, G.: 1986,Geschichte der Ästhetik und Kunsttheorie. Köln: DuMont

Buchverlag.Russell, D.A.: 1981,Criticism in Antiquity. London: Duckworth.Sophocles: 1947,The Theban Plays. Harmondsworth: Penguin.Soudek, J.: 1952, Aristotle’s Theory of Exchange.Proceedings of the American

Philosophical Society96.Stokstad, M.: 1995,Art History. New York: Harry N. Abrams Inc.Tijmes, P.: 1995, De romaneske waarheid.Tijdschrift voor Filosofie57.Tijmes, P.: 1996, Sacraliteit en schaarste. De dubbele huishouding van de mimese.

In P. Pelckmans and G. Vanheeswijck (eds.),René Girard. Het labyrint van hetverlangen. Kapellen: Pelckmans/Kampen: Kok Agora.

Tijmes, P.: 1997, Repliek.Tijdschrift voor Filosofie59.Vanheeswijck, G.: 1997, De romaneske waarheid bij René Girard.Tijdschrift voor

Filosofie59.Vergote, A.: 1996, Girard’s Absolute Theorie.Tijdschrift voor Filosofie58.Vovelle, M.: 1982,Idéologies et mentalités. Paris: Editions La Découverte.


Walton, K.: 1990,Mimesis as Make-Believe; on the Foundations of the Represen-tational Arts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Zimmerman, L.J.: 1987,Politieke economie van Plato tot Marx. Groningen:Wolters-Noordhoff.

Center Leo Apostel and Faculty of EconomicsVrije UniversiteitBrusselBelgium

mimesis and the representation of reality: a historical world view

Documents