1

The Function of Rhetoric According to Emperor Julian

Dominique Côté

University of Ottawa

Introduction

In the summer of 362, the 17th

of June to be precise, barely six months after his arrival in

Constantinople and his ascension to imperial power, Julian enacted legislation that sought

to exclude Christians from studying in schools of rhetoric.1

Philosopher, priest, theurgist and son of Zeus-Helios, the emperor Julian resolved to

undertake the divine mission conferred upon him: to return his subjects to the path of

truth and piety towards the gods.2

Julian’s laws pertaining to scholarship have been copiously studied and commented upon

in relation to his own antichristian attitude.3 For my part, I would like to make this the

point of departure for this exposé, and I shall focus on the definition of rhetoric the

emperor’s laws bring to the fore.

In the ideal world Julian sought to rebuild over the foundation of the true philosophy,

what role was to be played by rhetoric; this technê which, since Isocrates, assured in large

part the transmission of the paideia and served to define the Greek identity?

This is the general question that I am posing in this talk.

Along these lines, I shall seek to determine whether Julian’s own view was congruent or

at odds with the prevalent conception of rhetoric among those who practiced either

rhetoric or philosophy in the fourth century of our era.

The discussion, then, will unfold by addressing the following points:

1. Legislation on teaching or the need to redefine the role of rhetoric

2. A philosophical rhetoric in the manner of Isocrates

3. A Homeric rhetoric or the need for truthful discourse

1. Legislation on Teaching or the Need to Redefine the Role of Rhetoric

Text1 : Theodosian Code (XIII 3, 5). Trans. C. Pharr (1952)4

Masters of studies and teachers must excel first in character, then in eloquence

(magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde

1 Theodosian Code XIII 3, 5. A subsequent edict was issued on June 29 facilitating the construction of new

temples (CTh XV 1, 3). 2 Elm 2012 : 140.

3 See e.g. Tougher 2007 : 57; Rosen 2006 : 270.

4 With slight modifications by Elm 2012 : 140, n. 170.

2

facundia) But since I myself am not able to be present in all the cities, I order that if

anyone wishes to teach he shall not leap forth rashly and suddenly to this office, but he

shall be approved by the judgment of the municipal councils and shall obtain the decree

of the decurions with the consent and agreement of the best citizens. For this decree shall

be referred to me for consideration so that such teachers may enter into their studies in

the cities with a certain higher honor because of our judgment 5

The majority of specialists share the view that the edict of the 17th

of June 362 has no

religious connotations and contents itself instead with reminding teachers of the

importance of being irreproachable in matters of morality.6

It consists equally of a first step towards constituting a sort of imperial register—one

which is centralized rather than local—of all teachers. This being a measure that fits in

very well with the centralizing tendency of the imperial administration since the time of

Diocletian and one that enables the emperor to control the practice of teaching throughout

the empire.7

For certain historians, it also consists of the first step towards banning Christians from

occupying the positions of teacher or professor.8

It seems that according to the accounts of Eunapius9 and Ammianus Marcellinus,

10 inter

alios, that another law clearly forbidding Christians from teaching was put forward by

Julian, probably at the end of the summer of 362. The text of this law was not preserved

by the compilers of the Theodosian Code;11

however, either a letter of Julian’s or an

extract of a letter of Julian’s allows us to grasp its spirit.

Text 2 : Julian, Rescript on Christian Teachers (Letters 36, 422 a-423 a). Trans. W.C.

Wright (LCL)

I hold that a proper education results, not in laboriously acquired symmetry of phrases

and language, but in a healthy condition of mind, I mean a mind that has understanding

5 CTh XIII 3, 5 : magistros studiorum doctoresque excellere oportet moribus primum, deinde facundia, sed

quia singulis civitatibus adesse ipse non possum, iubeo, quisque docere vult, non repente nec temere

prosiliat ad hoc manus, sed iudicio ordinis probatus decretum curialium mereatur optimorum conspirante

consensu. hoc enim decretum ad me tractandum referetur, ut altiore quodam honore nostro iudicio studiis

civitatum accedant. Dat. XV kal. iul., acc. IIII kal. Augustas Spoletio Mamertino et Nevitta conss. (17 June

362). 6 Elm 2012 : 140; Rosen 2006: 270-273. Cf. Watts 2006 :69 : “the law makes no mention of Christians.”

See also Bowersock 1978: 84 for a different opinion. 7 Watts 2006 : 69-70.

8 Watts 2006 :69 : “By establishing a process through which the imperial government could collect the

names of all professors, the law of June 362 laid the groundwork for his subsequent action.” 9 Eunapius of Sardis, Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists X 8, 1-2 (Giangrande 79, 5-13) :

. 10

Ammianus Marcellinus XXII 10, 7 : arcebat (Iulianus) docere magistros rhetoricos et grammaticos, ritus

Christiani cultores; XXV 4, 20 : … docere vetuit magistros rhetoricos et grammaticos Christianos, ni

transissent ad numinum cultum. 11

See Goulet 2001 : 326.

3

and true opinion about things good and evil, honourable and base (

)

Now all who profess to teach anything whatever ought to be men of upright character

( ), and ought not to harbour in their souls opinions

irreconcilable with what they publicly profess; and, above all, I believe it is necessary

that those who associate with the young and teach them rhetoric should be of that upright

character; for they expound the writings of the ancients, whether they be rhetoricians or

grammarians, and still more if they are sophists. For these claim to teach, in addition to

other things, not only the use of words, but morals also, and they assert that political

philosophy is their peculiar field. (

)

Let us leave aside, for the moment, the question whether this is true or not. But while I

applaud them for aspiring to such high pretensions, I should applaud them still more if

they did not utter falsehoods and convict themselves of thinking one thing and teaching

their pupils another.

What! Was it not the gods who revealed all their learning to Homer, Hesiod,

Demosthenes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Isocrates and Lysias (

)? Did not these men think that they were consecrated, some to Hermes others

to the Muses ( )? I think

it is absurd that men who expound the works of these writers should dishonor the gods

whom they used to honour.

It comes through clearly from this letter that morality, which must serve as the main

criterion in the self-definition of the rhetorician, the grammarian or of the sophist, is in

fact a matter of moral integrity. The rhetorician who makes use of the ancient texts in

teaching rhetoric and who does not believe in the gods is in fact a liar.

The idea of subjecting candidates to the profession or holders of positions to an

examination of piety certainly qualifies as an innovation and as a radical measure, and is

described as such by both Ammianus Marcellinus12

and Gregory of Nazianzus.13

12

Ammianus Marcellinus XXII 10, 7 : illud autem erat inclemens, obruendum perenni silentio, quod

arcebat docere magistros rhetoricos et grammaticos, ritus Christiani cultores = “but this one thing was

inhumane, and ought to be buried in eternal silence, namely, that he forbade teachers of rhetoric and

literature to practise their profession, if they were followers of the Christian religion.” Trans. J. C. Rolfe

(LCL). 13

Gregory of Nazianzus, Orations 4 and 5, and more particularly Oration 4, 4-5 : “Car cette parole qui est

le bien commun de tous les êtres doués de raison, il l’a refusée aux chrétiens sous le prétexte qu’elle était

son bien propre : il avait élaboré à propos de la parole les conceptions les plus absurdes, cet homme qui

4

Christian rhetoricians clearly found themselves to be targeted by the new legislation put

forward by Julian, but they most certainly were not alone in this.14

The radical views of

the emperor, outside of the philosophical circles in which they belonged, never achieved

unanimity.15

Let us set aside temporarily the sacred nature of the ancient texts and focus instead on the

definition of the paideia, along with the rhetoric that comes out of it. I put forward the

hypothesis that Julian did not have exclusively in mind the exclusion of the Christians

from the teaching sphere once he enacted his legislation, but rather that he sought just as

much to return the system of education—and more specifically the teaching of rhetoric—

to its traditional foundation.

Proper Education and Proper Rhetoric

According to Julian, the proper education teachers ought to impart does not reside

primarily in mastering a , in the harmonizing of words and phrases,

but rather in right disposition and reasonable judgement; and in the soundness of

opinions on good and evil as well as on the beautiful and the deformed.

What the paideia—and more specifically the learning of rhetoric—ought to impart is

above all virtue and not virtuosity.

At its core, Julian does not want to exclude rhetoric from education to the profit of a

purely philosophical education; he does not want to have it that rhetoric comes to be a

discursive exercise that preoccupies itself only with fine language to the detriment of its

moral and philosophical objectives.

Against the Sophists?

As a way of situating Julian’s definition we can say that it opposes itself to a certain

sophistic practice of rhetoric.

Bad rhetoric, as he explains it to the Cynic Heracleios, is one that is characterized by

ignorance and a lack of refinement, a and a lack of creative spontaneity.

It compensates for this by means of an excess of ornamentation and exuberance.

croyait être le personnage le plus disert du monde ( ). Tout d’abord, il avait malhonnêtement

changé le sens de ce mot pour l’appliquer aux croyances, comme si le parler grec était affaire de religion et

non pas de langue (

). Tel est le motif qui lui a permis de nous interdire la parole en

prétendant que nous volions le bien d’autrui : agissant comme s’il nous avait aussi interdit l’usage de tous

les arts qui ont été inventés en Grèce, il a estimé que celui-ci était de son ressort en vertu de l’identité

d’appellation” (Trans. J. Bernardi SC 309, 1983). See Elm 2012 chap. 8 (336-377) and Bouffartigue 2010

b : 271-272. 14

Cf. Goulet 2001 : 328 : “À lire le texte de près, on constate que pour Julien ces adversaires peuvent être

aussi bien des païens que des chrétiens.” 15

Cf. Swain 2004 : 395 : “Julian had sought to impose a new style of Hellenic religion which was not

necessarily welcomed by people like Libanius.”

5

Text 3 : Julian, To the Cynic Heracleios (236 a). Trans. W.C. Wright (LCL)

You criticize everybody, though you yourself do nothing to deserve praise; your praises

are in worse taste than those of the most ignorant rhetoricians. They, because they have

nothing to say and cannot invent anything from the matter in hand, (

), are always dragging in Delos and Leto with

her children, and then «swans singing their shrill song and the trees that echo them», and

«dewy meadows full of soft, deep grass», and the «scent of flowers», and «the season of

spring», and other figures of the same sort.

Elsewhere, in Letter 33 addressed to Hermogenes, Julian indulges in a caricature of

orators, calling them singers or, in the translation of Bouffartigue, flute players. 16

There

is certainly reason to see in the use of the term (singer) a nod to the Asianizing

tradition; 17

the Asianizers being, according to Aelius Theon, those who inserted metre

and rhythm into their prose. 18

2. A Philosophical Rhetoric in the Manner of Isocrates

Julian is not against all orators or sophists, as his relations with Themistius and Libanius

demonstrate.19

He accepts that the sophists seek not to teach eloquence exclusively but

also to teach ‘political philosophy.’ He lauds them for this. What he disapproves of is the

contradiction between the statements and actions of certain sophists who appear to have

forgotten that the goal of genuine rhetoric is philosophy.

It is left then to define the connections between rhetoric and philosophy as Julian sees

them.

16

To Hermogenes, (Bidez-Cumont 33 = 13 Wright) : “Laisse-moi dire avec le lyrisme des rhéteurs …”

( ). Cf. Wright : “…in the language of the poetical

rhetoricians.” 17

See Bouffartigue 1992 : 521. 18

Aelius Theon, Progymnasmata, 71:

=

“Il faut veiller aussi à l’arrangement des mots et enseigner tout ce qui permet d’éviter un arrangement

vicieux, en particulier l’expression métrique et rythmée, comme l’est le plus souvent celle de l’orateur

Hégésias, celle des orateurs dits asianistes.” (Greek text and trans., M. Patillon 1997 CUF) . Cf. G. A.

Kennedy’s translation: “And one should show concern for the arrangement of the words, teaching all the

ways students will avoid composing badly, especially (how to avoid) metrical and rhythmical style, like

most of the writings of the orator Hegesias and the so-called Asian orators.” (Trans. G. A. Kennedy 2003.

Progymnasmata. Greek textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric. Atlanta: 13-14). On asianism, see

also Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On composition, 4. 19

On Julian’s relation with Themistius, see Bouffartigue 2006 and Watt 2012. On Julian’s relation with

Libanius, see Swain 2004 : 394-400.

6

Rhetoric: Indispensable to the Paideia

Broadly speaking, in terms of the paideia, Julian considers that rhetoric remains

indispensible to the formation of the . It forms part of the enkuklios

paideia and it is in this capacity that it is indispensible, as ‘bagage pédagogique.’20

Preparatory Function of Rhetoric

In terms of philosophical education, Julian seems to share the dominant view among

Platonists since the time of Porphyry, which is that rhetoric is a preparatory discipline

and is also useful in the formation of the philosopher.21

Text 4 : Julian, To Eumenius and Pharianus (Letter 3, 441 c). Trans. W.C. Wright (LCL)

If anyone has persuaded you that there is anything more delightful or more profitable for

the human race than to pursue philosophy at one’s leisure without interruptions, he is a

deluded man trying to delude you (…) Do not despise the study of mere words or be

careless of rhetoric or fail to read poetry. But you must devote still more attention to

serious studies, and let your whole effort be to acquire understanding of the teachings of

Aristotle and Plato. Let this be your task, the base, the foundation, the edifice, the roof.

For all other studies are by the way, though they are completed by you with greater zeal

than some bestow on really important tasks22

.

He even sought, if one is to believe Libanius, to meld together the two disciplines.

Text 5 : Libanius, Oration 12, 30. Trans. A.F. Norman (LCL)

Observing rhetoric to be a means of persuading the masses whereas philosophy induces

knowledge of matters more exalted, he thought it improper to discourse adequately on the

one subject and yet show an ignorance of higher things. So he combined both studies and

made an amalgam of them, elevating his intellect by a study of heavenly lore and at the

same time, by his association with rhetoric, training his tongue to run trippingly.

20

Bouffartigue 1992 : 624. According to Bouffartigue, the status of rhetoric within paideia, as an

“ensemble d’activités intellectuelles,” is rather mediocre. 21

Cf. Kennedy 1980 : 182 : “In the Neoplatonic view, the cornerstone of all philosophical method is the

process of definition and division as originally described by Plato and developed by Aristotle in his logical

works. Porphyry’s Eisagoge is a simple introduction to the art of definition and became the first work in the

Neoplatonic philosophical canon. If rhetoric was to be incorporated into a total system of knowledge, it

must be through the process of definition and division. Stasis theory, and the theory of the ideas of style,

themselves slightly reminiscent of Platonic ideas, provided an ideal subject for the Aristotelian-Neoplatonic

method.” On this, see also Swain 2004: 360-361. 22

7

In this same Oration (12, 92), Libanius maintains that the desire expressed by Julian to

lead the masses back to the righteous path found its source in his own eloquence.23

Elsewhere, (Oration 18, 158), Libanius specifies that Julian would have made the

mastery of rhetoric a requirement for holding the position of governor, contrary to what

was current under Constantius.24

It must be said, with regard to this passage (Oration 12, 30) that Libanius seeks to put to

the forefront his own understanding of rhetoric along with his own sense of its

importance. According to Odile Lagacherie, in Orations 12 and 13, both delivered before

Julian, Libanius sought to respond to criticisms expressed by Julian in his writings

(Panegyric in Honour of Constatius, To the Cynic Heracleios) regarding rhetoricians and

sophists by putting on equal footing logoi and philosophy, and by associating the hiera

with rhetoric (logoi) rather than with philosophy.25

Philosophical Goal of Rhetoric: Isocrates as Example

In its exercise, Julian asserts that rhetoric must be philosophical, and that the orator or the

sophist must also be a philosopher. Truly, he has in mind the example of Isocrates.

When he reproaches the Cynic Heracleios for lacking logoi just like the most ignorant

rhetoricians do, and for resorting to Leto—to the sweet singing swans and the trees that

give them echo—he contrasts the poverty of such speeches and his sophistic

ornamentation with the oratory technique of Isocrates:

Where do we see that Isocrates did this in his panegyrics? 26

I find it significant that Julian designates Isocrates as the exemplar of the good

rhetorician. Isocrates, whom we naturally associate with the teaching of rhetoric, never

uses the term in his writings, and never pretended either to be capable of delivering a

of any sort.27

It was to put forward a that he founded his

school in roughly 390 BC. Isocrates’ paideia involved learning speeches that were useful

in daily life as well as in public deliberations with the goal in mind of developing for

oneself the ability to arrive at a universally right judgement.28

23

Libanius, Oration 12, 92 : 24

Libanius, Oration 18, 158. 25

Lagacherie 2011 : 52 : “Je pose donc l’hypothèse que la lecture des textes composés par Julien à

Constantinople a conduit Libanios à prendre position face à l’opinion affichée de l’empereur. Libanios

entreprend de prouver qu’elle n’est pertinente ni en ce qui le concerne personnellement ni pour le monde

que Julien gouverne. Pour y parvenir, il met à égalité logoi et philosophie, quand il n’inverse pas la

hiérarchie : l’exemple le plus explicite est se trouve dans le discours XIII, où les logoi, et non la

philosophie, sont liés aux hiera.” 26

Julian, To the Cynic Heracleios (236 B). 27

Cf. Dixsaut 1986 : 65-67. 28

See Papillon 2007 : 58-59.

8

Text 6 : Isocrates, Antidosis 271. Trans. G. Norlin (LCL)

For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we

can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold

that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best

course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies

from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight.29

The ideal orator for Julian must correspond to the Isocratean type by his Atticism (as

opposed to Asianism), the simplicity and elegance of his style, and by the usefulness of

his discourse (the philosophical dimension).

Examples of Isocratean Orators

Libanius, official sophist of Antioch and author of eight speeches on Julian, of which two

(Oratories 12 and 13) were commissioned by Julian himself, surely has a place among

the good rhetoricians; rhetoricians who engage in political philosophy in their speeches.30

In a letter (97 BC=53 W) in which he lauds the style of Libanius in his speech in defence

of Aristophanes (Orat. 14), Julian says of him that he is “the most philosophical and

truthful of the rhetoricians” ( ).

Themistius too could certainly take his place among the good sophists seeing as he

“advocates for a rhetoric stripped of artifice and dedicated to usefulness and efficiency;

and advocates as well for a philosophy that is both concrete and comprehensible to the

majority,” as Boufartigue reminds us. 31

The Eunapian sophists for the most part belong, it appears, to the category of flute

players, with the possible exception of Prohaeresius towards whom Julian takes an

ambivalent attitude. The confusion maintained by Eunapius between sophistry and

philosophy contrasts with the sharp distinction Julian sets up between rhetoric and

philosophy.32

29

Isocrates, Antidosis, 271:

30 On Libanius and his conception of rhetoric, see Lagacherie 2011 and Cribiore 2007: 137-173 (Chapter 5:

Teaching the Logoi). 31

Bouffartigue 1992 : 628. Themistius considered himself to be a philosopher, not a sophist. See

Themistius Orations 21 (The Examiner or the Philosopher), 23 (The Sophist), and 26 (On Speaking, or

How the Philosopher Should Speak) apud Penella 2000. On Themistius defending himself against the

charge of being a sophist, see Roduit 2006: 143-148. For a general introduction to Themistius, see

Vanderspoel 1995. 32

On Eunapius and his sophists, see Penella 1990, Swain 2004 : 373-375, and Goulet 2010.

9

It is possible to be both orator and philosopher, like Themistius;33

or and

like his friend Eustathius to whom he wrote a letter (34 Bidez-Cumont = 43

Wright), but in the final analysis it is more worthy to be a philosopher than a speech-

giver. For example, he congratulates his friend Salutius for his mastery of oratory art,

which makes of him a Greek despite his Celtic origins, but even more for being a

philosopher, as philosophy is the domain in which Greeks alone have achieved

excellence.34

The Example of Julian

To a certain extent, the philosopher Julian also practices an Isocratean type of rhetorical

philosophy.

When he takes to speech-giving, which he does often (the bulk of his oeuvre is in the

form of orations), he does so with originality and does so too to defend truths: the truth of

his own philosophy especially.

In fact, Julian’s expressed views harmonize perfectly with his own conduct, just as his

own conduct harmonizes perfectly with the truth.

This also brings us back to the matter of the paideia, which above all is about the

formation of judgement.

It also brings us to my third and final point, that of Homeric rhetoric.

3. A Homeric Rhetoric or the Need for Truthful Discourse

Homeric Education

Bouffartigue says with good reason that Julian had two teachers who truly made an

impression on him. The first was his tutor Mardonius who introduced him to Homer, and

the other, finally, was Maximus of Ephesus, the philosopher who first exposed him to

Plato (Iamblichus).35

If it is to be believed, Julian literally received a Homeric education from his tutor. He

impresses this upon the Antiochians in a famous passage of the Misopogon, which has

been well studied by Athanassiadi and others,36

and which we can summarize as follows:

All that is of value to a man can be found in Homer.

33

Cf. Heather and Moncur 2001 : 5 : “Most of his speeches contained some reference to the central

equation between philosophy and insightful truth-telling … As well as a serious philosopher, Themistius

was also a consummate rhetorician.” 34

Julian, To Sallust (252 a-b). According to manuscript tradition, we should refer to this work as A

Consolation to Himself upon the Departure of the Excellent Sallust. Concerning the issue of who is the

of the manuscripts, see Lössl 2012. 35

Bouffartigue 1989 : 530 : “Julien se sent fils spirituel de Mardonios autant que du philosophe Maxime

d’Éphèse.”Cf. Rosen 2006: 98: “Was Mardonios für den Knaben gewesen war, das wurde der Epheser für

den Einundzwanzigjährigen.” On Julian’s intense relationship with Maximus of Ephesus, see Athanassiadi

1992: 34-37 and Criscuolo 2006. 36

Athanassiadi 1992 : 15 sq; Rosen 2006 : 71-76. Cf. Smith 1995: 24-25.

10

Text 7 : Julian, Misopogon (351 c-d). Trans. W.C. Wright (LCL)

I assure you, by Zeus and the Muses, that while I was still a mere boy my tutor would

often say to me : Never let the crowd of your playmates who flock to the theatres lead you

into the mistake of craving for such spectacles as these. Have you a passion for horse

races? There is one in Homer, very cleverly described. Take the book and study it. Do

you hear them talking about dancers in pantomime? Leave them alone! Among the

Phaeacians the youths dance in more manly fashion. And for citharode you have

Phemius; for singer Demodocus. Moreover there are in Homer many plants more

delightful to hear of than those that we can see … And consider the wooded island of

Calypso and the caves of Circe and the garden of Alcinous; be assured that you will

never see anything more delightful than these.

Homeric Imitation

Julian had absorbed Mardonius’ teaching so well that Homeric references abound in

practically all of his writings. To be sure, one can reduce this overabundance of Homeric

references to a matter of style and recall that this shows no originality; for example,

comparing the subject of a panegyric to the heroes of Homeric poetry, as Julian Caesar

does in his second panegyric to Constantius. 37

But when, in anger, Julian delivers to the Antiochians the assertion that we have just read,

and when he describes to Salutius the pain that his departure had caused him by telling

him that he had in his mind the words of the Iliad: “And so Ulysses found himself alone”

(Il. 11.401), it is therefore possible to believe, given all we know about him, that the

Homeric citations are not merely stylistic effects.38

It is possible to believe, in effect, given his Homeric training, that in a work such as the

Letter to Salutius, which belongs in the ‘Consolation’ genre ( ),

Julian exhorts his friend, who, like himself is tested by the separation imposed on them,

to imitate the Homeric heroes and to hope for relief from heaven.

37

In Julian’s Second Oration to Constantius, Constantius surpasses Nestor in strategy, Odysseus in

eloquence, Hector, Achilleus and Sarpedon in courage. One might add that in the Panegyric in Honour of

Eusebia, the empress is compared to Penelope. Concerning Julian’s prominent use of Homer, see Drake

2012: 37. J. F. Kindstrand (1973. Homer in der Zweiten Sophistik : Studien zu der Homerlektüre und dem

Homerbild bei Dion von Prusa, Maximos von Tyros, und Aelios Aeristides. Uppsala) had already shown

how important was Homer for Second Sophistic writers. 38

Athanassiadi 1992: 20: “When as Caesar he was treacherously deprived of a close friend and

collaborator, he wrote a self-consolation in which he identified with the most subtle of the Homeric heroes,

Odysseus (…) and through this game he managed to overcome depression, bolster his courage and stand up

again to face the tempests that were to come.” Cf. Ibid. 17, on Julian’s election to the rank of Caesar and

the way in “which he had imbibed Homer:” “Julian came to understand Homer so well, and to grasp so

fully the set of distinctive values that allows his universe to stand for all ages as a coherent and truthful

cosmos, that even when faced with the possibility of death his mind instinctively had recourse to Homer in

order to realize and express the situation.”

11

Text 8 : Julian, To Sallust (250 a-b). Trans. W.C. Wright (LCL)

But it is not right to praise and not to imitate the Homeric heroes, or to think that

whereas God was ever ready to assist them he will disregard the men of our day, if he

sees that they are striving to attain that very virtue for which he favoured those others.

If we possess the same qualities as Ulysses, who was beloved of the gods because he was

smart and possessed a ready and vigilant spirit, it is clear, then, according to Julian that

this same divine favour will not be denied to us.

Homeric Rhetoric and Truthful Discourse

My hypothesis is that Julian has assimilated the Homeric ideal—or the Homeric heroic

ideal—to such an extent that when he comes before the Senate to speak he does so as a

Homeric hero standing before the Achaean assembly; as one who is fully invested and

honoured and who finds himself in a peer-to-peer relationship.

Text 9 : Libanius, Oration 18, 154. Trans. A.F. Norman (LCL)

He made his entry into the senate house, too, and seated around him the Grand Senate

that had long been deprived of this honour. Until now it had been summoned to the

palace to stand and listen to a few remarks, and the emperor did not come to attend its

sessions, for because of his incapacity for public speaking, he shunned a place that

required an orator’s presence. Julian however, as Homer says of the able speaker, «with

unerring discourse» attended such debates (

) (Od. 8, 171), allowing any who so desired to speak his

mind freely before him and delivering speeches himself, sometimes «with words brief and

clear» (Il. 3, 214), «with words like snowflakes in winter», (Il. 3, 222), now imitating

those speakers in Homer ( ), now excelling

each of them in his own particular technique.

It is tempting to think that Julian has perhaps attempted to reevaluate the expressions of

imperial power by drawing inspiration from Homeric simplicity, at least as far as

exchanges and discussions between the emperor and senate members go, just as his

desire to reform the administration of cities by returning more power and autonomy to

them may have been inspired by the example of Classical Athens where the speeches of

the orators were not merely decorative.39

In other words, at the level of the head of state and equally with that of the cities, Julian

would have sought to return to public discourse the dimension that enables it to be

both true and useful.

39

Cf. Athanassiadi 1992 : 29 : “When, later, Julian promulgated a series of laws aimed at the restoration of

the curiae, his vision of an empire in which individual cities would more or less return to the ancient

condition of city-states owed something to the deep impression that Attic rhetoric, linked forever with the

Athens of the fourth century BC, had exerted on his mind.”

12

On the personal level, all unfolds as though Julian had taken to heart the rule imposed by

Phoenix for the education of the hero Achilles: to be a good speaker of words and doer

of deeds (Il. 9.443).

Speaking, logos, must therefore be less an object of technê and more an object of

aretê.

Homeric Rhetoric and the Sacralization of Greek Letters

We may put forward another hypothesis. By taking stock of Julian’s personal belief in the

sacred nature of the Homeric texts, it would be tempting to see in the background of

the education law the figure of Mardonius as embodiment of the exemplary model

of teacher, rhetorician and sophist in perfect harmony with the text…

The point is that Homeric rhetoric, the exercise of truthful discourse, does not consist

exclusively of speaking like the Homeric heroes, but of making the Homeric texts to

speak or, in other words, to hold forth in a discourse that is founded upon the Homeric

texts.

Rhetoric, as I have emphasized, forms part of the paideia, as educative process, and of

the paideia, as educative result; i.e., culture.

For the paideia, the education and culture that we are discussing here, is that of the

Greeks, meaning those who speak Greek. This is because ever since Isocrates it is not

blood that makes up the Greek but rather the paideia.

For the paideia, on the level of the grammatist, the grammarian and finally the

rhetorician, is arrived at by the study of the logoi, the study of Greek Letters. It happens

to be that these logoi, for men like Libanius and Julian, serve as connecting link to the

gods, the Greek gods, it goes without saying.40

Text 10 : Libanius, Oration 18, 157. Trans. A.F. Norman (LCL)

Also, considering learning and religion to be akin, and seeing the one nearly ruined, the other

totally so, he directed his actions to the complete restoration of learning to its position and its

renewal in men’s regard, first by honouring its exponents, and again, by personally composing

discourses. (

)

40

On Libanius’ “culte du verbe,” cf. Festugière 1959 : 92 : “Libanius parle du «sanctuaire de la culture»

( III, 35 [I, 278.8 F.], XXXV, 21 [III, 220.16]) … pour lui

le culte du verbe est quasi une religion, d’ailleurs liée, à ses yeux, aux rites des païens (

LXII, 8 [IV 350.13 s. F.])”. On the relation between

and , cf. Elm 2012 b : 10: “As his two orations against Julian reveal, Gregory (of Nazianzus) shared

Julian’s assessment regarding the centrality of logoi, hiera and the polis, Greek culture, the sacred and the

city.”

13

Text 11 : Libanius, Oration 13, 1. Trans. A.F. Norman (LCL)

In company with the worship of the gods, Sire, there has also returned the reverence for the

practice of eloquence, not merely because eloquence is perhaps no small part of such worship,

but also because you have been inspired towards reverence for the gods by eloquence itself

(

)

Conclusion

In conclusion, with his teaching law, Julian is at odds with the function assigned to

rhetoric in the paideia and in Platonic milieus.

Rather than being, in the case of the paideia, the training in an oratory art whereby the

basic materials, the ancient texts, serve as a model to imitate in terms of their form, or, in

the case of the Platonic milieus, a preparatory discipline to philosophy most notably

through the study of the staseis, the function of rhetoric, for Julian, becomes, in the case

of the paideia, a training in the language of the poets and orators, which assumes at the

same time a belief in the gods of the poets and orators; and, in the case of the Platonic

milieus, like the one to which Julian himself belonged, the exercise of a philosophical

rhetoric that serves truthful discourse.

Under these conditions, it goes without saying that the instruction of rhetoric takes on the

character of a sacerdotal activity.

The rhetorical ideal underpinning Julian’s teaching law obviously did not survive its

author.

The schools of rhetoric were to continue to use classical texts without requiring the

students consulting them to share the ancestral belief of their authors.

The Platonic schools of philosophy were to continue integrating rhetoric into their course

of study as a preparatory discipline.

In fact, we can ask ourselves whether Julian’s ideal of the sage who builds his teaching

upon a sacred text, who leads a philosophical life and who practices a rhetoric of simple

and truthful discourse was realized in the person of the Christian preacher, a John

Chrysostom for instance or, better yet, a Gregory of Nazianzus.

This is after all the very interesting and seductive thesis that Susanna Elm defends in her

masterly work of 2012 entitled: Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church. Emperor

Julian, Gregory of Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome, namely that Gregory of Nazianzus

would have modeled his career as bishop, as philosopher and orator on Julian’s own

intellectual process of development, in reaction to Julian, in emulation of Julian.41

41

Elm 2012 a and 2012 b.

14

Appendix

Julian’s Knowledge of Rhetoric

In contrast to his uncle Constantine and his first cousin Constantius, Julian received a

very good classical education. At the age of twenty, he was already an acccomplished

. Given that training in rhetoric stood as the final stage, the upper

echelon of the scholarly academic system, we can regard Julian as having possessed the

necessary skills for practicing rhetoric in a professional way. He in all cases attended the

finest schools (Libanius at Nicomedia and probably Prohaeresius at Athens).

What then were the rhetorical skills of the emperor; he who, as the evidence suggests,

aspired foremost to be a philosopher rather than an orator?1

It is not an exaggeration that almost the entire oeuvre of Julian bears the mark of rhetoric.

From the panegyrics to Constantius and Eusebia, given when he was Caesar in Gaul, to

the Misopogon and Against the Galileans, written at Antioch in 362-363 on the eve of his

campaign against the Persians, Julian practiced the art of discourse in a varied, original

way.

Jean Bouffartigue, who has left us the most recent and complete treatment of the topic in

his work entitled: L’empereur Julien et la culture de son temps (1992), has clearly

demonstrated Julian’s grasp of the theory and practice of rhetoric.2.

The Three Panegyrics

As an example, in the three panegyrics the young Caesar displays an undeniable

competence in the Epideictic genre, even though he admits rather candidly to neither

having much appetite for the exercise nor much experience in the matter. His

competence, however, is undeniable given that it gives off a strong scent of the school

and of the manual. We can consult the article by Shaun Tougher (1998) on this topic and

more particularly on the topic of the Panegyric to Eusebius, which clearly demonstrates

that the panegyric conforms to the model defined by the rhetorician Menander.3

The scholarly nature of the three panegyrics does not however prevent Julian’s highly

personal style from asserting itself. He knows by heart the rules of the panegyric and the

models of the genre, yet he cannot resist the temptation to give voice to his thoughts on

the limits of the exercise and on the sincerity of its practitioners. This is Julian’s style:

frank and harsh.

Text 1 : Julian, Panegyric in Honour of Constantius (4 b-c). Trans. W. C. Wright (LCL)

And now, what am I to do? What embarrasses me is the fact that, if I praise you, I shall

be thought simply to curry favour, and in fact, the department of panegyric has come to

1 Huart 1978 : 101 quoting Julian’s Panegyric in Honour of Eusebia (120 b-c).

2 Bouffartigue 1992 : 511-545 (Chap. X : Les savoirs de Julien : b) la rhétorique); 625-629.

3 Tougher 1998 : 110-114. On Menander, see Heath 2004.

15

incur a grave suspicion due to its misuse, and is now held to be base flattery rather than

trustworthy testimony to heroic deeds.

Further on, Julian gives away the trick somewhat clumsily in describing himself in the

process of composing his panegyric:4 “What is to be the beginning, what is to be the tone

that will best serve my disquisition?” (4c). Or again: “The rules of the panegyric require

that we make mention of the homeland alongside the ancestors; but, for my part, I do not

know which city to identify as your native land...” (5b).

The Progymnasmata

At the opening of the First Panegyric to Constatius, Julian admits to his incompetence in

rhetorical matters. Bouffartigue has demonstrated that, to the contrary, the young prince

has received and absorbed a full training in rhetoric.

The preliminary exercises, the progymnasmata (fable, tale, story, etc.) have for example

left innumerable traces throughout his oeuvre, his letters included. 5

The Letters

Some of Julian’s letters show that the emperor did not completely scorn the light tone and

ornamentation that is characteristic of sophistry. In a letter addressed to his friend

Evagrius, in which he informs him of his intention to hand over to him a holding in

Bithynia that he had inherited from his grandmother, Julian sees fit to express himself in

such a playful style because his recipient, he asserts, is filled with grace and culture.

Text 2 : Julian, To Evagrius (Letter 25, 427 a). Trans. W.C. Wright (LCL)

And there is no reason why I should not write in a light vein to you who are so full of the graces

and amenities of culture.

Other letters, such as those written to Hecebolius and to a certain George, are of such

sophistry that most experts consider them inauthentic.

In the bulk of the letters, Julian puts into practice the typical features associated with the

rhetorical subject of epistolography. Pierre-Louis Malosse, in a recent article, has

effectively analyzed the varied use of incipit and desinit (preambles and perorations) in

the emperor’s personal correspondence.

4 Malosse (2007 : 192) describes these letters as a “mise en scène du processus épistolaire.”

5 Bouffartigue 1992 : 523-533.

16

Select Bibliography

ATHANASSIADI, P. 2010. Vers la pensée unique. La montée de l’intolérance dans l’Antiquité

tardive. Paris.

ATHANASSIADI, P. 1992. Julian. An Intellectual Biography. London.

BAKER-BRIAN, N. and S. TOUGHER (ed.). 2012. Emperor and Author. The Writings of Julian the

Apostate. Swansea.

BOUFFARTIGUE, J. 2010 a. “L’empereur Julien et les nouvelles dimensions de l’espace profane,”

in É. Rebillard and C. Sotinel (ed.), Les frontières du profane dans l’Antiquité tardive. Rome.

109-126.

BOUFFARTIGUE, J. 2010 b. “Le concept d’atticisme et son axiologie chez les Pères grecs,” in L.

Brisson and P. Chiron (ed.), Rhetorica philosophans. Mélanges offerts à Michel Patillon. Paris.

257-274.

BOUFFARTIGUE, J. 2006. “La lettre de Julien à Thémistios : histoire d’une fausse manœuvre et

d’un désaccord essentiel,” in A. Gonzalez Galvez and P.-L. Malosse (ed.), TOPOI, Supplément 7.

Mélanges A. F. Norman. Lyon. 113-138.

BOUFFARTIGUE, J. 1992. L’Empereur Julien et la culture de son temps. Paris.

BOUFFARTIGUE, J. 1989. “L’état mental de l’empereur Julien,” Revue des Études Grecques 102 :

529-539.

BOWERSOCK, G. W. 1978. Julian the Apostate. Cambridge (Mass.).

CRIBIORE, R. 2007. The School of Libanius in Late Antique Antioch. Princeton.

CRISCUOLO, U. 2006. “Libanios et les philosophes de Julien : le cas de Maxime d’Éphèse,” in A.

Gonzalez Galvez and P.-L. Malosse (ed.), TOPOI, Supplément 7. Mélanges A. F. Norman. Lyon.

103-112.

DIXSAUT, M. 1986. “Isocrate contre des sophistes sans sophistique,” in Le plaisir de parler.

Études de sophistique comparée. Paris. 63-85.

DRAKE, H. 2012. “‘But I digress…’: Rhetoric and Propaganda in Julian’s Second Oration to

Constantius,” in Baker-Brian, N. and S. Tougher (ed.). Emperor and Author. The Writings of

Julian the Apostate. Swansea. 35-46.

ELM, S. 2012 a. Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church. Emperor Julian, Gregory of

Nazianzus, and the Vision of Rome. Berkeley.

ELM, S. 2012 b. “Julian the writer and his audience,” in Baker-Brian, N. and S. Tougher (ed.).

Emperor and Author. The Writings of Julian the Apostate. Swansea. 1-18.

FESTUGIÈRE, A. J. 1959. Antioche païenne et chrétienne. Libanius, Chrysostome et les moines de

Syrie. Paris.

GOULET, R. 2010. “Figures du rhéteur à Athènes au IVe siècle après J.-C.,” in L. Brisson and P.

Chiron (ed.), Rhetorica philosophans. Mélanges offerts à Michel Patillon. Paris. 205-237.

GOULET, R. 2001. “Prohérésius le païen et quelques remarques sur la chronologie d’Eunape de

Sardes,” in Idem, Études sur les vies de philosophes dans l’Antiquité tardive. Paris. 323-347.

HADOT, P. 1991. “La figure du sage dans l’Antiquité gréco-latine,” in G. Gadoffre (ed.), Les

sagesses du monde : un colloque interdisciplinaire. Paris. 9-26.

HEATH, M. 2004. Menander : A Rhetor in Context. Oxford.

HEATHER, P. and D. MONCUR (translation and introduction). 2001. Politics, Philosophy, and

Empire in the Fourth Century. Select Orations of Themistius. Liverpool.

17

HUART, P. 1978. “Julien et l’hellénisme; idées morales et politiques,” in R. Braun and J. Richer

(ed.), L’empereur Julien. De l’histoire à la légende (331-1715). Paris. 99-123.

KENNEDY, G. A. 1983. Greek Rhetoric under Christian Emperors. Princeton.

KENNEDY, G. A. 1980. “Later Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 13 : 181-

197.

LAGACHERIE, O. 2011. “Jeu et enjeux de la rhétorique dans les discours XII et XIII de Libanios,”

in Lagacherie O. and P.-L. Malosse (ed.), Libanios, le premier humaniste. Études en hommage à

Bernard Schouler (Actes du colloque de Montpellier, 18-20 mars 2010). Alessandria. 45-54.

LÖSSL, J. 2012. “Julian’s Consolation to Himself on the Departure of the Excellent Salustius :

Rhetoric and Philosophy in the Fourth Century,” in Baker-Brian, N. and S. Tougher (ed.).

Emperor and Author. The Writings of Julian the Apostate. Swansea. 61-74.

MALOSSE, P.-L. 2007. “Les bagues de l’Empereur Julien. La mise en pratique de la rhétorique

épistolaire dans la correspondance personnelle d’un empereur,” Rhetorica 25 : 183-203.

PAPILLON, T. L. 2007. “Isocrates,” in I. Worthington (ed.), A Companion to Greek Rhetoric.

Oxford. 58-74.

PENELLA, R. J. (translation, annotation and introduction). 2000. The Private Orations of

Themistius. Berkeley.

PENELLA, R. J. 1990. Greek Philosophers and Sophists in the Fourth Century A.D. Studies in

Eunapius of Sardis. Leeds.

QUIROGA, A. (ed.) 2013. The Purpose of Rhetoric in Late Antiquity : From Performance to

Exegesis. Tübingen.

QUIROGA, A. 2009. “Julian’s Misopogon and the subversion of rhetoric,” Antiquité tardive 17 :

127-135.

ROBERT, F. 2008. “La rhétorique au service de la critique du christianisme dans le Contre les

Galiléens de l’empereur Julien,” Revue d’études augustiniennes et patristiques 54 : 221-256.

RODUIT, A. 2006. “Thémistios et ses adversaires : le témoignage du Discours 17,” in A. Gonzalez

Galvez and P.-L. Malosse (ed.), TOPOI, Supplément 7. Mélanges A. F. Norman. Lyon. 139-157.

ROSEN, K. 2006. Julian. Kaiser, Gott und Christenhasser. Stuttgart.

SMITH, R. 1995. Julian’s Gods. Religion and Philosophy in the Thought and Action of Julian the

Apostate. London.

SWAIN, S. 2004. “Sophists and Emperors: The Case of Libanius”, in Idem and M. Edwards (ed.),

Approaching Late Antiquity. The Transformation from Early to Late Empire. Oxford. 355-400.

TOUGHER, S. 2007. Julian the Apostate. Edinburgh.

TOUGHER, S. 1998. “In Praise of an Empress : Julian’s Speech of Thanks to Eusebia,” in M.

Whitby (ed.), The Propaganda of Power. The Role of Panegyric in Late Antiquity. Leiden –

Boston – Köln. 105-123.

VANDERSPOEL, J. 1995. Themistius and the imperial court. Oratory, civic duty, and Paideia from

Constantius to Theodosius. Ann Arbor.

WATT, J. W. 2012. “Julian’s Letter to Themistius – and Themistius’ response?,” in Baker-Brian,

N. and S. Tougher (ed.). Emperor and Author. The Writings of Julian the Apostate. Swansea. 61-

74.

WATTS, E. J. 2006. City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria. Berkeley.