greece: a case of fragmented centralism and 'behind the scenes' localism

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c h a p t e r 1 7.............................................................................................

GREECE: A CASE OF

FRAGMENTED

CENTRALISM AND

‘BEHIND THE

SCENES’ LOCALISM.............................................................................................

nikos hlepaspanagiotis getimis

Greece

Inhabitants: 11.0 millionSurface area: 131 957 km2

Inhabitants/km2: 81.4

State form: UnitaryOfficial description:Parliamentary republicLanguages: Greek

Subnational government:1 034 municipalities50 prefectures

Map 17.1 Greece: Prefectures

OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 31/5/2010, SPi


Introduction and History

................................................................................................................

Greece, ‘the cradle of western democracy’, has in more recent years been described

as ‘the most centralist state in Europe’ (Hlepas 2003). Indeed, the percentage of

local public expenditure in GDP remains the lowest in Europe, while functions

of local governments remain quite restricted. Centralism has traditionally been

perceived as necessary in order to sustain national unity and (re-)distributive

capacities of the state in a country that had to cope with political instability,

weak economic development, and regional divergence. The dominant model of

‘pendulum democracy’ (Hendriks 2010), both at the national and the subnational

levels, remains unchallenged up to the present.

The country’s clientelistic political culture offered enough space to sectoral

interests that promoted an ongoing fragmentation of political and administrative

structures along the lines of specific sectors and functions. Confusion of political

responsibility and frustration of accountability, inefficiency and the disintegration

of public space were some of the results. Persistent fragmentation leads to a kind of

disintegration and lack of cohesion of sectoral policies that frustrate several

pending reforms.

Efforts to democratize the country through the overcoming of centralism and

enhancement of local governance in the early 1980s led to functional decentraliza-

tion, the establishment of a second-tier of local government and rigid amalgama-

tions of municipalities. While politically motivated reforms during the 1980s

focused on participation and legitimacy, since the late 1990s, within the framework

of Europeanization, a shift towards efficiency and competitiveness prevailed.

Throughout the last decades, local politics gained influence through informal

networks that existed behind the scenes of central state power. Being an integral

part of a constant bargaining process, local politicians could gain ground both

officially and informally but failed (or were not really willing) to withdraw the

traditional centralist pattern dominated by the respective party, political, and

sectoral elites.

Features of the national state tradition

The modern Greek state which became independent in 1833 has been consolidated

through the imposition of centralism and the abandonment of the former autono-

mist tradition that characterized the kind of ‘fragmented’ society typical of many

countries under Ottoman rule (Clogg 1983; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002). After

the victory of constitutionalism (1844 and, finally, 1863), local self-government was

established as an important arena of party competition and democratic legitimacy.

Greece follows the French Napoleonic state traditions according to Loughlin’s

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typology of state traditions (Loughlin and Peters 1997). Unlike the French model,

however, the holding of multiple offices (the cumul des mandats) was never

accepted and there was a clear distinction between ‘national’ and the ‘local’

politicians. Both categories were important for the kind of ‘backstage localism’

that characterized Greek politics and complemented the majoritarian, polarized,

and strictly representative political system of the country (Hlepas 2003).

Like other southern European states, Greece experienced periods of civil war,

authoritarian rule, and dictatorship, before the establishment of a stable ‘Third

Republic’ in 1974 (Diamandouros and Gunther 2001). Among the three young

southern European democracies Greece was the only one that simply brought back

a political elite, which had been ‘suspended for a few years’.1 But an important part

of public opinion had been radicalized and authoritarian attitudes were widely

discredited. This meant that the political parties could not simply rely on the old

personalized networks that traditionally dominated the party system and were

characterized by the influence of strong local leaders, thus maintaining a kind of

‘invisible’ local autonomy. The rising Socialist Party (1974–81) was the first big

party that systematized internal structures and rules, thus overcoming the perso-

nalized networks that used to fragment the Greek political parties. In this way the

Socialist Party could attract a large number of active members by offering them

new opportunities for political careers. Following this example, the liberal con-

servatives were also forced to build up a strong party organization (1985–), so that

all the main political parties have been transformed into ‘mass parties’ with many

cadres (Spourdalakis and Tassis 2006).

State administration was notorious for its ineffectiveness and instability, lack of

cohesion, and absence of transparency. Although Greek statehood had already been

established in the early nineteenth century and parliamentary traditions could be

traced back to that period, the country lacked a stable, professionalized bureaucracy:

tenure of public servants had officially been declared by the beginning of the

twentieth century, but it has only been partly practised since the 1950s and really

respected since 1974. Also nowadays, high posts in the civil service are allocated

according to political party affiliation and public administration is subordinated to

the government. For these reasons Greece lacks an independent administrative

elite. Trade union organizations within the public sector are controlled by the

respective parties and became very influential, using party politicization of public

administration for their own sectoral ends, sometimes even promoting a selfish

culture and practices of impunity in favour of inefficient or corrupt public ser-

vants. A parochial legalist spirit dominates the administrative framework and

practice thus creating a series of blockages and inefficiency. The rule of law also

has important deficiencies concerning the relations between individual citizens and

1 Right after their coup d’etat, the colonels often used similar expressions, referring to the country’s

politicians. Later on, they demonstrated their will to create a new, ‘non-corrupted’ political elite.

412 nikos hlepas and panagiotis getimis



the state administration. A fully integrated system of administrative courts has only

gradually been built up since 1974. Furthermore, Greek administrative justice

remains extremely time-consuming, while court decisions against state agencies,

up to the late 1990s, could not be enforced through obligatory implementation

measures. In this way, several citizens that had succeeded with judicial remedies

against the state failed in enacting the respective court decision and were as a result

demoralized. On the other hand, civil servants and agencies were thus encouraged

to continue their maladministration.

Extreme party politicization, unreasonable procedures that strain the public,

low ethics of public servants, and growing corruption have disillusioned the

citizenry (Spanou 1998). Although explicit dissatisfaction about state and admin-

istration remained extremely high throughout the past decades, civil society failed

in exercising systematic and efficient pressure for modernization and improvement

of the public administration. Greek civil society has been characterized by weak-

ness and fragmentation (Paraskevopoulos, Getimis, and Rees 2006). Civil demands

are expressed through channels of sectoral and political interests which operate

behind the scenes while outwardly the ‘paternalistic’ Jacobin state officially stands

for legal and national unity. In practice, it remains permeable to sectoral and

different kinds of partial pressures and demands. Indeed, the fragmented practices

of ‘Jacobin clientelism’ facilitate absorption and balancing of social conflicts,

demands, and expectations.

Among the plethora of pressure groups there are, however, some particularly

influential ones, namely those organized in professional associations, such as

engineers, lawyers, journalists, consultants, and physicians but also some entrepre-

neurial associations, such as the unions of public works’ constructors, hoteliers,

ship-owners, industrialists, and media-moguls. All these groups can effectively

intervene at all stages of the policy process (agenda-setting, decision-making,

and implementation). These pressure groups powerfully interfere in law-making,

distribution of information, and financial resources, while they have been able

to block, in several cases, reform procedures aiming at the opening of markets and

professions, collective decision-making, and deliberative policy formulation. This

dominating fragmentation and closeness of interest intermediation is reflected also

at the level of trade unionism. Indeed, the parochial organization of trade unions

into three levels (confederation, federation, local unions) and numerous branches,

imposed by law, does not promote the homogenization and long-term strategies of

the labour movement (Mavrogordatos 2001). Persistent uneven fragmentation,

apart from frustrating several pending reforms, leads to a kind of disintegration

and lack of synergy among different sectoral policies, affecting both social cohesion

and political legitimacy (Getimis and Kafkalas 2003; Getimis and Hlepas 2005).

National unity and/or cohesive pluralism seem to be mainly symbolic, while

hierarchical and authoritarian decision-making is practised and implemented

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through ad hoc repressive measures, when central power is at stake (Getimis and

Hlepas 2007).

The formulation and strength of corporate interests correspond to the size and

structure of employment and economic activities. Indeed, self-employment char-

acterizes more than 40 per cent of the economically active population (which is

only 60 per cent of the total population), while employment in the public sector

concentrates nearly half of salary-dependent employees. In this way, professional

associations and public servant unions, both following sectoral corporate interests,

have privileged access and gains through informal networks (Mavrogordatos

2000). The national economy is dominated by small- and medium-sized enter-

prises, while several big enterprises (public or private) shape oligopolistic struc-

tures and remain non-competitive in international markets (low percentage of

exports in GDP) thus depending on state procurement, public works, and self-

restrained state regulators. Economic development was based mainly on the tertia-

ry sector (tourism, banking, telecommunications, etc.), globalized Greek shipping

and income transfers from Greek immigrants and the EU (Pagoulatos 2003).

Many features of the Greek political and socio-economic system were not

adequate to cope with the new demands imposed by European integration

(Getimis 2003). Adaptation pressures through Europeanization (especially

through the structural and cohesion policy of the EU), as well as the dominant

objectives for efficiency and, later on, competitiveness influenced by the Lisbon

strategy (entrepreneurship, innovation), forced major changes within the state

machinery (Spanou 1998). Wider trends of neo-liberalism and the introduction

of the principles of New Public Management had a strong influence on public

policy and administration, causing the establishment of several new institutions

and mechanisms (auditing, controlling, regulatory authorities, etc.; Sotiropoulos

2007). Nevertheless, the enhanced demands for strategic and integrated policy

framework did not match the existing fragmented and sectoral policy procedures.

This kind of integrated framework would lay a hand on the strong sectoral interests

that tended to isolate their spaces through non-transparent and informal action.

The Institutional Expression

of Democracy

................................................................................................................

Several features of the Greek state correspond to the model of ‘pendulum democ-

racy’ (Hendriks 2010). For more than 150 years the Greek parliamentary system

remained a characteristic example of the ‘Westminster model’. The government is

formed from the majority of elected representatives in parliament. A two-party




system had been established by the late nineteenth century and bipolarity, with

rotating actors, characterized Greek political life. The role of the two competing

party leaders, each one gathering a complex alliance of influential political person-

alities, has been crucial for the political landscape of the country (Koliopoulos

and Veremis 2002). The ruling majority exercises power in a unilateral ‘winner

takes all’ way, excluding opposition and dissidents.

This kind of pendulum democracy has some positive features in that it allows a

strong representation of national interests to cope with crucial difficult-to-resolve

problems, mainly in foreign affairs (the Cyprus issue, territorial conflicts, ethnic

minorities, etc.) but also in internal affairs (quality of education, health system,

etc.). It can be argued that this model can counterbalance extreme fragmentation

and sectorization of interest intermediation. But the strongest of these interests

prefer a strictly representative system in comparison to open participatory systems,

because they are afraid of losing privileges of access and non-transparent ad hoc

negotiations with the current majority. Moreover, sectoral interests can better

influence central posts of hierarchical top-down decision-making than horizontal

networking relations. Therefore, an ambiguity of relations and balances exists

between the majoritarian and strictly representative Greek model of democracy,

on the one hand, and the fragmented Greek society, on the other. Within this

framework strong tensions can emerge, from time to time, which are expressed

through long-lasting strikes, demonstrations, and several forms of lively protest

that often managed to cancel reform initiatives.

However, some elements of consensus and participatory democracy have newly

been introduced within the framework of the dynamics of Europeanization: hear-

ings, public consultation, and independent regulatory authorities being the impor-

tant innovative institutions.

Since the early 1990s, several ‘independent’ regulatory authorities have been

established. These authorities try to contain phenomena of maladministration,

corruption, and oligopolistic or cartel structures and practices, and furthermore

prevent conflicts and litigations. As new institutions, established during the era of

the so-called ‘modernizing’ socialists (1993–2004) under strong European influ-

ence, they have been conceptualized as relatively independent actors that are not

subordinated to the government (Puhle 2001). Their leading posts have been

occupied by persons selected through consensual procedures and technocratic

criteria. In this way an important part of controlling, oversight, and regulatory

power could be removed from the fields of party competition and corporate

interests’ control. However, it remains an open question whether particularly

influential sectoral interests still manage to create new forms of privileged access

in the decision-making process (Georgantas 2006).

Apparently, the aforementioned institutions bringing elements of participatory

governance and consensual procedures do not seriously challenge the dominant

model of ‘pendulum democracy’. The political system has managed to maintain

greece 415



control over important instruments of public policy (public procurement,

contracting-out etc.), and to continue misusing these instruments in a non-

competitive, clientelistic way, excluding openness and fairness. Even these new

‘independent’ institutions have often been the victim of sophisticated falsification

through the party system and strong sectoral interests (Sotiropoulos 2007; Karkat-

soulis 2004). Widespread clientelistic recruitment on a contract basis within the

public sector, practices of selective interventions through the regulatory authori-

ties, as well as non-implementation of their decisions through the administration

reinforces the previous arguments. Furthermore, public consultation procedures

foreseen by EU directives in a series of public policies proved to be formalized and

guided through private consultants, while substantial active participation and

deliberative expression is neglected and public opinion is simply registered in

poll surveys. It is characteristic that important fields of public policy, such as

national health, still lack modern participatory institutions such as ‘user boards’.

For these reasons, there is much to be done, even at the institutional level.

Democratization of the political system in Greece can only be rounded off if

transparency of decision-making and enhancement of independent regulators is

further promoted through a series of consistent reforms that would challenge the

prevailing, strictly majoritarian, polarized and representative model of democracy.

The Institutionalization of

Subnational Democracy: A Mirror of

Pendulum Democracy

................................................................................................................

The territorial structure of local government and administration in Greece includes

1,034 municipalities, 50 ‘prefectural’ local governments (second-tier), 13 regions as

units of decentralized state administration, as well as several special districts (i.e.

districts of National Health System, Educational districts, etc.).

At the first tier, 1,034 units exist, as a result of the obligatory amalgamations of

the former 5,825 units during the late 1990s. These include 924 urban (demoi) and

100 rural (koinotites) units. They differ in internal organization, but are almost

identical in formal responsibilities. In practice, however, Greek municipalities offer

a mosaic of resources and possibilities, while their size in terms of both population

and territory can be extremely diverse.

Compared to the municipalities of many European countries, Greek municipa-

lities are short of competence in fields that are particularly important for local




society and development, such as urban planning, environmental protection, and

educational and health services.

Subnational finances

Local government at both tiers depends on state grants. The second tier, established

in 1994, is nearly totally dependent on state aid (97 per cent of total revenue), since

it lacks the kind of services which can be financed by fees and charges (e.g. waste

collection, water supply, etc.). Taxation autonomy of both tiers remains limited.

Furthermore, their total share of public expenditure is one of the lowest in Europe

(less than 4 per cent of GDP) (Heinelt and Hlepas 2006).

Subnational politics

While competence and taxation autonomy are reduced, the political authority of

local government is quite important. Directly elected mayors are influential ad-

vocates of local interests, their performance is often related to their having informal

access to decision-making processes at higher levels of governance. This local

political authority often cross-cuts party lines, following personal and localist

networks. However, it should be highlighted that, at the same time, local government

is an integrated component of the Greek party system. The latter has constantly

been characterized through bi-polarity and majoritarianism. The two strongest

parties are the centre-left socialists (‘Panhellenic Socialist Movement’—PASOK)

Table 17.1 Number of prefectures and municipalities in Greek regions

Region Prefectures Municipalities

East Macedonia and Thrace 2 55Central Macedonia 7 134West Macedonia 4 61Epirus 4 76Thessaly 4 104Ionian Islands 4 39West Greece 3 74Sterea Ellada 5 95Attica 3 124Peloponnesus 5 107North Aegean 3 36South Aegean 2 58Crete 4 71Total 50 1 034

Source: Ministry of the Interior (2008).

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Table 17.2 Competencies of local government in Greece

First tier Second tier

1. Housing, infrastructure, and communityamenities- Construction, maintenance, and managementof municipal roads, parks, and public spaces

- Urban planning and housing, buildinglicensing and control

- Traffic regulation and planning- Public parking

1. Housing, infrastructure, and communityamenities- Construction, maintenance, andmanagement of provincial roads

- Urban planning and building inspection- Planning, licensing and control oftransportation (buses, tracks, vehicles)

2. Environmental protection- Waste management- Water supply, irrigation, and sewage systems- Protected areas- Renewable energy

2. Environmental protection- Environmental impact assessment- Waste management permits- Coastal management- Environmental controls and fines/penalties

3. Education- Maintenance and management of schoolbuildings and facilities

- Adult education- Vocational training

3. Education- Construction of school buildings- Transportation of public school pupils- Vocational training

4. Recreation/culture- Municipal cultural centres, museums, andgalleries

- Cultural and sporting facilities

4. Recreation/culture- Cultural centres and institutions- Cultural and sporting facilities- Licensing and control of culturalactivities and institutions

5. Social protection- Nurseries and kindergartens,- Centres for aged and disabled people- Social inclusion programmes

5. Social protection- Application of social programmes,establishment of centres of socialservices

- Licensing and control of private welfareinstitutions and private care units

6. Health- Local medical assistance centres

6. Health- Public health protection and controls- Permits and control of public and privatehealth/medical institutions

7. Economic affairs/development- Licensing and control of local shops andsmall enterprises (tertiary sector)

- Municipal enterprises and developmentagencies

7. Economic affairs/development- Licensing and control of local economicactivities and professions

- Implementation of development programs- Prefectural enterprises and developmentagencies

8. Public order and safety- Municipal police

8. Public order and safety- Emergency planning and coordination

9. General public services- Registration, certification of civil status- One-stop shops of public administration

9. General public services- Registration, certification of civil status- Local, national, and European elections- One-stop shops of public administration- Aliens and immigration

Source: Ministry of the Interior 1996a, 2006.




and the centre-right conservatives (‘Nea Dimokratia’) that rotate in government

power. Given the electoral system, single-party central governments have been

the rule throughout the last three decades (with the exception of a few months

in 1989–90), while other parties (mainly of the left) have a strong influence on

syndicalism and civil society and a significant influence within municipalities. This

influence becomes weaker at the second tier, given the bigger sizes and the stronger

degree of party-politicization.

First- and second-tier local governments reproduce the patterns of central state

and party hierarchies at the local level: that means unilateral majoritarian rule over

municipal options and resources, polarization in local politics and subordination

of local bureaucracy. Further, national politics prevail over subnational politics

through the party system and administrative centralism.

The majoritarian electoral system in local government has hardly changed

during the previous three decades. Electoral norms provide for ‘governmental

stability’ for four years (the term of office of elected persons). Up to the elections

of 2002, victory was achieved only by the absolute majority of all the valid ballot

papers, even at a second ‘run-off ’ between the two lists that received the most votes

during the first round. In 2006, a new Act lowered the threshold for victory during

the first round from 50 per cent + 1 to 42 per cent. This was an option that

obviously favoured the two major parties of the Greek political system, who

became less motivated to foster coalitions with minor parties at the local level. In

fact, during the last municipal and prefectural elections in 2006, candidatures of

party coalitions were obviously less common than in previous elections. The

dominance of a ‘two-party’ system and ‘pendulum democracy’ at the local level

(Hendriks 2010) were thus further enhanced.

Table 17.3 Revenues and expenditures of local government, 2004


Revenue(� millions)

Stategrants

Own taxes fees,charges, etc.1

Total Stategrants

Own taxes fees,charges etc.2

Total

3 957(68%)

1 862 (32%) 5 819 1 242(97%)

43 (3%) 1 285


Expenditure Capital Current Total Capital Current Total(� millions) 887

(17%)4 298 (83%) 5 185 474

(37%)797 (63%) 1 271

1 Including new loans (312 million in 2004)2 Including new loans (only 1 million in 2004).

Source: National Statistics Service, National Association of Local Governments (2nd Tier).

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The electoral system in local government reinforces the majoritarian option,

combined with a dominant role for directly elected mayors and prefects: every

candidate for the post of mayor or prefect leads a list of candidates for all the seats

of the municipal council, while the law explicitly prohibits candidates who are not

on such a list from standing. National political parties officially are not allowed to

stand for local elections but in fact they nominate local lists, usually through

decisions taken by their central organs. Municipalities (and most of the Prefectural

Self Governments—PSGs) consist of unitary constituencies, while three-fifths of all

seats in the council belong to the list obtaining the majority and only two-fifths to

the opposition lists. While ensuring ‘governmental stability’ and strong majority

rule, the law thus promotes fragmentation of the opposition, since the remaining

two-fifths of council seats are proportionally distributed to the opposition lists.

This electoral system, taken in conjunction with the fact that the mayor, elected for

a four-year term, cannot be voted out by the council nor can he be removed by a

local referendum, gives rise to the conditions for a ‘monocracy’ of the mayor/

prefect in the municipality/PSG, that is, it is a quasi-presidential system, particu-

larly in cases where the mayor or prefect is a strong personality. Executive power is

mainly concentrated in the hands of the mayor or prefect, who also appoints the

Chief Executive Officer and in practice the heads of the administrative depart-

ments, while hiring influential technocrats (‘advisors’ etc.) on a contractual basis.

The mayor or prefect can, moreover, delegate the distribution of several executive

posts, such as those of deputy mayor or deputy prefect (who have considerable

powers and allowances), in order to ensure loyalty of the governing party list to his

person. The mayor- or prefect-affiliated majority of the council concentrates

regulatory powers, since devolution to council committees is not recognized by

Table 17.4 National and prefectural election results

National2007 (%)

Prefectural2006* (numberof prefectures)

National2004 (%)

Prefectural2002* (numberof prefectures)

National2000 (%)

NeaDimokratia(centre-right)

41.83 28 45.36 26 42.73

PASOK(socialist)

38.10 20 40.55 12 43.79

KKE(communist)

8.15 — 5.89 — 5.53

SYN (left) 5.04 — 3.26 — 3.2

LAOS (right) 3.80 — 2.19 — —

Other 3.05 2 2.74 8 4.76

Source: Ministry of the Interior and newspaper Kathimerini, 16 October 2006.




law and related sectoral bureaucracies of local government are subordinated to the

elected executive. It is obvious, then, that executive dominance and monistic

relations between the local council and the administration prevails in Greek local

government. This reflects the national system with its strong prime minister,

executive, and governmental majority.

Participatory democracy

Although subnational democracy (Loughlin 2001) reflects the dominant ‘pendu-

lum democracy’, some elements of participatory democracy can be found already

in the early 1980s, after accession to the EC and the victory of the socialists. District

councils, people’s assemblies in small municipalities, neighbourhood committees,

informal referendums, and local discussion forums brought new elements of

deliberative-participatory democracy to the local level (Hlepas 2003). The emanci-

pation of formerly excluded middle- and low-income groups, combined with

learning processes, were the gains of these formal and informal practices (Psycho-

paidis and Getimis 1989). This participatory impulse, however, gradually faded

away because of the colonization of the local system by the political parties, while

sectoral networks by-passed and downgraded those institutions that failed to fulfil

their integrative and deliberative role. Furthermore, elected representatives man-

aged to maintain their prominent role in the decision-making process.

Municipalities are conceived as strictly unitary, centralized entities, while sub-

local institutions, both in urban areas (‘city districts’) and in amalgamated munici-

palities (‘local districts’), have few important responsibilities and resources. Mayors

and municipal councils do not use the discretion given to them by law to allow

further decentralization of tasks and funds to locally elected bodies in city and local

districts. It is characteristic, that national and local associations of municipalities

usually attack state centralism but never put centralism within their own munici-

palities under question. Municipalities obviously prefer to act as politically con-

solidated corporations, ‘one and undivided’ institutions, under the unchallenged

leadership of (both legally and politically) strong mayors heading the majority.

Challenges and Opportunities

for Local Democracy

................................................................................................................

The enhancement of local democracy in Greece seemed to be an appropriate

answer to major challenges of democratization, political legitimacy and social

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inclusion. Europeanization obviously offers further opportunities to promote and

accelerate long-pending changes and reforms.

Already during the 1970s, public opinion connected centralism to the authori-

tarian and paternalistic attributes of the post-civil-war Greek state (1950–74;

Christofilopoulou 1991). The principal demand in relation to ‘democratization’

(Manessis 1985) included the overcoming of centralism. Furthermore, a widespread

populist perception blamed the ‘Athens-centric state’ for the plight of the pro-

vinces. The victory of the socialists, in combination with accession to the EC in

1981, further stabilized the young democracy, also through the incorporation

(Rigos 1997) of the left and of the so-called ‘less privileged’ classes,2 including

parts of the middle class, especially in the provinces. There was a spectacular

extension of state activities, with the public sector, as a whole, climbing from

about 40 per cent (1980) to nearly 60 per cent (1990) of GDP, and public employ-

ment increasing correspondingly. Political legitimacy was a major issue, whereas

public administration was put under the informal control of party cadres, becom-

ing an integral part of a machinery of ‘bureaucratic clientelism’ (Lyrintzis 1984;

Mavrogordatos 1997).

For Greek local government, there was an ambiguity. The municipalities could

also make a profit out of the extension of public responsibilities, public recruit-

ment, and public spending, while the decentralization ideology of the socialists

initiated several decentralization reforms. On the other hand, the rise of strong

hierarchical party machineries, the extreme party politicization of local govern-

ment, and, finally, a new centralist system for the recruitment of employees

(Mavrogordatos 1997), were challenging the formal and—especially—the informal

local autonomy.

New roles have been assigned to local government. The municipalities have been

earmarked to promote local development, while new forms of participation have

been introduced. Municipalities seemed to offer an easily accessible ground for

active citizens. Directly elected neighbourhood councils, citizens’ assemblies in

small municipalities, informal local referendums, public forums, etc. were new

institutions favouring deliberative procedures. At the higher level of the prefecture,

the establishment of indirectly elected prefectural councils was supposed to con-

tribute towards the democratic participation and the ‘opening up’ of the Greek

party system. Prefectural councils were henceforth including elected representa-

tives of local governments, chambers, trade unions, and professional associations.

These councils took over the main responsibility for annual local public investment

programmes (planning and allocation), thus becoming important institutions for

new forms of local participation and political bargaining among different sectoral

interests.

2 The politically extremely successful term of the ‘less privileged’ classes had been introduced by

the populist vocabulary of the socialist leader Andreas Papandreou (Mavrogordatos 1997).




The challenge of democratic participation in local development planning and

decision-making was also the motive for the institutionalization and encourage-

ment of municipal enterprises. Indeed, a large number of the so-called ‘local

development agencies’ have been founded since the mid-1980s, encouraged

through subsidies, tax exemptions, and flexible norms of hiring and contracting

(Hlepas 2003). Europeanization also soon emerged as a major challenge, demand-

ing new modes of action and increasingly putting forward efficiency prerogatives

(Getimis and Demetropoulou 2005).

But the country’s single-tier system of local government was suffering from

extreme fragmentation (more than 80 per cent of the 5,774 rural municipalities,

had fewer than 1,000 inhabitants). These municipalities could not take on an

important share of public responsibilities. Long-established Greek centralism and

top-down hierarchical policy-making had tried to cope with local problems in

rural areas through field offices of the relevant ministries, which were gathered in

each one of the country’s fifty-four prefectures. The mobilization of this over-

stretched, badly coordinated and sector-oriented institutional machinery could

only be stimulated through informal, clientelistic, local, sectional, or personal

networks (Spanou 2000). Keeping in touch with these networks, in favour of

their villages and their citizens, used to be a major task of rural mayors, while

the local MPs acted as the necessary links to the decision-makers of the central state

(Hlepas 1999). During the 1980s, the ruling socialists prioritized, in their political

agenda, participatory and decentralization reforms, while they hesitated in pursu-

ing territorial reforms. There was only a single case of territorial rescaling: being

obliged to respond to the reform of European Structural Policy by the late 1980s,

socialist government created thirteen regions, with indirectly elected regional

councils, in which representatives of local authorities, professional associations,

and state administration participated. Sectoral interests could better articulate

within this new institution that was established at a higher level than the previous

prefectural councils.

The problem of local government fragmentation was handled by the socialists in

two ways: either by encouraging voluntary amalgamations of smaller communes

through grants and other incentives, on the one hand, or by creating new ‘stronger’

types of municipal syndicates (‘development syndicates’, replaced by ‘district

councils’ in 1994), on the other. But the results of these efforts were not considered

by many observers as satisfactory. Some years later, only 367 small municipalities

(less than 10 per cent of the target group) had responded to the state incentives,

voluntarily merging into 108 units. Neither did the new types of municipal

syndicates live up to expectations. These failures were due to the fact that the

Socialist Party was not ready to confront the existing strong localism and preferred

less radical procedures on a voluntary basis. These fitted into its preference for a

bottom-up approach aiming at local legitimacy and acceptance. Socialist hesitation

greece 423



Table17.5

Employeesin

urban

andruralmunicipalities,1996

Region

Numberof

urban

municipalities

Employees

Employeesper

municipality

Ruralmunicipalities

Employees

Employees

perruralmunicipality

EastMacedonia/Thrace

22

1181

53.68

275

494

1.80

CentralMacedonia

58

5579

96.19

562

1025

1.82

WestMacedonia

20

510

25.50

336

361

1.07

Epirus

16

630

39.38

547

586

1.07

Thessaly

25

1590

63.60

499

699

1.40

IonianIslands

12

559

46.58

248

249

1.00

WestGreece

32

1406

43.94

642

658

1.02

CentralGreece

44

1189

27.02

550

755

1.37

Peloponnese

41

1092

26.63

823

915

1.11

North

Aegean

24

412

17.17

165

213

1.29

South

Aegean

27

1261

46.70

164

355

2.16

Crete

28

1392

49.71

515

680

1.32

Attica

88

18136

208.14

62

325

5.24

Total

437

35117

80.36

5388

7315

1.36

Source:Ministryof

Interior

1996b.



affected especially rural municipalities that were extremely under-staffed and

deprived of any possibility to fulfil their tasks (see Table 17.5).

Attempts to challenge the dominating centralist patterns culminated in 1994,

when long-lasting efforts to ‘democratize’ the state-controlled prefectures (nomar-

chies) succeeded, mainly thanks to the strength of the ruling socialist majority.

Such efforts had already failed in 1986 and 1990. In 1986, a law creating a second tier

of local government had been initiated by the ruling socialist party as an important

part of its reform agenda to enhance democratic legitimacy and participation.

However, due to strong resistance of local MPs, high-ranking party cadres and

senior civil servants, this law was not implemented. In 1990, a multi-party coali-

tion, under pressure from the local government lobby, as well as from the left and

socialist parties, adopted a new law, promoting an even stronger second tier. But

the coming to power of the conservative party, six months later, cancelled this

reform. The new government denied the empowerment of local government, since

the political influence of conservatives within local government remained weak.

The political landscape changed once again with the return of the socialists to

power in 1993. In 1994, just a few months after the change of government, the 161-

year-old state institution of the nomarchia (prefecture) was finally transformed

into a second tier of local government called Prefectural Self-Government (PSG).

While left-wing parties supported the reform, the conservatives opposed it, high-

lighting the risk to state unity and to efficiency. But the opposition failed since

the Socialist Party enjoyed considerable political strength following its electoral

triumph. Furthermore, state prefectures were in decline since state administration

was focused more on the regions. Finally, another factor favouring this reform was

that the new institution offered new opportunities to party workers as well as to the

local society. More than 1,500 prefectural councillors and fifty-six prefects and sub-

prefects were to be directly elected, while local societies took over responsibilities

Table 17.6 Distribution of second-tier local governments by population

Population Prefectural local governments % Total population %

<30,000 2 4.0 45 418 0.4430–50,000 5 10.0 190 199 1.8550–75,000 6 12.0 358 018 3.4975–100,000 6 12.0 539 833 5.27100–150,000 13 26.0 1 617 313 15.77150–200,000 9 18.0 1 566 701 15.27200–300,000 5 10.0 1 268 369 12.36300–500,000 2 4.0 623 622 6.08>500,000 2 4.0 4 048 831 39.47Total 50 100 10 258 364 100

Source: National Statistical Service, Statistical Yearbook: 2000.

greece 425



traditionally reserved to the state (Hlepas 2003). The long tradition of ‘behind the

scenes’ localism (distribution of resources responding to local claims, occupation

of posts responding to unspoken local quotas, etc.) could not withstand the rising

demands of the new, self-confident Greek province that was seeking to institution-

alize local power. Within this scenery, the decentralized state administration lost

ground and was obliged to withdraw and re-group at higher levels.

Since the state no longer exercised power at the prefectural level, the time had

come to change the character of the thirteen regions and transform them into

multi-sectoral state bodies that would gather at a higher level most decentralized

state administration. Hence, just a few months after the introduction of second-

tier local government, a new law gave the secretary generals of the regions new

powers which the appointed nomarchs (prefects) had previously exercised. These

powers corresponded to state functions exercised throughout the country, includ-

ing supervision of local authorities.

The need for efficiency, local development, and better social services in rural

areas were the main arguments for a remarkable territorial reform in 1998 known as

the ‘Capodistrias Plan’ of amalgamating local governments (Act 2539/1997). This

intended to restructure the first tier and create new, stronger municipalities. In fact,

the mandatory unification of municipalities in 1998 gives us what is up to now a

unique example of a radical reform through amalgamations in southern Europe.

The total number of municipalities was cut by 80 per cent, while the average

population of the municipalities climbed from about 1,600 to more than 11,000.

The so-called ‘Capodistrias Plan’ was not just a plan to merge municipalities; it

was also a plan for national and regional development with a timescale of five years

Table 17.7 Distribution of municipalities by orders of magnitude before (1996)and after (1999) the implementation of the ‘Capodistrias’ Plan of amalgamations

Population Municipalities 1996 % Municipalities 1999 %

<300 2 043 35.1 33 3.2300–500 1 180 20.2 14 1.3500–1,000 1 357 23.3 46 4.51,000–2,000 672 11.5 93 9.02,000–5,000 337 5.8 380 36.85,000–10,000 102 1.8 281 27.210,000–20,000 48 0.9 95 9.220,000–50,000 54 0.9 56 5.450,000–100,000 24 0.4 27 2.6100,000–200,000 6 0.1 6 0.6>200,000 2 0.03 2 0.02Total 5 825 100 1 033 100

Source: Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization.




(1997–2001). The new local authorities would obtain the financial resources and

qualified staff they needed in order to set up a ‘modern and effective’ unit of local

administration that would act as an ‘instrument and a pole of development’ for

its territory, thereby more easily taking advantage of EU funds. In this way, the

citizen would have more influence on local politics (a participatory result of the

amalgamations), since the new municipalities would undertake a much wider

range of activities. At the same time, continued representation of the old rural

municipalities would be provided through local, directly elected community

councils explicitly foreseen by the law.

The legacy of fragmentation: containment

of decentralization reforms.

An overview of the numerous attempts to reduce centralism throughout three

decades would easily come to the conclusion that initial expectations have not been

fulfilled. Greece still remains one of the most centralized countries of the EU,

characterized by strong unitary institutions covering an overall, multi-level, multi-

sector, and multi-actor fragmentation. Participatory reforms succeeded in pro-

moting inclusion and democratic stabilization. New democratic institutions and

practices could not, however, seriously put into question the dominating model of

‘pendulum democracy’ at any level of government. Europeanization caused, on

the other hand, important changes in structure and operation of local government

that moved towards new standards of efficiency.

Regarding decentralization and participatory reforms, the most appropriate

paradigm illustrating responses to initial challenges and opportunities for local

democracy was meant to be the establishment and performance of second-tier

local government. The newly established second tier, however, did not meet initial

expectations and faced major difficulties: most of the public servants in the former

state prefectures mistrusted elected officials and feared a downgrade in terms of

career opportunities, salaries, and pensions. Most of the old staff were, therefore,

not willing to move to these new local governments and tried by all means to return

to state administrative agencies. MPs in the provinces, on the other hand, perceived

the emergence of new directly elected players, especially the nomarchs (prefects),

within their own constituency as a threat to their position within the system of

political clientele. Corporate interests and larger businesses were also afraid that

their influence on locally elected politicians would not be as strong as it had been

within the hierarchical centralist structures of the state. Central bureaucracy, and

even an important part of the judiciary, anticipated trends of paralysing disinte-

gration and the emergence of new local powers that would not be loyal to state

hierarchies and order.

greece 427



In sum, an uncoordinated but convergent anti-reformist alliance attacked the

new institutions. There were long controversies and litigations, while in several

cases the courts decided that major state responsibilities (such as physical planning,

or the appointment of teachers in public schools) could not be transferred to local

government. Thus, the second tier lost, step by step, important fields of compe-

tence. The new local leaders at the second tier gradually realized that most of their

funds were coming from state grants, many of which were simply financing

concrete administrative tasks that the PSGs were obliged to carry out on behalf

of the state. Supervising and control responsibilities, routine duties, and a lot of red

tape constituted most of the workload, while the ministries, several state-controlled

entities, and the regions took crucial policy decisions directly affecting the pre-

fectures. Especially the regions could maintain and further gain power over distri-

bution, evaluation, and monitoring of European Operational Programmes.

Apart from protesting and litigating, directly elected prefects tried to claim

‘their’ part in the local political arena, not only by means of extensive use of the

strong, historically rooted symbolism of their office, but also through unscrupu-

lous clientelistic practices, and sometimes even by breaking the law. Being locally

elected leaders, maintaining strong and direct informal relations to citizens, the

prefects could accumulate the kind of local political ‘capital’ that was necessary for

their own access to decision-makers at the central level, each one on behalf of his

own local followers. In this respect the evolution of ‘prefectural’ local government

in Greece seems to provide a good example of how local political representation

degenerates when it has limited funds and policy options of its own (Hlepas 2003).

On the other hand, state-controlled regions were given wide-ranging compe-

tences in several sectors. Since PSGs were mistrusted, and lacked resources, experi-

ence, and know-how, the second tier lost further competences through laws

that seemed to favour the regions. Although conceived as ‘unitary’ entities of

decentralized state administration, the thirteen regions were also influenced by

the dominant ‘sectional spirit’ within the state administration, thus reproducing

themselves the kind of ministerial or sectoral politics that are typical for many

unitary states.

Furthermore, special regional districts were created by several ministries

such as that by the Ministry of Education in 2000, thus bypassing the thirteen

‘general’ regions and increasing the complexity of public administration as a

whole. The main argument for all of these new arrangements was the pressing need

for efficiency, often connected to the requirements of European policies and—

implicitly—to fiscal stress. The real reason, however, was more likely to be pressure

from sectoral interests (trade unionist, professional, business). The divisions of

competence among different levels of public administration were often unclear,

however, thus creating an environment of uncertainty and frustrating political

accountability.




Consolidation, on the contrary, seems to be improved at the local level: despite

many difficulties and quite a few failures, there is no doubt that the ‘Capodistrias’

amalgamation reform has already changed the landscape of local government in

Greece. The new, larger municipalities have more and improved resources so that

they can better respond to the demands and challenges of efficiency imposed by

Europeanization and new demands for social services. The new map of first-tier

local governments reflects the deep changes in demography, economy, commu-

nications and culture during the last decades that have tended to ‘urbanize’ out-

looks and lifestyles in rural Greece. Local peculiarities have faded; even the so-

called ‘geographic differentiation of political and voting behaviour’ that used be so

strong is declining in this small, increasingly homogenized country (Hlepas 2003).

Nowadays, local communities in rural areas expect much more from public

administration than they have in the past. Consequently, the amalgamations

of the 1990s were not simply the achievement of ‘radical modernizers’ or the

outcome of ‘socialist dogmatism’, they were also responses to a changing social

environment. This could also offer an explanation for the fact that resistance

against amalgamations has been (with some exceptions) less strong than expected,

although the most important political parties of the opposition resisted this

territorial reform and tried to mobilize their supporters.

Opportunities for participation offered by new (second-tier) and stronger

(amalgamated) municipal institutions did not prove to be as crucial as expected:

interest group systems at the local level are characterized by extreme fragmentation,

segregated sectorization, uneven access and influence to policy- and decision-

making, ad hoc mobilization, and lack of open pluralism (Getimis and Hlepas

2007). The latter is the outcome of a deeply rooted individualistic and non-

consensual, competitive culture. Local businessmen (especially the constructors

and providers of goods and services to local government), local media, local

associations, and, especially, local church dignitaries seem to be particularly influ-

ential, through informal networks, according to empirical surveys (Getimis and

Hlepas 2006). Cohesion of local societies is mainly based on strong local identities

and symbolism, personified through the directly elected mayors and prefects that

represent their voters, cities, and regions, often in cooperation with, or antagonism

to, local MPs, at higher (mainly central) levels of government. Demands of local

societies and local governments are expressed through these strong local leaders,

who maintain bonds and channels of easy access to decision-makers at the central

state level. It should be emphasized, however, that this kind of vertical intermedia-

tion of local interests is constructed along informal, ad hoc, and unstable networks

(Adam and Kriesi 2007) exposed to political and personal contingencies and

contexts. On the other hand, local actors seem to foster alliances and accept

consensus when it comes to the question of local economic development and

claims for European and national funding (Psychopaidis and Getimis 1989).

Indeed, Europeanization has promoted strategic regional planning and policies,

greece 429



encouraging local societies to consensual decision-making in order to strengthen

their own position within the respective processes of bargaining and distribution.

Conclusions

................................................................................................................

Greek statehood can be traced back to the early nineteenth century, and a two-

party, majoritarian, polarized system characterized a strong parliamentary

tradition. Public administration followed rigid centralist patterns right from the

beginning, but public bureaucracy was unstable up to the early 1970s. The country

despairs of its stable bureaucratic elite, while public administration is subordinated

to the government and is extremely party-politicized. A parochial legalist

spirit creates blockades and inefficiency, whereas the rule of law still has

important deficiencies concerning the relations between single citizens and state

administration.

The dominant ‘Westminster’ model of ‘pendulum democracy’ remains unchal-

lenged. Civil society remained weak and fragmented, while civil demands are

intermediated through sectoral and political channels constructed inside and

outside the ‘paternalistic’ Jacobin state. Influential pressure groups can, behind

the scenes, strongly and efficiently intervene in law-making, and distribution of

information and financial resources, while they have proved able to block, in

several cases, reform procedures. Persistent uneven fragmentation, apart from

frustrating several pending reforms, leads to a kind of disintegration affecting

both social cohesion and political legitimacy.

Adaptation pressures through Europeanization, as well as the dominant objec-

tives for efficiency and competitiveness, enforced important changes within the

state machinery and the establishment of new institutions. These changes could be

exploited by strong sectoral interests that tend to isolate their spaces of action and

finally manage to distort most of these new elements. Furthermore, the dominant

model of ‘pendulum democracy’ managed to absorb newly introduced traces of

participatory governance and consensual procedures. Public consultation proce-

dures, imposed by European Directives in a series of public policies, have been

formalized and guided through expertise and consultancy, while public opinion

was simply registered in poll surveys, thus excluding active participation and

deliberative expression.

The two-party system and ‘pendulum democracy’ is reproduced at the local

level. Local governments are conceived as strictly unitary, centralized entities,

characterized through the unchallenged dominance of the executive (especially




the directly elected mayors and prefects), thus reflecting, once more, the patterns

of the central state.

Even the participatory impulse of the 1980s gradually faded away because of

colonization by the political parties, while formal and informal sectoral networks

bypassed and downgraded those institutions that failed to fulfil their integrative

and deliberative role. Interest group systems at the local level are characterized

through extreme fragmentation, segregated sectoralization, uneven access to and

influence on policy- and decision-making, ad hoc mobilization, and lack of open

pluralism.

An overview of the numerous attempts to reduce centralism and enrich ‘pendu-

lum democracy’ with consensus and participation, would easily come to the

conclusion that initial anticipations have not been fulfilled. Reform capacity is

lower than anticipated; efforts towards change have been characterized by discon-

tinuities and breaks. Greece still remains a typical example of the ‘Westminster

model’ and the most centralist country of the EU, characterized by strong unitary

institutions covering an overall, multi-level, multi-sector, and multi-actor frag-

mentation.

Democratization of the political system in Greece can, however, only be achieved

if transparency of decision-making, decentralization, and enhancement of inde-

pendent regulators is further promoted through a series of consistent reforms that

would challenge the prevailing centralistic, strictly majoritarian, polarized, and

representative model of democracy.

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greece: a case of fragmented centralism and 'behind the scenes' localism

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