international organisations and the politics of migration

International Organisations and thePolitics of MigrationMartin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud

5 The last two decades have seen major shifts in the way international organisations (IOs)address migration. While state sovereignty remains central in the politics of migration,IOs are increasingly developing their visions regarding how the cross-border movementsof people should be governed (or ‘managed’) and, in some cases, they have becomeimportant actors in the design and implementation of migration policy. Research on the

10 role and functions of IOs remains scarce, however, and there are major uncertainties,concerning not only their actual influence, but also the political context in which theyoperate and the outcome of their initiatives. According to their advocates, theinvolvement of IOs would enable greater international cooperation, which would leadto policies that pay greater attention to human rights and development imperatives. Yet,

15 at times, interventions by IOs seem to reinforce existing imbalances, as theseorganisations primarily tend to align themselves with the interests and agenda ofdeveloped receiving states. In addition, the work of IOs is embedded in a complexinstitutional setting, characterised by sometimes-problematic institutional relationsbetween them, as well as between IOs and other international cooperation mechanisms.

20 Keywords: Migration Policy; Internationalisation; International Organisations; Migra-tion Research; Consultancy

1. Introduction

One of the core trends characterising the last two decades is the regionalisation andinternationalisation of migration-related policy issues. At the regional level, Europe is

Martin Geiger is a Banting Fellow at the Department of Political Science and Institute for European, Russian andEurasian Studies (EURUS), Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada. Correspondence to: Martin Geiger,Department of Political Science and Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University,B647 Loeb, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, K1S 5B6, Canada. E-mail: [email protected]. AntoinePécoud is a Professor of Sociology, University of Paris. Correspondence to: Antoine Pécoud, Professor ofSociology, University of Paris 13, 99 av J-B Clément, 93430 Villetaneuse, France. E-mail: [email protected].

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 2013http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.855071

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25 particularly concerned with the progressive elaboration of an EU migration regime,coupled with the increasing cooperation of neighbouring countries; another keydevelopment was the creation, in 1991, of the Budapest Process [which bringstogether European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA)states with the former communist bloc]. Similar regional consultative processes

30 (RCPs) have been launched in other world regions (Thouez and Channac 2006) andcoexist with one of the first forums of this kind, the Intergovernmental Consultations(IGC) on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America andAustralia, launched in 1985. Another milestone at the international level was the 1994Cairo Conference on Population and Development, which was followed by other

35 similar forums—including, for example, the first United Nations (UN) High-LevelDialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD, 2006, followed by asecond dialogue in 2013) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development(GFMD, organised yearly since 2007).

While the interest of international organisations (IOs) in migration is not new,40 these regional and international developments have created a favourable context for

them, as one of their main raisons d’être is to support states in their efforts toestablish policy consultations and cooperation. IOs have consequently been able toincrease their role and activities in the field of migration; this includes in particularthe substantial growth of certain agencies like the International Organisation for

45 Migration (IOM), the establishment of new organisations (e.g., the InternationalCentre for Migration Policy Development, ICMPD, in 1993), and the creation ofnovel patterns of cooperation between agencies, such as through the Global MigrationGroup (GMG) which was set up in 2006 (Pécoud 2013).1

The actual role and activities of IOs in the politics of migration remain under-50 researched, however. There is a growing body of work on the role of EU institutions

(e.g., Boswell 2008a; Geddes 2001; Guiraudon 2003), but no comparable work oninternational institutions. Little is known on the strategies of IOs, on their influenceon policy-making, on the worldviews they promote, or on the nature of theirinterventions and their actual contribution to policy implementation. This contrasts

55 with, for example, finance, security or development studies, which have long beenscrutinising the role of organisations like the UN, the World Bank, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (e.g., Broome andSeabrook 2012; Wallach and Woodall 2004).

2. State Sovereignty, Immigration Policy and IOs: A Short Historical Perspective

60 The interest of IOs in international migration is far from new. In 1919, upon itscreation, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) mentioned, in its Constitution,‘the protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other thantheir own’. This resulted in the establishment of international law instruments for therecruitment and treatment of foreign workers. There was strong resistance, however:

65 the pre-Second World War context, characterised by economic crises and strong

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nationalist and protectionist tendencies, was unsupportive of the efforts to promotemigrant workers’ rights (Battistella 2009). In the second half of the twentieth century,the development of human rights, along with the need for foreign labour in boomingWestern states, led to renewed interest in norms pertaining to migrants’ rights and to

70 the adoption of new Conventions by both the ILO and the UN.2 Again, however,states proved reluctant to ratify and implement these treaties (Cholewinski,de Guchteneire, and Pécoud 2009), making it difficult to establish the human rightsof migrants as an object of international cooperation (Pécoud 2009).

Today, international migration is commonly represented as an issue that is closely75 associated with ‘state sovereignty’. States, the argument goes, would engage in

international cooperation over a wide range of transnational issues but, as SaskiaSassen writes, ‘when it comes to immigrants and refugees, … the national state claimsall its old splendour in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders’ (Sassen1996, 59). Even if cooperation were recognised as useful, or even necessary, in

80 properly ‘managing’ migration, it would face the obstacle of states’ concern over thesovereign control of human mobility (Martin, Martin, and Weil 2006). States’unilateral approach to migration would most obviously manifest itself through theone-sided way they control their borders, and by the persistence of such methodsover time (see e.g., Zolberg 1997). In this view, migration politics is marked by the

85 ‘tyranny of the national’ (Noiriel 1991) and ‘cooperation’ (including the role of IOs)is something that would have yet to emerge.

Nevertheless, this ignores the fact that, from a functionalist point of view, theinternational nature of migration dynamics has long made them amenable forinternational cooperation. The longue durée perspective not only shows that ‘the state

90 monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement’ is the outcome of a long-standing, sometimes incomplete, and still on-going process, as governments have tocope with the influence of non-state actors (like corporations) while also struggling todevelop and maintain the bureaucratic and administrative resources to successfullymonitor peoples’ mobility (Torpey 2000; see also Geiger 2013). It also reveals the

95 permanent tension between sovereignty and cooperation in migration politics.Indeed, the ILO’s early work did not arise out of nothing, but reflected the politicalconcerns of the time with regard to the need to foster cooperation betweengovernments, to strengthen the international legal framework in which labourmigration took place, or to treat foreigners in a way that did not hurt receiving states’

100 diplomatic interests (Rosental 2006, 2011). Importantly, these concerns were not bornsolely out of humanitarian or idealistic preoccupations, but displayed a mix of social,economic and political imperatives (as, for instance, social rights could help tomonitor foreigners’ presence and activities).

Another object of early international cooperation concerns asylum seekers and105 refugees. The position of a High Commissioner for Refugees was first created in 1921

by the League of Nations, which marked the beginning of a process that culminatedin the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 andthe adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Loescher 2001). This also resulted in

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 3


an institutional fragmentation that exists to this day. For historical and political110 reasons (framed by World War II [WWII] and the East–West confrontation),

attention was mostly focused on the creation of a regime for refugee protection. TheILO nevertheless kept its labour migrants’ rights mandate, which indicated the sharpdiscrepancy in the treatment of refugees and (labour) migrants by IOs andgovernments. To further complicate the picture, yet another IO was created in

115 1951, but outside the UN system: what is now the IOM was initially called theProvisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants fromEurope (PICMME), designed as a temporary Europe-centred organisation with afocus on logistics and transportation (rather than on protection). The IOM onlybecame a permanent organisation in 1989 (Georgi 2010).

120 These developments resulted in at least three different policy/legal categories,and in a kind of division of labour between IOs: migrant workers’ rights (promotedby the ILO and later by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for HumanRights (OHCHR)), refugees and asylum (through the UNHCR), and logistical andother practical services to governments (by the PICMME/IOM). This configura-

125 tion was the object (and result) of much debate. The ILO, as the oldest agency withexperience in migration, was in favour of a comprehensive approach in addressingthe rights and protection of all those on the move. This was to some extent in linewith Europe’s reality in the post-WWII context, which saw a high number ofdisplaced people—but with no clear distinction between refugees and migrants.

130 Yet, some influential governments, including those of the USA and the UK,resisted the idea of giving too much influence to a single institution, particularly inlight of the fears surrounding a ‘communist influence’ in UN institutions thatcharacterised the cold war context. This is also why, until today, the IOM remainedoutside the UN system. This resulted in a piecemeal approach and a (deliberately)

135 fragmented situation (Karatani 2005).

3. IOs in Migration Politics: The Post-Cold War Context

The post-cold war period saw a number of changes in the relationship between IOsand migration politics. There were at least two interrelated dynamics at play: (1) theend of the East–West conflict raised hopes regarding the emergence of a consensus

140 on certain transnational issues and the elaboration of new mechanisms to regulatethem at the international level; and (2) the search for these new mechanismssimultaneously resulted from fears surrounding the decline of states’ influence andcapacities in a world that gradually became understood as a ‘global village’. Thecollapse of Communist states, along with the penetration of capitalism and the

145 intensification of market deregulation, created an environment in which sovereigntywas perceived as under threat—hence the search for solutions to the ‘crisis of thenation state’ and for new modes of ‘global governance’ that motivated, among otherthings, the creation of the Commission on Global Governance in 1995.



International migration was one of the issues, even if not the focal one, which150 exemplified these concerns. It became understood, both by some analysts and by

policy-makers, as a destabilising factor for states and societies. In Europe, fears overmassive East–West migration, along with refugee flows from the Balkans, illustratedhow migration and refugee movements could create security challenges. So-called‘new’ types of migration emerged in academic and political discourses, including

155 ‘human trafficking’ and the role of smugglers in facilitating irregular migration (e.g.,Salt 2001), or the impact of climate change in forcing people to migrate (Gemenne2011). These notions melded with preoccupations over perceived migration orrefugee ‘crises’ (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1992; Loescher and Loescher 1994; Weiner1995) and in debates regarding the ability of states to control migration (Freeman

160 1994; Sassen 1996).International debates on migration started to display a dual and ambivalent nature.

On the one hand, the interest in inter-state cooperation reflected the search for newstrategies to control and limit migration. Mechanisms such as the IGC or new IOslike the ICMPD were designed for states to exchange information, join forces and

165 react rapidly to migration challenges. The ‘internationalisation’ of migration politicswas then above all a strategy to preserve national/sovereign control over humanmobility. On the other hand, however, debates were also marked by the felt need todevelop genuinely ‘global’ and concerted migration policies; the intention was to gobeyond narrow, control-oriented concerns and to address broader imperatives (like

170 the development of sending regions, the need for migrant labour in developedeconomies, or the rights of migrants), and therefore to move migration away from thesecurity/control extent to, eventually, ‘manage’ it in a cooperative and comprehensivemanner. The work of Bimal Ghosh (1993, 2012) for the Commission on GlobalGovernance was quite influential in promoting such views. Despite (or thanks to) its

175 ambivalent nature, interest in these issues translated into several major initiatives.Following the 1994 Cairo Conference, migration became the focus of the GlobalCommission on International Migration (GCIM, 2003–2005), while other globalforums were set up (including the UN HLD and the GFMD).

From a neofunctionalist perspective, the ‘problems’ themselves and the interde-180 pendencies they create between states do not alone explain why IOs become

legitimate actors; the key point is the extent to which there is an agreement betweenstates to foster political integration. Thus, international migration may currently bein the process of turning into a truly ‘global’ issue, not necessarily because it hasbecome ‘more international’ or because we live in the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and

185 Miller 2009), but rather because it is being recognised by states as a topic worthy ofattention at the international level. This is why, for example, ‘the UNHCR … grewmuch faster than the number of refugees in the world … The UNHCR’s growth …

could not have been fuelled exclusively by the technical demands imposed by agreater refugee population. It was fuelled as well (perhaps primarily) by an



190 increasing political consensus among states that they had an ethical responsibility toameliorate the plight of refugees’ (Barkin 2006, 32).

In this respect, the ‘migration crisis’ (whether real or perceived) played a centralrole, by highlighting the limits of unilateral state interventions and the necessityfor governments to cooperate in achieving their goals; this prompted a renewed

195 interest in bilateral agreements (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010) andin multilateral initiatives, at the regional and international levels. IOs thus becamea more important element in states’ strategies, which in some cases meantreadjusting their mandates: the UNHCR had to address the question of how totreat not only asylum and refugee resettlement (Garnier 2014), but also migration,

200 and particularly the so-called ‘mixed’ flows (in which ‘genuine’ refugees are hardto distinguish from other categories of people on the move); the ILO (and the UNat large) have also been struggling to adapt their rights-based mandate to a moregovernance- and control-oriented context (Pécoud and de Guchteneire 2007).

Yet, such ‘real-world’ developments are only one side of the coin. Nay (2011)205 argues that changes within IOs result from both external pressure and from internal

dynamics; in particular, IOs should be seen as ‘bureaucratic entrepreneurs’ capable ofseizing external opportunities and responding innovatively to them. Indeed,neoinstitutionalist research has long made it clear that one cannot see IOs as staticsets of rules, mandates, bodies, etc., but as actors that can behave in a somewhat

210 autonomous manner, for instance by expanding in directions that were not initiallyexpected (or by failing to do what they are tasked to do). This scholarship has alsoshowed how IOs may be less concerned with their formal mission than with theirown rules – or survival. Thus, both the UNHCR and the IOM were originallysupposed to work within the European context; yet, the scope of their interventions

215 gradually became global, in a process that had much to do with IOs themselveslooking for work opportunities outside Europe (once this continent became morepeaceful and less ‘promising’ in terms of the ‘problems’ IOs are tasked to address).This is even more obvious in the case of the IOM, which was not destined to becomea permanent organisation, but nevertheless managed to endure by constantly

220 reinventing its role and functions—becoming so successful in this endeavour that ithas been growing substantially over the past decade (Georgi 2010; Loescher 2001).3

At a smaller scale, several other IOs whose formal mandate does not explicitlyfocus on migration were able to step in, by channelling their field of expertise (likehealth, development or transnational crime, etc.) to the cross-border movements of

225 people; this is the case of most of the agencies that are currently part of the GMG,and that thereby displayed a certain agency in redefining their activities. AsKathleen Newland sums up:

attention to international migration in the 1990s was sporadic and largely fruitless…No UN agency had migrants or migration processes as priorities… All of this changed

230 quite suddenly around the turn of the millennium. Suddenly, migration waseverywhere one looked in the UN system and beyond. (Newland 2010, 331–332).



4. Investigating the Role of IOs in the Politics of Migration

According to Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, ‘surprisingly few … studentsof IOs have been critical of their performance or desirability’ (1999, 701). This lack of

235 criticism and general ‘optimism’ about IOs might be caused by the widespreadassumption that they do what they are mandated to do, that is, solve problems andfoster cooperation between states–which is arguably preferable to confrontation,conflict or war. As far as migration is concerned, however, this optimism makes for asurprising paradox. It is common to criticise certain states for designing inappropri-

240 ate or unsuccessful migration policies (Castles 2004), but the same criticisms arehardly applied to IOs. Nonetheless, if the way states deal with migration is open tocritique, and if states are the primary instruction-givers of IOs, it would logicallyfollow that IOs should also become the focus of criticism, since they must be equallyunsuccessful in their migration initiatives.

245 Writing about the IOM, Rutvica Andrijasevic and William Walters note that:

despite the fact that [it] has become a major operator in the field of internationalborders and migration governance, there is surprisingly very little academic researchthat has interrogated this agency. Migration scholars routinely use IOM material asdata, and often participate in IOM research and policy programmes. But rarely has it

250 been the subject of critical scrutiny itself. … It is high time that the IOM [is] made anobject of inquiry in its own right. (2010, 980)

It is indeed striking to observe that, despite the influence of this organisation, only asmall number of articles were published on its activities, and only in very recent years(e.g., Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Caillaut 2012; Collyer 2012; Felli 2013; Geiger

255 2010; Georgi 2010; Georgi and Schatral 2012; Pécoud 2010). Oleg Korneev’s analysisof the IOM’s role in the elaboration and implementation of the EU-Russiareadmission agreement thus clearly stresses the need to acknowledge the importanceof this organisation in brokering and essentially organising international cooperationin the field of migration (Korneev 2014).

260 A similar lack of research concerns other important agencies. The work of the ILO,for instance, seems to be researched mainly from historical or legal perspectives(Böhning 1991; Haseneau 1991; Rosental 2006). Very little information is alsoavailable on the activities and possible influence of other increasingly importantinstitutions, like the UN Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank (even

265 if this may be understandable given their recent engagement with migration). Otherregional bodies (like the IGC, the ICMPD, and RCPs) are in the same situation(Georgi 2007; Hess 2010; Oelgemöller 2011; Thouez and Channac 2006).

The case of the UNHCR is quite different. It has been the object of much moreresearch, especially on its history and on the political, legal and humanitarian

270 dilemmas that characterise its agenda. Although there is no room here for anoverview of this literature, one can nevertheless observe that, while the UNHCR isregularly criticised for failing to protect refugees and for betraying its founding ideal



in the face of the political pressure put on by developed receiving states, this is usuallyinterpreted as a ‘challenge’ stemming from the environment in which the UNHCR

275 operates, and not from the UNHCR itself. The agency tends to be viewed asinherently well intentioned, as simply trying to do its best in a difficult setting. ButJennifer Hyndman (2000) provides a critical assessment of the UNHCR’s actualactivities, which leads her to stress the need to ‘study up’ and to complement theanalysis of migrants’ or refugees’ situation with an investigation of the institutions

280 that govern their lives (see also Agier 2006). Bhupinder Chimni (1998) underlines theclose ties that exist between the UNHCR and the research community, to the extentthat debates on this organisation often take the form of sympathetic comments ratherthan of criticism. In this matter, the need for such a critical approach is made clear bystudies on the UNHCR’s involvement in refugee resettlement (Garnier 2014), its

285 contribution to ‘migration management’ (Ratfisch and Scheel 2014) and itscooperation with the IOM in the area of ‘voluntary return’ (Koch 2014).

Discussing the role of IOs is difficult not only because of the general optimism thatsurrounds their activities or of the connections between them and researchers, but alsobecause of their fundamentally ambiguous nature. Indeed, when one speaks of an IO,

290 what does one refer to? Is it the mandate it receives from its member state, as well as itsresolutions and documents, adopted through consultative or decision-making pro-cesses? Perhaps, it refers to its role in promoting debates and exchanges betweengovernments and other actors? Could it be its corporate strategy to convincegovernments of its practicality as a means to ensure organisational growth (or

295 survival)? Or does an IO refer to the projects it manages at the country level and thegoodwill and values of its staff members? Depending on the focus of the research, theconclusions will be quite different. This is also a methodological issue. Some aspects ofthe work of IOs are quite accessible (including official documents and formalresolutions); in some cases, it may be feasible to speak to staff, even at high levels of

300 responsibility. Nonetheless on-the-ground projects can be very difficult to investigateempirically: outside researchers may be welcome at conferences or symposia, butmaybe not where IOs’ ‘real life’ decisions and activities are piloted and implemented.

To some extent, these different takes on IOs in regard to migration politics echothe controversies that pervade the scholarship on IOs in general. One can look at IOs

305 as formal institutions and investigate their mandate, constituency, organisationalstructure, internal rules, budget, etc. This may be useful in understanding thespecificity of each IO. For example, the IOM is known for being highly decentralised,and for its so-called ‘projectisation’ system, which means that funding is almostexclusively dependent upon specific projects.4 This particular style of management is

310 quite distinct from most UN agencies and confers a strong influence to key donorsand to field offices, which are responsible for attracting financial support. This callsfor a political sociology of IOs, which investigates the on-the-ground strategiesdeveloped by IOs and their relationships to their environment, in a way that (as notedabove) may account for changes over time in their role and functions.



315 By contrast, regime theory tends to look at IOs as ‘black boxes’ that constitutemore or less crucial building blocks in international cooperation; the issue then is notreally the services provided by IOs or the projects they implement on the ground, butrather their function as forums for states to reach multilateral agreements (Krasner1983). One can then contrast the relatively robust refugee regime, in which the

320 UNHCR plays a key role, with the much more fragile sets of rules and institutionsthat apply to international migration (Betts 2011). One can further discuss therelationship between IOs as ‘agents’ and their ‘principals’ (namely states): while, in arealist vein, IOs serve merely as the executor of states’ instructions, other scholarsstress their quest for autonomy (which may enable them to display agency and

325 promote their own worldviews), as well as their relationships with non-state actors(like non-governmental organisations, NGOs). Finally, research by internationalrelations (IR) scholars and political scientists is often marked by a lack of sociologicaland anthropological perspectives on IOs as organisations with staff, values, strategies,culture, internal tensions, etc. (see Cox and Jacobson 1973; Barnett and Finnemore

330 1999; Ness and Brechin 1988).A key issue that pervades these different approaches looks at the place of an IO

within the broader environment. Before WWII, the ILO was already struggling toimpose its agenda in the face of competing initiatives, like bilateral agreements andparallel multilateral processes (Rosental 2006). Today, a body like the IGC represents

335 the same kind of challenge, as it enables powerful receiving states to exchange anddiscuss their strategies outside IOs, in a manner that is characterised by greaterinformality and confidentiality (Oelgemöller 2011). While more formal and global,the GFMD is also situated outside the UN system and keeps IOs in a secondaryposition. In addition, IOs do not only coexist with other international processes that

340 bypass them, but also with each other, in sometimes quite contentious ways.Formally, competition between IOs makes little sense: if one assumes that they followstates’ directives, most of them having the same constituency, competition betweenIOs would only signal a lack of coordination between states, which would erroneouslygive the same task to more than one institution. Of course, this formal perspective is

345 too narrow and ignores the agency of IOs and their quest for autonomy. Nevertheless,it points to the role of states: what appears as ‘competition’ from the point of view ofan IO may indeed be a strategy from governments’ standpoint. As noted above, theway migration was split between agencies after WWII shows how governmentsdeliberately avoided the creation of a single powerful agency. In this respect, far from

350 being the consequence of IOs’ conflicting strategies, competition is organised bygovernments as a functional dimension of IOs’ working environment (Betts 2011).

In sum, the nature of IOs is complex to capture, which makes an assessment oftheir precise role difficult. The structural relation between states and IOs could serveas a basis for criticising their role as instruments of governments; yet, it is equally

355 possible to view them as doing ‘good’ work despite a ‘bad’ environment for whichstates (and especially Western developed states) would be primarily responsible.



4.1. Influence of IOs

Overall, IOs’ role and influence are marked by a paradox. On the one hand, theycould (or should) be the building blocks for establishing a new global system, which is

360 a highly relevant task in an age of globalisation. At the same time, however, thereremains considerable scepticism about their ability to meet the challenges they aredesigned to address. Both policy-makers and scholars regularly express concernsabout the capacity of IOs to reform and innovate, which in turns deepens doubts oftheir relevance and legitimacy in today’s world (Muldoon 2004). As far as migration

365 is concerned, the influence of IOs is further debatable, because the issue does not—with the exception of the IOM—belong to their core fields of competence. Moreover,IOs and their efforts still coexist with long-standing uni- or bilateral state approaches,as well as with competing regional/international bodies whose existence indicates thereluctance of governments to confer too much influence to IOs. The field of

370 international migration policy is therefore fragmented, which weakens the capacity ofIOs and enables states to go ‘venue-shopping’ and select the IO or forum they wish,depending on their interests.

The influence of IOs also varies greatly according to agencies and topics; some IOsare arguably more influential than others, and their influence may be greater in some

375 areas than in others. While several agencies are active in the field of migration, it isprobably fair to say that they do not all have the same influence; the UNHCR and theIOM are likely to exert the greatest influence in this respect, while other supposedly‘strong’ institutions (like the UNDP or the World Bank) are potentially veryinfluential, but still new players. By contrast, the work of other agencies in migration

380 may have very little impact, even if these institutions are key actors in other policyareas [like the World Health Organization (WHO) on health, the UNICEF onchildren, the WTO on trade, etc.]. Assessing the influence of IOs points again to therole of states. Is an IO influential, because it manages to develop sound policyrecommendations and implement useful projects on the ground? Or does its

385 influence stem from the support it enjoys from powerful governments? Alternativelyput, does their weakness reflect their own organisational shortcomings, or rather alack of necessary support from governments?

According to Foucault-inspired analysts (e.g., Larner and Walters 2002; Merlingen2003), the power of IOs can be interpreted as a form of ‘global governmentality’. By

390 setting standards, and by monitoring states’ behaviour, their work would amount to the‘conduct of conduct’ of states. Even without exercising direct coercive power, theywould determine the ‘right’ policies to be implemented by governments and developthe instruments through which to assess their compliance with these principles.Governments would not perceive the norms of IOs as imposed on them from more

395 powerful external actors; on the contrary, they would ‘self-discipline’ themselves,‘socialise’ with and adhere to these norms, understood as unquestionable universalvalues (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990; Joseph 2009; Manohka 2009; Schimmelpfennig2000). Moreover, as Stephan Scheel and Philipp Ratfisch describe, in the particular area



of migration politics, the role of IOs is not limited to ‘disciplining’ the ‘conduct of400 conduct’ of states, but also to the influence on individual people and their (migratory)

behaviour (Scheel and Ratfisch 2014, see also Geiger and Pécoud 2013a; Nieuwenhuysand Pécoud 2007).

This nevertheless leaves the ‘cui bono?’ question somewhat unanswered. The issueis therefore to assess whether IOs work ‘for the interests of all’ (as their mandate and

405 rhetoric claim), for their own interests as institutions, for the interest of particularstates to the detriment of others, or for certain interest groups within countries. Froma realist perspective, powerful states exert the greatest influence; IOs are then logicallyforced to act in a way that is compatible with these states’ interests and their claimed‘universality’ is therefore inherently flawed. On the other hand, this universality is

410 crucial, as it hides the real power relations between states and enables IOs tointervene in a neutral, technical and (potentially) more efficient manner. Accordingto Andrijasevic and Walters (2010), the IOM is thus well-adapted to a post-imperialworld, in which states are in principle independent and where dominant governmentsare not supposed to impose their views on the rest of the world. Yet, there are many

415 issues—and the control of borders is one of them—that are characterised by stateinterdependency, and for which dominant states feel the need to steer the behaviourof other states. This is where the IOM’s added value comes in, as this organisation hasthe capacity to guide the behaviour of weak states through persuasion, in a mannerthat formally respects their sovereignty.

420 Colleen Thouez and Sarah Rosengartner (2007) provide another example bylooking at the IOM’s role in RCPs. These are designed to enable governments in agiven region to discuss migration; whereas one could expect these exchanges to beregion-specific and to address issues that are most salient in the respective regions,they seem on the contrary to focus on more or less the same topics—and, what is

425 more, on precisely those topics that matter most for receiving governments (i.e.,border control). This paradoxical situation partly has to do with the fact that mostRCPs (like the Puebla Process or the Colombo Process) have the IOM as their‘secretariat’, meaning that this agency plays a key role in steering discussions andsetting the agenda. This not only enables the IOM to subsequently get involved in the

430 implementation of the initiatives agreed upon within RCPs, but it also illustrates theway in which an IO can vehicle the concerns of its most important member states,even when working ‘for the benefit’ of non-Western countries. Moreover, it showshow an IO can ‘export’ both concerns and practical ‘solutions’ from one part of theworld to the others (Geiger 2010; see also Korneev 2014).

435 4.2. Discourses of IOs

IOs produce influential sets of discourses, narratives or ‘scripts’ that then shape theway issues are framed, apprehended and addressed: ‘even when they lack materialresources, IOs exercise power as they constitute and construct the social world’(Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 700, see also Merçay 2014). Thanks to their good



440 reputation, access to data and information, and universal mandate, IOs are in aposition to influence the understandings of certain ‘challenges’ and to propose‘adequate’ recommendations on how to address them. Their involvement inmigration policy has thus developed along with the elaboration of discourses onwhat migration is and how it should be ‘managed’, contained in a relatively high

445 number of reports published since approximately 2000 (like the GCIM report, theWorld Migration Reports published by the IOM, or the UNDP 2009 HumanDevelopment Report).

Some of the core elements of IOs’ discourses on migration include the constructionof cross-border movements as a ‘global’ issue to be addressed ‘globally’; a positive

450 appreciation of migration as a ‘normal’ process that should be managed to benefitsending and receiving societies, and migrants alike (‘triple-win’); an emphasis oncooperation between states in handling migration, and on the linkages betweenmigration and other policy fields (like development); an adherence to universalprinciples, including human rights, but also to free-market beliefs, through the

455 recognition of the need to facilitate the ‘circulation’ of labour in a globalising world(Amaya-Castro 2012; Boucher 2008; Gamlen 2010; Kalm 2010; Levatino and Pécoud2012). At least three political agendas pervade these discourses: (1) the securityconcern with border surveillance and the control of unauthorised migration, (2) thelabour market preoccupation with economic migration and employers’ need for

460 foreign labour, and (3) the humanitarian imperative to foster development in sendingregions and to protect migrants, ‘victims’ of human trafficking, asylum seekers,refugees as well as (to a lesser extent) left-behind populations (Geiger and Pécoud2012; see also Carling and Hernandez-Carretero 2011).

These agendas usually mobilise different actors. The first is associated with home465 affairs ministries in receiving countries, while the second is a typical private sector

concern; the third is rather in line with IOs and NGOs, along with sending states andsome segments of receiving societies. Despite these groupings, the boundaries are notalways neat. For example, IOs struggle to incorporate the concerns of both receivingand sending countries, while the latter sometimes share parts of security-oriented

470 objectives. These three agendas are therefore not monolithic, but feature internaldebates. There are disagreements on how best to achieve security objectives, betweensmart borders policies and opening legal migration channels, for instance. There arealso discussions within the third agenda, such as those that oppose legalistic rights-based protection and less formal humanitarian interventions.

475 There are also debates between these different agendas. Control/security policies arecriticised for being unsupportive of economic growth (by the private sector), for leadingto human rights abuses (by NGOs) or for ignoring the development needs of sendingregions (by IOs). Similarly, employers’ needs for foreign labour would jeopardisedevelopment (e.g., in the case of skilled migration), violate migrants’ human and labour

480 rights (as foreign workers are expected to ‘do the dirty work’), or fuel irregularmigration channels (by attracting undeclared migrant labour). In turn, the protectionagenda, and particularly the right to seek asylum, would enable irregular migrants to



bypass admission policies, while being ‘economically useless’. The stated purpose ofIOs’ narratives, then, is to fine-tune migration policies and identify the ‘just right’

485 equilibrium between these different agendas. This is a compromising exercise that,inevitably, faces criticism from all sides (see Ghosh 2012).

What is special about IOs’ discourses is not, however, that they fail to conciliateirreconcilable political objectives. It is that they claim to do so by offering a somewhattotalising policy narrative that transcends political dilemmas and diverging interests.

490 This is also what makes these narratives relatively new. Indeed, the three politicalagendas outlined above are not new in and of themselves; their respective importancehas varied according to times and places, but they have long characterised migrationpolitics. It is the way IOs re-use and re-frame old arguments that raises a number ofnew issues.

495 One of these is the ‘managerial’ approach to migration. It is clearly an outcome ofthe ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) philosophy, which sees public actors developmarket-oriented positions to enhance cost-effectiveness. ‘Migration management’could also be seen as a reaction to the over-politicisation (or even ‘scandalisation’) ofmigration; over-politicisation makes the work of IOs difficult, and the argument

500 according to which political sensitivity would inhibit the development of econom-ically ‘sound’ policies is a common one. The issue then is the respective importance oftechnical/economic and political concerns; ‘migration management’ is clearly on theeconomic side, with the risk of downplaying values, rights and democratic legitimacy(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Kalm 2010). Another implication of IOs’ narratives is

505 their comprehensive and holistic nature. Migration policy is traditionally afragmented field, as different institutional actors and ministries deal with admission,integration, asylum, the labour market, international cooperation, human rights,development, etc. One of the key objectives of IOs in their interventions is—to usetheir jargon—to ‘mainstream’ migration and achieve ‘policy coherence’.

510 Chris Shore and Susan Wright (1997, 8) argue that ‘a key feature of modern power’is the masking of the political ‘under the cloak of neutrality’. Introducing amanagerial logic, promoting unquestionably ‘good’ objectives (development, goodgovernance, cooperation, protection of migrants and refugees, ‘policy coherence’,etc.), and claiming to benefit all parties—are all ways of depoliticising migration. This

515 enables IOs to appear as ‘impersonal, value-neutral, not self-interested and hencetechnocratic actors whose purpose is not the exercise of power but equitable problem-solving’ (Lavenex 2007, 253).

This calls for critically assessing the actual meanings and implications of even themost widely accepted objectives of IOs. Their narratives indeed rely upon assumptions

520 that seem so straightforward that they are hardly questioned. This applies to‘cooperation’, for example, ‘the sweetest and seemingly entirely unproblematic ofwords’ according to Raymond Apthorpe, adding, ‘we should… be suspicious of a termwhich is agreed among so many people, which everybody likes, and which everybody isin favour of’ (Apthorpe 1997, 53). Indeed, there is evidence that ‘cooperation’ may

525 mean nothing else than the imposition of control/security concerns upon sending



countries (Pina-Delgado 2013). The same applies to the protection, humanitarian anddevelopment-oriented agendas of IOs, usually presented as a much needed, positive andhuman rights-friendly counterpart to securitisation. Yet, Stephen Castles and Nicholasvan Hear (2011) warn that ‘helping’ states to develop or ‘protecting’ deserving migrants

530 (to the detriment of others) can display patterns of violence and power relations that—while less direct and visible than border surveillance—are just as real. Parvati Raghuram(2009) also stresses the normative, and sometimes even coercive, assumptions in theaspirations to transform migrants into ‘development agents’.

4.3. Practices of IOs

535 A strategy to unveil some of the realities behind IOs’ consensual narratives is toinvestigate the on-the-ground projects that are put in place under their discursiveumbrella (Caillaut 2012; Geiger 2010, 2011). This is a particularly under-researchedarea. Contributions to this special issue examine different examples of such practices,including readmission, refugee resettlement, the treatment of asylum seekers and

540 ‘voluntary’ return. What can be observed is that most IO practices are situatedsomewhere inside the triangle formed by the three policy agendas outlined above.

For example, so-called ‘counter-trafficking’, ‘readmission’ and ‘voluntary return’initiatives (Korneev 2014; Koch 2014, this issue) lie between security and humanit-arian concerns, while attempts to foster migration (i.e., ‘circular migration’) try to

545 conciliate the need for foreign labour with development efforts (Merçay 2014).Capacity-building would be situated in the middle of the triangle, as it usually aims atachieving all three objectives (Geiger 2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart 2010). Thetreatment of asylum seekers also displays a mix of humanitarian concerns and controlobjectives (Ratfisch and Scheel 2014; Garnier 2014). The same would apply to the

550 information campaigns put in place to prevent migration or trafficking (Nieuwenhuysand Pécoud 2007). ‘Border management’ initiatives lie in-between the security agendaand the need to facilitate needed migration.

What is striking is that IOs’ practices are almost never ‘chemically pure’ in terms oftheir policy objectives. This has to do with their comprehensive approach defined

555 above, which aims at satisfying very different interests and partners. The result ismorally and politically confusing situations; practices always seem to combine ‘bad’(security) measures with ‘good’ (development, protection) initiatives, along with some‘necessary’ (labour) elements. The typical IO approach would hence be ‘pragmatic’,attempting to find its way between different imperatives and to do the most out of

560 inevitable constraints. It follows that criticising IOs’ efforts would amount to stickingto idealistic assumptions that, by making compromises difficult, would do more harmthan good.

One of the clearest examples of this confusion lies in ‘return’ programmes. Asrecent research makes clear, such programmes have become central among IOs’

565 activities. This is the case of the IOM, but it is not unique in this respect: Anne Koch(2014) shows, for example, how the IOM’s services are also of indirect use to the



UNHCR. Such activities highlight the power of words and of labelling; what is‘voluntary’ about a return may be nothing more than the fact that a number ofinfluential actors have decided to call it ‘voluntary’. Indeed, as Michael Collyer

570 euphemistically observes, ‘it is not always clear that the label “voluntary” is entirelyaccurate’ (Collyer 2012, 286). They also display the depoliticising tendency discussedearlier: the same author further observes that the violence of such practices, and theimbalances of power they are based upon (between governments and migrants as wellas between governments of unequal power), is somewhat neutralised and isolated in a

575 ‘technocratic bubble’ (Collyer 2012, 278).Investigating the practices of IOs is also a way of assessing their influence. There is

indeed evidence that so-called ‘capacity-building’ activities do have an impact,especially in less developed countries. Given their political weakness and perceivedlack of experience, these countries are exposed to external interventions seeking to

580 shape their migration policy, often through IOs’ ‘help’ and ‘expertise’; while this isformally done for the sake of development and ‘in their interests’, there are obvious—but often unexplored—hidden agendas at stake in such processes (Caillaut 2012; Geiger2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fenart 2010).

What these examples make clear is the disconnection between IO narratives and585 practices (Basok and Piper 2012; Geiger and Pécoud 2010). The former envisages a

clear-cut yet imagined ideal ‘migration world’ (Walters 2010) in which people wouldmove for the benefit of all, while the latter take the form of much more down-to-earth projects that do not seem to have the potential to transform the world in such away—and even seem to reinforce existing trends. This situation can be interpreted as

590 an indication that IOs are unable to actually do what they claim they want to do; theywould rather talk than act and this gap between narratives and practices demonstratestheir powerlessness. Yet, another interpretation is that the function of IOs is preciselyto provide a new discursive framework for practices that are not in themselves new orchallenging. The apparent dichotomy between narratives and practices would then be

595 functional and developing and communicating discourses, policy scripts and ‘stories’would be a kind of practice in its own right.

5. Conclusion: IOs and Critical Migration Studies

The work of IOs, especially as far as the production of ideas and discourses isconcerned, is often done in close cooperation with researchers, experts and

600 consultants, whether they come from academic or from alternate institutions (e.g.,think-tanks). Reviewing the 2009 UNDP report on migration, Alan Gamlen observesthat it reads like a ‘who’s who of contemporary migration and developmentresearchers’ (2010, 415). The same could be said of other influential reports, suchas the six ‘World Migration Reports’ published by the IOM since 2000. Apart from

605 these reports, IOs also contribute to knowledge-production by publishing books andacademic journals and, in some cases, by funding research.



There are many reasons that explain (and sometimes justify) the cooperationbetween IOs and researchers. Although with different objectives, both producemigration narratives. Cooperation with IOs may be crucial for researchers in order to

610 access data and establish contacts. Moreover, IOs tend to be more open to a widerrange of migration-related issues than, say, governments in receiving countries. Theytherefore represent an attractive venue for researchers who believe that non-securitytopics such as development, human rights or global governance mechanisms areimportant. In a Weberian perspective, IOs as bureaucracies benefit from this access to

615 specialised knowledge and from the reputation of academics, whose (assumingly)‘neutral’, ‘objective and ‘scientific’ work confers technical and scientific legitimacy toIOs (Boswell 2008b; Hatton 2011). In turn, researchers benefit from the easy andquick dissemination of their research findings through IOs.

This may nevertheless be problematic. IOs indeed remain political (and620 sometimes closed) institutions, which may be incompatible with the conduct of

proper research. Analysing the role of the World Bank as a ‘knowledge agency’,John Toye and Richard Toye (2006) point out the contradictions betweenindependent and disinterested research and the power games within this organisa-tion, which include both the influence of wealthy Western states on its agenda and

625 the necessity for the Bank to remain neutral on non-consensual issues. Second, evenif IOs are not hegemonic actors in knowledge-production, they may neverthelessexert an influence on the way research is conducted in their field of competence,with all that this implies in terms of research biases, omission of disturbing issues orforms of ‘self-discipline’ among academics. As noted above, there is, for example, a

630 long-standing relationship between the UNHCR and the research community onrefugees and forced migration, which certainly has an impact on the knowledge thatis produced.

The ‘migration and development nexus’ is another example: Maruja Asis, NicolaPiper, and Parvati Raghuram (2010) argue that IOs influence research in this field,

635 especially in less developed countries, and that this leads to the omission ofpotentially important research fields; for instance, very little is known on therelationship between migration and development in history or on the impact ofinternal migration on development (see also Geiger and Pécoud 2013b). According toAlan Simmons (2008), the amount of research on remittances has less to do with the

640 actual impact of remittances on development than with the compatibility of thisargument with the current political and ideological context (especially as far as theneoliberal representation of migrants as entrepreneurial ‘development agents’ isconcerned). In other words, and as Raymond Apthorpe writes, ‘while policy languagepresents policy as being data-driven, complaining at times therefore about “lack of

645 data”, this masks the extent to which it is data-driving (lack of ‘appropriate’ data),choosing the data it prefers’ (Apthorpe 1997, 55).

A possible reaction would be to call for scholarly independence and greaterdistinction between institutional and academic idea-production. This is sensible, butprobably overly simplistic. Indeed, most researchers are not naïve enough to serve as



650 the candid instruments in IOs’ quest for scientific legitimacy and technical expertise.Most of them are aware of the complexity and ambivalence of their cooperation; onecould even argue that they are themselves political actors, as they develop andpromote their own views. François Gemenne thus writes that researchers ‘should beconsidered as policy entrepreneurs, whose perception of their research object is

655 shaped by a series of policy objectives and fundamental values’ (2011, 227).It follows that researchers may well engage in cooperation with IOs while

remaining critical of their activities (even if not all of them do so). One could evenargue that they should get involved, as knowledge on IOs (and therefore criticalassessment of their role) may require such involvement. Without developing a

660 sociology of careers in migration research, it is still clear that many people in this fieldcirculate between different milieus: universities, but also IOs, think tanks, NGOs, etc.This is not exclusive to migration, as the same types of professional trajectories havelong characterised development practice and thinking, for example. This means thatcritical research implies what Jennifer Hyndman (2000) calls ‘duplicity’, that is, the

665 combination of participation in IOs’ work and the independent criticism of theiractivities.

An alternative position has been put forward by Fabian Georgi and SusanneSchatral (2012), who argue that researchers face a dilemma. One the one hand, manyof them are deeply aware of the shortcomings and dead-ends in contemporary

670 migration politics; they know that ‘controlling’ or ‘managing’ migration hasdisturbing consequences, on migrants themselves and on the moral and politicalfoundations of receiving societies (see e.g., Anderson 2012). They also know that IOsare unable to challenge this situation and that some of their activities fuel, rather thansolve, these problems. Nonetheless, very few address these concerns directly by, for

675 example, engaging in critical discussions on freedom of movement; they would ratherengage in arguably superficial criticisms of some of the most brutal state practices, anarea in which they can find allies among IOs, in a way that makes a radical rethinkingof the premises of migration politics impossible.

This is a delicate issue, on which much remains to be thought and said. It involves680 a range of factors, from researchers’ ambitions and quest for funding or reputation, to

their fundamental moral or political reactions in the face of the harsh realitiesassociated with migration. Analysing the birth of ‘forced migration studies’, Chimni(2009) reminds us that social sciences are intrinsically connected to history andpolitics, but that they can to some extent surmount this through critical self-

685 reflection; he mentions social anthropology as an example of a discipline that, whileborn out of a colonialism, has since managed to reassess its ties to Western powerand global imbalances. There are indications that refugee studies and, more recently,migration studies have started to engage in such a process. It is nevertheless probablyfair to conclude that, thus far, this is not the dominant approach in the field, and that

690 time and efforts are still needed to achieve this goal.Migration has, over the last two decades, become a ‘global’ issue. One of the

consequences of this is that IOs find it easier than ever before to talk about migration



and to take initiative in this policy field. To many observers, this may be aninherently good development, as IOs are traditionally associated with internationally

695 recognised values (like global justice, development, human rights, inter-statecooperation), which often seem to be lacking in the current politics of migration.But as this introductory article has tried to show, the interventions of IOs in thepolitics of migration also raise a number of fundamental research issues—hence theneed to critically assess the role and functions of IOs. This is what contributions to

700 this special issue attempt to do, by exploring their agency, discourses and activitiesfrom a variety of angles, in different contexts and policy fields.

Notes

[1] The GMG currently brings together sixteen agencies: the IOM, the International LabourOrganization (ILO), the OHCHR, the UN Conference on Trade and Development

705 (UNCTAD), the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), the UNDevelopment Fund for Women (UN Women), the UNDP, UNESCO, the UN PopulationFund (UNFPA), the UNHCR, UNICEF, the UN Institute for Training and Research(UNITAR), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the UN Regional Commissions,the World Bank and WHO.

710 [2] These conventions include, in particular, the ILO Conventions 97 and 143, as well as the UNInternational Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers andMembers of Their Families.

[3] The IOM is not the only example. The IMF, for instance, was initially created to manage theBretton Woods system. It did not, however, go out of business when this system based on

715 fixed international exchange rates disappeared, as it successfully created new roles for itself.[4] At times, the IOM even seems to behave in way that is closer to a multinational corporation

than to a typical UN agency. For example, the IOM is based in Geneva but outsources lowerranking headquarter functions to new service centres in Manila and Panama, according tocost-effective logic that is still quite uncommon among national and international

720 bureaucracies.

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