regional organisations and humanitarian action

Regional organisations and humanitarian action Steven A. Zyck

November 2013

HPG Working Paper

HPGHumanitarianPolicy Group

About the author

Steven A. Zyck is a Research Fellow in the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI).

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank those researchers, policymakers and practitioners who provided insights and useful suggestions on drafts of this Working Paper, including peer reviewers Louise Fawcett and Herbert Wulf. Comments on earlier drafts were also provided by HPG Research Fellows Eva Svoboda and Lilianne Fan and Research Officer Simone Haysom.

This paper is part of a broader project on the role of regional organisations in humanitarian action. The project is overseen by an expert steering group which comprises Elizabeth Ferris (Brookings Institution), Sandrine Tiller (MSF), Charles-Antoine Hofmann (IFRC), Andrea Binder (GPPI) and Nicolas Lamade (GIZ). Several members of HPG’s Advisory Group also provided useful comments on the design of the HPG project on regional organisations.

This study was funded through HPG’s Integrated Programme. A full list of IP funders is available at http://www.odi.org.uk/work/programmes/humanitarian-policy-group/work-integrated-programme.asp. ODI gratefully acknowledges this financial support.

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

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© Overseas Development Institute, 2013

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG Reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

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Overview 1

Acronyms and abbreviations 3

Introduction 5

1.1Whatareregionalorganisations? 5

1.2Scope:humanitarianaction 6

1.3Approach 6

Concepts underpinning regional organisation 9

2.1Subsidiarityandsupremacy 9

2.2Sovereigntyamidstsupranationalism 10

2.3Solidarity(orSouth–Southcooperation) 11

2.4Conceptsinneedofrevision? 12

From concepts to institutions 13

3.1Regionalinstitutionsversusregionalcapacities 14

Regional organisations’ humanitarian action 17

4.1Humanitarianassistanceprovision/facilitationforrefugees 17

4.2Disasterriskreduction 19

4.3Conflictmanagement 22

4.4Regionalhumanitarianaction–analysis 25

Conclusion: gaps in knowledge 27

5.1Keyfindingsandimplications 27

5.2Lingeringquestions 28

5.3Reframingthedebate 29

References 31

Annex 39

1

2

3

4

5

Contents

�� Regional organisations and humanitarian action

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Overview

Regionalorganisationsarefrequentlycitedaskeyemergingactorsinthehumanitariansphere.However,thetruthtendstobefarmorenuanced,withwidevariationsamongregionalorganisationsandintheircontributionstohumanitarianaction,includingaidprovision,disasterriskreduction(DRR)andconflictmanagement.Despiteaspateofhumanitarianinstitution-buildingamongregionalorganisations,severalofwhichhaveestablishedspecialisedhumanitariandepartments,policyframeworks,committeesandfunds,theiractualcontributionsareuneven.Toprovideoneexample,fewregionalorganisationshaveplayedanyroleinrespondingtorefugeeneeds,despitethetendencyforregionalbodiestoexpressconcernoverthistrans-boundaryissue.In

relationtoconflictmanagement,includingmediationeffortsandprotection-orientedpeacekeeping,Africanregionalorganisations,particularlytheAfricanUnionandtheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates,areamongtheveryfewregionalinstitutionstohavemadeasignificantcontribution.Thatsaid,nearlyallregionalorganisationshaverespondedtoDRRgiventhatsucheffortsarerootedinregionalcommitmentsandprocesses.Thevariableinvolvementofregionalorganisationsinhumanitarianactionappearstostemfromawiderangeofpoliticalandcapacityissues,whichthispaperbeginstoexplore.However,manyofthekeyquestionsregardingregionalorganisations–includingbasicinformationontheirhumanitarianactivities–remainpoorlystudied.

� Regional organisations and humanitarian action

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ADB AfricanDevelopmentBank

ADMER ASEANAgreementonDisasterManagementandEmergencyResponse

AFISMA African-ledInternationalSupportMissiontoMali

AHA Centre ASEANCoordinatingCentreforHumanitarianAssistance

AHTF ASEANHumanitarianTaskForce

AMISOM AfricanUnionMissioninSomalia

AMU ArabMaghrebUnion

ARF ASEANRegionalForum

ASEAN AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

AU AfricanUnion

CAN AndeanCommunity

CAPRADE AndeanCommitteeforthePreventionandResponsetoDisasters

CARICOM CaribbeanCommunity

CCAPRRI CoordinatingCommitteeonAssistanceandProtectiontoRefugees,ReturneesandInternallyDisplacedPersonsinAfrica

CEPREDENAC CoordinationCenterforNaturalDisasterPreventioninCentralAmerica

DDR Disarmament,DemobilisationandReintegration

DRM DisasterRiskManagement

DRR DisasterRiskReduction

EAC EastAfricanCommunity

ECOMOG ECOWASMonitoringGroup

ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWest

AfricanStates

EU EuropeanUnion

FARC FuerzasArmadasRevolucionarias

deColombia

GCC GulfCooperationCouncil

HFA HyogoFrameworkforAction

IACNDR Inter-AmericanCommitteeon

NaturalDisasterReduction

IDPs InternallyDisplacedPersons

IFRC InternationalFederationofRed

CrossandRedCrescentSocieties

IGAD Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityon

Development

IGADD Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityon

DroughtandDevelopment

LAS LeagueofArabStates

MDGs MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

MINUSMA UNMultidimensionalIntegrated

StabilizationMissioninMali

NAFTA NorthAmericanFreeTrade

Agreement

NEPAD NewPartnershipforAfrica’s

Development

OAS OrganizationofAmericanStates

OAU OrganisationofAfricanUnity

OIC OrganisationofIslamic

Cooperation

PIF PacificIslandsForum

PSC PeaceandSecurityCouncil,African

Union

R2P ResponsibilitytoProtect

Acronyms


SAARC SouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation

SADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity

SADCBRIG SADCStandbyBrigade

SICA CentralAmericanIntegrationSystem

SOPAC SouthPacificAppliedGeoscienceCommission

SPC SecretariatofthePacificCommunity

TCG TripartiteCoreGroup(Myanmar)

UN UnitedNations

UNSC UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil

WFP WorldFoodProgramme

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1 Introduction

Anumberofregionalorganisationshavegraduallybutconsistently,particularlyoverthepasttwodecades,transformedthemselvesintogrowingplayersinthehumanitariansphere.Theyhaveinvolvedthemselves–sometimesindependentlyandsometimesinresponsetoUNprocesses–notonlyinaiddeliveryandcoordinationbutalsoindisasterriskreduction(DRR),conflictmanagement,peacekeepingandtheprotectionofcivilians.Forinstance,in2008theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)helpedtofacilitateaiddeliveryinMyanmarfollowingCycloneNargisthroughtheASEANHumanitarianTaskForce(AHTF),ajointhumanitarian–diplomaticendeavourwhichalsoinvolvedtheUnitedNationsandMyanmarauthoritiesina‘TripartiteCoreGroup’.Fouryearslater,theEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS)intervenedinMalifollowingamilitarycoupandrisingIslamistmilitancy,helpingtoendtheconflictinthecountryandspurringtheUnitedNationstostepin.

Whileattimescontroversialamonghumanitarianactorsandregionalorganisations’ownmemberstates,itisapparentthatregionalorganisationssuchasASEANandECOWASareincreasinglyplayingaroleininternationalaffairsandhumanitarianaction.Paralleldevelopmentsareemerginginotherpartsoftheworld,withregionalorganisationsincreasinglyseekingtopreparefordisastersandotheremergenciesandmitigateconflict.TheOrganisationofIslamicCooperation(OIC),forinstance,establishedaHumanitarianAffairsDepartmentin2008,andtheAfricanUnionlauncheda‘HumanitarianPolicyFramework’in2011.

ThisWorkingPaperexaminestheliteratureonregionalorganisations’humanitarianprioritiesandactivities.Whileastand-alonepieceofresearch,itsetsthestageforabroaderstudyintoregionalorganisationsandhumanitarianactionbyreviewing–andidentifyinggapsin–theexistingliterature.Indeed,itisimportanttoacknowledgethattherearemanygapsinunderstanding,asresearchon(andattentionto)regionaleconomiccooperationandregionaltradeagreementshaslongoutpacedworkonregionalorganisations’humanitarianefforts.

Followingthisintroduction,Chapter2examineskeyconceptsapplicabletoregionalorganisations,includingfoundationalissuessuchassubsidiarityandsovereignty.Whilethispaperprimarilyfocusesontangibleissues,abasicconceptualoverviewhelpstoaddresssomeoftheassumptionsandconventionalwisdomsurroundingregionalorganisations.Chapter3offersashortreviewoftheemergenceofregionalorganisations’humanitarianinstitutions,andChapter4addressesanissueaboutwhichfarlessisknown–theactivitiesofregionalorganisationsincrisis-affectedcontexts.Giventhebreadthofhumanitarianaction,thischapterfocusesonassistancetorefugeepopulations–giventhattheycomprisearegionalchallenge–aswellasDRRandconflictmanagement.Then,wrappingupthediscussion,Chapter5presentsaseriesofquestionswhichhavenotyetbeenaddressedwithintheexistingliteratureonregionalorganisations’roleinhumanitarianaction.Suchquestionswill,inthefuture,beaddressedintheHumanitarianPolicyGroup’sbroader‘ZonesofEngagement’project,whichinvolvesfieldworkconcerningregionalorganisationsintheSahelandSoutheastAsia(seeHPG,2013).However,beforeaddressingkeyconcepts,institutionsandactivities,itisusefultoclarifysomeofthecoretermsusedinthispaper.

1.1 What are regional organisations?

Asrecentresearchhasnoted,theterm‘regionalorganisations’hasbeencommonlyused,butwithoutsufficientclarity.Forinstance,withabroadandroughlyhewnnotionofregionalorganisations,theliteratureattimesapproachestradepacts(e.g.theNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement)onaparwithbroaderbodiessuchastheOrganizationofAmericanStates(OAS)ortheAfricanUnion(AU)(see,forinstance,Swanström,n.d.).Atothertimestheliteratureexaminesissue-orresource-specificbodies(e.g.theNileRiverInitiative)alongsidethosewhichareperhapsmorerootedinidentity(e.g.theLeagueofArabStates)orreligion(e.g.theOrganisationofIslamicCooperation)withoutprovidingaclear


rationalefordoingso.Hence,itisimportanttodeterminethekeyelementswhichdefineregionalorganisations,anddifferentiatethemfromotherinter-statebodies.

Thisstudyconsidersaregionalorganisationtobeaninstitutionwhichmeetsthefollowingcriteria:(i)substantialgeographicproximityorcontiguity;(ii)anofficialintergovernmentalstatusenshrinedinatreatyorcomparablelegalinstrument;(iii)acooperativeorcollaborativemandateratherthanaprimarilydefensivemission;and(iv)amulti-sectoralfocus(i.e.addressingarangeofissuesratherthanasingletopic,suchasfreetradeorfisheries)(seeGoertzandPowers,2011).Giventhefocusofthisstudyonhumanitarianaction,thisresearchwillprimarilyconsiderthoseorganisationswhichhavesomedirectrelationtohumanitarianaction,includingemergencyresponse,disasterriskreductionandtheprotectionofcivilians.

Thisdefinitionexcludesnon-regionalbodiesandthosewhichareprimarilyconcernedwithissue-specificcoordinationortradefacilitation.ItalsoexcludesbodiessuchasNATO,whichisnotregional(inaconventionalsense)andwhichisprimarilyfocusedoncollectivedefenceandwar-fighting.However,itincludestheArabLeagueandtheOIC,bothofwhichhaveahighdegreeofgeographicalcontiguityandwhichhaveadoptedaroleinrespondingtoconflictsanddisasters.Thestudyalsoincludesbodies,suchasECOWAS,whichappear(intermsoftheirnames)tobefocusedonasingleissueorsector(economicintegration),butwhichnonethelesshavefarbroadermandatesandportfolios.

1.1.1 Regional versus subregional organisationsIntheinterestofclarity,thisstudytreatsregionalandsubregionalorganisationsasasinglytypeofentity(regionalorganisations)giventhelackofcrediblereasonsfordifferentiatingbetweenthetwo(FerrisandPetz,2013).Consider,forinstance,thatsomecontinents(orlargeregions)haveanoverarchingregionalorganisationsuchastheAUandtheOAS,whileothers,suchasAsia,haveonlysubregionalinstitutions.Indeed,individualnationstendtobelongtoawidevarietyofpartiallyoverlappingregionalandsubregionalorganisations(seeFigure1andAnnex1).TheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC)belongstosevenregionalorganisations,whileseveralCentralAsianrepublicsbelongtosix.Whilenotgenerally

distinguishingbetweenregionalandsubregionalorganisations,thispaperemphasisesthoseareasinwhicha‘subregional’entityismandatedtoseektheapprovalofalargerregionalbodybeforetakingaction.

1.2 Scope: humanitarian action

Thisreviewfocusesonhumanitarianaction,whichisdefinedhereinaccordancewiththe‘PrinciplesandGoodPracticesofHumanitarianDonorship’asactivitiesintended‘tosavelives,alleviatesufferingandmaintainhumandignityduringandintheaftermathofman-madecrisesandnaturaldisasters,aswellastopreventandstrengthenpreparednessfortheoccurrenceofsuchsituations’(GoodHumanitarianDonorship,2003:1).Hence,thisstudywilllookatarangeofspecificactivities,includingtheprovisionofreliefassistanceduringandimmediatelyaftercrises,aswellasDRRactivities.1Conflictmanagement,peacekeepingandbroadermilitaryactivitieswillalsobeexaminedwheretheyareperceivedtohavepreventedoralleviatedsufferingandprotectedciviliansfromongoingorimminentharm.However,thisstudywillnotconsiderlonger-termpost-crisisrecovery,developmentcooperationorbroadermilitaryordiplomaticinterventionswhichdonotmeetthesecriteria.NordothefollowingchaptersexploretheworkbeingundertakenbyregionaldevelopmentbanksandregionalUNorWorldBankinstitutionsexceptwheretheyoverlapmarkedlywithSouthernregionalorganisations’humanitarianroles.

1.3 Approach

Asseveralpreviousstudieshavefound,thereisadearthofcrediblesourcesregardingtheactivitiesandimpactofregionalorganisationsdespiteagrowingliteraturefocusedontheirinstitutionalstructures,frameworksandconventions(seeFawcett,2004,2008;BailesandCottey,2005;GPDRR,2011;GoertzandPowers,2011;IFRC,2011).Muchoftheinformationregardingtheseinstitutionstendstobeproducedbytheinstitutionsthemselves,andstraddlestheborderbetweenanalysisandpublic

1. Disastermanagementisnotspecificallynotedhere,asthesefunctionstendtoapplytoreliefassistanceanddisasterriskreduction(DRR)activities.

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relations.Yetthereisemergingevidenceandrelativelyindependentanalysisfromthinktanksandinternationalorganisations,includingtheGlobalPlatformforDisasterRiskReduction(2009,2011),theUnitedNations,theLondonSchoolofEconomics(LSE)projectonregionalorganisations(Herz,2008;Nathan,2011)andtheBrookings-LSEProjectonInternalDisplacement(FerrisandPetz,2013;Hay,2013).Despitethevalueofthisemergingresearch,muchoftheexistingliteratureontheroleofregionalorganisationsinhumanitarianactionisgenerallynormativeandspeculative,focusingonwhattheseorganisations–accordingtotheirpoliciesandpublicstatements–haveputdownonpaper(i.e.instrategicframeworksandmemorandaofunderstanding)ratherthanwhattheyhaveactuallydonetodate(WilsonCenter,2008).Inotherinstancesitisaspirational,

suggestingambitiousfuturerolesforregionalorganisationswithoutnecessarilyengagingwiththosefactors,manyofthempoliticalandhistorical,whichhaveimpededcooperation.

Whilehighlightingthesegapsintheliterature,thispapercanonlybegintoaddressthem.Therawinformationaboutregionalorganisations’field-levelactivitieshas,byandlarge,yettobecollected.Thatsaid,recognisingthewealthofresearchonregionalorganisations’policiesandinstitutions(GPDRR,2011;HaverandFoley,2011;IFRC,2011),thisstudyinsteadbeginsafullerdiscussionoftheirtangiblecontributionstohumanitarianaction.Itreviewstheirworkinthreedifferentareas:humanitarianassistancefacilitationanddelivery(particularlyinrelationtorefugees),DRRandconflictmanagement.Herethe

Statesfrequentlybelongtoseveralregionalorganisations.Thishasprovidedthemwithavarietyofplatformsforpursuingtheirinterestsbasedontheparticularorientationofindividualgroupsandtheirmembers.Figure1outlinesAfricancountries’non-AUmemberships.

Acronyms:ArabMaghrebUnion(AMU);EconomicandMonetaryCommunityofCentralAfrica(CEMAC);CommunityofSahel-SaharanStates(CEN-SAD);EconomicCommunityoftheGreatLakesCountries(CEPGL);CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica(COMESA);EastAfricanCommunity(EAC);EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates(ECOWAS);EconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates(ECCAS);Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityforDevelopment(IGAD);IndianOceanCommission(IOC);ManoRiverUnion(MRU);SouthernAfricanCustomsUnion(SACU);SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC);WestAfricaEconomicandMonetaryUnion(WAEMU).

Source:African Regional and Sub-Regional Organizations(WashingtonDC:WoodrowWilsonInternationalCenterforScholars,AfricaProgram,October2008).

Figure 1: Regional organisations in Africa

CapeVerde

Senegal

Benin Mali

Senegal

Côted’Ivoire

Niger Togo

GuinessBissau

ECOWAS

WAEMU

AMU

MRU

CEN-SAD

CEMACECCAS

CEPGL

SADC

EAC

SACU

IOC

COMESA

IGAD

Liberia

SierraLeone

Guinea

Egypt

Libya

Tunisia

Morocco

Algeria

Mauritania

GhanaNigeria

Gambia

Cameroon

Equatorial

GuineaRep.Congo

Gaboa

SâoToméandPrincipe

Madagascar

MauritiusZambia

Zimbabwe

MalawiSeychelles

Réunion

Kenya

Uganda

Comoros

Somalia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Djibouti

Sudan

DRCongo

Angola

Mozambique Tanzania

SwazilandBotswana

Namibia

SouthAfricaLesotho

Rwanda

Burundi

Chad

Cen.Afr.Republic


studynotonlylooksatwhatregionalorganisationshaveimplemented(e.g.deliveringassistance),butalsowhattheyhaveachievedintermsofstakeholdercoordination,situationmonitoring,lessonssharingandresearch.Giventhatfewpreviousstudieshaveaddressedthe‘what’and‘how’ofregionalorganisations,thisstudyinevitablymissessome

contributionswhichhaverecentlyemergedorwhicharepoorlydocumented.Wehaveendeavouredtoavoidsuchoversightstotheextentfeasible,thoughthehopeisthatthisWorkingPaperwillserveasabasisforidentifyinggapsinunderstandingandfillingthemwiththeactiveinvolvementofregionalorganisations.

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Whileresearchintoregionalorganisations’humani-tarianrolesisrelativelynew,regionalorganisation–thatis,themannerinwhichstatesformunionsforvaryingpurposes–hasbeenalongstandingsubjectofstudy(Nye,1965;BarreraandHaas,1969;Haas,1958,1970,1971;WallaceandSinger,1970).Thischapterdoesnotattempttoengagewiththefullrichnessofthatliterature,muchofwhichfocusesonEuropeanintegration(Graglia,2013),butinsteadlaysoutsomekeyconceptswhichguideresearchers’,policymakers’andpractitioners’thinkingregardingregionalorganisations.Theseincludesubsidiarityandsupremacy,sovereigntyamidstsupranationalismandsolidarity(orSouth–Southcooperation).Thesethreepointsemergefromareviewoftheliteratureonregionalorganisations,butwereparticularlyshapedbyconceptualworkundertakenbytheAsianDevelopmentBankInstitute(Acharya,2012)andothers(see,forinstance,AlbertandHilkermeier,2001;Miller,1967).

2.1 Subsidiarity and supremacy

Theprincipleofsubsidiarityrequiresthat‘acommunityofahigherordershouldnotinterfereintheinternallifeofacommunityofalowerorder,deprivingthelatterofitsfunctions,butrathershouldsupportitincaseofneedandhelptoco-ordinateitsactivitywiththeactivitiesoftherestofsociety,alwayswithaviewtothecommongood’(QuadragesimoAnno,1931,citedinMøller,2005:3).Subsidiaritysuggeststhatresponsibilityforaddressingacrisisshouldrestwiththemost‘local’levelpossible(UNDP,1999).Acentralgovernmentshouldnottakeonasituationwhichprovincialauthoritieshavetheabilitytoresolve,andaregionalorganisationshouldnotaddresscriseswhichnationalauthoritiesareabletoaddress.Accordingly,theUnitedNationswouldbethefinalactortointerveneonceallsubsidiarylayers,includingregionalorganisations,haveprovedincapableofprovidingasolution.Conversely,supremacyholdsthathigher-leveldecisionsornorms,wheredeterminedtobenecessary,takeprecedence

overlower-levelcommitments.Hence,UNconventionswouldtheoreticallysupersedethoseofaregionalorganisationorindividualstate.Subsidiarityandsupremacy,evenifnotlabelledassuch,playaroleinshapingtheremitsandworkofregionalorganisations.Theprincipleofsubsidiarityhelpstoexplainwhy,forinstance,ASEANwascloselyinvolvedinCycloneNargisinMyanmar–whichdidnothavethecapacitytodealwiththecrisis–whileplayingafarsmallerroleinlarge-scaledisastersinThailandandelsewhereintheregion(Ferris,PetzandStark,2013).

Subsidiarity,inparticular,providesaseriesofrationaleswhichhavebeenfundamentalindrivingtheglobalpushfortheformationofinternationalorganisationssincetheendoftheSecondWorldWar.Lower-level(e.g.regional)organisationsarepresumedtofaceuniqueoutcomesofconflictsanddisasterswithintheirneighbourhoods,whetherintheformofrefugees,communicablediseasesorthespreadofviolenceacrossborders.Hence,theymayhaveagreaterinterestthansupranationalbodiesornon-regionalactorsinaddressingthosechallengesquicklyandthoroughly(Paliwal,2010).Furthermore,subsidiarityisrootedinthepresumptionthatstateswillfeelmoreownershipoverregionalcommitments–forinstance,concerningenvironmentalprotectionordisplacement–thanglobalonesand,hence,willbemorelikelytocomplywiththem.Lastly,subsidiarityis–fromanoperationalperspective–bolsteredbytheperceptionthatlower-levelstakeholdersbetterunderstandproblems(e.g.thedriversofaconflict),andmaythusbeabletoaddresstheminawaywhichismorecontextuallyorculturallyappropriate(OSCE,2011).SuchaperceptionwasreflectedinanAugust2013UNSecurityCouncildebateonregionalorganisations.Thedebatereportnotesthat‘regionalandsubregionalorganizationsarewell-positioned’tounderstandandrespondtocrisesintheirneighbourhoods‘owingtotheirknowledgeoftheregion’(UNSC,2013).

Thesepresumedbenefitsofsubsidiarityhave,particularlyasappliedtoregionalorganisations,beencalledintoquestion.Forinstance,regionalorganisations

2 Concepts underpinning regional organisation

�0 Regional organisations and humanitarian action

mayinsomecaseshaveexcellentcapabilitiesforeconomiccooperation,butitisrarelyclearwhethertheyhavetheappropriatemixofcapacitiestoaddressaparticularthreat(Ajayi,2008).Hence,subsidiarityimpliesahighdegreeofuncertaintywhenappliedtorelativelynovelandemergingchallenges(e.g.mountingethnicorsectariantensions)whereitisunclearwhetherlower-levelbodiesareabletorespondeffectivelyoratall.Inaddition,BjørnMøller(2005)notesthatsubsidiaritycanleadto‘passingthebuck’,allowinginternationalbodiestodeferresponsibilityforcomplexorcostlychallengestoregionalbodieswhichareperhapslesslikelytohavetheresourcesorcapabilitiestoresolvethem(seealsoBellamyandWilliams,2005;DiehlandCho,2006).Some,forinstance,pointtosuchadynamicinlocationssuchasMaliinlate2012andearly2013,whentheUnitedNationsencouragedECOWASinvolvementdespiteknowingthatitcouldtakeupwardsofninemonthsfortheregionalbodytomusterapeacekeepingforce(ZyckandMuggah,2013;Francis,2013).Lastly,manyexpertshavenotedthatlower-levelbodiesmayinfactbetheleast-suitedtorespondtoparticulartypesofcrisesgiventhatrelationsamongneighbouringcountriesarecommonlyweigheddownbylonghistoriesanddiverseagendas(Alden,2010;Nathan,2010).Hence,regionalorganisationsmaybeunwillingtocometotheaidofaneighbourwithwhomtheyhaveafractiousandcontentiousrelationship.Inothercases,regionalpowerdynamicsmaycomeintoplay,andaregionalorganisation’sabilitytosupportitsneighboursmaybeinfluencedbytheregionalheavyweight(e.g.NigeriainECOWAS,IndiaintheSouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation(SAARC))(Møller,2005;Wulf,2009;WulfandDebiel,2009).2Regionalhegemonsmay,forinstance,preventaparticularorganisationfromtakingastepwhichtheyoppose–butwhichthebroadermembershipfavours.However,inotherinstancestheyarepowerfulenablers,mobilisingresourcesandneighbourstotakeactionmorequicklyandeffectivelythantheymightotherwisehavedone.

Suchcriticismsarenotparticularlynovelandareatleastpartlytackledbytheprincipleofsupremacy.Forinstance,wherealower-levelactormaypossessthecapacitytotakeaparticularaction(e.g.protectrefugeepopulationsorcombatclimatechange),butlacksthepoliticalwilltodoso,ahigher-levelorsupremebody

(e.g.theUnitedNations)maystepintomandatecompliancebyestablishingnormsofonesortofanother(e.g.,laws,conventions).Supremacy,inthecaseofregionalorganisations,appliestoseveralelementsofinternationalandinternationalhumanitarianlawaswellastopeacekeeping.TheUnitedNationsCharterstates:‘TheSecurityCouncilshall,whereappropriate,utilisesuchregionalarrangementsoragenciesforenforcementactionunderitsauthority.ButnoenforcementactionshallbetakenunderregionalarrangementsorbyregionalagencieswithouttheauthorizationoftheSecurityCouncil’(ChapterVIII,Article53(1)).

Ofcourse,suchprinciplesdonotnecessarilyalwaysfeedintopracticeinaninternationalsysteminwhichsupremacyandsubsidiarityaremitigatedbypoliticalrealities,powerimbalancesandtheinterestsofmemberstates.Furthermore,monitoringandenforcementcapacitiesremainlimited,creatingasituationwhere‘supreme’policiesareprimarilyhypotheticalandcan,inmanycases,besidestepped.Thatsaid,subsidiarityandsupremacyprovideabasisforrelationsamongmultilateralinstitutions,includingregionalorganisations.

2.2 Sovereignty amidst supranationalismThequestionofsovereigntyhasfeaturedprominentlywithindiscussionsofregionalorganisations.Whilethereisgenerallyapresumptionthatmultilateralbodiesareaformofsupranationalism–cedingstatesovereigntytoahigherlevel(Best,2012)–regionalorganisationshaveroutinelyactedasdefendersofsovereignty(Seymour,2013).Forinstance,nearlyallregionalorganisationsasidefromtheAUandECOWASoperatebystrictprinciplesofnon-interferenceintheirmembers’domesticaffairs(Nathan,2010).ThisparticularlyappliestoASEAN,whichhasbeenastalwartdefenderofstatesovereignty(Ramcharan,2000),andtotheOAS.3Non-interferencewasenshrinedintheOrganisationofAfricanUnity(OAU)untilittransformedin2002intoafarmoreinterventionistbody–theAfricanUnion–authorisedtointerveneinmemberstatesintheeventofwarcrimes,genocideorcrimesagainsthumanity(UnitedNations,2011;AfricanUnion,2002).4However,anumberofAUmemberscontinuetoopposethegrowingwillingnessof

2 DespiteIndiabeingseenastheregionalhegemon,itwasactuallyBangladeshthatdrovetheformationofSAARC,andwhichhasbeenseenasamajorplayerintheAssociation.

3 RegardingASEAN,emergingresearchsuggeststhatmoresociallyandculturallyliberalelementswithintheregionareactivelypushingforamore‘involved’ASEAN(Davies,2013).

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theorganisationtowhichtheybelongtointerveneinmemberstates.AsWulf(2009:8)argues:

The nation-state’s authority is jealously guarded and its delegation to a regional body is opposed by most governments. Most regional bodies stress their character as inter-governmental organisations that might cooperate and pool resources, but still their members refrain from relocating governmental authority to the regional body.

Memberstateshavecommonlytendedtoacceptthesupranationalroleofregionalorganisationsonlytotheextentthatitfurtherstheirnationalinterestsanddesireforsovereignty.Forinstance,regionalorganisationsprovideaplatformformemberstatestoadvocateonbehalfoftheirsovereigntywhenfacingthreatsofexternalinterferenceorintervention.Theyalsopresentstateswithapotentiallymoreacceptablefall-backoptionintheeventthattheyrequireexternalsupport.Forinstance,asinthefrequentlynotedcaseofCycloneNargis,MyanmarwasabletoacceptASEAN’sroleratherthanaharder-to-controlandbroaderUN-mandatedinterventionwhich,inthejunta’sperception,wouldhavecomprisedagreaterthreattothecountry’ssovereignty(see,forinstance,Amador,2008;Wu,2010).RegionalorganisationscametobeviewedassympatheticinterlocutorswhichcoulddiscourageortaketheplaceofmoreintrusiveUN-ledinterventions.Hence,byeagerlyjoiningthree,fouroruptosevenregionalorganisations(seeAnnex1),countriesprovidethemselveswithalonglistofpotentialpartnersanddefenderswhenunderthreatorrequiringexternalassistance.

Ofcourse,anysuchstatementiscontingentupontheregionalorganisationinquestion.Asnotedabove,ECOWAShas,attimes,beenmorewillingtointerveneinmemberstatesthantheUnitedNations,andhassoughtUNauthorisationonlyafterdeployingforces(e.g.theECOWASMonitoringGroupinLiberiain1990).TheAUhasalsogrownincreasinglyinterventionist,albeitgenerallyasaclosepartneroftheUnitedNations.However,themajorityofotherregionalorganisationshavetendedtoholdtighttosovereignty,exceptinareassuchascustomsandfisheriesmanagement,whichtheyperceiveasbeinginherentlyregionalinnatureandmoreclearlybeneficialtotheregionandtoindividualstates.

2.3 Solidarity (or South–South cooperation)

Regionalcooperationandintegrationhavealsobeenheavilyinfluencedbyasenseofsolidarityamongnationswhichseethemselvesasfacingcommoncircumstancesor,inmanycases,threats.ThefirstwaveofregionalorganisationindevelopingcountriestookplacealongsidedecolonisationandArabnationalism(Fawcett,2008).BothsentimentsledtoadesiretoreducerelianceonformercolonialandWesternpowersandtoinsteadcultivateSouth–Southcollaboration,athemewhichhascontinuedtovaryingextentstothepresent.Furthermore,asFawcett(2004)highlights,thisdegreeofsolidaritywasbolsteredbytheperceptionofcommonenemies(includingbutalsobeyondformercolonialregimes).Forinstance,theArabLeaguewasinitiallymotivatedbytheestablishmentofIsrael

4 Thethreeimpetusesforinterventionnotedhere(i.e.warcrimes,genocideandcrimesagainsthumanity)arespecifiedinArticle4(h)oftheConstitutiveActoftheAfricanUnion.

ShortlyafterCycloneNargisstruckMyanmarinMay2008,ASEANlauncheditsfirst-everEmergencyRapidAssessmentTeam,composedofofficials,expertsandNGOpersonnelfrommemberstates(Creac’handFan,2008;ASEAN,2010).Basedonthisassessment,theASEANHumanitarianTaskForce(AHTF)wasformedalongsidetheYangon-basedTripartiteCoreGroup(TCG);theTCGbroughtASEAN,theMyanmargovern-mentandtheUnitedNationstogethertofacili-tateresponseoperations.ThroughtheAHTFandTCG,ASEANhelpedworkwithallstake-holderstofacilitatehumanitarianaccesswhilealsoengaginginsomedegreeofcoordination.Duringthereliefandrecoveryphase,ASEAN(2010)notesthatithadfacilitatedorexpeditedvisasformorethan3,800membersoftheinternationalcommunityandcollaboratedwithdonorinstitutionstohelpovercomeconcernsaboutprovidingresourcestoMyanmar.AnumberofanalystshavecreditedASEAN’sconsistentengagementwithMyanmar’sgovernment,anditssubtleformofinfluenceandpressure,asamajorfactorinhelpingthecountrytoopenuptoothermembersofthe

internationalcommunity(Ranjan,2009).

Box 1: ASEAN’s role in Cyclone Nargis recovery in Myanmar


followingtheSecondWorldWar,whiletheOAU(nowtheAU)wasfuelledbyoppositiontocolonialismandapartheid.Likewise,SADCfirstemergedasanattempttoreducesouthernAfricannations’economicdependenceonapartheidSouthAfrica(Lieberman,1997).TheGulfCooperationCouncil(GCC)foundarenewedpurposeinisolatingIranduringitslengthywarwithIraq(Partrick,2011),andASEAN’sformationin1967wasdrivenpartlybyoppositiontothecommunistinsurgencyinVietnamamongseveralcountriesintheregion(particularlyIndonesia,Malaysia,thePhilippines,SingaporeandThailand)(Hagiwara,1973).

Yetwhiletheirformationwasmotivatedbyasenseofsolidarity,theSouth–Southbasisofregionalorganisationshasbeenunderminedbyanumberoffactors.First,regionalorganisationstendtobeweigheddownbylonghistoriesandtensionsthatfundamentallyunderminecooperation,includingaroundhumanitarianissues(PutzelandDiJohn,2012).Forinstance,Healy(2009)examineshowIGAD’sattemptstomediateconflictineasternAfricawereunderminedbyfraughtrelationsamongSudan,Ethiopia,Eritrea,SomaliaandUganda(severalofwhichhadsupportedrebelgroupsintheirneighbours’conflictsinthepast).Likewise,SAARChas,amongregionalorganisations,beentheleastinvolvedinhumanitarianissues,afactwhichmanyattributetotheconsistenttensionswithinSouthAsia.InLatinAmerica,solidarityhasattimesbeencomplicatedbycompetingregionalblocs,whichtendtohavedifferingorientationstowardstheUnitedStatesanditsroleintheregion.Thishasnotonlycausedproblemsforexistingregionalorganisations,butithasalsoledtotheemergenceofnewintergovernmentalbodies,reducingtheinfluenceofregionalbodies.

Second,regionalsolidarityandpoliticshavebeeninfluencedbythepresenceofaregionalhegemon.Insomeregions,suchasWestAfrica,thehegemon–Nigeria–isrelativelyclear.ThesameistrueinmanyrespectsinsouthernAfrica,whereSouthAfricaisakeyplayer.Yetmanyotherregionslackaclearhegemon,includingSoutheastAsia(whereIndonesiaisbyfarthelargestcountryandamemberoftheG20,butmaynotnecessarilybecharacterisedasahegemon).Insomecasesahegemonmaybeabletodriveregionalcooperationforwardbyshoulderingasignificantshareofthecostsandworkinvolved.Alternatively,itsdominancecouldbeasourceoffriction,frustratingneighboursandleadingtocompetitionandanimosity.

Analystsdisagreeonthequestionofhegemonyandregionalorganisations;whilesomefeelthatthepresenceofahegemonicpowerisoverallabenefittopeacekeeping(see,forinstance,Francis,2010),othersfeelthatitcorrodesregionalcooperationmorebroadly.Ultimatelytheliteratureisinconclusivebothaboutwhatconstitutesahegemon,whether(andwhich)hegemonsexistinparticularregionsandwhethertheytendtohaveanoverallpositiveornegativeinfluence.5

Similarissuesapplytopeacekeeping.RegionalbodiesareincreasinglyseenasimplementingarmsoftheUnitedNationswhereithasfundstoofferbutlittlepoliticalwilltosendpeacekeepersintoinsecurecontextssuchasSomalia,theeasternDRCandMali(MuggahandWhite,2013).Westernmilitaryplannersrefertosuchanarrangementas‘Westernmoney,Africanboots’(Warner,2013;personalcommunications).Andwhileitisclearthatregionalorganisationsgenerallyhavetheirownsecurityandhumanitarianinterestsinformingsuchmissions,adesiretocontinuereceivinginternationalsupportalsoplaysarole.Forinstance,Nigeria,amongthelargestrecipientsofUSmilitaryassistanceinSub-SaharanAfrica,providedcrucialsupportfortheECOWAS-backedinterventioninMaliinearly2013.ItisworthaskingwhatofficialorimplicitroletheUSgovernment’s$600mannualaidpackagetoNigeria(Ploch,2013),includingitsmilitary,playedinthedecision.6

2.4 Concepts in need of revision?

Thisbriefconceptualreviewdemonstratesthatregionalorganisations–rootedinpromisingconceptsandprinciples–possessgreatpromise,butalsofacesignificanthurdles.Whileregionalorganisationsmaybebetterplacedtorespondtocriseswithintheirneighbourhoods,theymayalsolacktheresources,capabilitiesorpoliticalwillneededtotakemeaningfulaction.Thispapernowturnsfromthesesortsofhypothetical,conceptualissuestoregionalorganisations’tangibleinstitutionsandactivitiesindisaster-andconflict-affectedenvironments.

5 Thereappearstobeincreasingconsensusthateachregionalorganisation–anditscurrentorwould-behegemon(s)–shouldbeaddressedasunique,ratherthanasemblematicofabroadertendency(HaackeandWilliams,2009).

6 TheUSgovernmentauthorisedafurther$96minpaymentstoECOWAScountriescontributingtroopstoECOWAS’AFISMAmissioninMaliinFebruary2013(Oluwarotimi,2013).

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3 From concepts to institutions

Inthelate1990sand2000s,regionalorganisationsbegantodevelopmorefullyhumanitarianinstitutionsandbuilduponpromisinginitiativeslaunchedinprecedingdecades,suchasthe1965OASInter-AmericanEmergencyAidFund,the1987SAARCFoodReserveandtheCentralAmericanIntegrationSystem(SICA)’sCoordinationCenterforNaturalDisasterPreventioninCentralAmerica.ThesealsobuiltupontheworkoftheInter-GovernmentalAuthorityonDroughtandDevelopment(IGADD)–thepredecessortothepresent-dayIGAD–whichwasamongthefirstregionalentitiestobeprincipallymotivated,atitsinception,byhumanitarianratherthanpolitical,economicorsecurityobjectives(ROAPE,1994).Afteraseriesofdroughtsandfamines,theleadersofDjibouti,Ethiopia,Kenya,SomaliaandSudanagreedtoformIGADDin1985,anditwasofficiallyestablishedthefollowingyear.IGADDtackledimmediatehumanitarianneeds,

assessingtheimpactsofdroughtsandappealingtotheinternationalcommunityforresources,alongsidelonger-termdevelopmentefforts(ibid.).

Therapidemergenceofregionalorganisationsfocusedonhumanitarianissuesappearstoreflectavarietyoffactors.First,theMillenniumDevelopmentGoals(MDGs)in2000notonlybroughtgreaterattentiontohumanitariananddevelopmentconditions,butitalsoinvolvedaregionalmonitoringprocesswhichimpliedjointresponsibilityamongnationalandregionalauthorities.TheHyogoFrameworkforAction(HFA)ondisasterriskreductionin2005,whichspecifiedaroleforregionalorganisations,furtherimpelledregionalentitiestobecomemorefullyinvolvedinhumanitarianaction,asdiscussedinChapter4.Regionalorganisations’desiretofullydemonstratetheircapacityandrelevanceontheinternationalstagealsocontributedtotheirgrowinghumanitarianrole.

Figure 2: Cumulative number of regional humanitarian departments/centres7

7 Thisgraphisprimarilyintendedtodemonstratetrends.Exactdatesof‘establishment’forparticularinstitutionsareoftenuncleargiventhatthestartdatecouldbeconsideredtheyearaninstitutionproposedsettingupanewhumanitarianbody,theyearenoughmemberstatesapprovedthenewinstitutionortheyearthatthehumanitarianentityactuallybeganmeaningfuloperations.

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

20

11

20

12

AfricaAsia-PacificLatinAmericaMENA/Other


Aseriesofprominentincidentsalsocontributedtotheregionalisationofhumanitarianaction.TheRwandangenocideanditsregionalaftermathdroveinterestinthetransnationalnatureofconflictandtheneedtoavoidfutureatrocities;suchconcernsfoundparticularexpressionintheInternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereigntyreportontheresponsibilitytoprotect(R2P)in2001.Early-warningsystemsforconflictrapidlydevelopedacrossAfrica,drivenbytheAUbutgraduallyexpandingintothecontinent’svariousregionaleconomiccommunities.Suchinstitutionswereparticularlyinfluencedbyemergingeconometricresearchwhichseemedtosuggestthatitmayeventuallybepossibletogathersufficientdatatoseeconflictscomingandrespondaccordingly.Asidefromconflict,prominentdisasterssuchasthe2004IndianOceantsunami,whichaffectedseveralregions,alsoincreasedinterestinregionalapproachestohumanitarianproblems.

Asregionalorganisationsemerged,trendsbecomeevident.Thelate1990sandearly-to-mid-2000ssawastrongemphasisonpeace,conflictandsecuritycooperation,whileinthemid-to-late2000sthefocuswasmoreonDRRanddisastermanagement.Morerecently,amorematureformofregionalisationisemerging;thatis,regionalorganisationsareformingbroader,non-issue-specificregionalentitieswhicharemulti-sectoralandwhicharefocuseduponhumanitarianneedsingeneral,ratherthanspecificallyonconflictordisasters.ExamplesincludetheASEANCoordinatingCentreforHumanitarianAssistanceandtheOICInternationalCooperationandHumanitarianAffairsDepartment.Likewise,theAUandECOWAShavedevelopedbroaderhumanitarianpoliciesthatgobeyondtheUN-motivatedframeworkstheyhavepreviouslytendedtogenerate.Whileitiscertainlytooearlytosay,theestablishmentofthesebroaderhumanitarianentitiesandpoliciesmaysuggestanewdynamicinregionalhumanitarianaction.Thismeritsfurtherexamination.

3.1 Regional institutions versus regional capacitiesAnotherkeyissuerequiringfurtheranalysisisthecapacityofregionalinstitutions.Whiletheyhaveproliferated,manyreportshighlighttheirunevenlevelsoffinancingandhumanresources(bothintermsofnumbersandcapacity).Unfortunatelybudgetsformanyregionalorganisationsareunclearbecausetheirsmallcorebudgetsareoftensupplementedbylargeand

generallydonor-fundedinstitutionsfocusedonissuessuchaspeace,security,developmentandhumanitarianassistance.Thatsaid,onestudybytheUnitedNationsUniversityin2008analysed,basedoninterviewsandsurveys,thecorefundingavailabletoregionalorganisationsandtheirrespectivenumbersofcorestaffmembers(i.e.thoseworkingincentralinstitutions,excludingstaffinfieldmissions)(UNU-CRIS,2008).Theauthorconcludedthat‘thedifferencesintermsoffinancialpowerandhumanresourcesarepalpable’amongregionalorganisations,withsomehavingonlyafewdozenstaffandothershavingseveralhundred.Corebudgetsrangedfromaslowas$3m(IGAD)to$157m(OAS)in2007and2008,whenthedatawascollected.Whileitisimportanttoacknowledgethatthesefiguresmayhavechangedmarkedlyasregionalorganisationstakeonnewrolesandformnewsub-units,theydoprovideausefulapproximationofthestatureoftheseorganisationsinrecentyears(seeTable1).

AsthefiguresinTable1suggest,regionalorganisations,atleasthalfadecadeago,hadmarkedlydifferentlevelsofpersonnelandfunding.Some,suchasECOWAS,hadrelativelylargestaffsandbudgets,whileotherswerefarmoreconstrained.Thatsaid,sizeandfundingwasnot–atleastin2007/8–foundtocorrelatewithmotivationandstaffcapabilities.Forinstance,theUnitedNationsUniversitystudy(UNU-CRIS,2008)foundthatIGADstaffwereparticularlyentrepreneurialandhighlymotivated,whilemanyECOWASpersonnelweredescribedashavingbeenappointedbasedonnepotismratherthanqualifications.

Thestudyalsoshedlightonthequestionofregionalownershipandfinancing.Forinstance,onlyroughlyone-thirdoftheSADC’sbudgethadbeenprovidedbymemberstates,andonlyroughlythree-quartersoftheAU’scorebudgetwasprovidedbyAfricannations.TheAUisdescribedashavinghundredsofmillionsofdollars-worthofsupportfromexternaldonors,furthercallingintoquestionthedegreetowhichregionalorganisationsmightbeinfluencedbyexternalpatrons(includingChina,whichfundedtheconstructionofanew23-storeyAUheadquartersbuildingatacostof$150m)(UNU-CRIS,2008:22).

Suchrelianceonfinancialsupportfrombeyondregionalorganisations’ownmembersisalsofoundamongregionalorganisationsoutsideAfrica.FerrisandPetz(2013)foundthatonedisasterriskreductioninitiativeintheSouthPacificreceivedallbut12%ofitsfundingfromdonorsoutsidetheregion.ASEAN

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asksitstenmemberstoeachcontribute$30,000peryearfortheASEANCoordinatingCentreforHumanitarianAssistance,withtheremainderoftheCentre’sresourcesbeingprovidedbydonors(Ferris,PetzandStark,2013).NewZealandalonecontributednearly$400,000totheAHACentrein2011(morethanthe$300,000whichalltenASEANmemberswereobligedtoprovideintotal)(AidData2.0,2013).

Thecapacityofregionalorganisationstoday–aswellasdetailsregardingtheirfundingandstaffinglevels–ispoorlyunderstoodandrequiresfurtherattention.Withoutsuchfigures,itmaybedifficulttoassesstheirabilitytotakeon–andengageeffectivelyin–thesortsofnew(andold)humanitarianrolesoutlinedinChapter4.

Table 1: Regional organisations’ resources, circa 2006–2007Reg�onal organ�sat�on Staff members Core budget (US$m)

AfricanUnion 700 133(inc.96frommember

states)

AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations 260 9

CaribbeanCommunity 180 10

EconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates 50 17–18

EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates 300 121

Inter-GovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopment 80 3

LeagueofArabStates 500(plus500consultants) 35.7

OrganisationoftheIslamicConference 140(secretariat)totalstaff 23.7

of1,500

OrganizationofAmericanStates 506 157.3

PacificIslandsForum 100 23

SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity 200 45.3(inc.16.5frommember

states)

Source:UNU-CRIS(2008)Capacity Survey: Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations in the Maintenance of Peace and Security.Brussels:UnitedNationsUniversity–ComparativeRegionalIntegrationStudies.

Note:Staffingandbudgetfiguresaregenerallyfrom2006,2007or2008;theauthorsoftheUNU-CRISstudysoughtthemostrecentdataavailableatthetimeoftheresearch.

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Thischapterexploresamoretangibleyetalsopoorlystudiedtopic–thosehumanitarianactivitieswhichregionalorganisationshavethusfarundertaken.Thefollowingsections,involvingstructuredreviewsofregionalorganisations’publiclyavailablematerialsandtheexistingliterature,examinehumanitarianassistanceprovision(particularlyinrelationtorefugees),disasterriskreductionandconflictmanagement(includingpeacekeepingeffortsfocusedontheprotectionofcivilians).Theseareareaswhereregionalorganisations,accordingtotheavailableliterature,haveplayedatleastsomedirectrole.

Thisanalysisfocusesonthoseregionalorganisationsthathavebeenmostactiveinhumanitarianandsecurityissues.ThisgroupoverlapssubstantiallywithorganisationsbeingexaminedintheongoingBrookings-LSEprojectonregionalorganisations’roleindisasterriskmanagement(DRM)(seeFerrisandPetz,2013).SuchoverlapispartlyareflectionofthefactthattheBrookings-LSEstudyhasidentifiedthemostactiveregionalorganisationsinthehumanitariansector;however,italsorepresentsanintentionaldecisiontoensurethatthisstudyisabletocapitaliseuponothermajorresearchinitiativesonthehumanitarianroleofregionalorganisations.Alackofalignmentandharmonisationamongstudiesthusfarhaspreventedsufficientdialoguewithinthisresearcharea.

4.1 Humanitarian assistance provision/facilitation for refugees

Whileregionalorganisationsareprimarilypoliticalanddiplomaticentities,theliteratureispepperedwithexamplesofregionalinvolvementinaiddelivery.Thissectionassessestheextentofregionalorganisations’involvementinhumanitarianassistanceandgathersexamplestoillustratetrendsorapproaches.Giventhebreadthofhumanitarianaction,thisanalysishaschosentonarrowitsscopetoassistanceforrefugees,whichhavetendedtoposearegionalchallengeandwhichregionalorganisationshavefrequentlyfocusedoninpolicydocumentsandconventions(Ngung,1999).TheAUaddressesrefugeeissuesunderthe1969ConventionGoverningtheSpecificAspectsofRefugeeProblemsinAfrica(OAU,1969);ECOWASaddressesrefugeeswithinthescopeofits1999ProtocolRelatingtotheMechanismforConflictPrevention,Management,Resolution,Peace-KeepingandSecurity(ECOWAS,1999).TheOASisguidedbyboththeContadoraActonPeaceandCo-operationinCentralAmericaandbythe1984CartagenaDeclarationonRefugees(Lewis,2012).NearlyallregionalorganisationsreviewedinTable2haveestablishedagreementsconcerningrefugeeswithUNHCRandotherinstitutions(e.g.theAU’srecentagreementwiththeNorwegianRefugee

4 Regional organisations’ humanitarian action

Table 2: Humanitarian activities by regional organisations

Act�v�ty (refugees)

Facilitating/negotiatingaidaccess

Coordinatingaidprovision

Researchand/orregionallessonslearning

Fundingaidactivities(donor)

Directimplementationofaidprovision

Key:Clearrole/contributionPartialrole/contribution

AU

EC

OW

AS

SA

DC

OA

S

SIC

A

CA

RIC

OM

CA

N

LA

S

SA

AR

C

AS

EA

N

SP

C


Council)(NRC,2013;SecurityCouncilReport,2006).

Asidefromrefugees,nofacetofhumanitarianaidhasconsistentlybeenaddressedbyregionalorganisations,eitherinpracticeorviapolicyframeworks.Andeveninthecaseofrefugees,engagementhasbeenlimitedanduneven.Whilemostregionalbodieshavediscussedrefugeesatsomepointintheirhistories,fewhaveplayedadirectroleinaddressingrefugeeissuesduringacutecrises(e.g.bydisbursingorfinancingassistanceorbycoordinatinghumanitarianactors).Thatsaid,theyhaveperiodicallycontributedtorefugeeresponsesinindirectways,suchasfacilitatinghumanitarianaccess(AMISOM,2013).

TheAU,ECOWAS,theArabLeagueandASEANhaveallpubliclycriticisedthelackofcoordinationininternationalaidactivities,thoughnoneofthethreehassteppedintoadoptaroleinaidcoordination.Instead,theAUhasfocuseditseffortsongatheringandconsolidatingdataregardingrefugeesandotherhumanitarianchallenges,includingthroughitsrecentlyrevitalisedCoordinatingCommitteeonAssistanceandProtectiontoRefugees,ReturneesandInternallyDisplacedPersonsinAfrica(CCAPRRI)(AfricanUnion,2011).TheArabLeaguehasdonemuchthesame,dispatchingmissionstoreviewthesituationsofIraqiand,morerecently,Syrianrefugeesintheregion(Khraiche,2013).TheSecretariatofthePacificCommunity(SPC)hasexaminedtheanticipatedchallengeofclimatechange-inducedrefugeesinthePacific(see,forinstance,Vainerere,2009).Whileuseful,suchworkhastendedtobeinlieuoftangibleaction,ratherthanasaprecursortoaidprovisionorcoordination,whichregionalorganisationsgenerallylackthecapacitytodeliver.

Whereregionalorganisationshaveprovidedassistance,theamountsinvolvedaregenerallysymbolic(thoughhighlightingthisfactisnotintendedasacriticism).Forinstance,ECOWASdistributedupto(reportsvary)$15m-worthofaidtoLiberia,SierraLeone,GuineaandGuinea-Bissauforrefugeesbetween2005and2012underthePeaceandDevelopmentProject(PADEP)(ECOWAS,2012).ThefundswereallocatedtoECOWASbytheAfricanDevelopmentBank(ADB);ECOWASthenpassedthemoneytotheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP),whichprocuredanddistributedrice,maizeandothergrainstobeneficiariesinthetargetcountries(ECOWAS,2012b).ECOWASappears

tohaveprimarilyservedasanintermediaryinvolvedinhandingADBfundstoWFP,whileusingPADEP‘launches’inparticularcountriesasanopportunitytopromoteECOWAS’roleintheregion(ECOWAS,2002).

Inasimilarexample,theArabLeaguereportedlydistributedsmallamountsofaid,primarilymedicalsupplies,toJordantoaidSyrianrefugees(JordanTimes,22October2012);thesesupplieshavethenbeendistributedbytheUnitedNationsPopulationFund(UNFPA).InSudantheLeagueallocatedupto$30mforreconstructionactivities,includingtheconstructionofbetween12and15modelvillagesaimedatenticingrefugeestoreturntoDarfur(SudanTribune,16August2013).8

Relativelymodestamountsofaidfromregionalorganisationsappeartobecommoninothersectorsaswell.TheASEANAgreementonDisasterManagementandEmergencyResponse(ADMER)Fund,whichstartedinMarch2012,reportedlyfinanced$100,000-worthofricefromWFPforthePhilippinesfollowingTyphoonBopha(ASEAN,2012,2013).9Likewise,ECOWASprovidedaround$400,000forhumanitarianoperationsinNigeriaduringmajorfloodsin2012.

Otherregionalorganisationshaverefusedtointervenetohelprefugeepopulations.CARICOMandSAARChavedeclinedtotacklehumanitarianchallengesinvolvingHaitian(CARICOM)andBhutanese(SAARC)refugees–despitepleasfromparticularstatesforthemtotakeuptheseissues–duetooppositionfrominfluentialmembers.SAARChasblockedofficialconsiderationofBhutaneserefugeesinNepalandIndiasinceatleast1991,claimingthattodosowouldviolatetheAssociation’sbanondiscussionsofbilateralorcontentiousissues(Chandrasekharan,2008;Sridharan,2008).SAARCistheonlyregionalorganisationreviewedherewhichdoesnothaveofficialtreaties,conventionsor

8 TheSudan Tribunereportedthat15villageswerebeingbuilt,thoughothersourcesputthenumberat12.

9 Inaddition,ASEANindicatesthatitplayedarole,viatheAHACentre,inregionalcountries’responsetoTyphoonBopha,includingfood,milkandtentsfromMalaysia,$1mfromIndonesiaandthedeploymentofateamofSingaporeanexperts.

10CAN,arelativelysmallregionalorganisation,doesnotspecificallyhavepoliciesortreatiesonrefugees,thoughithassaidthatitintendstodevelopthem(CAN,n.d.).

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agreementsthatmentionrefugees.10Suchrecalcitrancereflectsdomesticconcerns(e.g.regardingethnictensionsinIndia)andregionaldiplomaticfactorsamongIndia,NepalandBhutanratherthananyprincipledoppositiontoregionalhumanitarianinitiatives.

Therehavealsobeeninstancesinwhichregionalorganisations,whilenotphysicallysupportingaiddelivery,havehelpedtoprotectrefugees.Sharpe(2011,2013)highlightsthemannerinwhichtheAUCommissiondrewuponthe1969ConventiontopreventBurundianrefugeesfrombeingexpelledfromRwandain1996andtohelpSierraLeoneanrefugeesfacingpotentialrightsviolationsinGuineain2004.Thatsaid,suchinstancesareportrayedasraritiesenabledbyactiverefugeeadvocates;inmostsituations,theAU’srefugeeprotectioninstitutionsandlegalframeworkshaveprovenincapableofaddressingtheplightofrefugees.Sharpe(2013)notesthat,inatrendcommonamongregionalorganisations,theAUhasfocusedonthequantityofrefugeeprotectionframeworks,institutionsandinitiatives,withoutpayingmuchheedtotheirqualityoreffectiveness.11

4.2 Disaster risk reduction12

Althoughregionalorganisationsthemselves13rarelyhavetheresources,capacityorwilltoprovidesizablevolumesofhumanitarianassistance–whichtheyviewasprimarilytheroleoftheUnitedNationsandotherinternationalorganisations–theyareinterestedinDRR(FerrisandPetz,2013).SoutheastAsia,thePacificIslands,CentralAmericaandtheCaribbeanhaverepeatedlybeenaffectedbyearthquakes,tsunamis,cyclones,hurricanesandotherpowerfulweatherevents.PreparednesswasfurtherpopularisedamongregionalorganisationsbytheHFA,whichidentifiedaparticularroleforregionalorganisationsinconductingassessmentsrelatedtoDRRatthenationalandregionallevels,reviewingprogressonDRR,establishingorstrengtheningDRRcentresandintroducingdisasterearly-warningmechanisms(UNISDR,2005:15).

Regionalorganisations’engagementwithnaturaldisastersandDRRactuallypredatestheHyogoFramework.TheIFRC(2011)notesthattheAU’sprimarydisasterstrategywasformulatedandadoptedin2004.Africa’sregionaleconomiccommunitiesmadeanearlierstart,withIGADlonghavingworkedonmitigatingthehumanitarianimpactofdroughtsandfoodinsecurity;itsregionalDisasterRiskManagementProgrammewaslaunchedin2002,oneyearaftertheSADChadadopteditsregionaldisasterstrategy.ComparableDRRplanningintheEconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates(ECCAS)andECOWASmainlyemergedfollowingtheAU-wide2004AfricaRegionalStrategyforDisasterRiskReduction(GFDRR,2010).

LatinAmericabegandelvingintoDRRissuesearlierstill.In1991theOASadoptedtheInter-AmericanConventiontoFacilitateDisasterAssistanceandtheassociatedInter-AmericanCommitteeonNaturalDisasterReduction(IACNDR)(OAS,1999).That

InauthorisingtheAUMissioninSomalia(AMISOM)in2007,theAUPeaceandSecurityCouncil(PSC)mandatedthemissionto‘facilitate,asmayberequired,withincapabilities,humanitarianoperations,includingtherepatriationofrefugeesandresettlementofinternallydisplacedpersons(IDPs)’.Thissupporttorefugeeshasinvolvedboththecivilianandmilitarycomponentsofthemission,withthelatterhelpingtosecuresomeaidshipmentsviaportsandotherkeytransitpoints.AMISONnotesthatitsHumanitarianAffairsUnitworkscloselywithOCHAandUNHCRaswellasUNICEF,WFPandotherhumanitarianactors,mostnotablyinsharinginformationregardinghumanitarianconditions.

Box 2: AMISOM and Somali refugees

11Sharpe’s(2011)researchpaperontheOAUandAU’srefugeeprotectionbodieshighlightsanextensivelevelofengagementwithrefugeeissueswithinAfricanregionalstructures.Conventions,committees,debatesandconferenceshavenotbeeninshortsupply.Yettheoutcomesoftheseprocesses,whichremainatanelitelevel,havebeencalledintoquestion.

12ThissectionbenefitedfromresearchconductedbyFerris&Petz(2013)inexploringdisasterriskreduction.Ferris&Petz(2013)focusondisasterriskmanagement(DRM),whichtheydefineas‘allactivitiesintendedtoreduceriskorpreparefordisastersaswellasthoseassociatedwithemergencyreliefandreconstruction’.

13Thatis,regionalorganisationsdonottendtohavelargeresourcesavailableforprovidinghumanitarianassistance.However,severaloftheirmembersdocommonlyhavegreaterresources,eitherindependentlyorviaregionalorganisations.


sameyear,CARICOMagreedtolaunchtheCaribbeanDisasterEmergencyResponseAgency(CDERA),whichwasparticularlyfocusedonpreparedness.TheAndeanCommunity’s(CAN)AndeanCommitteeforthePreventionandResponsetoDisasters(CAPRADE)wasagreedin2002;however,likemanyCANagreementsitsprimarymandateistopromotecompliancewithbroaderinternational(primarilyUN)frameworksandagreements(IFRC,2011).

InAsia,ASEANandSAARCbothestablishedregionalfoodsecurityinitiativesgoingbacktothe1970sand1980s,thoughovertworkonDRRwasprimarilyimpelledbytheDecember2004tsunami(ASEAN,1979;SAARC,1987).InJuly2005,ASEANestablishedtheAgreementonDisasterManagementandEmergencyResponse(ADMER),whichhasledtoregionalcooperationonDRRwhilealsostronglyreaffirmingstatesovereigntyandnationalleadershipofalldisaster-relatedefforts(OCHA,n.d.).

TheMiddleEastandNorthAfricawasperhapsthelastregiontobeginadoptingDRR-relatedframeworks,themostsignificantofwhich,theArabStrategyforDisasterRiskReduction2020,wasagreedin2010(ArabLeague,2010).Theregion’sfirstArabConferenceonDRRfollowedin2013,aroundthesametimethattheGCCbegancollaboratingwiththeUnitedNationsandothersonDRRandHFA-relatedissues(UNDP,2013).TheOIC–thoughnotexclusivelyaMiddleEasternandNorthAfricanentity–beganengagingdirectlyinDRRin2010(FerrisandPetz,2013:67),thoughithadpreviouslyplayedasignificantroleinlaunchinghumanitarianappeals,providingassistanceandconductingassessmentsinBosnia-Herzegovina,Yemen,Gaza,Indonesiaandelsewhere;however,thesehavetendedtocomprisedisaster(orconflict)managementratherthanriskreduction(OIC,2009).

TheseagreementshavebeenaccompaniedbyawiderangeofactivitiesrelatedtoDRRanddisasterresponse(seeTable3andBox4).WiththeHFAandassociatedreview/monitoringprocessesdrawingattentiontoindividualcountries’andregions’performance,regionalengagementhasbeenfarstrongerthaninothersectors,wherethefocusismorefirmlyuponthestateanditslegalobligations(e.g.inrelationtorefugeeissues).

Withregardtofield-levelinterventions,progresshasbeenunevenbutrelativelyextensive.EveryregionalorganisationhasfacilitateddiscussionsandregionalplanningonDRR.InseveralinstancesthesecoverDRRasawhole,thoughmanyregionshavebeguntodelvefarmoredeeplyintoparticularthreatsandsectors.SahelregionalorganisationsandIGAD–whicharenotincludedinTable3–havebothdonesignificantworkonpreparingfordroughtsandfoodinsecurity,ashasSAARC.Forinstance,theSAARCFoodBankhelpstoprepareforfoodshortages,whiletheIGADClimatePredictionsandApplicationsCentre(ICPAC)monitorsweatherconditionsinordertobetteranticipateandpreparefordroughts(ICPAC,2013).

Nearlyallregionalorganisationshaveengagedinsomedegreeofregionalcoordination.However,coordinationeffortsarenotnecessarilycomparable.Particularentities,suchastheAU,CARICOMandASEAN,haveclearregionalstrategiesthatprovideadegreeofsharedvisionwhichextendsacrossyears.Inotherinstances,organisationssuchastheArabLeagueengageinrelativelybroad-basedplanningonissuessuchastheenvironment,climatechangeanddevelopmentwithouthavingastrongcoordinationfunctionforDRR.ThesamecouldbesaidoftheOAS,wherememberstateshaverepeatedlyendorsedtheneedforgreatercoordinationsurroundingDRRbuthavemadelittleprogressinthatdirection(incontrast

Table 3: Activities related to DRR and disaster response

Act�v�ty

Facilitatingdiscussions/planningonDRR

CoordinatingregionalDRRinitiatives

Researchand/orregionallessonslearningonDRR

FundingDRRactivitiesinmemberstates(donor)

DirectimplementationofDRRprojects/activities


AU

EC

OW

AS

SA

DC

OA

S

SIC

A

CA

RIC

OM

CA

N

LA

S

SA

AR

C

AS

EA

N

SP

C

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toadvancedprogresswithin‘sub-regional’bodiessuchasCARICOMandtheCentralAmericanIntegrationSystem(SICA)(FerrisandPetz,2013)).Indeed,SICAhasbeenactivelyengagedwithDRR(ordisasterprevention)sincethefoundingoftheCoordinationCenterforNaturalDisasterPreventioninCentralAmerica(CEPREDENAC)in1987.TheCenterhasdevelopedstrategiesanddrivenresearchintonaturaldisasterswhilealsotakingstepstointegrateregionalcommunicationsystemstoenableearlywarning(CEPREDENAC,2011).

CEPREDENAC’sfocusonresearchisalsocommonamongotherregionalbodies.Hereresearchrangesfromshortnationalmissionstomemberstates,whichtheOASandECOWAShavedone,totheestablishmentofresearchcentresfocusedonDRRandrelatedissues.Theseinclude,tonamejustacoupleofexamples,theSAARCDisasterManagementCentreinNewDelhiandtheSouthPacificAppliedGeoscienceCommission

(SOPAC),whichwasfoundedinthe1970sandbecameadivisionofSecretariatofthePacificCommunity(SPC)in2011(Hay,2013).Inothercases,regionalorganisationsbenefitfromresearchinstitutionswhichareindependentoraffiliatedwithprominentuniversitiesintheregion(asinthecaseoftheUniversityoftheWestIndies).Theseinstitutionscommonlyengagenotonlyinresearchbutalsointrainingandcapacity-buildingforregionalorganisationsandtheirmemberstates.Aswithresearch,capacity-buildinghasbeenwidelyvariedbut,onthewhole,primarilyfocusedonconveyinginformationaboutkeyDRRconceptsandinternationalandregionalframeworksthroughworkshopsandseminars.

Suchinitiativeshaveprimarilybeenfinancednotbymembercountriesthemselves,whichhavedemonstratedinterestinDRRissuesbutafarlowerwillingnessorabilitytofinancethem.Conversely,donorcountrieshavebeenparticularlyinterestedinsupportingoverseas

TheBrookings-LSEstudyontheroleofregionalorganisationsinDRM(FerrisandPetz(2013))examined17differentindicatorsofperformanceandengagement.Itnotedthat,whileallregionalorganisationsexaminedhadDRRframeworksorconventionsandregularintergovernmentalmeetingsonDRMissues,farfewerengagedinfundingorimplementingprojects.Thatsaid,manywereinvolvedinwarningsystemsfornaturaldisastersandinconductingresearchandcapacity-buildingactivitiesaroundDRM.

Box 3: Findings of Brookings-LSE study on regional organisations and DRM

Act�v�ty

RegularintergovernmentalmeetingsonDRM

RegionalDRRframework/convention

RegionalDMframework/convention

SpecificorganisationforDRM

Regional/sub-regionaldisastermanagementcentre

Regionaldisasterrelieffund

Regionaldisasterinsurancescheme

RegionalfundingforDRRprojects

Provideshumanitarianassistance

Regionalrapidresponsemechanism

Regionaltechnicalcooperation(warningsystems)

Jointdisastermanagementexercises/simulations

TechnicaltrainingonDRMissues/capacity-building

ResearchonDRM/CCAissues

Regionalmilitaryprotocolsfordisasterassistance

RegionalwebportalonDRM

RegionalIDRLtreaty/guidelines

Total � � � � � ��

AU

EC

OW

AS

SA

DC

OA

S

SIC

A

CA

RIC

OM

CA

N

LA

S

SA

AR

C

AS

EA

N

EU

CO

E

SP

C


DRRinitiativesonthepremisethatpreparednessandmitigationeffortswilleventuallyreducetheeffectsofdisastersand,hence,theneedforcostlyhumanitarianoperations.Accordingly,SOPAC’sbudgetisoverwhelminglyfinancedbytheEuropeanUnion,withadditionalsizablecontributionsfromAustralia,NewZealand,FranceandtheUnitedStates–allofwhichwerefoundingmembersoftheSPC(SOPAC,2012).Likewise,CEPREDENACreceivesfundingfromtheUnitedStates,China,Japan,SpainandSwitzerland,aswellasfromtheEuropeanCommission,theWorldBank,theIFRCandanumberofNGOs.In2010,themostrecentyearforwhichpublicdataisavailable,itreceived$780,000fromtheJapanesegovernmentalone(JICA,2012;AidData2.0,2013).

Reliantonexternalfinancing,regionalorganisationshavegenerallynotactedasdonorsexceptinminorinstances,financingnationalefforts(oftenwithfundingfromtheUnitedNationsortheEU).Thisreflectsnotonlyadearthoffundingbutalsothesize,scale,contextualspecificityandcostofdisasterriskreductionprojects.

4.3 Conflict management

WhileregionalorganisationshavetakenonhumanitarianassistanceandDRR-relatedactivitiesinrecentyears,asprimarilypoliticalanddiplomaticentitiestheyhavelongengagedwithconflictsandtheirrepercussions.Thepreviouslydiscussedprincipleofsubsidiarityhaslongbeenappliedtoconflict,withresearchersandpolicymakersbothnotingregionalorganisations’potentialtointerveneinconflictsinways–giventheirunderstandingofconflictdynamicsandcultures–notnecessarilyfeasiblefortheUnitedNationsorindividualnations(PughandSidhu,2003;Boutros-Ghali,1992;Brahimi,2000).Asdiscussedbelow,thishasparticularly(butnotexclusively)appliedtoAfrica,whichisonthewholelesswedtonationalsovereigntyconcernsandwhereconflictsinonecountryhavealonghistoryofspreadingacrossborders.However,theArabLeague,generallyadefenderofstatesovereignty,tooktheextraordinarystepofrequestinginternationalmilitaryaction(theestablishmentofano-flyzone)overLibyain2011.WhiletheLeague’sactiononLibyaappearedoutofcharacterfortheorganisation,itreflectedmanyArableaders’personalanimositytowardsLibyanPresidentMuammarGadhafiandtheirgrowingconcernabouthiserraticstyleofleadership;theLeaguewasfurther

bolsteredbydeepconcernamongArabpopulationsovertheregime’sattacksoncivilians.Otherregionalorganisationshavealsosoughttoprotectciviliansandreduceconflicttensions.TheOASissupportingnegotiationsbetweentheColombiangovernmentandtheFuerzasArmadasRevolucionariasdeColombia(FARC)(Meyer,2013:9),andtheASEANRegionalForum(ARF)isbecomingincreasinglyinvolvedinaddressingregionalsecuritychallengesandassociatedissues(e.g.preventivediplomacy,defencecooperation).

Hereconflictmanagementisdefinedaseffortstopreventconflictand,onceithasemerged,toresolveitandmitigateitsdestructiveimpact(Wallensteen,2002).Hence,thetermisusedtorefertoawiderangeofinterventions,includingconflictmonitoringandearlywarning,conflictresolutionandmediation,peacekeepingandtheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflict.Whilebroaderregionalintegrationandeconomiccooperationmayhaveancillarybenefitsforpeaceandthemanagementofarmedviolence(seeAnnawitt,2010),thissectiononlyaddressesthoseinterventionswhichareovertlyaimedatmitigatingconflict.

Regionalinstitutionshavedevelopedpoliciesandstructuresforconflictmanagement.TheARF,anextensionofASEAN,wasestablishedin1994inordertohelptheregionalbodyaddresssensitivediplomaticandsecurityissuesseparatelyfromitsgenerallylessconfrontationalsummitsandhigh-levelmeetings(Whelan,2012).InLatinAmerica,theOAScreatedTheFundforPeace:PeacefulSettlementofTerritorialDisputes,morecommonlyreferredtoastheOASPeaceFund(OAS,2000),in2000.AcrossAfrica,initiativesandinstitutionsaretoonumeroustonotehere.TheyrangefromtheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncil(PSC)andPaneloftheWisetoECOWAS’ConflictPreventionFrameworkandSADC’sOrganonPolitics,DefenceandSecurityCooperation(ZyckandMuggah,2012).Standingpeacekeepingforceshavealsobeenestablished,primarilyundertheauspicesoftheAUStandbyForce(ASF),andtheECOWASMonitoringGroup(ECOMOG)hasbeenparticularlyactiveinWestAfrica,thoughSADC’sStandbyBrigade(SADCBRIG)hasbeenlargelyinactivesinceitwasestablishedin2004(deCarvalhoetal.,2010).BroaderpeaceandconflicteffortsinAfricahavealsobeeninformedbyconflictearlywarningsystems,fromthepan-AfricanContinentalEarlyWarningSystem(CEWS)toIGAD’sConflictEarlyWarningandResponseMechanism(CEWARN)inEastAfricaandSADC’sRegionalEarlyWarningSystem(REWS).(Foracomprehensivetreatmentofthese

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systems,seeWulfandDebiel(2009).)Ofcourse,asdiscussedbelow,institutionalisationhasnotnecessarilycorrelatedwithactivity,effectivenessorimpact.

Aswiththeothersectorsandissues,progresshasbeenhighlyunevenamongregionalorganisations.AsevidentinTable4,regionalorganisationsintheAmericasandtheCaribbeanhavehadrelativelylittleengagementwithconflictmanagement.CARICOMhasregularlydiscussedintra-Caribbeandisputesoversharedwatersandresources,thoughthesehaveneverbeenraisedtothelevelofmediationorconflictresolution.TheOASstandsoutasanexception,thoughithasprimarilytendedtoplayasupportiveroleandtheorganisationhasneverbeenatthehelmofpeacetalks.ItsMissiontoSupportthePeaceProcessinColombia(MAPP)has,since2004,helpedtofacilitatetalksandofferedtoprovideverificationofdisarmamentanddemobilisationefforts.TheOAShasalsohelpedtobuildmediationcapacityand,throughitsPeaceFund,providedtechnicalsupporttobilateral(mostlyterritory-related)disputesamongOASmembers.Itmostsignificanttestcamewiththeoustingin2009ofPresidentManuelZelayainHonduras;however,theOASwasslowtorespondtothecrisisand,despitebringingsomediplomaticpressuretobear,achievednosignificantimpact(Meyer,2013).TheArabLeaguehasbeencloselyinvolvedinmediatingconflictssinceatleasttheLebanesecivilwarinthe1970sand1980s,whenSaudiArabiaandSyrianegotiatedtheTaifAgreementunderanominalLeaguemandate(Pinfari,2009).14ArabLeaguemediatorswereunsuccessfulinbrokeringadealamongLebanese

factionsinDecember2006,thoughtheywereabletobringaboutapeacefulresolutiontothatcountry’spresidentialcrisisin2007and2008(ibid.).Morerecently,sincetheArabuprisings,theLeaguehasattemptedtomediateconflictsinEgypt,LibyaandSyria(Masters,2013).ItisalsoinvolvedinanewroundofplanningforpeacetalksbetweentheIsraelisandPalestinians.However,itseffectivenesshaslongbeencalledintoquestion,andtheIsraeligovernmenthasimplicitlyrefusedtoparticipateinnegotiations

Table 4: Activities related to conflict management

Act�v�ty

Coordinatingconflictearlywarningsystems

Researchand/orregionallessonslearning

Training/capacity-buildingonconflictmanagement

Engagementinconflictresolution/mediation

Peacekeepingwithprotectionfocus


AU

EC

OW

AS

SA

DC

OA

S

SIC

A

CA

RIC

OM

CA

N

LA

S

SA

AR

C

AS

EA

N

SP

C

14DespitetheArabLeaguemandate,creditforthenegotiationsisnormallygiventoSaudiArabiaandSyria,whichwereabletobringaboutchangegiventheirrelationswithfactionsinLebanon.However,theArabLeagueprovidedaforumforthetwocountriestochanneltheirdiplomaticefforts.

SeveralstudiesgoingbacktotheSecondWorldWarhavefoundthat,ofregionalorganisations’mediationefforts,onlyasmallfractionhavebeensuccessful.Forinstance,Nye(1971)examinedtheeffectivenessoftheOAS,OAUandArabLeagueinmanaging19conflictsbetween1948and1970.Weightingtheseconflictsbasedontheircomplexityandinten-sity,heconcludedthattheOAShadperformedratherwellasamediator,whiletheOAUwasperhapsmiddling;theArabLeaguewasdeemedtohavebeentheleasteffectiveinresolvingconflicts.DifferentfindingswerereachedbyZacher(1979),whoexamined116conflictsbetween1946and1977.ThatstudyfoundthattheOAUhadsuccessfullymediated37%oftheconflictsinitsregionwhiletheOAS(19%),ArabLeague(12%)andUnitedNations(9%)hadfaredfarworse.TheArabLeague’sdifficultiesinactingasamediatorwerefurthernotedbyAwad(1994),whofoundthatthebodyhadsuccess-fullymediatedonlysixof77conflictswhichithadattemptedtosettlebetween1945and1981.

Box 4: Regional organisations’ mediation efforts and outcomes


involvingtheLeague(TheEconomist,11May2013).SincetheArabuprisingsof2011,theLeaguehasnotsuccessfullymediatedasingleconflict–despiteaflurryofreneweddiplomaticengagement(Küçükkeles,2012).TheOIChasalsofaceddifficultyinmediatingconflicts,thoughithasreportedlyattainedsomelimitedsuccessincallingformoderationinMindanaosincethe1970sandenablinghumanitarianaccessinSomalia(Sharqieh,2012).AmongIslamicandMiddleEasternregionalorganisations’recentmediationefforts,onlytheGCC’snegotiatedtransitioninYemen–itsfirstexperienceofmediatinginaconflict–mightbecalleda(qualified)success(seeBox6).

Asianregionalorganisationshavebeenamongtheleastactiveinpreventingandrespondingtoconflicts.DespitetheprevalenceofconflictinSouthAsia,SAARChasnotengagedinconflictmanagement(Jetly,2003),althoughinformal,high-leveltalksonthesidelinesofSAARCsummitshavefacilitatedareductionintensions,particularlybetweenIndiaandPakistan(Sridharan,2008).ASEANhasbeeninmuchthesameposition,rarelydiscussingconflictsopenly

butinsteadapplyinginformalpressureonitsmembers.ASEANhaslongsoughttopersuadetherulersofMyanmartoopenuptotheinternationalcommunityandtheirowndomesticopposition(ibid.),andindividualASEANmemberstateshavebeeninvolvedinmediationandpeaceagreementmonitoringinAceh,southernThailandandMindanao(Odaira,2009;Wandi,2010).ASEANhasproposedanInstituteforPeaceandReconciliation,andcouldbepoisedtoengagemoreovertlywithconflictmanagement(Cristescu,NicolescouandWandi,2012).However,withtheprincipleofnon-violenceenshrinedinitscharter(Hara,2012),thesedevelopmentsareunlikelytoleadtothesortsofregionalpeacekeepingeffortsseenelsewhere.

OnlyAfricahasasignificant,demonstratedrecordofdirectandovertinvolvementinconflictmanagementinrelationtoresearch,trainingand,mostimportantly,diplomaticandmilitaryinterventions.TheAUhaslaunchedanumberofindependentpeacekeepingmissions,includinginBurundi(2003),Sudan/Darfur(2004),Somalia(2007)and,withECOWAS,Mali(2013),manyofwhichwereultimatelytakenoverorconductedinpartnershipwiththeUnitedNations.Citingtheresponsibilitytoprotect(R2P),theAU’sPeaceandSecurityCouncilhasdeployedpeacekeepersandonlypursuedUNapprovalatalaterstage(Paiwal,2010).Indeed,thereappearstobeagrowingtrendinAfricanpeacekeeping:AU(orECOWAS)forcesinterveneinaconflictorsituationwithlimitedresourcesandlimitedUNbacking;oncetheyencountereasilyanticipatedchallengesorresourceconstraints,theUnitedNationsfeelscompelledtoactandshoresuptheAfricanmission,partnerswithitorsubsumesitunderaUNmandate.

ThisscenariohasrepeatedlyplayeditselfoutinWestAfrica,whereECOWAShasbecomecloselyinvolvedinconflictmanagementonmultiplelevels.SinceECOMOG’sdeploymentofforcestoLiberiain1990,ECOWAShasdevelopedareputationasoneofthemostinterventionistregionalorganisationsintheworld.ItsdeploymentofforcesinCôted’Ivoireinlate2002–alongsideFrenchtroopsandintheabsenceofUNapproval–iscreditedwithendingtheconflictthereandcreatingtheconditionsnecessaryforapeaceagreement.Tosomeextent,theorganisation’sthreatstouseforcehavegrownsocrediblethat,in2009,ECOWAShelpedtopushtheGuineangovernmenttothenegotiatingtable

TheGCC,predominantlyapoliticaldiscussionforumandcustomsunion,tookupanewroleasmediatorinYemenduringtheArabupris-ings.ItdevelopedatransitionplanunderwhichPresidentAliAbdullahSalehwouldstepdown,cedingauthoritytohisdeputy,whowouldbecommittedtofutureelectionsandaNationalDialogueprocesswhichwouldtackleconten-tiousdomesticissuesandproduceanewconstitution(Burke,2012;2013).Despiteflawsinimplementation,theGCCinitiativehasbeenpraisedasaleast-badoutcomefortheArabworld’spoorestcountry.Thatsaid,analystshavenotedthattheagreementbenefitedfromafortunateconfluenceofcircumstances:SaudiArabia’slongstandingrelationswiththesittingYemenipresident,Qatar’ssupportforparticularoppositiongroupsinYemenandtheGCC’sbroaderconcernthatprolongedprotestandpoliticalviolenceinYemencouldspreadtoitsneighboursorcreateopportunitiesforextremistgroupssuchasAl-QaedaintheArabianPeninsula(Zyck,2013).

Box 5: The role of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Yemen’s transition

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bymakingpreparationsforaforcetointervenethereamidaharshgovernmentcrackdownagainstprotesters(StaresandZenkho,2011).However,asimilarapproachfailedinCôted’Ivoirein2010(Yabi,2012).Indeed,despitesomeprominentsuccesses,ECOWAS’conflictmanagementeffortshavefacedseveralchallenges–inadditiontobeinghighlymilitarised.TheorganisationisreliantonNigeriaforupwardsof70%ofitsfinancingandtroops,thusprovidingitslargestmemberwithadefactovetooverfutureoperations(Pitts,1999).Morebroadly,ithasattimesfacedcapacityproblems;inlate2012itestimatedthatitcouldfieldaforceinMali–afterIslamistandTuaregrebelshadseizedthenorthofthecountry–onlyninemonthslater(SecurityCouncilReport,2013).ItwaseventuallyspurredintoactionbyaFrenchandChadianinterventioninMaliinJanuary2013,butitwasonlyabletomusterafewhundredsoldiersafterseveralweeks(overwhelminglyfromNigeria).Asinpreviouscases,theregionalforceprovedaspearheadforaUNmission,knownastheUnitedNationsMultidimensionalIntegratedStabilizationMissioninMali(MINUSMA),whichabsorbedtheAU-backedECOWASmissioninJuly2013(ZyckandMuggah,2013).

OtherregionalinstitutionsinAfricahavebeenlessabletocontributetoconflictmanagement.SADChasestablishedseveralinstitutionsrelatedtoconflictmanagement,butisatafarearlierstagethantheAUandECOWAS,andmanySADCconflictmanagementinstitutionsremainsmall(Essuman-Johnson,2009)anddependentonSouthAfrica(Møller,2005).15AsidefromlimitedmediationeffortsintheDRCandthecontributionofpeacekeeperstotheAUmissionthere,SADChasonlyintervenedtwiceinregionalconflicts.Thefirst,in1998inLesotho,remainsasourceofcontroversy.SADC’slegalmandatetodeploypeacekeepershasbeencalledintoquestion,andSouthAfricahasbeenaccusedoflaunchingthemissionwithinadequatejustificationandinordertohelpitensurecontinuedaccesstowaterviatheKatseDam(Cawthra,2010).Inthesecondinstance,inMadagascar,SADC,inpartnershipwiththeAU,pushedforandmediatedapolitical‘solution’aftertheelectedpresidentwasoverthrownbyarival.However,theagreementwassoonviolated(ibid.;BakerandMaeresera,2009).

4.4 Regional humanitarian action – analysis

Asevidentfromthesectionsabove,regionalorganisationshavenotengagedwithdifferentelementsofhumanitarianactiontothesameextent.Refugeeissueshavebeentackledbynearlyallorganisationsexamined,andnearlyallhaveamajorandgrowingemphasisonDRR;however,conflictmanagementhasbeenaddressedhighlyunevenly,withAfricanregionalorganisationsadoptingasignificantlymoreaggressiveandcomprehensiveapproach(e.g.involvingmonitoring,peacekeepingandmediation)thanregionalentitiesonothercontinents.

Truetotheirpurpose–andreflectingtheirlimitations–regionalorganisationshavenottendedtoactasdonorsorimplementingagenciesexceptinasmallnumberofsymbolicinstances.Instead,asinter-governmentalbodies,theyhaveengagedinpolicy-leveldiscussions,conductedassessmentandresearch,developedlessons-learningsystemsand,tosomeextent,builtcapacities.Increasingly,thesearebeingundertakenwithindedicateddepartmentsandcentresfocuseduponnaturaldisastersand‘conflictearlywarning’.Suchfindingsareunsurprisinggiventheintent,objectives,resourcesandprinciplesunderlyingregionalorganisations.Theyareunlikelytobecomedonorsandareill-equippedtoengageinmoreinvasiveactivities.

Regionalorganisationsappearmuchmorelikelytoengagewithanissuewhenitisframedintechnicalratherthanlegalterms,whenitisbasedoninternationalstandardsandprocesses,whenmonitoringmechanismsareputinplaceandwhenaregionhasarelativelysimilarlevelofvulnerability.Likewise,statesovereigntyhasplayedacrucialrole–preventingparticularregionalorganisations(e.g.ASEAN,SAARC)fromenteringintonovelhumanitarianterrain.Ontheissueoflegalversustechnicalframing,considertheissueofrefugees,whichhasseenlimitedandinconsistentengagementbymanyregionalorganisations.Theissuehadbeencastinlegaltermsand,intheOASandCAN,wasaddressedbylegalentities.InSAARC,refugeeissuesintheregionhavenotbeenaddressed,andtheASEANRegionalForum,whileissuingseveralstatementsregardingtheneedtoaddressrefugeeissuesinAfghanistan,PakistanandtheKoreanPeninsula,hasthusfarsidesteppeddisplacementintheregion.Incontrast,manyoftheseorganisationshavebeenthemostactiveinDRR

15SADC’sRegionalPeacekeepingTrainingCentre(RPTC)hasatotalofsevenstaffmembers(SADC,2012).


efforts,whichtheytendtoviewastechnicalchallengesratherthanobligationsunderinternationallaw.Thesameappliestoconflictmanagement,whichsawitsgreatestburstofprogress(e.g.theformationofearlywarningnetworksacrosstheAfricancontinent)whenregionalorganisationsbeganseeingtheissueasoneofsemi-scientificprediction.

Regionalorganisationsappeartohaveaddressedissuesmorecomprehensivelywhen,liketheHFA,theycontainaclearroleforregionalorganisationsandonewhichwillbemonitoredregularly.Itisundeniablethatregionalbodies’preparationsforandresponsetotheHyogoprocesshavedrivenDRReffortsattheregionallevel.ThesoftpressureimpliedbyHFAmonitoringatthenationalandregionallevelshasalsobeencrucial.Nosimilarlyprominentinternationalframeworksormonitoringprocessesapplytoeitherrefugeeissues(oranyotherhumanitariansector)orconflictmanagement.

Regionalorganisationsalsoappeartohavebeenparticularlywillingtoengagewithanissuewhentheysharecommonriskprofiles.InrelationtoDRR,regionswhicharegenuinelycontiguousandfacesharedvulnerabilitiestendtobethemostwillingtocooperateonDRR.Forinstance,CARICOMandSICAhavemadetremendousprogressgiventhattheyfaceacommonthreat;asinglehurricaneortropicalstormislikelytoaffectnumerouscountriesinadiscretetimeperiod.Incontrast,theOASextendsacrossamassiveregionwhererisksmayrangefromlandslidesanddroughtinparticularareasto

hurricanesandfloodingelsewhere.FortheLAS,whiledroughtandwatershortagesarecommonacrosstheregion,somecountries(e.g.oil-richGulfstates)havethefinancialresourcestomitigatetheirimpacts,whileothersdonot.Hence,asharedriskprofiledoesnotnecessarilyequatetoashareddegreeofvulnerability.

Lastly,itisimportanttoacknowledgethat,whileregionalorganisationshavebeguntoengagewithawidevarietyofhumanitarianissues,thedegreeofcommitmentisnotasstrongasoftenadvertised.Fundingcontinuestocomeoverwhelminglyfromoutsideoftheregionsconcerned.FromASEANtoCARICOMandtheAU,externalsupport–evenwhenresourcesmaybeavailablefromwithintheregion–financesthevastmajorityofregionalorganisations’initiatives.TheUnitedNations,forinstance,financestheAU’smissioninSomaliawithnearlyhalfabilliondollarsperyear(UNGA,2013).

Furthermore,regionalagreementshavebeenratifiedbyonlyasmallnumberofregionalorganisationmembers.Forinstance,theOAS’Inter-AmericanConventiontoFacilitateDisasterAssistancewasadoptedin1991,butonlyratifiedbysixcountriesby2013(FerrisandPetz,2013:22).TheASEANAgreementonDisasterManagementandEmergencyResponse(ADMER)alsofacedamulti-yearratificationprocessbeforetakingeffectin2009.FewArabLeaguemembershavesignedontoregionalDRRmechanisms.AstheIFRC(2011)notes,thesearenottrulyregionalcommitments,butapatchworkofagreementsacceptedbysmallnumbersofcountries.

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Regionalorganisationshavebeenthesubjectofincreasedattentioninrecentyears.AsChapter2described,theyhavebothcometoembodyand,insomeinstances,disprovetheirhypotheticalbenefits.Thatsaid,theyaregrowingorplanningtogrowbothintermsofinstitutionsandactivities,whetherfacilitatingaidaccess,deliveringassistance,attemptingtomediateconflictsorlaunchingprotection-focusedpeacekeepingmissions.Giventhatregionalorganisations’involvementinhumanitarianactionhas,asnotedinChapter3,beenrapidlyinstitutionalised,itislikelytopersistandevolve.Hence,itiscrucialtounderstandnotonlywhattheyhavepreviouslydone–asChapter4hasattemptedtodo–butalsohowtheyoperate,setpriorities,designinterventionsandmeasuretheireffectiveness.Furthermore,researchersmustbegintoidentifytheresultstheyhaveachievedinordertohighlightareasforimprovingtheirinterventionsandthoseofso-called‘traditional’aidactorsintheUnitedNationsandbeyond.Indeed,researchintoregionalorganisationsisnotjustaboutanalysingandattemptingtostrengthentheirperformance–itisalsoaboutlearningwheretheyhavedevelopednewmodesofoperatingwhichotheractorsmaywishtoadoptorbuildupon.

5.1 Key findings and implications

Whiletherearemanylingeringquestionsregardingregionalorganisation(see5.2,below),itispossibletoidentifyanumberofconclusionsfromtheprecedingreviewofthepertinentliterature.First,othermembersoftheinternationalhumanitariancommunityshouldusecautioninapproachingregionalorganisationsasacoherentcategoryofinstitutionswithsimilarfeatures.Eachregionalorganisationisrootedinauniquehistoricalandculturalcontextwhichinfluenceshowtheyviewtheirrole,howtheymakedecisionsandhowtheyintervene(ornot)inparticularsituations.Furthermore,eachincludesaconstellationofpoliticalforces,whethertheinfluenceoftheUnitedStatesintheOAS,NigeriainECOWAS,SouthAfricainSADCandsoon.Theseforcesgobeyondbasicquestionsofhegemonyversusmultipolarityandreflectnuanced–andpoorlyunderstood–factorsrelatedtogeography,

commerce,militarypower,thecontrolofnaturalresources,identityandsoon.Overarchingstrategiesorapproachestowardsregionalorganisationsasawholeareunlikelytobeappropriate.

Second,thereisaneedtoensurethatthesepoliticalfactorsareconsideredindiscussionsofregionalorganisations’growinghumanitarianrole.Adegreeofpoliticalrealismwouldhelptotemperthelongstandingtendencyamongmultilateralinstitutions,inparticular,topraiseregionalinvolvementandpresentit,attimes,asapanacea.Asparticularinstances,suchasSADC’sinterventioninLesotho,imply,regionalinvolvementmaynotalwaysbebeneficial.Inothercases,suchasthesituationofBhutaneserefugeesinNepalandIndia,regionalorganisationscanbeusedtoclosedownimportantdebates.Theassumptionthatregionalorganisationswillalmostalwaysbewell-intentionedandwell-informedinterlocutorsinparticularsituationsdoesnotappeartobeborneout.

Third,whileacknowledgingthepoliticaldimensionsofregionalorganisations,therearebenefitsinframingissuesintechnicalratherthanpoliticalorlegalisticterms.Whereregionalorganisationsmayhavemadeahighdegreeofprogress–suchasDRR,climatemonitoring,foodsecuritytrackingandconflictearlywarning–theissueshavegenerallybeenseenastechnical.Similarly,research,capacity-buildingandlessonlearninghavebeenparticularareasofstrengthforregionalorganisations.Incontrast,theyhavebeenfarlesslikelytoengagewithissuesthattheinternationalcommunityhasclearlylabelledasapoliticalorlegalmatter.Hence,forinstance,membersoftheinternationalcommunitymayfindtheyhaveagreaterdegreeofsuccesswheretheyframeanissue–suchasrefugees–asatechnicalchallengebolsteredbyinformationsystemsandquasi-scientificstandards.Suchatacticofcoursehaslimitations,butitmayprovideameansofengagingregionalorganisationsonparticularissuesthattheymayotherwisebereluctanttotakeup.

Fourth,asonecanlearnfromtheHFA,internationalframeworkswhichspecifyaroleforregionalbodies,

5 Conclusion: gaps in knowledge


whichhavefixeddeadlinesandwhichincluderegularmonitoringprocessesattheregionallevelwillbemostlikelytoimpelprogressandfollow-up.Thatsaid,instancessuchastheHFAalsomakeitclearthat‘progress’mustincreasinglybeframedintangibleratherthaninstitutionalorpolicy-leveltermsinrelationtonotonlyDRRbutalsohumanitarianactionmorebroadly.Atpresentregionalorganisationshavetendedtowinpraiseforcreatingnewinstitutionsandestablishingcommitteesandpolicyframeworkswithoutnecessarilymakinganymaterialcontributiontothelivesofvulnerablepeopleandthoseaffectedbyconflicts,naturaldisastersandotheremergencies.Policyformulationandinstitution-buildingmusteventuallygiverisetopracticalactionatthelocal,nationalorregionallevels–mostofitunderthepurviewofnationalgovernments–ifregionalorganisationsaretobecomesignificanthumanitarianactors.

Fifth,itisclearthat–despitehand-wringingabouttherelationshipbetweenregionalandglobalinstitutions–thereisalreadyahighdegreeofinteraction.ThesamecountrieswhichfinancetheUnitedNationsorhumanitarianagenciesarealsofinancingthebulkofregionalorganisations’humanitarianefforts.Thisprovidesthesedonorswithadegreeofinfluenceoverregionalentities.Whileperhapsusefulinsomerespects,thisinfluencehasalsolimitedtheextenttowhichregionalorganisationsaregenuinely‘regional’.Analystsandpolicymakershaverepeatedlyexpressedhopethatregionalbodies(andotherso-called‘emerging’aidactors)willintroduceinnovationsandnewmodelsfromwhichothersmaylearn.However,thelikelihoodoforiginalthinkingmaybereducediftheyaretoofullybroughtintothesameinternationalbureaucracy–withitsestablishednorms,processesandpriorities–asmostotheractorsinthesector.Likewise,andperhapsmoretroublingly,donorinfluencemaycreateadifficultpositioninwhichregionalorganisationsarefinanciallypressured(orincentivised)totakeonnewchallengesforwhichtheyareill-prepared–orwhichdonotfullyinteresttheirsecretariatsandmemberstates.Thiswouldcreateanumberofadverseoutcomesandwouldplaceresponsibilityforkeyissues(e.g.emergencypreparedness,theprotectionofcivilians)inthehandsofinstitutionsunableorunwillingtogenuinelyfollowthroughonthem.

Nor,however,woulditbecorrecttoportrayregionalorganisationssimplyasimplementingagenciesfortheUnitedNationsorbilateraldonors(Baert,FelícioandDeLombaerde,2013).Indeed,certain

regionalorganisationshavedemonstratedahighdegreeofagencyintheirengagementwiththebroaderhumanitariancommunity.Forinstance,ECOWASandtheAUhaveintervenedinconflicts–withoutUNauthorisation–inaclearattempttoimpeltheUnitedNationstoact.ThesamedegreeofindependenceandagencycouldperhapsbeseenintheArabLeague’sdecisiontoauthoriseano-flyzoneoverLibya,oneofits(albeitsuspended)members,in2011.IndoingsotheLeagueindirectlypavedthewayforaNATOmilitaryoperationwithintheArabworld.Likewise,ASEANwasinmanyrespectsleadingandlegitimisingtheroleoftheUnitedNationsandthebroaderhumanitariancommunityinMyanmarfollowingCycloneNargis.Conversely,regionalorganisationshavealso,attimes,counteredglobalprioritiesandagendasbytakingminimalorsymbolicactions,suchassigningontoagreementsthatlackedmonitoringplansoranyhopesofmeaningfulenforcement.Themannerinwhichtheyhavedoneso–andtherationalesforsupportingoropposingparticularissues–isoneofseveralissueswhichrequirefurtherresearchandanalysis.

5.2 Lingering questions

Asnotedabove,thereisawiderangeofquestionswhichwouldbenefitfromfurtherexamination.Thispaperhas,inreviewingthepertinentliterature,identifiedseveralsuchgapsinknowledge.Tothisend,belowareanumberofquestionswhichthisbroaderproject–‘ZonesofEngagement:RegionalActionandHumanitarianResponse’–willaddress,andwhichotherresearchersmayconsidertakinguptoguidetheirownworkonthisissue.Thislistisnotcomprehensive,butseekstoidentifyanumberofthemostimportantgaps.

5.2.1 Concepts and principles• Howdoregionalorganisationsunderstand

theconceptofhumanitarianaction,andhowdotheyviewitinrelationtoseparatenotionsofdevelopmentcooperation,humanitarianintervention,statebuilding,stabilisationandsoon?Aretheredistinctprinciplesandnormsthatunderpinandframetheseunderstandings?

• Inwhatwaysdoregionalorganisations’implicit(andexplicit)humanitarianprinciplesandprioritiesdifferfromthoseoftheUN,theRedCross/RedCrescentMovementandotheractorswithintheexistinghumanitariansystem?

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5.2.2 Relations with other stakeholders• Towhatextenthaveregionalorganisationshelped

tocoordinateaidflowstocrisis-affectedcontextswithmultipledevelopmentpartners?Whatscopeistherefordoingso,andhowmighttheypursueenhancedcoordination?

• HowdolocalNGOsandcivilsocietyorganisationsincrisis-affectedcountriesworkwithandperceivetheactivitiesofregionalinstitutions?

• Towhatextentdodonoragenciesusetheirfinancialsupportforregionalorganisationstoinfluencetheirworkandpriorities–eitherdirectlyorindirectly?

5.2.3 Models of intervention• Whatspecificimplementationmodels–e.g.

financingmechanisms,partnershiparrangements,aidconditions–doregionalorganisationsemploywhensupportinghumanitarianobjectives?

• Whatspecificapproachescanregionalorganisationsemploytointerveneinacrisiswithoutraisingtheireofstateswhichcarefullyguardtheirsovereignty?

5.2.4 Politics of regional relations• Whatmotivatesregionalorganisationstobecome

involvedinaparticularcrisis,andhowaredecisionsmadetointerveneinaparticularcrisisornot?

• Doregionalorganisationsappeartobemostcapableofrespondingtocrises(orparticulartypesofcrises)whenthereisaregionalhegemonorwhenallmembershavearelativelysimilarlevelofinfluenceovertheinstitution?Aretherecertainformsofmanifestationsofhegemonywithinaregionthatareconducivetoregionalorganisations’humanitarianrole/performance?

• Whatinstitutionalstructuresandmechanismshavebeenmosteffectiveinpreventingpoliticalinterestsorrelationsfrompreventing(orbluntingtheeffectivenessof)regionalorganisations’humanitarianactivities?

5.2.5 Impact and measuring effectiveness• Whatimpacthaveregionalorganisationsachieved

whenengagingwithphysicalassistancerelated,forinstance,todisasterresponseorriskmitigation?

• Towhatextentandhowdoregionalorganisationsmonitorandevaluatetheiractivities?Howdothesecomparewithexistinginternationalmonitoringandevaluationstandards?

• TowhatextenthaveregionalorganisationsbeenallocatedrolesorresponsibilitiesthattheUnited

Nationsormajorpowershavethecapability–butnotthewill–toundertake?Insuchinstances,whatformsofpartnershiphavebeenmosteffective?

5.3 Reframing the debate

Respondingtothequestionsabovedoesnotnecessarilyrequirenewmethods.Rather,asLukVanLangenhove(2013)recentlywrote,itwillrequirethesynthesisofmethodologiesandtheoreticalframeworksfromarangeofdisciplines:internationalrelations,comparativepolitics,economicsandhistoryaswellassociologyandanthropology.Furthermore,notingthewidevarietyofinstitutionalexpansionwhichtendstoaccompanyregionalism,thereisanurgentneedforpublicadministrationspecialiststoanalyseandelucidatetheformalandinformaldecision-makingandaccountabilitymechanismswhichmakeuptheseincreasinglycomplexbodies.

ReturningtoChapter2’sfocusonkeyconcepts,understandingregionalorganisationsrequiresnewdefinitionsasthetopichasgraduallymigratedfromtheEuropeanexperiencetothedevelopingandnon-Westerncontext.NoteHaas’(1971:6)oft-citeddefinitionofregionalintegrationstudiesastheexaminationof‘howandwhystatesceasetobewhollysovereign,howandwhytheyvoluntarilymingle,merge,andmixwiththeirneighbourssoastolosethefactualattributesofsovereigntywhileacquiringnewtechniquesforresolvingconflictbetweenthemselves’.Suchdefinitions,whileperhapsapplicabletotheexceptionalEuropeanexperiencewithintegration,donotappeartoextendtoregionalorganisationsindevelopingcountries,whichoftenuseregionalinstitutionstodefendtheirsovereigntywhilefeigningdeferencetosupranationalconcerns.Nordoesaprimaryfocusonsovereigntyhelpustoanswerthefarmoreappliedquestionsnotedabove(andbrieflyanalysedwithinthispaper).Whatareregionalorganisationsdoing,howaretheydoingit,andtowhateffect?Aretheyagrowingforceforchange,ordotheyrepresentameansofbolsteringexistingregionaleconomic,political,militaryand,morebroadly,powerrelations?Thereisaneedtomorefullyunderstandwhatregionalorganisationsarebeforeanalysts,policymakersandinternationalhumanitarianprofessionalscanbegintoconsiderhowtheymightengagewiththeminordertoalleviatesuffering,mitigatedisasterrisksandprotectpopulationscaughtupinarmedconflict.

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��

Annex 1

AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

AF

RIC

A

Alg

eria

Ang

ola

Ben

in

Bot

swan

a

Bur

kina

Fas

o

Bur

undi

Cam

eroo

n

Cap

eV

erde

CA

R

Cha

d

Com

oros

Con

go

Côt

ed’

Ivoi

re

DR

C

Djib

outi

Egy

pt

Equ

ator

ialG

uine

a

Erit

rea

Eth

iopi

a

Gab

on

Gam

bia

Gha

na

Gui

nea

Gui

nea-

Bis

sau

Ken

ya

Leso

tho

Libe

ria

Mem

bers

hip,

cur

rent

and

pen

ding

, in

regi

onal

inst

itutio

ns

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �(c

ontin

ued)


AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

Liby

a

Mad

agas

car

Mal

awi

Mal

i

Mau

ritan

ia

Mau

ritiu

s

Mor

occo

Moz

ambi

que

Nam

ibia

Nig

er

Nig

eria

Rw

anda

São

Tom

é&

Prí

ncip

e

Sen

egal

Sey

chel

les

Sie

rra

Leon

e

Som

alia

Sou

thA

fric

a

Sou

thS

udan

Sud

an

Sw

azila

nd

Tanz

ania

Togo

Tun

isia

Uga

nda

Zam

bia

Zim

babw

e

Réu

nion

(F

ranc

e)

SA

DR

Mem

bers

hip,

cur

rent

and

pen

ding

, in

regi

onal

inst

itutio

ns (c

ontin

ued)

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

��

AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

AM

ER

ICA

S

Ant

igua

&B

arbu

da

Arg

entin

a

Bah

amas

Bar

bado

s

Bel

ize

Bol

ivia

Bra

zil

Can

ada

Chi

le

Col

ombi

a

Cos

taR

ica

Cub

a

Dom

inic

a

Dom

inic

anR

epub

lic

Ecu

ador

ElS

alva

dor

Gre

nada

Gua

tem

ala

Guy

ana

Hai

ti

Hon

dura

s

Jam

aica

Mex

ico

Nic

arag

ua

Pan

ama

Par

agua

y

Per

u

St.

Kitt

san

dN

evis

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �(c

ontin

ued)


AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

St.

Luci

a

Sur

inam

e

SV

G

Trin

idad

&T

obag

o

Uni

ted

Sta

tes

Uru

guay

Ven

ezue

la

Mon

tser

rat

Pue

rto

Ric

o

AS

IA

Afg

hani

stan

Arm

enia

Aze

rbai

jan

Bah

rain

Ban

glad

esh

Bhu

tan

Bru

nei

Cam

bodi

a

Chi

na

Cyp

rus

Geo

rgia

Indi

a

Indo

nesi

a

Iran

Iraq

Isra

el

Japa

n

Jord

an

Mem

bers

hip,

cur

rent

and

pen

ding

, in

regi

onal

inst

itutio

ns (c

ontin

ued)

� � � � � � � � 0 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

��

AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

Kaz

akhs

tan

Kuw

ait

Kyr

gyzs

tan

Laos

Leba

non

Mal

aysi

a

Mal

dive

s

Mon

golia

Mya

nmar

Nep

al

Nor

thK

orea

Om

an

Pak

ista

n

Phi

lippi

nes

Qat

ar

Sau

diA

rabi

a

Sin

gapo

re

Sou

thK

orea

Sri

Lank

a

Syr

ia

Tajik

ista

n

Tha

iland

Tim

or-L

este

Tur

key

Tur

kmen

ista

n

UA

E

Uzb

ekis

tan

Vie

tnam

Yem

en

� � � � � � � � 0 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 0 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �(c

ontin

ued)


AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

Pal

estin

ian

Terr

.

Taiw

an

Hon

gK

ong

EU

RO

PE

Alb

ania

And

orra

Aus

tria

Bel

arus

Bel

gium

Bos

nia-

Her

zego

vina

Bul

garia

Cro

atia

Cze

chR

epub

lic

Den

mar

k

Est

onia

Fin

land

Fra

nce

Ger

man

y

Gre

ece

Hun

gary

Icel

and

Irel

and

Italy

Latv

ia

Liec

hten

stei

n

Lith

uani

a

Luxe

mbo

urg

Mac

edon

ia

Mem

bers

hip,

cur

rent

and

pen

ding

, in

regi

onal

inst

itutio

ns (c

ontin

ued)

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

��

AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

�cas

A

s�a

Eu

rop

e P

ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

Mal

ta

Mol

dova

Mon

aco

Mon

tene

gro

Net

herla

nds

Nor

way

Pol

and

Por

tuga

l

Rom

ania

Rus

sian

Fed

erat

ion

San

Mar

ino

Ser

bia

Slo

vaki

a

Slo

veni

a

Spa

in

Sw

eden

Sw

itzer

land

Uni

ted

Kin

gdom

Ukr

aine

Hol

yS

ee

PA

CIF

IC

Aus

tral

ia

Fiji

Kiri

bati

Mar

shal

lIsl

ands

Mic

rone

sia

Nau

ru

New

Zea

land

Pal

au

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �(c

ontin

ued)


AU

CEEAC

CEMAC

CEN-SAD

CEPGL

COI

COMESA

EAC

ECOWAS

ICGLR

IGAD

MRU

SADC

UMA

CAN

CARICOM

MERCOSUR

OAS

SICA

UNASUR

APEC

ASEAN

BIMSTEC

CICA

CIS

CSTO

EurAsEc

GCC

GUAM

LAS

SAARC

SCO

EU

NATO

OSCE

RCC

OCO

PIF

Total

Reg

�on

A

fr�c

a A

mer

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s�a

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rop

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ac.

Org

an�s

at�o

n

Pap

uaN

ewG

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a

Sam

oa

Sol

omon

Isl

ands

Tong

a

Tuv

alu

Van

uatu

Am

eric

anS

amoa

CN

MI

Coo

kIs

land

s

Fre

nch

Pol

ynes

ia

Gua

m

New

Cal

edon

ia

Niu

e

Nor

folk

Isl

and

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lisa

ndF

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a

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The Humanitarian Policy Group is one of the world’s leading teams of independent researchers and information professionals working on humanitarian issues. It is dedicated to improving humanitarian policy and practice through a combination of high-quality analysis, dialogue and debate.

Readers are encouraged to quote or reproduce materials from this publication but, as copyright holders, ODI requests due acknowledgement and a copy of the publication. This and other HPG reports are available from www.odi.org.uk/hpg.

© Overseas Development Institute, 2013ISBN: 978 1 909464 39 1

Humanitarian Policy GroupOverseas Development Institute203 Blackfriars RoadLondon SE1 8NJUnited Kingdom

Tel. +44 (0) 20 7922 0300Fax. +44 (0) 20 7922 0399E-mail: [email protected]: http://www.odi.org/hpg

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