gender and the military: a comparative study of the participation of women in the armed forces of...

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Department of Political and Social Sciences

Gender and the Military

A Comparative Study of the Participation of Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies

by

Helena Carreiras

Thesis submitted for assessment with a view to obtaining the Degree of Doctor of

the European University Institute

Florence, March 2004


Department of Political and Social Sciences

Gender and the Military

A Comparative Study of the Participation of Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies

by

Helena Carreiras

Jury members: Philippe Schmitter (European University Institute, supervisor)

Donatella della Porta (European University Institute)

Fabrizio Battistelli (Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”)

Maria Carrilho (Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa, Lisbon)

Florence, March 2004

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CONTENTS

CONTENTS................................................................................................................................................2

TABLES AND FIGURES..........................................................................................................................5

LIST OF APPENDIXES............................................................................................................................7

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................8

CHAPTER I..............................................................................................................................................12

WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW ................................................................12 1. Women and warfare in historical perspective...............................................................................12 2. Factors affecting women’s military roles: analytical model and research design .......................21

2.1. Segal’s model: a brief outline................................................................................................................ 22 2.2. A critical assessment ............................................................................................................................. 27 2.3. A revised proposal................................................................................................................................. 35

2.3.1. Conceptualizing and measuring the dependent variable( WMP) ............................................. 37 2.3.2. Independent variables and research hypothesis........................................................................ 37 2.3.3. Investigating different analytical levels ................................................................................... 42

2.4. Research design and techniques ............................................................................................................ 42 CHAPTER II ............................................................................................................................................45

GENDER RELATIONS, GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MILITARY ......................45 1. Elements of a social theory of gender ...........................................................................................45

1.1. Gender as a contested concept............................................................................................................... 47 1.1.1. The different uses of the concept of gender: some illustrations ............................................... 48 1.1.2. Linguistic tensions and the sex-gender debate ......................................................................... 52

1.2. Gender as a useful analytical category .................................................................................................. 55 1.3. Social structures and gender regimes .................................................................................................... 57

1.3.1. Gender order and gender regimes ............................................................................................ 59 1.3.2. Theorizing change: ‘crisis tendencies’ in the gender order. ..................................................... 63

1.4. Towards a goal-oriented conceptualization of gender ........................................................................... 65 1.4.1. The relational character of the concept: a non-substantialist standpoint .................................. 65 1.4.2. The historicity of the concept: a non-essentialist perspective .................................................. 67 1.4.3. The case for a goal-related conceptual analysis ....................................................................... 68

2. Gender relations in organizations ................................................................................................69 2.1. Gendered organizations......................................................................................................................... 70 2.2. Women's presence in organizations: conditions and constraints ........................................................... 77

2.2.1. Kanter’s model of tokenism..................................................................................................... 79 2.2.2. Re-evaluating numbers, rethinking tokenism........................................................................... 84 2.2.3. Informal barriers and the glass ceiling effect ........................................................................... 88

2.3. Crossing the lines: segregation and gender in non-traditional occupations ........................................... 90 3. The military as a gendered organization ......................................................................................93

3.1. Gender, the state and warfare ................................................................................................................ 93 3.2. Gender and sexuality in military culture ............................................................................................... 95

3.2.1. Armed forces and masculinity ................................................................................................. 96 3.2.2. The experience of women soldiers......................................................................................... 102 3.2.3. The body, sexuality and sexual orientation in military culture .............................................. 107

CHAPTER III.........................................................................................................................................115

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF WOMEN’S MILITARY SERVICE.......................115 1. Women, work and the family.......................................................................................................115

1.1. Combining work and the family in late modernity.............................................................................. 115 1.2. 'Greedy institutions': military women and the family .......................................................................... 118

2. Women, citizens and soldiers: the political dilemmas of female military service .......................122 2.1. Women and democratization............................................................................................................... 122 2.2. Women’s interests and the military ..................................................................................................... 124

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2.2.1. The political construction of 'women's interests'.................................................................... 124 2.2.2. From ‘objective versus subjective’ interests to a politics of presence.................................... 126

2.3. Feminist perspectives on women and the use of military force ........................................................... 128 2.3.1. The legitimation of military force .......................................................................................... 129 2.3.2. The distinctiveness of women’s relation to peace and war .................................................... 137

CHAPTER IV.........................................................................................................................................141

THE MILITARY INSTITUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE ............................................................141 1. The military in the post-Cold War period: redefining strategic orientations .............................141 2. Organizational challenges and the military profession ..............................................................145

2.1. Changing patterns of military service: the decline of the mass army .................................................. 145 2.2. Models of organizational and professional change compared ............................................................. 150

2.2.1. The institutional/occupational model ..................................................................................... 152 2.2.2. Interactional and ‘professional organization’ models ............................................................ 157

2.3. The I/O thesis reconsidered: methodological and normative implications .......................................... 158 2.3.1. Methodological assumptions and 'pragmatic professionalism'............................................... 158 2.3.2. Normative implications.......................................................................................................... 161

2.4. Towards a ‘post-modern’ military? ..................................................................................................... 162 2.5. The I/O model and women’s professional identity.............................................................................. 165

3. Military effectiveness and gender integration.............................................................................170 3.1. The debate over women’s military roles: ‘rights versus readiness’ ..................................................... 170 3.2. Value rationales in the policy debate over women in combat ............................................................. 173

3.2.1. The physical tests debate ....................................................................................................... 174 3.2.2. Effects of women’s presence on unit cohesion and morale.................................................... 175

3.3. Re-equating the debate: social experimentation and the measure of effectiveness.............................. 179 CHAPTER V...........................................................................................................................................183

GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE ARMED FORCES: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE NATO COUNTRIES...................................................183

1. The position of women in the military: representation and integration policies ........................185 1.1. Global representation and recruitment policies ................................................................................... 185

1.1.1. Global representation............................................................................................................. 185 1.1.2. Recruitment policies .............................................................................................................. 190

1.2. Selection and training.......................................................................................................................... 195 1.3. Occupational segregation and employment......................................................................................... 198 1.4. Hierarchical representation.................................................................................................................. 204 1.5. Social issues: family policy, fraternization and harassment ................................................................ 208

1.5.1. Pregnancy and family policy.................................................................................................. 208 1.5.2. Gender equality programs and sexual harassment ................................................................. 212

1.6. An index of gender inclusiveness........................................................................................................ 215 2. Explaining gender incorporation patterns: a tentative test of hypotheses..................................219

2.1. Historical heritages, time effects and relative numbers ....................................................................... 219 2.2. Military structure and personnel accession policies ............................................................................ 228 2.3. The impact of social-economic and political factors: a selective exploration...................................... 232

3. Concluding remarks....................................................................................................................236 CHAPTER VI .........................................................................................................................................239

PORTUGAL AND THE NETHERLANDS: MILITARY AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS .................239 1. The military and the challenge of organizational restructuring .................................................239

1.1. Strategic orientations: perception of threat and mission definition...................................................... 239 1.2. Organizational change and the dominant military professional........................................................... 243

1.2.1. Force structure: from conscription to the all-volunteer force................................................. 243 1.2.2. Recruitment problems and solutions...................................................................................... 248 1.2.3. Organizational identification: institutional, occupational and ‘postmodern’ trends............... 250

1.3. Public attitudes towards the military ................................................................................................... 253 2. Patterns and policies of gender integration................................................................................255

2.1. The recruitment of women: historical and legal frameworks .............................................................. 255 2.1.1. ‘Ex-post pragmatism’: the Portuguese way towards gender integration in the military......... 257 2.1.2. The Netherlands: a NATO test-case towards gender integration ........................................... 260

2.2. The situation of women in the military: representation and integration policies ................................. 264 2.2.1. Relative numbers and evolution of representation ................................................................. 264 2.2.2. Occupational and hierarchical distributions........................................................................... 266

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3. Social trends and the situation of women ...................................................................................271 3.1. Women’s economic mobilization........................................................................................................ 271 3.2. Values, gender roles and the conciliation between work and the family ............................................. 275

CHAPTER VII .......................................................................................................................................278

INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS OF GENDER INTEGRATION: THE CASE OF THE OFFICER CORPS ....................................................................................................................................................278

1. Organizational structure and individual orientations ................................................................279 2. Cultural constraints and officers’ responses to gender integration............................................283

2.1. The perspective of women officers ..................................................................................................... 283 2.1.1. The paradox of discrimination ............................................................................................... 284 2.1.2. The negative effects of ‘tokenism’: visibility, contrast and role encapsulation...................... 286 2.1.3. Positive discrimination, differential evaluation and inequity ................................................. 290 2.1.4. Women’s responses to organizational constraints.................................................................. 292

2.2. The perspective of male soldiers ......................................................................................................... 299 3. Concluding remarks....................................................................................................................309

CONCLUSION.......................................................................................................................................312

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................................326

APPENDIXES ........................................................................................................................................356


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TABLES AND FIGURES

FIGURE 1.1 Segal’s Model of Factors Affecting Women’s Participation in The Military .....................23 FIGURE 1.2 Modified Model of Factors Affecting Women’s Participation in the Military (Iskra et al., 2002)...........................................................................................................................................................29 FIGURE 1.3 Factors Affecting Women’s Participation in The Military: A ‘Refocused’ Model .............37 TABLE 1.1 List of Independent Variables and Hypothesis (‘Large N’ Analysis) ...................................41 FIGURE 4.1 A Typology of Force Structures and Expected Changes...................................................148 TABLE 4.1 Social Organization of the Armed Forces: Institutional vs. Occupational..........................154 TABLE 4.2 Armed Forces in the Three Eras .........................................................................................163 TABLE 4.3 Military Women’s Motivations for Enlistment – Portugal (1994)......................................167 TABLE 5.1 Women in the Armed Forces of NATO Countries (2000)..................................................188 FIGURE 5.1 Evolution of the Percentage of Women in NATO Forces (1986/7-2000)........................189 FIGURE 5.2 Percentage of Women in Nato Forces, by Service (2000) ................................................190 FIGURE 5.3 Average Occupational Distribution of Military Personnel in 13 NATO Nations (2000)..199 FIGURE 5.4 Index of Women’s Occupational Integration in NATO (2000) (IWOI)............................204 FIGURE 5.5 Average Hierarchical Distribution of Military Personnel in NATO (2000)......................205 FIGURE 5.6 Percentage of Women within Rank Categories in NATO (2000) .....................................206 TABLE 5.2 Women in the Officer’s Categories (NATO-2000) ............................................................207 FIGURE 5.7 Index of Women’s Hierarchical Integration in NATO (IWHI) (2000) .............................208 TABLE 5.7 Index of Gender Inclusiveness in NATO - IGI (2000): Variables and Measurement.........216 FIGURE 5.8 Index of Gender Inclusiveness in NATO – IGI (2000) .....................................................217 FIGURE 5.9 Models of Gender Incorporation in NATO.....................................................................218 TABLE 5.3 Milestones in The Process of Gender Integration in NATO...............................................221 FIGURE 5.9 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Time and Women’s Relative Numbers (WR).....................224 FIGURE 5.10 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Time and Gender Inclusiveness in the Military ................225 FIGURE 5.11 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Women’s Relative Numbers (WR) and Gender Hierarchical Integration .............................................................................................................................................227 FIGURE 5.12 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Force Structure (CR) and Women’s Relative Numbers (WR)..................................................................................................................................................................229 FIGURE 5.13 Women Ratio by Type of Force (2000) ..........................................................................230 FIGURE 5.14 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Force Structure (CR) and Gender Inclusiveness in the Military – IGI ...........................................................................................................................................231 FIGURE 5.15 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Gender-Related Development Index and Gender Inclusiveness in the Military (IGI) ...........................................................................................................234 FIGURE 5.16 Plot of Countries’ Rankings: Gender Inequality (GEM) and Gender Inclusiveness in the Military (IGI)............................................................................................................................................236 TABLE 5.4 Correlation Coefficients (R) for the Dependent Variable (IGI) and its Component ‘WR’ and a Set of Independent Variables (NATO 18) .............................................................................................237 FIGURE 6.1 Total Active Armed Forces in Portugal and The Netherlands (1980-2001)......................243 FIGURE 6.2 Conscript Ratio in Portugal and The Netherlands (1980–1999) .......................................245 FIGURE 6.3 Number of Military Personnel by Service in Portugal and The Netherlands (1980/2000)247

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FIGURE 6.4 Percentage of Women in the Armed Forces in Portugal and The Netherlands (1980-2000)..................................................................................................................................................................265 TABLE 6.1 Male and Female Representation in the Armed Forces, by Service (Portugal and The Netherlands - 2000) ..................................................................................................................................266 FIGURE 6.5 Occupational Distribution of Women in the Portuguese and Dutch Armed Forces (2000) (%)............................................................................................................................................................267 TABLE 6.2 Percentage of Women in the Portuguese and Dutch Armed Forces by Occupational Area and Service (2000)....................................................................................................................................268 TABLE 6.3 Rank Distribution of Military Women in Portugal and The Netherlands (2000) – Percentage within Rank Category...............................................................................................................................269 TABLE 6.4 Rank Distribution of Military Women in Portugal and The Netherlands (2000) – Percentage within Gender Category ...........................................................................................................................269 TABLE 6.5 Representation of Military Women by Type of Contract in Portugal and The Netherlands (2000) .......................................................................................................................................................270 TABLE 6.6 Female Activity Rates in Europe (1995) ............................................................................272 TABLE 7.1 Number of Interviews by Sex and Nationality....................................................................278 TABLE 7.2 A Typology of Women’s Integration Strategies .................................................................296 TABLE 7. 3 Women’s Integration Strategies by Country.......................................................................299 TABLE 7.4 Battistelli’s Typology of Italian Soldiers’ Attitude Towards Gender Integration...............300 TABLE 7. 5 Typology of Dutch and Portuguese Male Soldiers’ Reaction To WMP............................301 TABLE 7. 6 Men’s Dominant Responses to WMP by Country.............................................................304


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LIST OF APPENDIXES Appendix 1.1 – Factors affecting WMP: variables and hypothesis compared

Appendix 5.1 – Organizational survey – questionnaire

Appendix 5.2 – Recruitment policies in NATO (2000)

Appendix 5.3 – Training standards in NATO (2000)

Appendix 5.4 – Occupational restrictions and occupational distribution of personnel in

NATO (2000)

Appendix 5.5 - Index of women’s occupational integration – IWOI (2000)

Appendix 5.6 – Hierarchical distribution of military personnel in NATO (2000)

Appendix 5.7 - Index of women’s hierarchical integration in NATO – IWHI (2000)

Appendix 5.8 - Index of gender inclusiveness in NATO –IGI (2000)

Appendix 5.9 – Measurement of the indexes’ variables – methodological notes

Appendix 7.1 – Statement for interviewees

Appendix 7.2 – List of interviewees

Appendix 7.3 – Interview guidelines

Appendix 7.4 – Military ranks

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INTRODUCTION

The right to fight and lead wars has until very recently been considered an

exclusively male activity. In most societies, the dominant tendency has been that, with

the exception of war heroines and mythological figures, women have taken part in

combat only in exceptional circumstances. Although they have sporadically participated

in military conflicts as combatants, usually at the end of the war they have been

expected to give up military roles and return to their traditional domestic sphere.

In recent decades, however, this pattern has undergone considerable

transformations. From the beginning of the ’70s, most Western armies began to admit

women in a way that marked a break with tradition. Contrary to historical precedents,

this call has not taken place in times of war, but in times of peace. Moreover, from their

original role as simple auxiliaries, women have progressively gained military status,

have been given similar training as men and performed functions in various areas which

have not been traditionally feminine.

By the beginning of the XXI century, despite a considerable heterogeneity

regarding integration policies, all NATO countries had admitted and increased the

number of women in their Armed Forces. During the past three decades various

restrictions have been lifted; women have been progressively allowed to enter military

academies and given access to a wider variety of positions and functions. In 2000,

around 280,000 women were serving in NATO forces.

The factors that induced these convergence effects derived from some global

sociological trends affecting most western countries, albeit with diverse rhythms and

degrees: increasing pressure for gender equity and changes in the military towards force

reduction and professionalization. The growing number and diversification of women’s

military roles is both a symptom of and one of the most visible consequences of change

in the armed forces during the past decades.

There is, however, the reverse side of the medal. Despite the above-mentioned

tendency to eliminate discrimination and equalize status between service members,

occupational restrictions still exist and women are largely excluded from many combat

related areas and functions. They have limited representation in higher hierarchical

posts and power positions within the military system. They are not always readily


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accepted, but often have to face hostile reactions. Empirical data show that even when

formal/legal integration has been accomplished, effective social integration has not

necessarily followed (Winslow and Dunn, 2002). In addition, progress made in the past

has not always followed a linear pattern. Women’s military participation has been

subject to cycles of expansion and contraction (Segal, 1999), and tendencies to reinstate

exclusionary policies have been observed.1

In the face of this evidence, a number of questions arise for which not many

answers have been provided yet: What factors explain variation in women’s military

roles? Why have some countries integrated women in their armed forces and developed

specific policies while others have only granted them a residual and symbolic presence?

How do social, economic, cultural, political and military factors interact to explain these

different ‘incorporation patterns’?

Despite the significant amount of literature that has been produced by historians,

sociologists, political scientists and feminist scholars, the comparative study of women

in the military is still a relatively uncharted area. This research is intended as a

contribution to its development by focusing on the factors at the basis of women’s

military recruitment and on the policies that have been developed in NATO countries

regarding their participation in the armed forces. It sets three fundamental objectives: a)

to explore and articulate various theoretical perspectives; b) to submit to empirical test a

variety of competing explanatory hypotheses with the use of original data; and c) to

achieve the previous objectives through a methodological focus on different analytical

levels, ranging from the observation of macro-societal processes to an in-depth

assessment of interpersonal relations.

From a theoretical standpoint, my goal is to articulate different areas and levels

of scientific inquiry. The interaction of different social processes and dynamics at the

basis of women’s military participation justifies an approach that simultaneously

considers the ideological-cultural dimension of gender relations (as a layer), the global

political-institutional context for the social participation of women, and the strategic and

organizational configuration of the armed forces. The conceptual framework of the

research will thus combine elements from a global theory of gender relations with

1 This has recently happened in the US, one of the most progressive cases in terms of female military recruitment: there were attempts to limit the number of women in the ranks and to impose new exclusionary regulations concerning, for instance, the prevention of marriage among military personnel and the presence of mixed-sex groups during military operations (Moskos, 1998b).

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organizational analysis, democratization and interest theory and the sociology of

military institutions. These elements together should contribute to the consolidation of a

systematic theory of women’s military roles cross-culturally and over time.

At the empirical level, I propose to test some existing (but still untested)

hypotheses concerning the factors that affect women’s military participation, as well as

to investigate the strength of some new relationships. This is thought of as a selective,

partial exploration of a complex empirical model, but one that is innovative if compared

to previous studies. This is so not only because it is based on original data gathered for

the first time in a comparative manner, but also because it refers to a variety of

empirical instances: all existing NATO countries in 2000, complemented with a

comparative case study of Portugal and the Netherlands.

Finally, from a methodological perspective, the thesis investigates the interplay

between different levels of analysis, that is, between societal trends (macro-level),

organizational factors (meso-level) and individual attitudes (micro-level) in shaping the

opportunities for women in the military. Besides looking at the societal factors that

influence or condition national military organization and policies, I also study how these

structural and organizational factors frame individual trajectories, choices and

expectations. And, inversely, I examine the extent to which individuals’ values and

options limit, subvert or reproduce organizational policies.

The structure of the thesis is the following:

Chapter 1 starts with a short revision of historical information concerning

women’s relation to war and military activities, and moves on to proposing the global

analytical framework of the thesis. After a critical analysis of existing models of factors

affecting women’s military roles –especially the so-called ‘Segal model’–, a ‘refocused’

analytical scheme is proposed. The set of dependent and independent variables is

described and research hypotheses are selected.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 develop the theoretical and conceptual framework. In

Chapter 2, a general theory of gender relations sets the ground for the analysis of the

military as both a gendered and ‘gendering’ organization. It proposes to look at the

relation between the macro-politics of gender and the micro-politics of the specific

‘gender regime’ of the military.


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Chapter 3 approaches the research topic from the point of view of social and

political factors that frame the reality and debates regarding the presence of women in

the armed forces. The analysis focuses on selected topics: transformations in women’s

social participation –namely those affecting their presence in the work-force and family

patterns; the role of women in democratization and the constitution of ‘gender

interests’; and also the variety of political and ideological standpoints in feminist

positions concerning women’s military participation.

Chapter 4 reviews major transformations in the structure of military

organizations. Besides comparing models of organizational and professional change –

and showing the extent to which such transformations relate to the recruitment of

women—, this chapter discusses the military arguments that have been used to justify

the inclusion or exclusion of women from the military in general and from combat areas

in particular.

The following three chapters present the empirical results of the research. In

Chapter 5, a ‘large N’ analysis is carried out in two steps. First, on the basis of

descriptions of the situation of military women and existing policies in each NATO

country, an ‘index of gender inclusiveness’ is proposed as a measure to classify the

various cases in terms of the degree to which they have integrated women in their armed

forces. This index is presented as an original instrument to operationalize the dependent

variable – women’s military participation. In a second moment, the selected hypotheses

are tested and the relative impact of explanatory factors is evaluated.

Chapters 6 and 7 refer to the case study of Portugal and the Netherlands. The

focus of the research is now at the organizational and interpersonal analytical levels.

Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of major trends in Dutch and Portuguese societies

in terms of women’s social participation, the organizational features of the armed forces

and their respective policies on gender integration. In turn, Chapter 7 presents results of

a content analysis of interviews with male and female officers in the two countries. The

aim here is to investigate the relationship between structural constraints and individual

values and attitudes, trying to understand the extent to which interpersonal relations

reproduce, reinterpret or subvert dominant cultural models and organizational

arrangements concerning gender integration.

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CHAPTER I WOMEN IN THE MILITARY: A GLOBAL OVERVIEW

1. Women and warfare in historical perspective

The association of women with peace and men with warfare has deep roots in

most cultures throughout history. Stereotypes of men as ‘just warriors’ and women as

‘beautiful souls’ have been used to secure women’s status as non-combatants and men’s

identity as warriors (Elshtain, 1995).2 The pervasiveness and trans-cultural persistence

of this imagery is well documented and reveals the extent to which male and female

identities have been forged around the matter of collective violence.

In contemporary Western societies there have been attempts –especially by

feminist scholars, women’s movements and interest groups- to transforme this

prevailing association. These attempts have been made either by redefining what is

believed to be a special relationship between women and peace or by denying the

specificity of this link and supporting the full access of women to military

organizations. In all cases, the “intricate symbolic network” (Macdonald et al., 1987) of

gender, peace and war has been operating at the core of political fights over women’s

social roles and emancipatory strategies. However, since war has usually been defined

as a male activity and highly valued masculine characteristics are often associated with

it, the image of women warriors has been seen as inherently unsettling, entailing a

symbolic rupture with the dominant gender order based on the separation of male and

female (Gherardi, 1994; Macdonald et al., 1987). Curiously though, the disruptive

identity of female fighters has been frequently used to sustain that same hegemonic

order of gender. The myth of the amazons is the best example of this instrumental use of

the disturbing image of ‘unnatural’ women. Amazons, the archetypal female warriors,

have been depicted in many different ways – as much as heroines as unnatural,

masculine and warmongering (Kirk, 1987; Hardwick, 1996), but always as marginal

and ambiguous in relation to accepted classificatory schemes. Confounding the

normally distinct categories of warrior (men) and women, amazons represented a

transgression of the ideal social order, thus defining the limits of society. Amazons, it is

said, “were the opposite of the ideal Athenian women: they did not marry, they

2 In one of the most encompassing inquires on the nature of this distinction, Elshtain has convincingly demonstrated how the stereotypes of ‘just warriors’ and ‘beautiful souls’ are undermined by the reality of female bellicosity and sacrificial male love (Elshtain, 1995).


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controlled their own offspring, they were warriors and they lived outside, (…) on the

borders of the known world; they were neither virgins nor married; they desired men

but did not want male babies” (Kirk, 1987: 31). Androgyne and liminal, they acted as a

metaphor for unmarried Athenian women as they were either killed or made into

‘proper women’ through marriage. This is why it has been argued that, by talking of the

amazons, it is the male Greek polis that is being defined in terms of its opposite (Kirk,

1987: 30). But the mythology of the Amazons does not only underline the opposition of

dual categories. It also supposedly documents the transition from a system of thought

that organized the experience of difference in terms of polarity and analogy to one based

upon a relatively rigid hierarchical scheme (Dubois, 1991). According to Dubois, this

scheme entailed gradations of superiority and inferiority –Greek, master, male and

human as opposed and superior to barbarians, slaves, women and animals

respectively— that have continued to influence western political thought (Dubois,

1991).

Many other examples of women warriors fill the history books.3 They go from

legions of warrior queens such as Boadicea –the British warrior queen who led her

people to battle against the Roman invaders (Macdonald, 1987)— through Jinga –the

majestic and murderous black queen who fought the Portuguese in the seventeenth

century Angola (Fraser, 1990)—, Jeanne d’Arc –who has been depicted as a heroine, a

saint and a witch (Pernoud and Clin, 1993)— to the women in the Inca battlefields –

whose involvement in ritual fights has been used by the Spanish conquistadores to

underline the primitive character of Andean societies (Dransart, 1987). The paradoxical

ways in which these exceptional figures have been described and their activities have

been recorded or forgotten show the importance of the role they played in ‘symbolically

articulating’ the social order and its values (Macdonald, 1987: 6).4 Their alternative and

contradictory portraits supply a focus for the ‘proper behavior’ of women and by

establishing the social limits of war, they guarantee the possibility of postwar

normalization.

3 There is an extensive literature on women warriors throughout history. In this research, two contributions deserve a special reference: Antonia Fraser’s Warrior Queens, and David E. Jones’s Women Warriors. A History, one of the most complete and comprehensive accounts on this issue. 4 Because of these multiple and often contradictory interpretations, figures such as Boadicea and the amazons “raise rather pessimistic questions for the enterprise of finding historical or mythological embodiments for feminist ideals” (Macdonald, 1987: 6).

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Beyond myths and tales of female warriors, the participation of women in actual

war fighting or their presence in war arenas reveals an historical pattern of exclusion

and omission. Women, as protagonists –not as victims, supporters or opponents— have

been systematically excluded from ‘regular’ war and combat activities. The only

thoroughly documented account of female involvement in a regular army before the XX

century is that of Dahomey, an XVIII and XIX century West African Kingdom.

Originally a praetorian guard sworn to celibacy, the Dahomeans developed into a force

of around 6,000 women warriors and were granted a semi-sacred status (Alpern, 1998;

Edgerton, 2000).

Despite the intensity of this account, the fact is that it remains an historical

exception. The tendency for the “disarmament” of women is recognized as prevalent in

most societies. This explains, at least partially, the invisibility of women’s participation

in the historical study of military institutions.5 And yet, women’s presence on

battlefields has been extremely significant for centuries. According to Hacker “from the

fourteenth to the nineteenth century, if not earlier, women in armies were not only

normal, they were vital. Armies could not have functioned as well, perhaps could not

have functioned at all without the service of women” (Hacker, 1981: 644). During the

whole early modern period in Europe, women camp followers constituted a real logistic

force, which was essential to the very existence of military formations. Like the soldiers

in the ranks, they were drawn from the lower social classes and most of them were

soldier’s wives or widows performing tasks as housekeepers, sutlers, whores, nurses,

laundresses, cooks and even soldiers (Hacker, 1981; Williams, 1988; Leonard, 1993).

Women’s roles changed during this long period and various exclusion measures were

imposed during the eighteenth century. The end of the Napoleonic wars at the beginning

of the nineteenth century completed a cycle in military history and brought with it both

the elimination of the last vestiges of nonmilitary support services and the total

exclusion of women. Hacker states that, “as armies became more professional and

bureaucratic –as they became in fact more exclusively military– they also became more

exclusively male…” (Hacker, 1981: 666). The new industrial era provided women with

work opportunities of a different kind. For some authors this gradual exclusion of

5 This blindness of historians to women’s military roles is also explained by the prescriptive character of most military history, which “remains a history of battles” (Hacker, 1981: 645). As Macdonald puts it: “Much of written history is the record of warfare – of conquest and revolution, of battles fought and treaties signed, of military and political tactics, of great leaders, and of heroes and enemies. In this history, women rarely figure” (Macdonald, 1987: 1).


15

women from armies is as meaningful as their prior participation, since it contributed to

one of the most relevant characteristics of the modern economic order: the separation of

the spheres of work and family life (Nef, 1968: 210-11).

In sum, despite the importance of the roles they performed, women tend to

‘disappear’ from historical accounts of military enterprises. As Hacker puts it, “like the

women healers who had vanished from the history of medicine or who were recalled

only as witches, the female camp followers of early modern armies vanished from

military history or were recalled only as whores. And just as the loss of the history of

women healers made the rise of professional nursing and of limited places for women

doctors in the nineteen century seem novel, so the loss of army women made the rise of

military nursing and the opening of restricted careers for uniformed women’s auxiliaries

appear as something new” (Hacker, 1981: 671).

However, after the Crimean War –with Florence Nightingale and her nursing

corps—, there was a new kind of relationship between women and military institutions.

Motivated by patriotic and humanitarian feelings these women were now recruited from

the middle classes and their presence in war theatres anticipated the progressive

institutionalization of female support roles during the two World Wars. The formation

in 1881 of the Army Nursing Service in Great Britain paved the way for a growing

presence of women in the armed forces during WW I. Their presence was particularly

important in Great Britain and the United States. The case of the URSS was rather

exceptional in that women formed an exclusively female combat battalion, the

‘Battalion of Death’, under the command of Mariya Bochkareva. The constitution of

this battalion, authorized in 1917 by the provisional government, aimed at providing

soldiers with an example of military virtue to shame and humiliate deserting men

(Griesse and Stites, 1982). According to Griesse and Stites, “it was certainly the first

instance in modern history in which women were used in all-female fighting units as

models of military valor and performance in order to check desertion and fraternization

with the enemy” (Griesse and Stites, 1982: 64). In general, though, women have been

demobilized at the end of the conflict.

These women’s corps were reconstituted only with the advent of WW II, but

then in substantially increased numbers. There is a wide consensus that this moment

represented a turning point in terms of female military participation (Binkin and Bach,

1977; Reynaud, 1988; Goldman, 1982; Campbell, 1990). During the conflict, women

HELENA CARREIRAS

16

had access to a larger number of functions, including some non-traditional onessuch as

mechanics, repair, transmissions, radar and anti-aircraft defense. However –and

significantly from a symbolic point of view—, their action was limited to the

preparation and control of the firing, which they were barred from executing themselves

(Goldman and Stites, 1982: 30).

During the war, around 350,000 women served in the U.S. armed forces and

although without military status, 800 formed the WASPs (Women’s Airforce Service

Pilots), flying all kinds of aircraft including combat planes. In England, more than

450,000 women represented 9.6 per cent of the total force in 1943. This was one of the

few countries, together with Germany, the Soviet Union and later Israel that instituted a

female national conscription system in time of war. Between 1941 and 1945 around

125,000 English women were conscripted for military service. Other countries such as

Canada, France or Germany have also used women in their armed forces, even if in

more limited numbers.6 As happened during World War I, the presence of women was

particularly significant in the armed forces of the Soviet Union. Due to the lack of male

manpower and the prolongation of the conflict, more than one million women were

recruited to serve in all kinds of functions, including infantry, armored cars, artillery and

anti-aircraft defense.

The USSR’s utilization of women in combat was - at least until the Gulf War -

the single major example of the large-scale use of women in combat in regular

international war. However, unlike other countries where, despite the fact that women

were generally demobilized after the end of the conflict, some of them remained in the

armed forces with a special peacetime status, in the USSR women’s presence became

irrelevant.

6 It is, however, worth noting that Germany, unlike England and other countries, did not respond to manpower shortfalls by resorting to large-scale female recruitment. In both wars “a profound historical and cultural hostility to the use of women for military purposes has shaped the West-German decision-making process. (…) The German pattern has been to resist the presence of women in the armed forces in anything but a marginal, preferably civilian, capacity” (Goldman, 1982: 6). This is an important element to understand the exclusion of women from military specialties in the Bundeswher until 2000. In Italy, in 1944 Mussolini’s government created the Servizio Ausiliario Femminile (SAF), which included up to 5,000 members. The constitution of this all-female corps, the first and only in the history of the Italian armed forces, resulted from a spontaneous mobilization process, initiated from the provincial basis of the party. According to the rules, these women could only perform their functions in non-armed support services. The fall of the fascist regime in April 1945 signaled the end of this short female experience in that which would be considered the ‘wrong side of the war’ (Spini and Isman, 1997; Viganò, 1997; Bravo, 1997).


17

Thus, with rare exceptions, during the two World Wars women did not bear

arms or serve in combat. At the end of the conflicts their presence became residual in

the majority of countries and the exclusion rule prevailed. The same happened with the

‘omission’ rule. As stated by Mady Segal, “what has happened in the past in many

nations is that when the armed forces need women, their prior military history is

recalled to demonstrate that they can perform effectively in various positions. There is a

process of cultural amnesia regarding the contributions women made during emergency

situations, until a new emergency arises and then history is rediscovered” (Segal, 1993:

84).

And yet, as clear as these exclusion and omission patterns is the tendency to

include women in combat activities whenever exceptional circumstances require their

participation. There is wide historical evidence that women have been effectively

utilized in combat during revolutionary settings when a society is undergoing

fundamental social and political changes. Whenever societies have confronted risks for

survival women have entered the military domain as combatants and this participation

was not only welcomed but also actively requested. This has happened during

revolutionary movements and national liberation wars.7 Some well-known examples are

the women warriors in Latin America –from the independence wars against the Spanish

to the late XX century political struggles (Harris, 1988; Bunster, 1988; Kanogo,

1987)—, the USSR during the 1917 revolution8 (Griesse and Stites, 1982), Yugoslavia

during World War II (Jancar, 1982, 1988), the African liberation movements (Amrane,

1982; Hélie-Lucas, 1988), the various resistance movements in occupied Europe during

World War II –particularly in France, Italy,9 Poland and the USSR (Spini and Ismani,

1997; Bravo, 1997; Rossiter, 1986 ), and the Israeli combatants during the war of

independence (Yuval-Davis, 1981, Bloom, 1982).

7 It has been noted that the number of women has always been higher (and also more accepted) in the less institutionalized military formations, more in resistance than in regular armies (Iskra et al., 2002). 8 Women’s participation in the revolutionary movement (the civil war of 1918-1920 and in the occupied USSR during WW II) has become a model for similar insurgent movements, particularly in the third world (Griesse and Stites, 1982: 7). 9 In the anti-fascist resistance, the partigiani, there was a female corps composed of 35,000 women, recognized as combatants (Spini and Ismani, 1997: 131; Bravo, 1997). But here again there was much resistance to giving women combat jobs; among those who fought very few became political commissioners. Besides, there was no such requirement on the part of women. According to Bravo (1997: 121) “the problem of the division of work shows the coexistence of egalitarian will and old prejudices in the way how the resistance world conceived women’s relation to politics.”

HELENA CARREIRAS

18

All these cases show that “when war intrudes into society –as in the case of

invasion and colonialism– it may become very difficult to maintain the traditional social

order, and boundaries, such as those of gender, may well break down” (Macdonald,

1987: 9). There is, however, great debate as to whether the obliteration of conventional

definitions of male and female roles in times of war represents structural or rather

circumstantial changes. In other words, as to whether gender boundaries really undergo

fundamental reconfiguration or are only temporarily ‘suspended’. This discussion

applies both to women’s participation in irregular partisan warfare, resistance and

liberation movements as well as to women’s status during the World Wars.

A common idea is that the World Wars have been watersheds for women. This

view stresses the new opportunities that opened up for them during the war: skilled jobs

in heavy industry, new positions in government bureaucracies, educational institutions

and the armed forces, as well as the opportunity to demonstrate their capabilities, skills

and power. In both world wars women gained economic independence and postwar

constitutional changes gave them the right to vote. Women received formal citizenship

in England, the U.S and Germany after World War I and in Italy and France after World

War II.10

For some, these changes were irrevocable and fundamental (Chafe, 1972); others

believe that they had an illusory nature and that women changed their roles ‘only for the

duration’ of the conflicts (Higonnet and Higonnet, 1987; Milkman, 1986).11 Although

many historians agree that the two world wars had an equalizing effect on the societies

of the belligerent nations, some have shown that men and women have benefited

unequally and that in war, as well as in peace, there were sharp differences in the

activities and status of men and women (Higonnet et al. 1987). They underline the fact

that while women’s situations changed, relationships of domination and subordination

were retained. For instance, in Mobilizing Women for War, Leila Rupp sustains that

neither the Nazi mother making munitions for her son, nor America’s Rosie the Riveter

had a significant impact on women’s economic status or on the public’s basic beliefs

10 Joan Scott notes that women’s contribution to the war effort (their ‘good behavior’) was often used by politicians as the reason to enfranchise women, a far better justification in their eyes than appearing to give in to the militant tactics of the suffragists (Scott, 1987: 24). 11 Various aspects have been highlighted to justify this perspective: the temporary nature of the industries involved, the fact that women were hired in certain sectors that were temporarily reclassified as appropriate for women and the fact that they were barred from highly skilled and supervisory positions and given incomplete training (Higonnet and Higonnet, 1987: 35).


19

about women’s nature in either society respectively. D’Ann Campbell has gone even

further, holding that during WW II women –housewives and demobilized workers

alike— anticipated and helped to promulgate the dominant ideal of postwar domesticity

(Campbell, 1985).

The central question here is thus to understand why “acquiring the vote or taking

up new employment did not readily translate into social and political power, and women

everywhere suffered the effects of postwar gender backlash”, or why “no strong, mass-

based feminist movements arose to preserve and extend women’s wartime gains”

(Higonnet et al., 1987: 6-7). Some have proposed that the answer is to be found in the

contents of ideological discourses concerning objective changes, which systematically

gave meaning to women’s new activities in ways that limited their potential to

transform gender relations: “although wartime propaganda exhorted women to brave

unfamiliar work, these appeals were contained within a nationalistic and militarist

discourse that reinforced patriarchal, organicist notions of gender relations. It stipulated

that women’s new roles were only for the duration and that wives and mothers must

make heroic sacrifices ‘for the nation in this time of need’” (Higonnet at al.,1987:7).

Likewise, “for many western feminists, the consequences for women’s roles and

status of the majority of revolutions and independence-movements has been

disappointing” (Macdonald, 1987: 9). Even when women participated in military

conflicts as combatants, at the end of the war they were expected to give up military

roles and return to their traditional domestic sphere. Additionally, the image of armed

women has frequently been mythified and used to mobilize men to combat. The image

of revolutionary combatants in Africa, Asia or Latin America, carrying a child in one

arm and a gun in the other has been used to promote mobilization for armed conflict.

According to Judith Stiehm, the implicit message of these images – i.e. that “ if even

women fight…” – was a form of blackmailing men into service, as well as a spectacular

demonstration of a nation’s determination to self defense (Stiehm, 1988: 96).

All these perspectives underline a similar pattern –one that different studies on

female fighters throughout history have also systematically stressed: after entering the

military domain, it is the definition of these particular women that is altered, while

broader conceptions about women, war and masculinity are left intact (Macdonald,

1987). In sum, they all point to the durability of received cultural images of men,

women and war.

HELENA CARREIRAS

20

And yet, as noted by Higonnet and Higonnet (1987: 31), “if we perceive the

wartime changes in women’s roles as a realignment of social territory that produces,

however piecemeal or inadvertently, greater social equality, then the rapid retreat from

those advances during the immediate postwar years seem puzzling.” In other words, the

crucial question remains that of understanding why women failed to capitalize on

wartime disruptions of gender norms in order to improve their social position and

increase their power.

This question should perhaps now be readdressed, given the fundamental

changes in women’s military roles in recent decades. From the moment women started

joining the military with full military status, were given similar training to men,

integrated education and access to an increasing number of functions, the historical

pattern has been dramatically challenged. This process has been depicted as a revolution

(Holm, 1993), a threat to the military (Mitchell, 1998; Creveld, 2001), and even as a

deeper transformation than the introduction of nuclear weapons.12 Independently of how

extensive we consider the impact of this new pattern of women’s military participation

to be –and there are reasons to suppose that the descriptions above overstate the real

effects of gender integration— one thing seems clear: this is no longer a change ‘for the

duration’. However unequal their status, however occupationally segregated and

culturally discriminated, women are no longer peripheral to the organization or merely

“passive spectators to the action in the center ring” (Brownmiller, 1993: 32).

Beyond the question of whether the emergence of women as soldiers has

shattered our notions of gender differences –which is beyond the objectives of this

research— lies the pressing question of characterizing these changes and identifying the

factors that have been shaping the process both from within military forces and from the

society at large. In the following section I shall thus look closely at existing theoretical

frameworks, which have been proposed to answer this question and develop a specific

analytical model for the present research.

12 The challenge this meant to the military establishment is well illustrated by a famous statement of Vessey’s, a former U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, who said: “the influx of women has brought greater change to the U.S. military than the introduction of nuclear weapons” (Carrol and Hall, 1993: 19).


21

2. Factors affecting women’s military roles: analytical model and research design

The extent to which women have participated in the armed forces, cross-

nationally and through time, depends on a wide set of variables, both internal and

external to the military itself. The relative impact and interaction of these variables is

associated with specific circumstances that define each country’s situation in varying

historical conditions.

Two main types of influence have been identified to explain the various rhythms

and characteristics of female military recruitment, as well as policy orientations

regarding their presence in the armed forces. On the one hand, social and cultural

factors seem to frame the process and generally create the background conditions for

women’s military recruitment. Such factors arise from global social change concerning

patterns of women’s social and political participation, their entry in the labor market and

democratic pressures towards more egalitarian gender values. On the other hand –and

probably wielding a more direct influence–, there are transformations within military

organizations deriving from major shifts in international relations as well as from

technological change: the inversion of the ratio between combat and support functions,

organizational fragmentation and occupational specialization, the end of the mass

armies and the development of all-volunteer forces, increasing professionalization and

size reduction. All these changes have determined the need for more qualified personnel

and underlined the dependence of the military on the global society. If, additionally, the

trend to decreasing birth-rates and the legitimacy crisis (Harries-Jenkins and Van

Doorn, 1976) that makes military service unattractive to young generations in Western

developed countries is taken into consideration, the result is a rather complex picture

concerning the factors that may exert influence over women’s military recruitment.

It is relatively easy to list all the factors that may impact on women’s military

roles; it is, however, more difficult to assess how the variables interact and how, under

specific circumstances, some acquire more salience or how opposite tendencies operate.

In one of the very few essays aimed at explicit theory building in this field, Segal

outlined a systematic theory of the conditions under which women’s military roles may

expand or contract, assessing, to a certain extent, the relative and combined effects of

those variables (Segal 1995). According to Segal, increases in women’s participation

are likely to happen when military missions and values are perceived as being more

HELENA CARREIRAS

22

compatible with women’s service, when changes in women’s social participation make

them more suited and willing to perform military roles or/and when threats to national

security are so serious as to require the participation of all citizens. Remarkable effects

may be witnessed when military needs and gender values are at odds with each other.

Despite the fact that Segal’s model remains to a large extent empirically

untested, it represents the only serious attempt at conceptual elaboration and theoretical

explanation concerning the varying degree of women’s presence in the armed forces,

cross-nationally and throughout history. As such, it is a fundamental starting point for

this research and deserves a careful, if synthetic, analysis.

2.1. Segal’s model: a brief outline

Segal’s proposal includes three types of factors that affect women’s military

participation (WMP) and thus act as independent variables: social structure, military

and culture. For each of these dimensions, the author presents a set of explanatory

variables and proposes specific hypotheses regarding their individual or combined

effects. Figure 1.1 shows a graphic representation of the original model.

Social structure refers to women’s civilian roles and general social and

economic trends that affect those roles. It includes variables such as demographic

trends, labor force characteristics (women’s labor force participation and occupational

segregation) the state of the economy and family structure.


23

��

��

��

Source: Segal (1995: 759)

The lack of male labor has historically operated as a strong incentive to

women’s entry in the workforce. This has had a similar impact in the military field

where the lack of men has generally meant the amplification of opportunities for

military women. According to Segal, this historical regularity helps sustain the

13 The author indicates that not all causal relationships among the variables are shown in the figure. She notes that “the three sets of independent variables are generally interrelated: aspects of the social structure affect the military, for example, demographic patters affect military accession policies. There are also substantial reciprocal relationships between social structure and culture.” (Segal, 1995:759). As shall be seen further on, the strong interaction effects between the independent variables creates the problem known in statistical terms as ‘multicolinearity’, which affects the empirical test of the model.

Military

National Security Situation Military Technology Combat to Support Ratio Force Structure Military Accession Policies

Social Structure

Demographic Patterns Labor Force Characteristics (women’s labor force participation and occupational sex segregation) Economic Factors Family Structure

CULTURE

Social Construction of Gender and Family Social Values about Gender and Family Public Discourse regarding Gender Values regarding Ascription and Equity

Participation of Women in the Military

(Degree of representation and

Nature of Activities)

HELENA CARREIRAS

24

hypothesis that when the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labor,

which is the case in periods of decreasing birth rates, women are drawn into service.14 A

second factor that is considered to influence women’s military roles is the level and

characteristics of female participation in the labor market, which is in turn closely

associated with the state of the economy. Here, the author holds that ‘the greater the

percentage of women in the labor force, the larger will be their representation in the

armed forces’. This happens, she argues, “partially because the same factors affect both

activities (such as a shortage of male labor) and partially because women’s greater

involvement in the workplace brings structural and cultural changes in the society that

make military service more compatible with women’s roles, thereby making their

exclusion less justifiable” (Segal 1995: 766-767). Likewise, gender segregation in the

civilian workplace is supposed to be negatively associated with women’s military

service, since a more integrated occupational structure is expected to indicate a more

gender egalitarian culture.15

The state of contraction or expansion of the economy may also have a strong

impact. Segal sustains that high unemployment rates (especially among young men)

leads to a ready availability of male labor and thus a decrease of opportunities for

women in the military. On the contrary, when the economy is expanding and there are

low levels of male unemployment, opportunities for women tend to increase (Segal and

Segal, 1983). Finally, family structure, particularly women’s family responsibilities,

affects greatly their participation in the military. Building on the evidence that this latter

variable is positively associated with later age at first marriage, later age at birth of first

child and fewer children, the author suggests that “the greater the family responsibilities

for the average woman, the less women’s representation in the armed forces” (Segal,

1995: 768).

14 Nevertheless, it is important to note that this hypothesized relation does not necessarily produce similar effects independently of the dominant system of military service – conscript or volunteer – and will most certainly depend on other military variables such as the national and international security situations. In any case, the utilization of women in the military has been a standard answer by most NATO countries to the demographic pressures felt since the end of the ‘60s, and a trend that has accentuated during the last decades of the century due to the anticipation of recruitment shortages (Segal and Segal, 1983; cf. Chapter V). 15 However, the author notes that this is a much less linear relation than the previous since when there is high gender segregation in the civilian labor market the military may rely on women to perform exactly those same tasks where women dominate in the civilian labor market.


25

Military variables are considered to be of overriding importance in determining

women’s military roles. According to Segal, the national security situation –level of

threat and nature of military missions—, technological changes, and various aspects

related to force structure and military accession policies are major determinants of

WPM. As far as the national security is concerned, the author sustains that there is a

complex relationship between both variables, that is, the level of threat to society and

women’s participation in the military. On the one side, when there are shortages of men,

during times of national emergency, most nations increase women’s military roles. As

mentioned above, historical evidence shows that many nations have drafted women in

wartime and their participation in revolutionary movements is a common pattern. Thus,

at the high end of the threat to the society, women’s military roles seem to increase.

However, evidence also seems to support the hypothesis that in societies with low

threats to national security, but with cultural values supporting gender equality,

women’s military participation increases. On the contrary, medium threat16 seems to be

associated with low participation of women, as may be the case of Israel.

The nature of military missions is also considered to influence the extent of

women’s participation. Segal (1995: 762) hypothesizes that “the greater the relative

importance of actual war fighting (especially ground combat) the less the participation

of women” arguing that, on the contrary, the more the armed forces are involved in

peacekeeping missions or operations that resemble domestic police functions, the

greater is expected to be women’s engagement.

Although with a much less linear relation to women’s roles, military technology

is another important variable in the model, since technological changes such as the

miniaturization of weapons, the development of air power and nuclear technology, have

had a fundamental impact on the way war is conducted and on the characteristics of

military jobs. These developments have enormously amplified the share of support jobs

and, since women’s participation is expected to be negatively affected by the proportion

of combat jobs, they have –if indirectly— enabled the participation of women in the

armed forces.

16 Medium threat is defined as “the situation in which the society is not threatened with imminent extinction or invasion by superior military forces, but there is a moderate to high probability of military action on its soil in the near future” (Segal, 1995: 762).

HELENA CARREIRAS

26

The likelihood of international deployments presents an additional factor. While

warfare at home can count on civilian infrastructures, engagements away from home

require the deployment of support personnel. Segal has argued that as long as women

remain mainly occupied in support functions, their number and roles can be expected to

rise as the number and proportion of personnel with primarily support functions rises

(Segal, 1995: 764). The impact of this variable on women’s roles may however vary

depending on which positions are open to them and which ones they actually fill.

Finally, various aspects related to force structure and military accession policies

also have a notable impact on women’s participation. For instance, as long as support

functions are concentrated on the reserves, women will be more strongly represented in

the reserves than in active duty forces. Consequently, the greater the reliance on

reservists for wartime mobilization, the greater women’s participation in such

mobilization. Furthermore, the delegitimation of conscription and the increase in all-

volunteer forces seem to be positively associated with the growing number of women in

the armed forces. Based on historical evidence, Segal suggests that “women’s military

participation tends to increase under voluntary accession systems (as well as when

social change is in the direction of gender equality)” (Segal, 1995: 765).

In sum, as far as military variables are concerned, the model predicts that the

level of women’s military participation is positively associated with technologically

advanced militaries, all volunteer forces, situations of high or low threat to national

security, greater proportion of support functions and greater reliance on reserves for

wartime mobilization. Inversely, medium threat scenarios, low technological

development, conscript systems of military service and high combat to support ratios

are expected to correlate negatively with women’s participation.

Finally, the ‘Culture’ category refers to the social construction of gender, social

values about gender and family, public discourse regarding gender and values regarding

ascription and equity. Segal rightly points out that perceptions concerning the adequacy

of women’s military participation are fundamentally the result of a social construction:

“The discourse on the issues, indeed the salience given to specific arguments about

women’s military roles, is not based on objective reality, but rather on cultural values.

When circumstances change, the effects of historical fact on women’s subsequent

military roles are overshadowed by the influence of cultural definitions and

redefinitions of their roles” (Segal, 1995: 758). Segal sustains that the more egalitarian


27

the social values about gender, the greater women’s representation in the military. As

social values have become more egalitarian in societies – concomitant with the political

enfranchisement of women as well as growing cultural acceptance of their participation

in other societal institutions - women’s military roles have also expanded. This is why a

driving force towards increasing women’s representation in the military has been laws

prohibiting discrimination based on gender. Among the cultural factors, Segal

underlines the importance of the social construction of family and social values about

family, since women’s social roles are affected by cultural expectations regarding their

devotion to the family. She holds that the greater the cultural acceptance of various

family structures and the movement away from traditional family forms the less gender

determines social roles and the greater the representation of women in the military

(Segal, 1995: 770). Emphasis on ascription by gender, cultural support to traditional

divisions of labor, religious fundamentalism and traditional family forms, will thus limit

women’s military roles.

2.2. A critical assessment

Although Segal’s model has been designed with an ambitious aim, that of

proposing “a systematic theory of the conditions under which women’s military roles

expand and the conditions under which their participation in the armed forces contracts”

(1995: 758), the author implicitly recognizes its limitations as a first contribution to

theory building in a field where there has been a clear absence of theoretical

systematization and comparative cross-national research. It is thus not surprising that

while still remaining a milestone in the study of gender integration in the military,

various aspects of the model have been subject to revision and a few others still deserve

critical scrutiny and development. I intend thus to follow Segal’s suggestion regarding

the need to test and expand her propositions, contributing to the ongoing debate and

research efforts. After calling attention to some of the model’s drawbacks and reviewing

other authors’ suggestions, I shall then propose additional revision. The three central

issues are: the scope of the model; the relative importance of the independent variables

and their articulation; and the definition of the dependent variable.

The two major revisions that have been proposed so far coincide with the

present research in a central critical comment: the lack of relevance or even absence of

HELENA CARREIRAS

28

political factors among the determinants of WMP.17 The first one, presented in an article

by Segal, Iskra, Trainor and Leithauser, consists of a direct attempt at expanding the

original model through a literature review concerning three countries in different

continents: Australia, Mexico and Zimbabwe. While sustaining that the model fits in a

general sense, the authors call attention to what they consider an important limitation:

the fact that it is based primarily on women’s military roles in western democratic

countries, with Segal’s own empirical research focusing mainly on the US military or its

NATO partners. Using examples from these three very different geographical and social

contexts, the authors conclude that some new variables and hypotheses should be added

in order to strengthen the model and expand its applicability. Therefore, the list of

variables and hypotheses has been significantly increased (Figure 1.2).

Two new variables have been added to cultural factors: ‘social construction of

the military’ and ‘social values about force, power, domination’. According to the

authors, “social values about force, power and domination determine how the military is

perceived in the society and, perhaps more importantly, how the society views conflict

and its resolution” (Iskra et al., 2002: 788). On the basis of this idea, they proposed a

new hypothesis: “the greater the emphasis on power, authoritarianism, hierarchy and

conformity, the more limited women’s participation in the military”.

As far as military variables are concerned, a new name, ‘Armed Forces’, is

considered more appropriate in order to broaden the scope of this dimension in cross-

national analysis. According to Iskra et al. (2002), the pervasiveness of different forms

of conflict makes the use of what is considered ‘traditional western concepts of warfare

and military organization’ very limiting, leaving aside other less institutionalized forms

of military activity. Besides, a set of new variables is also added. First, ‘purpose or

function of the armed forces’, evolving from its offensive of defensive nature, together

with a related hypothesis: “The more offensive or aggressive the function or purpose of

the armed forces is perceived to be, the more limited women’s participation. The more

defensive the armed forces is perceived to be, the greater women’s participation”;

Second, ‘Ideology of the armed forces Subculture’ referring to the extent to which the

military perceives itself or is perceived by society as elite combat warriors vs.

egalitarian citizen-soldiers. The assumption here is that “the more elitist and warrior-

like the views of the members of the armed forces, the more limited the participation of

17 The inclusion of political factors was suggested in Carreiras (1998) and Carreiras (2002c).


29

women”. Finally, the authors propose the inclusion of a third variable, ‘organizational

structure’, evoking the distinction between highly hierarchical institutionalized military

structures and supposedly less formalized and at least ideologically more equal guerillas

or revolutionary groups. Here, they anticipate that the more bureaucratic and

hierarchical the structure of the armed forces, the less women will participate.

��

�� !��"��##�$�

ARMED FORCES • Purpose/function of the armed

forces • Subculture ideology • Subculture demographics • Military technology • Organizational structure • Military Accession policies

SOCIAL STRUCTURE • Demographic patterns • Labor force characteristics • Economic factors • Family Structure

CULTURE • Social construction of military • Social values about force,

power, domination • Social construction of gender

and family • Public discourse regarding

gender • Values regarding ascription

and equity

POLITICAL • National security situation • Civil-military relations • Political ideology • Current leadership • Public policy regarding race,

ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc.

• Sources of change other than armed conflict

WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN

ARMED FORCES

HELENA CARREIRAS

30

Notwithstanding the relevance of these new variables –which, in any case, need

to be tested against other empirical instances—,18 the most important addition has been

the inclusion of a separate category of political factors: “In particular, we concluded that

a fourth dimension was needed to create a stronger model. We determined that political

factors in each country also play a considerable role in defining women’s armed forces

participation” (Iskra et al., 2002: 772). Besides transferring here the variable ‘national

security situation’, originally under military factors, these authors propose the inclusion

of the following variables: civil-military relations, political ideology of those in power

(and subsequent public policies regarding minorities and women) and sources of

political change other than armed conflict. New hypotheses are therefore set forth that

predict: 1) greater women’s participation in the military in states with legitimate

civilian-led governments than in those where the military exercises substantial influence

over the political process; 2) greater women’s representation in the armed forces the

more liberal the ideology of the political leadership; and 3) less likeliness of women

joining the armed forces the greater the diversity of methods and opportunities for non-

violent social change that exist in a patriarchal and discriminatory society.

It is not among the objectives of the present review to systematically comment

on each of these hypotheses in the light of the evidence used to sustain them. It is,

however, important to note some incongruence in the justifications presented, since the

link between empirical evidence and hypothesis is sometimes rather weak. Three

examples will help to clarify this statement.

The first concerns the civil-military relations variable and the prediction that

women will participate more in the armed forces of democratic states (with clear

civilian-led governments) than in those where the military exercise substantial influence

over the political process. This is a stimulating hypothesis, but plausible as it may be –

and there is wide empirical evidence to believe it is— the argument used to justify it is

rather dubious, resorting to a form of essentialism. “In a progressive democratic regime,

the lines between military and civilian are clear and authority is firmly established in

civilian hands. In other states, this arrangement is not as well defined and it is evidenced

by unique relationships and power structures between the politicians and military

18 The idea that revolutionary movements tend to be less hierarchical or develop an ideology of equality that would encourage women’s participation is at least controversial. As mentioned in chapter 1, women’s presence in the Italian resistance during World War II, the ‘partigiani’, showed that there were many resistances to give combat jobs to women and very few reached relevant political positions.


31

leader. (…) The result is, on the one hand, a fragile balance between authority and

governance by civilians; and on the other hand, a direct control of the political process

by the armed forces. Consequently [my emphasis], we predict that women will tend to

involve themselves in power situations, and thus regimes, that are viewed as legitimate

and non-oppressive” (Iskra et al., 2002: 790). Implicitly, the authors seem to assume

that this is not true in the case of men. If the dependent variable here is ‘women’s will to

participate’ –as it appears to be–, and not necessarily their actual level of participation,

then one might wonder why men do not share the same orientation. The presumption of

a positive relation between ‘womanhood’ and democratic orientation lacks theoretical

consistency and empirical confirmation.

The second example concerns women’s opportunities to become involved in

non-violent social change as a factor that lessens the probability that they will join the

armed forces. There is a paradox here, since democratic states, which present citizens

with a wide set of such opportunities, would tend to have more limited representation of

women in the military. This not only seems to contradict the previous hypothesis but

also the empirical fact of the rising number of military women in western democratic

states if compared to authoritarian regimes. A similar form of essentialism is

identifiable when the authors predict that, ‘if women can realize equality, expanded

opportunity and attainment of women’s interests through participation in grassroots

social organizations (domestic NGOs), they will tend to do so before participating in

large numbers in formal, patriarchal power organizations, like legislatures or the

military’ (Iskra et al., 2002: 792).

Finally, the third example regards the presumption of lower participation of

women in highly hierarchical and bureaucratic military structures if compared to less

formalized, ‘revolutionary’ or partisan groups. The first part of the hypothesis conflicts

with the so-called ‘combat-support’ ratio hypothesis, according to which the greater the

weight of support jobs (which presumably co-vary in a positive way with

bureaucratization), the greater the participation of women; the second part of the

hypothesis conflicts with the historical evidence of partisan groups’ unwillingness to

fully integrate women. Even if this has not always been the case, the example of the

Italian partigiani is enlightening in this respect. Although it included 35,000 women

recognized as combatants, there was strong resistance to giving them combat jobs and

among those who fought very few became commanders (Bravo, 1997).

HELENA CARREIRAS

32

The second revision of Segal’s model is that of Kümmel (2002a). Unlike the

previous work, there is no empirical test here. Resorting very closely to Segal’s model

and its subsequent revision by Iskra et al. (2002), the author proposes a reorganization

of the various factors in order to include a fifth dimension: the international context,

considering this a separate factor. The national context would then be subdivided into

politics, society, culture, and the military itself. The inclusion of the ‘international

environment’ dimension derives mainly from its importance in structuring the national

perceptions of security threats. Change in these perceptions may then impact upon force

structure and mission definition: “transformations of the security, political and strategic

environment of a given country may thus lead to changes in the armed forces, including

the recruitment –or dismissal– of women soldiers” (Kümmel, 2002a: 626). Another

important element of the international context is its effect of ‘demonstration’ or

‘diffusion’, since whether for a search for competitive advantages or a genuine interest

in an international perspective, the armed forces of other countries are studied

attentively, especially in the context of alliances and coalitions. “In a sense,

international demonstration, socialization, diffusion and dissemination effects (…) may

well be supposed to be at work” (2002: 628).

As far as the various factors pertaining to the national context are concerned,

Kümmel adds more variables and specifies existing ones. For instance, in the new

category of politics he underlines the importance of political change and the role of

political actors – from political parties to pressure groups or the media – and how they

deal with military issues. While keeping approximately the same variables within the

cultural and social dimensions, he adds new ones to the ‘Armed Forces’ category, such

as ‘soldierly interaction’, ‘level of women’s integration’ and ‘changing images of war’,

without, however, providing more than a brief description for each of them. In the same

vein as the other authors, he also calls for further research in a comparative perspective.

He concretely suggests that research should focus on the crucial question of the gender

issue and how cultural conceptions of masculinity and femininity frame –and are

simultaneously framed by— the military organization. In his perspective, this would

require both greater focus on interpersonal relations, which in turn would justify micro

level methodological approaches (ethnographic studies/participant observation/

interviews), and 2) extending comparative research to include also other major

institutions and organizations.


33

Notwithstanding the positive additions and proposed developments by Iskra et

al. and Kümmel (cf. appendix 1.1 – Factors affecting WMP: variables and hypotheses

compared), there are still some aspects that weaken the global applicability of the

model. One important characteristic of this analytical framework is that it tries to be all-

encompassing, including as many explanatory factors as possible. This results in an

extremely long list of independent variables (which can be more than the number of

cases (!), as in the research by Iskra et al.). On the one hand, this is a feature that

directly results from the intention of the author to set a basic framework to be

subsequently developed and tested, keeping it relatively broad and open. On the other

hand, however, it presents a basic difficulty regarding the operationalization of the

model. Hence, there is thus a clear trade-off: what it gains in generality, it loses in

precision and ‘falsability’. The lack of parsimony is thus one of the greater difficulties

posed by the model, one that reviewers not only did not consider but aggravated to a

large extent, since their proposals, more than specifying hypotheses, have contributed to

further amplifying the list of dimensions and explanatory variables. Additionally, the

fact that these variables are sometimes deeply interrelated (provoking

‘multicolinearity’) complicates it even further the empirical test of the proposed

hypotheses.

Nevertheless, important as this problem may be, at this stage it is probably more

important to systematically test the proposed relationships in as many empirical

instances as possible rather than closing down conceptual dimensions, thus narrowing

the list of relevant independent variables. Only through empirical testing will it be

possible to reach greater specification and precision. More than the lack of parsimony,

the deficient specification of the relative importance of the independent variables

constitutes a fragility of the model. Segal’s article (1995) does not include a clear

statement regarding the relative weight of the various factors or the extent to which they

affect women’s military participation. This may also be seen as a result of both the lack

of empirical testing and the inherent complexity of the model, since it is difficult to

make both precise and generalized predictions when there are so many variables at

stake. Although some of the proposed hypotheses define the conditions under which a

certain relation may hold, it is unclear what the outcome would be if changes were to

occur in other variables. To be sure, Segal (1995: 771) is fully aware of this problem:

“what would happen when the different factors are not congruent, for example, when

HELENA CARREIRAS

34

the national security situation would predict increased military roles for women, but the

cultural values are not supportive and vice-versa? Which causal factors seem to affect

the outcomes more?” The author suggests that the various possible combinations of

variable values be tested on many cases both historical and contemporary. Hypotheses

should thus be proposed that include a consideration of the relative importance of

variables, as in the following example: ‘when cultural values favor limited military roles

for women, but the national security situation presents a need for military labor, the

threat to security would override the cultural values (Segal, 1995: 771). In the same

vein, reviewers suggest that the variables may differ in impact, and that, under certain

conditions, some factors override or influence others. For instance, considering the

transformations of the military after the end of the Cold War, Iskra et al. posit that

national crises and their aftermath create conditions that are significant in the nations’

response to gender equality and women’s military participation during and following

periods of change or stress. They concretely hypothesize that “as the tendency to

participate in non-traditional and coalition based military operations increases, broader

international pressures to equalize women’s participation will also increase” (Iskra et

al., 2002: 793).

The above-mentioned characteristics are difficulties rather than inextricable

limitations. There is, however, a problem that may be considered more serious from a

methodological point of view. Both Segal and the model’s reviewers have given very

little attention to the conceptualization of the dependent variable, ‘participation of

women in the military’, and even less to the question of its operationalization. Segal

specifies two dimensions, ‘degree of representation’ –which seems to refer to more

quantitative aspects– and ‘nature of activities’ –apparently evoking more qualitative

aspects. However, no clear definition is provided regarding the exact sense of the

concepts or which empirical indicators would be useful to measure them.

I believe this is the major drawback of the model, since without a clear

definition of the dependent variable it is impossible to accurately test the impact of the

independent factors. Concretely, it generates confusion regarding what exactly the

independent factors are supposed to affect: women’s numerical presence (simple

presence)? Gender desegregation/amplification of occupational and hierarchical

opportunities (qualified presence)? Greater acceptance of women in military culture?


35

Willingness of women to join the armed forces? All or some of these dimensions

together?19

2.3. A revised proposal

Taking into consideration all of the above remarks, I shall propose some

modifications to the original and expanded versions of the model. The objective is

twofold: on the one hand, to work on some theoretical dimensions, not as much in terms

of proposing new variables as other authors did (even if I will propose some) but by

trying to conceptually elaborate some of the already proposed variables, ‘anchoring’ this

reflection on concrete theoretical frameworks; on the other hand, to expose selectively

some of the proposed hypotheses to empirical testing against an amplified universe of

cases, using original data. Both goals are to be understood as partial contributions to the

work that is being undertaken and not as an intention to provide complete testing of the

model. Figure 1.3 presents a graphic representation of what I call a ‘refocused’ version

of the model, one that depicts a ‘funnel of causality’.

While clearly resorting to Segal’s model, this proposal –which will be

elaborated in detail throughout the following Chapters— introduces some conceptual

and methodological specifications regarding, in particular: 1) the definition of the

dependent variable; 2) the specification of some independent variables and their

interrelation; and finally, 3) the different analytical levels of the research. The chosen

research design simultaneously responds to and reflects this framework.

19 Without explicitly addressing these issues, at various moments of her proposal Segal seems to acknowledge the multiple possible interpretations. However, ambiguity prevails. This happens, for instance, when describing military factors she distinguishes between the “number of women brought into the armed forces” and “women’s roles”, sustaining that the crucial determinant of the number of women brought into the armed forces is whether the supply of men meets the number needed to fulfill the military’s mission(s) while adding that “what military roles the women actually play is also affected by this variable, but those roles are more affected by other variables, such as cultural values” (Segal, 1995: 766). Some hypothesis regard clearly levels of numerical representation, others include reference to amplification of opportunities for women in the armed forces, and others relate national security with ‘extent of women’s participation in combat jobs’.

HELENA CARREIRAS

36

��

�� %��&'��

↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑

--------------------------TIME AND THE ‘WEIGHT OF HISTORY’-------------------------- (Duration of women’s presence and previous tradition of female military involvement)

GENDER RELATIONS

Characteristics of the ‘gender order’

POLITICAL FACTORS • Level of women’s

social/political participation

• Political system • Civil-military relations • Political ideology of

current leadership

CULTURAL FACTORS • Social construction of

gender • Public discourse

regarding gender • Social construction of

family

SOCIAL/ECONOMIC FACTORS

• Demographic patterns • Economic development • Labor force characteristics

(Women’s labor force particip.; Occupational sex segregation)

• Family structure

INTERNATIONAL GEO/STRATEGIC

CONTEXT • International

security situation • Alliance politics • ‘Diffusion effects’

ARMED FORCES

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

• Dominant I/O/PM

orientation (military accession policies; force structure; combat/ support ratio; social diversity of members)

STRATEGIC ORIENTATIONS

• National security

situation (mission definition; level of threat)

MILITARY CULTURE

• ‘Gender regime’

of the armed forces

(military ethos; values about war; dominant image of gender roles ; masculinity in definition of soldier’s identity)

WOMEN’S MILITARY PARTICIPATION

(WMP)


37

2.3.1. Conceptualizing and measuring the dependent variable( WMP)

An operational definition of the dependent variable requires specification of its

various conceptual dimensions and the identification of concrete empirical indicators. In

this research I propose a conceptual clarification of ‘participation of women in the

military’ that takes into account some major theoretical contributions. One of them

evolves from the field of gender in organizations. That is the case of work on the

definition of gendered organizations (Acker, 1991; Britton, 2000), and on minority and

majority groups’ relations, namely Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s work on tokenism (1977)

and her critics (Blalock, 1970; Yoder, 1991) –cf. Chapter II. The second derives from

feminist political scientists’ proposals, especially the theoretical distinction between

women’s ‘simple’ and ‘qualified’ (or ‘controlling’) presence in the social and political

realms (Philipps, 1995; Jonasdottir, 1988) –cf. Chapter III. While the importance of

analytically distinguishing both levels –strictly numerical/quantitative aspects and more

‘qualitative’ dimensions of participation— will also guide the selection/utilization of

independent variables (e.g. ‘simple’ indicators such as ‘percentage of women in the

workforce’ vs. more complex measures of gender equality), it will specifically be taken

into account to define dimensions of participation (WMP). Here, I look at various

indicators regarding the situation of military women, comparing policies and practices

in NATO countries. The purpose is twofold: on the one hand, that of updating previous

studies through a comprehensive and empirically-based description of ‘gender

incorporation patterns’; on the other hand, and relying on that description, that of

proposing ‘an index of gender inclusiveness’ as a measure to access the varying degree

to which NATO forces have integrated women. This is then used as the dependent

variable in the assessment of the relative weight of the various factors that influence

women’s military participation cross-nationally (cf. Chapter V).

2.3.2. Independent variables and research hypothesis20

The inclusion in figure 1.3 of a top box of ‘Gender relations’ corresponds to a

concrete theoretical standpoint that stresses the importance of a general theory of gender

relations as the background perspective through which to assess the framework of

explanatory factors of WMP. It is intended as an effort to extend the reflection on the

military as a gendered organization and investigate the relation between the gender

20 Cf. Chapter V for the operationalization of independent variables.

HELENA CARREIRAS

38

order of society at large and the particular gender regime of the military (Connell, 1987;

cf. Chapter II).

As far as the relative impact of independent variables is concerned, the present

proposal assumes the usefulness of identifying direct and indirect effects of independent

variables, namely the relative impact of military ‘internal’ and societal ‘external’

variables. Even if in the original model Segal does not explicitly point to an overall

dominance of a certain type of variables, she posits that military factors have a major

impact. One of her statements, in particular, provides additional support for this

supposition: “In general, it appears that demands for military personnel seem to be the

single most important factor in women’s military involvement, with cultural values

supporting gender equality also contributing to women’s sustained inclusion when the

nation is not threatened” (Segal, 1995: 760). I believe that this happens because there is

a direct influence of military structure and policies on women’s participation, whereas

other variables may exercise a more indirect – albeit no less important— influence.

In figure 1.3 I try to account for this characteristic by giving salience to military

factors. Besides amplifying the ‘Armed Forces’ box, I highlight the various ‘sub-

systems’ within military organizations, namely organizational structure, military culture

and strategic orientations. Notwithstanding the fact that each of these dimensions has its

own inherent impact, they also function as ‘filters’ that channel broader external

influences.

In terms of military organizational structure one variable that seems to be a good

indicator of the state of the relation between society and the military is the

Institutional/Occupational typology (Moskos, 1977; Moskos and Wood, 1988) or its

renewed version around three poles: ‘paleomodern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’

military (Battistelli, 1997d; Moskos et al., 2000) (cf. Chapter IV). There are reasons to

hypothesize that the more divergent (or dominantly ‘institutional’) the organizational

model of the armed forces, the greater the impact of military variables on the level of

gender inclusiveness of a force. The more the military ‘civilianizes’ itself (Janowitz,

1960), opening up to and depending more on society, the more external economic and

political pressures will condition the process of women’s military participation.

Due to the complexity of characterizing all countries in terms of the variables

included in this typology, the hypothesis will specifically be investigated at the case

study level. I will concretely look at the extent to which women’s career development is


39

affected by organizational orientations, arguing that ‘the more ‘occupational’21 the

military, the easiest women's progression and access to military positions’.

In the ‘large N’ analysis I select one of the central indicators of organizational

format, the conscript ratio to account for organizational military factors, and relate it to

the WMP (both women’s numerical presence and the gender inclusiveness index). The

hypothesis to be tested here is thus the following: ‘the greater the percentage of

conscripts in a country active forces (conscript ratio), the lower women’s numerical

representation and the lower the level of gender inclusiveness in that force’.

As far as social/economic and political factors are concerned, the refocused

model keeps central variables identified in previous analyses but highlights and

proposes testing of the importance of a new variable (here included under political

factors): ‘Level of women’s social and political participation’. Additionally, it

introduces a distinction between those factors pertaining to women’s simple presence

and women’s ‘qualified’ (or ‘controlling’) presence in the social and political realms.

The general question to be addressed here is the following: how does the level of

women's participation –both in the economy and the polity— and specifically women's

controlling presence or absence from these arenas –affect the options, rhythm and

characteristics of women's military participation?

Segal has suggested that there is a positive correlation between female activity

rate and women’s military participation. I argue that while this indicator of women’s

simple presence in the system may have an impact on women’s numerical

representation, the same may not happen when more qualitative aspects of participation

are considered. That is why an additional hypothesis to be tested is the following: ‘the

more women have a 'controlling presence' in society, the higher is the level of gender

inclusiveness in the military’. I generally contain that the more the ‘qualified’ presence

of women in society, the less conflictual was/is the recruitment decision, and the easier

the removal of formal barriers to women's access to military positions and jobs.

The third category of non-military factors, ‘culture’, should be understood as a

layer, affecting all other spheres, from the global political and social contexts to the

military institution itself. Even if analytically individuated for the sake of clarity of

21 Cf. Chapter IV for the definition of institutional/occupational trends in the armed forces (Moskos, 1977; Moskos and Wood, 1988).

HELENA CARREIRAS

40

presentation, this sphere of symbolic/cognitive/ideological constructs should not be

considered as just another dimension of social life but as one that is always present and

effective in social structures and practices. In other words, values about gender cut

across and interact with the remaining dimensions. Consequently, it seems adequate to

investigate its specified effects in the particular gender regime of the military and not

only focus on general or dominant conceptions of masculinity and femininity in society

at large. Furthermore, the difficulty in obtaining cross-cultural and comparative data on

this variable for all the countries – namely survey data on national value systems –

justifies the option to concentrate the inquiry of this cultural dimension of gender

integration at the case-study level and explore it through the analysis of in-depth

interviews. The main problem to be addressed here regards the impact of the prevailing

normative model of gender relations – and its reflection in the gender regime of the

military - on the process of women's military participation. To what extent are the

images, evaluation and behavior of military men and women based on and coordinated

with global cultural models that ensure the differentiation of gender? How do

conceptions of masculinity and femininity and the asymmetry they are based on affect

individuals’ perceptions of the integration process, their decisions, opinions,

expectations and practices?

I contend that the more asymmetric the normative conceptions of gender

relations, that is, the more traditional the vision of gender differences, the more difficult

is the acceptance of women in the armed forces.

Following Kümmel’s proposal, the international context is kept as a separate

dimension in order to underline the specific influence and relative importance of the

international security situation, the effects of alliance politics on specific policies and

the dissemination effects that emerge from contact and comparisons.

Finally, the bottom part of figure 1.3 highlights one aspect (or independent

variable) that has not been adequately analyzed in previous models and that I believe

deserves more attention in the empirical study of women’s participation in the military:

the effects of time and social change on gender integration. There is a widespread idea,

especially among some military sectors and policy makers, that time is a crucial factor

for gender integration and that the usually disadvantaged situation of military women

when compared to their male counterparts is due to their recent arrival. To be sure, there

are good reasons to suppose that this variable necessarily produces effects in an


41

organization where time defines to a large extent an individual’s career development.

Besides, many countries have a tradition of female involvement in the military, namely

during the two world conflicts of the XX century. It is plausible to suppose that this

historical precedent may also have an impact on present policies and orientations.

However, if one looks at the process of female social and political participation in

western industrialized democracies the relation is not always obvious. In general,

despite the amount of time that already passed since women obtained basic social and

political rights and have increasingly joined the public sphere, they have not reached

power positions in similar proportion. It is thus important to test the following

hypothesis: the longer the presence of women in the armed forces the higher the level of

gender inclusiveness. Table 1.1 presents a synthesis of the selected independent

variables and specific hypothesis that will be tested at a macro analytical level in this

research.

(�)��*��+��)��&��, ��$�

Type of factor

Variables Hypotheses

Political factors

Women’s ‘controlling’ presence in society

The more women have a 'controlling presence' in society, the higher is the level of gender inclusiveness in the armed forces

Military factors

Military Accession policies

The greater the percentage of conscripts in a country active forces (Conscript Ratio), the lower women’s numerical representation and the lower the level of gender inclusiveness in that force

Economic development The higher the affluence of a society, the higher the level of gender inclusiveness in the armed forces

Social/Economic factors

Women’s labor force participation (simple presence)

The greater the percentage of women in the labor force, the larger will be their representation and level of inclusiveness in the armed forces

Time effects Length of women’s military presence

The longer the presence of women in the armed forces the higher their numerical representation and the higher the level of gender inclusiveness

HELENA CARREIRAS

42

2.3.3. Investigating different analytical levels

Segal’s proposal, as well as Iskra et al.’s and Kümmel’s revised models focus on

societal-level variables, putting an emphasis on policy and subsequent representation of

women. As Segal herself notes, “When we get to the micro-level of interpersonal

relations, our knowledge is less systematic... there has not been as much theory building

and testing concerning the conditions under which gender integration is more or less

successful” (Segal, 1999: 574). A common suggestion for further research is thus that of

investigating various analytical levels, namely through the development of case-based

comparisons.

The present research aims at doing exactly this. I ask not only how some societal

factors influence military policies on women’s integration (macro-analytical level), but

also to what extent military organizational practices are patterned through gender lines

(meso-analytical level) and how both -societal and organizational factors- influence

individual practices and attitudes (micro-analytical level). In other words, besides the

identification of features of the global ‘gender order’ and its articulation with the

specific ‘gender regime’ (Connell, 1987; cf. Chapter II) of the armed forces, this work

seeks to explore the impact of macro and organizational-level variables on the

relationships, lives, options and expectations of military men and women. The selected

research design reflects this methodological concern.

2.4. Research design and techniques

The design of the study tries to correspond to the above-described objectives by

displaying a mix-methodological strategy, combining a large N analysis with focused

case studies. At the macro-societal level, it develops a comparative cross-national test of

some of the model’s propositions and hypothesis. This comparison relies on original

empirical information collected through an ‘organizational survey’ conducted in all

NATO nations,22 as well as on complementary document and statistical sources and

literature review (cf. Appendix 5.1: ‘Organizational Survey – Questionnaire’). The

option for this universe derives from both its theoretical and practical relevance. From a

theoretical point of view, two arguments support the choice: on the one hand, the

NATO universe provides for a diversity of situations against which to test the proposed

22 The database refers to year 2000, when there were still 19 countries in the Atlantic Alliance.


43

hypotheses. On the other hand, as noted above, there are reasons to believe that there are

international alliance ‘dissemination’ or ‘demonstration’ effects, which may impact on

doctrine formulation and policy definitions at the national level. From a practical point

of view, access to information (or the possibility to collect comparable data) and contact

with the various countries seemed much higher if the data collection required dealing

with a central integrated structure such as the Alliance, as was indeed the case. The final

database includes information on a long list of variables concerning analytical

dimensions of the dependent variable (WMP) such as global representation, recruitment

policies, selection and training, career development, occupational and hierarchical

distributions, family policy and gender equity monitoring. But it also includes military,

economic and political indicators regarding each country’s situation in terms of the

independent variables. Those concerning the military include, for instance, the type of

military system, force structure and force dimension. As far as the global society is

concerned, data has been gathered on variables such as level of development, the state

of the economy, women’s economic mobilization and political participation.

On the basis of and following this global analysis, a comparative case study of

two countries– Portugal and the Netherlands – was developed. Each of these countries

reveals a different ‘gender incorporation model’. They also differ in important aspects

regarding explanatory factors for women’s military participation, namely those

pertaining to external social, economic and political conditions. The question to be

asked here is the following: to what extent have military organizational policies on

gender integration been influenced by global social conditions and/or by organizational

changes affecting the armed forces? The focus is on the organizational analytical level,

which is explored through a comparison of the armed forces’ structural features and

recent changes, as well as policy options regarding the integration of women in the two

countries. Laws, official reports, military regulations and interviews of key-observers

(political and military leadership) were the main sources used.

Finally, at the micro level of interpersonal relationships, the dynamics of gender

integration are captured through ‘qualitative’ information deriving from 54 semi-

directive interviews conducted in the two countries with a diversified group of military

men and women officers (cf. appendix 7.2 – List of interviewees and 7.3 – Interview

guidelines). While it would be illuminating to confront the reality of personnel in

different rank positions, pragmatic considerations regarding the extension of the

HELENA CARREIRAS

44

research universe and the requirement of the ‘intensive’ interpretative focus at this

analytical level explain the option for a selective study of the officer’s category.

Officers constitute the professional corps of the organization and, as such, they not only

have a greater ‘structuring’ power over organizational features and arrangements, but at

the same time experience to a greater extent the power and influence of those

arrangements if compared to non-permanent personnel.


45

CHAPTER II GENDER RELATIONS, GENDERED ORGANIZATIONS AND THE

MILITARY

1. Elements of a social theory of gender

The term gender has been used in scholarly research to designate the set of

processes and rules that organize, in each society, patterns of relationship between men

(and maleness) and women (and femaleness), on the basis of ‘perceived’23 differences

between them. Gender relations exhibit both universal features and chronological and

cross-cultural variation that affect institutional structures, social interaction and

individual lives in major ways.

In spite of the variation of gender patterns, their symbolic order pervades whole

cultural systems, displaying, in some aspects, considerable trans-cultural stability. This

is the case of a widespread perspective on gender in Western cultures, which places men

and women in naturally and unequivocally defined categories. The differences between

them, seen as biologically based, fundamental and durable, are apparently supported by

the sexual division of work, by different ways of expressing feelings and sexuality or

even by unequal abilities, attitudes and behavior (West and Zimmerman, 1991).24

Overarching stereotypical folk theories of gender are based on two

underspecified core propositions: a) the recognition of a biologically based

correspondence between masculinity and maleness and between women and the cultural

traits of femininity, b) femininity and masculinity, men and women, are opposites. To

be more masculine is to be less feminine and vice-versa (Schwartz, 1992).

While this dominant model does not reflect the complexity of actual gendered

identities, all the latter are in some sense measured against the culturally hegemonic and

essentialist model.25 This normative model of masculinity and femininity is based on a

set of dual oppositions and dichotomies: rational/ emotional; logical/ intuitive;

23 Not necessarily ‘shared’ or ‘objective’. 24 However, these assumptions are not exclusive of the so-called ‘natural attitude’. As West and Zimmerman note, "even analysis on sex and gender in the social sciences, although less likely to accept uncritically such naive biological determinism (...) often retain a conception of sex linked behaviors and traits as essential properties of individuals" (West and Zimmerman, 1991: 15). 25 According to Bourdieu, this is why gender operates as ‘the best founded of collective illusions’ (Bourdieu, 1998).

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objective/ subjective, autonomous/ connected, calculating/ instinctive, restrained/

expressive, active/ inactive, aggressive/ passive, strong/ weak, protetor/ protected,

independent/ dependent, competitive/ cooperative, etc. As noted by Carol Cohn (1999),

this inventory could go on ad nauseam. The first of each pair of characteristics is

typically associated with masculinity, the second with femininity. However, it is worth

noting that this system of dichotomies encodes many meanings that are not necessarily

related to male and female bodies. Yet, once the coding takes place, maleness and

femaleness become tied to many other kinds of cultural representations (Cohn, 1993:

229).

Whereas there are a variety of gender categories operating in social practice,26

the dominant cultural vision recognizes two master statuses: male and female. The

relation between them is ambiguous: “male and female are separate but inseparable

because the Other is defined as such within an opposition where the two terms are

indispensable to each other” (Gherardi, 1994: 597-98). Yet, it is remarkable that

differences within each category are sometimes more salient than between them: “social

practices that construct women and men as distinct categories by converting an average

difference into a categorical difference –‘men are stronger than women’– negate the

major pattern of difference that occurs within sexes rather than between them” (Connell,

1987: 80).

Furthermore, besides the oppositional and ambiguous character of these classical

dichotomies of western philosophy, gender categories are also asymmetric. In these

distinctions, the interdependence of the terms is hierarchical: the first are superior and

the second derivates (Gherardi, 1994: 596). In fact, even if it is true that what it means

to be a man or a woman varies across cultures and history, in most cultures gender

differences seek to justify relationships of inequality and the domination of women by

men. However, the fact that women not only tend to experience systematic

disadvantages in male-dominated societies but have also been the object of a disturbing

historical invisibility, made the category become over-salient in the eyes of gender

scholars. This, in turn, had some perverse effects in terms of the social scientific study

of gender, since it directed exclusive attention to the situation of women, isolating them

as an analytic category, reifying the debate, and leaving men and masculinity aside for a

26 Connel notes that gender practices are organized in terms of a number of social categories, such as some of those recognized in our society: girls, old men, lesbians, husbands, etc. (Connell, 1987: 140).


47

long time.27 This identification of gender with women is but one of the problematic

tension points that characterizes the social history of the concept.28

Considering that gender is a core concept to be extensively used in this research,

it is therefore important both to understand the main problems associated with its

previous uses as well as to identify its usefulness.29 I shall thus start by looking at some

problems (gender as a contested concept) and potentials (gender as a useful analytical

category), after which I shall clarify the specific understanding of gender that will guide

this research (towards a goal-oriented conceptualization of gender).

1.1. Gender as a contested concept

The concept of gender was first introduced in the conceptual vocabulary of the

social sciences with one clear purpose: that of underlining the social and culturally

constructed character of the differences between the sexes, denying all natural and

biological deterministic explanations. Gayle Rubin used the term in her essay ‘The

Traffic in Women’ (1975), where it is included in the expression ‘sex-gender system.’30

From this moment on, its utilization became common within the academic field of

American feminism and was gradually exported to Europe during the second half of the

‘70s, facing various levels of success and resistance.

During the last two decades ‘gender’ has become a central analytical concept in

the fields of feminism and women’s studies, used to distinguish the culturally specific

characteristics associated with masculinity and femininity from biological differences

(chromosomes, genitals, etc.). Nevertheless, it also came to be one of the most

controversial concepts.31 Among the definitional problems that have been pointed out is

27 A curious aspect noted by Scott is that the use of the term ‘gender’ may have also been associated with the political acceptability of the field of gender studies since ‘gender’ has (or at least had in the beginning) a more neutral and objective sound than ‘women’ (Scott, 1988). 28 However, one should not under-evaluate the importance that this focus on women had in raising their overall historical visibility and the attention paid to the system of relations between the sexes in social scientific analysis. 29 Here I follow Lakatos’ model of research programs with the aim of identifying the negative and positive heuristic of the concept (Lakatos, 1970). 30 In fact, a testimony confirms that the term had already been used during the 1960s. A commission was formed by the Church of England to discuss the possibility of women priests. Initially they thought of calling it ‘Sex and the Ministry’, but since the word can mean sexual relations, they called it, more innocently, ‘Gender and the Ministry’ (information provided by Colin Crouch, EUI, Florence, 1998). 31 Gender may be considered an essentially contested concept (Gallie, 1956), even if not every criterion for such ‘membership’ is met. Frequently students of gender dynamics consider it to have some type of

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its ambiguity in relation to associated concepts such as sex, sexual identity, sexuality,

sex role, etc. From the point of view of its applications, users have been accused of

stretching the concept, exaggerating its extensity instead of concentrating on its

semantic intensity, that is, on clarifying its meanings (Sartori, 1984).

In one of the most critical assessments regarding the multitude of uses of gender,

Mary Hawkesworth provides a striking shortlist. She notes that gender has been

analyzed as an attribute of individuals, as an interpersonal relation, and as a mode of

social organization. It has been defined in terms of status, sex roles, and sexual

stereotypes. It has been conceived as a structure of consciousness, as triangulated

psyche and as internalized ideology. It has also been discussed as a product of

attribution, socialization and accustomed stance; as an effect of language, a structural

feature of social institutions and as a mode of perception. Gender has been cast in terms

of a binary opposition, variable and varying continua; it has been characterized as

difference, as relations of power manifested in domination and subordination, as an

instrument of segregation and exclusion and as inherently liberating (Hawkesworth,

1997: 650-51).

The question has been raised as to whether such controversy is directly due to

strictly ‘internal’ determinants - the ill-definition, under-specification, imprecision,

vagueness of the term itself - or to the paradoxical nature of the field of study where it

occupies a central position. The concept – and notably the debates around it – would

thus directly reflect un-eliminable ambiguities of the associated conceptual and

theoretical feminist frameworks (Scott, 1999). However, the controversiality of the

concept can be illustrated and simultaneously explained by a set of articulated factors:

on the one hand, the different uses of the concept of gender in feminist frameworks; on

the other, the foundational tensions associated with its introduction in the field of social

sciences: its origin as a linguistic category and the sex-gender opposition.

1.1.1. The different uses of the concept of gender: some illustrations

Most feminist perspectives share a few core propositions. For instance, the status

of gender as a social construction is one of the ideas that can be considered ‘un-

primacy among other explanatory categories; it is internally complex; it is open: admits considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances. Above all, its users have historically contested its application.


49

contested’ in the field (although not its articulation with biological difference). Another

one is the recognition of a prevailing pattern of inequality that has historically damaged

women in some basic processes of social life, creating a fundamental asymmetry of

power, resources and opportunities between the sexes (although interpretations differ

about the reasons and possible solutions for this).32 However, as noted by Scott (1988),

it is not enough to state that gender relations are social products; this reveals very little

about the reasons why gender relations follow certain patterns, how they operate in

concrete settings, and how they change. The application of the concept in various

feminist frames provides diametrically opposed answers to these questions. The sources

of asymmetry and inequality are found to derive from distinct social processes and are

explained by diverse concepts associated with gender in each of those semantic fields.

Since these multiple approaches come out of various disciplinary traditions and

paradigms, to review them systematically would be a massive undertaking in its own

right. But even a quick illustrative and necessarily simplified overview of a variety of

feminist positions shows how distinct instantiations of the concept of gender relate to

basic theoretical (and maybe incommensurable) standpoints and belief systems. The

nuclear assumptions of each analysis – presented here in an idealized form - rest upon a

specific understanding of the nature of social structure, power relations and social

change.

Within the field of liberal feminism, sexual differences are considered to be

irrelevant in terms of the definition of one’s status as an individual, endowed with rights

and responsibilities. Gender stereotypes are problematic in that they impede individual

rights. Power differences are considered to have a political and economic basis and are

seen as the result of a historical denial of women’s rights. Since its classic formulation

in the works of Mary Wollstonecraft (1975) and John Stuart Mill (1869), liberal

feminism has sought to draw attention to and to eliminate the legal constraints barring

women’s access to full citizenship through participation in the public world. According

to this perspective, inequalities may be erased through state political action such as

legislation and measures of positive action.

32 However, one should also acknowledge that the increasing visibility of gender inequality and the pervasiveness of this topic in feminist literature coexists with the evidence of worldwide trends in the direction of greater gender equality anchored in western models of progress and justice (Ramirez, forthcoming).

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Most contemporary feminists, however, react to this traditional liberal position,

claiming that the sources of discrimination against women run much deeper than legal

constraints. This is the case of many radical feminist approaches. From this point of

view,33 gender has been understood as a global system of domination. The State and the

judicial system have been seen as its main locus (MacKinnon, 1982). In a direct

confrontation with liberal feminism, radical feminists understand gender as a global

system of domination of women by men, through control of their sexuality and

reproductive capacity. ‘Patriarchy’34 is a deliberate, not accidental, system that pervades

a variety of other agencies of social control such as the family, the legal system, justice,

and the media.

Scholars such as Nancy Chodorow (1978), Luce Irigaray ([1974] 1985), Juliet

Mitchell (1975), and Gayle Rubin (1975), have looked at gender mainly from the

standpoint of psychoanalysis. In this case, the main locus of gender is sexuality; gender

is understood as an ideology of difference emerging from family relationships, and

particularly from maternity. It is unconsciously incorporated and enacted in sexuality,

language and taboos. Sexuality is thus seen as the cultural and ideological root of

oppression.

From a structuralist Marxist perspective, the privileged location of gender is

work (Hartmman, 1976; Barrett, [1980] 1988). The origin of women’s oppression can

be found in the social structure and the sexual division of work. Gender-based

domination is articulated by class relationships. Both institutions, the capitalist economy

and the patriarchal family, structure women’s lives (Hartman, 1981). One of the central

assumptions of the model is the economic-based nature of power difference between

men and women. Women are exploited for their wage labor as workers as much as for

their domestic and reproductive work as women. These differences can only be

eliminated through revolution (Schwartz, 1992: 9).

Drawing heavily on the anthropological tradition and particularly on Goffman

(1959, 1977) and Garfinkel (1967), ethnomethodological perspectives have proposed an

33 This term encompasses a large variety of feminist positions. Some feel that it is just a ‘catch-all’ for unlabeled feminisms (Schwartz, 1992: 10). One shared element is the assumption that the various domains of life are political domains: differences between men and women are the result of oppressive stereotypical gender models. Only radical change can stop domination. 34 In fact, feminists of every perspective have used this term very commonly. As noted by Lorber (1994), it has been so widely used “to stand for ‘what oppresses women’ that it sometimes seems to be the theoretical equivalent of phlogiston – what causes fire to burn –before the discovery of oxygen.”


51

interpretation of gender essentially as a situated process, taking place at the level of

daily practices and interactions. Gender is something one ‘does’ (West and Zimmerman,

1991; Kessler and McKenna, 1978). West and Zimmerman (1991: 14) define it as “the

activity of managing situated conduct in the light of normative conceptions of attitudes

and activities appropriate for one’s sex category.” Social change must be pursued not

only at the institutional level, but also at the interactional level where gender,

functioning as a ‘powerful ideological device’, “produces, reproduces, and legitimates

the choices and limits that are predicated on sex category” (West and Zimmerman,

1991: 34).

To structuralist constructionists such as Judith Lorber, gender is itself a social

institution (Lorber, 1994). According to her, gender is not located in the individual or

interpersonal relations, although the construction and maintenance of gender are

manifest in personal identities and in social interaction. Rather, she prefers to “see

gender as an institution that establishes patterns of expectations for individuals, orders

the social processes of everyday life, is built into the major organizations of society,

such as the economy, ideology, the family and politics, and is also an entity in and of

itself” (Lorber, 1994: 1).

Post-structuralist and cultural feminist theorists have in different ways

suggested a conception of gender as a discursive practice. On the basis of a critical

reading of Freud and Lacan, Judith Butler defined gender as performativity: “gender

designates the apparatus of production whereby sexes are established” (Butler, 1990).

Compulsory heterosexuality is seen as the central discursive site that produces gender.

According to Butler, “the heterosexualization of desire requires and institutes the

production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between ‘feminine’ and

“masculine”, where these are understood as expressive attributes of ‘male’ and

‘female’” (Butler, 1990: 17).

In a similar vein, other authors propose that gender should be understood as a

system of meanings. Cohn, for instance, stresses the ways in which gender is “a central

organizing discourse of culture, one that not only shapes how we experience and

understand ourselves as men and women, but that also interweaves with other

discourses and shapes them – and therefore shapes other aspects of our world” (Cohn,

1993: 228). Gendering is thus seen, above all, in its symbolic dimension, as a central

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organizing discourse through which people represent and understand their world in

general –not just male and female relations.

Besides these different uses, the social history of the concept may help to

explain its contested character. There are two particular ‘birth-marks’ that explain, at

least partially, the controversies it generated: on the one hand, gender is originally a

linguistic, grammatical category that was imported to the social sciences. If the choice

of the term had something to do with the supposed merits of its linguistic

characterization (Hawkesworth, 1997: 657-8), other more problematic aspects

accompanied the conceptual travel, generating acute contradictions at a later stage. On

the other hand, and clearly more importantly, the original underlying sex-gender

opposition had perverse effects by prolonging and reproducing the nature-culture

duality and by attributing to the biological base itself the reasons for gender

differentiation. The supposed naturalization of the category ‘sex’ subverted the original

purpose of the distinction between the physical and the social, exactly the one that

initially the introduction of the use of gender was supposed to achieve.

1.1.2. Linguistic tensions and the sex-gender debate

Gender existed first as a linguistic category, deriving etymologically from the

Latin Genus, roughly meaning ‘kind’ or ‘sort’. It is an extremely versatile linguistic

category that accounts for much of the interest it originated among feminist scholars. It

is not universal or invariant in different languages: sometimes, it is a central organizing

principle; sometimes, it is absent. It frequently marks the distinction between

feminine/masculine/non-sexed, but in some other languages it operates distinctions such

as animate/inanimate, human/other, strong/weak, male/other, female/other etc. The

number of grammatical genders may also have an extreme variability depending on

societies and cultures: “the number of genders is not limited to three, four is common

and twenty is possible” (Corbett, 1991; Hawkesworth, 1997). This characteristic of

historicity and cultural foundation of the linguistic category seemed to allow an easier

escape from biological determinism. However, the simultaneous ‘importation’ of

characteristics such as the principle of accordance reflected in the behavior of associated

words as a central criteria for gender classification – is frequently signaled as being at

the origin of many future misunderstandings (Hawkesworth, 1997: 657-658).


53

Concerning the problematic sex-gender opposition, there is an extremely

extensive bibliography as well as prolific and inconsequent debates. When gender

studies started to develop, the distinction between features of natural difference (sex)

and processes of knowledge and social differentiation about them (gender) was

considered fundamental to fight the powerful doctrines of natural difference. These

presupposed either a biological determination of gender –the case of Wilson’s scientific

sociobiology (Wilson, 1978) – or an additive vision of the relations between biological

imperatives and their cultural elaboration. In the latter line of thought society amplifies

and emphasizes natural differences and accommodates, within limits, the more powerful

biological constraints.

Unlike other social categories, gender has a firm and visible connection to

biological difference. It is thus tempting to fall back on biological explanations of

gender patterns, a mechanism of ‘naturalization’ that has been central to sustaining

sexual ideologies. Besides, the fact that biological difference is seen as underpinning

and explaining the social supremacy of men over women has been used as a useful

excuse for resisting equality (Connell, 1985: 5).

Strong arguments against theories of biological determination have been set

forth by a number of social scientists. Impressive work has been developed around

processes of gender construction in everyday life, namely through the salient

contribution of ethnomethodological approaches (Goffman, 1959, 1977; Garfinkel,

1967; Kessler and McKenna, 1978; West and Zimmerman, 1991). Generally speaking,

two main arguments have been used: first the inadequacy of a dimorphic vision of

gender categories, despite the power of processes of gender attribution which sustain

such a dualistic scheme. Research in this field has revealed cultural worlds where

gender is not necessarily dichotomous or dependent on biological criteria. Studies of

‘limit situations’ of transvestism or transsexual identities, such as Grafinkel’s famous

study of Agnes, have highlighted that the reliance on only two sex and two gender

categories is, to use Lorber’s expression, ‘epistemologically spurious’ (Lorber, 1994).

This has shown two things: first, that sex is not a self-evident category; it is also a result

of social attribution. Our conception of what is natural depends on a cultural

construction. Bodies are transformed by social practice as much as they intervene to

frame it. If gender differences were the result of genetic or hormonal characteristics,

only hermaphrodites would experiment gender bending (‘inconsistency of status’, to use

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the analogy to social class) and ambiguity. Transvestism and transsexuality would be

meaningless (Lorber, 1994: 27). And if differences are natural, why would they need to

be marked so heavily, as in the sometimes obsessive sex typing of clothes and

adornment? (Connell, 1987: 80). Second, this has raised the problem of how to explain

and understand ‘gender crossing’ (moving from one gender status to another) or the

actual existence of multiple gender categories. There is a certain debate whether the

order of gender is challenged by new or disruptive categories. Some believe that

resistance and rebellion against gender norms has rarely eroded the salience of dominant

gender statuses. In fact, ‘deviations’ work to reinforce prevailing schemes: “Though

individuals may be able to shift gender statuses, the gender boundaries have to hold, or

the whole gendered social order will come crashing down (…) Paradoxically, it is the

social importance of gender statuses and their external markers –clothing, mannerisms

and spatial segregation– that makes gender bending or gender crossing possible –or

even necessary” (Lorber, 1994: 27)

Kessler and McKenna argue in a similar way when they suggest that

transsexuals are in fact claiming that they are members of the ‘other’ sex and are

searching for ways of correcting a supposed error of nature. Disruption is thus seen as

functional to the prevailing scheme of the gender order, working to preserve it as a

reminder of the borders, as is the case of warrior women in history, the Amazons or

Joan of Arc. Others, however, have shown that things may be more complex, as in the

case of ‘Drag Queens’, transsexuals who sustain an uncertain gender identity and live as

such (Connell, 1987: 76).

A second strong argument has been made against the idea of natural difference

as a passively suffered condition. If nature had such a conditioning character –lived as

fate, or destiny— human history would be inconceivable. Those who share this view

underline the fact that history depends on the transcendence of the natural through

social practice. The relation between nature and culture is one of practical

transformation, something very different from the causal links supposed by biological

determinism. As noted by Connell, “The natural world is implicated in class relations,

for instance through the labor process and the function of the body as a tool. This does

not prevent class relations from being historical. No more should the implication of the

body in gender relations through sexuality prevent us from seeing the historicity of

gender” (Connell, 1987: 77).


55

Despite the adequacy of these arguments against the doctrines of natural

difference, the stress on the social character of gender arrangements has had negative

consequences as well. The most convinced sustainers of the sex-gender distinction were

accused of sociological reductionism: extra emphasis on the social dimension led to

minimizing the importance of the body in the social practice of gender (Connell, 1987:

74).35 This has been seen as replicating rather then undermining the natural attitude.

According to critics, by reproducing the opposition nature-culture in a version similar to

the base-superstructure model, these proposals could not avoid the traps of biological

determinism, “the lion in the path of social theories of gender” (Connell, 1987: 91).

Therefore, it is not surprising that an attentive analyst concludes: “no matter how

insistently feminist theorists have refined the term gender (purging it of all ‘natural’

connotations while promoting its status as social construction) they have been unable to

prevent its corruption. (…) Sometimes it seems that gender is just a polite euphemism

for sex” (Scott, 1999: 71).

From their refusal of biological fundamentalism, various feminist positions then

developed into a conflation of sex and gender: “both sex and gender are ascriptions of

meaning, variable ways of differentiating bodies in the (albeit different) domains of the

physical and the social. If that is the case, of what use is it to insist on a distinction

between sex and gender?” (Scott, 1999: 72). However, rather than engaging in this long

running and not always profitable polemic, it is important to look at the potentials of

gender as an analytical category and discuss how it will be used in relation to the

present research purposes.

1.2. Gender as a useful analytical category

Different efforts to clarify the conceptual confusion have been undertaken –from

the need to control its uses to suggestions that it should be abandoned altogether

(Hawkesworth, 1997). The latter perspective, one of a new ‘gender skepticism’ has

developed mainly within bio/eco and multiculturalist approaches. Scholars such as

Susan Bordo (1993) have questioned the possibility of gender generalizations in the

35 Curiously, during the 70s some western feminists began stressing the idea of an ineradicable difference between the sexes and celebrating the ‘specifically feminine’ virtues such as nurturance as opposed to male aggressiveness. This naturalization of difference had a clear expression in positions regarding issues of peace and war and the participation of women in the military, as we shall see further on. The idea of gender – in this case femininity as socially produced, was simply abandoned. This is yet another example of the paradoxical nature of feminism.

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face of the multiplicity of women’s experiences. In the same vein, post-modernist critics

refuse existing gender narratives as totalizing fictions and question the sex-gender

distinction considered, as seen above, as a form of de-problematizing sex and sexuality

as socially and culturally constructed categories.

While acknowledging existing problems, others have suggested that it is

possible to integrate most of the criticisms into a more sophisticated conception of

gender, stressing the importance of the concept as an analytical category. Sandra

Harding, Joan Scott and Robert Connell have proposed alternative versions of what we

could call ‘gender optimism’.

Harding sustains that recognizing gender as a cultural construction in no way

limits the force of gender as an analytical tool. She distinguished three processes

through which gender operates: “Gendered social life (…) is the result of assigning

dualistic gender metaphors to various perceived dichotomies that rarely have anything

to do with sex differences (gender symbolism); it is the consequence of appealing to

these gender dualisms to organize social activity, dividing necessary social activities

between different groups of humans (gender structure); it is a form of socially

constructed individual identity only imperfectly correlated with either the reality or the

perception of sex differences (individual gender)” (Harding, 1986: 17-18).

Showing the same attention to analytical levels, Scott proposed one of the most

influential definitions: “Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based on

perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying

relationships of power” (Scott, 1988: 43). Gender, in the first part of the definition,

involves four interrelated elements: a) culturally available symbols that evoke multiple,

and often contradictory representations (ex: Eve and Mary); b) normative concepts that

set forth interpretations of the meanings of the symbols attempting to limit and contain

their metaphoric possibilities (they typically take the form of the binary oppositions

identified above, categorically asserting the meaning of male and female, masculine and

feminine, while repressing alternative possibilities;36 c) social institutions and

organizations such as the labor market, education and the polity. d) subjective identity.

Scott insists on the historicity of the concept, criticizing psychoanalytic a-historical

36 Sometimes, contests about gender definitions take place and the conditions and circumstances for these ‘negotiations’ ought to be analyzed. As noted by Scott, “The position that emerges as dominant, however, is taken as the only possible one. Subsequent history is written as if these normative positions were the product of social consensus rather than of conflict” (Scott, 1988: 43).


57

interpretation of gender construction. According to her no one of these elements

operates without the other, but how they operate is a question to be left to historical

research.

The second part of the proposition identifies what differentiates gender from

other identities, that is, its capacity to ‘signify’ relationships of power: “Gender is not

the only field but it seems to have been a persistent and recurrent way of enabling the

signification of power in the West, in the Judeo-Christian as well as in the Islamic

tradition. (…) To the extent that [gender] references establish distributions of power

(differential control over or access to material and symbolic resources), gender becomes

implicated in the conception and construction of power itself” (Scott, 1988: 45).

Besides these proposals, probably the most systematic attempt to theorize gender

has been Connel’s Gender and Power (1987). Since his formulation is encompassing

and will be used in the present research, it is useful to look at it more closely.

1.3. Social structures and gender regimes

In Gender and Power (1987), Connell provides an integrated account of much of

the previous work on gender: “His theory accounts for virtually every feminist usage of

gender over the past several decades and relates them in a multi-layered whole”

(Hawkesworth, 1997: 672). Connel proposes a systematic theory of gender, applied to

the various domains of economics, politics, sexuality and the psyche. It is presented as a

‘practice-based’ theory, stressing the constraining power of gender as well as the ways

in which actors resist or subvert those constraints. His account of the historicity of

gender is thus based on a conception of gender as a social structure, understanding

structure as a result of sedimentation and institutionalization of past practices that

becomes a pattern of constraint on present practice: “structure specifies the way

practices (over time) constrain practices” (Connell, 1987: 95).

However, practice also has a dynamic dimension in that it “can be turned against

what constrains it; so structure can deliberately be the object of practice. But practice

cannot escape structure, cannot float free of its circumstances” (Connell, 1987: 95).37

This understanding of structure is close to that developed by Pierre Bourdieu in Outline

37 The author gives an example that clarifies this idea: “Victorian Women rejecting marriage were not free to adopt any other sexual life they pleased. Often, the only practicable alternative was chastity” (Connell, 1987: 95)

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of a Theory of Practice (Bourdieu, 1977), or by Anthony Giddens’ theory in Duality of

Structure (Giddens, 1984).38

Connell’s proposal is also based on the rejection of all biological determinism or

any other attempt to derive gender from the functional needs of society or the

imperatives of social reproduction. The body is never experienced without cultural

mediation. In this sense gender refers to the cognitive and interpretative practices that

create, and appropriate reproductive biology.

The author identifies the existence of three fundamental structures in the field of

gender relations: labor (division of labor), power (authority, control and coercion) and

cathexis (emotional links). The former refers to the processes of occupational sex

segregation, that is, the allocation of different kinds of jobs to different categories of

people as well as to the organization and design of the work, and occupational sex

typing. The second structure, power, is defined in a rather negative way as authority,

control and coercion.39 Within this domain, we find gender-structured hierarchies both

in the public and private realms, creating a male monopoly of the means of institutional

and interpersonal violence and defining domestic and sexual asymmetries. Here it is

important to distinguish between “the global or macro-relationship of power, in which

women are subordinated to men in the society as a whole, from the local or micro-

situation in particular households, particular workplaces, particular settings. It is

possible for the local pattern to depart from the global pattern, even to contradict it”

(Connell, 1987: 111).

38 Connell criticizes both ‘dualist models’ because of their supposed closeness to historical change. However, even if Connell sees his own emphasis on context as the major difference between his proposal and these authors’ theorizations, the proximity is clear. He himself notes that, “The balance formulated by Giddens as the ‘duality of structure’ is, of all current frameworks for social theory, the closest to the requirement of a theory of gender” (Connell, 1987: 94). 39 This is a different definition of power than, for instance, Kanter’s (1977) understanding of power as efficacy, which will be referred to in the next section. Regarding the potential of feminist contributions in the field of International Relations, Bethke Elshtain calls our attention to the distinction between the two Latin terms for power Potestas (control supremacy, dominion) and Potentia (might, ability, potency, unofficial and possibly threatening of disorder and chaos). While, she argues, men have been the wielders of institutional power and dominion, women have been the unofficial repositories of non-political power. There is thus the “possibility of opening up political space by pushing back the sway of Potestas in favor of modes of social organization less dominated by fear of multiple sources of power and action than the state –centric model presumes” (Elshtain, 1997: 86). Implicit here is also a criticism of some feminist perspectives that endorse a vision of power as a form of connection and care that is in contrast to ‘harsher’ alternatives “connection may be as easily bread conflict as anything else, and care may turn maternalistic and controlling” (Elshtain, 1997: 86).


59

The third axis, the structure of cathexis, refers to the ‘sexual social

relationships’, that is, those relationships “organized around one person’s emotional

attachment to another” (Connell, 1987: 112). While recognizing that sexual practices

are governed by other structures as well, (e.g. the economy), Connel notes that gender

structures the pattern of desire, identities of desiring subjects and identification of

desirable objects, as well as conditions for sexual exchange. This is clear in the set of

norms that regulate couple relationships, laws concerning rape or age of consent or even

in the incest taboo. The socially hegemonic pattern of desire presupposes sexual

difference, which can be emphasized as a means of intensifying desire.40

The mechanisms through which the sexual division of work, relations of power

or cathexis are sustained may vary significantly, according to the specific contexts of

various institutions. Although there is not a necessary coherence in the articulation of

these structures, none of them can be considered independent of the others. There is

some kind of orderliness that relates them, not in terms of a systemic functional unity,

but in terms of what Connel prefers to call ‘historical composition’. In this sense,

gender is a ‘linking’ concept “It is about the linking of other fields of social practice to

the nodal practices of engendering, childbirth and parenting” (Connell, 1987: 140). The

extent of these links, its “social geometry’ is then a question for empirical investigation

and cannot be pre-defined: “there are times and places where these links are more

extensive and compelling, where (...) a greater percentage of the social landscape is

covered by gender relations; and times and places where they are less” (1987: 140).

1.3.1. Gender order and gender regimes

Drawing on previous proposals,41 Connell sustains that the concept of a single

structure of gender relations must be broken into component sub-structures which he

calls gender regimes defined as “the historically produced state of play in gender

relations within an institution” (1990: 523).42 For instance, to pick up Connell’s

examples, institutions such as the family, the State or the street have, in concrete space-

40 This helps to explain the exaggeration of gender differences to be discussed further ahead. Cf. also Gherardi (1994). 41 Connell considers Mitchell’s identification of four structures of gender relations, production, reproduction, socialization and sexuality (Mitchell, 1966), as a first attempt to theorize in this direction, even if in an inconsistent way. 42 This concept is very similar to Schmitter’s concept of ‘partial regimes’ within a global political regime (Schmitter, 1995).

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time contexts their specific gender regimes. The relations between the various gender

regimes of different institutions define, at the level of the whole society, the gender

order conceived as the place where the global macro-politics of gender are played out.

At this level, there are patterns of relationship between masculinities and femininities,

which correspond to face-to face interactions within institutions, but become much

more ‘skeletal’ and simplified. Connell identifies the existence of a hegemonic form of

masculinity, which establishes itself in relation to femininity, as well as to other

subordinated masculinities. Here, the concept of hegemony is used in a Gramscian

sense, meaning “social ascendancy achieved in a play of social forces that extends

beyond contests of brute power, into the organization of private life and cultural

processes” (Connell, 1987: 184).

Hegemonic masculinity, as an ideal type, embodies the currently accepted

answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, guaranteeing the dominant position

of men. Although not incompatible with the use of force, hegemony does not require it.

More than direct violence, hegemony is based on a successful claim for authority43. As

a state of play, it does not suppose the eradication of alternatives or total dominance. On

the contrary, it may consist exactly in preventing these alternatives from acquiring

cultural recognition or political expression. In fact, hegemonic masculinity constitutes

itself in relation not only to femininity but also to other masculinities: some

subordinated, as is the case of homosexuality or the symbolic assimilation of certain

groups of heterosexual men into femininity when they fail to develop complicity

towards the hegemonic pattern, others marginalized, in the case of dominant and

subordinated masculinities along class and ethnic divides.

Thus, the idea of hegemony generally implies a large measure of consent and

complicity on the part of all those who do not fit the hegemonic stereotype:

“masculinities constructed in ways that realize the patriarchal dividend, without the

tensions or risks of being the frontline troops of patriarchy, are accomplice in this

sense” (Connell, 1987: 79). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that hegemonic masculinity is

not necessarily considered threatening by most women, who may in fact find it more

familiar or manageable than non-hegemonic masculinities. This may be a crucial

element in explaining the reproduction of practices that institutionalize male domination

over women, despite possible strong pressures for change.


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In order to gaining greater understanding of this question of reproduction and

change, the social psychological approach used by Lígia Amâncio may be extremely

helpful, even if it is focused exclusively on the cognitive dimension (Amâncio, 1992,

1993, 1994). Drawing on the work of Lorenzi-Cioldi (1988, 1991), she emphasizes an

asymmetry of the masculine and feminine models and the way this regulates social

positions and relationships. According to this proposal, the concepts that define what it

is to ‘be a man’ or ‘be a woman’ combine into an asymmetry of meanings that are more

universal at the masculine end of the scale and more specific at the feminine end.

Basing her work on different studies on gender-associated belief systems, Amâncio

(1992) highlighted the way in which, in our societies, the model of masculinity is quite

similar to the predominant model of individuality. This overlapping of the categories of

man and individual thus explains the symbolic dominance of the masculine and its

representation as a universal being, while the female model is identified within the

private space of the family and emotions.

This classificatory asymmetry helps us understand the greater visibility of

women when positioned in supposedly atypical contexts, since the significance of

femininity is collective and depends on a specific position within the social system:

"This explains why a woman who is out of her 'natural environment', either because of

the position she occupies or her behavior, requires explanation and justification, which

is not true of men. Similarly, uncharacteristic behavior with relation to the norm is

noticed more and raises more negative criticism in women than in men” (Amâncio,

1992: 12).44

In addition, this asymmetry has a regulating function on the effects of social

change upon the symbolic universe that differentiates the sexes. This can be illustrated

by the fact that the entry of women into the work force does not seem to have brought

about significant reformulation of this cultural matrix. Rather, it has given rise to sub-

categories of women: the woman-worker in general, and more specifically, the

businesswoman, policewoman, etc., to which we could certainly add the woman soldier.

The author points out that, “in all these cases, social thinking has found ways of

categorizing the women who enter the so-called masculine professions which entail

43 One could say that the reverse is also true. 44 I have some doubts about the accuracy of this interpretation, but, again, that is a question to be answered by empirical research.

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their 'masculinization', whereas feminine signifiers remain few and confined to their

traditional contexts” (Amâncio, 1993: 132).

This points to the need to reconsider common assumptions about the

inevitability of a transforming impact that the increase in the number of women in the

work place and in the public sphere in general will have in the internal structure of

organizations and on society’s perception of the role of women. Research in this area

has shown that men and women do not see differently the dominant models of

masculinity and femininity and the asymmetry upon which they are founded. On the

contrary, they generally share the normative assumptions of these models and reproduce

them in their behavior: “just as people see ‘females’ as women more than they see

‘males’ as men, so women ‘see themselves’ first as women and men ‘see themselves’

first as individuals” (Amâncio, 1993: 135).

Referring to a similar issue, Connell admits that there may be a kind of fit

between hegemonic masculinity and emphasized femininity. This specific kind of

femininity represents a model of compliance with male power, of nurturance and

empathy. It is expressed in practices such as the display of sociability more than

technical competence, fragility in mating scenes or acceptance of marriage and

childcare as a response to labor-market discrimination against women (Connell, 1987:

187). This form, however, is not in a position to become hegemonic regarding other

femininities, in the sense hegemonic masculinity is. Any struggle or attempt to

constitute gender interests around this model is a contradiction in terms because to

acquire a stance in sexual politics would require the subversion of the model’s own

prescriptions. This description of the current gender order is not supposed to identify

fixed types. It is historically constituted through both the interconnections of various

gender regimes and the social struggle around the terms of those relationships.

As far as the first aspect is concerned, sometimes gender regimes are connected

in a complementary way. For instance, the part-time pattern of female recruitment in the

labor market articulates with women’s domestic responsibilities at home. There is here a

‘practical accommodation’ between the two institutions. Other times connections may

reveal a conflictive pattern (e.g. emotional relationships of the family vs. demands of a

state at war); a third pattern of connection between institutions set them as the domain

of common strategy or movement.


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Here lies the second major step in the constitution of the gender order: the

struggle around the constitution of gender interests. This process refers to how

groupings that are the major actors in sexual politics give “a particular content to a

social category, establishing particular contrasts with and distances from other social

categories, and constituting an interest around which identity and action can be

organized” (Connell, 1987: 137). The constitution of a social category, he notes, “is not

quite the same thing as the constitution of a social interest (…) An interest is defined by

the possibility of advantage and disadvantage in some collective practice. (…) the

interests are articulated by processes of mobilization that define collective goals and

strategies”. This, he adds, “is not a point to be settled by postulation. The way of

defining interest that is ascendant at a given time or place is an empirical question”

(1987: 138).

1.3.2. Theorizing change: ‘crisis tendencies’ in the gender order.

Practices may reproduce or depart from the existing situation in terms of gender

relations. According to Connell, they may be cyclical or divergent. The process of

institutionalization of gender therefore regards the conditions that make cyclical

practices probable: “gender is institutionalized to the extent that the network of links to

the reproduction system is formed by cyclical practices. It is stabilized to the extent that

the groups constituted in the network have interests in the conditions for cyclical rather

than divergent practice” (Connell, 1987: 141).

Since reproduction may be a common outcome of practice but is by no means a

necessary one, crisis tendencies may develop, challenging the gender order as a whole

or the gender regimes of specific institutions. Crisis tendencies are defined as a

combination of structured conflict of interest and potential for decomposition (Connell,

1987: 117). Gender politics is thus understood in terms of the clash of interests

constituted historically within gender relations45 (Connell, 1999: 704).

45 Connell notes that different structures may contradict each other. The structure of gender relations is characterized by internal differentiation, historical unevenness and internal contradiction. Gherardi (1994) stresses a similar idea when sustaining that there is an inner ambiguity in the construction of gender. The management of cross-gendered situations –that is, of a “dual presence” (the simultaneous presence in the consciousness and experience of women of the public and private, home and work, personal and political)— is based on a two-stage ritual involving the ceremonial work of paying homage to the symbolic order of gender and the remedial work of repairing inequality.

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An example may be illuminating at this point. Connell identifies the major

structural features of the gender order of rich capitalist countries (which are at the same

time building blocks of modernity) as: a) gendered separation of domestic life from the

money economy and the political world; b) heavily masculinized core institutions and a

more open-textured periphery; c) institutionalized heterosexuality and the invalidation

and repression of homosexuality. All three patterns sustain a fourth feature: the major

pattern of sexual politics, the overall subordination of women by men. While this

pattern is still dominant, there are, according to Connell, various symptoms of a crisis

tendency that illustrate structural tensions of the current gender order.

With regard to the first aspect –separation of domestic life and the formal

economy— the large-scale and long-term employment of married women seems to

subvert the principle of separation between home and work. The wife’s wage, even if

defined as a ‘second income’, is a strong power resource in domestic politics and thus

contributes to the erosion of domestic patriarchy. Likewise, the concentration of large

numbers of women in segregated labor markets creates a new political situation in the

workplace, opening a potential space for the articulation and mobilization of social

interests that may challenge the established gender order. Other aspects may disrupt the

legitimacy of domestic patriarchy. Among them rank: the growth of general claims for

equality as the basis of legitimacy of the State involving state strategies that weaken the

legitimacy of male’s domestic power (e.g. funding of women’s education at a large

scale, creation of mechanisms for intervening in domestic violence, changing provisions

about property, taxation and pensions that treat a married women as a person in her own

right).

All these aspects may not result in an actual or automatic reversal of patriarchal

authority, but they do seem to increase vulnerability to change. When other conditions

develop (e.g. reliable and easy contraception techniques such as the pill, growth of

women’s higher education, politicization of certain groups of women), the potential for

a crisis becomes stronger. While these aspects impact on the structures of labor and

power, the third one, cathexis, is also challenged by the crisis of the heterosexual ‘ideal’

couple and the emergence of other forms of sexuality (women’s liberation or gay

liberation movements reflect these crisis tendencies in sexuality, even if not a general

crisis of the model).


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1.4. Towards a goal-oriented conceptualization of gender

The above discussion points clearly to the need to move the debate about

‘gender’ from abstract and rather inconsequent attempts at ‘conceptual puritanism’ to

the specific contexts of the utilization of the concept, its instantiation in concrete

empirical frameworks and its relevance regarding the research objectives.

It has been noted that work in the field of gender relations is not cumulative;

alternative perspectives tend to pass each other by. However, one must recognize that

important steps have been made towards the specification and applicability of the

concept. I believe that some of these efforts should be incorporated in the present

analysis. More than trying to propose a new definition, I see this ‘incorporation’ as part

of an attempt both to sum up those I believe are the useful theoretical elements of the

outlined proposals and to clarify the methodological approach adopted here in terms of

operationalization of ‘gender’. What follows is a modest attempt to justify a non-

essentialist, relational, non-individualistic and historical understanding and use of

‘gender’ as an analytical category. What exactly does this mean?

There are two basic methodological principles – underlined in many of the

approaches mentioned above - which should be taken into consideration. Each of these

principles relates to a specific methodological problem: 1) the problem of the empirical

referent – calling for a non-substantialist and relational standpoint; 2) the problem of the

historicity of the concept, calling for a non-essentialist position.

1.4.1. The relational character of the concept: a non-substantialist standpoint

In the social scientific literature on gender relations, the difficulty of

distinguishing between sociological designations and their ‘physical’ referents led

frequently to the equation between gender and women. In fact, as was previously

observed, some approaches in the field of gender studies highlight women as objects of

study isolating them as an analytical category and considering them as an homogenous

group, disregarding internal differences resulting from other attributes which locate

individuals differently in the social structure. As a consequence, gender becomes a self-

explanatory category in the understanding of social processes.

The basic orientation of these studies, by conferring visibility on women and

stressing a way of thinking, morality and practices supposedly specific to them, has led

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to an analytical model of total opposition between the categories of male and female,

thereby reinforcing gender differences. On the other hand, this tendency to emphasize

substance –in this case 'real' groups of men and woman— instead of focusing on

relations, and above all on the conditions of the social and political articulation of

sexual difference, has promoted and deepened misleading beliefs on the biologically

determined character of gender cleavages.

Just as it would be limiting to study the dynamic constitution of class structures

by focusing exclusively on one class such as peasants or the bourgeoisie, it is not

acceptable to focus only on women, on men or on some other historical category based

on sexual difference if we want to analyze the structure of gender relations, its

articulation in family patterns, organizations, rules and discourses and its incorporation

or subversion in social practices. This does not mean we might not be more interested in

certain groups and in highlighting the mechanisms of their political, ideological or

historical constitution as such. What we should not do is to isolate them analytically,

obliterating all that in its constitution concerns relational practices, oppositions,

conflicts and alterities. For instance, focusing on specific groups of women such as

soldiers, textile workers, or mothers, one should take them as a privileged observation

platform from which a whole relational field may acquire visibility. Likewise, the same

argumentation could be used regarding men’s studies and masculinity, whose

development since the 80s curiously emerges as one of the most interesting by-products

of the new attention to gender dynamics. The interest of this perspective may be less

due to the fact that it reveals new forms of self-consciousness and reflexivity among

men as historical actors – and not mere passive repositories of a dominant model of

individuality but to the investigation of the extent to which certain models of

masculinity – and their situated transformation - may help us understand such varied

problems as the social experience of unemployment, labor accidents in the building

industry, situations of domestic rupture or the performance of combat groups.

To sum up, gender does not mean women. Likewise, it does not mean men.

Contexts of interaction where men and women act socially are necessarily the empirical

‘locus’ of the concept. In this sense, men and women are agents of distinctive gender

experiences (Piccone and Saraceno, 1996: 25). This perspective recognizes a specific

‘status’ of the relation between biology and culture, which is not one of causation but


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one of practical relevance (Connell, 1987: 78).46 Hence, I shall adopt a minimalist

perspective, one that sustains the futility of insisting upon precise linguistic usage and

recognizes that “social relations of gender are not determined by biological difference

but deal with it; there is a practical engagement rather then a reduction (...) gender

means practice organized in terms of, or in relation to, the reproductive division of

people into male and female” (Connell, 1987). The key lies in how we understand the

relation between biology and the social, trying to avoid reductionism in both ways.

1.4.2. The historicity of the concept: a non-essentialist perspective

The above-criticized perspectives suffer from the additional problem of

essentialism. By isolating gender cleavages from the global contexts of differentiation,

and sustaining their primacy in the understanding of social relations, these approaches

produce unidimensional explanations of social processes. One of the consequences of

such a homogenizing perspective is the under-evaluation of class profiles, social

trajectories, values and life styles.

Attributes like class, race or age –to mention just a few –do not always prevail

over those produced by gender 'location'. In fact, there is enough empirical evidence

pointing to an increasing range of social situations that both objectively and subjectively

define men and women's relationships as specifically gendered ones (that is, situations

where gender has some kind of primary 'explanatory relevance' to these relationships, be

they conflictive or co-operative).

The problem is that the perspective under critique tends to define every relation

between men and women as being fundamentally a 'gender relation', thus conferring on

gender identities an epistemological primacy over all other roles and identities. In

addition, and perhaps even less acceptably, such a definition is formulated apriori in a

completely a-historical way, without any consideration of time and space constraints.

The presumption of the superiority of a gendered narrative shuts out contesting

interpretations. As Elshtain notes, "too often, claims to a privileged standpoint are self-

insulating and promote a refusal to engage the aims and claim of others (Elshtain, 1997:

78).

46 This concept of ‘practical relevance’ has some similarity to Weber’s ‘elective affinity’ (Weber, 1983).

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I would thus stress that gender differences must be historically situated, that is,

contextualized in time and space. Its ‘heuristic power’ changes over time, from one

society to another, depending on specific and complex sets of articulated economic,

political and cultural conditions that define, to use Connell’s concept, the ‘gender order’

or a specific ‘gender regime’. It is thus important not to lose sight of the combination of

social-institutional constraints upon which gender divisions are drawn, as well as the

way they affect practices, value systems and representations. This does not mean that

certain realities cannot be looked at from the specific prism of gender. It means,

however, that gender cannot be considered an explicative category apriori. The focus

should thus be on understanding the relative importance of gender dynamics in social

life and the concrete modalities of its articulation with other types of cleavages.

There are contexts where gender has more salience as an organization principle.

However, as rightly pointed out by Connell, we cannot understand the place of gender

in social processes by isolating a set of ‘gender institutions’: “gender relations are

present in all types of institutions. They may not be the most important structure in a

particular case, but they are certainly a major structure of most” (Connell, 1987: 120).47

The military is certainly a ‘privileged observatory’ for gender dynamics.

1.4.3. The case for a goal-related conceptual analysis

Finally, it is important to think about conceptual options in terms of trade-offs

(e.g. losing in precision to gain in applicability) and to assert the need for a goal-related

analysis. This means using the concept of gender in relation to the specific research

question. Scott seems to endorse this position when she suggests that we formulate

questions such as: how do laws, rules, and institutional arrangements refer to and

implement differences between the sexes? How have different societies organized

gender relationships? Has sexual difference been invoked differently in different kinds

of political/social movements? How, and in what terms? What is the specific link made

in articulations of sexual difference to other kinds of difference? (Race, class, ethnicity,

47 For instance, some domains that for a long time resisted being questioned from a gender perspective have more recently been analyzed in terms of gender relations, making visible a whole new set of relationships and dynamics. This perspective has been adopted in a significant way to study the models of Welfare State and political-institutional systems. The new literature in the field of International Relations is another interesting example of this new visibility (Elshtain, 1997; Zalewski, 1993; Murphy, 1996; Peterson, 1992a; Tickner, 1992).


69

and so on)? Such questions do not assume that gender is always the driving force; on

the contrary they allow for the possibility that it may not be.

Regarding the study of gender dynamics in the military, some of the relevant

questions could thus be: how relevant is gender as a structuring principle in the

military? Is there a hegemonic pattern of gender relations? To what extent does the

gender regime of the military relate to (reproduce, amplify, transform, distort, ‘feed’)

patterns of a general gender order in the respective society? How does it interact with

other cleavages and markers of identity? How does it change over time within the same

context? How do individuals use it to position themselves, to interact?

All these questions require attention to different analytical levels. Gender is not

a property of individuals, something they enact in ways consistent with their biological

characteristics or sex role socialization. It is a linking concept that necessarily involves

research at the various analytical levels, from macro-societal tendencies to the situated

patterns of interaction of everyday life.

2. Gender relations in organizations

Most theories of gender have focused either on limited contexts such as face-to-

face interactions or on the gender order of society as a whole. The meso-level of

organization was often skipped over. Yet, in some ways this is probably the most

important level to understand since “we live most of our daily lives in settings like the

household, the workplace and the bus queue, rather than stretched out in a relation to

society at large or bounded up in a one-to-one” (Connell, 1987: 119)48.

When scholars began to pay attention to organizations as a locus of gender, they

usually did so by choosing one particular institution, the family and kinship, as the

bearer of gender and sexuality. This has left untouched the dominant tendency to study

structures such as the workplace as if gender did not matter. In fact, throughout the

twentieth century theories of organization and management have taken for granted the

assumption that organizations and occupations are gender-free. Abstractly defined

workers are supposed to be recruited and rewarded on the basis of ‘objective’ skills or

qualifications, and occupations structured independently of who fills specific positions.

Discussions of organizational behavior developed around supposedly universalistic

48 It should be noted, however, that a bus queue is not an organization.

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processes, regardless of the culturally and socially contingent characteristics of workers.

This dominant perspective has been so pervasive that some authors believe that “the

assumption of gender neutrality may be one of the great blind spots, and errors, of

twentieth century organizational theory” (Rothchild and Davies, 1994: 583).

Despite the fact that even today research in this field is frequently conducted

within a gender-neutral framework, more recent work has clearly challenged this

assumption, showing how organizational practices are patterned through gender lines

(Acker, 1991, 1992b; Martin and Collinson, 1999). Joan Acker was one of the first to

systematize the various contributions that, for more than a decade, had set the basis for

this new perspective in the area of gender, work and organizations. In her proposal of “a

theory of gendered organizations” Acker argued that organizations are not gender

neutral, that positions and jobs have built into them assumptions about the kind of

worker who is supposed to fill them (Acker, 1991).

The idea that gender is a constitutive or even a foundational element of social

structure became enormously influential and it is now common to speak of institutions,

occupations, policies or practices as gendered (Britton, 2000). But what exactly does it

mean to say that an organization is gendered? Scholars who have formulated the same

question (Rothchild and Davies, 1994: 584; Britton, 2000: 419) have found out that

there are different answers.

2.1. Gendered organizations

The literature drawing on the so-called gendered-organizations tradition is not

always consensual about what it means to say that an organization is gendered. The

meaning of the concept is still unclear both from the theoretical and empirical points of

view. In a notable attempt at systematization that is worth following closely, Dana

Britton identified three of the most common interpretations. First, organizations may be

seen as inherently or essentially gendered, which implies that they have been “defined,

conceptualized and structured in terms of a distinction between masculinity and

femininity” (Britton, 2000: 419), presuming and inevitably reproducing gender

differences. Second, organizations or occupations may be seen as gendered if they are

male or female dominated. Finally, it is possible to argue that gendering occurs when

organizations “are symbolically and ideologically described and conceived in terms of a

discourse that draws on hegemonically defined masculinities and femininities” (Britton,


71

2000: 420). According to Britton each one of these interpretations poses specific

problems, particularly regarding their implications for change. While most authors have

picked up elements of the various interpretations, it is nonetheless possible to detect a

predominant emphasis in concrete proposals.

The most salient examples of the first standpoint –the conception of

organizations as inherently gendered— can be found in the thread of literature on

bureaucratic organizations (Ferguson, 1984; Savage and Witz, 1992). Although not

relying on this tradition, Acker’s analysis is equally based on the assumption of a

‘constitutive’ gender logic, concealed by apparently gender-neutral technical-rational

control systems. Organizations are considered to be gendered, in that their structure and

organizational logic are implicitly based on assumptions about gender: “To say that an

organization, or any other analytical unit, is gendered means that advantage and

disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and identity, are

patterned through and in terms of a distinction between male and female, masculine and

feminine” (Acker, 1991: 167).

According to the author, every organizational logic has a gendered substructure

observable in written work rules, labor contracts, managerial directives or systems of

job evaluation. In this sense, there is no such a thing as a gender-neutral job description

since every job has to be filled by real workers. The gender-neutral status of a job is

dependent on the assumption of a disembodied, abstract worker who exists only for the

work and has no other conflicting imperatives of existence.49 The closest this ideal

category comes to a real worker is the male worker whose existence centers on his full-

time life-long job, while his wife takes care of his personal needs and children. Thus,

she argues, “the concept ‘a job’ is (…) implicitly a gendered concept, even though

organizational logic presents it as gender neutral. A job already contains the gender-

based division of labor and the separation between the public and the private sphere. [It]

assumes a particularly gendered organization of domestic life and social production”

(Acker, 1991: 170). This position echoes similar criticisms of the liberal notion of the

individual as a universal being, abstracted from bodily attributes. Just like the ‘political

fiction’ of the individual or the citizen, she sustains, “the worker with a job is the same

49 The absence or even the banishment of sexuality from the workplace is seen as part of the wider process of differentiation between home (the place for legitimate sexual activity) and the place of capitalist production; the concept of a disembodied job is taken as a symbol of this separation of work and sexuality.

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universal individual who in social reality is a man. The concept of a universal worker

excludes and marginalizes women who cannot, almost by definition, achieve the

qualities of a real worker because to do so is to become like a man” (Acker, 1991: 171-

172).

As demonstrated by this analysis, the assumption that organizations are

gendered usually corresponds to the recognition that they are masculinized, in that they

are built by and represent the interests of men and male workers. Britton’s contention

that the designation of organizations as gendered is needlessly generic is a good

illustration of this point: “as the hypothetical worker is male, so too the paradigmatic

organization presumed by ideology and policy is male- dominated” (Britton, 1999:

469/470).

There are a number of problems inherent to this perspective. On the one hand,

considering that organizations per se are intrinsically gendered/masculinized (and

therefore oppressive) deprives the theory of much of its heuristic strength. For instance,

it prevents the possibility of investigating the existence of female-

dominated/masculinized settings (e.g. female guards in women’s prisons) or male-

dominated/feminized ones (e.g. certain churches/ religious institutions). On the other

hand, this approach is also problematic in terms of implications for change. If

bureaucratic organizations are seen as essentially gendered, social change can only arise

from a radical transformation or even the eradication of bureaucracy, as we know it. In

this context, it becomes impossible to look for ways of improving existing

organizational environments.

Interestingly, it has been shown that, under certain circumstances, more

bureaucratized settings may be less oppressively gendered than other more

informal/collegial contexts. In their research on engineering labor markets, for example,

Cook and Waters found that bureaucratic regulations imposing standardized recruitment

and promotion practices increased the representation of women at entry and

management levels (Cook and Waters, 1998).50

50 Commenting on this, Britton notes that a strategy aiming at understanding the factors that give rise not to un-gendered organizations but to less oppressively gendered forms “helps to make sense of the fairly persistent finding that, in the spirit of Weber’s original analysis, in some cases, more bureaucracy, rather than less, appears to reduce gender inequality” (Britton, 2000: 430).


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The second position, where organizations are considered to be gendered only to

the extent that they are or have become female or male dominated, has been developed

mainly by historical work on the transformation of specific occupations. This has been

called the ‘nominal’ approach to applying the concept of gendering (Britton, 2000: 424;

Savage and Witz, 1992). Here, the term ‘feminization’ has been extensively used to

mean the process through which an occupation becomes female dominated. For

instance, this has been particularly salient in work about the feminization of clerical

professions (Davies, 1982).

However, I agree with Britton that this interpretation is also problematic and

may even obscure the process through which gender works in specific historical

contexts, undermining the potential of the ‘gendered organization’ perspective:

“Describing an occupation as feminized or masculinized, or, more generally, as

gendered, is not at all the same thing as noting that it is male or female dominated, and

conflating the two may keep us from seeing contexts in which male-dominated work,

for instance, is more or less masculinized” (Britton, 2000: 424).

A more fruitful distinction is proposed by Roos and McDaniel (1996), between

sex composition – the representation of male and female workers - and gender typing –

the extent to which an occupation becomes associated with feminine or masculine

characteristics or is seen as appropriate for men or for women. While the two variables

frequently co-vary, Britton argues that it should also be possible to treat them

independently. The example of research about female correctional officers in women’s

prisons provides one good example of how an occupation dominated by members of

one sex may be sex-typed in the opposite way.51

In any case, speaking of organizations as a whole is different from speaking of

sex-segregated occupations. Specific occupational areas may be masculinized or

feminized but, since they exist within masculinized organizational structures, this

51 This example also shows how change occurs in terms of the sex-typing and sex-composition of certain occupations. Before the establishment of the first women’s prisons in the US the job of guarding female inmates was not only male dominated but also sex-typed as masculine, that is, seen as appropriate for men. Their superior physical strength was considered necessary, since women criminals were perceived as even more irredeemable than men. Later on, during the late nineteenth century, the view that women offenders needed a different kind of care led to the establishment of female reformatories dominated by female officers. At present, while the occupation is still female dominated, there seems to be little evidence that it is sex typed as feminine. In fact, available data shows that female officers not only do not feel that women inmates need a different kind of care or that their job requires female stereotypical characteristics, but they also perceive policy differences between women’s and men’s institutions as evidence that women prisons are more lax than men’s (Britton, 1999; Martin and Jurik, 1996).

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“appears to determine, in the last instance, the success and perceptions of workers in

both masculinized and feminized occupations. (…) Given that the arena in which

[occupations] are performed may be said to be masculinized, this suggests that workers,

even in female-dominated occupations, who possess masculine characteristics (i.e. who

‘do masculinity’ successfully) will accrue more advantage than their feminine

counterparts” (Britton, 2000: 426). This help explain some apparently paradoxical

findings in the research on gender and work organizations, such as the success of men

in female-dominated occupations (Williams, 1993) or the more male-like biographies of

women in top positions in male dominated occupations.

This approach has serious implications for analyzing the conditions for change.

Against the prevailing idea that numerical representation is a determining factor for

altering gender inequalities in organizations, critics of the nominal approach sustain that

sex balance alone may not be enough to change the gendered nature of the workplace

(Williams, 1995; Yoder, 1991, Britton, 2000). According to this perspective, research

should concentrate on whether and how gender composition relates to the feminization

or masculinization of work settings, instead of assuming a priori a direct

correspondence between these variables.

A third and probably the most common way in which researchers have been

referring to gendered organizations is situated at a more discursive level. Here, an

organization is seen as gendered to the extent that it is symbolically and ideologically

conceived in terms of gender divisions. Kanter, whose work focuses more on structural

than on symbolic processes, pinpoints the ‘masculine ethic’ of corporate management

(Kanter, 1977); Joan Acker includes the construction of symbols that explain, express,

reinforce, or oppose gender divisions as one of the various levels at which ‘gendering’

occurs in organizations (Acker, 1991); Sylvia Gherardi has emphasized the discursive

construction of gender in organizational cultures (Gherardi, 1994).

The problem with this standpoint is that it focuses exclusively on discourses and

not on the institutional and structural contexts where these discourses are produced. A

discourse-centered perspective fails to incorporate the extra-symbolic expressions of the

gendering processes. Above all, it eludes the importance of the historical and contextual

conditions under which gendering occurs.

From this systematization I retain two basic insights, which can be seen as an

application of those stressed above. The first refers to the importance of context in


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shaping specific patterns of gender relations. This has been increasingly recognized in a

number of empirical researches. One outstanding example comes from Ely’s study of

the gendering process in the legal profession (Ely, 1995). The author compares the

perception of traits necessary for success and the self-definition of women lawyers in

both sex-integrated and male-dominated law firms. In the latter case female attorneys

seemed to develop very rigid patterns of gender differentiation (seeing women as more

flirtatious and sensitive, and men as aggressive and self-confident) and evaluated female

stereotypical traits less favorably. On the contrary, those in sex-integrated firms were

more likely to minimize gender differences, to value feminine traits over masculine

ones and to see themselves as more capable of succeeding. This research demonstrates

the importance of contextual variables both in understanding the concrete ways in which

gender operates and in conceiving change. According to Britton, “without attention to

the settings in which [gendering] occurs, we run the risk of reifying gender in an

organizational and occupational context, and become unable to identify ways in which

these environments might become less oppressively gendered” (Britton, 2000: 428).

The second insight refers to the problem of analytical levels. Applying the concept at

the individual/interactional level is different from applying it at a more aggregated

organizational level. Individual actors interpret, reproduce and subvert normative

conceptions of gender that operate in the level of the organization. The gendering

process at the individual and interactional levels is often more flexible and contradictory

than what might be predicted. The way in which workers sometimes reinterpret the

characteristics of their jobs in order to accommodate them to their gender status is a

good example of such flexibility. In a study of female firefighters, Scuratowicz found

that these women had broadened their interpretation of the physical requirements

associated with their job from the male-stereotypical sense of ‘brute-strength’ to a more

nuanced conception, which combined strength, flexibility, endurance and fitness

(Scuratowicz, 1996). Another example may be found in the complexity of processes

creating and maintaining sex-segregation (Cockburn, 1985), which, as stated by Acker,

have “as much to do with employers’ calculations of their advantage and their

exploitation of gender differences as with male workers’ collective creation of their

identities as men and workers or female workers’ identification with their domestic

roles” (Acker, 1992a: 566).

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A question still remains: is it possible to say that an organizational setting is

more or less gendered? If so, how can we identify the extent to which an organization

may be considered less gendered than another? A first step to answer these specific

questions concerning measurement is to adopt a tentative definition of ‘gendered’

organizations. Britton has stated a provisional definition that organizations or work

environments in which gender is less salient are “those in which gendered

characteristics, taken here to mean hegemonically defined masculinities, and

femininities, take on less significance in the construction, reproduction and allocation of

‘advantage and disadvantage, exploitation and control, action and emotion, meaning and

identity” (Britton, 2000: 423).

I will adopt a similar definition but in a slightly different version: gendered

organizations are those where characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity or

femininity (Connell, 1987) have some degree of ‘explanatory power’52 in terms of the

definition of its prevailing 'structure of advancement and exploitation' (Schmitter,

1981), that is, on production and allocation of material and symbolic resources.

Henceforth, drawing on the contributions of Acker, Cohn and Britton, it is possible to

identify some of the basic lines through which ‘gendering’ occurs within organizations.

First, there are structural divisions along gender lines (divisions of labor, of

allowed behaviors, of locations in physical space, of power). For example, in terms of

recruitment and selection procedures, organizations are gendered in that they prefer

workers whose time, energy and attention will not be drawn away by non-work needs

and commitments. Second, there is the level of organizational culture and ideology.

This refers to cultural values about masculinity and femininity and to the construction of

symbols and images that explain, express, reinforce, or sometimes oppose gender

divisions. For instance, what is valued in an organization or in a worker is often

expressed in terms that are culturally seen as masculine. Leaders, for example, are

described as ‘forceful, hard, aggressive, tough, strong, ambitious.’ Third, there are

patterns of interaction and identity formation that express, reinforce or subvert those

structural and ideological constraints. How would this work concretely within

organizations?

52 Salience, as in Britton’s definition, is a rather vague concept. I believe that ‘explanatory power’ is a more exact expression.


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2.2. Women's presence in organizations: conditions and constraints

Besides the fundamental recognition of the gendered character of organizations,

analysis in this field has been developed in close association with the more global issue

of minorities in organizations, a fertile confrontation field for structuralist and

individualist approaches. The question of the relative weight of organizational positions

and individual characteristics in explaining men and women’s behavior has been of

central concern in these discussions. While the first position confers an overwhelming

explanatory importance on organizational dynamics, power structures and especially

relative numbers, the second stresses the specific social characteristics of the actors as a

key factor for understanding men and women’s organizational behavior and strategies.

Kanter’s path-breaking research Men and Women of the Corporation (1977),

which opened the way to the study of gender in organizations, is probably the best

example of the structuralist framework in this field. Despite later revisions, debates and

criticisms, it remains, in various ways, an invaluable reference for the study of gender

relations in organizational settings. In a case study of an American Corporation (dubbed

Indsco) in the mid-70s, Kanter stresses the importance of organizational dynamics and

structural features to account for people’s responses. She identifies three major factors

that condition work behavior: structure of opportunity, power and relative numbers.

Discrepancies in the opportunity structure – of mobility and growth - are seen as

affecting engagement with work, that is, levels of ambition and commitment, ways of

seeking social recognition and amount of risk-taking. Such a structure is determined by

promotion rates from particular jobs, ladder steps associated with a position, the range

and length of career paths opening from it, access to challenge and increase in skills and

rewards as well as individual prospects relative to others of his or her own age and

seniority (Kanter, 1977: 246).

According to Kanter’s model, those low in opportunity are unlikely to develop

the necessary motivation that would allow them to improve their situation. They tend to

limit their aspirations, have lower self-esteem, seek satisfaction in activities outside

work or interrupt their careers, have a horizontal orientation (compare themselves to

peers), be critical of high-power people, be less likely to protest directly or seek change,

and be more concerned with extrinsic rewards such as the economic or social payoff of

the job. On the contrary, those high in opportunity are expected to have high aspirations,

high self-esteem, be committed to the organization’s goals, have a vertical orientation

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and be more concerned with the intrinsic aspects of the job. Cycles of advantage and

disadvantage are set in motion that objectively limit the individual’s responses to their

organizational situations.

The second building block of this structural model, power, is defined as efficacy

(the ability to mobilize resources) more than domination, and is seen as a virtual

requisite for effective performance. Kanter examines the specifically organizational

ways in which power accumulates: through activities, often made possible by formal job

attributes, and through informal alliances with sponsors, peers or even subordinates.

The routinization or visibility of the function, its relevance to the organization, approval

by high-status people and the existence of sponsors or favorable alliance with peers are

among the factors that determine differential levels of organizational power. Kanter

hypothesizes that people low in power resources would tend to foster lower group

morale, behave in more authoritarian ways, try to retain control and restrict subordinates

autonomy and use more coercive than persuasive power.

The third element in the model, relative numbers, is probably the most tested

and discussed component of the whole theory. It refers to the proportions and social

composition of people in similar situations, that is, the relevant social types in various

parts of the organization, e.g. women, blacks, and other ethnic minorities. The basic

assumption here is that numerical distributions have a major influence on the social

experiences of the group. In Kanter’s case study, women were found in extremely low

numbers among male peers, a situation that created strikingly different interaction

contexts for men and women. Due to their limited proportion – the very few among the

very many - these women became tokens, that is, representatives of their category rather

than independent individuals, “symbols of how-women-can-do, stand-ins for all

women” (Kanter, 1977: 207).

Tokenism is not necessarily a gender-related issue. According to Laws, it is

“likely to be found whenever a dominant group is under pressure to share privilege,

power, or other desirable commodities with a group that is excluded” (Laws, 1975: 51).

However, it has been generally defined as an insidious pattern of experience that usually

develops when women break existing barriers in certain occupational fields. While the

institution of tokenism may have certain advantages also for the tokens, who may

experience the “thrill of achievement in a new realm” (Yoder et al., 1983: 325) or

increased self-esteem derived from “mastering a difficult situation and from getting into


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places that traditionally exclude others of one’s kind” (Kanter, 1977: 240), its negative

side effects have been overwhelmingly pointed out.

In Kanter’s view, the token situation accounts for many of the difficulties that

numerically scarce people face in fitting and gaining acceptance in an organization. The

existence of tokens is considered to foster social segregation and may lead the persons

in that position to develop compensation ‘strategies’, either by overachievement, hiding

successes or turning against people of their own kind. In this theory of tokenism

numbers are thus considered as having a major significance: “numbers are important not

only because they symbolize the presence or absence of discrimination but also because

they have real consequences for performance” (1977: 6). The relevance of both Kanter’s

analysis of tokenism and the discussions and revisions it generated is of particular

interest for the analysis of gender relations in atypical situations or “gender

inappropriate occupations” (occupations stereotypically defined as masculine) as is the

case of the military. A more detailed analysis is thus necessary to clarify the social

dynamics it entails.

2.2.1. Kanter’s model of tokenism

Kanter identifies four group types on the basis of different proportional

representation of kinds of people: at one extreme, uniform groups are those composed

of only one social type of people. These groups can be “considered homogeneous with

respect to master statuses such as sex, race or ethnicity” (1977: 208); at the other

extreme, skewed groups are those where there is a dominance of one group over the

other with a typological ratio of around 85: 15; tilted groups, with ratios of perhaps 65:

35, move toward a less extreme distribution; while in balanced groups – at about a 60:

40 down to a 50: 50 ratio – the effect of proportions is neutralized and outputs for

individuals will depend more on other structural and personal factors. Tokenism as

defined by Kanter refers to the numeric skewedness of one’s group, that is, tokens are

members of a subgroup that composes less than 15% of the whole group. This was the

case of women in her study. Their rarity was considered to account for particularly

negative consequences: performance pressures due to high visibility, social isolation

resulting from the exaggeration of differences by the dominant group (contrast), a

situation that Kanter called ‘boundary heightening’, and finally ‘role-encapsulation’ as

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an effect of gender stereotyping (assimilation). Visibility, contrast and assimilation in

turn generated typical token responses.

First, the high visibility of the token – a novel perceptual element whose every

move is noticed and easily recalled - leads to various forms of performance pressures.

While “the token does not have to work hard to have her presence noticed (...), she does

have to work hard to have her achievements noticed” (1977: 216). Because that

visibility stems from characteristics of the master status in this case the discrepant

gender location, other aspects of the token’s performance tend to be ignored (the

tokenism eclipse). For instance, women’s physical appearance tended to eclipse their

technical abilities, thus producing additional pressure. However, tokenism seems to set

up contradictory dynamics, for people in that minority status may also be afraid of being

too outstanding in performance for fear of retaliation. They would thus try to become

socially invisible: “paradoxically, while the token women felt they had to do better than

anyone else in order to continue, they also felt, in some cases, that their successes would

not be rewarded and should be kept to themselves (…). The choices for those in the

token position were either to over-achieve and carefully construct a public performance

that minimized organizational and peer concerns, to try to turn the notoriety of publicity

to advantage, or to find ways to become socially invisible” (1977: 217).

Visibility and publicity are thus a two-edged sword for tokens, since they are

both representatives and exceptions: on one hand, they are considered exceptions and

unusual examples of their kind, especially when they succeed; on the other hand, they

serve as symbols of their category when they fumble. Kanter sustains that what in the

literature was identified as women’s ‘fear of success’ is in fact token women’s fear of

visibility, that is, the result of their attempt to face pressures by making themselves and

their achievements invisible, playing down the recognition of their presence. As later

noted by Yoder, Kanter’s findings have helped counter a long-standing tendency, both

in popular and scholarly literature, to attribute to women the difficulties they encounter

in the workplace, supposedly resulting from their ‘Cinderella complex (Dowling, 1981),

the ‘impostor phenomenon’ (Clance and Imes, 1978), or their ‘inadequacies on the fast

track rather than the mummy track’ (Schwartz, 1989).

A second consequence of the token situation is contrast, the exaggeration of

differences. Because perceived differences generate uncertainties among dominants

about how to behave toward tokens, this effect leads dominants to amplify both their


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commonalty and the tokens’ differences. By doing so, they create and heighten

boundaries of which previously they might not even have been aware. Shared elements

of the dominant culture (for instance, in the case of masculinity, displays of aggression

or potency) are thus emphasized in contrast to the token, as a way of reaffirming in-

group understandings or asserting group solidarity. “Ironically” —Kanter (1977: 223)

notes— “tokens (…) are thus instruments for underlining rather than undermining

majority culture.” Contrast is also built through other means. Kanter identifies three

other interactional phenomena which contribute to boundary heightening, whether

consciously or unconsciously: interruptions as reminders of difference (reminders of the

special status of the token such as apologies for the use of certain language or questions

of appropriateness), overt inhibition (informal isolation of tokens by keeping them away

from certain occasions and networks) and loyalty tests (aimed at assuring that tokens,

whose position raises uncertainty due to the possibility of ‘outside loyalties’, will not

turn against dominants). “The dilemma posed here to tokens was how to reconcile their

awareness of difference generated by informal interaction with dominants with the need,

in order to belong, to suppress dominants’ concerns about the difference” (Kanter,

1977: 229) Hence, tokens’ answers to the reinforcement of cultural boundaries could

take two forms: either accepting isolation with the risk of exclusion from important

informal socialization, or trying to become insiders by defining themselves as

exceptions and turning against their own social category. The occurrence of this second

general response possibility suggests to Kanter a re-examination of the popularized

‘Women-prejudiced-against-women’ hypothesis (also known as the ‘Queen Bee

syndrome’) as being of structural rather than sexual origins.53

Finally, a third type of effect is set in motion that aims at reducing dominants’

uncertainty about tokens through the use of stereotypes: assimilation. “The

characteristics of tokens as individuals are often distorted to fit pre-existing

generalizations about their category as a group” (Kanter, 1977: 230). Tokens become

encapsulated in specific roles that keep them in a bounded place and out of the

mainstream interaction. Although instances of ‘mistaken identities’ may be changed,

this involves an extra burden in terms of time spent in re-affirming accurate role

53 Another example of this type of dynamic is the two-token situation, where dominants may develop strategies (like setting up invidious comparisons or treating two women as an automatic pair) that undermine solidarity between them, defeat possible alliances and foster distance and competitiveness. Structural circumstances like pressures from the dominant group may thus result in what otherwise could be seen as prejudicial response of women to each other (Kanter, 1977: 237-238).

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relations. Usually, status leveling occurs, which involves “making adjustments in the

perception of a token’s professional role to fit with the expected position of the token’s

category” (Kanter, 1977: 231). One example would be the tendency to treat women as

secretaries even when others know they are not. By using status leveling, dominants

induce tokens into stereotypical roles that preserve familiar forms of interaction. In the

case of Indsco, Kanter observed four types of informal ‘role traps’, defining for

dominants a single response to the token’s sexuality: the ‘mother’, the ‘seductress’, the

‘pet’, and the ‘iron maiden.’ ‘The mother’ is supposed to be a rather ‘safe’ role, since

mothers are available to all in providing emotional support and are not necessarily

vulnerable to sexual pursuit. However, it has its costs. Women who are typecast as

nurturers are simultaneously assimilated into stereotypical feminine characteristics such

as excessive emotionality, exactly those that are least valued and most criticized by

those in positions of authority. The ‘seductress’, a second Freudian type, defines a

sexual object role much more subject to tension, for it involves elements of sexual

competition and jealousy. Frequently subject to ‘protectionist’ attitudes, the perceived

sexuality of the seductress blots out all other characteristics. A third type, the ‘pet’, was

identified as a mascot, an amusing, cute symbol, towards whom the male group tended

to develop a “kind of ‘look-what-she-did-and-she’s-only-a-woman attitude’”, provoking

in turn self-effacing girlish responses on the part of these women. Finally a fourth type

of role, the ‘iron maiden’, refers to the stereotypical role into which strong women

usually fall. Those who were inducted into this profile –either because they failed to fall

into any of the other categories or because they in fact resisted role encapsulation– were

considered tougher and more militant than they actually were.

Kanter found that, in general, the tokens’ responses to role encapsulation tended

to be conservative. Low-risk strategies for minimizing change and attempts to adjust to

previously defined stereotypical roles were found to be the most common. What should

be underlined is that, because of this pattern and in the absence of external pressures for

change, tokenism can become a self-perpetuating system. Hence, “acceptance of role

encapsulation and attendant limitations on demonstration of competence may work to

keep down the numbers of women in the upper ranks of the organization, thus

continuing to put people in token positions” (Kanter, 1977: 237). This tendency is

strengthened by pressures and inducements on tokens to dissociate from others of their

category, thus failing to promote, or even blocking, their entry into corporate ranks. The


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tendency to perpetuate discrimination at the top is even more inflated by the particular

characteristics of certain jobs that make them more likely to produce discrimination.

This is the case of the high uncertainty of managerial powerful positions that make trust

important “thus evoking a preference for confining power to people resembling those

already in power” (Kanter, 1977: 292), a process termed as the “cloning effect”. The

token position thus contains various dilemmas and contradictions; the person in this

position is subject to personal, social and organizational ambivalence.

Kanter’s work has been extensively tested and her findings have been replicated

across a variety of settings. Although with slightly different expressions, the negative

consequences and dilemmas of numerical scarcity were identified among the first

women to join certain occupations such as correction officers in male prisons (Jurik,

1985; Zimmer, 1986), police women on patrol (Martin, 1980), coal miners (Hammond

and Mahoney 1983), physicians (Floge and Merill, 1985) and academics (Young,

Mackenzie and Sherif, 1980). In the field of military organizations, Yoder, Adams and

Prince (1983) found that the first women to join the military academy at West Point

reported social isolation, excessive visibility and role encapsulation. Rustad (1982) also

identified similar patterns in a study of American enlisted women.

However, Kanter’s proposal has also been subject to serious criticism. For

instance, one problem that has not been highlighted, but nonetheless may be pointed

out, refers to a possible ‘over-simplification’ of the relevant social identities and

cleavages that operate in organizational settings. Multiple cleavages or distinct

interacting master statuses may impact on the group typology in ways that complicate

the modalities in which the different variables interact in the model.54 Yet, the main

criticism that has been directed to this theory of tokenism refers to the supposedly

structuralist determinism of the approach, evident in Kanter’s interpretation of the

effects of numerical balance.

54 Kanter refers briefly to the articulation and interaction effects between the various factors, but does not elaborate on this argument. She points out the dynamic character of the hypothesized associations and the consequent difficulty in identifying cause and effect (e.g. does low opportunity produce low commitment or do those with low commitment get channeled into low opportunity positions? How does tokenism interact with the other variables?). Kanter’s somehow limited answer is that some type of Feedback Loops connects structure and behavior producing upwards cycle of advantage and downward cycles of disadvantage. This is behind such phenomena as ‘power begets power’, later in this section identified after Robert Merton as the ‘Matthew effect’.

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2.2.2. Re-evaluating numbers, rethinking tokenism

Kanter (1977: 212) assumes that the negative consequences of tokenism are

mainly an effect of numbers and that these consequences are similar, regardless of the

category from which the tokens come. Although at some point of her argument she

admits that “the specific kinds of people and their history of relationships with

dominants provide cultural content for specific communications” (Kanter, 1977: 212),

or underlines the fact that ‘preexisting generalizations’ about the token’s category

account for some of the negative organizational dynamics, such as ‘assimilation’

(stereotypical role encapsulation) (1977: 230-232), her main argument is that “the job

makes the person” (1977: 292).55 The difficulties women face in a token’s situation are

considered similar to the experiences of people of any other type that are represented in

very low numbers (the lone black among whites, the lone man among women, the few

foreigners among natives). In sum, it is sustained that “any situation where proportions

of significant types of people are highly skewed can produce similar themes and

processes. It was rarity and scarcity, rather than femaleness per se that shaped the

environment for women in the parts of Indsco more populated by men” (Kanter, 1977:

207). More balanced numbers of men and women would presumably eliminate the

negative characteristics described.

Both assumptions –the irrelevance of gender per se and the positive effects of

balancing numbers— have been subject to criticism and discussion in the light of a vast

set of empirical findings. In particular, inconsistencies have been found regarding

Kanter’s assumption that the situation of women improves as their numbers increase in

an organization56 (Bird, 1996). Over time, Kanter’s hypothesis has been challenged by

various alternative explanations. One of the most tested has been Blalock’s minority

size-inequality hypothesis (Blalock, 1970; South et al., 1982). While in the former

proposal token minorities are considered to be subject to greater hardships than non-

55 This argument is still sustained in Kanter’s after word to the 1993 edition of Men and Women of the Corporation. However, while reaffirming the importance of structural factors – opportunity, power and numbers – in determining performance and success, the author points out to the shifting nature of those factors: “access has been reshaped by macro forces outside the boundaries of the corporation. (...) The locus of careers increasingly is not the institution but the persons own professional base and network of contacts. (...) The career anxieties that of men and women face in the mid-1990s are a function of much larger forces, reshaping much larger systems” (Kanter, 1977: 290-291, 294). 56 One should nevertheless recognize that many of the subsequent criticisms focus on and isolate one element of Kanter’s model, relative numbers, leaving untested how this variable associates with the other two: opportunity structure and power.


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tokens, and it is predicted that an increase in minority numbers would help to eliminate

problems, Blalock’s perspective has led to the opposite prediction, that is, the increase

in numbers would generate additional pressure. Originating in the race relations

literature, it suggests that “minority individuals are less likely to be accepted by the

dominant category when there are enough of them to present threats to the political and

economic security of the majority” (South et al., 1982: 588). Instead of diminishing the

negative consequences of tokenism, numeric surges may be experienced as threatening

by the dominant majority, who then react by increasing discrimination. This may result

in harassment, wage inequities and blocked mobility. Support for this hypothesis from

research findings has been considered moderate to strong (South et al., 1982). How can

we thus make sense of these opposing views? Under which conditions and

circumstances does tokenism produce such disparate effects?

A critical perspective, which tries to identify the pitfalls in Kanter’s theory of

tokenism but still aims at reconciling her analysis of numbers with other types of

intervening variables, comes from Janice Yoder. She argues that Kanter’s model, as

well as subsequent replications, confounded four different factors: numeric imbalance,

gender status, occupational appropriateness and intrusiveness. Yoder considers that

despite the attention given to gender as a master status that permeates social relations in

organizations, Kanter minimized the gender of her subjects when discussing the

negative consequences of tokenism. Against the assumption that tokenism produces

identical results independently of the social category of the token, Yoder sustains that

the gender of the token affects its status. In fact, she argues, there is overwhelming

evidence that token men avoid the negative consequences of numeric imbalance

(Fairhurst and Snaveley, 1983). Some studies have shown that the visibility afforded to

token men may even enhance their opportunities for promotion. “In short” Yoder

concludes, “the negative consequences of tokenism seem to occur only for members of

social categories that are of lower status relative to the majority” (Yoder, 1991: 181).

Kanter, according to Yoder, thus failed to acknowledge the extent of organizational and

societal sexism as one of the basic causes for the negative consequences of tokenism.

How are we to explain both the popularity of Kanter’s analysis and the replication of

her findings? According to Yoder, this happens because all these studies focused on

women working in occupations stereotypically defined as masculine and considered at

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the time as inappropriate for women. ‘Gender inappropriateness’57 is thus proposed as

another relevant variable that should be added to the analysis. However, as Yoder

herself accurately notes, almost all studies of women and men tokens have been

developed in gender-inappropriate contexts. Hence, there is little or no evidence

regarding more ‘gender-neutral’ occupations to test the relative effects of this factor.

However, the various results seem to confirm the fact that in such ‘atypical’ contexts

scarce women feel performance pressures, social isolation and role encapsulation, but

men tokens do not.

A third variable that has been demonstrated to influence outcomes is

‘intrusiveness’, the degree to which the presence of minorities is seen as threatening by

the dominants. Intrusiveness –the central dimension in Blalock’s hypothesis— is also

related to the social value of occupations, in terms of compensation and prestige. Male-

dominated occupations usually score higher in both aspects. Research has extensively

shown the pervasive effect of this process of gender typing, highlighting patterns such

as the devaluation of women’s work (England, 1992; Steinberg, 1990) or an

occupation’s decrease in prestige as it becomes female-dominated (Reskin, 1991;

Maruani and Chantal, 1989). As shall be seen further on, this factor helps to explain

why women have been more eager to join male-dominated occupations or more willing

to allow men in female-dominated ones than the reverse. As Yoder (1991: 184) puts it,

“men in male-dominated occupations have more to lose by the intrusion of women in

great numbers than do women in the less prestigious female–dominated occupations,

which may actually increase the status when they are infiltrated by men.” Hence,

intrusiveness interacts with gender status in that it seems to occur when members of a

lower status group (not of a higher status group) start gaining entrance into an

occupation in greater numbers. According to the minority-size hypothesis, resistance

from the majority may increase with the numerical growth of lower-status minorities.

Dominants would thus react in order to limit minority power gains and prevent system

changes that are less likely to occur when the minority is very small. Results of a study

of women in the US Federal Bureaucracy (South et al., 1982) pointed in this direction.

The authors found that social support, operationally defined as perceived

57 The process of gender typing of occupations entails both a normative definition of what is considered appropriate work for men and women, evoking negative consequences for deviant behavior, as well as a numerical dimension, operationally defined by the ratio of women to men workers (in the occupation as a whole or in the immediate work groups) (Yoder, 1991: 182).


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encouragement for promotion from co-workers and supervisors, had a negative

correlation with female proportional representation: the greater the proportion of

women, the less encouragement for promotion females received from their male

supervisors. Yoder hypothesizes that women in Kanter’s case study may have felt the

negative effects of tokenism, not necessarily or only because they were few but because

of their increasing numbers, a growth that was perceived as particularly intrusive in a

previously all-male occupation.58

The main point of Yoder’s argument is not that numbers are not important but

that their impact should be evaluated in articulation with other variables. The combined

effects of token numbers, gender status, norms of occupational inappropriateness and

intrusiveness may generate different outcomes. It is thus possible to reconcile

apparently opposite approaches by teasing apart the individual and combined influence

of these four independent variables. A simplified synthetic description of this alternative

perspective would be the following: “The initial effects of being a token, or one of a

small group of low-status newcomers, seem to be performance pressures, social

isolation and role encapsulation, as well as, for women, sexual harassment and limited

opportunities for promotion. Gradually, as the novelty wears off and the minority group

increases a bit, the work situation becomes more comfortable. However, when numbers

of a low-status group increase substantially across the occupation, the reaction is

stepped-up harassment, blocked mobility and lower wages.” Hence, as some empirical

researches have also demonstrated (Epstein, 1981), reconciling numbers and

intrusiveness acknowledging the interplay of both theories seems not only possible but

the most fruitful analytical direction to explore. At another level of analysis this is

equivalent to stating that the analysis of structural determinants –such as those

identified by Kanter— may and should be combined with the socio-historical

characteristics of the subjects (Beccalli, 1997).

However, not only independent variables are at stake in this alternative

interpretation. The focus is also on the dependent ones. Yoder considers that one

limitation of Kanter’s approach is obvious in the policy dimension, since she ignored,

on the side of the dependent variable, more insidious forms of discrimination such as

58 It should be noted that external variables might be important. For instance, family patterns and roles may influence work attitudes, expectations and commitments, as well as global employment environment (job security etc.) may interfere with intrusiveness (O’Farrell and Harlan, 1982; Swerdlow, 1989).

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sexual harassment, wage inequality and blocked mobility, which came to be known as

the ‘glass ceiling’.59

2.2.3. Informal barriers and the glass ceiling effect

This pervasive phenomenon identifies the existence of ‘invisible’ barriers that

prevent women’s career advancement and especially their access to high-level positions

of power and prestige. The U.S Department of Labor defines the ‘glass ceiling’ as

“those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified

individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management level

positions” (Martin, 1991). At present, there is a certain degree of controversy as to

whether the glass ceiling should be understood as a generic term covering different

forms of labor force disadvantage or rather identified with specific, intensified

discrimination at the higher levels of managerial hierarchies (Baxter and Wright, 2000a,

2000b).

In a polemical article presenting the results of a study of the US, Australia and

Sweden based on cross-sectional aggregate data, Baxter and Wright have argued that

there was no evidence for a systematic glass ceiling effect in the US and very little in

the other countries. Understanding the ‘glass ceiling’ as the “specific claim that the

obstacles women face to promotion relative to men systematically increase as they

move up the hierarchy”, Baxter and Wright sustain that, within the limits of cross-

sectional data analysis, there seems to be no empirical confirmation of the hypothesis.

In their view “since the rhetoric of a glass ceiling may deflect political attention away

from struggles over opportunities at the lower levels of hierarchies (...) the metaphor

should be used with caution” (2000a: 290). Among other aspects, criticisms were made

of the fact that the study focuses on one of the various dimensions of the phenomena:

that of discrimination in vertical promotion, leaving aside other dimensions such as pay

or prestige (Britton and Williams, 2000). Similarly, Ferre and Purkayashta (2000) have

noted that the cumulative effect of constant discrimination in promotion across levels of

managerial hierarchies, and not only that which happens at the top, can be considered a

form of glass ceiling.

59 If this criticism may be applicable concerning sexual harassment and wage inequality, it is probably unfair regarding the blocked mobility variable, since Kanter includes this in her analysis of power and opportunity. The neglect of these other components of her model may explain the inaccuracy of the critical comment.


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In any case, independently of definitional and methodological problems, the

various authors involved in this debate agree on a range of issues, namely on the fact

that women face systematic obstacles to promotions in managerial hierarchies, be they

the result of objective discrimination in promotion decisions or more indirect forms of

discrimination built into institutional structures or social environments (Baxter and

Wright, 2000b: 814).

Benokraitis and Feagin have typified the latter type of phenomenon (1986).

They described the informal and subtle ways in which women’s trajectories are

undercut. Among others, they identify the following: condescending chivalry, where a

boss protects a woman employee from what could be useful criticism, referring to

protectionist and paternalistic attitudes;60 supportive discouragement, where a women is

discouraged from competing for a position because of the risk of a possible failure;

subjective objectification, being grouped with ‘all women’ (the same as being a token);

considerate domination, such as deciding what responsibilities a married woman can or

cannot handle, instead of leaving the decision to her; radiant devaluation, when a

woman is given extravagant praise for doing what is considered routine when men do it

(the ‘dancing-dog’ effect). All these practices, close to what Lorber parsimoniously

named the Salieri Phenomenon, “undermine a woman’s reputation for competence in

the eyes of others and her abilities in her own eyes, making it less likely that she will be

visible to gatekeepers or considered a legitimate competitor for a position of power”

(Lorber, 1994: 237). Arguably, the intensity or pervasiveness of such practices may

change over time and context. The major problem, however, seems to be the circular

reproduction of both privilege and disadvantage that came to be known as the Matthew

effect.61 It should, however, be noted that the assumption of cumulative disadvantage

implied in this model has not always received empirical confirmation. Referring to

occupational sex segregation, Jacobs notes that such a model implies several conditions:

that older women will be more segregated than younger ones; that changes will be due

principally to new cohorts of women entering male-dominated fields, and also that

women will not be entering traditional male occupations –predictions which are not

always confirmed by empirical evidence. On the contrary, he argues, “when social

60 As Kanter (1997: 241) reminds us, deference can also be a patronizing reminder of difference. 61 Robert Merton first described this effect in science to explain the ‘halo’ that winning the Nobel Price confers (Merton, 1968).

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restrictions on entry into male-dominated pursuits become somewhat more relaxed,

some women in all age groups take advantage of these new opportunities” (Jacobs,

1993: 52). This raises the important question of gender segregation in the workplace,

particularly in relation to women’s access to non-traditional occupational fields.

2.3. Crossing the lines: segregation and gender in non-traditional occupations

Gender segregation has been signaled as one of the most persistent and

widespread characteristics of work in modern societies. It affects the structure of the

labor market, workplace relationships, control of the work process and wage relations.

As seen above, although subject to great variation, this segregation pattern usually

entails a devaluation of women’s work in terms of its social value, salary and benefits

(Reskin, 1991) and is accompanied by a gender typing of jobs as masculine and

feminine.

In particular, the marginalization of women in male-dominated occupations has

been identified as a major tendency in the work world (David and Vicarelli, 1994). In

their volume In a Men’s World. Essays on Women in Male-Dominated Professions,

Anne Spencer and David Podmore (1987) have individuated some of the factors at the

origin of such marginalization dynamics. A first obstacle refers to the process of sex

typing of occupations, that is, the existence of stereotypes associated with certain

professions such as combativeness, decision-making skills, or physical endurance as

opposed to female stereotypical and supposedly ‘natural’ instability, emotionality and

fragility.62 A second obstacle results from the absence of a mentoring ‘support system’.

Due to their recent access to these professions, women are deprived of this informal

network. A third obstacle relates to the conflict between the total dedication required by

professional commitments and the multiple interruptions and discontinuities derived

mostly from family responsibilities. Finally, a fourth problem regards the hostility of

both ‘clients’ who are unwilling to accept women, and male colleagues worried about

the loss of prestige or even of retribution after the entrance of women (Spencer and

Podmore, 1987).

62 Referring to this issue, Cohn notes that, “what is especially complicated for women about masculine framing of values is two-fold. It is not that a woman can’t have those qualities, but first, she may not be perceived as having those qualities, even when she does. And second, if she is perceived as having them, she is often not admired in the same way: she’s not a strong leader – she’s a (rhymes with witch)” (Cohn, 1999: 8-34.)


91

Nevertheless, during the last few decades women have been entering a variety of

nontraditional and male-dominated occupations. The question has thus been raised as to

what extent the growing presence of women in these areas entails an inversion of

previous segregation patterns or, on the contrary, becomes a source of new

differentiation. If, on the one hand, a decrease of segregation has been signaled in

association with growing educational levels and redefinition of vocational choices

among women (Piccone Stella and Saraceno, 1992), on the other hand, new processes

of systematic selectivity have been identified that still account for gender

discrimination. The growing number of women in the work force seems to hide the

reality of intra-occupational segregation. Women tend to be over-represented in less

prestigious, and lower paid areas of activity within occupations. Likewise, a vertical

segmentation in terms of power is also visible in the limited representation of women in

the higher ranks and leadership positions.

These dilemmas are amplified when women enter non-traditional occupations

where they have to confront the variety of structural and cultural obstacles that have

been highlighted before.63 However, looking at segregation as something that only

happens to women is only a part of reality (even if the most prominent). As Christine

Williams accurately noted, “occupational sex-segregation is a two-way street: it is just

as important to understand what keeps men out of female jobs as it is to understand

what keeps women out of male jobs” (Williams, 1993: 2).

A first finding is that men are even less likely than women to aspire to work in

gender-atypical jobs. Unlike male-dominated jobs where proportions of women have

dramatically increased over the last thirty years, female-dominated occupations have not

changed their sex composition in significant ways (Jacobs, 1993: 53-54; Kauppinen-

Toropainen and Lammi, 1993). There seems to be no agreement on the reasons for this.

Some explanations have been tentatively proposed. The first assumes that this happens

because pressures for sex-role conformity are stronger for men than for women; a

second explanation is that female-dominated occupations are relatively unattractive in

terms of wages and benefits. A final alternative holds that this result is an artifact of the

limited number of female-dominated occupations (Jacobs, 1993: 62). Additionally, men

63 However we should not lose sight of the importance of context and the flexibility of interaction strategies to accommodate change. For instance, in a study of Rapid Transit Operatives Marian Swerdlow shows how men and women developed accommodative patterns that allowed them to accept women as co-workers without giving up their beliefs about male superiority (Swerdlow, 1989).

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who ‘cross over’ usually do not stay very long, leaving to take jobs that are more highly

rewarded in terms of pay and prestige (Williams, 1993: 4). In the words of Jerry Jacobs,

“women are more likely to be pushed out of male-dominated fields while men are more

likely to be pulled out of female-dominated fields” (Jacobs, 1993: 61).

Also remarkable is the fact that men who enter female-dominated occupations

do not seem to face the same problems women do in male-dominated settings.

Empirical research has shown that the minority status of men in traditional women’s

occupations tends to turn into a career advantage. In a study of men and women in

nursing, librarianship and social work in the United States, Williams found out that men

not only were found in the more prestigious and better paid functions but they also

seemed to be on a “glass escalator’: they were pressed by their male mentors to move up

in their professions into positions of authority. The same has been stated by Izraeli who

proposes an explanation: “even where women are the majority of the workers, men tend

to be favored for positions of authority, because women and men will accept men as

representing their general interests but will see women as representing only women’s

interests” (Izraeli, 1984).64 However, Williams also reports that sometimes these men

faced a glass ceiling at a higher level where affirmative action policies protect women’s

placement (Williams, 1992). Likewise, even if men do not experience the same

structural obstacles women do, they too are confronted with the need to reassert their

gender status. Crossing over, for both men and women, represents a challenge to the

gender order thus creating the need to reassert and vindicate their true and ‘right’ gender

status.

While in gender-atypical jobs women are often suspected of ‘masculinization’

and are thus required to present female gender ‘credentials’; men are also pressed to

emphasize their masculinity, attempting to create distance from female colleagues

(Williams, 1989). In a study of men employed in nursing and caregiving occupations in

Nordic countries, Kauppinen-Toropainen and Lammi (1993) found that men felt they

were trapped in a double-bind situation since they were seen as strangers by other men

and were pressed into traditional masculine roles by their female colleagues.

The need to stress the ‘right’ gender location reinforces even more gender

differences in nontraditional settings. This is done through both formal processes such

64 Here we find again the effect of the classificatory asymmetry of gender representations and the way in which both men and women share them.


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as occupational segregation or the symbolic reaffirmation of sex differences in

sumptuary and etiquette rules and informal strategies such as differential evaluation and

homosocial65 networks and sociability (Briton, 1990; Lorber, 1994). This seems to be

the principal similarity between men’s and women’s experiences of sex segregation: the

continuous pressure to conform to gender-appropriate behavioral norms that defines a

‘revolving-door’ pattern of mobility (the frequent movement of workers in and out of

sex-atypical jobs) for both men and women (Jacobs, 1993). Yet, as noted by Williams

(1993: 3), unlike emphasized femininity –which may have little advantage for women in

male-dominated settings— masculinity can be an advantage because the qualities

associated with it are more highly regarded than those associated with women, even in

predominantly female jobs.

The classificatory asymmetry built into the representations of masculine and

feminine which help explain this difference also accounts for another common pattern:

when men perform traditionally female roles, frequently it is the role that is

transformed, not the men. For instance, in a study of all-male stripping troupes

Tewksbury shows that in performing this traditionally female role, new elements of

masculinity are incorporated into it that enable men to preserve their sense of

masculinity (Tewksbury, 1993). Inversely, as mentioned in Chapter I, when women

enter masculine traditional roles such as that of warrior, often it is the image of those

particular women that is affected, not the role itself. However, this is difficult to judge

when simultaneous changes in military roles such as the emergence of the ‘peacekeeper’

are occurring.

3. The military as a gendered organization

3.1. Gender, the state and warfare

One important contribution of feminist scholarship to the study of the state has

been the recognition of the multiple connections between state processes and agencies

and gender identities. Joining other critics, feminist approaches have challenged the

conception of the state as a unitary and rational actor, as well as the global view of the

ideal moral agent as a being who is disembodied, ageless, sexless and transcendent of

65 Trust and loyalty are frequently built through homosociality: bonding of men of the same race, religion and social class background (Lipan-Blumen, 1976; Lorber, 1994).

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all historical particularity (Elshtain, 1997). A few evident aspects of the gendered nature

of the state have been signaled: with very few exceptions, state elites have been the

preserve of men; for a long time the state has armed men and disarmed women; it

intervenes actively in the social division of labor, allocation of power and control of

sexuality. When managing institutions such as marriage and motherhood, or

implementing welfare policies, the state is not only seen as performing a regulating

function, but also as participating in the constitution of gender categories.

This ‘gender constitutive’ role is particularly clear within military institutions,

where, through their bureaucratic mechanisms and centralized policy-making and

execution, the state formally and authoritatively institutionalizes dominant patterns of

gender relations. Starting from this assumption, Connell sustains that there is a ‘core’ in

the power structure of gender, contrasted with the more diffuse or contested patterns of

power in the periphery. He argues that the hierarchies and work-forces of

institutionalized violence – military and paramilitary forces, police and prison systems -

are one of the components of this core in the power structure of gender in the advanced

capitalist countries (1987: 109). “It is no accident –Connell notes— that the means of

organized violence –weapons and knowledge of military technique –are almost entirely

in the hands of men” (1987: 107). According to this view, the military has probably

been the most important arena for the definition of European/American culture and of

its model of hegemonic masculinity where the figure of the military hero, a specialist in

violence, has occupied a central position.

In the past, armies have systematically used the power of this masculine imagery

for purposes of recruitment and mobilization of support for war. The most systematic

case in modern history has probably been the Nazi cult of Nordic manhood. Fascist

regimes have also strongly emphasized masculinity as a mobilization device. As noted

by Connell, “in gender terms, fascism was a naked reassertion of male supremacy in

societies that had been moving towards equality for women. To accomplish this,

fascism promoted new images of masculinity, glorifying irrationality (the triumph of the

will, thinking with the blood) and the unrestrained violence of the frontline soldier”

(Connell, 1995: 153).66

66 A recent example of how hegemonic conceptions of masculinity are used to sustain powerful interest groups is the case of the gun lobby: “Gun organizations are conventionally masculine in cultural style. (...) The gun lobby hardly has to labor the inference that politicians trying to take away our guns are


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Examples like these could be multiplied. However, for the purposes of the

present research the question is to investigate how these images and processes have

participated in the constitution of the military gender regime. Particularly, it is relevant

to assess how much this cultural ‘heritage’ contributes to explaining the nature of

women’s roles and the gender policies developed in the armed forces of western

developed countries.

3.2. Gender and sexuality in military culture

Like other formal organizations, the military has a particularly clear gender

regime, even if it is less homogeneous than is usually supposed. In the light of the

framework of ‘gendered organizations’ analyzed above, the military can be seen as an

‘extreme case’ of gendered organization in terms of the criteria that scholars have used

to classify organizations as gendered.

Gender may be considered a very significant element to understand the structure

of advantage and exploitation in the military in at least three main dimensions. First, the

military’s organizational structure is clearly based on gender divisions, both in terms of

opportunity and power (hierarchical divisions) and in terms of occupational structure

(sexual division of labor). Women are excluded from certain specialities and there are

distinct patterns of gender representation by rank and functional areas. Second, it is

male-dominated in terms of numeric representation, especially in the areas more closely

related to the core functions of the institution, exactly those that confer not only more

prestige and rewards but also objective possibilities to access the higher hierarchical

ranks. Despite a notable increase in the representation of women throughout the

organizational structure over the last few decades, it is a realistic assumption that male

dominance will continue to exist in the near future. Finally, from the point of view of

culture and the structure of cathexis, hegemonic definitions of military conflate with

hegemonic masculine culture and ideology, even if such construction is subject to

historical change and varies significantly in different sectors inside the institution. In

any case, the military has for centuries been a source of normative conceptions of

gender, which, on the one hand amplifies dominant cultural patterns and, on the other,

actively participates in its production and reproduction. Thus, more than merely

emasculating us. At both symbolic and practical levels, the defense of gun ownership is the defense of hegemonic masculinity” (Connell, 1995: 212).

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gendered, the military is also a ‘gendering’, gender-granting or gender-defining (Cohn,

1993; Segal, 1999) institution.67 In the following sections, I will explore some of the

most significant mechanisms through which gendering occurs in the military.

3.2.1. Armed forces and masculinity

Traditionally, the military in general and combat units in particular have been

seen as a proving ground for masculinity. Through specific forms of socialization,

disciplinary models and authority patterns the military has functioned as a central

agency for the construction of the masculine gender identity and, thus, equally central to

the definition of hegemonic masculinity. The imprimatur of masculinity conferred by

the institution then becomes a core element in a soldier’s self-definition and

simultaneously an operative norm for the performance and interaction in military

groups.

Military service (especially conscript service) has frequently been depicted as a

rite of passage, transforming boys into men, and youth into adults. In some ways, it has

also functioned as a ritual of differentiation between men and women, or better,

between the socially constructed categories of masculine and feminine, an opposition

that pervades many of the tensions at the core of military imagery. The equation

‘masculinity-warrior’ is operationalized through a conditioning model of creating the

masculine male where physical standards acquire a major salience. In an analysis of

military socialization and masculinity Arkin and Dobrofsky have shown how, from the

moment of recruitment through basic training, values associated with physical strength

represent the prerequisite for masculinity: “emphasis on high physical standards

implicitly carries with it the military’s belief that masculinity is determined primarily by

a healthy body not a healthy mind” (1978: 156). The initial physical status of the recruit

sets the patterns for stratification within the military structure since those with better

physical profiles are traditionally designated for the more prestigious and rewarding

combat careers, while those with lower physical standards are tagged for support and

administrative functions. Since opportunities for promotion and career advancement

often depend on the performance of functions in combat or line units, being assigned to

67 It is relevant to note that the military’s hegemonic conception of masculinity has often been incorporated in other arenas of social life. For instance, Collinson and Hearn have shown how in the practice and ideologies of management there has been a recurrent association between gender, hierarchy and management on the one hand and militarism and warfare on the other (Collinson and Hearn, 1996).


97

these areas obviously increases one’s status and probability of reaching the higher

ranks.68

In no other area have the links between biology and social behavior been so

explored and abused. The fact that throughout history war has been an almost

exclusively male activity is frequently used as an empirical illustration of the link

between male biology and aggression. David Marlowe has sustained this position,

arguing that “the male’s greater vital capacity, speed, muscle mass, aiming and

throwing skills, his greater propensity for aggression, and his more rapid raises in

adrenaline make him more fitted for physically intense combat” (Marlowe, 1983: 190,

my italics).69 Additionally, the capacity to carry out aggression is seen as being

connected to the nature of the male bond, and this, in turn, is sustained by the language

of male sexual identity: “the soldier’s world is characterized by a stereotypical

masculinity. His language is profane; his professed sexuality rude and direct; his

maleness is his armor, the measure of his competence, capability, and confidence in

himself”(1983: 192).70 Alongside language, proclamation of sexual prowess, riddles and

songs that denigrate women, pornographic posters and movies are also evident symbols

of the archetypal culture of masculinity within military units. In one way or another, the

soldier’s sexual status is always ‘on the line’.

Reinforcing male numerical dominance in the military is thus a masculine or

masculinistic imagery that pervades the military function and images of it. However,

this frame of military masculinity must be looked at as an ideal-typical form of the

dominant model. In social practice it is often reinterpreted and enacted in apparently

paradoxical ways. For instance, Cohn has noted that, “while representing the most

traditional, bifurcated and narrow gender images, in practice, participation in the

68 As shall be seen further on, the question of physical tests and standards becomes extremely relevant in the debate of women in the military and particularly in the dispute over women in combat. I believe this is a crucial aspect to explain differential evaluation, perceptions of equity and discrimination concerning gender integration in the military. 69 Interestingly, while recognizing that, unlike among mammals, “human studies are not conclusive”, Marlowe quotes a Swedish research where a significant relationship was detected between testosterone levels and self-reports of physical and verbal aggression (Marlowe, 1983: 190), as if the relationship between these variables necessarily implied a causal link. 70 Of course, one must acknowledge that the ‘invention’ of an exclusive language, rich in acronyms, jargon and metaphors fulfills a variety of functions which are not only related to gender. Madeleine Morris has stressed the way the language of military culture allows soldiers and sailors to both comply with authority and safely ridicule superiors, complain about tasks or distinguish themselves from outsiders (Morris, 1999: 57).

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military allows men to transcend many of the constraints of hegemonic masculinity”

since “military men are allowed more intimate bonds with other men than is typical in

the civilian world” (Cohn, 1999). Cohn sustains that this loosening of the bounds of

masculinity is made possible by the military’s power to grant hegemonic masculinity to

its members. This allows all these activities to be reinterpreted as manly rather than as

threats to hegemonic manhood. Arkin and Dobrofski share an apparently different view

by establishing a careful distinction between the masculine camaraderie and

companionship integral to the ‘buddy system’ and any possible sanction of intimacy

(1978: 163). In reality it is possible to articulate both positions. In this case, without

sanctioning a certain type of intimacy, one that could have sexual or erotic connotations,

the form of military companionship embedded in the ‘team’ archetype allows and

requires another type of intimacy, one that is reinterpreted to dismiss any possible

sexual meanings. The mechanism that allows the reinterpretation to take place is the

‘buddy system’. The tension generated by this understanding of intimacy among men is

particularly visible in the discussion over homosexuality in the Military, as shall be seen

further on.

Another point worth noting is that the association and overlap between the

hegemonic definition of military and masculine does not exist in isolation. According to

Macdonald (1987) these categories are part of a structural system of concepts, a

semantic grid that sustains the articulation between gender, peace and war. While its

sense and moral load may vary, in this symbolic matrix femininity, peace and passivity

frequently have the same location opposed to a set comprising masculinity, war and

activity. In this sense, the systematic exclusion of women from warfare has contributed

to reinforcing gender differences and codifying frontiers between masculine and

feminine. Macdonald argues that the images of women in the military domain cannot be

considered irrelevant or accidental. On the contrary, whether women are present or

absent their images have always played an important part in defining and articulating

the symbolic order and its values: “Women’s roles and images of women, are not (…)

neutral in the military scheme of things, but have a carefully defined structural

relationship as part of that scheme” (Macdonald, 1987: 21)

The image of women is seen a fundamental element in the definition of a

soldier’s identity, functioning as a referential ‘other’. Besides the masculine models of

the ‘hero’, the ‘buddy’, or the ‘tough man’, soldiers are frequently exposed to negative


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images, of women or homosexuals, used to represent the weak or inefficient qualities of

the recruit. This is particularly clear during basic training, where soldiers are usually

addressed as ‘faggots’ or ‘girls’. As noted by Macdonald, “in this transaction, non-

masculinity is equated with ineffectiveness and passivity; and masculinity with power

and aggression. (…) The younger soldier, however, does not easily transform himself in

the masculine side of the equation, for in the submission to authority required of him, he

is taking on a typically ‘feminine’ role. This tension at the heart of the imagery serves

the army well, however, for the insecurity it generates can be countered only by the man

proving his masculinity along the lines laid down by the military ideology” (Macdonald,

1987: 16).

The image of woman-as-the-other is, however, subject to a great deal of

variability and instability. Multiple sub-categories or archetypes of women co-exist in

the symbolic universe of the military. Besides the broader association between women

and all values and qualities that are not male, and thus not desirable for a soldier, several

stereotypes emerge. A first image is that of women as sexual object. Arkin and

Dobrofski see the emphasis on the heterosexual use and abuse of women as sexual

objects as deriving from the need to dismiss any possible doubts about the gender

identity of the male. A curious example of this process of objectifying women to

confirm male values of dominance is the common naming of equipment by women’s

names (Arkin and Dobrofski, 1978: 162).

Related to this stereotype is also the conception of women as a hunting trophy.

As accurately noted by Fabrizio Battistelli, throughout history males have always

demonstrated the same perseverance in excluding their women from warfare and

including those of the enemy. While women of one’s clan or social group were ‘spared’

as combatants, other women were looked on as trophies. In this conception, the rape or

slavery of the women of the enemy has an obvious and tremendous symbolic meaning.

The demoralizing consequences of abduction or rape of women are well documented. In

the context of war, rape is considered a ‘supreme’ offense, sometimes one even stronger

than defeat. Susan Brownmiller has masterly synthesized this idea: ‘Men of a conquered

nation traditionally view the rape of “their women” as the ultimate humiliation, a sexual

coup de grace. Rape is considered by the people of a defeated nation to be part of the

enemy’s conscious effort to destroy them (…) Apart from a genuine, human concern for

wives and daughters near and dear to them, rape by a conqueror is compelling evidence

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of the conquered status of masculine impotence. (…) The body of a raped woman

becomes a ceremonial battlefield, a parade ground for the victor’s trooping of the

colors. The act that is played out upon her is a message passed between men – vivid

proof of victory for one and loss and defeat for the other’ (Brownmiller, 1993: 38).

Battistelli calls attention to the fact that this is a rather generalized mechanism in

war, and not only in the past. Even today, sexual violence is extensively used as a

weapon, as was the case of the mass rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1991 and

1995, and many other committed by soldiers of regular armies throughout the whole

XX century (Battistelli, 1999; Seifert, 1994; Stiglmayer, 1994, Hayden, 2000; Beverly,

1996; Sharratt and Kaschak, 1999). The author notes that “in all-male societies, as have

been the armed forces worldwide until very recently, rape in war and fantasy around it

in peace-time functioned as a non-stigmatized institutional escape from the all-male

condition and the inherent homosexual condition associated with it both as a possibility

and as a threat” (Battistelli, 1999: 51).71

At the other end of the classificatory spectrum, but closely articulated with it, is

the image of the woman as a protected being, one that a soldier is supposed to fight for

and defend from the horrors of war (mainly mothers, wives and daughters). Underlying

this category is the opposition, usually naturalized as symmetric between the role of

women as mothers and the role of men as warriors: giving life and giving death,

maternity and combat, seen as mutually exclusive activities and specific to the ‘essential

nature’ of women and men. This division is also expressed in the relation between

protectors and the protected which, according to Stiehm, institutes a relation of

dependence of women on men and a profound inequality concerning the responsibilities

of collective defense (Stiehm, 1982). Segal has also proposed an explanation for the

functionality of this image of women during war-time. Assuming that there is a

psychological differentiation between the ‘real world’ and the combat situation, which

allows some men to resist the enormous stress of war, she conjectures that one of the

survival mechanisms could exactly consist in the preservation of the image of that world

where women have a central role. “Women, (at least ‘our women’) –she argues— are

71 The homosociality of the military, understood as a social preference for members of one’s own gender, but [which] does not necessarily imply erotic attraction is thus frequently accompanied by homophobia: “Homophobia may serve as a boundary between social and sexual interaction in a homosocially stratified society (Britton, 1990: 437).


101

not part of the war. Indeed, one of the reasons men have for fighting is to protect their

women and the rest of the image of the world back home” (Segal, 1983: 209).72

Just as these images of women have been present or absent, instrumentalized or

ignored in different situations, also the archetypes and mechanisms of masculinity have

been subject to significant variation over time. Images of masculine heroism have

shifted throughout history. In fact, at a certain moment within the same society there

may exist different models of masculinity, some of them more associated with violence

than others. The same thing happens inside military organizations.

There is a notable heterogeneity of gender environments in the military. Some

units and branches are more gender integrated than others and this division maps onto a

hierarchy of masculinities. Cohn provides a suggestive example of such diversity. In her

study of gender and National Security, she found that while combat unit men tended to

think of themselves as the most ‘studly’, officers in combat support and combat service-

support offered a different understanding, suggesting that the macho masculinity was

really a compensation for combat soldiers’ lack of technological and organizational

skills. Consequently, she adds, “in different branch and unit contexts, men construct

different components of the construct ‘masculinity’ with concomitant differences in

their attitudes about women in the military” (Cohn, 1999: 35). This is exactly why the

military has to be understood in terms of the relationship between masculinities

(Connell, 1987, 1995). It is the relationship between forms of masculinity –some

physically violent but subordinate to orders, others dominating and organizationally

competent— that may help us understand the present state of gender relations in

military organizations. In fact, it would be inaccurate and naive to suppose that military

operations actually work on the basis of traditional heroism archetypes. With the

technologization of warfare, the ‘management of legitimate violence’ became strongly

based on rational-bureaucratic techniques of organization (Cf. Chapter 4). Due to the

multiplication of support functions, in modern armies the majority of soldiers are not

combatants at all and most military leaders would agree that ‘Rambo types should not

be driving our jeeps and supply trucks’ (Connell, 1995).

72 As shall be seen, this has been proposed as one of the explanations for men’s resistance to women in combat. If men allow women to be involved in combat the differentiation cannot be maintained and the psychological defense is lost (Segal, 1983: 209).

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Within this process of structural change, military service has also lost most of its

symbolic power in the production of gender referents. For some analysts the loss of

relevance of the masculine ‘ethos’ in military socialization is an accomplished and

ineludible reality. According to this perspective, cohesion and solidarity of military

groups, previously anchored in shared models of masculinity, has come to be based on

an individualistic ethic and a more instrumental vision of interactions (Moskos, 1970).

Traditional archetypes of masculinity have lost most of their integrating power. The

transformation here identified refers fundamentally to a normative shift in the

recruitment appeal – more than ‘make a man out of you’ military service is increasingly

presented as a place for professional qualification and acquisition of technical skills

within a process of convergence between military and civilian bureaucratic values.

However, it is possible to hypothesize that we may have witnessed a process of

reconfiguration of the traditional definition of masculinity, more than its suppression or

total reconfiguration. It is worth noting the suggestion of Arkin and Dobrofsky that the

fact that ‘becoming a man’ is nowadays defined in terms of learning an occupation or a

skill, probably means that to the recruitment message has been added the traditional

work ethic dimension of masculinity, which equates it with productivity, occupation and

breadwinning. These authors believe that despite the organizational shift towards more

professionalized forces, “the traditional male role is still dominant and even

contemporary analysis of the military must focus on the traditional processes and

images of masculinity upon which the system is based” (1978: 153).

After nearly three decades of women’s presence in the Military of at least some

western countries, it is possible to question whether Arkin and Dobrofski’s contention is

still valid. While significant changes have taken place in terms of the social composition

of the armed forces, there is, nevertheless, some reason to believe that the connection

between masculinity and soldering has not been entirely broken. This would seem to be

proved by the experience of women in the military.

3.2.2. The experience of women soldiers

As shown in the previous section, stereotypes of maleness are frequently built

through contrast with femininity and values associated with women. It is not surprising

to observe that, “compatibilities and inconsistencies become especially critical when

women are incorporated into active military service” (Ardener and Holden, 1987: xviii).


103

Over the past two decades, despite a notorious increase in women’s

representation in the armed forces of most western countries, the routinization of their

presence in some settings, the diversification of their roles, and the parallel increase in

acceptance, “organizational resistance and interpersonal adjustments are still prevalent”

(Segal, 1999: 574). A variety of studies have emphasized the constraints and difficulties

military women face in order to accommodate their gender and work status in the

military. While most of these constraints have been formal and objectively expressed in

regulations and policies, some authors claim that the broader ideology of masculinity

prevalent in the institution is much more effective in limiting women’s participation

than either specific institutional or interpersonal constraints (Herbert, 1998: 6).

However, it is certainly more accurate to underline the way in which such broader

ideology actually intervenes in the production of formal constraints as much as it is

embedded in informal relationships.

Although very different factors contribute to the determination of female

military roles and the experiences of women vary significantly cross-culturally and

within services, a number of common features characterize these experiences as well as

the way in which women manage conflict and negotiate integration in an environment

generally defined as masculine. An immediate observation refers to the fact that women

usually constitute a small proportion of their work groups and are thus exposed to most

of the effects of gender skewedness summarized in the previous section (Kanter, 1977).

Kanter’s theory has been tested in the military with contradictory results (Barkalow and

Raab, 1990; Yoder and Sinnet, 1985; Yoder, Adams and Prince, 1983, 1989; Williams,

1989; Rustad, 1982; Dunivin, 1988). Most of these studies have stressed the negative

effects of tokenism, amplified in this specific type of ‘gender inappropriate’

occupational setting for women. Others have called attention to the importance of

variables such as the existence or absence of institutional support, changes in the

dominant group, cohesiveness among tokens (Yoder, Adams and Prince, 1983), and

type of work (Dunivin, 1988) in explaining the diversity of women’s experiences in the

military.

In a longitudinal study of the first class of women at the US military Academy at

West Point, Yoder, Adams and Prince have found that women were subject to the same

processes of visibility, contrast and assimilation documented by Kanter (Yoder, Adams

and Prince, 1983). However, the longitudinal nature of the data allowed the authors to

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venture the hypothesis that tokenism may be a first step in the integration process,

especially if institutional supports help reduce the negative effects of tokenism over

time. This was found to be the case of West Point where growing numbers of women,

time, change in the sex role attitude of men and institutional supports (such as sustained

commitment to the integration of women and reassessment of training goals) have

helped to facilitate the integration process. In the light of these results, institutional

policies that discourage negative behaviors against token members may be of vital

importance for the failure or success of the token group.73 In other words, they may be

decisive in reducing the perceived ‘intrusiveness’ of the new group.74 Rosen et al. also

suggested that “while competition or the threat of competition may lead to increased

discrimination it is also true that increased demands for certain skills or functions may

lead to a decrease of discriminatory practices, particularly at policy-making levels”

(Rosen et al., 1996: 540)

In another study, different effects have been identified depending on the type of

work. Using data from a US Air Force attitudinal survey, Karen Dunivin analyzed men

and women’s perceptions of the organizational environment in terms of differential

perceptions of the opportunity structure, power and relative numbers. While in

traditional areas (personnel and administration) women’s attitudes varied from less

positive than men when they were few to a more mixed pattern when they were many,

in non-traditional but simultaneously highly valued fields (such as the piloting of

warplanes) women’s attitudes were similar to men’s. According to Dunivin, these

results did not confirm Kanter’s assumptions. Instead, she argues, a potentially more

powerful explanatory model would classify women’s attitudes into two interacting

dimensions: numeric dominance (group sex ratio), typifying women’s ascribed status,

and work type, exemplifying women’s achieved occupational status. This model

suggests that occupational status may be a better predictor of military women’s attitudes

than gender status: “women in sex-atypical jobs may feel greater career opportunity and

power because the non-traditional job (not the occupant) has opportunity and power

73 Nevertheless, it should be noted that this process may not be simple if dominant members feel overly pressured by institutional policies: “In this case, blatant anti-token expressions may fade only to be replaced by more subtle, covert forms of discrimination and hostility” (Yoder, Adams and Prince, 1983: 334). 74 One should note that the short time-span (4-year period) of this study may not be enough to accurately measure and evaluate changes. This is especially worth noticing if Yoder’s analysis of tokenism is taken into consideration.


105

associated with it” (Dunivin, 1988: 80). Dunivin’s analysis is particularly relevant

because it calls attention to the importance of diverse institutional locations – in this

case the differentially valued occupational fields –in determining individuals’ attitudes

and responses to the organizational environment. However, two aspects should be

criticized in this proposal: first, this analysis is exclusively based on the ‘subjective’

dimension of women’s perceptions and representations, thus leaving aside more

objective indicators regarding actual power and opportunity resources; second, it reveals

a rather static view of the process. A diachronic analysis of ‘intrusiveness’ levels,

focusing on change over time associated with relative numbers, as well as its specific

interaction with gender status, may reveal different patterns.

In any case, an overwhelming majority of empirical studies has stressed

women’s position of structural ambiguity that make them face a basic dilemma: can one

truly be75 a soldier and a woman and not be viewed as deviating either from what it

means to be a soldier or from what it means to be a woman? (Herbert, 1998: 10). This is

particularly notorious in the case of women in non-traditional areas who often find

themselves in a double bind: “when they succeed in their work, their femininity is

questioned; when they fail, their womanliness is affirmed at the expense of their work

role” (Shields, 1988: 107). This has a clear impact on the ‘portability of women’s

credentials’. Moskos and Wood noted that, “whenever a woman moves to a new

assignment, she is tested informally in a manner not typically experienced by men. If a

woman’s performance is evaluated positively, it is not generalized to other females but

is considered an individual accomplishment. If her performance is judged unsuccessful,

however, her individual failure is likely to be generalized to all women” (Moskos and

Wood, 1988: 286).

It is now possible to see clearly the effects of the classificatory asymmetry that

regulates gender representations as well as, to use Kanter’s term, a certain form of role

‘encapsulation’, where women are caught in the trap of different evaluation. The

question of physical standards and tests is at the very heart of this problem of

differential evaluation and perceptions of inequity, which is an important dimension of

gender relations in the military (Segal, 1999). It has been used both to express men’s

perceptions of unjust and unequal treatment and to reinforce female stereotypes. Since

75 As defined by Blalock (1970): the degree to which the presence of minorities is seen as threatening by the dominants.

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women usually have lower physical requirements and can pass tests at levels for which

men would fail, many male soldiers feel that women are given an unfair advantage and

that their presence contributes to lower standards in the organization. The fact that

women are being judged on physical traits on which average men score higher and that

other traits where women would outperform men (such as flexibility) are not included in

the tests is not usually taken into consideration. In fact, as noted by Segal, military

women often evaluate their own performance by the male standards and therefore feel

less worthy (Segal, 1999: 576).

Cohn has recently advanced a renewed analysis of this question, one that is

particularly useful to understand resistances to gender integration, particularly in

operational and combat oriented functions. She contends that the structure of work in

military institutions is invisibly premised on male bodies and male social lives, which in

turn shapes the image of how the work should be done and who the ideal worker is.76 In

many occupations the image of the ideal worker is seen to derive exclusively from the

intrinsic characteristics of the function itself, that is, it comes to look as though a man is

needed to perform it because that is the nature of the work, not because the particular

ways the work is expected to be done were based on male bodies and social lives. As a

result, she argues, when women enter organizations like the military they will be judged

on the basis of how well they match the image of the ideal soldier, an ideal that is not

seen as arbitrarily gendered. A reified notion of standards is thus operating: “[In the

military] a good soldier is one who can do a certain number of push-ups, climb a robe

using upper body strength and run certain speed. Not because those are actually required

to get the work done, but because most fit men are able to do those things, and so those

capacities have been folded into the standard, the image of the ideal soldier” (Cohn,

1999: 35).

Some men’s protest over physical standards, she argues, has thus been a way of

reasserting gender differences, a socially acceptable way of saying what is no longer

officially say-able: that women are inferior. Her conclusion is worth a full quote:

“Whether differences within groups are greater than between the groups, whether the

difference is significant in the majority of MOS, whether women are strong and fast

76 By work organization the author means everything from the kind of machines designed to do the work, and how much strength they require to operate or how far one is expected to be able to reach to use them, to the number of hours a day or week people are expected to work, to the structure of the work day, to career tracks that do not have ways to incorporate childbearing.


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enough to perform their tasks, whether the difference could be made irrelevant by either

having uniform task-related standards or re-engineering tasks, whether running a mile a

minute faster enables a man “to outrun a bullet faster than a woman can” – all of these

are beside the point. The point is that because that difference is the one that remains, PT

performance, failure to come up to the male standard, provides a focal symbol for

pointing to (what some men construct as) female inferiority. Talking about different PT

standards becomes a way of asserting that pretensions of gender equality are false”

(Cohn, 1999,C8:17).

Despite the overall pessimism of most of the available reports, it is, however,

important not to over-emphasize the negative aspects of women’s experiences since not

only are such problems not felt with identical intensity in the various locations, but there

are also studies that point to rather successful integration processes (Devilbiss, 1985;

Moskos, 1985a, 1994). A number of factors such as time, increase in the number of

women, better matching of physical capacities with jobs and changing values and

expectations of younger cohorts have helped to create a more supportive environment

for women and reduce tensions (Shields, 1988: 108). Another important example comes

from recent cases of women’s participation in peacekeeping missions, where the

gender-integrated nature of military units deployed to the conflict areas has been

considered to account significantly for the success of the operations (Miller and

Moskos, 1995; Maniscaldo, 1997; Carreiras, 1999). Be this as it may, cultural

ambivalence and resistance to change seem to be prevalent regarding women’s roles in

the armed forces at a particularly crucial moment of institutional redefinition.

3.2.3. The body, sexuality and sexual orientation in military culture

Sexuality is a crucial test-ground for the relationship between men and women

in the military. The gender regime of the military includes various mechanisms of

sexual regulation and surveillance, which usually involve ‘contrast’ and ‘boundary

heightening’, that is, the amplification of gender differences. These, however, are not

only the result of ‘external’ institutional or interactional pressures. They are not

necessarily forced on people. As in the case of other non-traditional occupations, men

and women in the military actively ‘do’ gender, sometimes reinforcing, at other times

redefining their activities in terms of traditional male and female traits. Gender is then

constructed in self-conscious ways, and not only as a product of social ‘automatism’.

The reassertion of the true gender identity is required both from men and from women

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in ways that have been, at least until today, more obvious in the military than in civilian

life.

It is possible to identify some major ways, both formal and informal, through

which differences are built and negotiations over sexuality take place: prohibition of

lesbians and gays from military service, spatial segregation, sumptuary and etiquette

rules, and sexual harassment.

The cultural warfare around sexual orientation

The debate over the presence of gays and lesbians is probably the most recent

and striking example of the nature of the gender regime in the military. In fact, there

appears to be a relationship between the degree to which homosexuals are accepted in

the military and the degree of gender integration in many nations (Segal, Segal and

Booth, 1999).77 Although homosexuals have always served in the military, they have

not done so openly. In the US, the official ban on their service was proclaimed in 1950

and since then policies have been increasingly restrictive. Between 1980 and 1990, the

US military expelled an average of 1500 homosexual service members per year (Scott

and Stanley, 1994: xi). In 1992, President Clinton’s announcement that he would

support the lifting of the ban generated widespread public as well as academic

controversies (Scott and Stanley, 1994; D’Amico and Weinstein, 1999; Herek, Jobe and

Carney, 1996; Benecke, Corbett and Osburn, 1999). After much debate, Congress

adopted the so-called “don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue” policy regarding

homosexuality.78

Although there is reasonable debate as to whether the experience of integrating

‘minorities’ such as women and blacks may be comparable to that of gay and lesbian

soldiers (Rolison and Nakaiama, 1994) most arguments against the latter’s participation

in the military center on similar aspects as in the case of gender and racial integration:

the effect of the presence of these ‘minorities’ on 1) male bonding, 2) unit cohesion, and

3) the external image of the military. As noted by Herbert, it is remarkable that, “though

the debate over lesbians and gays was not intended to be a lesson in the military’s

77 The US seems to be an exception since it has a high degree of gender integration but excludes homosexuals. 78 Synthetically, this meant that military members could no longer be asked about their sexual orientation (don’t ask), people should keep their orientation to themselves (don’t tell), private lives should not be investigated by commanders (don’t pursue).


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perspective on gender, it unintentionally provided significant information on the

importance of masculinity to soldering (Herbert, 1998: 43).79

In a study of the attitudes of service members of eight military bases in the US

towards homosexual service members, Laura Miller found that, although traditional

anti-ban and progressive pro-ban worldviews co-existed, the former was prevalent

(Miller, 1994). However, she reports that male soldiers felt much more intensely than

women about the issue and were much more opposed to the lifting of the ban. Because

of their minority status and experience of discrimination, women tended to feel more

sympathetic toward gays and lesbians.

However, the author’s suggestion that servicewomen may have benefited from

the growth of the category ‘gay’ (a supposedly more important threat than women in the

eyes of ‘straight’ male soldiers) in the context of the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue’

policy is highly problematic. In fact, not only has it been observed that since the

implementation of this policy the number of discharges for homosexuality as well as

violations of the policy has actually risen, but women have been disproportionally

affected (Segal, 1999: 577; Stiehm, 1994: 161; Weinstein and D’Amico, 1999). Women

become suspect for the simple fact that they join the military. As stated by a female drill

instructor in the Marines: “the qualities and traits that we demand and are supposed to

be training our recruits are the same traits that make us look homosexual” (quoted in

Herbert, 1998: 18). In an even more pessimistic vein, some authors have argued that the

policy serves to undermine the core values of the military culture. For instance,

Benecke, Corbett and Osburn have argued that while the ban of gay and lesbians creates

a culture of intolerance, the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell, don’t pursue’ policy has seriously

failed to alleviate it and, on the contrary, has encouraged mistrust, deception,

prevarication, harassment and violence (Benecke, Corbett and Osburn, 1999).

In any case, Miller’s contention to explain the attitude of male soldiers is worth

keeping in mind: “disrupting the rules about heterosexuality sends shock waves

throughout the entire system of gender as a pervasive social and cultural distinction.

Fundamental beliefs about human identity and interaction are not easily shaken and are

not abandoned on the basis of a single public policy” (Miller, 1994: 84).

79 It is also curious and simultaneously ironic that the battle for homosexual’s rights emerged in a conservative institution like the military before it did in other civilian settings. As noted by Margaret

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In trying to explain the massive negative response to Clinton’s attempt to lift the

ban on homosexuals in the military, Cohn argues that the issue is not so much sexuality

as gender. Therefore, rather than simply being a manifestation of anxiety about

sexuality, the massive and virulent opposition derives from a profound anxiety about

male gender identity: “what is so unacceptable is not homosexuals in the military, but

having people who are openly gay in the military, that is, having the military appear as

anything other than a strictly heterosexual institution” (Cohn, 1999: 3). The relative

absence of lesbians from the controversy is considered to be a striking factor pointing to

that conclusion. According to Cohn, this was an obvious feature of the fear that military

effectiveness and unit cohesion would be jeopardized by the presence of gay soldiers,

whose life and physical integrity could be in danger (heterosexual soldiers would beat

up homosexuals). No similar argument was even suggested regarding lesbians.

The author notes the peculiarity that “what is acknowledged as one group’s

problem is taken as a reason to discriminate against another group. Although parallel

arguments were made, American society did not find this an acceptable rationale for

racial discrimination. Why is it deemed reasonable, then, in relation to sexuality?”

(Cohn,1999: 13). Underneath the military readiness versus civil rights debate there is a

debate not about institutions and their role, but about intimate heterosexual soldiers’

feelings. In Cohn’s view the issue then is visibly more than the mere presence of gays.

The public acknowledgment that the military is not a strictly heterosexual institution

would make it lose its ability to be a masculinity-granting institution.

Other authors have sustained a similar position, arguing that the proposed policy

is a defensive discourse that attempts to protect hegemonic masculinity in the military

and, as such, is reminiscent of an earlier one that attempted to exclude African

Americans from the armed forces (Rolinson and Nakayama, 1984: 121). In sum, we

may say that the rules that govern gender interaction are fundamentally at stake in the

discussion of gays and lesbians in the military. As noted by Miler, “Cultural warfare of

this sort therefore entails a struggle for cultural dominance. Compromise is

unacceptable (…) winning is crucial because the worldview extends beyond the issue at

hand and gives meaning to the entire structure of people’s lives” (Miller, 1994: 84).

Cruickshank, “to the dismay of some gay and lesbian activists, the military issue has turned out to be a major battleground for gay rights in the early 1990s” (Cruickshank, 1994: 15).


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Spatial segregation and uniforms

The issue of the physical separation of men and women in the military

environment has always been a source of tension for policy-makers. Ensuring the

existence of separate barracks and latrines has probably been one of the first concerns in

every country’s armed forces when women first joined the organization. Through spatial

segregation and the issuing of strict rules about adultery and fraternization80 the military

has tried to avoid the threat of romantic and sexual relationships, which are seen as

eroding unit cohesion.

This problem of physical proximity has been particularly amplified in situations

such as basic training (Williams, 1989) and, above all, in present debates about

women’s access to submarine units. As in other contexts, “it may well be that the

custom of separate facilities is not so much demanded by the existence of two sexes as

it is a means of reinforcing perceptions of sex/gender differences. Control of sexuality

may, in fact, not be so much a result of gender differences as it is a mechanism for

insuring their maintenance” (Herbert, 1998: 16).

This is even more obvious regarding the use of sumptuary and etiquette rules,

another common way of fostering gender differentiation in the military. Aside from

logistic issues such as barracks and latrines, women’s bodies and appearance have

caused extreme concern ever since they joined the institution.81 The need to stress

difference and reaffirm the ‘correct’ gender status has been a source of tension and

permanent negotiation through the design of uniforms, hats, shoes, hair-cut style, nails,

make-up, use of jewelry, etc. Uniforms are designed differently and dress codes are

common. For instance, in many situations women are required to wear skirts,82 even

though they may be unsuited for the performance of certain functions.

80 Initially the term referred to relationships between men of different ranks. After women joined the forces, the meaning of the concept has been broadened to include male-female relationships. 81 As reported by Treadwell (1954) already in 1940 the existence of breast pockets in military uniforms created a vexing situation for the military. On one hand designing different uniforms would contradict military uniformity, on the other, the breast pocket might draw attention to women’s busts. After heavy debate it was decided that women’s uniforms would not have breast pockets. 82 A story reported by Barkalow and Raab is a good example: at the rock and roll dance at West Point in 1976, the year women were admitted for the first time, the school’s administration “were reportedly perturbed by the sight of mirror-image couples dancing in short hair and dress gray trousers” and a rule was established that women cadets could dance at the events only if they wear skirts (Barkalow and Raab, 1990: 53).

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In her study of the US Marine Corps, Williams reports on concerns the Corps

had about maintaining the femininity of their female recruits, commissioning several

studies on the ‘defeminization’ of women marines as well as ‘femininity tests’. In this

case, women were required to use make-up, had classes on make-up, hair-care, poise

and etiquette and, unlike men, women could wear long hair. Another trivial but

revealing example refers to umbrella use: while women were allowed to use umbrellas,

men were not, because senior officers thought it was ‘too wimpy’ (Williams, 1989: 47-

48).

Within the US Service Academies, Hillman has shown that the “fear of

‘masculinizing’ women was a constant refrain in the official discussion of female

appearances, reflecting both concern about women replacing men as soldiers and

disavowal of the possibility of lesbians –who were presumed to look ‘mannish’– among

academy cadets” (Hillman, 1999: 70). She sustains that uniforms played a crucial role in

keeping women at the periphery of American military culture, since the desire to create

a safe feminine image often overwhelmed functionality in women’s uniforms (Hillman,

1999: 66).83

As in the case of the gay ban regulations, the concern about preserving women’s

femininity has been considered to reflect men’s insecurity about their own gender

identity. In a study of the integration of women at the US Air Force Academy, Stiehm

(1981) notes that men’s masculinity seemed to be threatened by the presence of women.

In sum, “the paradox facing armies is how to preserve sex-difference, while controlling

sexuality” (Macdonald, 1987: 11).

Sexual harassment

Despite serious definitional problems that make it difficult to accurately

document and ‘measure’ the phenomenon, sexual harassment has been considered one

of the most debilitating obstacles women have to face within organizational settings.84

83 Hillman also notes that the absence of women in the decision-making process about clothing and regulations governing appearance has had ludicrous consequences as in the case of the Air Force Academy’s quest to find single-size bra that it could issue to all entering women (Hillman, 1999: 77). In a study of the first women to join the Portuguese armed forces, similar situations were found as, for instance, the building of some dozen bidets aligned inside an open space on the women’s sanitary premises. 84 Firestone and Harris note that in spite of different assumptions and measurements, most research seems to agree on the following points with respect to sexual harassment: a) sexual harassment of women in the workplace is widespread; b) men are also victims of sexual harassment, although not to the same extent as


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Various factors make them particularly vulnerable to such practices in the military: their

token status, their lower organizational power due to usually subordinate positions in

the rank structure, the fact that military personnel often live in close quarters together

for long periods of time, and, last but not least, the overall masculine (and often sexist)

culture of the institution.

Although sexual assault seems to be rare, even if present (Morris, 1996), various

forms of harassment are common (Segal, 1999). It has even been considered a ‘fact of

life’ in the US armed forces (Stremlow, 1990: 98). The literature on sexual harassment

in the military has distinguished between two fundamental types: sexual and gender

harassment. Sexual harassment or ‘first generation’ is an overt, blatant form of

harassment based on explicit comments and jokes, insistent sexual proposals, suggestive

looks and gestures which affected predominantly the first generations of women to join

the services. Gender harassment, or ‘second generation’ is a more subtle and non-sexual

form of harassment that has developed as women move up the ranks. This is not as

blatantly offensive as the first generation but has the same discriminatory and

demoralizing effects. It includes resistance to women’s authority, women’s isolation,

withholding of information, gossip and rumors, sabotage of women’s work, constant

scrutiny, sexist remarks or even indirect threats (Segal, 1999; Guenter-Schlesinger,

1999).

Another distinction has been proposed that only partially overlaps the above. It

distinguishes between individual and environmental harassment, that is, between

individual incidents and the broader workplace atmosphere. The former regards direct

demands on individuals, and leaves very little room for misinterpretation (actual or

attempted rape, assault, pressure for sexual favors or dates, sexual touching, sexual

letters or phone calls. The second is systematic rather than personal in nature (general

teasing or sexual jokes, sexual whistles, calls, suggestive looks etc…) (Firestone and

Harris, 1994).

If we look again at the US case, despite several decades of programs to fight

sexual harassment on the part of the services, including training and education, this is an

area where severe backlash has occurred. In the early 1980s the US Department of

women; c) sexual harassment has severe negative consequences for both individuals and organizations; d) documentation of accurate rates and types of sexual harassment is hampered by lack of a uniform definition, explanatory model, and disparate research methodologies (Firestone and Harris, 1994: 29).

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Defense committed itself to a goal of ‘zero tolerance’ for sexual harassment. However,

incidents that happened over the last decade, including the Tailhook scandal,85 and more

recent allegations of sexual assault against drill instructors in the Aberdeen Proving

Ground show that such a goal is far from reality. Particularly striking is the conclusion

that “training does not appear to be the critical factor in eliminating this insidious

behavior it was once thought to be” (Guenter-Schlensinger, 1999: 199).

The tendency to reasserting masculinity is thus clear, both at the interactional

and political levels. Together with attempts at re-segregation in basic military training

and policies regarding homosexuality, the prevalence of sexual harassment may be seen

as the effect of pressures to reassert the masculinity of service members, in a period

where the main function of the military is shifting from warfare to ‘operations other

than war’ (OOTW) such as peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. As noted by

Segal, “as the military changes in adaptation to its likely role in the twenty-first century

forces for tradition are resisting changes that they have defined as “feminization” of the

military” (Segal, 1999: 576).

85 Collective sexual assault by servicemen on their women colleagues during a Navy Convention in Las Vegas in1991.


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CHAPTER III SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS OF WOMEN’S MILITARY

SERVICE

Among the variety of social, economic and political factors that affect women’s

participation in the military are the conditions and constraints of female economic and

political participation. As far as the pattern of women’s economic mobilization is

concerned, a crucial question is that of the conciliation of work and the family. As

underlined in Chapter I, not only are women’s social roles affected by cultural

expectations regarding their devotion to the family, but the share of responsibilities in

the domestic sphere structures to a great extent women’s work options and strategies.

The second issue, in turn, refers to women’s status as citizens and their relationship to

the state. Examining this requires a close analysis of the specifically political debates

and controversies around women’s status and interests as both citizens and soldiers. In

this chapter I shall explore these two dimensions of the presence of women in the social

and political system.

1. Women, work and the family

1.1. Combining work and the family in late modernity

One of the most distinctive features of modernity has been the separation

between the world of work in the formal economy and the private and domestic world

of the family, understood as two potentially conflicting spheres, governed by different

rules and values. This separation between formally defined work and the family has

been partially achieved through a gender segregation rule: while men moved into the

workplace, most women stayed within the domestic arena of the family: “...the rules of

family, rooted in affective ties, and those of work, rooted in calculated exchange, could

be separated and protected from one another, through the work, behavior and indeed

expected character traits of the two genders” (Crouch, 1999: 53-54). Industrialization

was therefore associated with the increase of the male population in the full-time work-

force and the massive presence of women –especially married women— at home,

involved with domestic work and child rearing.

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Over the past three decades this segregation pattern has been challenged, with

both the rise of female employment and women’s increasingly, through part-time

employment, combining domestic and remunerated work. Moreover, and perhaps as a

consequence, there has been a re-evaluation of the role of women in society and thus

more expanded career opportunities for them.

Trends in family formation and household structures also point to dramatic

changes: 1) the rising age of the first marriage, reversing the trend toward early and

universal marriage observed for the first two decades of the century; 2) low levels of

fertility and increasing age of entering into first motherhood across birth cohorts; 3)

return of bachelorhood and childlessness 4) increasing presence of ‘rare family types’

like single parent families, de-facto unions or recomposed families (Crouch, 1999;

Blossfeld, 1995). Such changes have alternatively been seen as evidence of a crisis in

the family, unable to effectively integrate its members, or as evidence of the emergence

of new more flexible and free forms of family, where personal autonomy and affective

links among its members are emphasized. To a certain extent, they have also been seen

as significantly articulated with the above-mentioned transformations regarding

women’s presence in the labor market.

Crouch has raised the question of whether such a dramatic increase of women’s

labor-force participation reveals an erosion of the gender segregation upon which the

modern order was based or in fact represents a further extension of the segregations

associated with that pattern (Crouch, 1999: 67). The author gives primacy to the

hypothesis: as the majority of working women are involved with service activity of a

household replacing kind, “the process of moving work away from the family (...) is

continued and indeed taken to new heights in post-industrial society. (...) The

segregations of the social compromise are reproduced but at a different institutional

location. In that sense we are seeing not a transcendence of mid-century principles of

social organization, but their extension –an extension that requires some reorganization

of the gender division of labor and the position of the family” (Crouch, 1999: 67).

However, despite the persistence of segregation, the presence of women in this new

institutional location – paid work – may produce significant structural and symbolic

rearrangements which are not a mere extension of previous patterns of social

organization.


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One central question arising from all these structural changes, affecting nearly

all countries in contemporary Europe and most of the western world, regards the

difficult conciliation between paid work and family life. It relates, at the same time, to

the above-mentioned reorganization process of both labor and family life required by

the ‘extended segregations’ of late modern social structures. The way in which women

deal with and are affected by it has been particularly stressed, as women’s move into

employment has not been followed by a reverse move of men into child rearing and

housework.

There has long been political recognition of the problem. The issue of equal

responsibilities in domestic life has systematically been highlighted since the 1979 UN

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women, until the

more recent Beijing Platform for Action (1995) that suggested the development of

policies aiming at changing attitudes regarding the share of domestic activities as a way

in which to promote an equitable integration of work and family.

Despite such political awareness, it has widely been pointed out that in families

with working mothers it is the woman who usually has the major task of conciliating

both worlds. Indeed, most approaches regarding this issue share the basic assumption

that there is a powerful interactive link between women’s work and family decisions.

Women seem to face a series of dichotomous choices in which work and family

commitments are posed as competing, alternative commitments; choices in one sphere

depending on the opportunities, incentives and constraints posed in the other (Gerson,

1985: 193) Therefore, combining child rearing and committed, continuous work still

implies for most women the proverbial ‘double burden’ of household work added to

paid work, while men seem to make little adjustment of their working time to take up

domestic tasks (Crouch, 1999, 215-218). Even when both partners are in full-time

employment women tend to undertake a disproportionate amount of both housework

and childcare (Ellis and Wheeler, 1991; Headlee and Elfin, 1996). Research has also

shown that in some situations, because of the difficulty in combining work and

motherhood, women in paid employment tend to postpone childbirth, and even that

there is in some countries a positive relation between female labor-force participation

and increasing divorce rates (Chafetz, 1995; Huinink and Mayer, 1995). This

asymmetry is also seen as explaining critical problems in women’s career advancement.

Women who choose or are constrained to combine both roles may have to adapt to

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lower professional expectations and tend to accept and positively evaluate flexibility.

Part-time work is clearly one central factor in this respect, which not only demonstrates

women’s double commitment, but may also reveal the tendency to lower career

investment among women.86

In a study on how women decide about work, career and motherhood, Gerson

(1985) addresses some of these questions stressing variation among women. She

analyses their choices regarding work and the family in the context of structured

constraint. Analyzing four groups of women, distinguished by their initial orientation

toward work and family and the subsequent experience of stability or change in

adulthood, she found that different groups of women (choosing domestic or non-

domestic lives) confronted dilemmas that lacked established, institutional solutions,

facing thus different forms of ‘structural ambiguity’ in which they were forced to chose

between mutually exclusive but equally problematic alternatives.87 Four types of factors

seemed to influence the choices: 1) the building of, or the failure to build a stable

relationship with a male partner, together with this partners’ orientations toward bearing

and rearing children; 2) blocked or expanding workplace opportunities; 3) male

economic support; 4) perceived rewards and costs of a domestic life-style. Women are,

she argues, “specially subject to the dilemma of ‘packaged’ choices. Not only are they

reared with conflicting expectations, but they also confront ambiguous structures that

often require them to choose among a number of desired goals” (Gerson, 1985: 193).

This structural ambiguity is particularly visible in military organizations, where the

above-signaled contradictory dynamics seem to be amplified.

1.2. 'Greedy institutions': military women and the family

From a historical point of view, the relationship between the family and the

military has always involved conflict. The traditional difficulty in articulating the

requirements of stability of family life and the permanent mobility, risk and availability

required by the military have always characterized the military profession.

86 The opportunity for career improvement is thus limited even if we admit that for most women working part-time means that they can be “more relaxed about job change, job reduction or even job loss than their husbands” (Crouch, 1998: 17). 87 Following Oackley, the author argues that structural ambivalence is a defining feature of women’s position in modern societies and regards a “social state in which a person faces contradictory normative expectations of attitudes, beliefs and behavior”.


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The characteristics of this antagonism have changed, as much as have military

organizations and family structures themselves. One could even hypothesize that recent

trends toward an increasing proximity between the armed forces and civil society

together with greater symbolic convergence with civilian values, would favor a better

articulation of military life and more flexible family models. This, in turn, would help

dilute traditional tensions between both institutions. However, contemporary tendencies,

both at the level of global social dynamics such as the growing participation of women

in the labor market and at the level of military families in particular (significant

increases in the rate of marriage among service members in the lower ranks, increase of

single parents, military mothers and dual-career couples) seem to foster the antagonism.

The conciliation between the two institutions thus becomes more problematic.

According to Mady Segal, these difficulties are to a large extent due to the fact

that both the military and the family have many characteristics of what Coser called

‘greedy institutions’ (Coser, 1974). Both depend strongly on the commitment of

members and impose on them great demands in terms of loyalty, time and energy, if

compared to other institutions that tend to limit normative pressures allowing workers

the conciliation of a variety of activities and membership.

While it is true that the family imposes burdens on all its members – even if in

various degrees along time - its is, however, particularly ‘greedy’ for women since they

are expected (and usually choose) to devote to the family more time and emotional

energy than that required from men. Although changes in terms of family relationships

toward a more egalitarian division of domestic tasks may have positive impact on that

‘selective greediness’ (although exerting more pressure on men), the problems persist.

Empirical data about women’s work shows a recurrent pattern of female

segregation in the labor-market, particularly in occupations that require levels of

commitment, which are incompatible with child-rearing or family responsibilities. It is

not surprising that the type of demands the armed forces make on service members,

namely geographic mobility, periodic separation from the family, sea duty and

assignments, instability of work hours, residence in foreign countries, or even the risk of

injury and death, conflict with the needs and demands that family life and maternity

impose on women. This makes the management of the double membership particularly

complex.

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While the difficulty in conciliating family and professional life is not exclusive

to the military profession, and certainly not a problem only felt by women, it is

nonetheless recognized as affecting particularly servicewomen and their career

strategies. Research conducted on this topic has shown that maternity constitutes the

main reason for the non-reenlistment of women, particularly of those assigned to non-

traditional areas subject to irregular working hours. Various studies conducted in the US

during the 1980s showed that women tended to leave the military earlier than men due

to their family responsibilities. Additionally, the existence of children reduced by 69%

women’s probability of reenlistment (Shields, 1988). On the other hand, as also

revealed in the French case, "maternity means a lower availability for the profession and

may induce de-investment in the career. In the armed forces, not only are the projects to

reach the officers ranks almost automatically abandoned, but the mere execution of

daily tasks –particularly in operational specialties— may become problematic”

(Reynaud, 1988). In this situation, strategies may vary between the immediate leave

after the first child or the option for a two-speed career, that is, a greater availability

before maternity, followed by the option for a calmer and more stable activity

afterwards.

These studies also showed that marriage strongly limited women’s professional

ambitions. An analysis of differences in marital status between men and women in the

US armed forces in 1985 revealed, for instance, that among male senior

noncommissioned officers there were significantly higher percentages of married men if

compared with lower enlisted grades (89% against 27% respectively). The opposite was

true for women: 35% among junior enlisted were married compared to 26% of the NCO

corps. In addition, while only 10% of men were childless, 70% of women were.

Commenting on this data, Moskos stated that “career military women are pressured

under the status quo either to be single or, if married, to be childless. The institutional

demands of military life are much heavier for women than for men” (Moskos and

Wood, 1988: 285).

Pregnancy and childcare have also been highly controversial and emotional

issues in debates regarding women in the Military. While empirical data regarding the

US armed forces has revealed that there were no significant differences in lost time

between men and women and that, in fact, men had lost more time on average because

of drug and alcohol abuse than women because all of these motives combined with


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pregnancy (Shields, 1988: 109; Holm, 1993: 303), the truth is that the presence of

pregnant women in the armed forces has been considered a threat to military efficiency

and deployability (Binkin and Bach, 1977; Shields, 1988; Holm, 1993). On many

occasions pregnancy has been a reason for compulsive demobilization, as happened for

instance in the US until 1975. The suspicion of intentional pregnancy by service women

to avoid deployment to the front or to remain there has been extensively used to

legitimate exclusion policies (Tuten, 1982: 251) However, the fact has been

acknowledged that this attitude seems to result more from cultural resistance to

women’s presence in nontraditional functions than from objective factual reality: “There

is no type or quantity of statistical data comparing lost time between men and women

that will convince male soldiers that pregnant women are not trying to escape (that is,

avoid work) in traditionally male functions” (Moskos, 1985a: 46).

The participation of women in the military has also led to another potentially

problematic phenomenon in terms of the articulation between the family and military

life: marriage between military men and women. From the institutional point of view

the existence of dual-career couples poses several problems, namely those concerning

assignment policies: “dual-service couples are often seen as a problem for personnel

management because most such couples desire joint domicile, which require the

military to coordinate the assignments of two people” (Segal, 1988: 91). In these

circumstances there is the possibility that one of the careers will be damaged, which

becomes clear after the birth of the first child, a situation that in some cases seems to

reduce drastically the possibility of maintaining parallel careers (Reynaud, 1988: 126).

Partially because of these problems, a significant percentage of dual-career couples

decide to remain childless.88 Once again, the military organization seems to reproduce

all too well the ambiguous messages of society regarding the proper role of women.

88 It should, however, be noted that despite these problems dual-career couples might actually benefit the institution if compared with couples where one member is a civilian. As sustained by Segal, it may be easier to co-ordinate assignments within the institution than to consider civilian employment opportunities. Besides, these couples are likely to be more committed to military life and able to understand better each other’s job requirements (Segal, 1988: 91).

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2. Women, citizens and soldiers: the political dilemmas of female military service

2.1. Women and democratization

The question of the impact of democratization on gender relations and of

women’s position/role in the process of consolidating democracy have been a motive of

special concern for feminist scholars, who generally start by highlighting the invisibility

of women in most of the political science literature devoted to the topic of

democratization.89 Most of these criticisms have been directed to the liberal conception

of democracy with its abstract paradigm of the individual, “understood as male and

universal” (Cavarero, 1992: 32). To the liberal idea that social inequalities are irrelevant

to political equality, radical feminists have opposed the argument that class inequality

undercuts formal political equality and that democracy is incomplete until it addresses

social and economic concerns. This debate –which has also shaped major divergences in

feminist political thought— has found significant expression on the question of equality

vs. difference, universal vs. particular concerns, public vs. private spheres, and is, in

fact, anchored in the confront between different conceptions of democracy.90 But even

setting aside this opposition, most of the discussion is based on the starting assumption

that political equality having been achieved, it would now be the case of moving

towards the fulfillment of what T. H. Marshall saw as the social and economic forms of

citizenship. However, authors like Anne Phillips have acutely observed that political

equality has not yet been delivered, and that the centrality of the specifically political

should thus be stressed: “Politics is a particular kind of activity, and not to be dissolved

into everything else” (Phillips, 1993: 86). The dilemma she identifies is the following:

how can democracies deliver on equality while accommodating and welcoming

difference? What kind of politics can recognize group difference while resisting

fragmentation into discrete and local identities? (Phillips, 1993: 2). These are open

questions for the future, but even if political citizenship is considered a distinct question

from that of social and economic inequality - the potential tension between equality and

89Sometimes extreme positions are taken on this issue. Carole Pateman, for instance, has written: “For feminists democracy has never existed; women have never been and still are not admitted as full and equal members and citizens in any country known as a democracy” (Pateman, 1988: 210). 90 In Democracy and Difference, Phillips calls our attention to the fact that recent feminist debate has been characterized by a sharp contrast between (male) abstraction and (female) specificity, thus reproducing the same ‘false oppositions’ (Phillips, 1993: 11).


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freedom, democracy and market economy being acknowledge - the relation between

both sets of concepts becomes important when the problem of the ‘quality’ and

‘qualification’ of democracy is addressed. What is being underlined here is that the

patterns and effects of the power distribution in society may affect the institutions and

rules that define democracy in the first place, as they affect the conditions for the

exercise of democratic citizenship.

The question of the role of women’s organizations in democratization processes

may be taken as an expressive example of these discussions. Some scholars have noted

the extent to which existing analysis fails to incorporate a gendered perspective,

ignoring the actions and impact of certain women’s movements in transitions to

democracy. Waylen, for instance, argues that the explanation for this omission stems

exactly from a narrow definition of politics and a restricted institutional conception of

democracy adopted by the majority of the scholars working on democratization in the

1980s. She criticizes the ‘competitive elitist’ view of politics considered to be narrowly

defined to include only the upper echelons of the public sphere - where women do not

appear as politically active - downplaying the significance of wider sorts of political

activities - like social movements - in which women are more likely to be involved.

While arguing that works on social movements “provide a corrective to the top-down

perspective of democratization theorists” (Waylen, 1994: 334), the author recognizes

some problems raised by this perspective: first, the link between grass-roots movements

and the wider context, the state and political parties, was extensively ignored; second,

the majority of writers sharing a bottom-up focus also failed to discuss gender issues. A

new conception of democracy is therefore considered necessary, since “democracy at

the institutional level does not necessarily entail a more even distribution of power in

society, particularly with regard to gender.” She continues, “the narrow definitions of

democracy, politics and citizenship, the concentration on the public sphere and the use

of simplistic notions of civil society mean that these works are of little use to

understanding the place of gender in the processes and outcomes of democratization”

(Waylen, 1994: 333/335). However, trying to face the contradictions that have emerged

between the public realm of political equality and the private realm of economic and

social subordination, the author seems to minimize the first of the problems identified

above: that of the limiting effects of grass-roots movements localism. This issue has

been at the center of what Phillips identified as the American radical critique of liberal

democracy (Phillips, 1993). According to this perspective, the micro-politics of grass-

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roots democracy is not likely to solve the main problem - which is considered to be

crucial - of the declining significance of the public sphere. Instead of advocating the

dissolution of distinctions between public and private, as the European tradition of

radicalism suggested, prospects for a better democracy are considered to lie on a more

active revitalization of the public sphere. In other words, citizenship is considered to be

about "transformation", involving some process of separation from the most immediate

concerns and localized identities, in opposition to a view that stresses and exposes

group difference and inequality (Phillips, 1993: 13-14). This is where the question of

women’s interests becomes central.

2.2. Women’s interests and the military

2.2.1. The political construction of 'women's interests'

Some scholars argue that women, as gendered individuals, should be considered

a group with distinctive and 'representable interests'. Furthermore, according to the

interest reasoning, women’s interests are different from men’s and often conflictual.

However, feminist perspectives on the question of ‘interests’ have been very diverse in

form and contradictory in content. This includes the possible use of interest theory

itself. For instance, while some have argued that the utilitarian connotations to

calculation of the language of interests could never serve the feminist purposes

(Diamond and Hartsock, 1981), others have accepted the theoretical and normative

aspects of the interest theory, even if a conceptual re-definition was deemed necessary

(Jones and Jonasdottir, 1990).

While earlier feminist perspectives assumed frequently that women had –and

should recognize— common interests in changing the prevailing gender arrangements,

more recent work has challenged essentialist notions of women's political interests,

based on assumptions such as the existence of an unitary and natural category,

"women", with a set of already defined interests and homogeneity of experience. This

position does not suppose a denial of gender interests or even of gender interest groups,

but rather proposes a reformulation of the debate, stressing the need to develop a

historically situated analysis. This means following a conceptualization of interests as

socially identified and mediated: interests do not just ‘exist’; they are constituted in

terms of a complex and continuous process (Schmitter, 1981). Consequently, there

seems to be no possible agreement about the nature of such interests: “while it is true


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that at a certain level of abstraction women can be said to have some interests in

common, there is no consensus over what these are or how they are to be formulated

(…). A theory of interests which has an application to the debate about women’s

capacity to struggle for, and benefit from, social change, must begin by recognizing

difference rather than assuming homogeneity” (Molineux, 1985: 61). The most

interesting question to ask would not be ‘which are women’s gender specific interests?’

but rather, ‘under which conditions have these interests been socially defined and

politically mediated in concrete historical situations?’(Schmitter, 1981).

Nevertheless, there have been attempts to identify some distinctive women’s

interests. Among these are the supposed objective women’s interest in mothering and

reproduction; the political economy of the gendered division of labor; the arrangements

of the female body; spirituality and contact with the divine (Ferguson, 1990). Still, other

scholars, while rejecting notions of a common identity, believe that along with

continuing inequalities at different levels, women have in common a discursive

marginality (Pringle and Watson, 1992). But in spite of the strong divisions among

feminists regarding the definition of these interests, most of them are willing to accept

as a minimum common denominator the fact that gender is a powerful organizer

principle of social life and human consciousness. Furthermore, there is also enough

empirical evidence that women and men are actually forming groups based on the

politics of household, parenting and sexuality, and that at least some of them have taken

the form of fully fledged interest organizations (Jonasdottir, 1988). But the point that

should be stressed is that such interests are always precarious historical products,

subject to processes of dissolution and redefinition (Pringle and Watson, 1992). A

similar perspective is underlined by Jonasdottir: “Whether or not certain social groups -

as for instance women or children - do have group specific interests, or are concerned

with public policy, cannot be determined in the abstract or as a matter of principle.

Theorizing in terms of interests (as all theory that aims at description and explanation of

reality) must be historically and empirically informed” (Jonasdottir, 1988).

Such a standpoint simultaneously challenges the existence of natural and unitary

categories of men and women as well as the belief in independent and pre-given

specifications of group interests. It also overcomes the ambiguity surrounding the use of

the concepts ‘women’s interests’ and ‘gender interests’. In fact, most mainstream

analyses have not gone beyond the notion that ‘gender means women’. If interests are

relational in their nature, then it is difficult to understand the lack of theorizing about

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men’s gender interests in the work of feminist scholars. What are men’s gender interests

assumed to be? Do all men have an interest in preserving patriarchal arrangements?91

These questions should also be raised if we are to understand how gender interests are

built up and mediated.

Approaching the question of the gender political interests of (different groups)

of men and women in an historically situated manner, has been at the basis of recent

attempts to redefine the opposition between objective and subjective interests, one of

the most recurrent and often ‘essentialist’ debates within the interest theory, and to

which I will turn now.

2.2.2. From ‘objective versus subjective’ interests to a politics of presence

One proposal that explicitly considered gender interests from such a standpoint

is that of Maxine Molineux (1985), who distinguishes between ‘practical’ and

‘strategic’ gender interests. Practical interests are seen as arising from the concrete

conditions of women’s positioning within the social division of labor. These are

contextualized interests that if realized would improve women’s material situation but

not necessarily challenge the gender order: “Practical interests are usually a response to

an immediate perceived need, and they do not entail a strategic goal such as women’s

emancipation or gender equality” (Molineux, 1985: 63). An example of this would be,

for instance, female collective action’s frequent claim that women have a special

interest in domestic provision and public welfare by virtue of their place within the

social division of labor. In terms of these practical gender interests women might find

themselves opposed, depending on their social location. Strategic gender interests, on

the contrary, are deduced from feminist analyses of women’s subordination and from

the formulation of an alternative set of arrangements to those that exist. The author

recognizes that there is not an automatic relation between these strategic interests and

women’s recognition of them or desire to realize them. This poses of course the delicate

and often ‘biased’ question of subjective vs. objective interests. To Molineux, even the

‘lowest common denominator’ of interests is not accepted by all women. And this does

not happen because of some ‘false consciousness’ –although it may interfere— but

91 Orloff (1997) addresses this point criticizing Jane Lewis when she argues that “we have to consider their [women’s] right not to engage in paid work (decommodification) and by extension, their right to do unpaid work, and also their right to do paid work and by extension their right not to engage in unpaid work. Orloff then asks: “Would feminists or other interested in creating a gender-egalitarian society want to extend these rights to men - particularly the right ‘not to care’?” (Orloff, 1997:10).


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because certain changes, such as women’s personal independence and autonomy from

men, could threaten the practical interests of some women, or entail a cost not

compensated for. So, she argues, “the formulation of strategic interests can only be

effective as a form of intervention when full account is taken of these practical interests.

Indeed it is the politicization of these practical interests and their transformation into

strategic interests which constitutes a central aspect of feminist political practice”

(Molineux, 1985: 63)

While accepting as interesting the idea of practical gender interests, Orloff

(1997: 11) criticized Molineux’s belief that some unity could be built among women

around these strategic interests, even in the face of differences. She questions our

capacity to specify “objective” or “strategic” interests for any groups, as much as she

questions the possibility of deducting politically-salient identities and interests from

social structures.

Independently of whether or not interest theory is considered adequate to

analyze gender based cleavages and political action, it must be recognized that the

problem of objective vs. subjective interests fails to capture the ‘dual’ character of

social processes - the interaction of both structure and agency - as well as the diverse,

shifting and conflicting nature of social action. The ‘essentialist’ character of this debate

is underlined by Schmitter, who argues that, “perhaps it would be more accurate to to

call interests “theoretical” rather than objective or subjective (…) [Interests] must be

discovered and assessed, whether by those directly affected or by those indirectly

attentive to them” (Schmitter, 1981:43).

Another perspective that clearly aims at overcoming the notion of objective vs.

subjective interests, is that of Jonasdottir, who claims that what is needed is a refocusing

of the lens of interest, to emphasize its formal dimension - the notion that interest means

a group ‘being among’ the members of a political community, who have a ‘controlling

presence’ - rather than the contents, which are the specific needs of a certain group. This

view leaves open to theoretical and empirical analysis the content aspect of human

values and preferences, which then remain the object of conflicts. “Interest always

relates to some sort of controlling attendance confronting conditions of choice (…) this

means either ‘being among’ those creating the alternatives, or knowing, by means of

information, concrete thinking, and clear vision what one chooses and has to chose

between” (Jonasdottir, 1988: 50/51).

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By focusing on the conditions of choice and not only on the contents of those

choices that are offered, women’s present political interests are considered to concern

the building up and controlling of, as sex/gender, a concrete presence or attendance in

the system. It follows that a central point to consider is whether and to what extent

present political structures enable women to build, maintain and control their presence

in politics as women. In other words, the question is: under what conditions can women

as women develop a controlling presence in situations of choices in general and in

authoritative decision making?

This perspective is especially promising if taken as a conceptual framework to

analyze women’s interests facing military participation. In the light of Jonasdottir’s

proposal, it is possible to ask how women’s access to military positions is seen as

promoting or decreasing women’s 'controlling presence' over conditions of choice, both

inside the institution and in the state arenas where decisions concerning the use of

military force are made.

2.3. Feminist perspectives on women and the use of military force

Associations between gender and military force are prevalent and yet full of

confusion. This uncertainty arises from two main sources: (a) the diversity of women’s

experiences and (b) the divisions within feminist perspectives. Feminists have posited

conflicting theories on the relation of women to war, peace and revolution, and women

have, according to changing social historical circumstances, responded to warfare and

peace movements in a great variety of ways.

It is thus not surprising to find no unitary position being taken either by feminist

groups, women's associations or feminist scholars on the relation of women to issues of

war, peace, security and organized violence. One possible way of dealing with this

complexity has been to categorize the varieties of feminism. As Carroll and Hall argue,

although it is not always illuminating “it does convey a sense of the diversity of

feminism while offering orderly frameworks to manage some of its complexities”

(1993: 12). The conventional categories of feminism usually include at least three

branches of the feminist movement: “mainstream” or liberal feminism, socialist and

Marxist feminism, and radical feminism. It is however common to find different

typologies, based not only on political/chronological dimensions, but also on


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methodological standpoints.92 In order to contrast the different perspectives of these

various epistemological and theoretical feminist traditions, the argument will follow an

analytical distinction – even if this is not always easy to operate— between two central

problems: the legitimation of military force and the distinctiveness of women's relation

to peace and organized violence.

2.3.1. The legitimation of military force

If, for some movements, armed action is considered necessary in certain social

situations –especially those of political resistance and national liberation struggles—

and female participation and leadership are even seen as a reason for pride, for some

other feminists military force lacks legitimacy, and they thus describe women’s military

involvement as unacceptable.

2.3.1.1. The revolutionary tradition and the 'right to fight'

The first of these positions inspires some revolutionary feminist perspectives,

which advocate women’s rights to fight against the imposition of an unfair social,

economic or political order. This tradition can be traced back to the time of the French

Revolution when some women among the minority of feminist supporters of the

revolution included in their demand for political equality the right to bear arms.

Pauline de Léon, who became the leader of the society of Revolutionary

Republican Women, submitted a petition to the National Assembly in 1791, requesting

authorization for a woman’s militia, on the grounds that women have the right to self-

defense and to the defense of the revolution. Women wanted, she declared, the honor of

sharing the trials and glories of their brothers-in-arms and of “making tyrants see that

women also have blood to shed for the service of the fatherland in danger” (quoted in

Pierson, 1987a: 208). As Pierson has argued, for these early ‘feminists’, the

militarization of women was not just something seen as an imprescriptible right but as a

necessary step toward redressing the power-balance between the sexes (Pierson, 1987a:

208). This type of request became frequent during the initial years of the revolution,

92 This is, of course, not to mention the diversity of labels that have emerged to qualify specific feminist perspectives. A description provided by Caroll and Hall (1993: 12) is impressive: “African-American or black feminism, Third world or 'women of color feminism, womanism, Jewish feminism, ecofeminism, anarchofeminism, cultural feminism, spiritualist feminism, lesbian feminism, pacifist feminism, postmodern feminism and conservative feminism).”

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even if it was not successful. Indeed, the request of women to concern themselves with

state matters was considered a threat by most male revolutionaries, who strongly

opposed their claims by invoking the danger of inverting the natural order of gender

roles (Marand-Fouquet, 1993; Pierson, 1987a). Although the fear of women taking up

arms to defend themselves may have contributed to the decisiveness of their political

suppression, the tradition of women’s involvement in uprisings of social protest and

revolutionary civil war lived on (Pierson, 1987a: 210).

The involvement of women in the Nicaraguan revolution - and particularly the

positions taken up by AMPRONAC (Association of Nicaraguan Women Confronting

the Nation’s Problems) - is often presented as a modern example of this standpoint.

However, instead of focusing on women’s specific demands, the association has aimed

at incorporating women both physically and ideologically into the revolution. In their

attempt to integrate women into the anti-Somoza movement, AMPRONAC recognized

that its campaign “would not please the big international feminist movements, for in

content, it rather laid emphasis on the general struggle of our people for a free country.

But this corresponds to the real need of Nicaraguan women, who lay the foundations of

the equality of their sex on equal participation in the construction of a new Nicaragua”

(Isaksson, 1988).

While still surviving in the contemporary world, the revolutionary position

found itself facing serious criticism. Different arguments have been used by feminist

scholars to show how the participation of women in revolutionary struggles only

apparently contributed to a positive change in women’s social and political status; on

the contrary, according to this view, it seems to have further reinforced traditional

gender cleavages. On the one hand, it has been noted that although the exclusion of

women from combat has been relaxed during revolutionary struggle –national liberation

wars, guerrilla resistance against invasion– the “political and military decisions to put

women into combat have almost always been made by men” (Goldman, 1982: 11). On

the other hand –as shown in Chapter I—, there is the historical evidence of the impact

of revolutions over the status of women. Despite their combatant roles during these

conflicts, in its aftermath women were expected to give up leadership positions and

return to the domestic sphere: “once a stable state has emerged (or re-emerged), its

domination by men is reasserted and combat becomes male exclusive again” (Pierson,

1987a: 222). The experience of women during the colonial struggle in Cuba, Algeria


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and China also suggest that after a period of gratitude to all those who co-operated in

overthrowing the foreign power, the revolutionary government returns to a policy of

female exclusion (Tobias, 1990: 166). The aftermath of the revolution in Nicaragua also

documents this change, providing a useful case study of the typical effects of women's

involvement in revolutionary movements (Seitz, Labao and Treadway, 1993).

However, the process of the military incorporation of women that developed in

most western armies in recent decades has significantly changed this situation, shifting

attention to the question of citizenship and equity regarding women’s access and

progression inside military structures. Most even believe that the “anticipated victory of

movements to end gender bias in the militaries of a number of states (...) should have a

major impact on world politics” (Murphy, 1996: 521).

2.3.1.2. Citizenship and the liberal feminist perspective

This position has been highlighted by many women’s organizations in the area

of so-called liberal feminism. The main claim of such organizations has been the fight

for a 'first class citizenship' for military women. Their action has mainly concentrated

on the question of the equality of women’s access to all military specialties and jobs.

The revolutionary expectations of other groups of women are here replaced by the fight

against occupational segregation politics and the search for the removal of

institutionalized forms of discrimination, including women’s access to combat jobs.

In fact, most prescriptive analysis by liberal feminists start by highlighting the

fact that the traditional exclusion of women from those organizations in charge of

managing legitimate violence has historically meant an exclusion from citizenship. By

the time western nation-states were constituted, the right to combat and use guns on

behalf of the political community was seen as one of the major acquisitions of an

emergent citizenship status. Military participation was an instrument through which

certain discriminated social groups acquired civic and political rights, while others - like

women - were denied such rights.

Women seem to have been excluded from the political community through both

exclusion from conscription and suffrage. In this respect, it is curious to note how, in

the majority of western democracies, the extension of voting rights to women was

closely linked to their participation in the war effort during the two world conflicts. As

described in Chapter I, in most countries women obtained the vote in the aftermath of

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suffragist campaigns and women’s mobilization into the formal economy during World

Wars I and II (Reynaud, 1988: 44).93 This two-century-old association between

citizenship and the right to combat has continued to be evoked in recent decades in

situations where military participation was seen as a potential way for some minority

groups to obtain legitimacy and political rights, thus supporting the claim to full

citizenship.94

Some scholars have also stressed how military service still functions as a kind of

entitlement for a role in civic life. Analyzing the connections between participation in

warfare and political leadership in the US, Sheila Tobias has shown that during periods

when heroism in warfare and leadership in politics are strongly linked, women have

experienced real obstacles to their political ambitions (Tobias, 1990: 164) To explore

this hypothesis, she compares two periods: the period immediately after World War II,

when returning GIs made their claim to leadership in Congress, and the 1986 elections

when Vietnam veterans were asserting their claims. As in both periods women

candidates to public office did not serve in war, their claim to leadership quite as much

as their right to citizenship had to be posited elsewhere. Tobias raises questions about

the degree to which participation in war continues - even into the nuclear age - to be a

test of political leadership, a test that, in her view, women are virtually certain to fail

(Tobias, 1990: 165). What is surprising in this analysis is the extent to which

contemporary political strategies still rely on the soldier-citizen connection, and how

strongly candidates for public office feel the need to describe themselves in this way.

Facing the reality of a growing presence of women in the armed forces, she

answers with skepticism: “While more and more women are volunteering for the

military, particularly as previously restricted classifications are being opened to them, it

remains most unlikely that any significant number of American women will seek

military service in the coming decades the way some men do, as a convenient stepping

stone for politics. (...) So long as women cannot display either medals of honor or

missing limbs as signs of service to their country, the issue of war and politics for

women will remain on the cutting edge of feminist theory and a constraint on the future

of feminism itself” (Tobias, 1990: 183).

93 The case of Switzerland is particularly striking: when women gained the right to vote in 1971, this was associated with the decline in the citizen-soldier ideal (cf. Pateman, 1988: 211)


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However, most feminist scholars have noted that in the relationship between

citizenship and defense the status of women as citizens is profoundly ambiguous. Carol

Pateman showed how, in the context of the battle for women’s suffrage, part of the

counter-argument for extending the vote to women was that in their role as mothers they

were performing a public service: that the women who died in childbirth were

sacrificing their lives as much as the men who died in battle. According to Pateman,

motherhood as a political status, as a major vehicle of women’s incorporation into the

political order, has shaped women’s duty to the state and women’s citizenship. This has

been, she argues, a troubling legacy; women and men have been incorporated into

citizenship in different ways: men primarily as soldiers and workers and women

primarily as mothers (Pateman, 1992).95 Some feminist scholars have stressed the fact

that this asymmetry already underpins liberal democratic notions of citizenship, since

the ‘political’ status of citizens is premised on arrangements of sexual inequality

(Phillips, 1993: 106/107).

2.3.1.3. Antimilitarism and the radical standpoint

Most of the arguments against revolutionary or liberal feminist perspectives

have been used to sustain the claims of anti-militarist feminists in the fields of radical

and socialist feminism. However, it is difficult to identify a consistent and homogeneous

position in this regard. While some radical feminists express doubt about taking a fully

pacifist stance, arguing that the participation of women in national liberation struggles

may be necessary, others deny any validity to the right to fight, dismissing it as

unimportant, non-existent or, like the right to sell oneself into slavery, inadmissible

(Ruddick, 1983b: 474; Chapkis, 1981). In spite of this fundamental difference, the

various perspectives share the same fundamental opposition to militarism: it is seen as a

basic expression of patriarchy.

94 Curiously, the same happened with some pacifist groups on the basis of the argument that “even a moral decision to give up guns, depends on the ability and freedom to use them”. 95 It is interesting to note how some recent proposals partially build on this idea. Feminists like Sara Ruddick or Jean Bethke Elshtain have indeed developed a so-called ‘maternal feminism’ based on this relation between maternal virtues and citizenship (Ruddick, 1988). Mary Dietz, on the contrary, has argued that this maternal feminism is incompatible with democratic citizenship. First, she sees the relationship between mother and child as unequal, qualitatively different from the egalitarian relationship that ought to characterize relations between citizens; second, she condemns the implicit development of a notion of citizenship from a position of women’s superiority (cf. Phillips, 1993: 83).

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Female military participation is thus perceived as strengthening further male

domination in society as well as women’s discrimination. According to this perspective,

war cannot be eliminated without eliminating patriarchy, and no lasting peace or

security is possible if patriarchal social structures are not transformed. It is from a

position of 'outsider' and refusal of co-optation by the system that Virginia Woolf wrote

in Tree Guineas the sentence that became famous among the most prominent

representatives of this radical and internationalist feminism: "As a woman, I have no

country, as a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world".

Without being a pacifist, Cynthia Enloe is one of those advocating extensive societal

transformation. Sharing with Woolf the idea that women as 'outsiders' have a valuable

contribution to make to the debates on war and peace, she subjects the military

definition of national security to feminist inquiry.

In Bananas, Beaches and Bases, she draws a connection between the politics of

US ‘capitalist imperialism’ and the denigration of women in third-world countries. By

analyzing women whose role in world politics escapes the conventional definitions of

actors that might influence policy-makers –diplomatic wives, women employed in

export-oriented industrial sectors of NIC's, or women working in military bases— she

also intends to show that women are not peripheral to international affairs. Moreover,

when addressing the question of the interconnections between patriarchy and militarism,

she argues that the military have a crucial interest in the preservation of a male-

dominant social order, depending, for its reproduction, on ideological constructions of

masculinity and femininity as complementary (Enloe, 1990b).

In this context, the problem of equality is carefully re-examined, leading to the

conclusion that the occupational segregation of women in the armed forces is the

clearest proof of the reinforcement of the sexual division of labor in the military, even

more so than in civilian life. It is also frequently argued that military interests are

openly opposed to the development of the social, political and economic interests of

women: “Instead of falling into the trap of seeking equal opportunity within a system

rooted in oppression, women can redefine the terms of the struggle. We can undermine

the power of men over women by undermining and resisting the structures that make

men powerful. When militaries promise us ‘equal opportunity’ we must respond by

questioning: the opportunity to do what? Opposition to all forms of militarism must be a


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vital part of the feminist movement. In a nuclear age, all our lives depend on it”

(Chapkis, 1981: 39).

One good example of the clash between liberal feminist and radical positions

can be found in the debates in the USA regarding the return of the draft in 1980. The

controversy surrounding women’s conscription (and conscription in general) divided

US feminists over questions of principle and strategy. Ultimately it was about how to

reconcile the immediate demand for equality of opportunity –a practical interest, in

Moulineux’s terms— with the more ‘strategic’ recognition of the need to eliminate the

structural roots of inequality.

While opponents to the Equal Rights Amendment firmly rejected the possibility

of the registering and drafting of women, using arguments such as “we are not going to

send our daughters to do a man's job” (Holm, 1993: 351), most ERA supporters were

uncomfortable. Some of them suggested that women should refuse to register until the

ERA was ratified: "When American women have equality of opportunity” said Bella

Abzug, "there will be enough time to talk about equality of sacrifice” (Holm, 1993:

352). Others, like Women's Equity Action League saw registration as an opportunity to

show women's commitment, thus helping ratification by putting women in a stronger

position to insist on equal protection of the constitution. Women in Congress were also

divided on the issue. As Holm reports (Holm, 1993: 353), some considered that as long

as women were not to be used in combat, there was no need to register for the draft;

others predicted "a terrible back-lash" if women were not registered.

Liberal feminists have traditionally advocated extending all civil rights and

responsibilities to women, including their equal exposure with men to the political will

of the state. The elimination of exclusions regarding conscription or the criteria used to

recruit for combat related positions has thus been considered necessary as a means for

women to acquire full citizenship rights. In the United States, NOW is taken to be the

organisation most paradigmatic of this liberal feminism (Jones, 1990b: 126). Although

opposed to the draft in principle, NOW’s reaction to a possible registering of women if

a draft became unavoidable, was positive. This was seen as being in the interest of the

military and also in the interest of women, who otherwise would be denied the chance

to fulfill the ‘unique political responsibility’ of risking one’s life for the State. “War is

senseless. Neither the lives of young men or young women should be wasted. But if we

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cannot stop the killing, we know we cannot choose between our sons or daughters”

(quoted in Holm, 1993: 352).

NOW’s positions have been criticized for their supposed blindness regarding

gender-neutral concepts of equality. Kathleen Jones argued that it is not only necessary

to grant political rights, but also to assume the democratization of choices and

responsibilities at the economic, social and political levels: “The demands for an agenda

of non-discriminatory opportunities within the existing framework bears all the marking

of co-optation” (Jones, 1990b: 127). Arguing that the use of force on behalf of the

State's interests is determined by political authorities, the author assumes that women's

power to influence it would be secured to the extent that they had equal access to

political positions. Moreover, her criticism of NOW positions underlines the fact that

the liberal argument of equality of opportunities becomes virtually insignificant if their

substance contributes to a narrowing of choices in the long run: “If women content

themselves with petitioning for entry in certain quarters, leaving the institutions

arranged as they find them, women will discover the existing characteristics and values

of society unscathed, if not strengthened” (Jones, 1990b: 132).

However, predisposed by their criticism of war to assume antimilitarist and

pacifist positions, radical feminists have faced some profound contradictions that more

moderate scholars have not hesitated to point out: on one hand, the relative difficulty in

discussing, from such a standpoint, the question of equality of opportunities and non-

discrimination regarding women’s access and progression in the military. On the other,

as argued by Sara Ruddick, by assuming this perspective, such movements ignored the

historical and political significance of both the right to fight and the duty to serve, thus

assuming a politically separatist position based on the ‘comfortable’ political identity of

the outsider: “The right to participate in organized violence and to share its burden is for

women a mean of self respect, full citizenship and equality with men. The alternative,

allowing men exclusive control of the means of violence, endorses the division between

protectors and protected, endangers women, and ironically sustains military as well as

masculinist ideologies” (Ruddick, 1983a: 476).

Stiehm’s analysis of the protector/protected relationship underlines the same

perspective. She considers that the masculine character of the military has contributed to

create an asymmetric division between protectors and protected which, in turn, has

instituted –both at the individual and collective levels— a relation of dependency of


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women on men. The degree of threat is in part defined by the protector, in whose

interest it may be to exaggerate the threat. Furthermore, the fact that protectors

sometimes identify more with other protectors than with the protected may become the

greatest threat of all. “A society of defensors”, she sustains, “composed of citizens

equally liable to experience violence and equally responsible for exercising society’s

violence, is (…) stronger and more desirable” (Stiehm, 1982: 367).

Even authors who situate themselves in the area of post-structuralist thought, but

who seem to share similar concerns regarding the ‘structural violence of state systems’,

have acknowledged the basic asymmetry of protection rackets and the need to consider

the different location of individuals within security systems: “once institutionalized,

protection systems render disengagement risky at best, and possibly devastating”

(Peterson, 1992b: 52). The fact that choices are always trade-offs shaped by context

renders this particularly true for the most vulnerable, posing at the same time enormous

difficulties in asserting strategies for change.

Another perspective on women’s interests regarding the use and legitimacy of

military force is somehow less extreme than the previous one, and can be seen as an

attempt to reconcile feminism and antimilitarism. Referring to the Italian case, Sebesta

has argued that the question of the admission of women into the armed forces or the

conditions of their presence within the institution can only be addressed after a

necessary reconversion of the military. The most useful task that women can

accomplish is that of contributing to the external control of the military apparatus. The

reconversion of the military in terms of ethical values and internal goals is seen as a

double function that “could be carried out with more incisiveness by many women

outside the military system, rather than by a few inside” (Sebesta, 1994: 44). The fact

that women are not adequately represented in power positions outside the military –thus

lacking a ‘controlling’ presence in the system— does not seem to be taken into

consideration.

2.3.2. The distinctiveness of women’s relation to peace and war

Besides the problem of legitimacy of military force, feminist positions have

considered the distinctiveness of women’s relation to organized violence in differing

ways. If sometimes the argument underlying such specificity is based on women’s

exclusion from power positions in the public sphere, in other cases it is anchored on

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women’s maternal experience supposedly responsible for ‘ontological’ propensions to

pacifism, care and the defense of life itself. In any case, both oppose women’s military

participation, often sharing an essentialist vision of gender categories.

One of the most influential contemporary feminist perspectives is exactly the

one we could call pacifist and maternal feminism, which opposes the ‘moral mother’ to

the image of the ‘warrior woman’, a powerful symbol supporting many women’s

pacifist groups and their political activities. In the West, this association grew out of the

Victorian ideology of women’s moral superiority and the glorification of motherhood.

Most turn-of-the-century feminists shared this ideology. Indeed, the presumption of a

deep relation between ‘feminine nature’ and pacifist virtues was already strong during

the first suffragist campaigns, where the argument that women’s vote would favor peace

was frequently used. Emily Pankhurst, the leader of the British suffragettes, declared in

1912: "It has never been and never will be the policy of the Women's social and

political union recklessly to endanger human life. We leave that to the enemy. We leave

that to the men in their warfare. It is not the method of women” (quoted in Pierson,

1987: 213). The second wave of feminism that developed after the ’sixties partially

assumed this position (cf. Albrech-Heide, 1981) The proliferation of nuclear guns and

the development, within the context of East-West tension, of diverse threats to peace

constituted the background of such movements.

A more recent perspective aiming at discussing the relation between a

supposedly feminine peacefulness and women’s military participation comes from Sara

Ruddick, who considers herself antimilitarist but supports women’s right to combat. She

holds that there is a specific women’s culture based on ‘preservative love’ emerging

from women’s maternal experience, which, if transformed by a critical feminist

consciousness, could become a reliable resource for peace. By pointing out how women

seem to be disproportionally involved in all societal modes of care and by noting the

important role that they have played in peace movements and peace-thinking, the author

claims that such recognition may be used to empower women and make peace politics

more efficacious (Elshtain and Tobias, 1990). Consequently, it is assumed that women’s

presence in the military would serve women’s interests to the extent that some

fundamental changes would occur regarding the nature of that institution (Ruddick,


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1983b).96 However, such conclusions have been considered highly problematic. The

pacifist position, even if in a less radical version, has been criticized for reproducing the

gender stereotype of the non-violent caring woman, thus eroding the very basis that

would allow the claim for non-discrimination and equality of opportunities between

men and women.

Once again, feminists have found themselves divided over this question. Like

many “Just War” thinkers, a number of contemporary feminist scholars have

highlighted the fact that an unjust peace can be as devastating as outright violence

concluding that, as Jean Elshtain argues, the simplistic dichotomy “war versus peace

cannot capture the daunting complexities of contemporary political and social life”

(Elshtain and Tobias, 1990: x). This author has proposed one of the most well argued

critiques of the association between women and peace, identifying the absolutizing

effects of such an equation. According to her, the social boundary thus reinforced

between a masculine, patriarchal, violent, and dis-ordered world on one side, and a

peaceful, non-violent, harmonious world on the other, have helped to maintain the

dualism of separate spheres: “Such is the irony of total inversions –she argues— which

wind up endorsing –Indeed requiring— that which they would oppose. Until such

absolutist constructions are challenged, not in opposition to but in the name of a critical

and ironic feminism, peace will remain a problem” (Elshtain and Tobias, 1990: 265). A

similar position is held by Janet Radcliffe Richards in a provocative piece significantly

titled 'Why the pursuit of peace is not part of feminism' (Richards, 1990). She insists that

the apparently radical claim for the building of a new society based on female

peacefulness is profoundly conservative, helping to sustain traditionalist claims

concerning separate spheres. "From this it will follow,” she concludes, “that although

there may be excellent reasons for an all-female protest camp at Greenham, the idea that

peace is a feminist issue is not one of them" (Richards, 1990: 213).

Advocating the need to reconsider traditional notions of citizenship, Ann

Tickner joins the chorus of criticism, arguing that "a new notion of citizenship cannot

come about until myths that perpetuate views of women as victims rather than agents

are eliminated." One such myth –she claims— is the association of women with peace,

96 Interestingly, a similar assumption is also at the base of other proposals that assume that women’s presence in the armed forces could generate a structural transformation, not as a consequence of some distinct peacefulness, but due to their usually subordinate position in society, which supposedly determines less aggressive organizational behavior (Bystydzienski, 1993).

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an equation that has been invalidated through considerable evidence of women’s

bellicosity and support for wars in many societies. According to Tickner, "the

association of femininity with peace lends support to an idealized masculinity that

depends on constructing women as passive victims in need of protection” (Tickner,

1992: 59).

The feminist perspectives analyzed and contrasted in this Chapter diverge in

fundamental epistemological, theoretical and normative/political dimensions, which in

turn become particularly amplified when the issue of women and the use of military

force is at stake. The debate is no more conclusive than is the recent historical record on

the impact of gender differences on the management of 'legitimate violence'.


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CHAPTER IV THE MILITARY INSTITUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The present tendency towards women’s military recruitment has developed in a

context of significant transformations regarding the global security conditions as well as

the goals, strategic orientations and organizational structure of the armed forces of

western democracies. These changes have been charted along two main dimensions: on

the one hand, the strategic, political definition of the use of force and the ‘management

of violence’ in a new international scenario; on the other hand, the changing relationship

between armed forces and society. This can be analyzed in terms of both the

organizational and professional transformations inside the military institution and the

social perception thereof.

Whatever the implications of these organizational shifts may be in terms of

specific policies, women’s military recruitment is a feature that simultaneously results

from and reveals the ‘intensity’ of change within military organizations. In this Chapter,

the major trends of these ongoing transformations, as well as the theoretical debates

around them, will be reviewed and subjected to critical discussion.

1. The military in the post-Cold War period: redefining strategic orientations

One of the most important assumptions in civil-military relation’s theory is that

armed forces are Janus-faced organizations: on the one hand, they have to assure

military effectiveness in order to respond to the changes of the strategic context; on the

other, especially in democracies, they must be responsive to wider social values and

thus to the society in which they are embedded and which pays for them (Dandeker,

1998; Ammendola, 1999). The dilemmas and tensions originating from this dual frame

of reference have been particularly highlighted since the end of the Cold War. A

number of changes at the broader social-political level - in terms of both the

international strategic context and domestic social structures - have fundamentally and

progressively challenged previous national definitions of strategic interests, conceptions

of security and threat, and even existing perspectives regarding the nature of warfare.

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At the international strategic level, the most obvious feature of these changes has

been identified as the "shift from the 'certainties' of the bi-polar standoff between the

two superpowers to a more uncertain, fragmented world of competing centers of

economic, political and military power" (Dandeker, 1994: 639). Especially in the past

two decades, security issues have been redefined. Traditional approaches based on the

classical paradigm of realism, focusing on a strict political-military dimension and a

stato-centric vision, have been challenged. Barry Buzan’s study, People, States and

Fear (Buzan, 1991), was one of the first attempts to re-think the core concept of

‘security’, calling attention to its multidimensional nature.97 While maintaining that

states are still the ‘dominant units’, he at the same time criticized the conceptions of

security bound to the level of individual states and military issues and called for a

broadening of the concept in order to include political, economic, societal and

environmental dimensions. Non-military dimensions of security, considered as

'common-risks' which individual nation-states can neither escape from nor deal with

alone, have thus come to the fore. The new concept of 'risk-society' posited a major

emphasis on these new sources of danger that cut across political borders (Shaw, 1998).

Although recognizing that this is not a new idea –since western states have

developed a perspective of common security in response to perceived common threats

for at least half a century—, some new elements are now seen as decisively changing

the situation. Among them is the emergence of a new and rather 'nebulous' category of

political subject, 'the international community', whose individual members’ rights and

interests are increasingly acquiring stature in world politics. As argued by Shaw,

“however inconsistently Western States and the UN respond to genocide, human rights

abuse, anti-democratic regimes, global poverty and environmental degradation, it is an

extremely significant transformation which has turned these issues into definers of

world politics” (Shaw, 1998: 78). However, 'common risks' affect different groups very

unequally and not all of them are military in nature, although some may become a

potential source of military threat. As a result, it is difficult for any society to identify

the conditions under which certain risks (defined as capabilities not matched to intent)

may become identifiable threats (Dandeker, 1994).

97 Bilgin, Booth and Jones (1998) stress the fact that different scholars have already underlined the multidimensional nature of the concept. They quote Baldwin, who referred to Wolfers as the first author to dwell on the issue of multiple dimensions of security already in 1952. These authors also note that a


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These shifts have had major consequences in terms of the role and structure of

the armed forces. It is possible to outline two fundamental dimensions of change: the

nature of military missions and the impact of technological developments on the

organizational format of the military. First, the nature of the military task has changed.

This process had already begun during the Cold War period. Together with the

diversification and diffuse character of emerging new threats, nuclear weapons have

meant that the armed forces’ mission has become determined by a logic of deterrence.

Some authors argue that this fact reveals a radical transformation of the traditional role

of the armed forces: while deterrence has always been a part of military strategies, it has

now become the core organizing principle of the institution (Reynaud, 1988: 27).

Providing deterrence or accomplishing some limited political objective are now the

major functions that the military have to share with politicians and diplomats. In this

perspective, the use of military force has become an option to be used in the last resort.

Especially since the end of the bipolar world, the military mission has been

reoriented, with priority shifting from national territorial defense to multinational

interventions aimed at supporting peace and stability at a more global scale (Dandeker,

1998: 84). Although international law after World War II already contemplated this type

of mission, the actual number of multinational 'peacekeeping operations' has undergone

a substantial increase since the dilution of East-West tensions and the renewal of the

UN's role in world politics. Precisely because this entailed fundamental changes in the

nature and scope of military missions and not a mere increase in its number, a

distinction has been proposed between the first and second generations of peacekeeping.

The second type of mission, which took on increased importance among the armed

forces’ 'operative possibilities', may thus be distinguished from the former at different

levels. Some of its key features are: 1) Complexity and ‘fuzziness’: experience has

shown that this type of mission is reasonably unpredictable in what concerns its

territorial scope as well as its specific ‘engagement rules’; 2) The armed forces become

multinationalized in various degrees and forms. In order to be effective, national

leadership has to address interoperability problems, “including not only technology and

equipment but also a range of cultural issues arising from cooperation between

formations working under quite different national personnel policies" (Dandeker, 1998:

reductionist approach to security had earlier critics from within the realist ranks, namely George Kennan, with his famous X article "Sources of Soviet conduct", Foreign Affairs, 25: 4, July, 1947.

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85); 3) They also become multifunctional: military dimensions increasingly interface

with local and international political dimensions. The need to interact with a wide

variety of political and social actors has challenged the traditional understanding (and

practice) of military professionality.

Military establishments have also been reshaping their organizational format,

accelerating the trend away from mass armed forces towards more technically-based

volunteer forces. Technological developments, which have increased the destructive

power of the arms systems in unprecedented ways, have been among the causes of the

decline of the mass army, based on universal conscription, of the modern period.

Technological change has fragmented the military organization into many specialties

and increased reliance on non-military experts for the development and operation of

complex weapon systems. This new situation has led to an inversion of the ratio

between support and combat functions (tooth-to-tail ratio), the first becoming largely

dominant. Military sociologists have thus underlined the progressive constitution of

'deterrence' forces: smaller and professionalized, easily deployable and highly

technically qualified, capable of handling the growing uncertainty of international

relations.

The problem, however, as Dandeker has put it, is that “changes stemming from

the external strategic context and the domestic social structure are not occurring

sequentially but simultaneously. Thus, while armed forces in most industrial countries

have experienced sharp cuts and restructuring of their organizational format, military

personnel are being asked to be prepared for a wider variety of missions encompassing

peace support operations as well as traditional war-fighting” (Dandeker, 1998: 85). How

has the military attempted to adapt to these different challenges? It may be said that it

has done so both by seeking to achieve greater flexibility in its organizational structures

and by responding to pressure from the wider society to conform to civilian values such

as social equality.98 In order to analyze further this process and its implications in terms

of women's military participation, it is worth scrutinizing the main features of both

organizational and professional transformations and revising the scientific debates that

have taken place in this respect.

98 For example, this is evident in the current debates on the position of women and homosexual personnel in the services.


145

2. Organizational challenges and the military profession

2.1. Changing patterns of military service: the decline of the mass army

After the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Warsaw Pact the question

of whether 'universal conscription' was still the appropriate organizational recruitment

pattern for the armed forces has gained a new impetus. As some countries started

processes leading to the abolition of the draft –France, Belgium, the Netherlands—

different authors anticipated the end of universal conscription in the West before the

millennium. However, the erosion of the fundamentals of conscription had started much

earlier. From the mid-sixties on and during the seventies, different countries were

already facing basic challenges to their existing force structure and recruitment

practices.99 Some clear symptoms of this tendency were the decreases in enlistment, in

the quality of the draftees, in retention rates, in growing levels of conscientious

objection and also in the publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the conditions and

terms of military service (Kelleher, 1978: 3). The draft, as an institution, seemed to be

losing its previous basis of legitimation.

The prediction of the end of the mass army and the theoretical debates around it

have been permanent constituents of military sociology during the second half of this

century. The thesis of the ‘end of mass-armies’ has traditionally emphasized the relation

between increasing living standards in modern industrialized societies, with its growing

functional fragmentation and professional specialization, and the erosion of compulsory

military service. Some authors have anticipated that smaller and professionalized forces

would better meet the political needs for security, requiring fewer conscripts and a

different civil-military framework. This would happen as a consequence of two major

trends: 1) technical developments blurring the traditional distinctions between civil and

military spheres, and 2) the impacts of the modernization process over social and

political structures, based on an increasing degree of individualization and normative

pluralization.

99 Some of the most important contributions regarding these long-term trends begun to be published from the early ‘60s, as in the case of Janowitz: “The decline of the Mass-Army”, military Review, 52 (February, 1972); the collected papers of Jacques Van Doorn in The Soldier and Social Change (Beverly Hills, Sage, 1976), and Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn, eds. (1976): The military and the problem of Legitimacy (Beverly Hills, Sage), especially Janowitz's summary chapter, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies.”

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According to the 'end of the mass army theory', in the course of the

modernization process the nation loses importance as a reference point for collective

identities and the military organization –both technically and socio-politically— tends

to follow an organizational pattern based on differentiation. The higher the internal

division of labor inside the Military, the higher the tendency to rely on well-trained

professional soldiers. This aspect was particularly emphasized by Van Doorn, who

claimed that especially the large and rich countries could afford to maintain forces on

the basis of volunteers, thus assuming the existence of a negative correlation between

the socio-economic degree of modernization and the extent of compulsion as the

recruitment basis for the armed forces. In sum, a common conclusion was that "the mass

army, indebted to a national ideology, organizationally homogeneous, but functionally

little differentiated and based on physical mobilization of human masses in order to be

efficient, but economically inefficient as far as the ratio between personnel, capital and

technology is concerned, is out of date" (Haltiner, 1998a: 39).

However, these developments have not always been viewed in such a linear

way. Already at the end of the 1970s, difficulties were identified concerning

organizational and political resistances to the end of the draft. While confirming Van

Doorn's and Janowitz' central predictions regarding the decline of the mass armies, a

study conducted by Kelleher in 1978, concentrating on six European states, has

underlined two major obstacles: on the one side, what the author called the

'pervasiveness of incrementalism', that is, the ability of bureaucratic actors to defend

entrenched positions; on the other, the difficulties of making political choices,

particularly about the future of conscription. The concrete political situation of Western

European States at the end of that decade –namely, its supposed structural weakness and

the inability of leaders to assess what would be a tolerable level of risk if essentially

professional armed forces were to be established— seemed to indicate that "a politics of

gradualism, of solution by attrition" would be "the safest short-run course, however

compelling and irreversible the long-run pressures and trends" (Kelleher, 1978: 5).

In a more recent research, aimed at answering the question of whether the

decline of mass armies has taken place in the sense predicted, Haltiner concludes that

the era of mass-armies would come to an end with the turn of the century in Western

Europe, even if not all of its nations had given up conscription by then. In the light of an

analysis of structural indicators for the period 1970-1994 and an expert survey for


147

fifteen Western European nations,100 James Burk's assumption that "ending conscription

is not a necessary outcome of the decline of mass armed forces" is confirmed (Haltiner,

1998a: 58). In this research, mass armies were considered to have the following

characteristics: 1) the recruitment system is based on universal or selective conscription;

2) a relatively large population mass may be mobilized for military purposes; 3) specific

age cohorts of the male population are liable for military service, and the majority is

actually drafted; 4) the share of volunteers, especially women, is relatively low; 5) the

level of military technology is also relatively low. The Armed Services, Air Force and

Navy mostly rely on conscripts to serve for short periods of time; 6) the armed forces

are army-dominated.

The author recognizes that, in order to be operational, the conceptual definition

excludes some important political attributes of mass armies, especially those related to

its symbolic significance in terms of the state and national integration. In spite of this

limitation, a considerable set of objective indicators has been used to measure the

change of the military structure of the different countries during the period 1970-1994.

Among these, the military Participation Ratio (MPR –share of a country’s population

registered by the military), the MPR of the military Age Cohorts, (percentage of drafted

individuals of a particular age cohort) the Conscript Ratio (CR –percentage of

conscripts compared with the total of a country’s regulars), the Women Ratio (WR –

percentage of women compared to the total armed forces), etc.

Taking the Conscript Ratio as a reference, three types of conscription forces

were described: a) a first type of Pseudo-Conscript Force (type I) with a Conscript Ratio

below 50%, already in the Cold War period. Although based on conscription as a basis

for recruitment, the majority of the force members are volunteers. Most countries of this

type reacted to the end of the Cold War with the downsizing of their armed forces and a

further decline in their conscript ratio. Countries in this category are Belgium (until

1992), Denmark, Germany, France and the Netherlands (until 1996); b) Soft Core

Conscript Forces (type II) refer to those military organizations with a CR between 50%

and 67% during the Cold War and a sharp decline afterwards. Belonging to this

category were the armed forces of Austria, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Portugal.

100 Countries with conscription systems were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. For structural comparison other countries with All-Volunteer forces have also been analyzed: Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and the United States.

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In some of these states an almost dramatic shrinking process from a high to a low CR

over a period of a few years could be observed. C) Finally, armed forces whose CR was

above two-thirds (67%) during the Cold War period and that maintained a high

conscript ratio until the mid-1990s were classified as Hard Core Conscript Forces (type

III) (Switzerland, Turkey, Finland and Greece). The following graph shows that the

mass-army format of armed forces rises relatively continuously in the transition from

type 0 (Zero Draft States) to type III (Hard Conscript forces).

��-��(��./��0��

Source: Haltiner, K. (1998a)

Furthermore, the various other indicators retained in this analysis seem to

confirm most of Keheller’s previous prognosis regarding size, conscription ratio and

structural differentiation in Western European armies: military Participation Ratio and

Conscript Ratio decreased in the period 1970-1994 and have done so even more rapidly

since 1990; armed forces have become smaller in size, technically and structurally much

more differentiated, and increasingly reliant on volunteer personnel, regardless of

whether conscription still exists or not.

Type 0

Zero Draft United Kingdom Ireland

Type I

Conscription ratio below 50%

Germany Denmark Belgium

Netherlands France

Type 2

Conscription ratio Between 50% and

66%

Sweden Norway

Italy Austria

Portugal

Spain

Type 3

Conscription ratio above

66% Greece Turkey Finland Switzerland

All-Volunteer Forces

Pseudo-Conscript

Forces

Soft Core Conscript

Forces

Hard Core Conscript

Forces


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The results obtained have also pointed to the fragility of the initial hypothesis,

which established a connection between increasing living standards and the end of

conscription. Van Doorn's assumption that socio-economic modernization would favor

the trend to volunteer systems was only weakly supported by the data. Other strategic

and military goal-bound factors such as the new missions for the armed forces,

(peacekeeping and peace enforcement) seem to be of greater importance for recent

changes in force structure: "the combination of being a member of a defense alliance,

being far from a direct national military threat and participating frequently in

international missions facilitates the abolishment of conscription and the change of

army format into a force with no or a low degree of compulsory military personnel"

(Haltiner, 1998a: 60).

Most importantly, the results allow a general conclusion to be drawn that the

classic distinction between conscript forces and volunteer systems might not be

maintained. Due to the ongoing transformation trends as well as a large variety of

unique developments and special national cases, “it makes little sense to dichotomize

conscript systems and all volunteer systems as is done often in military sociology”

(Haltiner, 1998a: 50).101 The same conclusion has been underlined by other authors who

try to explore the organizational consequences of the new imperative of 'doing more

with less' that seems to affect the emerging type of armed forces in western industrial

countries (Dandeker, 1998). Four main types of military organizations are usually

identified to characterize currently existing systems:

• A militia system, based on conscription and a limited professional body, where the

majority of the personnel are citizens who have a civil occupation and are

simultaneously trained in military techniques (the Swiss model);

101 Pseudo-conscript forces, for instance, resemble the all-volunteer forces of the Anglo-Saxon type more closely as far as their structure is concerned than those states that mainly provide compulsory personnel. Exceptions to the general trend can be explained by specific politico-historical factors, as is the case of Greece and Turkey –countries with border conflicts—, Finland –which is not a member of a defense Alliance and where territorial defense is still of great importance, and Switzerland –where the Militia system and the ideology of neutrality have an enormous impact. We should of course note that all these aspects refer to the set of factors that the author has excluded from the analysis in the first place, that is, the socio-political attributes of mass armies, especially those related to social mobilization such as the position of the military in national emergency forces, as citizen training or, more generally, as the symbol of state and national integration.

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• Professional armies, with a strong component of volunteer personnel, reinforced by

reservists recruited directly as volunteers from civilian life or among old active duty

personnel: the so-called Anglo-Saxon classic models;

• Systems combining the above two models, where the armed forces are based on

significant professional contingents, backed by conscript soldiers: the German

model and the French model (at least until 2002, the deadline established by

President Chirac for the passage to an all-volunteer force);

• Finally, professional systems of a limited dimension based on reservists as a means

for force reconstitution and regeneration (this is the recent tendency in the United

States, United Kingdom, Canada and Australia) (Moskos and Burk, 1994).

In reality, the classification of military organizations in terms of the various

models is not an easy task, since, as demonstrated by Haltiner, some of them are in

transition between models or tend to combine elements of the different types. However,

the fourth model is considered to define the basic format of the emerging type of

military organization, where new challenges –at both the organizational and

professional levels— will continue to develop.

2.2. Models of organizational and professional change compared

In the face of all these transformations, various scholars have tried to

characterize the new emerging organizational format of the armed forces of western

nations, considering its degree of convergence or divergence towards civil organizations

and societal values. The models used by researchers in the post World War II period

already reflected the strong pressures for social change in military organizations. While

some focused on the divergence factors, others pointed to the development of a

converging tendency between civil and military organizations. An extended literature

was produced in the United States during the’ fifties, which emphasized the

homogeneity and the relative autonomy of the officer corps as a distinctive feature of

military institutions. Wright Mills popularized the term ‘military mind’ (Mills, 1956). In

turn, Huntington, in his famous book The Soldier and the State, identifies the

development of military ‘professionalism’ as the distinctive element of the military

profession compared with civilian occupations, while at the same time distinguishing

the present military from his predecessors (Huntington, 1957). Based on expertise,


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responsibility and corporateness, professionalism is seen as a specific type of vocation

shared by career officers who would therefore assure the specificity of the military

organization. According to Huntington, while the Nation-State remains the main form

of political organization, war cannot be eradicated and those who assure the high

function of external security should preserve the conservative and realist ethos of

professionalism. Historical evidence, however, has pointed to the inadequacy of

Huntington’s thesis, which he himself partially reformulated at a later stage, recognizing

the impact of a double technological/strategic revolution upon civil-military relations

and military organization and professionalism (Huntington, 1963).

At the other end of the spectrum of normative positions, but still emphasizing

the isolationism and divergent character of military institutions, are those approaches

where the army is considered to be a total institution (in a 'Goffmanian' sense), aimed at

reproducing repressive social forms while at the same time remaining insensitive to the

evolution of the broader external context. Some authors believe that these perspectives,

which flourished during the ’sixties and ’seventies, are today as outdated as

Huntington's (Boëne, 1998: 174). Nevertheless, as will be seen further down, some

recent proposals still rely, at least partially, on this author's thesis when it comes to

stressing the uniqueness of the military institution and the need to develop 'internal'

models to understand military professionalism.

Between these two extremes, military sociology has developed a set of

alternative theories to explain social change within military organizations, at the core of

which questions related to professionalism have acquired major importance. This is the

case of Morris Janowitz' classic work which signaled a trend towards 'civilianization',

stressing the growing convergence between the military and civil society (Janowitz,

1960). According to this perspective, technological developments have occasioned

institutional fragmentation and a growing dependence of military organizations on non-

military expertise and technologies, thereby narrowing differences between the two

sectors. As a result of the rationalization process, affecting both civil and military

institutions, bureaucratic structures lose weight, combatants become minoritary, and

leadership styles are less authoritarian. In addition, the author believes that such a

convergence partially dilutes the sources of potential ideological conflict between civil

and military elites. He stresses, however, that such proximity does not lead to identity or

confusion; even if submitted to instrumental rationality, the military profession

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maintains its distinctiveness and must incorporate and preserve the limits of

convergence.

Janowitz’s civilianization thesis opposed, albeit only implicitly, Huntington’s

hypothesis, which assumed the need for a certain military isolation from society as a

basic condition to ensure organizational efficiency and political neutrality. Despite this

difference in emphasis - which continued to characterize later work in this area, most of

the subsequent proposals reveal some conceptual continuity. While recognizing the

structural distinctiveness of military institutions –that is, the ever-present probability of

combat and the monopoly of organized violence, most of them pointed to increasing

commonalties between military and other bureaucratic organizations.

Janowitz inaugurated a paradigm that became classical and dominant, giving rise

to a variety of perspectives within the sociological study of military institutions.102 In a

certain way, the common core of all the research aiming at explaining change lies in a

generalized perception of the decline in relevance, legitimacy and prestige accorded by

contemporary society to the military profession, the dilution of its specific contents, and

a shift in the value orientation of military professionals. This was also the starting point

for Moskos’ analysis of change within the American military. In order to overcome

strict theoretical and methodological oppositions around micro-macro or action-

structure polarities, he proposed a model highlighting the ever-changing interface

between armed forces and society, which came to be known as the I/O thesis (Moskos,

1977, 1985b, 1986; Moskos and Wood, 1988).

2.2.1. The institutional/occupational model

The institutional/occupational model proposed by Moskos is considered to be an

obligatory starting point to the analysis of change within military organizations.103

102 It has also survived various critical visions, both in the ’sixties and more recently. Ginsburg, for example, saw a dilution of military professionalism in the growing use of civilian expertise, while Ellwein considered occupational fragmentation and functional diversification as provoking the dissolution of military professionalism. More recently, Barrere-Maubuisson and Robert (1994) have suggested that “professionalisation leads to deprofessionalisation” (cf.Boëne and Dandeker, 1998: 176). 103 A good overview of different models can be found in the special issue of Current Sociology on the military profession in Europe (Current Sociology, 42(3), 1994), particularly the article by Marina Nunciari “Rethinking the Military Profession: Models of Change Compared.” The issue includes an extended bibliography on the topic. A comparison between the Moskos and Thomas models is developed in Boëne (1984), “The Moskos and Thomas Models Contrasted”, in J. Kuhlmann, ed. Military and Society: The European Experience, Munich, SOWI, pp.35-66. F. Batistelli’s (1990) Marte e Mercurio. Sociologia dell’Organizacione Militare, also provides a useful synthesis of various contributions.


153

Indeed, when first proposed in 1977, it gained attention not only from social researchers

but also from policy-makers and senior officials in the armed forces, and all subsequent

models refer to or criticize Moskos' proposal in one way or another. In this model a set

of polarized empirical indicators is identified in a continuum ranging from a military

organization that is highly divergent from civilian society to one which is highly

convergent with civilian structures. Two ideal-type models are conceptualized: an

institutional or divergent model, legitimated in terms of norms and traditional values,

where the members of the institution are seen as following a ‘vocation’, relying on

symbolic rewards and sharing “a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor

of a presumed higher good” (Moskos, 1986: 378); and an occupational or convergent

model, close to the dominant market rationality of civilian society, where motivations to

join or remain in the military are of an extrinsic material and instrumental nature. Table

4.1 shows the different variables initially identified by Moskos along the lines of both

orientations.

When this thesis was first presented –in the context of a “strange crisis”104 in the

definition of the essence of the military organization—, Moskos defended the idea that

the dominant trend in the American armed forces was a shift from a ‘vocational’ to an

‘occupational’ logic, and a corresponding move from institutionalism toward

occupationalism. In this sense, the I/O thesis reproduces polarities of the social structure

that have always been at the core of mainstream macro-sociology, such as idealism vs.

materialism, normative vs. functional integration or even traditional vs. legal-rational

authority. As Moskos himself admits, “any master trend in Western society would

certainly be found somewhere along the lines of the shift from normative to functional

integration. The posited shift of the military system from institutional to occupational is

perhaps no more than the particular application to the military of this master trend”

(Moskos and Wood, 1988: 17).

104 “The military was undergoing a strange sort of crisis: not the noisy turbulence of the latter years of the Vietnam War, but a quiet malaise, a sense that the recruits were being bought at the margin of the labor market, that officers were driven by careerism, and that reasons for military service had become obscured.

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(�)��-��1��2��%� ��+��1��Variable Institutional Occupational

Legitimacy Normative values Marketplace economy

Societal regard Esteem based on notions of service

Prestige based on level of compensation

Role commitment Diffuse; generalist Specific; specialist

Reference groups “Vertical” within the armed forces

“Horizontal” with occupations

Recruitment appeals Character qualities; life-style orientation

High recruit pay; technical training

Evaluation of performance Holistic and qualitative Segmented and quantitative

Basis of compensation Rank and seniority; decompressed by rank

Skill level and manpower shortages; compressed by rank

Mode of compensation Much in non-cash form Salary and bonuses

Legal system Military Justice; broad purview over member

Civilian jurisprudence; limited purview over member

Female roles Limited employment; restricted career pattern

Wide employment; open career pattern

Spouse Integral part of military community

Removed from military community

Residence Work and residence adjacency; military housing; relocations

Work and residence separation; civilian housing permanence

Post-service status Veterans’ benefits and preferences

Same as non-servers

Source: Moskos and Wood (1988:16)

However, in subsequent work aiming at evaluating theoretical developments and

empirical applications of the model, a significant renewal of institutionalism among the

American military during the ’eighties has been signaled, contrasting with the clear

occupational emphasis of the previous decade (Moskos and Wood, 1988). This trend

underlined the possibility of potential tensions between the two orientations, in some

cases leading to the reinforcement of institutional orientations –presumably more

adequate to promote institutional cohesion, personnel commitment and motivation

around common values and shared goals and other times promoting a more

individualistic occupational pattern congruent with the rational calculation of the market

The heart of the matter, it seems, was a paralysis in the definition of the essence of the military organization” (Moskos and Wood, 1988: 3).


155

place –which supposedly undermines military professionalism and decreases

organizational commitment and distinctive identity (Moskos and Wood, 1988: 7).

This fact was at the origin of at least some of the subsequent controversies and

discussions around the conceptual and operative difficulties regarding the application of

the model. Janowitz was one of the first to criticize Moskos for “changing the rules of

the game of social analysis without clearly signaling the change he introduced” and

suggested that changes would be better conceptualized as from professional to

occupational (Janowitz, 1977: 51-54). The intense dispute between Moskos and

Janowitz set the foundations and arguments for later discussions of the model and its

operationalization. However, it is possible to sustain that their opposition was based

more on conceptual than on factual disagreement.

Sorensen has clearly identified elements of compatibility and divergence

between the two approaches, both of which deserve to be revised at this point

(Sorensen, 1994). Starting from the idea that the two authors disagree less than is

usually thought, he points to five main themes where agreement can be found: 1)

despite the different concepts of ‘occupationalism’ and ‘civilianization’, both refer to

the same trend; 2) even if Moskos argues that all the American military is undergoing

change and Janowitz confines his view of this trend to the officer corps, Moskos

implicitly agrees that only the officers could accomplish the I/O shift, since only

officers can claim the feeling of ‘following a call’ characteristic of members of an

institution; 3) Moskos sees the military facing major problems while Janowitz identifies

partial discontent but not to the point of undermining professional identity. This

disagreement can be considered as limited because Janowitz recognizes the problem and

speaks of the ‘lower standards of some officers’; 4) they both explain I/O shifts in terms

of external forces more than internal factors; 5) finally, according to Sorensen, both

perceive officers as passive and inactive actors in their reactions to the shift.105

In two aspects, however, their disagreement is seen as real: the role of trade

unions (Moskos believing that members of an institution do not organize themselves

into a union, and Janowitz considering unions as proof of professional strength) and the

reversibility of change (while for Moskos the I/O shift can be reversed, Janowitz sees no

return from the ‘civilianization’ trend).

105 Here, the interpretation of Sorensen’s model does not acknowledge later revisions.

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The main factor that provides a lead to understanding the discussion between the

two authors is the conceptual focus of each. As Sorensen has noted, Moskos used the

concepts of organization, institution and occupation but ‘ignored’ the concept of the

military profession, as it had been developed in previous research traditions. In contrast,

Janowitz concentrated on the military profession, understanding it as an institution. We

may thus conclude, with Sorensen, that “this different approach eroded any mutual

understanding, even of formerly well-accepted concepts” (Sorensen, 1994: 607).

Sharing a similar critical view, some authors have emphasized the simultaneous

presence of institutional and occupational features in the armed forces, proposing a

conceptual frame close to what Janowitz called “pragmatic professionalism” (Stahl,

McNichols and Manley, 1980); others have stressed the alternative and even

incompatible character of both orientations (Faris, 1988). Moskos suggested a possible

solution to this dilemma when he stressed that the I/O model should not be seen as

describing homogeneous or unambiguously defined situations at either one of the poles

or even as intermediary positions along the continuum, but rather as a conceptual tool

useful to chart the existence of plural configurations where contradictory features may

co-exist. As he himself admits, “I/O modalities will interface in different ways even

within the same national military system. There will be differences between military

services and between branches within them. I/O modalities may also vary along internal

distinctions, such as those between officers, non-commissioned officers and lower

ranks; between career and single-term military members; between men and women;

between draftees and volunteers; and so on” (Moskos, 1986: 81).

In this sense, the military organization could become plural or segmented: while

some sectors would remain distinctively military and divergent from civil society (such

as the combat units), others, particularly in the more administrative or technical areas,

would progressively resemble an occupation. Even if we agree with Battistelli’s

comment that Moskos did not develop this idea in his later contributions to the I/O

debate (Battistelli, 1990: 168), it should be noted that Moskos stressed the model’s

capacity “to allow us move beyond the institutional versus occupational dichotomy to

examine the different degrees of institutional and occupational aspects and see where

they are in opposition to each other, and where they are manifest jointly. Such a

dynamic approach comprehends not merely an either-or situation, but a shifting

constellation of institutional and occupational features in the armed forces” (Moskos,


157

1986: 382). Nevertheless, the above signaled conceptual problems have given rise to an

extensive literature aimed at clarifying the concept of military profession and at

evaluating the applicability of the I/O model and its revised versions. This is the case of

various proposals that explicitly focus on the notion of the military as a profession.

2.2.2. Interactional and ‘professional organization’ models

At a more synchronic level, Thomas and Rosenzveig (1982) have built an

interactionist model defining four different types of career strategies: a) an institutional

strategy (long-lasting career; high task specificity; traditional values and norms; inner

reference groups); b) an individual or industrial strategy (brief service followed by a

civilian career; high task-transferability to civilian life; individualistic values); c)

community or initiatory strategy (choice of small distinctive and demanding operational

communities like commandos, parachuting, flying combat aircraft; restricted reference

group, values and norms); d) unstable or non-existing strategy.

Each of these strategies then relates, with varying levels of consistency, to two

different subsystems: the organizational (technical/administrative) and the operational

(combat-oriented). These systems are described as having conflicting rationalities and

different functional goals. While the combat-oriented model is grounded ethically and

mainly addressed to mission accomplishment without cost calculus (its emphasis is on

military uniqueness, rank and authoritarian control styles), the technical/administrative

subsystem, on the contrary, is ruled by an instrumental rationality addressed to the

optimization of the main organizational task. Focusing on military performance and

taking efficiency as the basis for legitimation, the model hypothesis is that the

development of different career projects or strategies is affected by the dual value

system.

Despite conceptual differences and a clear synchronic focus if compared to the

developmental character of the I/O model, Thomas’s proposal shares some of the basic

characteristics of the latter. Analytical frameworks focused on the bipolarity

profession/bureaucratic organization have, on the contrary, been presented as diverging

from the basic standpoints of the I/O thesis (Faris, 1988; Prandstraller, 1985; Nunciari,

1994; Caforio, 1988). Faris, for instance, argues that the institutional/occupational

dichotomy exists basically between institutional values and bureaucratic rationalism

(Faris, 1988). However, he defines the concept of bureaucratic rationalism in a very

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different way from Prandstraller (1985), who, following Huntington’s tradition,

conceptualizes the military profession as a bureaucratic profession, defined by the use

of technical-scientific knowledge, the existence of internal educational resources for the

training of ‘bureau-professionists’, a life-time career option, and a hierarchical but co-

operative structure. The distinction between profession and organization is diluted and

both professional and bureaucratic elements converge in organizational roles congruent

with the general goals of the military. In this context, the professional military

bureaucracy is not considered to reveal major differences from civilian bureaucratic

structures. However, if its position in the broad social and political system is similar to

that occupied by other comparable civilian organizations (in terms of relevance and

dimension), its organizational format must diverge so as to conform to the main goal of

security production with the potential use of violence.106

2.3. The I/O thesis reconsidered: methodological and normative implications

2.3.1. Methodological assumptions and 'pragmatic professionalism'

Despite all the mentioned developments, some of which have added valuable

conceptual and operational developments to the I/O thesis (and frequently also some

confusion, as should be clear from the above discussion of concepts like ‘profession’ or

‘bureaucracy’), there is a certain consensus around the idea that conceptual and

operational difficulties result from the methodological complexity of the model,

particularly from the fact that it relates to different analytical levels, each of them

requiring specific methodological strategies and appropriate measurement. Indeed, the

absence of adequate clarification regarding the research focus, the use of inadequate

techniques in its examination and, in particular, over-reliance on micro-level survey

data are considered to have caused much of the ambiguity revealed by empirical

research on institutional/occupational orientations (Wood, 1988: 28).

David Segal was one of the authors who stressed these problems, proposing a

distinction between two different analytical levels: the organizational, comparing the

military as an institution with the military as a workplace; and the individual, comparing

military service as a calling with military service as a job. Unlike other contributors to

106 Nunciari and Caforio have developed some elements of this perspective (Nunciari, 1994; Caforio, 1988).


159

the ongoing discussions, he explicitly tried to identify some of the major measurement

efforts, showing their strengths and weaknesses and proposing an agenda for further

research (Segal, 1986).

Because interactions between the various dimensions are hypothesized as being

strong, measurement is required at all levels. The author started from the observation of

survey approaches based on direct inquiry as well as on multiple-item indices. These are

considered to be useful to measure individual orientations but inaccurate for describing

organizational changes. The results showed that “institutional and occupational

constructs are not separate poles of the same dimension but rather are independent

dimensions” (Segal, 1986: 355). This point had already been suggested by Janowitz and

reaffirmed in a study by Sthal, Manley and McNichols (1980), who claimed that

‘pragmatic professionalism’ could exist among members of the military, who can be

concerned about occupational values without rejecting traditional values or norms. In

short, Segal concludes, “while the data are not sufficient for indicating long-term trends,

they do indicate that for individuals, at a given point in time, institutional and

occupational orientations can coexist. That one is concerned about pay, benefits, and the

economic well being of one’s family need not mean that one is a bad soldier. The

evidence seems to suggest that a mixture of orientations –a form we have referred to as

‘pragmatic professionalism’– is the modal type” (Segal, 1986: 363/64).

Identical findings were also reported when more indirect measures were

analyzed: both orientations seemed to covary more than polarize. When the inquiry

refers to concomitant structural changes occurring in the military as an organization,

survey measures are considered to be insufficient and analysis of ethnographic or

organizational data is required. In spite of the absence of information regarding long-

term changes, Segal sustains that the retrospective measuring of institutional/

occupational constructs is possible to some extent.

After an examination of previous research findings, the author questions the

taken-for-granted assumption of the stronger ‘institutional’ character of the military –

namely, a dominant sense of community - under an earlier model in the past. He notes

how historical research makes visible economic concerns and ‘occupational’ driven

values among soldiers before the transition to an all-volunteer force, as well as

prompting the recognition of deteriorating cohesion and communitarism during specific

periods. This leads him to formulate the hypothesis that a pattern of ‘pragmatic

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professionalism’ may also emerge at the organizational level “with short term

fluctuations in a more economic direction when caps are put on military pay or when

the structure of traditional benefits is threatened, and short-term fluctuations in mission-

oriented directions during the early stages of military engagements or during periods

when America’s position in the international system is being challenged by terrorists or

foreign powers” (Segal, 1986: 371).

Taking into account these inputs, some methodological precautions regarding

the I/O thesis can be synthesized at this point. At a macro-sociological level, the model

refers to the way in which global, historical and societal trends affect civil-military

relations; at a meso-analytical level it discusses changes within the social organization

of the armed forces; and at a third level it focuses on individual attitudes and behavior.

The interaction between these different levels is particularly complex and may function

in different directions.107

As noted by Segal and others, operationalization should also be consistent with

previous level definition: survey methods seem to be adequate to measure individual

attitudes at the micro-level, broader social historical approaches would be indicated for

the macro-sociological focus on civil-military relations, while the meso-organizational

level is served best by ethnographic, case-study or in-depth interviewing of selected

small samples of military persons. This question is important because, as Moskos

himself recognizes, “taking levels of analysis into consideration helps us to face the

‘vexing question’ of whether the I/O concept describes a zero-sum phenomenon or

multidimensional processes. For instance, empirical research has revealed that although

institutional and occupational orientations seem to relate inversely, they often coexist at

the individual level while organizational analyses have pointed much more to the zero-

sum phenomenon” (Moskos and Wood, 1988: 281).

These redefinitions were not always taken into account by authors who, while

recognizing the I/O thesis as a milestone for further discussion in the field, underlined

107 As stated by Wood (1988: 34), “the I/O thesis is not a prediction of occupationalism; rather it offers a way of understanding ongoing social organizational change. The pressure for occupationalism is great because it steams from macro-social change, which is articulated through the meso-organizational level to the micro level. Left to operate unchecked, this trend is probably strengthened by a similar interaction from the micro level upward. As cohorts of members with an occupational orientation move through the military systems and gain influence, they will create meso-level organizational changes that fit their occupational orientation to military service and reduce further the distinctiveness of the military as a unique institution in society. Thus, social organizational changes at all levels interact in both directions.”


161

its ‘excessive’ character and the contradictory results of empirical research. In an

evaluation of different proposals related to military professionalism, Boëne notes that

“by neglecting the specificity of the military function, [Moskos’ thesis] predicts the

death of the military ethos, with all its comunitarian and normative implications”

(Boëne, 1998: 178).108 If more recent developments are taken into account, this no

longer needs to be the dominant interpretation.

We should, nevertheless, take the criticisms of those who fear for the falsability

of the model seriously, if multiple and uncertain interfaces of I/O modalities are

admitted to exist. Sorensen, for instance, has argued that the mere recognition of such a

plurality and complexity of possible combinations “is like a weather forecast saying

‘either it will rain or it won’t’. Such a statement is always true, but imprecise”

(Sorensen, 1994: 611). The clear identification of the analytical level and observation

unit, as well as a definition of the conditions under which a certain relation is expected

to be observed, are thus decisive elements of any serious attempt at both empirical

testing and theoretical development.

2.3.2. Normative implications

One other factor should nonetheless be signaled, one that also explains some of

the tensions and controversies occasioned by Moskos’ proposal, which is related to its

intrinsic normativity. In reality, it was conceived as a systemic, multidimensional

model, with both descriptive and analytical goals.109 However, as pointed out by Cotton,

“the I/O model is not only descriptive and morphological; it is clearly normative in that

it posits a desirable institutional state fading into distance as time goes on (...) it has a

latent concern with what ought to be happening and how we can alter the lines of

development” (Cotton, 1988: 40). Moreover, Cotton considers that this normativity

accounts for the widespread interest in the model among policy-makers and senior

military personnel. Remarkably, the single circumstance of having been proposed –

highlighting the trend to occupationalism— fostered the development of policies aiming

108 Free translation from the original French version. 109 Moskos has underlined his own perspective on the function of social research: “The main objective of social sciences is to deepen the policy makers’ understanding of social institutions by illuminating critical relationships, not to supply specific answers to particular questions. In a political democracy, the ultimate goal of social research is to enlighten the citizens in their own decision-making processes.” (1988: 281).

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at institutional renewal within the American armed forces. The tension between the two

orientations has evident reflections on the policy debate.

Sorensen has developed this point, considering the inevitability of a harmful

cause-relation effect to be a problem. According to him, the fact that changes forced

upon the officers’ corps and then transposed to the military system are perceived as

harmful to both the military profession and organization is not acceptable. In addition,

reinforcing his argument, the author claims that “we cannot compare the situation of

today with that of yesterday, because we lack empirical data; we do not know the exact

reasons for the ‘lower standards’ if they actually were lower” (Sorensen, 1994: 606).

Sorensen’s argument is as follows: the problem identified, ‘discontent’, should be

shown to have been caused by the I/O shift. It could, in fact, be caused by other factors

that might always have existed. The more self-critical attitude within the armed forces

would account for its increasing public visibility. “If so –he argues– bringing problems

out in the open is a sign of an healthy organization, not the sick one that Moskos and, to

some extent Janowitz seemed to think” (Sorensen, 1994: 605).

A different argument is developed by Dandeker, who suggests that it is a

mistake to anticipate an attenuation of institutional features of the military, not least

because what he calls 'radical occupationalism' may be counter-productive in civilian

market-based enterprises, let alone a military context. This, he claims, is the challenge

of building a new military ethos that meets the operational needs of the military as well

as those of modern social values.

In sum, for most researchers the normative dilemma still remains: that of

structuring and supporting an organizational format compatible with the armed forces'

goal of operational cohesion, without at the same time favoring its isolation from the

broader society, which is considered both impracticable and undesirable in a democratic

society.

2.4. Towards a ‘post-modern’ military?

In recent years changes in the military have been reinterpreted as the move from

a ‘modern’ to a ‘postmodern’110 form of organization and thus a new model –even if

110 The way in which the term ‘postmodern’ is used in this proposal has very little to do with general academic conceptions of postmodernism. The authors recognize that there is probably only one area of overlap: the predictions of cultural relativism and a breakdown of traditional lines of demarcation between civil society and military. They note that “the framework for analysis (…) is not postmodern at


163

more complementary than oppositional– has been proposed. Moskos, William and

Segal (2000) posited the thesis that Western developed democracies are moving from a

type of organization associated with nationalism, to an organizational form adapted to a

new world system and to the erosion of traditional forms of national sovereignty. While

the modern military was based on “a combination of conscripted lower ranks or militia

and a professional officer corps, war-oriented in mission, masculine in make-up and

ethos, and sharply differentiated from civilian society”, the new post-modern type

“undergoes a loosening of ties with the nation state. The basic format shifts towards a

volunteer force, more multipurpose in mission, increasingly multipurpose in makeup

and ethos and with greater permeability with civilian society” (Moskos et al., 2000: 1).

Drawing on the experience of the United States and other western European nations, the

authors propose a threefold typology of the military and society to account for the

identified historical changes (Table 4.2).

(�)��-��(��.��

Forces variable Moder (Pre.Cold War)

1900-1945

Late Modern (Cold War) 1945-1990

Postmodern (Post-Cold War)

Since 1990 Perceived threat Enemy invasion Nuclear war Subnational (eg. ethnic

violence, terrorism) Force structure Mass army,

conscription Large professional army

Small professional army

Major mission definition

Defense of homeland Support of alliance New missions (e.g. peacekeeping, humanit.)

Dominant military professional

Combat leader Manager or technician Soldier-statesman; soldier-scholar

Public attitude towards military

Supportive Ambivalent Indifferent

Media relations Incorporated Manipulated Courted Civilian employees Minor component Medium component Major component Women’s role Separate corps or

excluded Partial integration Full integration

Spouse and military Integral part Partial involvement Removed Homosexuals in military

Punished Discharged Accepted

Conscientious objection

Limited or prohibited Routinely permitted Subsumed under civilian service

Source: Moskos et al. (2000: 15).

all” and even that the editors and chapter authors of the book “are quite ortodox positivists”(!) (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000). In this sense, there is a conceptual stretching which may cause more confusion than clarification of the described tendency.

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At the global societal analytical dimension, five major organizational changes

are highlighted: increasing structural and cultural interpenetrability between civilian and

military spheres; diminution of differences within the armed services based on branch,

rank and type of functions; change in military purpose from war-fighting to missions

that cannot be labeled as military in a traditional sense; increased use of military forces

in international operations legitimized by entities beyond the nation-state and finally,

internationalization of the military themselves.

Battistelli has noted that all these changes can be placed along the classic

“institutional/occupational” dichotomy proposed by Moskos to describe the transition

from an early modern to a late modern military organization. The same happens, he

argues, with correlated changes at the organizational analytical level, namely in terms of

the dominant professional ideal (movement away from the warrior-hero type towards

the emphasis on the soldier scholar and soldier-statesman ideals), the increasing use of

civilian personnel, fuller integration of women and acceptance of homossexuals and

more tolerance of conscious objection and alternative forms of military service.

However, Battistelli also notes that “discussion of the transition to a postmodern

military has so far neglected the third dimension of the institutional-occupational

dichotomy that focused on the subjective experience and attitudes of soldiers

themselves” (Battistelli, 1997d: 468). Having found that frequently individual soldiers’

attitudes could not be traced back to either the institutional or occupational pole but

rather to post-materialistic motivations, ideal in kind, described as “self-oriented,

individualistic in the expressive (rather than instrumental) sense, even narcissistic”

(Battistelli, 1997d: 469), he moves on to expanding the original bipolarity into a

trichotomy. Moskos’ ‘institutional’ model, characteristic of the early modern era, is thus

associated with what the author prefers to call ‘paleomodern’ society, the ‘occupational’

type is associated with the more utilitarian and materialistic ‘modern’ society, and

finally, Inglehart’s ‘postmaterialist’ outlook is considered to be a salient feature of

‘postmodernity’. The author warns against possible distortions that might arise if these

types were to be interpreted in historical sequence. He prefers a synchronic focus where,

as in the I/O model, characteristics of the various types are not mutually exclusive and

may co-exist in specific empirical contexts. This proposal is an important complement

to the model if we aim not only at describing change at the societal/organizational levels

and relating it to policies regarding WMP, but especially if, as is the case of the present


165

research, an additional goal is that of exploring interpersonal dynamics of gender

integration and how these relate to the above-mentioned transformations.

2.5. The I/O model and women’s professional identity

The various interpretative models concerning WMP outlined in Chapter I

underline that the extent to which the armed forces of Western European countries have

increased the recruitment of women has depended largely on military requirements such

as the professional character of military force structure and volunteer accession

policies.111 Those proposals also stress how women's military roles have been enlarged

in the context of growing technical specialization and 'occupational' pressures within the

armed forces during the last three decades. This tendency is congruent with the

assumption of the I/O thesis regarding the role of women, which is considered to be

extremely limited in an institutional type of military organization, whereas the shift

towards more occupational and specially postmodern patterns is supposedly associated

with expanding employment opportunities for women.

Empirical research has shown that the armed forces of Western countries have

regularly increased the number of women in their ranks during the last two decades. A

relation has been shown to exist between this tendency and the degree of specialization

of the armed services (namely, the growing need for qualified personnel to fulfill new

technically demanding functions). The results of early research have revealed that the

goal of raising the force qualification has been met, at least in the case of the United

States. The American experience has demonstrated that the presence of women has

promoted an increase in educational levels, as women who volunteer for the armed

forces are on average better educated than men. The country’s ability to maintain an all-

111 Some authors have strongly argued that nations considering a transition from conscription to a volunteer system tend to include plans to expand women's military participation. This has been shown in a research about the end of the mass-armies in the West, conducted by Haltiner and which emphasized the importance of the Women Ratio (the percentage of women compared with the total armed force), considered to be ‘an excellent indicator of the Army format’. Results of this research pointed to a general negative correlation between the degree of women’s participation and the mass-army format of the armed forces: “the higher the WR, the lower is the mass army format of a force and the higher the degree of organizational role differentiation and specialization” (Haltiner, 1998a: 54). Consequently, the author hypothesizes that “the degree of women’s participation (…) will only substantially increase if conscription is abolished and the personnel will have to be recruited entirely on the labor market" (Haltiner, 1998a: 60). The author further believes that the existence of compulsory personnel for the military is the largest obstacle to an increase of the Women’s military Participation Ratio.

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volunteer army has even been considered to depend on the effective use of the female

labor-force. (Binkin and Bach, 1977: 71)

Most of the researchers who have dealt with this problem have thus tried to

understand how organizational change interacts with individual orientations: if at the

macro and meso analytical levels the trend towards occupationalism seemed to

characterize both civil-military relations and organizational recruitment policies, what

happens with women's orientations? What kind of values do women bring to the

military? Is it possible to identify among them a specific value pattern when compared

with their male counterparts? Are women motivated by economic-related aspects, by an

institutional sense of calling, or by 'pragmatic professionalist' values?

It has been predicted that, due to their usually disadvantaged position in the

labor market, women tend to adopt, more than men do, a 'market-oriented' approach,

seeking to maximize economic advantages in terms of salaries, fringe benefits or job

security. Despite the fact that, historically, women have always proved to be

'institutionally' driven, conceiving military service as a vocation or a 'calling' (as was the

case of military nurses during World Wars I and II), the new context is seen as

potentially revealing a different motivational pattern. As stated by Patricia Shields

“according to the occupational thesis, variables such as wages and unemployment are

critical in explaining enlistment, attrition and reenlistment. If these variables are

effective at predicting female military participation patterns, they would certainly

support the contention that women are attracted to the armed forces for occupational

reasons" (Shields, 1988: 103).

Empirical research carried out in Europe and the United States during the 1980s

seemed, however, to highlight an opposite tendency. Drawing on the results of various

studies on enlistment motivations, Shields shows that, paradoxically, women do not see

the armed forces as another employer but, rather, are attracted by the unique

characteristics of the military such as discipline and adventure. One of these studies,

conducted by Shields on American military women, has revealed that the possibility of

traveling and the feeling of being different from civilian women were among the most

important motivations for enlistment: "Theirs wasn't just another job –it offered

excitement, adventure, discipline and structure" (Shields, 1988: 104). While job security

is still indicated as a relevant reason for enlistment, the more 'institutional'


167

characteristics of the Armed forces (absent in the context of other civilian organizations)

are dominant.

Reynaud pointed to the same effect in the case of the French Military,

underlying the way in which "the search for a structured environment and an organized

life" as well as the need to escape routine was among women's motivations (Reynaud,

1988). In a study of the first one thousand women to join the Portuguese armed forces

(including officers, non-commissioned officers and lower ranks) carried out in 1994,

these results have also been confirmed to a certain extent (Carreiras, 1997a). In this

research, 16 indicators have been used to measure I/O motivations. The results of a

factorial analysis of principal components are shown in Table 4.3.

(�)��-�� +��.��3��44-$�

Motivations Import. Not import.

The desire to work in a disciplined and structured atmosphere

87.9 12.1

Institutional factors (core dimension)

The desire to serve my country

87.2 12.8

Possibility of participating in a prestigious institution

84.5 15.5

Access to good civic training 79 21 Possibility of pursuing a career that was

traditionally closed to women 84 16

Institutional factors (life-style dimension)

To escape routine and live an active life 68.7 31.3

The attractiveness of the uniform 57.6 42.4 Possibility of traveling and getting to know

other places 48.8 51.2

Job security 74.5 25.5 Occupational factors Better professional opportunities than in

civilian life 75.4 24.6

No employment alternatives 42.1 57.9 The opportunity to leave parents' home and

to start an independent life 24.3 75.7

Circumstantial factors Military influences among friends or family 29.1 70.9 Failing access to university 21.1 78.9 Possibility of training/education at a low

financial cost 20 80

Source: Carreiras, 1997

The results show that some of the items included in the core 'institutional'

dimension acquired a major importance. "Attraction for the discipline and the structured

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environment of the armed forces" is indeed the reason that a larger percentage of

women have indicated to justify their decision to enlist. It is immediately followed by

the "will to serve my country" and the "possibility to develop a prestigious activity".

One of the dimensions included in what was then designed as the 'life-style' dimension

of institutional factors – and should clearly now be considered among

‘postmodern’factors—that also has strong weight was "the possibility of doing

something different, previously closed to women". As in the previous cases, Portuguese

military women seem to have been attracted by the uniqueness of the armed forces,

more than by mere circumstantial factors or the search for labor/economic security.

More than a job or an 'occupation', military service is above all a challenge and a

distinctive activity where structure and innovation coexist. This seems to be the main

conclusion, even if occupational dimensions are not absent. In fact, almost 3/4 of the

women still consider labor security or the chance to find better professional

opportunities than in civilian life an important reason for joining the armed forces. If

only the initial motivations to enlistment are considered, it is thus possible to identify

the common presence of 'institutional' and 'occupational' features, a pattern that has

been defined in theoretical approaches as 'pragmatic professionalism'. A reinterpretation

of these results in the light of more recent theoretical developments, namely Battistelli’s

identification of a third pole of ‘postmodern’ motivations, helps to make sense of the

overall picture of women’s motivations.

It should, of course, be noted that such tendencies might vary depending on the

positions individuals occupy within the organizational structure. Traditionally, officers

trained in military academies and schools or those employed in combat-oriented

functions tend to score much higher on institutional features than the remaining

personnel. Even if women are under-represented in top hierarchical positions, they may

be expected to develop institutional orientations as they move into higher ranks. To the

extent that they are excluded from these positions, their future 'institutional' orientation

may, however, be diluted. Referring to career combat soldiers, Shields argues that "the

values that tie these men together and produce unit cohesion are institutional. Hence, as

long as women are excluded from this inner circle, their institutional orientation in

average will not reach its full potential. (...) The military is giving women a message

that undermines female institutional values and, by implication, promotes an

occupational orientation" (Shields, 1988: 110).


169

Taking the Portuguese case as an example, it is possible to observe a tendency

when the question of change over time regarding motivations or expectations is

addressed. Corroborating previous research findings, the results of this study have also

highlighted a stronger emphasis on the core dimension of institutional values by women

cadets of military academies –those who will become officers— as well as by those in

'operational' specialties (pilots, parachuters, air police). However, despite this tendency,

these groups of women are exactly those where a greater awareness of difficulties and

obstacles to women's integration has been reported. Moreover, even if the collected data

does not allow for a longitudinal analysis, it has also been possible to identify an

increase in critical evaluations over time. The longer the permanence in the military, the

higher the percentage of those who declared themselves to be discontent, willing to

leave or anticipating problems in the near future.

Trying to assess the problem of the change in values in an analysis of the

potentialities of the I/O model in policy-making, Wood has argued that only if

minimum material requirements are met will individuals accept the hardships associated

with military activity, as long as they perceive themselves as working for the common

good of society (Wood, 1988). To the extent that such an objective is diluted, or

material conditions are considered to be particularly deficient, their commitment will

suffer and they will tend to adopt the occupational orientation characteristic of the

specialist.

As far as military women are concerned, and considering the co-existence of

various types of motivations –including ‘post-modern’ factors—, an hypothesis may be

raised concerning the possibility of change. As it goes, institutional orientations may not

be sustained, or may at least suffer some erosion, in the absence of both

material/economic incentives and personal fulfillment. Especially for those women who

remain in the military and proceed with their military careers, the maintenance of high

levels of institutional affiliation may largely depend on the existence of guaranties in the

field of economic reward and individual well-being associated with expressive and

participatory dimensions of life.

In the case of military women, however, the conditions under which a specific

orientation may develop –and potentially influence role performance, career paths,

attrition or re-enlistment decisions— are related to other variables that seem to affect

them in ways not confronted by men. Beyond the scope of policy decisions that define

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women's roles at the organizational level, social structure dimensions, such as family

and maternity, as well as cultural aspects must be considered. Some of these variables

are crucial in explaining the military roles of women and these will be carefully

scrutinized at the case-study level.

3. Military effectiveness and gender integration

3.1. The debate over women’s military roles: ‘rights versus readiness’

Most of the discussions around the participation of women in the military or the

roles and functions they should perform have been framed in terms of the opposition

between citizenship and military efficiency. In these debates, democratic values of

equality and non-discrimination are weighted against those of military necessity and

readiness, two sets of values considered to be incompatible, as if the choice for one

would automatically cancel out the other. A civil society equal rights discourse is set in

opposition to a discourse of military readiness and national security. Supposedly,

accepting one involves denying the competing claims of the other.

The ‘effectiveness’ argument’s extreme position assumes that the military are

different from the rest of the society: their mission, to provide security, is singular and

take precedence over all others; therefore the role of the military is not to grant equal

rights to all individuals and the institution should not be transformed into a ‘laboratory

for social experimentation’. The ‘civil rights argument’, on the contrary, underlines the

way in which the military in a democratic polity is (or should be) a reflection of the

society it is supposed to protect, including the defense of its core values such as

citizenship and equality. Between these two ideal-types, positions have varied

significantly and not always has the endorsement of one necessarily involved a full

rejection of the other.

In any case, the intensity, pervasiveness and confrontational character of the

‘rights versus readiness debate’ are striking. The relevance of this debate resides less in

its contents than on the impact it has had on policy decisions, from recruitment and

selection standards, to women’s functions and assignments, as well as on the overall

socio-political construction of the issue of women soldiers. Moreover, it has been taking

place not only in the military policy-making arena but also more generally in the public

sphere, the media and even in academic circles.


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It is remarkable and simultaneously puzzling to note that the arguments do not

seem to have changed significantly since the 70s. Segal already pointed to this in the

beginning of the 80s (Segal, 1982, 1983) and at the start of the XXI century, a revision

of current debates leads us to the same conclusion. With very few differences,

arguments have been reproduced ad nauseum, in a way as repetitive as apparently

inconsequent. However, even admitting that many of the confronting perspectives have

developed in strictly normative/ideological terms (Binkin and Bach, 1977: 72), one

should not dismiss the importance of the crucial issues at stake. As central as addressing

citizenship concerns is to know whether ensuring the acceptation of social diversity

(women in this case, but also ethnic minorities or gays) requires a trade-off in military

efficiency.

In general, the basic assumption shared by those who believe that women

represent a danger to military readiness is that the military should not be used as a social

laboratory. Because the presence of women is seen as jeopardizing the effectiveness of

the forces, their access to combat functions is considered a risk for the security of the

nation. Tuten has put it bluntly: “the primary function of the U.S. armed services is to

provide for common defense –not to redress perceived social and sexual inequalities in

our society. (…) The primary function of the military services is to defend the American

society, not to change it. To the extent that we use the military as a testbed for social

experimentation we risk the security of the nation” (Tuten, 1982: 261). In a similar vein,

Marlowe sustained that “if we are serious about the missions that are mandated for the

combat arms, we cannot afford to make them a locus of social experimentation”

(Marlowe, 1983: 195). More recently, Moskos has also endorsed a similar position,

stating that “political leaders and scholars have come to think of the military as a social

laboratory, in which charged debates over gender roles and homosexuality and national

service can not only be addressed but possibly resolved” (Moskos 1993). This position

is usually accompanied by controversial statements (as seen above) such as that there

are no fundamental discontinuities between modern war and modes of successful

warfare in the past (Marlowe, 1983: 198), or that the influx of women into military

services was not the product of military need but the result of external political pressure

(Tuten, 1982: 260).

In what concerns this issue, the United States is probably the most paradigmatic

of NATO countries. Resistances have been expressed from the very start of female

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recruitment in the seventies, and seem to gain new impetus at present.112 Often critics

focus explicitly and exclusively on the combat-related functions, with opponents of

female involvement in combat showing nevertheless some tolerance for the assignment

of women to support and combat support roles (Marlowe, 1983). Other times the mere

presence of women, independently of the function they perform is seen as a

fundamental threat to the functionality, if not survival, of the organization (Mitchell,

1998; Tuten, 1982).113 Some have even argued that the influx of women into the

militaries of advanced countries not only does not represent a gain for women but it

represents in fact part symptom part cause of the decline of the ‘advanced’ military. Van

Creveld has sustained this position, stating that, “if only because research shows that

going into combat is the last thing most military women want, the more of them there

are around the less capable those military are of acting as effective combat units”

(Creveld, 2001: 442).

At the other end of the ideological spectrum are those who believe that

citizenship rights and responsibilities are paramount and should have priority in the

whole discussion. Liberal feminists have been among those who more strongly

emphasized the need to bring ‘citizenship’ concerns into the debate on women soldiers’

roles. Lorry Fenner sustained that the focus of discussions should not be the particular

conditions of service and the inclusion of specific groups but the fundamental issues of

citizenship and the role of the military in a democratic society. She argued that the

debate has excessively focused around the question of military effectiveness, but “we

resist discussing the disjuncture between our cultural ideology and democratic political

philosophy; or how discrimination and inconsistent and contradictory restrictions hurt

efficiency; or how constantly changing, non-reality-based standards militate against

cohesiveness and damage the credibility of policy-makers; or how failure to live up to

our rhetoric affects morale and integrity” (Fenner, 2000: 19).

112 One recent example of this tendency was the attempt by some members of Congress to require the services to segregate basic training. Although this has not happened, study groups have been formed to examine the issue. 113 One of the most recent and devastating critiques of gender-integration efforts in the American military comes from journalist Stephanie Gutman. In her book The kinder, gentler military: can America’s gender-neutral fighting force still win wars? (2000) –which Carol Gillian considered to be ‘an impassioned defense of the warrior culture and the vision of masculinity it sustains’– Gutman sustains that “the nineties were a decade in which the brass handed over their soldiers to social planners in love with an unworkable (and in many senses undesirable) vision of a politically correct utopia, one in which men and women toil side by side, equally good at the same tasks, interchangeable, and, of course, utterly distracted by sexual interest.”


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Likewise, Feld has argued that “the case for accepting women for combat

assignments cannot be argued on a pragmatic basis; nor at least on strictly military

terms” (Feld, 1978: 559). Defenders of this position usually underline the fact that

arguments to exclude women from the military or limit their roles and functions are

reminiscent of those used in the past to exclude other categories, or of those used to

justify excluding women from other occupations (Segal, 1982, 1983). They also point to

the connections between concepts of citizenship and military participation, stressing the

way in which excluded groups have achieved more equal citizenship rights through

military service. Although debatable, it is also frequently assumed that “integration of

women into previously masculine domains such as the military is likely to accomplish

equality faster and more completely since this involves access of previously excluded

individuals into an existing social system, rather than core changes in the cultural value

of differing social systems” (Segal, 1983: 204). But what arguments have been used to

justify exclusionary or integrative policies?

3.2. Value rationales in the policy debate over women in combat

Four main sets of arguments have been exposed and confronted on each side of

the ‘rights versus readiness’ divide.114 First are concerns about women’s individual

characteristics, their bodies and psychological characteristics that supposedly make

them less effective combatants (physical strength, menstruation, pregnancy,

emotionality, ability to perform under stress, etc.). Second are questions related to the

effects of women’s presence on cohesion and morale of military units (interpersonal

processes bearing on performance; impact on ‘male-bonding’); third, arguments

regarding cost-effectiveness (attrition, job migration, lost duty time, personnel selection

costs); finally there are the consequences of women’s participation in the military in

terms of social and cultural values (preservation of gender ideals, public opinion,

perception of the military by allies and potential adversaries). In order to move forward

from a repetitious debate, without at the same time ignoring its significance and impact

114 Important contributions for this debate during the last three decades, including complete and extensive revisions of the contrasting arguments, are Binkin and Bach’s Women and the military (1977). Nancy Goldman’s edited volume Female Soldiers – Combatants or Noncombatants, especially the articles by Quester, Tuten and Segal (Goldman, 1982), Segal’s and Marlowe’s articles in R. K. Fullinwider’s (ed., 1983) Conscripts and Volunteers: military Requirements, Social Justice and the All-volunteer Force, and among the most recent, Rita James’s Simon’s Women in the military (2001).

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on policy definition, I propose to review two core issues: the problem of physical

standards and the effects of women’s presence on cohesion in military units.

3.2.1. The physical tests (PT) debate

Women’s psychological characteristics such as lack of physical (upper body)

strength, menstruation and pregnancy have always been seen as limiting women’s

capabilities to perform military tasks, especially those related to combat. The issue has

raised and continues to raise deeply emotional reactions, partially because of the

perceived injustice of gender-norming the physical fitness and training standards.

Referring to men’s average higher levels of physical strength, resistance and

speed, Tuten noted that “few would deny that these physical attributes are essential to

the soldier or marine in ground combat. Therefore (...), the exclusion of women from

front-line ground combat is mandated by their lesser physical capabilities” (Tuten,

1982: 248). Opponents to this view emphasize the need to develop job-related physical

tests: “if a certain level of physical strength is required for a particular job, then this

would serve as one of the selection criteria for the job. Rather than assuming that all

women are incapable of performance by virtue of the average women’s lack of capacity,

specific requirements should serve as the selection criteria, not gender” (Segal, 1983:

206). This would of course imply the development of such measures. Actually though,

since the relationship between specific military training standards and the actual

physical requirements of the jobs or tasks is not clear, other analysts sustain that from a

sociologists’ perspective there is nothing self evident about the argument of identical PT

standards. In this line of thought Cohn has asked: “what intrinsic relation does women

doing push-ups, or running, or being able to perform in exactly the same way men do,

have to equal rights?” (Cohn, 1999). Her answer is that at the level of political theory it

has none, since the political notion of equality assumes difference and presumes a social

agreement to consider different people as equivalent (not identical) for a stated purpose.

But it has also been pointed out that different physical standards and tests may

have problematic consequences. On the one hand, when gender-specific physical tests

are implemented (the most common situation in NATO countries), change associated

with gender integration may be interpreted as a lowering of standards. On the other end,

physical performance becomes one important source of perception of inequity and

inequality. Referring to the physical fitness test soldiers have to go through for


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admission and training, Segal has noted that “since a women can pass the test with a

performance for which a man would fail, many male soldiers believe that women are

given unfair advantage” (Segal, 1999: 576).115

Change in standards is itself a difficult issue; usually pre-existent standards are

reified as if they are something outside anyone’s agency or ability to challenge. Since

physical tests were initially conceived to measure men’s physical fitness with limited

equipment, this reinforces perceptions of inequality. Not only are women being

evaluated by traits on which average men score higher than average women but those

physical traits in which women would outperform men are not routinely included (such

as measures of flexibility). Moreover, military women often “judge themselves by male

standards (just as men judge them) and therefore feel less worthy” (Segal, 1999: 576).

Nevertheless, the fact remains that perceptions of women’s physical inferiority by both

men and women, military and civilians, lay at the basis of much of the opposition to

women in various military functions especially those related to ground combat.

3.2.2. Effects of women’s presence on unit cohesion and morale

Behind the argument that the presence of women affects male bonding and thus

performance is the belief that effective or successful performance is the result of

cohesion, and this, in turn, is a result of social homogeneity. By interfering in the unit

cohesion of male-bonded groups women would thus represent a threat to effectiveness,

especially in combat situations. Gabriel has clearly expressed this point-of-view: “the

fact is that combat effectiveness is only partially, and probably only a small part, the

result of well-applied technical skills. (…) military unit effectiveness and cohesion are

far more the result of sociopsychological bonding – anthropologically, male bonding –

among soldiers in combat groups. Without this crucial bonding units disintegrate under

stress no matter how technically proficient or well-equipped they are” (Gabriel, 1980

quoted in Tuten, 1982: 251).

Strong arguments have been put forward against these assumptions. One of them

regards the evidence of women’s prominent role in terrorist and guerilla groups, in

which strong patterns of male bonding would be expected to exist (Binkin and Bach,

1977: 91). Others derive from the results of various empirical researches.

115 Interestingly, the author also notes that such concerns are rarely voiced with regard to differential standards by age (Segal, 1999: 576).

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Two important early studies conducted by the US Army Research Institute for

Behavioral and Social Sciences in the mid 70s examined the performance of women

both in noncombatant units during training programs (MAXWAC) and while away

from home installations during extended field exercises (REFWAC). In both cases

results showed no significant relationship between the proportion of women and the

readiness and operational capability of the units.

More recently, the participation of women in peacekeeping missions has also

been a source of information regarding the performance of mixed groups in field

situations. Various authors who have studied this issue concluded that men and women

work better together under the difficult and stressful field conditions than often in the

barracks’ environment. The fact that they are sharing tasks and goals presumably makes

integration easier and increases the possibility that people are seen as individuals more

than members of a group or sexual category (Moskos, 1998; Miller and Moskos, 1995;

Maniscaldo, 1997).

One of the first researches to highlight this result was conducted by Moskos in

1984 during the US Granaderio exercise in Honduras, where the author observed the

performance of male and female soldiers in a difficult field situation. According to

Moskos, “the incorporation of women in the extended deployment and field conditions

of Honduras can be recorded as a success story. On balance, the women were working

well in demanding jobs in a difficult environment. Work relations between the sexes

were better in the field setting than was often the case in garrison. Over time, the

women came to be regarded and evaluated as individuals rather than as a sexual

category. This individuation contributed more than anything else to the successful

incorporation of women into nontraditional assignments.” (Moskos, 1988:42-43).

In another study, Devilbiss also found evidence that “cohesion is based on

commonality of experience, shared risk, and mutual experiences of hardship, not on

gender distinction” (Devilbiss, 1985: 543). A research conducted by Miller and Moskos

among American soldiers deployed to Bósnia-Herzegovina in 1996 (Maniscaldo, 1997),

concluded that there was a generalized acceptation of women in peacekeeping

operations: 98% of the soldiers was contrary to the possibility of preventing the

participation of women in this type of mission. This opinion was identically shared by

both sexes.


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In various aspects, this debate mirrors the one about homosexuals in the

military.116 Interestingly, in both cases the debate is centered less on women’s or gay’s

attitudes than on claims about heterosexual men and their response to having women or

gays with them in their units. Yet, as pointed out by Segal, “if men believe that women

are not part of their group and that they cannot function with women around, this belief

will disrupt functioning and may hinder actual ability to cope with the stress of combat,

thereby serving as a self-fulfilling prophecy” (Segal, 1982: 278).

But even if we admit that the presence of women or other minority categories

may have disruptive effects in the cohesiveness of all-male groups, and that this is an

important issue to be addressed by policy-makers, the question remains to assess the

relationship between cohesion and performance. Contradicting intuitive ideas, research

results in this field seem to be extremely elusive and inconclusive.

Kier has underlined the fact that cohesion is only one of multiple factors that

may affect group performance and that its contribution may be both considerably less

significant and more complex than often assumed (Kier, 1999: 44). For instance, there

is little evidence of a casual relationship between cohesion and performance. Only a

modest positive correlation has been identified and, even in this case, analysts seem to

be more confident that successful performance leads to cohesion than the contrary

(Kier, 1999: 41).

Additionally, cohesion can be beneficial or damaging to a group’s performance.

Group cohesion can be dysfunctional to organizational performance whenever the group

goals are contrary to those of the organization, or when the group develops a subculture

that make acts of resistance feasible. This was observed during the Vietnam war, where

certain groups developed a powerful ideology of their own that was more likely to

reinforce dissent from, than commitment to the service’s larger goals and normative

claims (Helmer, 1974; Westbrook, 1980 quoted in Kier, 1999: 42).

116 However, contrary to what happens regarding women, a gay’s capacity to serve is rarely seriously questioned. As pointed by Cohn, in this case the threat to military effectiveness is seen to come mainly from the difficulty in maintaining unit cohesion and morale among heterosexual soldiers, should openly gay soldiers be allowed to serve. Arguments have been encompassing, from the fear that sexual harassment and or fraternization will undermine unit cohesion; that straight men will not take orders from gay officers, because they do not respect gay men; that straight men’s discomfort with openly gay men will lead them to commit acts of violence against men in their own units; or simply that the male-bonding upon which unit cohesion depends will be impossible with gay men present.

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A fundamental distinction to understand this issue is that between two

components of cohesion: social cohesion and task cohesion. Social cohesion refers to

emotional personal bonds that unite people, such as friendship, caring or closeness; task

cohesion refers to a shared collective commitment to achieve goals. Research has shown

in a more clear way that while the more instrumental nature of task cohesion seems to

have a positive influence on performance the same cannot be said about social cohesion

(McCoun, 1993, Kier, 1999: 43). Where a small correlation has been identified between

cohesion and performance, task cohesion was found to be the critical component. In

various studies not only did social cohesion show no contribution to the cohesion-

performance link, but it has even been shown to hinder productivity, a result that has

been replicated in historical and sociological research of military units. Researchers

have identified multiple factors that may explain this pattern: affective bonding may

provide a kind of ‘shield’ against external authority, it may influence commanders to be

less willing to push the members of the group and in socially cohesive groups

individuals may tend to devote more energy to strengthen interpersonal relationships

than to achieve common tasks. These results also confirm those obtained regarding the

effects of homogeneity on performance. Various studies have highlighted a similar

conclusion: homogeneous groups are not necessarily more effective than more

heterogeneous groups. Consistency of beliefs may produce rigidity and generate forms

of what has been called “strategic myopia”, the difficulty in admitting that things could

or should be different (Lorsch, 1985).

In sum, although similar individuals tend to seek one another’s company, and

cohesive groups may often be more enjoyable, they are not always more productive.

Even admitting that social cohesion may under certain conditions improve military

performance, there seem to be reasons to believe that cohesion does not depend on

discrimination against women, gays or lesbians. Kier has identified five reasons to

sustain this claim. First, even if sexist and homophobic attitudes may help build military

cohesion, that does not mean they are the best, optimal and even less the only way to

achieve unit cohesion. Second, the factors that affect the formation of primary group

ties are as diverse as the stability of membership, group size, frequency and duration of

contact, the group’s recent experience, the presence of a threat or crisis, the quality of

leadership and the sense of equity within the group. Building in-group cohesion is thus

something that can be achieved in many different ways, and shared values and attitudes


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can be created among disparate members. Third, research has indicated that social

cohesion based on homogeneity (such as the one most likely to derive from ‘male-

bonding’) is the less likely to contribute to military effectiveness. Fourth, as shown

above, studies of field situations have demonstrated that when task cohesion was

achieved within a group the presence of women did not damage performance. On the

contrary, the distinction between the group and the outsiders was prevalent over that of

the sexes within the group. Fifth, the fact that women are presently an active part of

military forces and play an important role in terms of force stability, suggests that

tolerating sexism and homophobic attitudes is dysfunctional. As Kier puts it, “any form

of discrimination toward organizational members is pernicious in an organization that

performs group tasks and depends on the integration of all individuals and units. Even if

these attitudes once served important functions in the military, they are unnecessary and

they undermine military effectiveness” (Kier, 1999: 47). From the policy-making point

of view, this conclusion supports the vision that ‘managing diversity’ more then

assuring homogeneity is the fundamental challenge for personnel policies in modern

armed forces.

3.3. Re-equating the debate: social experimentation and the measure of effectiveness

In the previous sections it has been shown that arguments about equality and

military necessity have developed hand in hand, whenever the question of social

diversity has been at stake, as in the case of women, African Americans or the presence

of gay and lesbians in the military. Despite the different rationales behind the laundry

list of arguments used by advocates or opponents of women in the military (or in

combat), these are frequently based on the assumption of a necessary trade off between

egalitarianism and military excellence. However, this background assumption may be

challenged. The question is, should the debate be framed thus? Some authors believe it

should not. According to them, this particular dyad is a very inaccurate way of

understanding ongoing processes and policy debates regarding women’s military

participation.

First of all, one should question what it means to talk about ‘social

experimentation’. Katzenstein and Reppy most accurately note that the armed forces

necessarily engage in “social experiment” in the sense that they must always to some

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extent adjust to changes in society while respecting criteria for military readiness. An

example is the way that changing social norms regarding the role of women as well as

patterns of their participation in public life have made the military women’s corps seem

anachronistic, and how, simultaneously, maintaining separate organizations imposed

managerial inefficiencies (Katzenstein and Reppy, 1999a: 5). In this sense, Katzenstein

and Reppy (1999: 4) read military history as “having been and continuing to be an

experimental process in which societal norms about citizenship rights and societal

perceptions about group competencies continuously inform the calculations among

military policy makers about how best to constitute a fighting force. (...) Militaries are

always in the business of evaluating the competencies of their personnel, a process that

involves the necessity of witnessing the actual experience of performance under fire but

is also shaped by perceptions filtered through the social norms of the day.”

A similar position is sustained by Cohn, who argues that the military has always

been part of the society and a reflection of it, showing how public opinion and values

are often cited as justification for military policies and actions when they fit the

institution purpose, while ignored when they do not (Cohn, 1999). Second, the criteria

used to measure effectiveness must also be addressed. Against the dominant

representation of efficiency calculations as ‘objective’ is the evidence of

‘social/subjective’ elements built into these apparently objective and neutral measures.

The fact that standards of efficiency have permanently been subject to changes and

adjusted to adapt to both the characteristics of the available personnel pool as well as to

technological developments117 is a striking example of this. In one of the first studies to

address this problem Binkin and Bach stated it clearly: “perceptions of military

efficiency are as often as not themselves constituted by existing social typecasting (...)

The problems associated with measuring military effectiveness are well recognized.

Even with weapon systems, whose function and purpose may be reasonably pinpointed,

it is difficult to measure effectiveness with any confidence. The more labor intensive the

operation becomes, the more difficult it is to identify output and the less quantifiable are

the relevant variables. Complex factors such as discipline, leadership, training, societal

influence, and group relationships, all bear on performance. (…) Given these inherent

117 Connell has sustained this idea, noting that “no average physical or psychological difference between the sexes has the slightest bearing on the efficiency of production in an age of numerically controlled machine tools, automatic data-processing and mechanized agriculture. Thus there is no sacrifice in the total abolition of the sexual division of labor” (Connell, 1987: 280).


181

conceptual difficulties and measurement problems, it is not surprising that the

arguments on both sides of the issue have been largely ideological” (Binkin and Bach,

1977: 72).

Moreover, some changes seem to be taking place regarding the nature of the

debate itself. In certain policymaking contexts the emphasis put on military

effectiveness is fading as a rationale for preventing women’s access to certain positions

within the military structure. Rationales are in fact frequently reviewed. Results of a

study conducted by Dandeker and Segal (1996) in the U.K. indicated that military

effectiveness could decline as a basis for excluding women from certain positions and

functions, to be replaced by arguments concerning rights of privacy and decency. “The

main reason for such a change is the vagueness of arguments based on operational

effectiveness, especially those concerning the supposed effects of male bonding”

(Dandeker and Segal, 1996: 33). The vagueness and difficult measurement of the

concept of ‘military effectiveness’ makes it difficult to be convincing in a court of law.

Facing a growing tendency on the part of service members to use law courts to pursue

their grievances, military policymakers would thus tend to use rights to privacy, which

are “enshrined in law and are therefore easier to justify in court.”118

Paradoxically, although it has been proved that effectiveness is not affected by

the presence of women –at least not more than by other variables— and that good

leadership, technological innovation (e.g. ergonomic studies) or monitoring programs

may help produce the necessary adjustments, this does not mean that attitudes towards

military women have changed significantly. In fact some believe that “there is both

empirical and theoretical basis for asserting that increased contact between men and

women in the military workplace will not in and of itself lead to an improvement in

attitudes towards women” (Rosen et al., 1996: 539). Negative attitudes persist despite

positive performance results.

While some authors have emphasized the importance of institutional policy to

change such negative attitudes (Yoder, Adams and Prince, 1983; Rosen et al. 1996),

others have stressed the major impact of culture and the limits of formal policies in

redressing culturally entrenched stereotypes. According to this later position, acceptance

problems happen because of the central role that hegemonic masculinity has played in

118 Concretely in the UK this position is consistent with a continued exclusion of women from submarines and other classes of vessels in the Royal Navy.

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the construction of military identity and also because of its nice fit with another military

core value, uniformity. Katzenstein and Reppy share this perspective: “Persistent gender

discrimination suggests that there are aspects of military culture that actively promote

intolerance. Military culture is at odds with official policy on gender integration because

masculinity has traditionally been central to military identity and culture” (Katzenstein

and Reppy, 1999b: 2). In this view, frequent incidents related to sexual harassment, for

instance, should not be understood as a failure to have rules but rather as a result of the

clash between a sexist culture and official policies on gender integration. Accounting

for the persistence of many of the problems of gender integration in the military is a

dominant culture of masculinity more than the lack of rules, the deficient leadership or

the absence of adequate policy.

The question thus remains for research to investigate the extent to which the

increasing representation of women, their access to more functions and combat

functions and their participation in major deployments has contributed to alter

perception’s of women’s roles in the military, the acceptance of women, and the

readiness of gender-integrated units (Rosen et al., 1996: 551).


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CHAPTER V GENDER INTEGRATION IN THE ARMED FORCES: A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON OF POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN

THE NATO COUNTRIES

A common observation regarding the current participation of women in the

armed forces in western democratic societies is that there is great variation regarding the

extent to which the different NATO119 countries have integrated women. Such variation,

ranging from an almost total absence, rank limitations, segregated training and severe

functional restrictions, to relatively open career patterns, full integrated training and

access to combat roles, is due to complex constellations of factors that in each case have

differently affected policies and practices.

As described in Chapter I, the degree to which women have been accepted in the

military may result from a variety of factors: different cultural value-systems, the

structure and characteristics of the military, the length of time women have served or

the social, economic and political characteristics of each society. Since each country has

its own history and cultural traditions –which in part affect the degree of acceptance that

women can expect to find in the armed forces– some might argue that comparisons are

too complex and not always obvious. However, there are factors that induce

convergence effects. Four aspects must be highlighted in this respect. Primarily, the

development of macro-sociological trends –from a rather strong pressure to achieve

gender equity in most of the western world, to changes in the military towards force

reduction and professionalization– which affect all these countries, even if with diverse

rhythms and degrees.

Secondly, the ‘universal’ character of gender differences, stressing the cross-

cultural dimension of the gender gap if compared to other type of distinctions, such as

those derived from race or ethnicity. In other words, while the various countries have

different trajectories in terms of integration of racial, ethnic or linguistic minorities –

some of them experiencing extensive social diversity, others being much more

homogeneous—, differentials relative to gender are present in all arenas and institutions

of social life in the various societies. The persistent character of gender discrimination

in the sphere of work is a good example of this cross-cultural pattern, one that labor

119 All but Iceland, which has no armed forces.

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statistics systematically identify in a wide variety of social and historical contexts. This

type of cleavage impacts on social definitions of adequate gender roles, on average age

of marriage or at first child, as well as on issues of intimacy and sexuality, all of which

are crucial factors in the process of gender integration in the military (Segal, Segal and

Booth, 1999: 228).

A third element that brings these countries together, as far as its analytical status

is concerned, is the institutional isomorphism of military organizations. Beyond national

and inter-service specificity, the military as an organization possesses a number of

structural and cultural features that are shared cross nationally (e.g. type of missions,

hierarchical organization, value-system based on discipline, obedience, esprit de corps,

uniformity and masculinity).

Finally, the fact that the specific group of countries under analysis is associated

in NATO necessarily impacts on doctrine formulation and policy definitions across

countries. A visible consequence is the creation of international co-ordination structures,

which, in turn, contribute to the reinforcement of synchronization processes. One good

example is the existence of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (CWNF), a

structure within NATO military committee. Notwithstanding the fact that it has a mere

consultative role, the committee produces regular reports on the situation of women in

the armed forces of NATO and advises its leadership and member nations on critical

issues affecting servicewomen.120

Despite the fact that this structure does not aim at promoting unification of

policies among member countries,121 one must admit that the simple fact of

disseminating information and facilitating exchange of experiences may progressively

contribute to homogenizing dominant integration models. The growing number of

multinational operations and the increasing role and responsibility of women in this

type of mission is, for instance, a reality that will probably require additional integration

efforts.122 At a global analytical level all these factors thus constitute what we may call a

120 The Committee was created in 1973 and existed on an ad hoc basis until July 1976 when the military committee formally recognized it. A support office was created in 1997 and given permanent status on the international military staff at NATO headquarters at the end of 2000. 121 Sarah Garcia, a former coordinator of CWINF stated that “creating a NATO standard is not the goal of the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces. Its goal is effective integration of women in terms of equality” (Garcia, 1999: 35). 122 This has been acknowledged by General Marcelite Harris, who stated that “in a multinational mission this could pose a tremendous challenge for NATO military leaders because of the varying reactions to a


185

minimum, (but operative) common denominator that produces ‘comparable’ effects in

terms of cognitive models, policy orientation and formalization of behaviors.

It is now important to look at various indicators regarding the position of

military women in the various countries, addressing more attentively the differences

that emerge against the background of these commonalty factors. Concretely, in this

Chapter I shall describe the situation of women in the armed forces of NATO countries,

both in terms of formal policies and, as far as possible, actual practices, in order to

explore patterns of gender integration in the military.123 The goal of this analysis is to

signal key differences and similarities among the various NATO countries and to create

an ‘integration index’ regarding the participation of women in the military (the

dependent variable in this study). This index will then be contrasted against some of the

selected independent factors that have been proposed as determinants for the role

women play in the armed forces.

1. The position of women in the military: representation and integration policies124

1.1. Global representation and recruitment policies

1.1.1. Global representation

Global figures and statistical representation reveal little about the nature and

characteristics of the gender integration process in the military, as fundamental

woman in a position of senior command. This creates internal conflict, which breaks down the military chain-of-command, hence rendering military readiness less capable of accomplishing the mission. (…) To fail to accept women in senior positions or as equal coworkers is to fail to make maximum use of the strength of NATO military forces” (Harris, 1997: 25/26). 123 Some reviews of the situation of women in the armed forces of the NATO countries have been done in the past (Klick, 1978; Stanley and Segal, 1988). After more than one decade some major changes have occurred concerning women’s military roles and a new and more complete assessment is needed. 124 In order to assure comparability all data refers to year 2000. Two cases deserve special mention: Italy and Germany. Despite the fact that Italy started female recruitment at the end of 2000, it still had not incorporated women at the moment when the organizational survey was done. This is why I decided not to include the case of Italy in the analysis, especially when dealing with statistical data. Nevertheless, I tried to mention it in terms of initial policy-definition regarding recruitment or education of future women soldiers. In Germany, the year 2000 signaled a major change in policies regarding military women. Following a European court decision, all existing occupational restrictions were lifted. However, this also happened after the data-collection phase, and from the point of view of the representation of women, did not cause immediate changes. This is why I preferred to consider the German situation prior to legal change.

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differences regarding women’s roles remain invisible. Nevertheless, these are important

indicators of women’s presence inside military structures that I believe must be taken as

the starting point for any further analysis of the ‘quality’ of such presence.

The work of Kanter (1977) on ‘tokenism’, analyzed in Chapter II, points to the

importance of ‘relative numbers’ in determining the resources and possibilities of

groups to influence power structures inside organizations. Although other variables –

such as the level of intrusiveness or the social status of the token— should also be

considered, and some of Kanter’s assumptions –namely that a growing numerical

representation entails necessarily similar gains in terms of power— have not always

been confirmed by empirical research, it is commonly accepted that relative numbers

are still among the crucial determinants of a group’s power and performance in work

settings. In 2000, around 280,000 women served as volunteer soldiers in 17 NATO

countries.125 Table 5.1 shows the absolute numbers and percentages of women in each

country.

A first striking observation concerns the disparity of absolute numbers if

compared to percentages, a situation that results from the variable size of military forces

in each country. Luxembourg, for instance, has an almost negligible number of female

soldiers (47), but still a percentage (4.2) that triplicates that of Germany (1.4) whose

forces (Medical Service) employ more than 4500 women.

Roughly, it is possible to identify four groups, two of them corresponding to

extreme categories: a first group where female representation is extremely limited,

accounting for around 1% or less of the total military force (Germany, Turkey, Italy and

Poland); a second group of countries that has still a limited representation, around 3% to

4% (Greece, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark and the Czech Republic); a third set

where female representation ranges from 5% to 9% includes, at the bottom, Portugal

and Spain and at the top Belgium, Netherlands, United Kingdom and France; finally a

fourth group referring to the special cases of the United States and Canada, where

women make up more than 10% of the total military force.

If we compare the two extreme groups, there are of course effects of time to

consider.126 While the higher percentages of Canada and the US will probably relate to

125 Iceland does not have armed forces and Italy started female recruitment in 2000. 126 Later in this Chapter (section 3.1) I will concretely observe the impact of time on representation.


187

some extent to the longer presence of women in the forces, the Italian case is rather

exceptional in that it derives from the absence of servicewomen until 2000. Their

representation will most probably increase in the coming years. The case of Germany,

in turn, is a deviant one since there existed a constitutional restriction on the use of guns

by women until 2000. As a consequence, female soldiers served almost exclusively in

the Medical Services (defined as non-armed) and a small number in the military Bands.

This situation has changed due to a decision by the European Court of Justice in

response to a lawsuit by a German servicewoman, after which all existing restrictions

were lifted.127

As far as the intermediate groups are concerned, two situations are worth noting:

first, the rather good representation attained by Portugal and Spain, two of the last

NATO countries to admit women in their armed forces; second, the striking difference

between Poland and the other two ex-communist countries, the Czech Republic and

especially Hungary. While the rapidly increasing percentage of women soldiers in the

southern European countries may be due to the political will to intensify the delayed

modernization of the armed forces, the almost residual female representation in the

Polish military seems to relate to aspects of military structure and culture as well as to a

strong catholic and conservative social environment128.

127 Court sentence of January 11th 2000, Tanja Kreil, Case C285/98. 128 According to a senior civil servant and researcher at the Czech Ministry of Defense, Marie Vlachova, interviewed in the course of this research, a number of factors explain the Polish situation: 1) enough male recruits due to the prestige of the military profession in Poland – a situation that is quite different from that of the other two countries. Even in the past regime the military kept relatively high esteem, being seen more as national than allied force. This nation-building role of the armed forces has been reinforced after the change in 1989; 2) position of Polish women in society – in Poland the strong catholic tradition plays its role, and women have much more submissive positions than in the Czech Republic and Hungary - good examples may be the abortion right or the number of women in political structures; 3) the strong esprit de corps typical of the Polish soldiers, which is based on values such as manhood, courage, and other macho values.

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(�)��5��

��,�(1�0��###$�

Country N %

Italy

0 0

Poland 239 0,1

Turkey 917 0,1

Germany 4530 1,4

Norway 1030 3,2

Czech Republic 1935 3,3

Greece 6155 3,8

Denmark 1033 4,2

Luxembourg 29 4,2

Spain 6462 5.8

Portugal 2925 6,6

Hungary 2957 6,8

Belgium 3202 7,6

Netherlands 4170 8

United Kingdom 16623 8,1

France 27516 8,5

Canada 6558 11,4

United States 198452 14,0

Total 282673 12.7

Source: Organizational Survey, Annual Reports of the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces; NATO Review, summer 2001, p.34

N.B.: Values refer to active forces, conscripts included. When dimension of total force was not made available in the survey, data from The Military Balance (ISSM, 2000-2001) was used.

In all cases, and despite a notable increase in representation levels especially

during the past decade (Figure 5.1), global percentages point to a ‘token’ situation,

where women represent less than 15% of the whole group. However, it is important to

call attention to differences in representation in specific sectors of the military, since, as

shall be seen further on, percentages of women vary enormously by occupation, unit,

rank or service in each country. This myriad of situations ranges from total absence to

situations of accentuated feminization (e.g. the case of some units of the medical service


189

in Germany where women represent more than 50% of the personnel pool in some

units).

��5��

.+��,�(1��46789:�###$�

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

Turkey

Poland*

Germany

Norway

Czech Republic*

Greece

Luxembourg

Denmark

Spain

Portugal

Hungary*

Belgium

Netherlands

United Kingdom

France

Canada

United States

2000

86/87

N.B. Percentages of women in the total active force, including conscripts

* Data for the first period refers to years 1990/2

Sources: Stanley and Segal (1988: 563); Organizational survey; Annual Reports of the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces

From the point of view of service distribution, women’s representation is higher

in the more specialized services: Navy and Air Force. Women make up 6.3% of Army

personnel, 10.2% of the Navy and 12.2% of the Air Force (Figure 5.2).

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��5��

��,�(1��"�)��+��###$��

Source: Organizational Survey; Annual Reports of the Committee of Women in the NATO Forces

1.1.2. Recruitment policies

From the point of view of the recruitment format, a first noteworthy observation

is that all NATO countries have decided to incorporate women on a strictly volunteer

basis. In some countries, however, the possibility of women’s conscript recruitment is

foreseen in the case of general mobilization or war. This is true in the Netherlands,

Greece and the Czech Republic. In countries where military service is still based on a

conscript model, such as Norway or Denmark, women can also enlist voluntarily to

perform service under similar conditions as conscript soldiers. The same possibility

existed in Belgium and France until these two countries decided to move towards an all-

volunteer force in the mid- and late ‘90s respectively.

In all cases, however, the position of women joining this modality of service is,

or has been, very different from that of men, starting with the significant fact that theirs

is a voluntary commitment.129 Besides, the representation of women’s in the conscript

type of service has generally been very limited. In Belgium, for instance, the measure

was introduced in 1984 when an Economic Recovery Act allowed young women to

volunteer for military service as draftees, with the aim of encouraging recruitment for

129 This raises the problem of perceptions of inequity, since male conscript soldiers, as has been noted in the case of Norway frequently take the favorable conditions under which women accomplish conscript service as an unfair advantage.

6,3

10,2

12,2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Army Navy Air Force


191

the regular army. This measure had little success and military conscript service was

suspended, for both men and women, in 1995. In France, the presence of women in the

national service, introduced on an experimental basis in 1970 but only fully

institutionalized in the early 80s, involved an extremely reduced number of women. In

1986, for instance, there were only 1965 female volunteers in a total force of 250 000

soldiers (Reynaud, 1988: 58). Norway is also experimenting difficulties in attracting

women to this modality of service and the number of women who voluntarily complete

military basic training has been decreasing in recent years.

With the probable exception of France, where allowing women to join the

national service is a measure to be understood in the context of a strong historical

association between republican citizenship and military service, the measure has

generally had a more instrumental nature. This can be seen in the case of Denmark,

where in 1998 women were allowed to enroll on a similar basis as conscript soldiers by

signing a contract. The main goal of this decision was to improve a stagnant female

recruitment situation: “This new option makes it possible for women to familiarize

themselves with the military environment and conditions, without having to commit to

several years of service right away. Hereby, these women will attain insight to

encourage them to pursue a military career” (CWINF, 2000).

Even if debates regarding conscription of women have generally lost momentum,

associations of female conscription and citizenship concerns are not totally absent from

legitimating discourses concerning type of service. It is curious to note that in some

contexts where recruitment difficulties are felt, this discussion has gained a new

impetus. This has happened in Norway in recent years, where conscription of women

has been presented as a way of amplifying female representation in the services and

promoting equality (Nielsen, 2001: 26).

From the point of view of global representation, policies have varied depending

on internal and external determinants. Two major formal mechanisms have contributed

to limiting or conditioning the overall representation of women. A first formal

mechanism through which women’s representation has been limited refers to rank

restrictions. A number of countries with conscript systems of recruitment and no

possibility of volunteer service in the non-commissioned or enlisted ranks do not recruit

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women in these ranks. This is the case of the Eastern European countries, Poland,

Hungary, and the Czech Republic (until 1999),130 as well as Greece and Turkey.

A second mechanism consists of the establishment of maximum ceilings. Again,

countries with conscript systems, no recruitment shortages, facing some degree of

national security tension and simultaneously experiencing little pressure towards gender

equity in the services, have formally instituted ceilings on women’s representation. This

is the case in Greece and Turkey, where women cannot represent more than 10% and

4% respectively of cadets in military academies. Italy is the only other country that has

formally indicated that it will place limitations on women’s recruitment, and this can be

associated with the very recent start and experimental character of the whole process

during its first year. Interestingly, however, the limits that were established are rather

generous, if compared to the actual overall representation of women in NATO forces:

20% in military academies and NCO ranks and 30% for the enlisted ranks.

Some countries that had regulatory quotas in the past have progressively

eliminated them. This is the case of France, where maximum quotas were eliminated in

1998, and Belgium, where until 1981 there were quotas reserving a certain number of

places to women in military academies. At present, thus, the overwhelming majority of

countries do not have formal quantitative limitations (Appendix 5.2).

Nevertheless, two situations must be distinguished. A first and larger group of

countries does not have formal limitations (at least not generally applicable in all

services and categories), but ceilings exist in practice when assignments are considered.

And these are not always ‘glass’ ceilings: frequently the number of women is directly

limited by the number of billets and positions they can access in each recruitment

campaign or, more pragmatically, by logistical considerations (as, for instance, the posts

aboard ships). It may also happen that women are not assigned to a number of positions

that are supposedly open to them because these positions are coded to be filled by

someone with occupational skills women cannot have due to existing functional

restrictions (Harrell and Miller, 1997: 30). The decision on which and how many

positions will be made available for women, or the options for concrete assignments is

often taken on the basis of the commanders’ authorized discretion in assigning

personnel. These decisions are frequently supported either by arguments concerning

130 In 1999, a law eliminated pre-existing ceilings for women’s access to military universities.


193

concrete material conditions, such as those mentioned obove, or by un-expressed

feelings and personal judgments of decision-makers.131 As noted by Harrell and Miller

regarding the US case, since these practices are not formally sanctioned, the extent to

which they occur cannot be easily accessed and “can only be discerned through site-

based investigations” (Harrell and Miller, 1997: 30).

Additionally, even when some kind of record exists, the fact that often these

decisions are not the object of explicit regulation in the law but rather issued

periodically in specific directives, often at service level, makes it extremely difficult to

investigate the gap between formal policies and actual practices. Hence, it becomes

difficult to determine the extent to which these informal restrictions contribute to

defining the level of women’s representation in various functions, units or categories.

In sum, in all these cases, the absence of formal restrictions is most probably

related to existing anti-discriminatory laws – both at national and international level132 -

in the light of which such explicit limitation policies are (or have become)

unsustainable. Besides, those restrictions appear as rather difficult to justify on a

rational or theoretical basis, since, as noted before, there seems to be no clear or direct

relation between the representation of women and the degree of force cohesion and

readiness.

There are, however, other cases where we witness the opposite situation, that is,

where recruitment difficulties have forced the military to define recruitment ‘goals’ in

terms of female representation. In the context of favorable economic conditions in the

labor market, as well as specific dilemmas concerning service conditions within the

armed forces (e.g. amount of deployment time; salaries and economic benefits), the

number of candidates usually decreases and attrition levels tend to increase. This is, for

instance, the case in the Netherlands. Although the Ministry of Defense had set a target

of 8% of women to be reached in 1993, recruitment difficulties made it impossible to

reach that figure. In 1994, that goal was postponed to 1996 and at the end of the decade

131 Harrell and Miller note, for instance that “a common scenario is the commander who refuses to choose a driver or aide of the opposite sex because of the fear of potential rumors or sexual harassment charges” (Harrell and Miller, 1997: 30). 132 For instance, the 1979 UN Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women or, at the EU level, the European Convention on Human Rights.

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it had not been met yet.133 In 1999 a new recruitment goal of 12% for 2010 had been

set. Likewise, in Norway, despite a process of force reduction, female recruitment is

considered fundamental and a goal of 7% (excluding conscripts) of female personnel

has also been set for 2005. In Canada, a new comprehensive plan was signed in 1999

targeting the underepresentation of women and other minorities. The stated long-term

goal is to raise the representation of women to 28% of the overall Canadian Forces.134

These different situations have a clear expression in policies regarding

recruitment programs. In those countries where the number of female candidates is high,

no specific programs have been developed. In other cases, recruitment and retention

problems, sometimes associated with legal pressures to achieve gender equity –as in the

case of Canada where a court decision mandated the military to full integration in

1989— have induced the development of specific recruitment programs. While many

countries have comprehensive recruitment programs not specifically targeted to women

(e.g. the US), sometimes programs and promotional campaigns have been designed

concretely to attract or retain female soldiers. This has happened in Norway, Denmark,

Canada and the UK.135

133 Progress reports in the early nineties showed that women were not interested in military jobs, and this was considered to be due to various reasons: the image of the Defense organization, being an organization only with men, the lack of technical education among women and physical overload during basic training 134 This percentage was arrived at by survey of the Canadian population, assessment of the eligibility of the population pool and propensity for women to join the military. 135 Due to a rather low percentage of female officers, since 1996 the Danish Armed Forces have intensified recruitment for female candidates through an ‘aggressive’ recruitment campaign, focusing on the use of more female officers as briefers in promotion sessions in public schools and in school job experience programs. Female officers have also been used extensively in advertisement, TV and cinema campaigns. Despite initial expectations, this campaign has not been successful in redressing the tendency to a lowering number of candidates. In fact, the number of applicants for military education in 1999 and beginning of 2000 was the lowest ever (CWINF, 2000). This has been interpreted as the result of expanded work opportunities in the labor market, extremely physical demands in military training and cultural barriers. In Norway, ‘active marketing’ has also been developed in the 1997 and 1998 recruitment campaigns (brochures, films, and special programs to follow female applicants to military schools). Unlike the Danish case, here there was an increase in the number of applicants to the Officer Candidates Schools. A new television program was also developed in 1998, detailing a female infantry officer’s life. Canada, facing serious attrition and retention problems, developed various programs specifically aimed at keeping women in the ranks. All three services have set long-term recruiting goals: Army-40%; Navy-40%; and Air Force-27%. The Army’s plan to increase the number of women in the combat arms is two-fold: an aggressive recruiting campaign specifically targeting these career fields and implementation of the ‘Leadership in a Diverse Army’ program aimed at preparing combat units for the new female recruits. The campaign was considered successful “despite negative publicity by the media” (CWINF, 2000). It included a website, extensive media coverage and a mobile recruiting team (comprised of women in combat arms) who traveled across Canada visiting schools and population centers. The program included a General’s seminar, studies to determine systemic or social barriers and examine attrition rates. The Navy has also increased the number of mixed-gender ships and developed the program “Vision-2010 – The integrated Navy”. Studies have been carried out to address the problem of personnel retention in


195

1.2. Selection and training

With regard to recruitment and selection standards, all countries declare that

they apply similar educational requirements and psychological tests both in general

recruitment and in contests for military academies and schools. Likewise, the

overwhelming majority follows integrated basic training programs. Hungary is currently

the only country that segregates basic training, but Greece and the United States also

report partial segregation practices. While in the US this happens only in the Marine

Corps, Greece applies the segregation rule in the Navy and in NCO ranks. Notable

differences exist, however, with regard to physical tests and training (Appendix 5.3).

The global approach to physical evaluation, specifically the institution of what

has been called ‘gender fair’ or ‘gender free’ tests, has been a source of tension for

policy makers, as can be seen in the variety of solutions adopted and the hesitation and

changes that have characterized the policies of various countries. While the majority of

NATO countries adopt different physical tests and standards to evaluate men and

women –even if with variation depending on trades and services, as in the US—, some

have opted to apply similar criteria to evaluate physical capabilities and performance. In

2000, this was the case in the Netherlands, Belgium, UK and Canada.

One striking observation refers to the disparity and instability of policies that

have been followed in this field. Changes have occurred in opposite directions: while

some countries decided to move from similar to different physical requirements, others

have done exactly the opposite. Denmark and Spain moved from similar to different

physical tests and standards. After 1999, an association established between recruitment

and retention problems and the high difficulty level of physical requirements led the

Danish armed forces to differentiate measures. After one decade of supposedly ‘gender-

free’ physical tests136 and in a similar context of recruitment shortages, the Spanish

armed forces have also decided to move in the same direction. This decision was part of

order to face the high attrition rate. The Air Force “Flight Plan for Life” program addressed all personnel issues including some that impact women such as flexible work hours and work-family conflicts. In the UK, the Army has adopted advertising techniques that directly target women, in place of the previous practice of using one standard form of advertising for both men and women. Finally it is worth noting the fact that Germany is currently developing a specific advertisement campaign targeting women in order to attract candidates to all military areas that remained closed until the 2000 decision to lift all existing restrictions. 136 In fact, this refers to the previously existing male tests.

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a policy ‘package’ of overall lightening of physical and educational demands on all

candidates.

Belgium has followed a rather different path, changing from different measures

prior to 1981 to then judging women by the existing male standards until 1984.

Following a ministerial decision, the Joint Staff decided to apply the formerly male tests

to everybody. However, this decision “proved naturally discriminatory to the extent that

these tests were not gender-neutral, but favored men” (Manigart, 1999: 111). One

example is the decline in the number of female cadets at the Royal Military Academy

after 1981, when a previous quota system reserving a certain number of places for

women was eliminated. In order to change this situation, the Minister of Defense

ordered the Joint Staff’s Personnel Directorate to develop new, gender-neutral tests,

which were implemented in 1986.137 After this, the number of women increased. At

present, criteria for physical fitness and physical training are thus identical for men and

women.The Belgian option seems to fit into a common emergent pattern, especially

visible in those cases where physical overload has been identified as one of the factors

that more negatively affect women’s recruitment and retention (as well as women’s

health, since the percentage of injuries and medical downgrading is much higher among

women)138 and where, simultaneously, pressures towards greater gender equity are felt.

Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK are among those that have gradually

changed their overall policy and philosophy concerning physical evaluation. In all these

countries efforts are being made to adjust physical measurement without differentiating

between male and female. This is not sought by applying previous male tests to all

personnel but through a policy of focusing not on initial requirements but on possible

end results. In general, physical tests become job-related and assessments are supposed

to show individuals the level of training they need in order to perform specific

functions.

In the Netherlands, a job-specific physical tests policy is being prepared

consistent with made-to-measure work down to specific function levels. Several studies

have also been conducted in order to optimize training efforts in relation to functional

requirements. VERGO (Women and Ergonomics) pilot projects were completed in 1999

137 Law of December 19, 1986 modifying criteria for physical tests. 138 A study conducted by the British Army has shown that, controlling for maternity and pregnancy related illnesses, the most frequent reasons for women being downgraded are musculo-skeletary problems (CWINF, 2000); In Denmark similar problems have been reported.


197

on new ergonomic design of tasks and equipment to reduce physical requirements

without diminishing operational readiness. The results were reported as successful since

they “proved that procedures and equipment can often be adapted using simple aids in

order to lighten the physical burden of the work considerably” (CWNF, 2000).

Additionally, women are given the opportunity to attend physical training courses paid

by the government in the period prior to their entering military service. The aim is to

provide additional physical skills, which will give women a greater chance of

succeeding.

In 1999 the British army has followed a similar philosophy, by replacing pre-

existing ‘gender-fair’ tests with an identical test: the Army’s Physical Selection

Standards for recruits (PSS), which aims at providing a valid and reliable predictor of

physical task performance. According to official reports, “this scientific approach to

physical testing consists of nine tests and measurements to predict the level of fitness

the recruit will achieve at the end of basic training. This new test matches the recruit

potential to an appropriate trade, and the Army hopes it will reduce injuries during

training” (CWNF, 2001). The Army recruiting offices have issued a video of an

individual physical fitness training program designed to assist weaker applicants

prepare for the PSS selection test. Unlike the Army, neither the Navy (with the

exception of the Royal Marines) nor the Air Force has physical selection tests for

recruits. However, there are certain trades within these services that, because they

require higher physical standards (e.g. MCD, Aerial Erector), have their own gender-

free tests.

In Canada, where eligibility requirements are also the same for men and women,

task-based physical standards have been in use since the mid-1980s. The Army has a

gender free physical test (LFPFS). In 2000 the validity of the original requirements was

being evaluated in order to assess whether the gender and age free measurement criteria

are still effective in predicting performance.

In Denmark, a country where physical demands have been specifically identified

as a tremendous barrier for women applying to the armed forces, new physical demands

(without the change of end requirements) were being implemented in 1999. According

to armed forces’ officials, “what has changed are the initial requirements for applicants

allowing the entry of more women. The idea is for women to undergo training to meet

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the end requirement physical demands, even if they did not fulfill present initial

requirements” (CWNF, 1999).

These examples of diverging policies show how very little consensus exists

among nations regarding the definition of ‘best practices’ in terms of gender-related

physical requirements and evaluation and it also shows how critical the issue of physical

evaluation and requirements has been in determining recruitment policies.

1.3. Occupational segregation and employment

The occupational distribution of military women reveals a strong cross-national

segregation pattern. Data available for 13 NATO nations139 shows that more than two

thirds (70%) of military women are concentrated in support (personnel/

administration/logistics) and medical functions, 17.5% in technical areas (engineering,

communications), and only 7% occupy positions in the more operational areas in

combat arms (artillery, infantry, cavalry).

Even if the relative weight of each of these different types of functions in the

overall military organizational structure is taken into account, women are clearly over

represented in the traditional female areas. In fact, support functions in the areas of

personnel, finance, administration and medical services employ an average of 46.1% of

military personnel in NATO countries, against more than 70% in the case of women.

The opposite happens in technical and particularly operational functions where the

asymmetry is also extremely visible: while 22.2% of military personnel occupy

operational functions only 7% of women do (Figure 5.3).

This limitation to the occupational opportunities of military women, especially

their exclusion from combat arms, has a negative impact on future chances for

promotion. Although there is great variation in NATO militaries regarding personnel

139 Data on this variable has been particularly difficult to obtain. Paradoxical as it may seem if we consider the bureaucratic nature of the military, many countries do not have systematized information on the functions that women occupy, and thus national delegates have failed to provide it in the survey. Methodological problems related to the complex issue of classifying occupations also exist that harm the accuracy of comparisons (cf. enclosure ‘methodology and sources’). Nevertheless, after multiple attempts to obtain this information through additional personnel contacts and by using multiple sources, it has been possible to collect data regarding thirteen of the seventeen NATO nations that employed women in their forces in 2000 (Iceland and Italy excluded). There was no data available for France, Poland and Turkey. Germany is not included because available percentages refer exclusively to the Medical Service. Unfortunately it has not been possible to obtain information regarding percentage of women within the various occupational areas.


199

career paths, most armed forces require servicemembers to perform specific functions as

a basis for promotion. Being formal or informally excluded from these functions

prevents women from acquiring the experience that would allow them to reach higher

ranks140.

��5��+��1��;��)��,�(1�

,��"��###$�

Source: Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from CWINF. Women percentages refer to the total number of women.

According to most of the studies that have been conducted on this issue, reasons

for disparities between men and women are to be found in the conservative and

discriminatory occupational assignment policies that have been followed by a majority

of countries. As noted in Chapter II, the ideological association between high

percentages of women in military units and a decrease in force cohesion and readiness

(which has not been objectively proved) is frequently invoked to justify exclusionary

policies. But it is also important to acknowledge another important determinant in this

unequal outcome. Sometimes, the characteristics of women’s choices, whenever they

are organizationally possible, may help to explain the higher concentration of women in

traditional female areas. Knowing that such a trend is predominant in terms of previous

women’s vocational choices in the educational system, it is not surprising to find a

reproduction of this pattern in terms of military occupational preferences. Very limited

empirical research has been conducted on this issue at a comparative level. However,

140 For example, referring to the US case, Harrell and Miler mention that “although drill sergeant is a position completely open to women and is coded to reflect a gender neutral assignment policy, the position is often coded to be filled by someone with an infantry skill coding, which is closed to women” (Harrell and Miller, 1997:30).

46,2

70,4

28

17,522,2

73,5 5,2

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

Support Technical Operational Other

TotalWomen

HELENA CARREIRAS

200

some results obtained in particular case studies seem to corroborate this hypothesis. A

study conducted in the Czech Republic concluded, “most women chose their field of

university study [in the military] according to the type of duty they want to assume after

completion of training. They are mostly interested in service that does not involve

irregular and long hours, outstanding physical requirements, work in the field and direct

command work with a large number of soldiers. Therefore, female soldiers mostly

perform administrative, legal, personnel and technical work on lower management

levels” (CWINF, 2000). Likewise, in Belgium, official sources report that women’s

preferences may partially explain their absence from certain jobs (CWINF, 2000). In

any case, and especially in the absence of accurate international research, the impact of

formal policies should not be under evaluated. A detailed analysis of statistical

representation and policies followed in each country reveals a rather diversified picture

(Appendix 5.4).

While in some NATO nations such as Poland and Greece (and Germany until

2000) women are formally excluded from any kind of combat functions, other nations

have been pioneers in lifting all restrictions on women’s participation in combat

functions. This has happened in Belgium, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands.

Belgium eliminated all restrictions in the early ‘80s, and in the Netherlands women

joined the crew of combat ships in the mid-80s. Denmark and Norway, two of the most

‘progressive’ countries in this respect, quickly followed the Dutch example. Norway

was the first country to permit female service aboard submarines and it is currently the

only NATO country that has employed women in submarines.141 Significantly, in 1997

the Norwegian Navy had its first woman submarine commander. Since 1985 women

have been allowed to join all combat functions. Denmark adopted a similar measure in

1988 after various successful experiences in combat arms. Unlike the Netherlands,

where, despite a legal absence of restrictions there are still areas closed to women on the

basis of combat effectiveness or ‘practical reasons’, or Belgium, where women do not

yet serve in a considerable number of functions, Danish and Norwegian servicewomen

have served in almost all operational specialties.142

141 Curiously, Norway is also the only NATO Country where a woman has occupied the position of Minister of Defense. In March 1999 Eldjorg Lower was appointed as Minister of Defense. She left office in March 2000 due to change in government. 142 Until 2000 no women served as fighter pilots, para-rangers or marine commandos. According to official sources, “This is only due to the fact that no women have been able to meet the standards”


201

Consistent with an open approach to occupational issues, Norway, the

Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg are the only NATO countries where part-time

work is allowed for active-duty personnel. This possibility is related to the overall

situation in the labor-market, where part-time work has known significant diffusion.

However, it does not seem to be extensively used by military personnel, due to the

opposition of superiors and the loss of financial benefits.

Many other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal and Spain,

do not impose legal restrictions. However, it is important to note that this does not mean

that women have real access to all functions: in the generality of cases they are, in

practice, absent from combat or close-to-combat areas. For instance, in the Czech

Republic, women are concentrated in the logistics field, engineering, communications,

medical and support services. They are absent from airborne units, platoon and

company commanding and flight personnel. In Hungary most women are employed in

administrative, personnel and medical positions. Portugal and Spain share this pattern in

that despite the theoretical absence of restrictions,143 various specialties and units

remain closed in practice. On the contrary, some countries that have instituted formal

restrictions –the US, Canada, and the UK— are among those where more progress has

been made concerning the diversification of women’s roles (even if not necessarily in

terms of representation).

Canada and the UK are two differentiated cases in terms of gender occupational

policies. Together with Germany after 2000, these countries have experienced rather

strong external pressures to achieve gender equality in the services and eliminate

functional restrictions. These pressures, coming from the broader society and

particularly channeled through civilian courts, clearly reveal a new emergent trend in

terms of civil-military relations as well as a growing relevance of political factors in the

definition of women’s military roles.

In the UK, significant changes started taking place in the early ‘90s when

positions aboard surface ships as well as all aircrew roles were opened to women.144 In

(CWINF, 2000). In Belgium absence of women from some areas interpreted as the result of limited number of jobs and/or to women’s preferences (CWINF, 2000). 143 In Portugal the remaining limitations in Army combat arms were eliminated in 1996 while Spain opened up all functions in 2000. 144 Women have served at sea since 1990, initially as volunteers and then with an automatic sea liability from September 1991. They usually make up between 10-15% of a ship’s company. In 1999, eight

HELENA CARREIRAS

202

1998, a review of areas of employment closed to women on combat effectiveness

grounds led to 1,300 “attached billets” filled by royal Navy or Army personnel in the

Royal Marines being opened to women. In 2000 overall 70% of Army posts were open

to women, 73% in the Naval Service and 96% in the RAF.

However, restrictions on women’s employment in submarines and in units

whose first function is to “close with and kill the enemy” remain in place. Women

cannot serve in submarines or as Mine Clearance Divers “due to medical/practical

reasons” (CWINF, 2000).145 They are also not allowed in the RAF regiment, the

infantry, the Royal Armored Corps and the Royal Marines.

Policy makers have been hesitating as to whether the country should move to a

totally unrestricted employment policy for women. However, the policy of excluding

women from certain areas on the basis of combat effectiveness was challenged in 1999

in the European Court of Justice against the EC Equal Treatment Directive.146 The final

outcome of this legal process was consistent with existing restrictions, since the Court

left it up to national authorities to decide which areas would justify the exclusion of

women on the basis of combat effectiveness.

Canada, in turn, is probably the most paradigmatic case of change fostered by

external political factors. In 1989 the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal required the

armed forces to remove all employment restrictions (with the exception of service in

submarines). The ruling allowed for a ten-year period to achieve the full integration of

women. However, in 1999, despite progress made, the integration was still considered

hundred and twenty five women were at sea on forty seven ships, including ninety seven officers. Twenty-nine of the ships were truly mixed, sixteen had only female officers and two had female ratings but not officers. In 2000, a third of women (973) were serving at sea in forty ships (89 officers, 37 senior ratings and 847 ratings). In 2001 the first woman was selected to command a fast patrol craft in the Navy. 145 “Of primary concern was the possibility that women might, unknowingly, expose their unborn child to levels of contamination, routinely found in the atmosphere of our submarines, above those considered safe and the substantial medical risks to an unborn child associated with the very high pressures to which divers are subjected” (CWINF, 1999). 146 The European Court of Justice has given its ruling in the case of Mrs. Sirdar, a former Army Chief, who challenged the services’ policy on the exclusion of women from certain posts on the grounds of combat effectiveness. Her application to transfer to the Royal Marines was rejected on the grounds of women’s exclusion from the Royal Marines because their presence could be a detriment to combat effectiveness. “On 26 October 1999, the ECJ rejected the submission of the U.K. that decisions affecting the combat effectiveness of the armed forces were outside the scope of the EC Treaty. In the view of the Court it was not possible to infer from the Treaty a general exception covering all measures taken for reasons of public (both internal and external) security. The Court, however, accepted that Article 2 of the Equal Treatment Directive was capable of justifying the exclusion of women on the grounds of combat effectiveness” (CWINF, 2000). The case was referred to the British Courts but was settled without being tested under British law.


203

incomplete. This period has been marked by massive reorganization of the forces,

including downsizing, recruitment restrictions and budgetary cuts, all of which had a

significant impact on the ability to recruit and promote women. The overall

representation of women grew very moderately from 9.9% in 1989 to 10.8% in 2000.

The same happened regarding diversification of occupational roles, with percentages

showing a small increase in almost all areas.

In spite of the fact that only in a small number of cases are women allowed to

get involved in combat, they have already been mobilized in highly operational

situations. During the Gulf War, 37,000 American and 1,100 English servicewomen

were deployed to the Persian Gulf region. In the US this extensive presence in a war

theatre has contributed decisively to changing the combat exclusion rules. After the

Gulf War, combat rules were changed to allow women to compete for assignments in

aircraft engaged in combat missions. The Navy was also directed to open additional

positions aboard ships and to develop legislative proposals to repeal the remaining

restrictions on the presence of women on ships engaged in combat missions. Identical

requests were made to the Army and Marine Corps. Hence, 41,000 new positions were

made available to women. Rules state that “service members are eligible to be assigned

to all positions for which they are qualified, except that women shall be excluded from

assignments to units below brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct

combat on the ground”. This new policy was stated in 1994 along with a definition of

“direct ground combat” as “engaging an enemy on the ground with individual or crew

served weapons, while being exposed to hostile fire and to a high probability of direct

physical contact with the hostile force’s personnel”. Since April 1993 over 1.1 million

positions have been opened to women and despite remaining restrictions147 in 1999

women competed equally for assignment in 260 000 additional combat positions from

which they were previously excluded (CWINF, 1999). In 2000 more than 80% of the

total jobs and over 95% of all career fields were also open to women.

The participation of women in international operations has also been

intensifying significantly since the early 90s, after the start of the conflicts in the

Balkans. By 2000, all NATO countries (with the exception of Italy) had deployed

147 Due to the current assignment policies several positions remain closed, such as infantry, armor, certain artillery posts, Special Operations Forces (SOF), Army aviation, combat engineers, Air Force SOF rotary pilots, combat controllers, pararescue, tactical air command and control, anti-air warfare and certain ordnance and assault amphibious vehicle maintenance posts in the Marine Corps.

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204

women in UN and NATO international and peacekeeping missions. However, levels of

participation have varied significantly among member nations. While in some cases it

has been almost symbolic (Greece, Turkey, Poland and Luxembourg), in other cases

women’s presence in PK operations has been particularly expressive. For instance, by

2000 the US had 11,200 women involved in NATO peacekeeping operations and in

1999 women constituted 8.9% of the total US force deployed in missions abroad.

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Taking into account the observed variables regarding the position of women in

the occupational structure, as well as legal restrictions and possibilities in each country,

an index of occupational integration has been built. The results are presented in Figure

5.4 (cf. Appendix 5.5).

1.4. Hierarchical representation

Nearly half (49.9) of all servicewomen in NATO are concentrated in the enlisted

ranks, 36% in the NCO’s and only 15 % belong to the officers’ category. Unlike their

148 This index is not supposed to reveal absolute positions, from total exclusion to complete inclusion. While having a low score means total or almost total exclusion, having the highest score does not mean full occupational integration; a concrete score merely indicates a relative position between countries. The country with the highest score is simply the one that has reached the highest level of gender occupational integration within the selected set of countries.


205

distribution in terms of occupational areas, the representation of women throughout the

various ranks is much more balanced when compared to the overall personnel rank

structure: they are only slightly underrepresented in the officer’s and NCO’s ranks and

over represented among the enlisted (Figure 5.5).

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Source: Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces.

However, a different reality is highlighted when looking at relative percentages

within each hierarchical category. Due to their very low absolute numbers, women have

an extremely limited representation in the various ranks. However, contrary to the

widespread idea that women’s representation is limited in the officer’s ranks if

compared to the enlisted force, data show that there is not a large gap between these two

categories. If we exclude from the analysis the countries that impose rank restrictions

(Poland, Hungary, The Czech Republic, Greece and Turkey), women represent in

average 11.1% of the officers and 12.6% of the enlisted personnel in NATO forces

(Appendix 5.6).

There are, however, relevant differences between the countries (Figure 5.6).

Two patterns emerge: a first one referring to roughly half of the cases consists of a

lower representation of women in the officer’s ranks and a higher representation among

enlisted personnel if compared to women’s overall percentage in the force. Here, the

percentage of enlisted women more than doubles their weight in the officer’s categories

(Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Spain).

A second pattern refers to countries where there is a more balanced

representation between categories and even higher percentages of women in the

15,714,5

38,235,6

46,149,9

0

10

20

30

40

50

O fficers N CO 's Enlisted

TotalW omen

HELENA CARREIRAS

206

officer’s category than in the enlisted ranks. Belonging to this group, Norway is a clear

‘deviant’ case in that women officers constitute 5.3% of the officer’s category, only

1.5% of enlisted and 3.2% of the total force. In Canada, the UK and the US, women are

represented in the officer’s category in slightly higher percentages than in the overall

structure; the same happens in Greece and the Czech Republic, which in this case may

result from existing rank restrictions, since women are excluded from the enlisted

category.

��57��<��'��!�0��,�(1��###$�

Source: Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from the CWINF

In principle, there are almost no formal restrictions on women’s hierarchical

progression in NATO. Countries that in the past imposed maximum posts for women

have progressively changed that policy. Presently, all nations report that women’s

hierarchical progression is not limited by law and that they are subject to identical

promotion criteria. However, there are some exceptions to this rule and women’s

representation in the various ranks as well as their promotion conditions are limited in at

least three major ways. First, in some countries women have not served long enough to

attain higher ranks. Second, some countries do not recruit women for specific

categories: these are the cases of Greece, Turkey, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech

02468

10121416

Luxem

bourg

Poland

German

y

Turkey

France

Denmark

Spain

Czech

Rep

ublic

Greece

Belgium

Portug

al

Netherl

ands

Norway

Hunga

ry

United

King

dom

Canad

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United

States

Total

Officers

NCO+Enlisted


207

Republic (until 1999), where women are not admitted in the enlisted categories

(exclusively conscript). Third, in other instances, combat exclusion and occupational

segregation prevent women from acquiring the experience and fulfilling the functions

that would serve as the basis for promotion.

If we look more closely at the internal distribution inside the officer’s category

(Table 5.2), it is striking to observe that the overwhelming majority of women (two-

thirds) is concentrated in the lower officer ranks, that is, in the posts from lieutenant to

major. The United States is an exception in that there is a less unbalanced distribution

among the various posts.

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COUNTRIES OF.6+ OF.4-5 OF.1-3 TOTAL WOMEN

OFFICERS

N % N % N %

Belgium 0 0 25 11 202 89 227

Czech Republic 0 0 85 21 320 79 405

Denmark 0 0 2 2 109 98 111

Greece 5 1 102 11 816 88 923

Hungary 0 0 49 8 591 92 640

Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Norway 0 0 2 0,3 617 99,7 619

Portugal 0 0 0 0 313 100 313

Spain 0 0 0 0 622 100 622

Turkey 0 0 5 1 861 99 866

United Kingdom 2 0 134 5 2453 95 2589

United States 32 3 948 31 28582 66 29562

Total 987 3 9563 26 26327 71 36877

Source: Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from the CWINF

N.B.: OF6+ (Brigadier, General); OF4-5 (Lieutenant Colonel, Colonel); OF1-3 (Second Lt., Lt., Captain, Major); Data not available for France, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland.

As in the case of occupational integration, an attempt at classification was made

regarding the hierarchical position of military women in the various countries. Based on

HELENA CARREIRAS

208

the available data, two indicators for which all countries could be classified were

selected to build a synthetic index: existence or absence of formal hierarchical

restrictions and percentage of women in the officers’ category. Results are presented in

Figure 5.7 (cf. Appendix 5.7).

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As in the occupational index, countries which in 2000 applied formal restrictions

to women’s access to some ranks have the lower scores: Germany, Poland and Turkey.

Greece and especially Hungary (countries with similar restrictions) stay out from this

group because of their good comparative performances in terms of women’s

representation in the officers’ corps. Unlike what happens in terms of occupational

distribution, Canada and the US have the highest scores here.

1.5. Social issues: family policy, fraternization and harassment

1.5.1. Pregnancy and family policy

The conciliation between family life and a military career has been identified in

many countries as one of the most important – if not the major - problem women have

to face in the services. The increased difficulties they find in effectively pursuing a

149 Like the ‘index of occupational integration’, this index is not supposed to reveal absolute positions. A concrete score merely indicates a relative position between countries.

01234567

Italy

German

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Poland

Turkey

Greece

Hunga

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Luxem

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Rep

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Belgium

Denmark

France

Portug

alSpa

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Netherl

ands

Norway

United

King

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Canad

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United

States


209

military career while at the same time devoting attention to family and children has been

considered one of the factors with major negative impact on women’s retention and

career development. Survey results show that together with cultural and attitudinal

resistances, conciliation between family and work is the greatest difficulty confronted

by military women in more than half of the NATO countries. Despite this

acknowledgment, a majority of nations limits policies in this field to following civilian

law and regulations regarding pregnancy (namely pregnancy leave and prohibition of

dangerous work to pregnant women) and parental leave. All have issued specific

directives concerning service conditions in particular jobs or military positions for

pregnant women. However, the extent to which family issues have been the object of

specific programs varies significantly.

About one third of the NATO countries have implemented specific measures or

programs aimed at facilitating the articulation between family responsibilities and

military life. Not surprisingly, this has happened more extensively in those countries

where women’s roles have known major developments: the US, UK, Norway,

Denmark, the Netherlands and Canada. In all these countries there was a process of

‘spill-over’ from civilian social policy to the armed forces.

The Scandinavian countries are the most progressive in this respect, since

civilian regulations concerning maternity and family protection are clearly among the

most favorable in the western world. In Norway, the military follows public services’

policy on maternity and paternity leave. An employee receives 42 weeks paid leave at

100% of their salary or an optional 52 weeks at 80% of their salary. Similarly, in

Denmark there are around 30 full paid weeks of maternity leave, part of which is to be

used by the father.

Recruitment and retention problems turned the question of conciliating work and

family into a political priority in the late ‘90s. Denmark issued an explicit family policy

on January 1999. This policy is based on a “flexible attitude”, focusing on the need to

take into consideration the employee’s family-related obligations when organizing daily

work, days off and holidays. In Norway, a new personnel policy completed in 1998

paves the way for the creation of Family-Support Groups on every base. Some units

have built their own kindergartens and an effort is made to give dual-career couples jobs

in the same unit or in the same area.

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210

In the Netherlands, the issue of exploring possibilities of combining a job with

responsibilities at home is also high on the political agenda, including that of the

Ministry of Defense. Various programs and measures have been implemented to face

the retention problem. Child-care facilities – namely in-house day-care centers - and

special licenses are in place as well as a family policy aimed at preventing simultaneous

deployments of military couples. Both parents are entitled to partially paid parental

leave.

In the UK, extensive maternity leave provisions allow servicewomen to choose

retirement/discharge on grounds of pregnancy or to return to duty after the birth of the

child after a period of leave. For qualified personnel leave comprises a period of 18

weeks ordinary maternity leave (OML) (14 weeks of which are on full pay) and up to 37

weeks unpaid additional maternity leave (AML).

In Canada, women can take up to 17 weeks of subsidized leave, with an

additional 24 weeks available as parental leave upon application (available to the

military spouse also). A family-friendly policy was under development in the late 90s,

aimed at dealing with tour lengths and deployments, housing, education, dependent

travel, separation, spousal employment, family-related leave and childcare (CWINF,

1998). The Canadian Forces also examined pregnancy policies in the field and aboard

ships (i.e. employment limitations) and the possibility of extended leave without pay

similar to public service employees (i.e. holding the position open for up to five years

while on parental leave). However, even if the policy allows the employment of

pregnant women in field units while in garrison, it requires that they be immediately

removed from operational duties. This rule has been considered “very conservative and

inflexible, resulting in hardship for the losing unit and frustration and career slow down

by the woman, who in most cases is capable of continuing the work in the short term”

(CWINF, 1999).

In comparison, the US has more restricted maternity and parental regulations.

Policies on maternity care authorize pregnant soldiers to take a combination of accrued,

advanced, excess, sick-in-quarters, sick-in-hospital and convalescent leave. Women are

allowed forty-two days convalescence leave and have a six-month period to met

physical readiness standards again. As far as conciliation between family and work is

considered, a specific DoD directive (1342/17) on family policy prescribes a set of

programs including “pre-mobilization indoctrination, deployment support, relocation


211

assistance, information and referral services, child care, private and public sector

employment assistance, special needs support, family advocacy, foster care, family life

education, dependent’s education, substance abuse prevention, family health and fitness,

spiritual growth and development, emergency services, counseling, family centers and

community development”150.

Some other countries, among which France, Belgium, the Czech Republic and

Hungary, have specific and rather extensive leave measures, but isolated from a global

policy in this field. In Belgium, pregnant service women must not execute tasks that can

be harmful for her or the child; she is entitled to ask for a different job and is not

authorized to work more than 8 hours a day or 40 hours a week. Women are allowed 15

weeks maternity leave, at the end of which they (and men) can take an additional three

months unpaid nursing leave. There is a paid childcare leave with a maximum duration

of 4 weeks or 6 weeks (if the child is less than three). All these leave opportunities

count as active service. All personnel can ask for a temporary unpaid leave of maximum

2 years for family reasons to spend some time with their children.

A similar situation is observed in France. On maternity leave servicewomen

maintain all rights concerning remuneration, promotion and retirement. Men and

women may use parental leave at six-month intervals until the child is three years old.

Unlike maternity leave, during this period service members are no longer considered on

active duty. Therefore, there is no salary from the armed forces, but all benefits from the

social security system (family allowances, reimbursement of health care, etc.) are

assured.

In Hungary and the Czech Republic there are no specific policies dealing with

conciliation of work and family life. In the two countries work conditions for pregnant

servicewomen and maternity issues are subject to civilian legislation. There are,

however, specific leave measures. In Hungary pregnant women are relieved from the

responsibility of fulfilling duty during the entire period of the compulsory medical

check-up. During this time they are entitled to an absence fee. Women cannot be

assigned to night service from the beginning of pregnancy to the time the child is one

year old. Until the child is six she cannot be assigned to 24-hour service. Both parents

are entitled to some extra days of holiday for each child under 16 if they are bringing

150 Answer to the ‘Organizational Survey’.

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212

the child up alone. In this case either is entitled to sick leave. There is a six-month

maternity leave of which four weeks should be taken before birth if possible.

In the Czech Republic, new legislation was issued in 1999 that contains specific

provisions concerning the duty of pregnant women soldiers. The distinct nature of the

duty of female soldiers consists of a series of benefits regarding the exercise of

functions, leave, etc. Single parents are entitled to similar protection.

All remaining countries fall in the default category: they all follow civilian

regulations and do not have specific family programs. Poland, Portugal, Greece,

Turkey, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain grant maternity leave (ranging,

however, from 12 months in Greece, to 4 months in Portugal) and various levels of

parental leave and allowances, but have not developed a global policy on family

matters.

1.5.2. Gender equality programs and sexual harassment

A similar situation characterizes NATO countries’ policies concerning gender-

equality monitoring and sexual harassment. Again, it is possible to identify two main

situations. On the one hand there are those countries with a pro-active orientation

regarding discrimination and sexual harassment, where specific policies have been

drawn. On the other hand, there are those nations where no specific policies have been

implemented, and in many cases are not even considered to be necessary. Consequently,

they have a merely reactive attitude, following general law and military disciplinary

regulations.

Among the first group we find the US, Canada, UK, Denmark, Norway, the

Netherlands and Belgium, where specific programs have been implemented to deal with

these sensitive issues. Situations vary from extremely regulated contexts, as in the US,

to an approach that privileges ‘confidential counselors’ adopted in the Netherlands and

Belgium. In most cases, however, regulations in the field of sexual harassment are part

of broader policies aimed at dealing with discrimination and promoting equity. This

‘mainstreaming’ orientation has had a clear expression in the development of mentoring

or monitoring programs aimed at gender equality and gender awareness. This trend

began during the ‘90s and particularly intensified during the last years of the decade.


213

Canada was among the pioneer countries in this field. Following the tribunal

order that required an external monitoring for gender integration, the Ministry of

Defense established an Advisory Board on Women in the Canadian Forces in 1990,

composed of 7 members who are in charge of monitoring and implementing the equality

policy. Policies on sexual misconduct, racist conduct and personal relationships

complement an harassment policy and the commitment of senior leadership has been

considered as pivotal to the efforts of gender integration. All services have developed

their own programs.

Likewise, in the UK, there are well-established policies and complaints

procedures dealing with cases of bullying, sex and racial discrimination and harassment.

In March 1998 the MoD established a Tri-Service Equal Opportunities Training Centre.

This centre prepares Service Equal Opportunities Advisers and provides EO awareness

seminars. In addition, services have their own training and education programs,

supplemented by telephone lines, videos looking at sexual and racial harassment, and

bullying. Continuous attitude surveys, workshops and focus groups are held.

Scandinavian countries have also adopted various measures in this direction.

Norway has an overarching sexual/gender harassment policy defining complaint

procedures and detailing actions to be taken in rape cases. Since 2000 Denmark has

been developing a new harassment policy based on a set of precise definitions of

harassment, sexual harassment, responsibility of commanders and peers, as well as

regulations concerning the handling of concrete cases.151 A DAF Committee focusing

on Equal Opportunity issues was formed in 1990 with the task of monitoring gender

disparities and statistics on female representation. In 1996 the Committee prepared a

Chief of Defense Action Plan describing initiatives aimed at promoting equal

opportunities until 2000. The plan proposed a recruitment strategy for increasing the

number of women in the forces. Recommendations were made regarding the

establishment of realistic recruitment targets, policies on family, maternity and paternity

leave. In 1998, following the implementation of a 1997 additional policy on prohibition

against differential treatment on governmental places, the committee on equal

151 It is stated that “Prospective cases concerning harassment should be solved at the lowest possible level. Cases of a more general nature can be considered in the co-operation board while single cases are considered with reference to FKOVEJL concerning cases of harassment” (CWINF, 2000).

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opportunities was abolished and replaced by a sub-committee on equal treatment in

general.

Belgium and the Netherlands have developed an approach that centres on the

presence of confidential counselors to deal with issues of discrimination and

harassment. In 1997, the Belgian General Staff implemented a specific policy to prevent

sexual harassment (AOJ/821) and personnel were trained to serve in ‘trustworthy

persons’ posts.152 In the Netherlands, there is a policy outlining a complaint procedure

on sexual harassment, which details its purpose, the use of confidential counselors and a

complaints committee. All service's training courses devote attention to lessons in

ethics, managing diversity and dealing with undesirable behavior. All military

personnel, both during initial training and during follow-up and career training courses

attend these lessons.

Finally, the United States have extensive policies and directives on

discrimination and equal opportunity, to include sexual harassment, defined as a form of

sexual discrimination that involves unwelcomed sexual advances, requests for sexual

favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature. Service specific policies

are based on the concept of “zero tolerance” established by the Department of Defense

in the early 80s.

All other NATO countries have a ‘minimal’, and frequently ex-post, approach to

issues of harassment and gender discrimination. Even if some of them, like Spain and

Luxembourg, have regulations that concretely focus on harassment, these are not

integrated in any broader program or even within an explicit policy. The general pattern

is the dependence on existing disciplinary regulations and general civil law. In the

absence of institutionalized solutions and clear policies, problems of this kind become

simultaneously less acknowledged inside the ranks and less visible to the exterior.

With regard to monitoring, a common trend is the existence of an advisory

committee, usually in the dependence of the MoD: this is the case of southern and

central European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal and Italy.

Spain has also declared its intention to create such an organ.153

152 In 2000, 76 confidential counselors were on duty. 153 However, it is noteworthy that eastern European countries seem to start paying greater attention to gender equality and quality of life issues. In 1999 Hungary has created an ‘Equal Opportunities Examining Committee’ and Poland the ‘Women Council in the armed forces’. In the Czech Republic


215

In the light of these descriptions, one crucial question regards the efficacy of

programs aimed at facing cultural and attitudinal resistances to women in the military.

Here again, we are confronted with the need to assess the relation between formal

policies and regulations and their implementation and outputs, which is not necessarily

a linear one. Unfortunately, empirical data in this area is rather scarce.

Research conducted in the US has shown a rather dark picture. Despite existing

regulations and efforts made to prevent harassment, the US military has faced various

sexual harassment and sexual assault scandals during the past decade. This has been

considered “especially troubling in light of the fact that Department of Defense (DoD)

has had specific policy prohibiting sexual harassment of military personnel for over

fifteen years” (Guenter-Schlesinger, 1999: 195). In spite of increased awareness and

knowledge, a large majority of service women surveyed in 1995 declared that they had

experienced behaviors that could be described as sexual harassment. In the wake of

serious harassment incidents, military orientations became more conservative, ranging

from proposals to re-segregate basic training to a significant shift in fraternization

rules.154 In any case, independently of policy concrete orientations and efficiency –the

evaluation of which will require extensive research— awareness of sexual

discrimination and harassment as well as service attempts to confront these problems

should be read as efforts towards integration and thus as a positive elements in a

country’s classification in an overall index of gender inclusiveness.

1.6. An index of gender inclusiveness

Despite the lack of information for some of the countries, the available data –

both in terms of precise statistics and more qualitative analysis of policies– allows the

construction of a global index of gender inclusiveness. Considering the macro-analytical

level of this analysis, it is more accurate to talk of an index of ‘formal’ inclusiveness

since the available indicators refer mainly to global statistics and formal mechanisms

and rules. In spite of the efforts to confront, whenever possible, normative frames and

there is a Working group for equality at the MoD and some empirical research has already been conducted among military women regarding sexual harassment. 154 Up to 1999 dating was allowed between officers and enlisted personnel in the Army as long as they were not in the same chain of command. Starting in 2000, the DoD decreed that there would be an absolute ban on dating between officers and enlisted persons. In this regard the Army would follow the fraternization rules already existing in the other services (Moskos, 1999: 21).

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their implementation it has not always been possible to evaluate the distance between

policies and actual practices. In any case, different indicators have been chosen to build

the index, including organizational structure and organizational policy indicators (Table

5.7).155

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��VARIABLE (WEIGHT) INDICATOR MEASUREMENT

Global representation (3)

1. Percentage of women in total active force

0 = 0-1%; 1=+1- 5%; 2= +5-10%; 3=+ 10%

2. Formal functional restrictions to combat functions

0=total; 1= many;2=few; 3=none

Occupational integration (6)

3. Percentage of women in traditional functions

0=90-100%; 1=66-89%; 2=50-66%; 3=less 50%

4. Formal rank restrictions 0= yes; 3=no

Hierarchical integration (6) 5. Percentage of women in

officers ranks 0= 0-1%; 1=+1-5%; 2=+5-10%; 3=+ 10%

Training segregation (2)

6. Segregation in basic training 0=total; 1=partial; 2=no segregation

7. Family programs 0=no; 1=yes Social policies (2) 8. Harassment and gender equity monitoring

0=no; 1=yes

Structural variables refer to the overall representation of women in active duty

forces (1), occupational sex segregation (3) and rank distribution (5). These indicators

are usually considered of major importance to determine the extent of women’s roles in

the military. The impact of related policies is also captured through the inclusion of

indicators pertaining to the existence of segregation practices (6), and presence or

absence of formal limitations in occupational (2) and hierarchical terms (4). Hence,

beyond the question of relative numbers, other dimensions of the integration process are

included that concern respectively the structure of opportunities and power distribution.

This is why, together, these indicators contribute with almost 90% to the indexes’

overall weight.

Finally, the index includes two additional indicators relative to existing

programs or policies aimed at confronting erosion factors, such as those derived from

the difficult conciliation between family and a military occupation (7) or sexual

155 Country scores and variable weighting are displayed in appendix 5.8.


217

harassment and gender equity monitoring (8). Since it has been recognized that these

factors have a strong impact on integration processes, attention given by policy-makers

to ‘quality-of-life’ areas should be taken as important elements for the qualification of

women’s presence in the military.156

It is important to note that this index, like the previous two partial indexes of

occupational and hierarchical integration, is not supposed to reveal absolute positions,

from total exclusion to complete inclusion. While having a low score means almost total

exclusion, having the highest score by no means signifies full integration; a concrete

score merely indicates a relative position between countries. The country with the

highest score is simply the one that has reached the highest level of gender integration

within the selected set of countries. Figure 5.8 presents a graphic representation of the

countries’ scores.

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156 Even if in some cases it could be argued that the actual over-regulation of procedures regarding for instance sexual harassment does not necessarily facilitate integration and may, instead, have negative collateral effects, it is assumed that the absence of institutional channels and rules to identify and solve those problems does not eliminate them or their damaging consequences for the overall process of gender integration.

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218

If we separate relative numbers (global representation) and the remaining

dimensions of integration, it is also possible to graphically represent different groups of

countries along both dimensions (Figure 5.9).

��54��,�(1�

Actual Representation

+ _

Canada (14)

Norway (14)

Denmark (13)

United States (12)

United Kingdom (13)

Belgium (13)

Netherlands (12)

France (9)

Portugal (9)

Spain (10)

Luxembourg (8)

Czech Republic (7)

For

mal

Incl

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s (1

-16)

_

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Hungary (5) Greece (3) Turkey (4)

Germany (2)

Poland (1)

Italy (0)

Type I – Advanced/extensive inclusiveness (Euro-atlantic model) - 5 countries (Canada, US, UK, NL, B)

Type II – Advanced/intensive inclusiveness (Scandinavian model) - 2 countries (N, Dk)

Type III – Moderate inclusiveness (Southern European model) - 4 countries (F, P, Sp, H)

Type IV – Limited inclusiveness (Mixed territorial model) - 7 countries (L, CR, Pl, Gr, T, G, I,

Four different groups of countries can be identified. The two groups on the

upper half of the table are those that score high on inclusiveness and can thus be named

as ‘advanced inclusiveness’ types. On upper left quadrant there are those countries that

not only have the higher levels of inclusiveness but also have the highest numerical

representation: Canada, US, UK, Netherlands and Belgium. These countries constitute

type I: ‘advanced/extensive inclusiveness’ (Euro-Atlantic model). On the upper right

quadrant there are those that although scoring high in inclusiveness have more limited


219

quantitative representation: Norway and Denmark. These have been classified as type II

–‘advanced/intensive inclusiveness’ (Scandinavian model). On the lower part of the

table there are those countries that have lower levels of inclusiveness. On the left

quadrant we find France, Portugal, Spain and Hungary, the countries of type III—

‘moderate inclusiveness’ (Southern European model). While having medium to low

scores on inclusiveness, they have still reached significant representation levels. Finally,

on the lower right quadrant are the countries with the lowest levels of inclusiveness and

also the lowest percentage of women in the armed forces: Luxembourg, the Czech

Republic, Greece, Turkey, Germany, Poland and Italy. These are type IV – ‘limited

inclusiveness’ or ‘mixed territorial model’.

After conceptualizing, describing and measuring the dependent variable–

‘women’s military participation’ (WMP)—, it is now important to understand what

factors may explain the observed incorporation patterns and test some of the hypotheses

that have been identified in the analytical model as potential determinants of women’s

military roles.157

2. Explaining gender incorporation patterns: a tentative test of hypotheses

2.1. Historical heritages, time effects and relative numbers

A first fundamental variable to consider when analyzing current situations

concerning the role women play in the armed forces is the timeframe of the process.

This can be observed around two different dimensions: the existence of an historical

tradition of female military involvement and the length of time that has passed since

countries started the so-called ‘second generation’ process of gender integration that

took place throughout the western industrialized world after the 70s.

157 Here, a note of caution is required. The complexity of processes and variables interacting in the social, economic and political spheres – which may, under specific conditions, affect gender integration in the military– makes the systematic evaluation of its impact over the military participation of women too ambitious a goal to pursue within this research. Besides the use of aggregate data at a macro-analytical synchronic level –which we propose to carry on in this Chapter— such an objective would require a certain accumulation of concrete case-studies and cross-time analysis, sensitive to both historical specificity and social change in the various countries. The analysis developed here is affected by a strong multi-colinearity problem, that is, the fact that independent variables are related to each other. This is the reason why no multiple regression analysis has been done. Nevertheless, exploring analytic directions that may bring some light to the global dynamics at work appears as a reasonable objective in terms of the necessarily partial contribution this research aims at giving to the global process of knowledge building in this area.

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Beginning with the historical dimension, NATO countries have very different

historical traditions of female involvement in military operations. As described in

Chapter I, some of them have had large contingents of women performing support roles

during WW II and I. That was the case of the US and the U.K., and, to a lesser extent,

Canada and Germany. Some have mobilized women at various times but in a less

significant way; in various other cases women have joined revolutionary armies in civil

wars or resistance movements throughout the XX Century. While in some nations

women’s participation was interrupted after the end of conflict, in some others they

continued to serve in reduced numbers and under a special peacetime status.

As far as the moment they started female recruitment after the ’70s is concerned,

major differences can be observed: some pioneer countries started recruiting women

more than three decades ago, in the early ’70s. Among these we find the United States,

Canada, Denmark and France. Others followed the trend and progressively opened their

ranks to women in the late 70s and during the early ’80s – Norway, Belgium, the

Netherlands, UK, Turkey and Greece. A third group includes those countries where

female recruitment was initiated in the late ’80s or early ’90s –Portugal, Spain,

Luxembourg, Poland, Hungary– or intensified it during this period, as happened with

the Czech Republic. Finally, there are the rather special cases of Germany, where

women joined the military in the medical corps in 1975, but only in 2000 were given a

full military status, and Italy, where the first female incorporation took place in 2000

(Table 5.3). Four decades were thus necessary to institute female recruitment in all 18

NATO countries.


221

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COUNTRIES 1970S 1980S 1990S 2000

Canada 1970 – Legal measures to abolish quotas, expand areas and promote equality

1978 – Human Rights Act: trials to evaluate women in combat arms

1989 – Court order to full equality

Unites States 1973 - All-volunteer force. Expansion of women’s roles

1993 – Defense Authorization Act: Eliminated various restrictions in combat arms

Denmark 1971 – Women allowed to NCO and enlisted ranks 1974 - Women allowed to Military Academies

1978 – Equality laws induced progressive elimination of restrictions

France 1971 – Women obtain military status

1982 – Women allowed in Military Academies 1983 - Policy Document ‘Thirty measures for military women’

1998 – Quotas eliminated

Belgium 1975 – First women recruited as enlisted 1978 - Women allowed to Military Academy

1981 – Equality laws opened all functions, prohibit discrimination and abolish quotas

Norway 1977 – Parliamentary resolution to allow women to join

1985 – Parliament recognize full employment opportunities Combat restrictions lifted

The Netherlands

1978 – Women allowed in Military schools (except Naval College)

1982 – Separate Corps disbanded 1983 – Women allowed in Naval College

UK Limited representation in separate corps

1992 1993 – disbanded last separate female corps

Greece 1979 – Women allowed to NCO Corps

1990 – Women allowed to Military Academies

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222

Turkey 1982 – Resumed recruitment for officers on direct appointment

1992 – Resumed recruitment in Service Academies

Czech Republic

Expansion of women’s presence

1999 – Ceilings eliminated to Military Academies

Hungary Limited women’s presence

1994 – Women allowed to military academies

1996 – New constitutional law prohibiting discrimination

Poland 1988 – Specif regulations for military women

1999 – Women allowed to Officer’s schools

Luxembourg 1987 – Women allowed to Army as NCO’s

1997 – Women allowed as enlisted

Spain 1988 – Women allowed to join Military Academies

1999 – Eliminated functional restrictions

Portugal 1991 – Women allowed to join all ranks

1996 – Eliminated restrictions in Army combat arms

Italy 1999 – Law allowing women to join military academies

2000 – First incorporation of women

Germany 1975 – Women join Medical Service

2000 – Women allowed to all positions and functions

A commonly stated belief is that both aspects – time and previous tradition -

condition the state of gender integration in the military. Two specific arguments have

been used:158 first, the idea that previous experience must have had at least some impact

in defining the conditions that surrounded the “second-generation” process of gender

integration, and, second, that time has a positive impact on both quantitative and

qualitative dimensions of women’s military integration. According to this perspective,

unequal gender representation is not necessarily a result of discriminatory practice or

glass-ceiling effects, but mainly a consequence of the limited amount of time women

have served in certain circumstances. Hence, from this point of view, time constitutes a

158 These arguments are often used by senior military officers and policy-makers to interpret the asymmetric position of men and women in the armed forces.


223

major factor in eliminating discriminations and bringing nations with lower levels of

integration to reach the more progressive countries. Interestingly, however, empirical

results do not confirm this general hypothesis, or at least seem to support it only

partially and for a specific cluster of countries.

As far as historical experience is concerned, there are some ‘anomalous’

elements. On the one hand, among the pioneer group of countries we find some which

had significant female involvement in World Wars I and II (US, UK, Canada), while

others such as Belgium, France or Denmark did not. On the other hand, the two

latecomers (Italy and Germany) recruited women in these conflicts, albeit in limited

numbers. This may lead us to rethink whether previous women’s presence in the war

arena had some, if any, influence in the timing of a ‘new’ start in the ’70s. One possible

conclusion is that, apparently, previous tradition did not have the catalyzing function

some would have expected in terms of pressing for an early start at this later stage. The

pattern of ‘historical amnesia’ mentioned in Chapter I –the invisibility of women’s

contributions to war and their total redrew to traditional roles after the end of

conflicts— has probably prevailed (Segal, 1993: 84). But even if there were not a direct

impact of this historical factor in explaining differences in polices and practices between

countries, it is possible to sustain the second hypothesis. For instance, it is plausible to

admit the existence of a link between time and relative numbers: in general, countries

with a longer experience of female recruitment should also be those where percentages

of women are higher. If this is so, the proposed hypothesis ‘the longer the presence of

women in the armed forces the higher their numerical representation’ should be

confirmed.

However, results show only a moderate negative correlation159 between time and

relative numbers (R=-.507; Sig. 0.05). A graphic representation helps to visualize it

(Figure 5.9). If there was a high correlation, countries should cluster along a diagonal

linking the upper left and lower right side of the graphic. This does not seem to happen.

If, besides, we eliminate the outliers, where the relation seems to hold strongly (Italy,

Canada and US), there is a rather chaotic pattern relating the length of female presence

in the forces and their relative numbers.

159 To classify the strength of the correlation, I follow Bryman and Cramer (1992), who adopted the following criteria: bellow .19 - very low; between .20 and .30 - low; between .40 and .69 - moderate; between .70 and .89 - high; and between .90 and 1 - very high.

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224

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If we look beyond numbers and strict quantitative representation, there are again

reasons to believe results could be different. The fact that the military is an organization

where time is usually an important criteria for assessing statutory positions (rank

progression, promotions) makes it reasonable to admit that time almost ‘automatically’

affects the various circumstances that define women’s positions. This would support the

hypothesis that ‘the longer the presence of women in the armed forces, the higher the

degree of gender inclusiveness’.

The relation between the length of female recruitment (Yearstart) and the index

of gender inclusiveness (IGI) shows, in effect, a significant, if still moderate, negative

statistical correlation (R=-.604; Sig.- 0.01): the earlier countries started to recruit

women the higher their score is in the index of gender inclusiveness. Figure 5.10

portrays countries’ scores along both dimensions.

Percentagewomen2000

1614121086420-2

Yea

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rt2010

2000

1990

1980

1970

1960

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225

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Index of Gender Inclusiveness

20151050-5

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UK

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L

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F Dk

CR

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Nonetheless, visibly different patterns emerge. The first concerns the most

integrated countries, that is those classified as advanced inclusiveness types (C, US, Nl,

UK, B, Dk, N,). Because these have the highest scores in the index of gender

inclusiveness and were among the first to start female recruitment, they appear in the

lower left quadrant and form a clear cluster. The second pattern characterizes countries

with progressively lower scores –moderate and limited inclusiveness types— which

tend to appear towards the center and upper right side of the diagonal, even if

distributed in a less tight cluster. Here, a few cases deserve particular attention: Portugal

and Spain have an unexpected location, since the two countries have already reached a

good integration score despite a rather late start. The opposite happens with France, a

clearly deviant case in this correlation. Even if it had a rather early departure, France

does not reach levels of integration comparable to those countries that started

HELENA CARREIRAS

226

recruitment at about the same time.160 A third group, however, does not fit at all into the

general pattern. The supposed correlation does not hold true for countries with the

lowest scores in the index of gender inclusiveness, thus belonging to the limited

inclusiveness type –Turkey, Poland, Germany and Greece. Despite the fact that these

countries started women’s recruitment rather early (with the exception of Poland),

various factors (to be analyzed further on) must have prevented or created obstacles to

the development of the integration process.

If, instead of considering the overall index of gender inclusiveness we look at

the relationship between time and specific sub-indexes, slightly different results emerge.

For instance, correlation between time and the occupational and hierarchical integration

indexes are only moderately significant (R=-.475 and -.522 respectively), and the

deviant character of those countries that score lower in integration is even more visible.

This is particularly surprising since, according to the above-stated hypothesis on the

frequently automatic effects of time over rank progression, one would expected to find

higher representation of women in the officers’ ranks (especially in the upper posts) in

the countries that started recruitment earlier.161

In sum, results show that time is correlated to some extent to the degree of

women’s integration, but this does not hold true for those countries that score low in

integration. Against common beliefs, data supports the idea that time, by and in itself,

does not automatically foster gender integration and especially does not have the

relevant impact on representation that some would expect.

What could be said about the impact of relative numbers on integration? At this

analytical level, it is not possible to test Kanter’s or Blalock’s hypothesis on the impact

of numbers over a group’s acceptance and performance. First of all, because there is no

theoretically significant variation in the selected countries’ status: all have a ‘token’

situation where women represent less than 15% of military personnel. Only a focused

case analysis at a service specific level would allow such an inquiry. Second, there is no

160 It is important to note that, in spite of an official start in 1972, real perspectives for the amplification of women’s roles only happened ten years later in 1982 with the publication of the document Thirty Measures for military Women. This may, at least partially, explain the anomalous position of France in the plot. 161 This hypothesis is only valid under the condition that countries have allowed equal access to all ranks at the same time. In those where recruitment has only been possible in some ranks (or where there is evidence for ‘informal’ rules that actually prevent women from accessing higher ranks) numbers are distorted.


227

data available on change over time concerning the various factors used to build the

index of gender inclusiveness.

However, it is illuminating to investigate the extent to which numerical

representation relates to aspects such as role diversification or hierarchical distribution.

If correlated with the two partial indexes ‘occupational integration index’ and

‘hierarchical integration index’,162 results show a very similar effect to that of time as

far as occupational diversification is concerned: greater percentages of women do not

mean a less segregated occupational environment (R=.507, sig-0.05). There is, however,

a high positive correlation between the percentage of women in a force and their

hierarchical distribution: the greater the percentage of women, the higher the level of

gender hierarchical integration (R=.847) (Figure 5.11). If the outliers US, Italy,

Germany and Poland are excluded, the correlation is still strong (R=.735, sig.0.01).

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It is possible to suggest that, as happens with time effects, relative numbers have

only a limited effect over the type and diversity of roles women perform in the armed

162 Correlation with the global integration index does not make sense since ‘relative numbers’ is one of the indexes’ indicators.

Index of Women's Hierarchical Integration

76543210-1

Perc

enta

gew

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2000

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

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0

USA

UK

T

SP

Pl

N

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L

I

H

Gr

G

F

Dk

CR

C

Be

HELENA CARREIRAS

228

forces. But, unlike time, quantitative representation seems to have a positive impact on

women’s rank distribution.

2.2. Military structure and personnel accession policies

Drawing on previous theoretical assumptions (Segal, 1995, 2000) and empirical

findings (Segal, 1999; Haltiner, 1998a, 1998b), this research assumes that military

variables are important determinants of women’s military roles. Characteristics of force

structure are supposed to condition both representation and other more qualitative

variables regarding the process of gender integration in the armed forces (e.g. role

differentiation/segregation).

In order to test this general hypothesis (or better, to check its prevalence for

recent years and for the NATO universe), I have selected, as independent variable, an

indicator pertaining to the organizational format of the military and used as criteria to

define the mass-army character of a force: the conscription ratio (CR – percentage of

conscripts in total active force)

As was seen in Chapter IV, the conscript ratio (CR) has been used as one of the

most significant indicators of the mass-army nature of a military force, in that “the

larger the CR, the more likely a force may be called a mass-army under a structural

perspective” (Haltiner, 1998a: 45). The presumption is that the higher the CR of a

military force, the lower will be the representation of women and their role

differentiation. On the contrary, the lower the CR the higher is expected to be the

percentage of women and the less segregated their occupational distribution.

Results show that there is a negative correlation between the weight of

conscripts in the total active force and the representation of women in the ranks (women

ratio – WR) (R=-.720; Sig. -0.01). This confirms general research findings in this area

that relate the percentage of women and the organizational format: the higher the mass-

army format of a force, the lower is the WR (Figure 5.12).


229

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Figure 5.12 shows that the representation of women is higher in countries that

have voluntary systems of military service or consider transition from conscript to all-

volunteer forces and face actual or potential recruitment shortages. Inversely, countries

based on conscript military systems and no recruitment difficulties tend to have the

lowest representation of women.

Another way of looking into this same relationship is to consider the previously

discussed categorization of military forces proposed by Haltiner (1998a, 1998b), where

countries are divided into four types according to their ‘conscript ratio’: AVF, ‘pseudo-

conscript’, ‘softcore conscript’ and ‘hardcore conscript’. If we focus on the evolution of

women’s military representation, it is possible to see that while all groups of countries

have been increasing their ‘women ratio’, AVF countries have the highest levels of

representation, hardcore-conscript forces the lowest, and there is no relevant difference

between pseudo and soft-core conscript forces.

Percentagewomen2000

1614121086420-2

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40

20

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230

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Note: AVF (US, C, UK, Nl, B, L); Pseudo Conscript (Dk, F, I, G, CR, P); Softcore Conscript (H,S,N,Pl); Hardcore Conscript (Gr, T).

But besides the impact of organizational format on quantitative representation,

that is, on relative numbers, the proposed hypothesis points to a relation between

organizational format and more qualitative indicators such as the diversification of

women’s military roles. Countries with AVF systems of military service are expected to

score higher on variables such as the proposed ‘index of women’s integration’, while

countries categorized as ‘hardcore conscript’ are expected to show the lower scores in

this type of measure.163 Once again, results point to a significant if moderate negative

statistical correlation between both variables: the higher the conscript ratio, the lower

the level of integration (R=-.683; Sig. 0.01).

163 We should of course remember that this synthetic index includes both quantitative and qualitative indicators, including global representation.

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The corresponding scatterplot (Figure 5.14) displays a visual representation of

countries’ relative positions along both dimensions. Those with high conscript ratios

like Turkey, Greece or Poland have the lowest scores in terms of gender integration,

while AVF cases such as the US, UK, Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands show the

best performances of the index. Less clear are the positions of soft-core and pseudo

conscript types. Together with Luxembourg -an exception to the general trend since the

AVF character of its forces coexists with a very modest level of integration- Norway is

a deviant case in that it presents a high percentage of conscripts, while at the same time

scoring high on integration.

In any case, since this greater dispersion was not observed in the correlation

between CR and strict quantitative representation, we must admit that the variable

‘organizational format’ helps explain variation in relative numbers more than it does in

terms of the overall index. This seems to be supported by other results. For instance, if

HELENA CARREIRAS

232

we look at the relation between organizational format (measured through the CR) and

the index of occupational integration – a variable that measures specifically role

diversification, thus more a ‘qualitative’ aspect—, reveals a low negative correlation

between these variables (R=-.431; Sig., 0.05).

In sum, we may conclude that organizational format (measured by the CR) may

be a good predictor of women’s representation but does not seem to influence role

differentiation, one of the crucial elements in the definition of gender-integration in the

armed forces. In the light of this data, we may admit the hypothesis that other external

variables will probably help to better explain the ‘quality’ of the process (the level of

integration). This is the objective of the following section.

2.3. The impact of social-economic and political factors: a selective exploration

Hypotheses concerning the influence of social-economic factors over women’s

military participation stress the impact of global economic conditions and the degree of

women’s economic mobilization on their military roles. According to the empirical

plan drawn in Chapter 1 I propose to test the following two hypotheses: ‘The higher the

affluence of a society, the higher the degree of gender inclusiveness in the armed forces’

and ‘The greater the percentage of women in the labor force, the larger will be their

representation and level of inclusiveness in the armed forces’. In order to explore these

hypotheses, I have opted to select a few independent variables concerning two main

defining dimensions of the broader social context: the level of development of each

society and the specific situation of women in the economic and political spheres. In

both dimensions individual variables as well as composite indexes have been identified.

The first dimension – level of development - is measured through two single

variables: GDP per capita and youth unemployment and a combined measure, UNDP’s

gender-related development index (GDI).164 Likewise, the second dimension –more

directly related to the situation of women— includes two different measures: female

164 GDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the Human Development Index –a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living– adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women. It includes the following indicators: ‘life expectancy at birth’, ‘adult literacy rate’, ‘combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment rate’ and ‘estimated earned income’ (cf. UNDP, 2001: 242-243). It varies between 0 and 1.


233

economic activity rate, and a synthetic measure of participation, UNDP’s gender

empowerment measure (GEM).165

As far as economic and social development is concerned, results show that

levels of youth unemployment do not seem to affect representation of women in the

military, nor the extent to which they have been integrated in the ranks.166 As far as

economic development is concerned (GDPpc), there is a low positive correlation with

the dependent variables: correlation with numeric representation is .402 and with IGI

.499 (both for Sig.=0.05).

However, the more complex gender-related development index (GDI) has a

moderate positive correlation with the index of gender inclusiveness (IGI) (R = .618,

Sig=0.01). The visual representation of this relationship shows that this is especially

true for the set of countries that form a cluster at the upper right end of the diagonal

(Figure 5.15). These are those that score higher on the inclusiveness index (C, USA, Dk,

N, Be, NL and the UK). In fact, in this sub-group the correlation increases to R =.679

(sig. 0.05). If excluded from the analysis, the correlation disappears.

165 GEM is a combined index measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment –economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making and power over economic resources. It includes the following indicators: ‘seats in parliament held by women’, female legislators, senior officials and managers’, ‘female professional and technical workers’ and ‘ ratio of estimated female to male earned income’ (cf. UNDP, 2001: 244-245). It varies between 0 and 1. 166 This does not rule out the hypothesis that there may be a relation between this economic determinant and changes through time concerning the extent to which a country’s armed forces have used female labor force, but this is an hypothesis to be tested against time-series data.

HELENA CARREIRAS

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There are two different situations: countries with high levels of human

development (and a more equal situation between men and women in those indicators)

scoring high on female military integration, and countries where such a relationship

does not hold. The fact that the correlation rose when a gender ‘weighted’ measure was

introduced supports the idea that indicators of the situation of women may be more

helpful to explain variation in integration levels.

If we look at indicators that measure more directly the social and political

participation of women, a surprising result emerges. Against theoretical expectations,

namely contradicting the hypothesis that ‘the greater the percentage of women in the

labor force, the larger will be their representation in the armed forces’, results show

that, for this particular universe, ‘women’s economic activity rate’167 does not affect

their numerical representation in the armed forces (R=.172) nor does it affect

167 For this indicator I have used data for 1999 (the most recent available) from the United Nations Development Report (UNDP, 2001).


235

inclusiveness (IGI) (R= .306).168 Apparently, this result indicates that women’s ‘simple

presence’ or attendance of the system does not seem to be sufficient to influence their

representation or integration levels within the military. In Chapter 1 I have put forward

the idea that ‘the more women have a 'controlling presence'169 in society, the higher is

the level of gender inclusiveness in the military’. In order to test this hypothesis, it is

fundamental to find indicators pertaining to the ‘quality’ of women’s presence in the

social-economic and political arenas.

Among the various possible indicators of women’s ‘qualified’ or ‘controlling’

presence I have opted for using a composite measure of gender inequality: UNDP’s

‘Gender Empowerment Measure’. This measure combines participation and decision-

making indicators in the economic and political spheres as well as an estimate of power

over economic resources (UNDP, 2001: 244-245).

Here again, the data shows no significant relation between gender inequality

(measured by GEM) and relative numbers of women in the military (R=.386). However,

unlike what happens with activity rates, there is a significant correlation between this

participation indicator and gender integration in the military: the higher the GEM (and

thus the more ‘qualified’ the social and political presence of women), the higher is the

inclusiveness index (R=.665; Sig.= 0.01). If, additionally, one of the most deviant cases

is eliminated from the analysis (Germany), the correlation becomes clearly the higher

obtained till now (R= .809), Sig.=0.01) (Figure 5.16).

168 If we use a different source, data for 1999 from the UN Report of World Development on female activity rates, these results are even more accentuated; that is, there is no relation between female activity rate and the two indicators of women’s military presence I have been using. (Act.rate/Percent women: R² = 0.03; Act. Rate/Index of integration: R² =.144). 169 As defined in Chapter III following Jonasdottir, 1990.

HELENA CARREIRAS

236

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This reinforces an underlying distinction in this research: that which exists

between quantitative indicators or the ‘simple presence’ of women, and their ‘qualified’

presence, that is the actual access to a wider set of opportunities and exercise of power.

These two dimensions are frequently collapsed and it is not always clear whether

scholars refer to relative numbers alone or to broader ‘inclusiveness’ dimensions.

Additionally, external variables related to the ‘qualification’ of women’s social and

political participation –more than their economic participation alone— have a crucial

impact on the second dimension (inclusiveness).

3. Concluding remarks

If we consider the various coefficients that have been observed throughout the

previous sections, some conclusions can be highlighted (Table 5.4).


237

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Time Military factors

Social-economic and political factors

Yearstart CR GDPpc Youth Unemployment

GDI Female Activity Rate

GEM

Index of Gender Inclusiveness (IGI)

- .602 -.683

(-.727)*

.499 - .618 - .665

(.809)**

%Women (WR) -.507 -.720 .402 - .534 - -

* Without Luxembourg

** Without Germany

CR – Conscript Ratio; GDPpc – Gross Domestic Product per capita; GDI – Gender-related Development Index; GEM – Gender Empowerment Measure

• Time is not as good as expected as a predictor of women’s representation in the

military: a longer presence of women in the ranks does not imply a consistent

increase in their relative numbers. Although time is positively correlated to some

extent to the overall degree of women’s integration, this only seems to be true for

the group of countries that score higher in integration. Against common beliefs, data

supports the idea that time, by and in itself, does not automatically foster gender

integration, or contribute to eliminate existing discriminations in terms of

occupational or hierarchical de-segregation.

• As far as military related factors are concerned, evidence shows that, as expected, a

specific military factor – the ‘organizational format’ measured by the ‘Conscript

Ratio’ – has a significant relation with inclusiveness and especially with

representation. This means that the more a force relies on volunteer personnel, the

higher is the percentage of women. Inversely, the closer a military is to the mass-

army format (hard-core conscript forces) the lower is female representation.

However, the impact of the ‘Conscript Ratio’ seems to be higher on relative

numbers or hierarchical integration than it is in terms of occupational role

diversification.

• Some ‘external’ variables related to the social-economic and political structures

seem to have a negligible influence over numerical representation of women in the

HELENA CARREIRAS

238

military but a significant impact on their global integration. Still, here one must

distinguish between those factors that concern women’s ‘simple presence’ in the

system, which are not responsible for relevant variation in the qualitative status of

military women, and those referring to women’s ‘qualified’ presence, which instead

seem to influence gender integration to a reasonable extent.

Taken together the results suggest that changes in the organizational format of

the military may foster change in the human landscape of the armed forces, but some

external variables, specifically those concerning women’s ‘qualified’ presence in the

social and political realms have also a significant impact on gender integration.

Even if extrapolating beyond available results, I would hypothesize that change

towards greater gender equality in the armed forces will not occur automatically as a

consequence of time or the increase in relative numbers. It will probably depend much

more on the extent to which external variables, such as women’s ‘controlling’ presence

in society at large will determine policy orientations and decision-making processes

within the armed forces.


239

CHAPTER VI PORTUGAL AND THE NETHERLANDS: MILITARY AND

SOCIAL CONTEXTS

The two countries chosen as case studies, Portugal and the Netherlands, have a

different score in the ‘index of gender inclusiveness’ (11/19 and 14/19 respectively).

These countries have been classified as belonging to different gender incorporation

models: Portugal to the Southern-European model, the ‘moderate inclusiveness’ type,

while the Netherlands was included in the Euro-Atlantic model, also called the

‘advanced/extensive inclusiveness’ type. If the conclusions of the large N analysis are

to be taken seriously, these differences must relate to both military organizational

features and external variables, particularly those concerning women’s social

participation. The objective of the present chapter is exactly that of analyzing and

comparing the two countries along these dimensions. It will also provide the occasion to

investigate the particular ways chosen in each country to accomplish transformation in

the social composition of the armed forces.

1. The military and the challenge of organizational restructuring

As happened throughout the western world after the fall of the Berlin wall, the

90s were a decade of profound changes for the armed forces of Portugal and the

Netherlands. However, these two ex-colonial powers have adjusted to change in

different ways and with different rhythms. In order to set the context for confronting

gender incorporation patterns in each country I shall start by giving a general overview

of military policies and organization, reviewing some of the indicators that have

recently been proposed to analyze change in military organizations (Moskos, Williams

and Segal, 2000). These indicators are organized around three main analytic

dimensions: strategic orientations in defense policy; organizational restructuring and

relations between the military and society.

1.1. Strategic orientations: perception of threat and mission definition

Since the mid-sixties, ‘civilianization’ has been a major trend in the Dutch

armed forces. While Portuguese soldiers were still fighting colonial wars in Angola,

Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, supposedly defending the empire, the Dutch were

HELENA CARREIRAS

240

already starting to change away from the divergent ‘institutional’ model of organization.

Defense policies aiming at a complete integration of the armed forces in society and the

motto ‘as civilian as possible, as military as necessary’ seemed to capture this

orientation (Meulen, 2000: 117). The last decade of the XXth century has produced a

radicalization of this trend. The so-called ‘final professionalization of the military’

(Meulen, 2000) contributed decisively to this ‘blurring’ of the civil-military dichotomy.

As stated by Meulen, “during this time, crucial decisions and painful experiences

changed the Dutch military to a degree unprecedented in the previous forty-five years.”

(Meulen, 2000: 102).

The dilution of the East-West tensions and especially the disintegration of the

Soviet Union led the Netherlands to review its defense interests. The ‘defense white

paper’, published in the spring of 1991, set the basis for a gradual reduction and

restructuring of the Dutch armed forces. In the meantime, the experiences of the Gulf

War, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia, indicated a growing importance of out-of-

area operations, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement missions. After a strong debate,

the Dutch parliament accepted in 1993 a ‘Priorities review note’ redefining military

missions. Two major tasks were defined: crisis management and protection of the

integrity of Dutch and allied territory. The first, referring to the so-called ‘new

missions’ –preventive deployment, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace-

building and even peace-enforcement— became extremely frequent during the 90s and

have since taken the Dutch military all over the world. Unlike Portuguese soldiers, who

only started to deploy internationally after the second half of the decade, at that time

their Dutch counterparts had already developed routines for monitoring elections,

verifying weapons agreements and controlling embargoes. The need for flexible, highly

mobile forces capable of operating all over the world led to the creation of an airmobile

brigade composed exclusively of professional soldiers.

The creation of this new elite unit is, however, associated with an historical

episode that has tragically signaled the role of one of its battalions, the ‘Dutchbat’,

during the UN peacekeeping mission in former Yugoslavia. The fall of Srebrenica in

July 1995 and the tragic fate of 7,000 Moslems killed in what has already been

considered the worst war crime in post-1945 Europe, raised doubts about the

intervention of the battalion, accused of not having done enough to stop the

slaughtering. The importance of this event and its consequences justify the statement


241

that “in writing about the Dutch military during the watershed period after the Cold-

War, one must discuss Srebrenica” (Meulen, 2000: 102). In fact, in its aftermath and in

the context of bitter debate in the Netherlands, support for sending Dutch troops abroad

decreased significantly “if not in the eyes of the public, then certainly among

politicians” (Meulen, 2000: 102). In the wake of Srebrenica, decisions on how, where

and when Dutch troops should be involved in the new missions acquired a new tone:

“lessons learned involve the balancing of ‘narrow’ national security interests against the

ideal of safeguarding a lawful international order. On another level, identification with

and loyalty to the United Nations –traditionally high in the Netherlands– are set against

the necessity of sound military mandates and unambiguous military structures”

(Meulen, 2000:104). The whole situation had significant consequences in terms of

defense policy definition: greater prudence in the acceptance of future missions,

additional emphasis put on the protection of national and allied territory and loss of

consensus about mission definition. There is a general conviction that “another

Srebrenica would no doubt push the military profession into a crisis” (Meulen,

2000:107).

Portugal presents a rather different picture in terms of the two variables at stake,

perception of threat and mission definition. Policy definition on defense issues –as on

all other spheres of social life— has been marked by the two major political-military

developments of the Portuguese modern period: the colonial war between 1961 and

1974 and the democratic revolution that overturned a fifty-year long authoritarian

regime in 1974. Despite the relevance of the military’s role in the process of transition

to democracy,170 their progressive withdrawal from the political scene was accompanied

by a process of objective and subjective marginalization, which has continued until the

present. The Portuguese armed forces reached the end of the century in a particularly

dramatic situation in terms of obsolescence of equipment, absence of strategic

orientation, shrinking budgets and lack of coherent human resource policies.

The lack of clear defense policies has been systematically pointed out and made

clear by the actual absence of an up-dated strategic concept of national defense. Santos

has put it bluntly: “no one knows which perception the Portuguese democratic political

170 There is an extensive bibliography concerning the role of the military in the political transition to democracy in Portugal. Despite its relevance for understanding organizational trends within the military organization, this is a topic that cannot be developed here (cf. Carrilho, 1985; Ferreira, 2001; Schmittter, 1999).

HELENA CARREIRAS

242

power has regarding potential threats. (...) This unusual situation, unique among western

countries, is due to the complete obsolescence of state structure for security and defense

issues” (Santos, 2001: 184). As far as mission definition is concerned, similar criticisms

have been echoed, especially from within the military institution itself. According to

some of these analysts, the nature of military missions that emerges from official

documents seems to be broad enough as to cover any possible situation regarding the

use of military force (Santos, 2001: 185). Santos notes that the result of this ‘strategic

vacuum’ is that the organization, equipment and utilization of military forces are taken

on a case-by-case ad hoc basis, with all the technical and economic problems this

attitude involves. Others underline the inadequacy of existing legal frames and the

perverse effects that a merely reactive (and often delayed) attitude on the part of

political leaders has on the international perception of the Portuguese military (Pinto,

2002: 185).

Notwithstanding such criticisms, it is possible to identify very general trends in

the political definition of defense orientations. Against the opinion of significant sectors

of the Portuguese political and military elites, who endorsed an attitude of isolationism

in the line of the famous ‘collaborating neutrality’ that prevailed during the previous

world conflicts, the participation in international missions became a progressively

important area for military action.171 The need to constitute a force system able to fulfill

Portuguese commitments in NATO and the European Union, as well as to collaborating

in multinational peacekeeping missions, was explicitly stated as a desired objective in

the Portuguese Defense Concept defined in 1994. Portuguese troops had already been

modestly present in UN operations, mainly in Angola and Mozambique,172 but it was

only the participation of a Portuguese contingent in Bosnia in 1996 that signaled a true

change in policy towards what some have referred to as the ‘europeanization’ of

Portuguese defense policy (Vasconcelos, 1999). This experience revealed a growing

public, political and military support for the participation of Portuguese soldiers in

multinational peacekeeping operations (Vasconcelos, 1999; Carrilho; 1999; Carreiras,

1999a).

171 The Portuguese position regarding a possible involvement in the Gulf War has been identified as one good example of this attitude. While supporting the western coalition, Portugal was presented as a ‘non-belligerent’ State.


243

However, old policy dilemmas –synthesized in the ‘Angola or Bosnia’ debate—

became extremely visible during the Kosovo crisis, when the national capacity to

maintain troops simultaneously in more than one operation was severely tested.173 The

ambiguities and lack of strategic definition of Portuguese defense policy emerge thus as

a major source of civil-military tension in a context where growing internationalization

seems to be the unavoidable ‘destiny’ of the Portuguese military.

1.2. Organizational change and the dominant military professional

1.2.1. Force structure: from conscription to the all-volunteer force

The global trend towards force reduction that has generally affected NATO

countries since the early ’90s has also characterized the situation in the two countries

under analysis. As shown in Figure 6.1, both Portugal and the Netherlands have

drastically reduced their personnel pool, even if this reduction has been fostered by

different direct historical and social influences.

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172 Portuguese military observers have integrated various UN missions, but in a very limited way: UNOGIL in Lebanon in 1958, Namibia in 1989, ONOMUZ in Mozambique, UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III and MONUA in Angola. 173 Eventually, this led later to the withdrawal of Portuguese soldiers stationed in the Kosovo region in order to ensure Portuguese military presence in East Timor.

0

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1992

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1994

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1996

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1998

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2000

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HELENA CARREIRAS

244

In the Netherlands, the announced change in mission orientation led to extensive

transformation in force structure. In order to fulfill the new tasks, a drastic restructuring

of the armed forces was announced and ‘downsizing’ became the key objective: plans

where drawn to reduce personnel from 128,550 in 1990 to 75,200 in 2002. The

projected decrease of 40% overall by 2000 in what had been a standing mass-army

during the Cold War, produced a loss of legitimacy of conscription, since it would be

virtually impossible to fairly distribute the burden of the draft. “Calling up a minority of

draftees could be justified under the conditions of threat that the cold-war entailed.

Continuing with this policy in the new international context could no longer be

legitimized,” pointed out Meulen (2000: 105). This loss of legitimacy would happen for

two main reasons: first, because the number of conscript soldiers would shrink even

further; second, because worldwide crisis-management would be felt (by politicians and

by the public opinion) as a task to be developed by well trained and immediately

deployable soldiers –and not by conscripts.

In 1993, the government decided to suspend conscription, becoming one of the

first countries in continental Europe to take that decision. Although the initial

suspension date was set at January 1st 1998, since August 1996 the armed forces of the

Netherlands have consisted exclusively of volunteers (Figure 6.2).174

The Portuguese way into professionalization has been much slower. From the

beginning of the 1990s, a slow but clear –albeit conflictual– tendency has developed

towards professionalization. Plans to change from conscription into an all-volunteer

system of military service were drawn up. The approval in 1991 of Law No. 22/91 (a

revision of the military service law of 1987) was an important step in the direction of

‘professionalization’. A semi-professional system was created, based on volunteer and

short-term contract regimes. New volunteer members were expected to progressively

replace the pool of conscript soldiers. Two main changes were introduced: 1) reduction

of the time of conscript service from the previous 12/15 months in the army and 18/20

months in the navy and air force to a mere four-month period;175 2) creation of new

short-term regimes for ‘voluntary’ and ‘contract’ service. The first, lasting between 8

174 Conscription is not explicitly ruled out. Formally it has been suspended, not abolished. Conscripts constitute the bulk of the reserve force but they will be called to duty only in extraordinary circumstances (Meulen, 2000: 106). 175 Service is extendible, in exceptional circumstances, to 8 months in the army and 12 months in the navy and air force.


245

and 18 months, is a precondition to application for a ‘contract’ term of service which

varies from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 8 years.

Both measures are to be understood in the context of the first significant

transformation of the Portuguese armed forces after the end of the colonial war in terms

of personnel reduction and global re-dimensioning. From 1989 to 1998 there was in fact

a reduction of 39% in the total force, corresponding to a decrease from 72,085 to 44,200

service members. There were two main reasons for this: a reduction in the number of

conscript soldiers (Figure 6.2) and a similar reduction of career personnel from the

Permanent Structure (QP). The objective of this last measure was to achieve a re-

equilibrium of the hierarchic pyramid, which had become completely distorted after the

end of the colonial war.176

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Note: Conscript Ratio = Percentage of conscripts in total active force. The increase in Portuguese values in 1992 is explained by the reduction of time of conscript service to 4 months and the corresponding increase in the number of annual enlistment.

The reduction of conscription time to 4 months was one of the first indications

of a shift towards what was referred to, in the law as well as in other documents and

promotional material, as “a new conception of military service”, based on the key-

176 The hierarchic pyramid was almost inverted, with an excess of personnel in the higher ranks and a clear deficit in the lower officers’ ranks. Because colonels were the most affected by this legislation (many of them were forced into compulsory retirement) it came to be known as ‘the Colonels’ law’ (DL 202/93).

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60,0

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1990

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1994

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1998

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2000

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Portugal

HELENA CARREIRAS

246

concepts of modernization and professionalization. However, the most important

element of the model was the second measure: the introduction of special recruitment

regimes of a voluntary nature. Under the new framework, after three to four months of

basic training (SEN), volunteer soldiers could serve for a period of up to 18 months –the

voluntariado regime– and then apply for a fixed-term contract– the contrato regime. A

set of economic incentives was established in order to make these new regimes

attractive to young people. These included vocational orientation, access to education,

professional training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits and support

for re-integration into civilian life after the end of the contract.

Notwithstanding its initial ambitions, the model began to show signs of major

weaknesses soon after being implemented. Highly critical reactions were felt, especially

among certain military sectors: “after a rather turbulent process (…) only by miracle it

was possible to organize and keep, specially in the Army, operational units and mobilize

them to distant operations’ theatres” (Santos, 2001: 188). It is curious to note that a

similar solution of radical reduction of conscription time had been considered in the

Dutch case. This alternative, however, was rapidly eliminated since its costs were

thought to be prohibitive and the strategic relevance of a mass of reservists barely

trained seemed very questionable (Meulen and Manigart, 1997: 321). But even

Portuguese political authorities would later recognize the fragility of the model,

considered to be excessively costly and operationally inefficient.177

Despite these drawbacks, the trend towards ‘professionalization’ intensified

throughout the decade and the constitutional reference to conscription was eliminated in

177 The following problems have been indicated (MDN, 1998: 1) in terms of cost-efficiency, it was considered excessively costly because it required the co-existence of two separate recruitment systems; 2) it was also considered operationally inefficient due to its short duration, producing a large contingent of “ill-trained” soldiers, with “dubious usefulness”; 3) due to organizational difficulties and lack of infrastructure, only a limited percentage of fit recruits were being admitted. This had been the case throughout the 1980s (and even before), but between 1992 and 1998 the admission rate decreased continually from 52% to 31%; the system was therefore seen as impeding equal treatment and fairness, since only a few of the sum of able citizens were actually recruited; 4) conscript soldiers had to be used by extending their four-month period to make up for the lack of candidates for the ‘voluntariado’ regime, which in theory was to consist solely of volunteer soldiers; a notable number of conscript soldiers were also being used for short periods in general services that did not require a military specialization. This was later recognized as affecting “the sense of usefulness of the armed forces” and as frustrating for young people’s career aspirations; 5) finally, the system created instability, as a result of the continual rotation of conscript soldiers. Nevertheless, it was recognized that the system assured the transition from the old conscript model to a more versatile system and that it would lead to adoption of various measures concerning the reorganization of the armed forces: “It was a political decision, which, by allowing the institution of a mixed system, has helped the creation of a new model of armed forces based on an all-volunteer force” (MDN, 1998: 7).


247

1997. Finally, in 1999 a new military service law established what may be seen as the

most challenging measure in the reorganization process: the establishment of an all-

volunteer force in peacetime, to be completed by 2004 after a four-year transition

period.

In both countries, personnel reduction had different impacts on each of the three

services, affecting particularly the army (Figure 6.3). Given its heavier territorial

structure, this service is more dependent on large contingents of complementary

personnel. Simultaneously, due to its technical specificity, the qualifications required by

the army are probably those that have the least interest or equivalents in the labor

market, thus making it less attractive for young people concerned about their return to

civilian life after relatively short periods in the ranks. In the Netherlands one fourth of

non-commissioned army officers alone had to leave, and in Portugal it is also in the

Army that the situation is considered more problematic in view of the projected

reforms.

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The Portuguese army has to face additional problems due to its major

dependency on conscript personnel. In 2000, while the air force did not have conscripts

and only a small percentage of navy personnel came from the conscript group, the army

still relied extensively on conscription to fulfill its personnel needs. In 2000 the

‘professionalization ratio’ was already 100% in the air force, while conscript soldiers

still accounted for 25.4% of the army.

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

70000

80000

1980/81 1985/86 1990/91 1995/96 2000/01

Army Netherlands

Army Portugal

Navy Netherlands

Navy Portugal

Air Force Netherlands

Air Force Portugal

HELENA CARREIRAS

248

1.2.2. Recruitment problems and solutions

Although force reductions and professionalization raised similar problems in the

two countries, different approaches were chosen to solve them. In the Netherlands, there

was much concern over possible recruitment shortages during the transition years. Until

1996, the results were quite successful, with over 90% of positions fulfilled “without

concessions in respect to quality” (Dekker, 1998: 7), but in 1997, the first post-draft

year, difficulties made themselves felt, especially within the combat arms affected by a

strong shortfall of volunteers. In the words of a senior officer at the Ministry of Defense

“This brought about a shock effect. We learned very quickly that the transition to

professional armed forces means fundamental change in all elements of the

organization” (Dekker, 1998: 7). As a consequence, a set of measures was taken to

improve the position of the Dutch armed forces on the labor market on a structural

basis. Critical success factors have been identified and implemented: the recruitment

process (expansion of inter-service recruitment centers); duration of contracts (adapting

the length of contracts to the preference of candidates, making them ‘as flexible as

possible’); employers’ image (intensive media campaigns); education: new education

training centers have been opened aiming at giving short contract personnel an

opportunity to obtain certificates to enhance their future employability. At the same

time, at the end of their contract, personnel are put in contact with civil employers and

institutions. This emphasis on education aimed at both restricting the armed forces’

expenses with unemployment benefits178 and assuring the political and social legitimacy

of a system that takes in large quantities of young people for a short period of time.

Finally, a labor market monitor system has been developed in order to review the supply

and demand on the labor market at regular intervals: “by anticipating labor market

developments we are trying to gain and maintain a strategic advantage over our

competitors” (Dekker, 1998: 12).

In the context of a favorable external economy, continued recruitment and

retention difficulties during the decade have pushed even further this policy orientation.

In 2000, these concerns were translated into renewed policy orientations towards

effective staffing policy: offering external job security when leaving the service, new

media and communication campaigns, support for pre-recruitment physical training

178 In 1998, the Dutch armed forces succeeded in re-employing practically all departing short-contract personnel (Dekker, 1998: 11).


249

programs, reduction of ‘initial wastage’179 by reducing excessive waiting times between

selection operations and actual enlistment, reinforcing the relationship between living

and working in the same region, clarifying posting and job-allocation for fixed-term

contractors; combining work and care tasks and finally paying specific attention to

women in the organization (Hoof, 2000).

In Portugal, the present transition into an all-volunteer force raises similar

concerns. In view of such a profound change in force structure and personnel accession

policies, there is a fear that serious recruitment and retention problems will emerge.

This fear is exacerbated because of a generally accepted failure of the social-economic

incentive system that ought to have been established following the ‘91 legislation, but

which in fact was never adequately developed. Complementary regulatory legislation

was never issued for many of the proposed measures. This is seen as partially

accounting for the failure in attracting the necessary number of candidates, especially in

the army. In 2000, there was a deficit of around 8,000 soldiers in this service,

corresponding to half of its needs in terms of enlisted personnel (Santos, 2001: 188). It

is thus not surprising that the army has shown greater resistance to the introduction of

the all-volunteer force and posed more obstacles to proposed changes during discussion

of the law. According to MoD sources, the process will consequently move more slowly

than initially expected, namely in terms of the reform of command structures,

centralization of resources and inter-service recruitment coordination.

This may constitute a real obstacle, since centralization is presented as one of the

basic principles of the new model: “The all-volunteer model requires a recruitment

structure able to respond efficiently to the need to attract young citizens to serve in the

military, to prepare and keep them for periods that simultaneously meet the armed

forces’ standards and assure their later integration in civilian life. This requires a

concentration of efforts and is definitely not compatible with decentralized systems at

the branch level” (MDN, 1998: 11).

Besides centralization at the organizational level, various measures have been

proposed with respect to the challenge of professionalization, especially the need to

attract sufficient numbers of qualified personnel. First, and probably the most important

axis of the model, there is a renewed policy of socio-economic incentives, including all

179 Applicants leaving in the period between the conclusion of the selection procedure and the actual call-up.

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250

those previously programmed –vocational orientation, access to education, professional

training, social security, financial allowances, fringe benefits, return to civilian life after

the end of the contract– and some additional measures concerning preferential treatment

of ex-soldiers in public programs and institutions. Second, there is an emphasis on the

public relations dimension of recruitment policy. Third, there is a possible rise in the

proportion of civilian personnel and of women.

However, despite the announced intentions, skeptical evaluations concerning the

real possibilities to implement this model are common: “a safeguard clause is kept

according to which the government may use conscription in case the number of

volunteers is not enough to fulfill military needs. We shall see whether there will be the

courage to activate this clause, since it is almost sure that it will have to be done”

(Santos, 2001: 188).

1.2.3. Organizational identification: institutional, occupational and ‘postmodern’ trends

The professionalization process and the occupational turbulence it generated

have significantly accentuated the ‘civilianization’ trend in the Dutch armed forces. As

noted by van der Meulen, “no matter how tactful, responsible, or even generous any

negotiated policy is with respect to the shrinking numbers, such a process cannot fail to

influence overall organizational identification [which] will tend to become more

occupational than institutional” (Meulen, 2000: 108). Various factors have emphasized

this occupational orientation throughout the decade. First, the need for recruitment

appeals for short-term soldiers to become attractive in the labor market forced the

development of a social policy network including contracting with civilian employers

and commercial outplacement organizations to guarantee the placement in the labor

market of both redundant soldiers and those finishing their contracts. Second, the

individualization of career patterns, namely the move away from collective promotions,

and the flexibility of work contracts became a crucial element in staffing and human

resource management policies. Third, large trade unions, representing 80% of defense

personnel, acquired growing influence. Even if not able to prevent involuntary

dismissals, military unions combining frequently with their civilian counterparts have

today a great impact in negotiating salaries and career-related issues.


251

Overall, there seems to be a consensus over the idea that “the Netherlands is

crossing a historical threshold (…). [Professionalization] along with military

unionization, acceptance of homosexuals, placement of women in combat assignments

and a strong commitment to peacekeeping missions – would seem to have launched the

Dutch armed forces well into Postmodernity” (Moskos, Williams and Segal, 2000: 9).

However, even if it is clear that the Dutch military are resembling more and more other

large-scale organizations in their unprecedented move toward cost-effectiveness, some

aspects, however, seem to underline ‘institutional’ features. The character and

frequency of new missions, as well as the “deep soulsearching on the utility of the

military” in the wake of Srebrenica seem to point in that direction. Accordingly, van der

Meulen stressed that some shifting lines typical of divergence should not be overlooked,

and raised the question of whether “such postmodern state of affairs is not another

indication of the marginalization of the military (…). In terms of presence, purpose,

priorities (regarding non-military issues) and budget (a 20% reduction between 1990

and 2000), such marginalization can be considered the real macro-trend following the

end of the mass-army” (Meulen, 2000: 118).180

In Portugal, similar structural forces are at play, even if trends are less clear,

outputs more ambiguous and the rhythm of change slower and more conservative. The

move in 1991 towards a semi-professional model was accompanied by a clearly

‘occupational’ campaign, including television spots and other promotional initiatives.

Military service was presented as an opportunity for professional development and as an

instrument for self-fulfillment. Although more ‘institutional’ values were not totally

absent from the recruitment appeal, the rationale behind the arguments used was

predominantly ‘occupational’: “the proposed legal model aims at raising awareness

among young people about military service as a demanding professional activity (…)

countervailing the inconvenience of its short duration with appropriate stimulus to the

reinsertion of the citizen in active civilian life” (MDN, n.d.).

However, the above-described ‘occupational’ orientation proved to be more

intense in its discursive and symbolic dimensions than in organizational reality since, as

180 However, as also noted for the Portuguese case, we may admit that this kind of ‘marginalization’ has constituted a general trend in those countries that have shifted from conscript armies to all-volunteer forces during the last decade. It is still to be seen whether the events of September 11th in he USA, or in Iraq, will not invert this trend, namely by amplifying the visibility of the military and the redefinition of military tasks.

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noted above, measures aimed at materializing this orientation were not successful and

initial plans to overall modernization and re-equipment were also not fulfilled. Various

other indicators point to the dominance of conservative institutional forces while

simultaneously marking strong differences between Portugal and the Netherlands in

terms of their armed forces’ openness to society.

One of these indicators refers to professional representation and military trade-

unionism. As noted before, in the Netherlands the existence and growing influence of

military trade unions, consulting with their civilian counterparts, is a consolidated

reality. On the contrary, in 2000, all types of military trade unionism were still

prohibited in the Portuguese armed forces, and the National Defense Law imposed an

extremely restrictive frame in terms of civic and political rights on military personnel.

After more than one decade during which various associations for representation of

professional interests have been born (Carrilho, 1994: 162-166), several changes were

introduced in the Law in order to eliminate some of the existing restrictions, namely in

terms of freedom of expression and association. However, this has been considered a

very limited accomplishment both by the media and various military sectors (Santos,

2001:195), since these newly stated rights refer exclusively to the

professional/deontological sphere and still exclude all types of unionism or political

involvement.

The aspects where such conservative ‘institutional’ forces are more obvious are

those related to cultural attitudes towards social diversity, namely sexual orientation.

While, as shall be seen further on, reactions to the innovation of women soldiers have

not revealed strong resistances, the issue of homosexuality is still a taboo in the

Portuguese Military, as much as it is in society at large. Existing regulations do not

make any reference to the problem of sexual diversity and the actual practice has been

that of discreetly excluding homosexuals that explicitly indicate their sexual orientation.

Besides, as noted by Santos, “if there is knowledge that a certain service member is

homosexual, he risks being excluded and marginalized (…), which may lead to an

attitude of voluntary dismissal equivalent to a de-facto punishment” (2001: 194).

From the point of view of professional identities there is also some ambivalence.

Data from survey analysis collected throughout the decade confirm the relative growth

of ‘occupational’ orientations among specific categories of military personnel, but also

the fact that ‘institutional’ orientations have kept a relative predominance. A


253

representative survey of the Portuguese officer corps, conducted by Carrilho in 1990,

showed that ‘occupational’ motivations were dominant among Air Force officers, while

Army and Navy personnel still endorsed more clearly ‘institutional’ values. In any case,

Carrilho notes that at this stage a ‘plural’ model was dominant in the Portuguese armed

forces (Carrilho, 1994: 152). At the end of the decade, another survey to soldiers who

participated in the IFOR and SFOR missions in Bosnia showed a mixed picture

(Carreiras, 1999d). Not only were institutional orientations still dominant among

officers but also new, ‘post-modern’ motivations emerged with notable intensity.181

In this survey some questions dealt with professional identity, namely those

regarding motivations to join the military. Results pointed to a considerable weight of

‘institutional’ (‘paleomodern’) factors, that is, factors associated with the traditional

culture, values and objectives of the military –with emphasis on aspects such as service

to the nation or ‘esprit-de-corps’– as well as on the more self-centered factors (‘post-

modern’) such as ‘search for adventure’ or ‘personnel test’. Enlisted personnel tended to

choose these last items in higher percentage, whereas officers and NCO’s stressed more

the institutional factor ‘serve my country’.

1.3. Public attitudes towards the military

The aforementioned transformations concerning the armed forces, namely the

end of the draft, force reduction, and involvement in peacekeeping missions, have

usually been backed by considerable majorities of public opinion in the two countries.

In the Netherlands, public opinion turned around in a very short time: at the end of 1989

a majority still favored conscription; at the end of the ’90s there was a balance between

those favoring and those opposing the draft; in the spring of 1991 a slight majority

supported an all-volunteer force and by the end of 1992 this majority had grown to 70%

(Meulen and Manigart, 1997: 322). In Portugal, according to recent national surveys,

public opinion has slowly but clearly shifted to support a totally voluntary system of

military service. In 1996 about two thirds of the population supported an all-volunteer

force, versus 31.5% who still preferred conscription (Carrilho, 1998). The same

proportions held in 1999 (Matos and Bacalhau, 2001: 93).

181 However, one should be cautions regarding the possibility of generalizing results, since not only was this a very special group of soldiers, but also the context was relatively unique. Various domestic and international factors may impact on motivations but, as noted by Isernia and Lanzieri, “the specific conditions of each mission – its interest, emotion or routine – influences decisively the social construction of peacekeeping and stresses the ad hoc character of each experience” (Isernia and Lanzieri, 1999: 203).

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Likewise, participation in peacekeeping missions has been generally welcomed.

In the Netherlands the new roles of the military have received considerable public

support. Even if in the immediate wake of Srebrenica, public morale had been boosted

by the international community’s more aggressive stance, one month after its fall

support for staying in had recovered182. Apparently, as noted by van der Meulen, “the

ambivalence and prudence toward new missions, which have influenced political

decision-making to some degree, have not affected the general public” (Meulen, 2000:

114) However, the author recognizes the existence of latent structural strains which

have the potential to erode public support and the new legitimacy of the military. One

refers to the limited tolerance for casualties –if there were to be many— and the second

to political and military reluctance to deploy ground forces to risky and violent settings.

In any case, “public attitudes in the 1990s, and not only in opinion pools, could be

labeled pragmatic, with an undercurrent of idealism. The most severe test so far –the

deployment of troops in Bosnia– showed that public opinion does not simply turn

negative when things go bad and that the public can tolerate at least some casualties”

(Meulen, 2000: 114).

In Portugal, as seen above, political and military leaders have been rather

conservative regarding the international involvement of the military. However, from the

moment Portuguese troops were deployed to IFOR mission in Bosnia, positions started

to change, moving towards a clearer will to participate in post-Cold-War military

missions. Not only were the armed forces willing to intervene internationally, but

already in 1993, public opinion was also favorable to an European operation in the

Balkans. In 1996 more than 2/3 of the Portuguese public supported the country’s

participation in the IFOR mission.

The presence of Portuguese soldiers in Bosnia became one of the major media

events in the country and contributed to an increasing visibility of the Balkan conflict.

In fact, after the deployment the media started to give much more attention to the

situation in Bosnia. Between January and August of 1996, 25 newspaper, radio and

182 This finding is puzzling. According to Rene Moelker, a Dutch military sociologist consulted on this issue, people did not believe anymore in a succesful ending of the mission UNPROFOR, but support recovered because, under NATO, the Rules of Engagement (ROE’s) changed and ‘muscular’ intervention became possible. There was no trial but a very intensive parliamentary enquete, which ended in the spring of 2003 and provoked significant changes in political decision-making. Empirical data shows that politicians became more prudent in their decisions prior to deployment, but the whole affair did not influence public opinion’s support for missions abroad.


255

television channels kept 150 permanent reporters in Bosnia. During the first months,

soldiers had many reasons to complain and their complaints were immediately recorded

in the journalist’s reports. The absence of previous experience in this type of mission

and above all the bad weather conditions (previous participation had always taken place

in Africa) resulted in various difficulties of installation and inadequate equipment. More

than other national contingents, Portuguese troops had to adapt to the new European

scenario. The novelty of the whole experience resulted in an unprecedented attention

and support given to the armed forces and the military’s new missions.

2. Patterns and policies of gender integration183

2.1. The recruitment of women: historical and legal frameworks

Women have served in the Dutch armed forces since 1944 when some two

hundred women integrated the first Dutch Women’s Corps (VHK) created in the United

Kingdom during World War II (23 December 1943). The corps aided evacuees, assisted

with food distribution and took part in the organizing of the transportation of children.

After the War the VHK remained as a reservoir of administrative personnel (Bolscher

and Megens, 1991: 180). From 1944 through the 1980s, there were three separate

women’s corps: MARVA (Navy),184 MILVA (Army) and LUVA (Air Force). Within

these corps, women fulfilled jobs in administration, signal units, medical corps, service

corps, transport units, fighter control and air-traffic control. Although the corps had

military status, separate rules and restricting terms of employment related to education,

career potential and dismissal from the service in case of marriage or pregnancy were

created. The work of women was considered to be temporary and supporting: “In

advertisements to recruit women for the corps it was said, ‘the only weapons of the

female soldier, her accuracy and charm –weapons we should call “disarming”’ and

‘here women are not trained in readiness to fight but to fulfill a useful function’”

(Richardson and Bosh, 1999: 134).

183 Information analysed in this section was obtained from bureaucratic sources and interviews with policy-makers in each country (cf. Appendix 7.2 – List of interviewees). 184 The MARVA was established in 1944 in view of a predictable men shortage during the so-called ‘liberation of the Dutch Indies’. Women were recruited with the slogan ‘Free a man for the fleet’. In 1948 the corps strength was of about 700 women, employed in the administrative section, as cooks, tailors and drivers (Bolchser and Megens, 1991: 180).

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The ‘real’ integration process began in 1978 when women were allowed to enter

all military institutes and military training centers, except the Royal Naval College, Den

Helder, which remained closed until 1983; from January 1979 on, they were assigned to

various arms and branches of the three services. Some consider that this decision to

allow men and women to take part on an equal base in the Dutch military has put the

Netherlands in a unique position in the world, even if conscription for women was

considered not opportune (Bolscher and Megens, 1991: 180-181). In 1982, all separate

women’s corps were disbanded and from this moment on women were given the same

contracts, submitted to the same training and supposed to have the same rights and

obligations as their volunteer male colleagues. In 2000, more than 4,000 women

represented 7.7% of the total military force in the country.

The Portuguese armed forces also had a pioneer historical experience with

female soldiers. They were recruited for the first time in 1961185, with the creation of an

all-female corps in the air force. These first women were trained as parachutists with the

mission of providing nursing assistance during the war in Portugal’s overseas territories

in Africa and served in combat areas in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau during

the 13-year colonial conflict. Notwithstanding the fact that they participated in difficult

rescue missions in combat areas, their position was still exceptional. For not only were

they placed in a separate corps and limited to support roles, but they also had a

particular outlook on their participation in the war. One of these nurses later declared: “I

went overseas to help those who needed me, never to participate in a war. I was given a

gun for personal defense, but I never used it. Besides, our vision was very different”

(Reis, 1978).

In addition, the whole experience may be considered rather limited, since no

more than 50 nurses graduated during the whole period and at the end of the war only

16 of them remained on active duty. Moreover, the immediate interruption of female

recruitment after the end of the war brings the Portuguese case into the historically

dominant pattern: recruitment of women during war periods, followed by their

‘dismissal’ and return to traditionally female occupations at the end of the conflict.

More than two decades later, the situation had changed dramatically. Following

the general European trend, even if with some delay, the Portuguese armed forces

185 A dozen nurses had already participated in the Portuguese expeditionary corps during WW I, but that was a very exceptional situation.


257

opened their ranks to women. In 1988, two young women were accepted by the Air

Force Academy for careers as pilots, and henceforth the three services gradually

allowed women into their various establishments, including service academies, without

rank restrictions.

Portuguese women found this an attractive opportunity. During the years of

1992 and 1993 about 3,500 candidates applied for the army, navy and air force.186

Indeed, the number of female candidates has always been much higher than the number

of those actually enlisted, and in 2000 almost 3,000 women were serving as volunteers

in the Portuguese armed forces, in a wide variety of services and positions.

2.1.1. ‘Ex-post pragmatism’: the Portuguese way towards gender integration in the military

In Portugal, at the beginning of the 1990s, there were no policy documents that

concretely referred to women’s recruitment as an element of the new semi-professional

context. However, the political conditions and the organizational atmosphere were

already there, favoring women’s presence in the ranks or at least ensuring the absence

of serious resistance. This must explain why no obstacles were placed in the way of the

two women who, in 1988, ‘knocked at the Air Force Academy door’ and were

welcomed despite the absence of specific legislation. According to senior officers in the

Air Force Academy, the law subsequently had to be changed to conform to reality.

However, the whole process developed unplanned, in a markedly contingent

way. Not only was there a total absence of previous preparatory studies,187 but even

policymakers admit that a true policy definition was lacking and that decisions were

being made on an ‘ad-hoc’ basis. Indeed, they were frequently also made on an ‘ex-

post’ basis, that is, a merely reactive attitude on the part of the services prevailed when

dealing with the most immediate concerns involving the presence of women: uniforms,

logistics, physical tests, pregnancy, maternity, etc. One of the most obvious examples of

this ‘pragmatic’ approach was the way decisions were taken on the functions and

occupational areas that should be open to women. Practical considerations (even if

accompanied by somewhat obscure justifications such as ‘easiness of women’s

186 The exact numbers were the following: 1204 for the army, 662 for the navy and 1557 for the air force. 187 Apart from some short prospective essays written by officers in the framework of promotion courses in military institutes, there was only one sociological study at this time: Carrilho 1990.

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integration’) explained, above all other reasons, the initial selection of support areas

(Carreiras, 1997a). Very often the number of available posts for women or even their

access to certain functions was exclusively determined by circumstantial and material

conditions, such as the existence of adequate accommodation or sanitary facilities.

Curiously, the same dominant pattern would explain the rather surprising lifting in 1996

of all previous formal interdictions on women’s access to combat arms in the army.

According to the testimony of an officer responsible for policy definition at the Army

Academy, the bar was removed after a woman cadet was admitted to the military

Academy’s artillery course. Once again, the law had to be changed accordingly.

Despite the almost anecdotal element of these reports, ‘ex-post pragmatism’

seems to have worked out extraordinarily well. The various services have demonstrated

a notable capacity to adjust to the new situation and to rapidly find adequate solutions.

This may account for both the smooth start of the process and the subject’s ‘eclipse’

from public and political attention just a few years later. All three branches gradually

opened to women –the air force being the absolute pioneer and the navy the most

cautious– including all military academies and schools. Except for some areas of the

navy –maneuvers, diving and the marine corps– women are formally accepted in every

military specialty. However, combat areas have never in practice been opened to female

personnel.

Presently, in the context of the transition to a voluntary system, the need to

recruit women was for the first time included as a relevant goal in official discourse. A

significant increase in the number of women is considered an important element for

success of the new model and a target of 8 to 10% women has been set: “The voluntary

enlistment of women in the armed forces will considerably enlarge the recruitment pool

and the number of women in service is likely to grow. The incorporation of women and

their participation in units deployed abroad has been a success; this reveals great

possibilities for the future. It is thus foreseeable that the existing female contingent,

which represents around 5% of active duty personnel, will grow to 8% to 10% of the

total force” (MDN, 1998: 14). Politicians apparently became aware of the importance of

recruiting women to meet the needs of the future all-volunteer force. The instrumental

nature of this decision is clear in the legal text, which focuses explicitly and exclusively

on the functional aspects of women’s participation. Concerns about citizenship are still

absent from the political discourse. One decision illustrates this well.


259

Among the innovations of the new military Service Law, one specific measure

aims to strengthen the relationship between citizens and the armed forces: the institution

of a ‘National Defense Day’. According to art. 11 of Law 174/99, at the age of 18 all

young people must attend a one-day program where they will be provided information

about national defense objectives, the organization, missions and resources of the armed

forces, and the existing possibilities in terms of military service. Attendance is

compulsory with only two exceptions –the case of prolonged sickness or residence

abroad. Penalties are to be applied to those who do not comply. However, rather

astonishingly, regulatory legislation in practice exempts women from this obligation

through somewhat obscure legal rhetoric.188 According to a source in the Ministry of

Defense, only economic considerations justify this paradoxical decision. Once more,

instrumental considerations overcome political principles and the proverbial double

standard is kept.

The bottom line is that women seem to be seen, as in so many other similar

situations, as a kind of labor-force reserve that the armed forces had to mobilize to deal

with a current or anticipated lack of qualified personnel available on the job market. A

series of questions thus remains to be answered: will the new socio-economic incentive

schemes –in the presumption that these will be effectively applied– be enough to attract

young women as well as young men? If this is so, and admitting an eventual lack of

male candidates, to what extent will policymakers wish to raise female percentages in

the total force? How much will the cultural/political rationale for setting ceilings (even

if not explicitly recognized as such) lose ground to the more instrumental imperatives of

necessity? Above all, knowing that the number of female candidates has been high in

the past, a crucial question would be whether these incentives are enough to retain

women in the military. Are they likely to provide adequate answers to the type of

problems and difficulties women usually face inside the armed forces? Given that no

specific family policies have been elaborated, no monitoring or mentoring programs

instituted and no clear policy on sexual harassment drawn up, the answer is most likely

negative.

188 While the exemption of women is not directly stated, the regulation exempts from the National Defense Day all those who have not been submitted to military registration, which is the case of women.

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2.1.2. The Netherlands: a NATO test-case towards gender integration

Unlike Portugal, the Netherlands has always had a pro-active attitude regarding

the presence of women in the armed forces. Two major factors have motivated this

policy attitude: on the one hand, the influence of social and political pressures towards

gender equality which were felt in society at large; on the other, military recruitment

needs following the move to an all-volunteer force. From the beginning of the

integration process in the late ’70s, and unlike other NATO countries where combat

reservations were clearly stated, no combat jobs were formally closed to women.

Bolscher and Megens have hypothesized that, for this reason, the Dutch army may have

been used by NATO as a test case for the integration of women in the military

(Bolscher and Megens, 1991: 181).

These authors also believe that “a lack of manpower, or the more technical way

of fighting, reasons which in other countries contributed to the growing part of women

in the military, did not have a decisive influence on Dutch policy makers. (…) The

integration was introduced mainly for political motives and was more or less forced on

the military (…). The decision to integrate women was mainly a political decision, one

which many men and women in the military itself were not very pleased with. Many

prejudices against women and doubts concerning the integration policy were expressed”

(Bolscher and Megens, 1991: 181/182). This is reported by one of the interviewees in

this study, one of the first women to join the army military academy in the early ‘80s:

“In the beginning of the 80s it was a political fact that male officers did not want

women in the army and they had statements such as ‘you’re here just because

politicians wanted. (…) If we had the choice it would only be male soldiers in the

army.’189 However, even if military related factors might not have exerted a direct

influence at the start, they very soon became of an overriding importance in determining

policies concerning military women, when recruitment difficulties began to be felt.

During the first decades of integration, maybe because “the cultural

development lagged behind” (Richardson and Bosch, 1999: 134) and some ‘practical’

problems also remained concerning adaptation of barrack and ship accommodation and

the apposition of physical requirements, which often women could not fulfill, “the

interest of women in the army seemed to diminish more than to increase” (Bolscher and

189 Interview HA1 (cf, Appendix7.2).


261

Megens, 1991: 181). As a result, the first emancipation memorandum ‘Women in the

armed forces’ was issued, stressing the importance of cultural change, which was

needed to train men and women in a dominantly male environment. “In the light of the

idea that affirmative action would stimulate the integration of women, all services

formulated plans of this kind in 1989” (Richardson and Bosch, 1999: 134). The attempts

to facilitate women’s access to the military were different for the various services. The

Navy decided on a large experiment with women in jobs on ships (Guns, 1985) and the

land forces distinguished all jobs according to their physical demands, within functional

groups.

As a result of the transition from a conscript system of military service to an all-

volunteer force the conditions for access, training and career progression became similar

for both sexes and women acquired the same formal rights, duties and possibilities as

their male counterparts. However, this formally gender-neutral integration policy did

not lead to a great increase in the number of women in the military. Despite the fact that

the Ministry of Defense had set a target of 8% of women to be reached in 1993,

recruitment difficulties made it impossible to reach that figure. Progress reports in the

early nineties showed that women were not interested in military jobs, and this was

considered to be due to various reasons: the image of the defense organization, being an

organization only with men, the lack of technical education among women and physical

overload during basic training (Richardson and Bosch, 1999). In 1994, that goal of 8%

was postponed to 1996 but still had not been met at the end of the decade.

This situation started to raise major concerns due to a growing shortage of

qualified personnel, and female recruitment was considered vital in the constitution of

the AVF: “Whereas in the past the integration of women was mainly a matter of desired

cultural change, a situation has now come about in which the armed forces have to adapt

more and gear themselves more towards women within the operational and

organizational possibilities provided to that end by the organization” (MoD, 1997: 3).

In addition, the acknowledgement of the disappointing rate at which

emancipation was being attained, gave origin to the publication in 1997 of a ‘Policy

Letter on Equal Opportunities within the Defense Organization’, aiming at applying to

the armed forces the same framework on equal opportunities policy established for the

general Dutch society by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In this

document, a recruitment goal of 12% was set for 2010. To achieve this goal, the

HELENA CARREIRAS

262

services were aiming at a recruitment figure of 20% women with fixed-term contract

per recruitment batch. A new emphasis on social diversity and the conciliation of work

and care set the basis of this new policy approach. Different measures concerning

physical training, conciliation of work and care, acceptance, attitude and image, were

announced and regularly up-dated from then on.

As far as physical standards are concerned, several studies were conducted in

order to optimize training efforts in relation to functional requirements. VERGO

(Women and Ergonomics) pilot projects were completed in 1999 on new ergonomic

design of tasks and equipment to reduce physical requirements without diminishing

operational readiness. The results were reported successful since they “proved that

procedures and equipment can often be adapted using simple aids in order to lighten the

physical burden of the work considerably” (CWINF, 2000). Additionally, women were

given the opportunity to attend physical training courses paid by the government in the

period prior to them entering military service, a measure sought for providing additional

physical skills, which would give women a greater chance of succeeding (made-to-

measure work).

An active recruitment policy specifically targeted at women was also designed,

including media campaigns, information in secondary schools and local employment

agencies and the appointment of female recruitment officers and NCO’s. Policy makers

were aware of the need to compete in the labor market in an overall favorable economic

context. The occupational orientation is thus associated with the recruitment of women:

“An adventurous character is not sufficient to create an attractive image. (…) Salaries

and other employer benefits have to be competitive, or at least in line with what is

offered elsewhere. (…) Labor participation of women is growing rapidly and

demographic trends show a growing dependence on the female part of the labor market

in the Netherlands”190.

However, initial recruitment is only one of the problems military services have

to face. The premature outflow of women remains very high and is partially considered

to account for the limited presence of women in the higher ranks. Besides the focus on

career guidance, measures aimed at conciliation between family and military life –an

issue also reported high on the political agenda of the country— have been intensified

in order to face the retention problem. Child-care facilities –namely in-house day-care

190 Interview with Colonel Leijh (The Hague, Ministry of Defence, 14th June 2000).


263

centers– financial compensations for day nursery and special licenses are in place as

well as a family policy aimed at preventing simultaneous deployments of military

couples. Both parents are entitled to be partially paid parental leave. Consistent with the

situation in the external labor market, where part-time work has known significant

diffusion, a package of arrangements of part-time jobs has also been made available for

both men and women within the Dutch armed forces191. However, military personnel do

not extensively use it. For instance, in 2000 only 185 women and 133 men used this

possibility. The main reason suggested to explain this is the opposition of superiors who

still do not accept the idea of such an ‘occupational’ trend within the military

profession: “We think that the number of people asking will grow but that will be slow

because it is not in the mind of a conservative organization as the defense organization.

It is a completly new fashion in the mind of older people; our two and three star levels

are not doing that. Because a military is not only a job… that kind of arrangement will

come in slowly. It is one step forward and two steps back, but it will happen. Not now,

but in five or ten years. You cannot close your eyes to the developments in the total

society and the defense organization is learning all that: doing, learning, doing, learning

and doing its policy closer to what is normal in the Netherlands”.192 In addition, the loss

of financial benefits and a bad PR of these measures seem to account for its

unsuccessful outcome: “a lot of defense personnel does not know which arrangements

are possible” (Richardson and Bosch, 1999: 137).

Interviews conducted with MoD officials within this research reveal that there is

a strong consciousness that confronting premature outflow of women and to bring

women to the top of the organization will require explicit policy efforts: “This needs

policy and this needs very active policy. You have to give strict guidelines to bring

people to the higher level”.193 However, it is curious to note the paradox in the same

official’s explanation for the problem and powerlessness to solve it: “Another problem

is if the females and the men leave the academy at 22, a lot of women have their family

problems, want to get pregnant, follow the husband, in short, there are a couple of

reasons why females leave the organization. You can’t solve that problem… women

will always get pregnant, give birth and have children (…). What you can do is to have

191 This measure is not meant to be used instead of sub-contracting to civilian firms, but merely to give military men and women the same opportunities which are available in civilian life. 192 Interview with Colonel Leijh (The Hague, Ministry of Defence, 14th June 2000). 193 Interview with Colonel Leijh (The Hague, Ministry of Defence, 14th June 2000).

HELENA CARREIRAS

264

an open mind. You cannot influence this moment in personal life. What you can do is to

develop a number of arrangements as possible incentive to give the idea that you are a

good boss in a good organization”194.

As far as cultural acceptance is concerned, there is a policy outlining a complaint

procedure on sexual harassment, which details its purpose, the use of confidential

counselors and a complaints committee. All service training courses devote attention to

lessons in ethics, managing diversity and dealing with undesirable behavior. All military

personnel, both during initial training and during follow-up and career training courses

attend these lessons.

Notwithstanding all existing programs, the established goals, namely those

concerning representation, have been difficult to attain. A general idea is that the

prevailing image of organizational culture still remains as one of the more resistant

obstacles to gender integration: “discipline, uniformity, and toughness are making a

comeback in the Dutch armed forces. Such a correction of the excesses of conscript

culture makes some sense, but it might be overdone and unintentionally might

contribute to the impression of a macho community. This would be counterproductive

for gender diversity” (Meulen, 2000: 112).

2.2. The situation of women in the military: representation and integration policies

2.2.1. Relative numbers and evolution of representation

If we compare the two countries in terms of relative numbers, there is an

apparently surprising finding: representation levels do not reflect the impact of the

observed differences in policies concerning the presence of women in the military. In

the case of the Netherlands, one might have expected that, having started female

recruitment one and a half decades earlier, in the mid-seventies, and having pursued

specific policies aimed at improving female recruitment and retention, the quantitative

presence of women would tend to be significantly greater than in Portugal, one of the

latecomers within NATO. However, the data show that this is not the case, which

confirms the absence of a clear relation between time effects and relative numbers (cf.

Chapter V).

194 Interview with Colonel Leijh (The Hague, Ministry of Defence, 14th June 2000).


265

In fact, the Netherlands had low levels of female recruitment until the beginning

of the ’90s, when numbers began to rise more significantly. In 2000, only one

percentual point separated the two countries in terms of female military representation.

By that year, and after a decade of sustained numerical growth, almost 3,000 Portuguese

women soldiers represented 6.6% of a total of 44,000 soldiers, while the existing 4,148

Dutch servicewomen made up 7.7% of the total 53,500 military force (table 6.1).

Despite having started female recruitment more than a decade later, Portugal

nonetheless saw the same intensification of female recruitment that characterized most

NATO militaries in the early ’90s. What is striking here is that, in the Netherlands, the

intensification of female recruitment coincides with the establishment of the all-

volunteer force, while in the Portuguese case the recruitment process brought forward

by more than 10 years the transition to a ‘professionalized’ system.

��7-��

,��46#:�###$�

Source: Netherlands: data from the Policy Letter on Equal Opportunities in the Defense Organization (MoD, 1997), and CWINF - Annual Reports. Portugal: data from Carreiras (1999c) and CWINF – Annual Reports.

There are, however, some asymmetries regarding the relative weight of women

in the various services. While the Netherlands presents a rather balanced situation, albeit

with the navy and air force showing a slightly higher female representation than the

army, Portugal reveals a clear inbalance, especially in the navy, a service where women

make up only 3.4% of the personnel –that is, half of the army’s representation and one

quarter of the air force’s (Table 6.1). While, as mentioned, the navy has the smallest

absolute number of women, showing an extremely moderate growth and a tendency

0

2

4

6

8

10

1980 1983 1985 1987 1989 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Netherlands

Portugal

HELENA CARREIRAS

266

toward stabilization, the army reveals a trend of accelerated growth, both in terms of

absolute as well as relative numbers. Some 56% of Portuguese servicewomen are found

in the army, 12.4% in the navy and 31.6% in the air force. The air force, which was the

pioneer service regarding women’s recruitment, slightly reduced its relative share in

1998 and then grew again over the following two years. The particularities of the

various services, namely the difficulties associated with service aboard ships (and their

transformation in order to accommodate women), as well as the army’s greater

territorial component help to explain the existing distribution.

(�)��7��'��"�)��+��

��,��:��###$� THE NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL

BRANCH MALE FEMALE TOTAL MALE FEMALE TOTAL

N % N % N N % N % N

Army 22458 93.1 1675 6.9 24133 24497 94 1638 6 26135

Navy 11679 90.8 1183 9.2 12862 10332 96.6 363 3.4 10695

Air Force 10645 90.5 864 9.5 11509 6447 87 924 13 7371

MP 4604 90.8 462 9.2 5030 - - - - -

Total 49386 92.3 4148 7.7 53534 41276 93.4 2925 6.6 44201

2.2.2. Occupational and hierarchical distributions

If, instead of focusing strictly on relative numbers we look at more ‘qualitative’

indicators of the situation of military women, namely those pertaining to the functions

they perform, a fairly common situation can be identified: they are concentrated in

support functions, that is, health, administration, personnel, logistics and finance.

Therefore, the two countries share the dominant pattern that characterizes the whole

NATO universe (Figure 6.5).


267

��75�1��;��)��;��

��###$��C$��

8

22,510,410,3

81,6

67,1

0

20

40

60

80

100

Operational Technical Support

PortugalNetherlands

Note: Percentages refer to the total number of women.

However, a closer look at the distribution within occupational areas reveals

substantial differences between the two countries. This is the case of the relative weight

of women in operational and support functions, with Portugal showing a much more

segregated distribution. Over three quarters of Portuguese servicewomen (81.6%) are

concentrated in support areas, and only 67.1% in the Dutch case; inversely, a very

significant percentage of women perform their tasks in operational functions in the

Netherlands (22.5%), against only 8% in Portugal.

This difference must be related both to existing anti-discriminatory policies

(within a supportive general social environment) as well as to the pioneer role the

Netherlands has had within NATO in eliminating restrictions to women in combat and

operational functions. Although there still remain some practical restrictions to the

employment of female soldiers in the Marine Corps and submarines, the fact that they

joined the crew of combat ships nearly twenty years ago, in the mid ’80s is very

relevant in this context.

195 Data for the Dutch Army refers only to women with long-term contracts (CWINF, 1998); Data for the Dutch Navy refers to January 2002.

HELENA CARREIRAS

268

(�)��7��;��)��

1��+��###$� ARMY NAVY AIR FORCE TOTAL

FUNCTIONS NL PORTUGAL NL PORTUGAL NL PORTUGAL NL PORTUGAL

Operational 5 1.1 35.4 12.4 40.8 13.9 22.5 8

Technical 14 6.8 5.2 19.5 9.7 7.6 10.3 10.4

Support 81 86.4 59.4 68.1 49.5 78.5 67.1 81.6

Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Source: CWINF, 1998,2000; Data supplied directly by the Navy and Air Force in the Netherlands.

Note: Percentages refer to the total number of women.

Although there is limited data to compare men and women’s distributions across

the occupational structure, available information show that women are clearly over-

represented in the health and support functions, and under-represented in operational

and technical areas. In the Netherlands, for instance, while men serving in long-term

contracts in the Dutch Army are equally distributed over different corps, only 5% of the

women in that type of contract occupy positions in combat units, 14% in technical

functions and 81% serve in auxiliary areas (Richardson and Bosch, 1999). In Portugal,

comparisons between men and women reveal identical inbalances: 36.7% of military

men serve in operational areas, against only 8 % of women; 42.4% are employed in

technical specialties, against only 10.4% of women; and 47,5% are concentrated in

support functions, against 81.6% of women.

Turning now to the position of women in the rank structure, we see that they are

concentrated in the lower ranks. Curiously, the relative distribution of military women

through the various hierarchical categories is similar in the two countries. In 2000 they

represented around 5% of the officer ranks, 4 % of NCOs and 13% of enlisted personnel

(Table 6.3).


269

(�)��7��'��!�;��)��,��

��###$�3��<��!��NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL POSTS

MW W %W MW W %W

Officers 9709 516 5.3 6623 313 4.7

NCO’s 23636 1021 4.3 16244 693 4.3

Enlisted 20189 2611 12.9 13051 1750 13.4

Cadets n.a. n.a. n.a. 1056 119 11.3

Total 53534 4148 7.7 36977 2875 7.8

Note: Percentages refer to the total personnel in each rank category in each country. Conscripts are excluded in the case of Portugal; n.a. = information not available.

If we look at column percentages and compare the structure of rank distribution

between the total force and that of the women’s group in each country, the same

asymmetric effects are clear (Table 6.4): while the officers’ group represents 18% of the

total military personnel, only a percentage of around 12% of women occupy officer’s

positions. This under-representation is even more clear in the NCO ranks, for only one

quarter of women belong to that category (which concentrates half of the total

personnel). Inversely, women are clearly over represented in the enlisted ranks, where

their relative number doubles the weight of that category within the total military

structure.

(�)��7-�

'��!�;��)��,��###$�3��<��

NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL

MW % W %W MW % W %W

Officers 9709 18.1 516 12.4 6623 18.4 313 11.4

NCO’s 23636 44.2 1021 24.6 16244 45.2 693 25.1

Enlisted 20189 37.7 2611 62.9 13051 36.3 1750 63.5

Total 53534 100 4148 100 35918 100 2756 100

As far as the internal structure of the officers’ rank is concerned, women’s

limited representation is even greater: in Portugal the maximum rank attained so far by a

HELENA CARREIRAS

270

woman is that of captain,196 and in 2000 the majority of women officers belonged to the

lowest officer’s positions. This may be considered a normal consequence of the

regulatory norms for promotion due to the more recent Portuguese experience, which

require individuals to spend certain amounts of time in each rank. However, it is more

difficult to understand that in the Netherlands only 2% of military women officers hold

posts over major (CWINF, 1998).

As seen above, this problem has been identified as a consequence of premature

outflow, which seems to affect women in a disproportionate manner if compared to

men. While there are no significant differences in the percentages of regular and non-

regular outflow between men and women in fixed-term contracts, there are strong

differences by sex among those with indefinite contracts. In this situation women tend

to leave for non-regular reasons much more than men (85.3% against 49.1%).

Another indicator of the segregation pattern concerns the contracts women have:

in the two countries they are mostly employed in short-term contract service or as

complementary personnel. In the Netherlands, men and women can serve as volunteers

in two major categories: contracts for an indefinite period of time or short-term

contracts. Apparently, women “show a preference” (CWINF, 1998) for enlisting on a

short-term basis: they represent 13.8% of all military personnel in short-term contracts

and only 3.6% of those enlisted on a long term basis. In Portugal, women are

concentrated in the complementary personnel structures, representing less than 1% of

career personnel (Table 6.5).

(�)��75�'��)��(��0��

��,��###$�THE NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL

SHORT-TERM CONTRACTS

INDEFINITE CONTRACTS

COMPLEMENTARY PERSONNEL

CAREER PERSONNEL

MW W %W MW W %W MW W %W MW W %W

Officers 923 177 19.2 8786 339 3.8 1297 291 22.4 5546 65 1.2

NCO/ Enlisted

20727 2816 13.6 23098 816 3.5 13189 2168 16.4 14136 101 0.7

Total 21650 2993 13.8 31884 1155 3.6 14486 2459 17 19682 166 0.8

196 There was a female lieutenant-colonel in the past within the group of parachutist nurses recruited during the colonial war, but she left active duty in the early ‘90s. In 2002 some women were following


271

Despite a balance in relative numbers –partially explained by the late arrival of

Portugal and the political decision to rapidly reach the levels attained by other countries,

the lack of recruitment difficulties in Portugal and the existence of these difficulties in

the Netherlands—, Portugal presents a more segregated pattern: a) in terms of service

distribution –with a low representation of women in one of the more specialized

branches, the Navy; b) in terms of occupational distribution, with a much lower

representation of women in operational functions.

Generally, indicators point to a situation where women have more precarious

positions within the structure and are still far from a fair representation in power

positions inside the organization. Even if time effects are considered, the comparison

between these two cases –one with longer experience and clearly more active in issuing

and implementing policies— seems to confirm that once again, time does not seem to

have interfered in correcting the observed inbalances. On the other side, the failure to

reach a more balanced gender representation in spite of the pro-active policy attitude

suggests that external factors may be of great importance in explaining the role of

women within the armed forces. Why are women leaving in the Netherlands and still

wishing to join in Portugal? Various aspects related to global economic conditions,

women’s participation in the labor-market, the conciliation of work and family, and

values concerning gender equality may help to explain individual options.

3. Social trends and the situation of women

3.1. Women’s economic mobilization

The increase in women’s labor-force participation is one of the most significant

changes in western developed countries during the last decades of the XX century.

Portugal and the Netherlands are no exception to the global trend, but each country

presents some particularities in terms of this normative and objective reshaping of the

female social participation pattern. Table 6.6 shows that the two countries have female

activity rates that are higher than the European average.

specific courses to become major.

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272

(�)��77�

��+��'��.��445$�

GLOBAL ACTIVITY RATE*

ACTIVITY RATE OF MOTHERS (20-39 YEARS OLD)

Belgium 52.4 70.3 Denmark 74.6 87.6 Germany 60.4 51.9 Greece 45.3 47.4 Spain 45.6 46.8 France 61.2 69.9 Ireland 47.9 40.7 Italy 43.0 51.6 Luxembourg 57.8 43.5 The Netherlands 58.5 48.1 Austria 64.5 - Portugal 61.4 76.9 Finland 71.8 - Sweden 78.0 - United Kingdom 67.5 59.2 EU (12) 57.3 57.8

* Percentage of women aged 15-64 within the same age group

Sources: European Commission, Employment in Europe, 1996; Bulletin sur les femmes et l’employ dans l’UE, 1995

In Portugal, from a situation where women represented only 13% of the active

population197 in the ’sixties, they reached 61.4% in 1995. Although the increase in

women’s labor-force participation has been very significant in nearly all European

societies, is should be noted that Portugal, which started out with one of the lowest

levels in the ’sixties, at the beginning of the ’nineties had the highest rate among

southern European countries and a relatively high rate within EU countries.

Comparative data from Eurostat (1996) show that in Portugal the proportion of active

women between 15 and 64 years old (61.9%) was in 1998 above the medium value for

the EU (58.2%), and far above Spain (47.5%), Italy (44.2%) or Greece (48.5%).

197 Despite the significance of this increase, its meaning cannot be over-simplified. As pointed out by Almeida et al. (1998), “in some social contexts there is no clear distinction between the active or non-active status of women. This is the case, for instance, of farmers and partial-farmers’ families, where women develop productive activities that are closely connected to household work. It follows that if we


273

One other important indicator of this Portuguese specificity regards work

characteristics: unlike most of their European counterparts, Portuguese women do very

little part-time work (presently less than 6%).198 Furthermore, while 30 years ago

women tended to be more active between 15-19 years old –that is, in most cases before

marriage and child birth –the modal value of such participation in the ’nineties is

especially strong among the 25-29 age group, exactly those that sooner or later will face

active maternity. Even if some of these women leave the labor market –whether on a

temporary or definite basis— in the near future, as a consequence of marriage or child

birth, it is still unlikely that it would lower this rate significantly, the major trend

pointing to a conciliation of career and family commitments.

If we add to this picture the finding that participation levels among married

women (49%) are still very high if compared to European patterns, and that the activity

rate of Portuguese mothers between 20 and 39 years old is the second highest (76.9%) –

immediately after Denmark and almost the double of Ireland or Spain—, the particular

situation of Portugal in the European context is further stressed. Scholars have found

this a puzzling situation. How can such a strong female participation in the labor market

be explained, knowing that: a) it happens during a particularly intense moment in terms

of family commitments; b) most women have full-time employment and not part-time

work; c) it coexists with a remarkable deficit of either public or private child-care and

support structures? A number of explanations have been provided. These range from

ideological factors such as the impact of the revolution of 1974, which supposedly

reinforced a modern dynamic of female autonomy and emancipation, to more structural

variables such as women’s economic protagonism in the Portuguese economy –due to

emigration (particularly strong during the ’sixties) and male military recruitment in the

context of the war in the Portuguese former colonies of Angola, Mozambique and

Guinea between 1961 and 1974-, basic economic constraints that still affect

considerable sectors of the Portuguese population; and the existence of strong solidarity

and family networks (sometimes even co-residence) which compensate for the absence

of child care facilities and provide a different kind of domestic support to families.

consider for 1960 the so-called ‘domestic farmers’ as active, the activity rate would grow considerably, although remaining still far from its present figure.” 198 Due to the fact that most northern European countries' female activity rates include high percentages of part-time work, it has even been claimed that if we consider the number of working hours as a criterion

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274

In the Netherlands, there has also been a significant rise in the participation of

women in the labor market since the ’70s, from 34% in the mid-70s to 58.5% in 1995.

Unlike in Portugal, female labor force participation is characterized by the immense

popularity of part-time work. The Netherlands is the only European country where the

majority of working women (67.9%) work part-time (less than 36 hours a week) (Jacobs

et al., 2000: 1). Here, “part-time work has been actively encouraged by a range of state

policies and collectively bargained agreements as a central plank in the creation of a

more employment intensive pattern of economic growth and as a means of increasing

women’s integration in the labor market” (Fagan et al., 2000: 175).

However, the shorter average working week and the shorter employment history

(due to temporary career interruptions) of Dutch women if compared to men has its

drawbacks. A report of the Ministry of social affairs states that this pattern “continues to

undermine the position of women in the labor market and their ability to progress to

more senior or management posts” (MSAE, 1995-2000: 13). Considering the popularity

of part-time work among parents of young children, especially mothers, Jacobs et al.

stress the same conclusion: “Part-time work is not considered a second-best option, on

the contrary, it has gained full recognition (…). However, the acceptance of part-time

work is less obvious for managerial and leading positions, both in the private and the

public sectors, which leads to a negative impact on the career of mainly women”

(Jacobs et al., 2000: 2). In any case, the possibility of what has been called a “gender-

friendly working time regime” (Plantenga et al., 1999) has been associated with a long

practice of consultation between social partners (employers organizations and trade-

unions) and the State regarding work arrangements. This institutionalized tripartite

model –the so-called ‘poldermodel’–is strongly embedded in the Dutch society and has

even been considered responsible for the favorable economic climate in the country

during the 90s. Taking into account the above-described facts and figures, we should

then address the question of the kind of relation that exists between objective

participation and values concerning gender equality at work and family roles.

to measure women’s presence in the labor market, Portugal would probably show the highest rate in the EU (Almeida and Wall, 1993).


275

3.2. Values, gender roles and the conciliation between work and the family

Sociological surveys carried out at the European level during the last decades

show interesting results in this respect. A survey conducted in the framework of the

‘European Study Group’ in 1990199 throws some light on attitudes towards family issues

and women’s role in society. Almeida and Wall (1993) report that, as generally happens

in Europe, the family seems to have –more than work, friends or leisure— a decisive

importance in the Portuguese daily life. There is a broad consensus on the level of

satisfaction over family life –80%— regardless of social origins, age or even gender.

Additionally, a curious pattern emerges from Portuguese attitudes toward female labor

market participation: not only is it largely accepted as an important factor for individual

autonomy but also as a source of economic wealth for the household. This is

particularly visible among women themselves, younger cohorts and more educated

groups, but it is still a notable feature in general terms. Not even maternity appears as an

obstacle to such a positive attitude: 76% of the Portuguese agree with the idea that ‘a

working mother can maintain with her children a relation as strong as would a non-

working mother’. It should therefore be noted that, more than in other European

countries included in this study, “reciprocity ideals between men and women outside the

household are remarkably sustained in Portugal” (Almeida and Wall, 1993: 48).

However, other variables reveal ambiguity: if women’s presence in the labor market is

seen as acceptable, so is their domestic role. Some indicators are telling: 62% of the

respondents agree that ‘a job is a good thing but what women really want is a home and

children’; 84% admit that ‘a school age child will probably suffer if the mother has a

job’, and 61% admit that ‘a women needs children to be fulfilled’.

With regard to male and female domestic roles, Portugal presents notable

differences from the other countries with high female employment rates, mostly

northern, instead sharing southern European features. Eurostat data (Knuppel, 1995)

show that, at least in the opinion of women, Portuguese men are among the least co-

operative in domestic work (72%), supplanted only by the Spanish (80%).200

199 The survey included Belgium, France, Germany, UK, Northern Ireland, Republic of Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. In Portugal it was co-ordinated by the ‘Instituto de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento’. 200 This tendency had already been reported in a survey of Portuguese couples with children younger than 15 years old (1988), which showed that in only 28% of the cases were all family members involved in domestic work and that the father’s participation was particularly low regarding basic domestic tasks

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The case of the Netherlands reveals some acute contradictions as far as values

on gender roles are concerned. Jacobs et al. (2000: 2) have noted that “It looks as if the

work ethic in the Netherlands is controlled by opposite forces. (…) On the one side, we

observe the persistence of traditional family values, whereas, on the other side, we

notice the development of a strong ideology of equality between men and women.”

Survey data results are consistent with this statement.

A special Eurobarometer report on equal opportunities for men and women in

Europe conducted in 1996 reveals that 46.2% of Dutch women agree with the statement

that a woman should have a job, whereas only one third of the men (34.2%) does. These

figures are among the lowest in Europe. A majority of Dutch think that ‘equality

between men and women brings more harm than good in daily life’, the highest number

in Europe. But Dutch are also those in Europe who agree more with the idea that

‘equality between men and women makes personal development easier’.

Results from another survey conducted in the frame of the European network for

the division of unpaid and paid work between women and men have shown that the

percentage of time Dutch women spend in paid work decreases substantially (to about

half) when they start a relationship and even further when they become mothers (Jacobs

et al, 2000). This research has also confirmed the idea that the Dutch are not globally

favorable to the image of the working women and seem to evaluate more positively

women’s role as mothers. This strong ‘maternalistic’ orientation, characteristic of other

European countries such as the UK or Germany is visible in the historically-rooted

Dutch resistance to forms of institutionalized childcare. As noted by Jacobs, “Dutch

parents are not in favor of asking someone else to look after their children. Taking

children to a day-care center for a substantial amount of time per week is generally done

out of necessity”. Although it seems to be gradually waning, opposition to this type of

childcare continues to exist (Jacobs et al., 2000).

The same research has also come to a curious conclusion: that policies do not

play an important role in the time spent on paid and unpaid work among men and

women. The authors stress the fact that this does not mean that policies such as

childcare, parental leave, calamity leave or flexible working hours are useless or

unnecessary. Instead, they believe that such policies may facilitate the combination of

(preparing the meals, making beds, washing the dishes, washing or ironing clothes) (cf. Almeida and Wall, 1993: 44).


277

work and care. A lack of policies, in turn, could also be a severe obstacle to achieving a

more egalitarian gender division of work. In any case, and despite the fact that Dutch

couples seem to reproduce at the micro level of the household the global practice of

‘consultation’, reported as a typical Dutch phenomenon, to decide about the division of

household tasks, work time and family commitments, the result is still that “it is the

woman who does the majority of the work, while the man only gives a helping hand”

(Jacobs et al., 2000: 49).

These conclusions confirm a common finding of similar studies: female’s

growing participation in paid work does not automatically lead to a redefinition of the

domestic division of labor or to more egalitarian values about gender roles. Indeed,

while it cannot be denied that women's participation in the labour market is one of the

most remarkable changes that has taken place in recent decades in industrialised

societies, and that such a phenomenon co-exists with deep social, economic and cultural

transformations, work on its impact on dominant cultural conceptions of masculinity

and femininity cautions against linear conclusions about the re-evaluation of cultural

norms about gender. For instance, in a comparative study of female employment and

changes in attitude towards gender roles, Haller and Hoellinger (1994) have

demonstrated that an automatic connection between women's participation in the

labour-force and a move towards more egalitarian ideas about the role of women in the

family and at work did not exist. Although the increase in the number of women in paid

employment is essentially determined by changes in political and economic

circumstances, as well as the economic status of the women and their families, changes

in attitude in this area would seem to have more to do with historically prevalent

attitudes towards individuality, freedom, the family and social stratification. These

findings seem to contradict the sometimes 'taken for granted' inevitability of a

transforming impact that the increase in the number of women –in the workplace and in

the public sphere— would have on the internal structure of organisations and on

individuals' ideas about gender roles. This is one of the questions to be analysed in the

next chapter.

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CHAPTER VII INTERPERSONAL DYNAMICS OF GENDER INTEGRATION:

THE CASE OF THE OFFICER CORPS

In previous chapters, the process of WMP has been analyzed at the global

societal and organizational levels. It is now important to address the question of

individuals’ attitudes and values and examine the relation between structural

arrangements and interpersonal processes. Therefore, this chapter addresses a set of

related questions: how do military men and women make sense of their experience in a

mixed-gender environment? How do cognitive models of masculinity and femininity

influence their interpretations of the gender integration process? To what extent do

external variables, such as family responsibilities, determine personal options,

expectations and institutional commitment? In order to answer these questions, fifty-

four semi-directive interviews to men and women officers have been conducted in the

two countries (Table 7.1.)

(�)��9��,��)�� +��<��)��/��,��

PORTUGUESE DUTCH TOTAL

Male Officers 13 12 25

Female Officers 16 13 29

Total 29 25 54

Interviewees were selected by a contact person in each branch of the armed

forces according to a pre-defined profile that aimed at assuring diversity in terms of

personal characteristics, professional experience and institutional location (e.g. rank,

type of function, and family status). To make sure that interviewees were correctly

informed about the nature of the interview, its academic goals and guarantee of

confidentiality, a written statement was provided at the moment when they volunteered

to cooperate with the research (Appendix 7.1).

The fieldwork took place during the months of June and July of 2000 in the

Netherlands and during the months of October/November of the same year in Portugal.

All Dutch interviews were conducted in reserved rooms at the headquarters of each

branch of the armed forces. Trips were organized for some interviewees to come from


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their units to The Hague. In Portugal, most of the interviews took place in the

interviewees’ local units (air bases, ships, army bases).

The interviews followed the same overall plan but with a great deal of flexibility

in each conversation. This flexibility was crucial in order to explore aspects of the

personal experience of officers (e.g. deployments, peacekeeping operations) as well as

specific issues (e.g. sailing in the Navy, experience at military academies, etc.)

(Appendix 7.3 - Interview guidelines).201

1. Organizational structure and individual orientations

Some of the social and organizational trends that characterize and differentiate

the Portuguese and Dutch cases analyzed in Chapter VI have a clear expression on the

officers’ individual attitudes and values. A first dimension to be addressed concerns

patterns of motivations for enlistment.

Male officers’ motivations for joining the military are a mix between the three

types previously considered: institutional, occupational and postmodern. While Dutch

officers refer mainly to occupational (5/12) and post-modern (5/12) factors, the

Portuguese tend to stress ‘post-modern’ (8/16) and ‘institutional’ factors (6/16). If this

different emphasis on the occupational and institutional poles respectively seems to be

congruent with global organizational orientations, variation cannot be considered

important since the two groups privilege ‘postmodern’ orientations. However, the case

of women officers reveals significant differences.

More than three fourths of Dutch women officers (10 out of 13) share post-

modern orientations. With very few exceptions of occupationally driven officers, and a

couple of references to institutional motivations, the remaining identify the search for

adventure, travel, excitement, distinctiveness and teamwork as the most attractive

features of a military career and the reason for joining. The lack of ‘institutional’

motivations is coincident with the overall organizational occupational and '‘post-

modern'’ characteristics.

201 I have made a free translation of Portuguese officers’ discourses, but tried to keep the colloquial oral style. This may cause some weird grammar or lexical construction in English.

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Contrarily, Portuguese women are much more institutionally driven.202 While

post-modern motivations are also strong (7/16), two thirds (10/16) of Portuguese

women indicate ‘institutional’ reasons to justify their option. They talk about ‘values’,

‘organization’ and ‘respect’:

“I had an old-fashioned idea of the military… that everything was organized. Well, this is not like that anymore… Before coming, at college, I though that things ‘out there’ were just like in the jungle, and I thought that if I didn’t want to step on other people to progress, why would they step on me? Therefore, I wanted to go to a place where there is some order, some hierarchy, where I know that a certain place belongs to me and no one is going to steal it from me” (PAF1; 24 years-old Portuguese air-force lieutenant, navigator).

[What does it mean for you to be in the military? Which are the most important characteristics of military life?] “I think that… respecting the country where we live, respecting our flag, respecting our chiefs, be them good or bad… Basically, that’s what distinguishes… Respect for our traditions, for our way of doing things; not talking against those above us. I think that is the greater difference between a soldier and a civilian.” (PM3; 24 years-old Portuguese navy lieutenant, operational)

These different orientations relate to perceptions of behavioral patterns, as for

instance is the case of leadership styles. When asked about differences in command

styles between man and women officers, Portuguese women consider themselves, and

are also considered by men, to have a particularly directive command style, to be more

rigid and less permissive than men. This tendency is explained by both women and men

in terms of women’s need for recognition. A more soft or less directive command style

would not only be at odds with valued organizational features (traditional leadership

and discipline characteristic of the institutional model), but would also favor women’s

identification with stereotypical female ‘weakness’:

“Women have a style of leadership which is more rigid, more secure, less permissive. They don’t tolerate mistakes. This can be negative, right? They are leading a team so they should have more humanitarian feelings… But they need to affirm themselves; they are tougher for defensive reasons. I think I am less permissive myself” (PM4; 31 years-old Portuguese navy lieutenant, psychologist).

In the Netherlands, on the contrary, both men and women think that women

have a softer and more person-oriented approach, if compared to the task-oriented male

style. Yet, this is not necessarily seen as negative, considering the general ‘postmodern’

202 This result is not surprising since previous studies had already revealed this strong institutional pattern among Portuguese women soldiers (Carreiras, 1997a).


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organizational climate where cooperative ideals of rank relations are more valued than

traditional authoritarian models:

“I always say that I am happy if the task is done, but I am not happy if people are not smiling. I prefer people smiling and the task not done than the other way around, the task done but everybody walking around in a bad mood. That is a difference. Men mostly say the task is important and ‘you have to do this!’.Also a big difference is when somebody does his work very well, and you tell him ‘ that is nice and that is good’ or you say nothing about it. Men do not do that so much, women do it often” (HAF3; 39 years-old Dutch air-force lieutenant-colonel, electronics)

A second area where global cultural and organizational features have an impact

on individual options concerns the conciliation of work and family. Segal’s assumption

that women’s military roles may be affected by cultural expectations regarding their

devotion to family is confirmed. Family responsibilities and children rearing are

identified by both men and women as the most important obstacles to women’s career

development and access to higher ranks:

“If you want to make a career in the forces, and I think the same goes for air force or army or navy, you have to have full commitment, you have to work 5 days a week, take some extra time, skip your vacation once in a while, have piles of extra hours in a weekend; you have to give everything if you want to have a career. If you have one or two children or if your husband works part-time or maybe even full time, then you can’t make that choice to go 100% for the job, because there is someone else saying ‘Mommy’… so you have to make a choice” (HAF3; 39 years-old Dutch air-force lieutenant-colonel, electronics).

When asked about the conciliation of family and work, and about the impact of

family commitments over professional choices, most women experience ‘structural

ambiguity’: they have to face ‘choices’ in which work and family commitments are

posed as competing, often mutually exclusive alternatives; choices in one sphere

depending on the opportunities, incentives and constraints posed in the other (Gerson,

1985).

But here we find the most striking differences between the two countries. When

confronted with the need to divide their time and energy between work and family,

Dutch women give a clear preference to the latter. Together with the negative impact of

frequent deployments (a strong complaint also among male officers), this devotion to

the family is also one of the most (if not the most) significant reasons for hypothetically

leaving the armed forces. Difficulties in this respect are increased by the fact that many

women officers are married to servicemen. This finding is congruent with the above-

described cognitive patterns of gender relations in the Netherlands: a strong family-

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oriented, maternalistic ideology, and an individualistic work ethics centered on

‘postmodern’ values such as self-fulfillment. The following testimonies are illustrative

of this overwhelming preference for family among Dutch women, as well as of a

tendency to devaluate promotion and career progression.

“I would consider the possibility of combining both, that would be the ideal. So I would work 2-3 days a week. My partner is not going to work less and I don’t want it either, I want to take care of the children, not every day a week maybe, but I feel that it is a women’s job…Well that is not right, but I can’t avoid…” (HA8; 27 years-old Dutch army captain, logistics).

“ I don’t see the navy as my total future. It’s nice for a couple of years. But I’m thinking about children, and I don’t want to have to go away and sail and have my children at home. That’s not an option. Let’s see…” (HN4; 27 years-old Dutch navy lieutenant, weapons engineer).

“I think it is more important to feel well at your present job than to be promoted, I do not think promotion is important. When we will have children, they will be much more important than my job, and my career will not be important at all anymore. I think that promotion without children would go faster than with children. I think that would be a consequence for me personally. I know mothers who also have career besides their children, but it is a personal choice for me. I do not think that career is that important anymore” (HN10; 50 years-old Dutch navy captain, administration).

A rather different picture is revealed by Portuguese women, who are less sure

than their Dutch counterparts about which aspect of life they should give preference to.

In general though, they underline their will to keep working and try to manage the dual

commitment. Even if also in this case women admit that they sacrifice career

development to a certain extent, they search for compromise:

“I still have to follow a training to be able to stay in the permanent structure [QP]. If I would have children I would have to conciliate things. Some women do it. They belong to the QP and they have their family. I would be able to do it too” (PAF5; 27-years-old Portuguese air-force lieutenant, air-police officer)

“Career progression, yes, that is everybody’s ambition, but for me the money and a few more stars…not really. But well, if I must accomplish a mission, this is my profession and children and family will have to understand. If it is an obligation … my kids and my husband will have to understand” (PE7; Portuguese army lieutenant, administration)

“I will find a way of conciliating things (…) otherwise I prefer to have no children” (PM3; 24 years-old navy lieutenant, operational)

“I cannot imagine the situation of leaving work and staying home for years taking care of the kids. I would become crazy after one week. But I could sacrifice a quicker career


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progression, have less money, but caring for my children. That would be ok, but giving up my career, that is out of the question”(PAF4).

Various factors may explain this pattern: the strong orientation of Portuguese

women towards work and reciprocity in gender relations; the average lower age of

Portuguese female officers,203 which possibly makes them more optimistic regarding the

possible conciliation of both spheres, or even the economic difficulties that force both

members of Portuguese couples into paid employment. But the nature of military

missions in each country also helps to explain the observed differences. The frequency

of deployments abroad –which can sometimes last for 6 months every two years— is

clearly a dissuasive factor for both male and female officers in the Netherlands. These

constraints are incomparably more important for women, but Dutch male officers also

show a strong attachment to the family.

Although Portuguese soldiers have already been involved in a few international

missions, all personnel were deployed on a strictly volunteer basis. Hence, this factor

does not seem to affect their respective choices or calculations, at least not yet.

However, if international missions increase in the future it is possible that there will be

a correspondent change in attitude.

If women’s family roles are definitely perceived as affecting their military roles,

other aspects, stemming from cultural conceptions of gender, have also been identified

throughout the interviews as significant obstacles to gender integration.

2. Cultural constraints and officers’ responses to gender integration

2.1. The perspective of women officers

The analysis of the women officers’ interviews confirms to a large extent the

conclusions of previous studies concerning the impact of the military’s gender regime –

namely the institutionalization of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ and its correspondent

archetypes of femininity. Despite the growing acceptance and routinization of women’s

military participation, cultural resistances are still prevalent. Although a large majority

of interviewees does not recognize the existence of explicit discrimination –at least they

have not felt it personally– a diversity of problems have been identified that not only

203 This is a consequence of the more recent start of the process of gender integration in Portugal if compared to the Netherlands.

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coincide but clearly amplify patterns observed in situations of ‘tokenism’ and women’s

access to other ‘atypical’ or ‘inappropriate’ occupations. Comparing the two groups of

women officers in this research allows us to identify these organizational and

interpersonal constraints as well as women’s responses and adjustment strategies. But it

also provides an occasion to investigate the complexities of the gender

‘accommodation’ process and to explore variation among women. After reviewing the

various difficulties that Portuguese and Dutch women officers have reported, I move on

to propose a typology of female integration strategies, taking into account conceptions

of gender difference and responses to organizational constraints.

2.1.1. The paradox of discrimination

When directly confronted with the question of male soldiers’ resistance to

women in the military, and the existence of discrimination, a large majority of women

officers, irrespective of their national background, state they have never experienced it,

although they know about ‘cases’ of effective and explicit discrimination. There is a

tendency to underline the exceptional character of discriminatory practices, 1) through

‘particularization’ – that is, explaining discrimination in terms of the idiosyncratic

characteristics of specific individuals 2) by situating it at a different institutional

location, as is the case of transferring that burden to ‘enlisted’ women, 3) or also by

referring it to a specific time-frame (initial periods of women’s presence in the armed

forces or in a certain unit):

“I think we have been treated as equals, we were treated like men” (PE1; 31 years-old Portuguese army lieutenant, parachuter).

“No, I think it happens, but I never heard about any case or had personal experience with negative discrimination. Well, I think that if one woman experiences this discrimination, it does not mean that another woman has to experience that in the same way. It is a personal thing, but I never heard about it” (HAF2; 28 years-old Dutch air-force captain, intelligence analyst).

“Problems, well, difficulties. If you are talking about real discrimination, I am sorry, I have heard a lot about it and I always thought that the real discrimination of women was in lower ranks” (HAF3; 39 years-old Dutch air-force lieutenant-colonel, electronics).

However, in the course of almost every interview these same women recognize

the existence of a variety of obstacles and difficulties regarding both the acceptance of

women in general, and their own personal experience. This is the case of a Portuguese


285

parachuter on a short-term contract who having started by saying that ‘I personally

don’t have any reason to complain. I never had any problems’, moves on to reporting a

situation that could actually be described as perceived discrimination on the basis of

gender:

“I am the deputy of a company commander, and they won’t give me the position of company commander because I am a woman. There is even a company where a commander is missing… [Did you complain about that?] Yes, I have shown that I am as capable as a man but… I think it is the only negative aspect here: at the leadership level a woman is not welcomed. But with time things will change ‘se Deus quiser’…[if god will…] Being a woman is always a disadvantage” (PE1, 31 years-old Portuguese army lieutenant, parachuter).

Accounts of male resistance to women’s presence range from various forms of

symbolic ostracism –as in the refusal to adapt language used in basic training– to rather

brutal intimidating practices. The first situation is well illustrated by a 24-years-old

Dutch army 1st lieutenant in the medical service:

“when I joined my first exercise, my commander (he was a very big and strong man), he did not look very friendly. He said: ‘ men listen, and I am not going to say women listen because I am not used to women, so when I say men listen I mean everybody’, and he kept it during four years. He was a very friendly man, yes, but in that part I was ‘wow!” (HA1; 24 years-old Dutch army lieutenant, medical service).

The second situation is reported by one of the first women to join the Portuguese

armed forces who felt enormous resistance to her presence at the academy:

“it all started with small things, such as anonymous letters under the room door, pornographic images… sometimes they went inside and made a mess…” (PAF10; 30 years-old Portuguese air-force lieutenant, pilot).

Stories of women having to cope with sexual jokes and pornographic posters are

also common. A 39-years-old Dutch air-force Lt.Colonel gives one of the most extreme

accounts of such a situation:

“once I was a commander and was commanding about 50 people. We had there a poster from Playboy, a kind of girl and everybody saw pictures of me in advertising [Air Force recruitment campaign]. They had cut out my head and put it on that poster, in the office. (…) I really thought ‘what do I have to do? Is this a kind of insubordination or is it just an attack from men on women or something like that?’” (HAF3; 39 years-old Dutch air-force lieutenant-colonel, electronics).

Most of these accounts come from women who work in operational or technical

areas, or refer to specific situations such as Academy life. Both contexts are known to

be a kind of reserve of traditional military norms and values and thus less exposed to

change. Yet, even interviewees who report intimidating practices show an ambivalent

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position regarding their global evaluation of inequity. Why then, do women officers

prefer not to talk about discrimination? This apparent contradiction is probably the

result of two interrelated processes: on the one hand, the need these women may feel, as

officers, to avoid a negative image of the integration process, trying to stick to a more

‘official version’ of reality; on the other hand, the reinterpretation of problems as

difficulties, hardships, and obstacles –in any case, something different from

discrimination– may serve an important goal in the process of self-identification and

building of a positive institutional image. The ‘discrimination diagnosis’ would

probably sound like dissent, jeopardizing women’s chances of being accepted, while at

the same time tying them to the undesirable role of the ‘victim’.

The analysis of specific problems and dilemmas confronted by women provides

additional occasions to confirm this interpretation.

2.1.2. The negative effects of ‘tokenism’: visibility, contrast and role encapsulation

Almost all of the negative consequences of ‘tokenism’, intrusiveness and

asymmetric social status were identified by women in the two countries. Problems

associated with gender numerical unbalance, concerning both the hardships associated

with the ‘one token’ situation and the ‘intrusiveness’ of greater numbers of women,

were frequently described. Performance pressures, resulting from excessive visibility

are a generalized complaint:

“We were being tested, evaluated. That’s what I felt, a pressure, the need to do everything perfect and comply with the orders we had, not break the rules to reach the goals. That’s what I tried to do” (PE8; 27 years-old Portuguese army lieutenant, administration).

“When I joined I was very, very naïve. I thought it was the most normal thing in the world that women walked around in the military (…) it appeared that I was only the 5th woman at that time to join for pilot training. Tthat was in 1985 and they started I believe in 1980, but I did not know at that time. So there were just a few women around and all the attention was always focused on you and everybody knew who Mary204 was and all the other guys in class, well they did not know it was John or Peter or nobody, all attention is focused on you and that has annoyed me for a long time. I was pretty shocked by that (…) it also gives a lot of extra pressure” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

Performance pressures also lead to the proverbial ‘double bind’ regarding the

evaluation of women’s performance: when a woman is positively evaluated her success

204 All names have been changed to preserve anonymity.


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is considered an individual accomplishment, not generalized to other women. It may

even be interpreted at the expense of her femininity. When she fails, her womanliness is

affirmed and her failure is likely to be generalized to all women:

“You are always in the picture and they are not even aware of it, but as soon as you make a mistake everybody notices. If a man makes a mistake nobody cares, we do not even remember his name anymore. So that is already higher standards what they are setting for you and you are setting for yourself, because you do not want to do those mistakes that in general everybody makes but they only single you out because you make them. It works that way. Standards are higher, but they will never agree with you, they will say that is not true; ok that is the end of a discussion” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

Likewise, if a woman is praised it is said to happen because she is a woman and

not because she performed well:

“I became captain now, there are some colleagues from my class who have the same rank now, and some are still lieutenant and they will stay for another year, so they are looking, ‘oh why did she become captain? ah because she is a woman.’ They argue as a joke, but there is second meaning. When you get something before they do, they always suspect” (HA8; 27 years-old Dutch army captain, logistics).

This cognitive process may be less unconscious and more strategic than is

usually supposed. Used as an argument in competition for promotion it becomes an

instrument in the power structure of gender relations.

A second set of problems relates to the mechanism Kanter (1977) named

‘contrast’, the exaggeration of differences between tokens and the majority group.

Various accounts mention the multiple ways in which group differences are emphasized

and boundaries heightened. For instance, a Dutch air-force captain recalls how

interruptions are used as reminders of difference, and how that upsets her:

“In briefings, general briefings where all the pilots are, where you are the only woman, a lot of times you are addressed by, (and it still happens, by the way),’gentlemen … oh we have a woman today and I have to take care of my jokes’ and even years ago… I was so angry, I was pissed of all the time, and now I just look at someone with a look like ‘you are a very pathetic man’, because in their own insecurity they just single you out and that happens a lot” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

One of the consequences of ‘contrast’ is social isolation and exclusion from

informal networks. Many women, especially when they were the only one, felt lonely

and excluded from socialization in the men’s group, either because they were not

invited or because they were not really interested in sharing ‘boys’ talk’ or activities

such as ‘drinking and smoking in the bar’, or ‘watching porno movies’. To be sure,

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women react differently to social isolation, as shall be seen further on. Nevertheless, the

idea that ‘there was something going on and information being passed that I missed” is

very often transmitted. The above quoted Dutch air-force captain notes that,

(…) as a women, no matter how close you think you are with your male colleagues and go on exercises, you sleep in the same tents, you go on UN operations, you share a lot of experiences together; no matter how much you feel part of the group, in the end you will never be. They will always, at some point, not unfriendly but whatever…they bond together and you realize there is something going on and you are not part of it. And I have experienced that in the beginning and I thought that was very disappointing but I was not the only one, all the women... And it does not matter if you are gay or women or ethnical minority. It does not make any difference. It is the same, it is just the basic fact: you are a minority. And it is not personal; you just have to live with that” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

In her theoretical assessment of this dimension of tokenism, Kanter has

underlined the process through which men tend to amplify commonalties, emphasizing

shared elements of the dominant culture, such as, in the case of masculinity, displays of

aggression or potency, in contrast to the token’s stereotypical features. However,

empirical data points to a more complex situation. While this type of boundary

heightening seems to depict accurately the situation in special and operational units (e.g.

marines, pilots), in less ‘extreme’ environments the presence of women is often

considered to relax the atmosphere. It induces language moderation and less

exaggerated macho behavior. In the eyes of some women, men who do not identify with

hegemonic masculinity apparently appreciate this situation of lowering boundaries:

“You know, there is also a lot of pressure between men. A lot of them are doing things they do not really like to do (…) as soon as women join the squadron, the atmosphere changes. Mentality changes. That is also funny then, because a lot of guys say’ we like it’. There is not as much peer pressure anymore for them. Attention gets focused on the women, that is of course negative, and not on the few men that are weak or not so good in their job” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

The third most common consequence of tokenism ‘role encapsulation’ (the

distortion of women characteristics to fit existing stereotypes) is again a salient process

reported by Portuguese and Dutch interviewees. The ambiguity of women’s role as both

soldiers and women is a permanent reference:

‘They look at me as a woman but not as a colleague” (HA3, 33 years-old Dutch army captain, logistics),205

205 When asked to give some example, she mentions the fact that male officers often call her ‘girl’ whereas they would never refer to her male colleagues as ‘boy’.


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“You have to prove yourself as an officer and as a woman” (HA8; 27 years-old Dutch army captain, logistics);

“When women join the forces they are immediatly labeled: looking for men. Since I came it’s been a hard fight to escape that label” (PAF1; 24 years-old, air-force lieutenant, navigator).

This finding confirms results of previous studies. For instance, in research on the

first women to join the Portuguese armed forces (Carreiras, 1997a), the sentence ‘male

soldiers accept women in the military but they don’t accept female soldiers’ seemed to

express the view of a large majority of servicewomen.

Besides focusing on general obstacles to the integration process, the interview

aimed at exploring the question of more insidious forms of discrimination, such as

sexual harassment. Here again, positions reveal caution. Despite the fact that some

women reported personal experiences that could fit a general description of harassment,

most declared that they knew about specific cases but had never been the object

personally. However, in this case there are remarkable differences between the

discourses of Dutch and Portuguese women. This can be related to the very different

policy approaches regarding sexual harassment at the organizational level. While Dutch

women are aware of the existence of formal complaint mechanisms, the Portuguese talk

about a ‘Grey area’ and the very negative consequences, for the supposed victim, of

using formal complaint procedures:

“These are very tricky situations. Now, if one asks me: ‘why didn’t you complain?’ No, these things happen and we cannot prove it; these are very grey situations and besides they don’t just happen, it is a slow process… the tendency is to say ‘she provoked it, she is the bad one’. So I think it is natural that people don’t want to talk about it” (PAF10; 30 years-old Portuguese air-force lieutenant, pilot).

“In the military that is not very well accepted. Therefore, people try to hide it and avoid publicity and try that nothing gets to be known outside. That would be a very negative example” (PM1, 35 years old, Portuguese navy lieutenant, physician).

With regard to sexual behavior, various interviewees also reveal the existence of

a phenomenon that seems to be particularly amplified in the military environment: the

control of women’s sexuality. Women’s sexual behavior is a matter of organizational

anxiety, especially among Portuguese officers. One of the most striking examples of

this is an account of the interruption of male sailors’ ‘socialization’ with women invited

aboard the ships (usually during scales at foreign ports) after the moment women joined

the navy:

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“One night there was a conversation among officers. We talked about different behaviors regarding women aboard ships. Then he told me: ‘women are not equal. Women are women, men are men, and they cannot behave the same way.’ Then, he gave various examples. When ships are at shore it is rather common to have female visits aboard. From the moment the crew included women the commander prohibited those visits. Why? Not to upset women sailors, he said! But it was really because if they would bring female friends the girls would also be allowed to bring men and that was totally out of the question; he could not even imagine that” (PM1, 35 years old, Portuguese navy lieutenant, physician)

This same circumstance is confirmed by male soldiers who react in an extremely

negative way to the possibility that women sailors would be allowed to invite civilian

men aboard ships. There are various other situations where women are required to

conform to gender-appropriate behavioral norms. This is often done through specific

requests concerning women’s body and physical appearance: a Portuguese naval

engineer (PM8) reports a situation where he had to tell a girl to shave her legs; a

Portuguese ‘marine’ (PM5) reveals his uneasiness for having to tell two girls that they

should not shave their hair completely; many others express their worries about possible

pregnancies. One of the most interesting examples comes from PAF12 who, because of

her ‘manly’ behavior felt pressures to conform to the ‘correct’ female identity. She

reports a brigadier’s admonition:

“Once he told me: ‘you know X, women have their place here but there are two mistakes: the men who cannot deal with them, and women themselves. To emulate men we don’t need you. Maybe we opened up to women because they have something that the organization needs. Generally you have to be equal but then there are particularities where you have to be women and they have to be men’. He told me that I should behave like a woman, otherwise I would not be of any value to the organization because I would be simulating something I was not. From then on I started to pay more attention, trying to be myself, lowering my defenses” (PAF12; 27 years-old Portuguese air-force cadet, pilot).

2.1.3. Positive discrimination, differential evaluation and inequity

Notwithstanding the previous findings regarding integration difficulties, and the

intensity of reports on the negative effects of male soldiers’ resistance to accept women

as equal co-workers, women officers seem to resent more the existence of ‘positive’

than ‘negative’ discrimination’. At first glance, this was a surprising result and one

more paradox revealed at the interpersonal analytical level. In fact, the majority of the

interviewees are upset with the dynamics of ‘positive’ discrimination, both in its

organizational form (specific policies, rules or standards for women) and in its

attitudinal expression in protectionist and paternalist behavior on the part of some men.


291

Both are seen as negatively affecting women’s acceptance, since men’s perception of

unfair and unequal treatment would provoke rejection and sexist attitudes.

This point of view is particularly underlined by Portuguese women. While

Dutch women may take more nuanced attitudes,206 the Portuguese are much more rigid

in their judgments.207 In the Dutch case, positive discrimination policies are viewed

with suspicion, even if specific organizational dilemmas are acknowledged:

“I think it always works against women. Because you may get a few more women in the forces or keep them a little bit longer but the big problem is that people who are already in the forces get that same mark on their head” (HAF3; 39 years-old Dutch air-force lieutenant-colonel, electronics)

Curiously, even a measure such as part-time work –technically available to both

men and women but clearly more used by the latter— may produce the same negative

effects. Referring to a woman colleague, promoted at the same time, a Dutch army

captain says:

“But I said to her: ‘it is not fair that we become major at the same time, because I now worked 5 years full time and you half-time. So why is it not that you have to stay longer captain and then become major?’ o.k. if we make that kind of rules those women walk away. It’s always a contradiction between those groups. But inside of me I don’t feel that is fair. (…) It is not possible that she has the same experience as me when you are just there half time. She must do that work some years longer, maybe not for 50% longer, but for example 40%” (HA3; 33 years-old, Dutch army captain, logistics).

From the point of view of paternalistic and protectionist attitudes, women

officers are conscious of how deference can be a reminder of difference: accepting

protection means accepting to be different, which, in turn, leads to rejection by male

peers. To be sure, sometimes paternalism is considered ‘understandable’. But this does

not mean it is accepted. On the contrary, most women find themselves facing a dilemma

since it is difficult to reject it without confronting male authority and sending a message

of presumption and excessive rigidity.

More than in any other area, tension in this respect rises whenever the question

of physical skills and tests is at stake. This is one of the areas where more difficulties

are signaled in the course of the interviews –also in men’s opinions as shall be seen

further on— and where women’s positions reveal great ambivalence. While the Dutch

206 For example: “If they say we have 2 people equally qualified and the woman goes first…I guess that’s about as much as I can accept” (HN10; 50 years-old Dutch navy captain, administration). 207 For example:“many times I wished I was not a woman not to be benefited” (PM10, 25 years-old, Portuguese navy lieutenant, administration).

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are divided over the question of similar or different physical tests, the Portuguese tend

to understand why men (namely at the Academy) feel discriminated against because of

women’s lower physical requirements:

“We are signaled out in terms of the physical proofs, because there are different criteria and I think that is not correct” (PE7; Portuguese army lieutenant, administration).

An interesting feature of discourses about positive discrimination is that women

tend to be more critical of other women who accept favors than of the organization,

which develops policies that are seen as favoring women (especially in the Dutch case

where those policies actually exist) or of men who have paternalist attitudes:

“Of course men do not like that [positive discrimination of women] and I can not blame them for that. If we want to do the same things we have to have the same rights but also the same obligations. Men see this and they say that is unfair, ‘you are women, you can get everything easily’. So it depends on every woman, if she behaves like “ well I am a woman and I can get everything I want”, then you will not be accepted easily I think. (…) We have this power, because it is bad thing according to the politicians if women leave the air force, it is not possible. We have some power and I think it is a bad thing to use this power. If we want to have a mature organization where women feel well, then we should not make this difference between women and men, it is not fair, this way you can not have a pleasant atmosphere” (HAF2; 28 years-old Dutch air-force captain, intelligence analyst).

In addition, the interviewees’ speech reveals a process of rationalization that

somehow ‘naturalizes’ male peers’ resistance. There is an interpretation of men’s

behavior as normal or at least ‘understandable’: it is understandable (not necessarily

acceptable) that they refer to women saying ‘man’; that they resent the existence of

different physical standards, that they prefer to bond with other men, that they use

deference towards women. The share of cognitive models that regulates gender roles

and identities has this curious consequence: the ‘normalization’ (or at least under-

evaluation), on the part of the supposed ‘victim’, of the discriminatory

discourse/behavior of the ‘offender’.

2.1.4. Women’s responses to organizational constraints

Women officers react differently to the problems described above. But before

exploring these different profiles, it is important to look at commonalties and

specifically at two ‘responses’, which are common to all interviewees:

‘overachievement’ and ‘rejection of one’s kind’. As described in Chapter 2,

‘overachievement’ is a frequent token’s response to visibility and the performance


293

pressure it generates. Women feel they have to do more and better than their male peers,

and that this effort is not always rewarded:

“It is hard because you have to give 200% and you see that your men colleagues do not have to do the same things and that is why it is hard in the beginning, I also think why women do not want to stay long in the army, because it costs you a lot of energy, always not to come in the picture or in spot lights, but if you want to be accepted you have to give much more than a man. You get results, but it costs a lot of time and a lot of energy” (HA7; 41 years-old Dutch army captain, communications).

However, if overachievement is a strong pattern, the amplitude of the second

response is absolutely overwhelming. The lack of cohesiveness among tokens has also

been identified as one of the most common responses of members of a minority group

to social isolation and role encapsulation. The ‘rejection of one’s kind’ constitutes an

attempt at detaching oneself from the stereotypical characteristics associated with one’s

social category. This is extremely amplified in the present research. Both Portuguese

and Dutch women adopt a particular critical stance regarding other women. In general,

they prefer to work with men, who are seen as more ‘direct’, ‘honest’ ‘sincere’

‘friendly’, ‘straightforward’ and ‘loyal’. Women, instead, are considered to be more

‘conflictive’ and driven by ‘jealousy’:

“I think men are more straightforward. I mean they say what they think, and if they do not like you they let you know. Women are more like, ‘ok I like you, but if you turn around I will step on your back’. Women just talk and talk about others… Yes, I think it is easier to work with men” (HAF2; 28 years-old Dutch air-force captain, intelligence analyst).

“There’s a lot of trouble between women and jealousy, and I think it’s easier to deal with men [Why do you think it happens?] Maybe men talk about it when they don’t agree and women just let it go” (HN2; 37 years-old Dutch navy major, administration).

“Women are like cats. They lie and they don’t look at means to reach their ends. Frequently, when they want something they are even hypocritical, deceiving… I think that among men there is more loyal competition. When they have something to say, they say it” (PAF12; 27 years-old Portuguese air-force cadet, pilot).

Positions are ambiguous regarding women as role models: on the one side, the

presence of older women who could act as mentors is considered positive since lower

rank women can see that it is possible to progress; on the other, women as superiors

may be felt as a threat:

“I think it is not easy for lower ranking females if there is a higher ranking female. You think you know more than, or better than anyone what is going on. If they complain to

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a male officer they might get lucky” (HA6- 41 years-old Dutch army captain, communications).

Likewise, a Dutch air-force captain, (HAF4) recognizes that she missed role

models and believes that younger women would be ready to accept them in the

beginning, but not after having already spent a certain time in the military. She criticizes

her own position as mentor:

“What I was inclined to do and I sort of don’t do this anymore because it was a bit condescending and that was never meant to be… you want to take care of them, you want to warn them about things, you want to say to them ‘don’t do this or that’, in a friendly way, an older sister way. Some of them were very happy about that, others were not, and they were looking at me like ‘who are you? I don’t care about what you think’. And then I realized that this is also discriminating, that I do that with them and not really with the guys. It is a sort of condescending way which I never meant to be, and I realized that this is ridiculous, when men do that with us we feel that we hate that and I am doing the same really” (HAF4; 39 years-old Dutch air-force captain, helicopter pilot).

Sometimes specific decisions at the organizational level may lead to increased

conflict. This is the case of a situation reported by a 24 years-old navy lieutenant (PM3)

who was assigned to a vessel where she was not qualified to be, but because there were

enlisted women there was the need of a female officer:

“Only the best go there. If they would tell me ‘you go there because you performed well and that’s your own merit’ I would be very happy. Like this it is terrible because when I get there I will have problems with the other officers. They are there because they deserved it. I am there because I am a woman. I will have to tell them they are absolutely right” (PM3; 24 years-old, Portuguese navy lieutenant, operational).

In order to make sense of the variety of women’s responses to organizational

constraints I have built a typology where cases are classified along two different

dimensions: on the one hand, women’s normative conception of gender ‘distance’ in

terms of their focus on difference or equality: on the other hand, their dominant attitude

concerning integration. Table 7.2 displays the various types.


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Attitude towards the organization

Loyalty Dissent

Assimilation

‘Masculinization’

(‘disruptive loyalty’)

Conformity

Diluted Femininity

(‘silence’)

Disaffection

(‘exit’ without conflict)

Perc

eptio

n of

gen

der ‘

dist

ance

’

Dif

fere

nce

E

qual

ity

Complicity

Emphasized femininity

(‘conservative loyalty’)

Assertiveness

Militant/‘radical’ femininity

(‘voice’)

Antagonism

(‘exit’ with

conflict)

Each strategy is characterized by a specific standpoint regarding archetypes of

masculinity and femininity (‘masculinization’, ‘diluted femininity’, emphasized

femininity’ and ‘militant femininity’) as well as by women’s dominant attitude towards

the organization, which I have named after Hirschman’s famous typology ‘exit’, ‘voice’

and ‘loyalty’ (Hirschman, 1970): ‘conservative loyalty; ‘disruptive loyalty’; ‘silence’,

‘voice’ and ‘exit’.

The two types in the right column –disaffection and antagonism— do not have

empirical correspondence in any of the interviews. They remain theoretical possibilities

to be explored and tested in future research. Being members of the active force, none of

the interviewees could be classified as having adopted the ‘exit’ solution described by

those types. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine situations where women with

egalitarian gender values would feel so disappointed and impotent in the face of

organizational constraints, as to opt for leaving the armed forces passively and without

conflict. Disaffection would thus correspond to an attitude of great skepticism regarding

the possibility of women being truly accepted and given equal treatment in the military,

together with the belief that nothing can be done about it. Antagonism, instead, would

refer to those cases of profound discontent due to the organizational failure in

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accommodating women’s difference. In this case, ‘exit’ with conflict could be a

possible outcome.

Conformity (‘diluted femininity’)

Conformists believe that gender differences should be minimized. Women

should avoid exposure and excessive visibility and should adapt to existing rules. This

is the prototypical defensive position coincident with Kanter’s remarks regarding tokens

attempt at becoming socially invisible, carefully building an image that minimizes

organizational and peer concerns:

“Sometimes I preferred to pretend I was not there” (PAF10; 30 years-old Portuguese air-force lieutenant, pilot).

Conformists use various mechanisms to play down difference:

1) Self-contention:

“The main thing is not complaining. When you complain about different things you are not accepted. I had in my mind ‘I am not going to complain’, so if I have a tough time I walk or something, they cannot see me crying or complaining” (HA1; 24 years-old Dutch army lieutenant, medical service);

2) Searching for gender neutrality:

“I always wanted to be the more neutral possible, not being an excessively feminine stereotype nor the opposite. Try to find a balance, to be able to have good relationships and manage things” (PM4; 31 years-old navy lieutenant, psychologist);

3) Creating distance in order to prevent comments and bad reputation:

“Maybe being more reserved is a way to protect myself of gossip and try to pass unnoticed in order to be treated as an equal person and not as a woman” (PM10; 25 years-old, Portuguese navy lieutenant, administration);

“Always watch out that you do not have negative PR, because if you have negative PR there goes all your career with you” (HA7; 41 years-old Dutch army captain, communications);

4) Developing a cooperative attitude towards men:

“As far as I’m concerned I want them to help me, but I will help them to make them help me (…) If they need something I am always ready to help them. It is a way for me to feel well with them and vice-versa. Sometimes I even do it at the expenses of my family life, or by leaving later than I should” (PAF1; 24 years old, air-force lieutenant, navigator).


297

Assimilation (‘masculinization’)

Those who confront integration dilemmas through ‘assimilation’ believe that

gender differences should not only be minimized but eliminated. Women should adapt

and ‘do it the ‘military’ way’: develop ‘aggressive’ and directive leadership styles, share

male social practices and use the same language. The idea is to deal with men on their

own ground. By unconditionally incorporating dominant aspects of military culture,

assimilation entails women’s ‘masculinization’, that is, the display of stereotypical

masculine traits both in physical appearance and behavior. Since this type of subversion

of gender norms is seen as dangerous, the ‘assimilation’ strategy involves a disruptive

kind of loyalty. Assimilation cases range from discursive practices such as those of a

27-years-old Portuguese air-force police officer (PAF5) who always refers to the ‘men’

under her command, even if those ‘men’ include women, to those of a 27 years-old

Portuguese air-force pilot (PAF12), who provides the most remarkable example of

someone who ‘assimilated’ male culture to a point of having identity problems and even

being warned about it by a male officer:

“Once they told me: ‘stop, you are a woman; you are not a man’ I reached the extreme of only dressing in men’s clothes, I didn’t feel well with a skirt. Male jackets, boots… Before I was not like this, I liked typical female clothes and make-up. Since I came I cut my hair like the boys. I stopped being feminine. (…). And there is something I am not very proud of, the language, but it ended up by saving me; when they started testing me I would answer with some bad words” (PAF12; 27 years-old Portuguese air-force cadet, pilot).

Complicity (‘emphasized femininity’)

Complicity is the most conservative of the four integration strategies. It

reproduces traditional gender roles by ‘emphasizing’ stereotypical characteristics of

femininity. As noted by Connell (1995) there is a kind of fit between this pattern of

‘emphasized femininity’ and traditional conceptions of masculinity. The ‘accomplice’

believes that gender differences should be preserved. Women should keep and openly

express their femininity and behave according to traditional gender roles:

“I do everything not to be confounded with them, not to be confounded. I love to dress my skirt and do everything to wear it because I am a woman, I am in the military but I am a woman… My skirt, my shoes, my hearings… I am a woman, I like it and care about it. They see me and they say she is a woman and an officer, but she is careful to show that she is a woman, she is feminine. Maybe the girls don’t care, but I do” (PE8; 27 years-old Portuguese army lieutenant, administration).

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They further believe that, in the military, there are functions that are more

appropriate for women, and therefore their exclusion from combat functions is

legitimated.

Assertiveness (‘militant femininity’)

Women who choose ‘assertiveness’ think that gender differences should be

respected but in an emancipatory sense. Women should impose their specificity, not

adapt to gender-unfair rules and macho behaviors. This strategy corresponds to a pro-

active behavior, where women use ‘voice’ to make their claims or channel their

complaints. If ‘emphasized femininity’ involves the risk of increased role encapsulation,

assertiveness is also a risky strategy. It erodes various loyalties, not only towards the

organization and male peers, but also towards other women since support for feminist

militant positions is extremely reduced. It may result in effective segregation either

imposed from the outside or self-induced.

Assertive women are ready to report cases of supposed sexual harassment, to use

the official complaint channels, to ensure respect for existing policies regarding

maternity and family, to denounce failure in promotions or assignments due to women’s

family responsibilities, etc… They are also ready to confront male culture, as in the

frequently mentioned issue of watching porn movies or having posters of naked women

on the walls. Referring to the later situation, a Dutch army captain reports her assertive

behavior:

“I said to those mechanics: I want you to take them down, ‘why? they had been there for years’ and I said ‘I do not care, I accepted this but I do not any longer, I want you to take them down’. ‘Oh, we are going to talk to the commander’ and I said ‘I don’t care to whom you are going to talk to, but I win this, you take them down’” (HA3; 33 years-old Dutch army captain, logistics).

All these strategies are ideal-types. Interviewees have been classified according

to a dominant tendency in their discourses, but some have been included in more than

one type. Change through time also occurs, and various women report having changed

their opinions and behavior in the course of the years. These cases refer usually to

moves from the more cautious ‘conformist’ position to ‘assertiveness’ or from

‘assimilation’ to ‘conformity’. In other cases, reported ambivalence of gender status

makes it difficult to classify certain interviewees:


299

“You should not behave like,’ ok I am a woman and I can not do this and I can not do that’. On the other hand you should not behave like as man because you are not a man, you are a woman” (HAF2; 28 years-old Dutch air-force captain, intelligence analyst).

As expected, there is also a lot of criticism between the adepts of the various

types. Conformist women tend to criticize both emphasized femininity and

masculinization. In turn, those who adopt ‘assimilation’ criticize ‘emphasized

femininity’, and finally those in the ‘accomplice’ category tend to criticize assimilation.

If we look at the distribution of interviewees by the various types (Table 7.3) we see

that the most conservative strategies are clearly preferred: 23 out of 29 women prefer

not to challenge military culture, by choosing to act in a conformist or accomplice

manner. Conformity is by far the most frequent strategy: almost 60% of the

interviewees are classified within this category (17).

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COUNTRY STRATEGIES

PORTUGAL THE NETHERLANDS

TOTAL

Assimilation 3 1 4 Complicity 2 4 6 Conformity 11 6 17

Assertiveness 0 2 2 Total 16 13 29

Although this is true for both Portuguese and Dutch women officers, almost

two-thirds of the former adopt a conformist position (11 in 16) for less than half of the

latter (6 in 13). Compared to their Portuguese counterparts, Dutch female officers

diversify integration strategies, using to a greater extent the more risky responses of

‘complicity’ and ‘assertiveness’. Such eclecticism may relate to the more diversified

organizational orientations found among Dutch women (namely the more self-centered,

hedonistic motivations associated with post-modern values), while the institutional

orientations of the Portuguese might explain the greater percentage of those who opt for

a low profile, non-challenging attitude.

2.2. The perspective of male soldiers

In order to organize and systematize the analysis of male soldiers’ values and

attitudes regarding WMP in a way similar to what has been done for women,

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300

interviewees have been typified according to both their values regarding gender

differences and their opinion concerning the presence of women in the military. The

starting point for this analysis is Battistelli’s typology of male soldiers’ attitude towards

women in the military (Battistelli, 1997c, 1999). This is one of the very few attempts at

describing and interpreting, with the use of qualitative data, the way male soldiers react

to the possibility of having women in the armed forces.208 Despite the fact that it was

originally developed to classify Italian soldiers’ attitudes in a moment where women

had not yet joined the forces, it is a useful starting point for the present analysis.

Additionally, data concerning the way Portuguese and Dutch soldiers make sense of

their experience in a mixed-gender environment –for already 10 and 20 years

respectively— can simultaneously provide a new test for the typology.

Battistelli’s typology organizes the various categories around the two above-

mentioned variables: attitude towards women soldiers, and the conception of ‘woman’

in terms of equality and difference (Table 7.4).209

(�)��9-�D�� (�� (�<��@��

��

Attitude towards women soldiers

Conception of woman Against In favor

Difference -

+

Misogynous

Gentleman

Macho

In need of care

Equality = Antimilitarist Integrationist Source: Battistelli (1997c).

The fact that the characteristics of interviewees in the present research are

different from those in Battistelli’s universe has required some revision and adaptation

208 Kümmel has also tried a typification but using survey answers of German male soldiers (Kümmel, 2002b). 209 Misogynous: thinks of woman as different and inferior to man; is against women’s presence in the military (woman = unfit); Gentleman: thinks of woman as different and superior to man; is against women’s presence in the military (woman = angle); Antimilitarist: supports gender equality but thinks it is not worth that women join the armed forces (military organization = unfit); Macho: thinks of woman as different and inferior to man; supports women military participation in subordinated functions (women- sutler); In need of care: thinks of woman as different and superior to man; supports women’s presence in the armed forces in idealized terms (woman = nurse); Integrationist: thinks of women as equal; supports women’s presence in the military.


301

of the typology (Table 7.5). A general observation is that, from the point of view of

institutional characteristics, I am dealing with a much more homogeneous group: on the

one hand it is exclusively composed of officers, leaving aside NCO’s and enlisted

categories; on the other, as a consequence of this option but also due to the volunteer

nature of officers’ recruitment in both cases, conscripts are absent. All these categories

were present in the Italian samples. Variation here is expected to result more from

variables such as age, type of function or the different national cultural background of

interviewees.

(�)��9�5�

(��;�� '��E�

ATTITUDE REGARDING WMP

ACCEPTANCE (21)

PERCEPTION OF GENDER

DIFFERENCES OPPOSITION (4)

FULL CONDITIONAL

Macho (6) Difference (women’s subordination)

Sexist (3)

-

Pragmatist (4)

Difference

(women’s sublimation)

Traditionalist (1)

- Gentleman (2)

Equality

[antimilitarist] (0) Integrationist (9)

-

* Between brackets the number of cases classified according to the type. N = 25.

With some nuances and readjustments regarding Battistelli’s proposal, the

various types can be described as follows:

Sexist (originally misogynous): The sexist has a negative evaluation of women’s

difference in relation to men and opposes WMP. The presence of women is considered

negative for the organization in general and for his military unit in particular. The best

example of this attitude is expressed in a Portuguese marine’s dramatic statement “If

women come here I will drop my beret”. The symbolic meaning of the beret –

something precious that one only wins the right to use after hard tests of courage,

toughness and manliness – is so important that making such a statement is equivalent to

rejecting his own identity as a soldier.

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Traditionalist (originally ‘Gentleman’): The traditionalist underlines women’s

difference in terms of their supposed virtues and capabilities framed by an idealized

conception of woman. The ideal female image is considered incompatible with military

functions and their military participation is discarded:

“I cannot see a woman combatant as my female ideal, not really. I may accept her but that is not the woman I like. [what is your ideal?] She’s got to have certain fragility and I must feel that I can be a support for that fragility… So that she may feel safe… I cannot think otherwise” (PAF7; 48 years-old Dutch air-force colonel, physician).

Pragmatist: The pragmatist underlines women’s difference due to their physical and

psychological weaknesses, but still favors conditional integration. The prototypical

pragmatist idea is that women’s presence in the military is not good or bad; it is a fact.

Pragmatists believe that the armed forces would function better if they were to remain

all male, but since women joined, the organization has the responsibility to integrate

them if effectiveness is to be achieved. In general, this position coincides with the belief

that women should follow exactly the same standards and requirements as male

soldiers, including those used to evaluate physical aptitudes and training:210

“So let’s see it this way. In the navy we need about 16,000 people to do the work. If we have to take 16,000 people from only men, then you could have a problem with filling all those places. If you can also try to reach girls, women, for those functions, then you have a much bigger group to fill those functions. I think that’s good. Of course, they have to have the same education. You should ask the same for the… the same standards. My experience is that I don’t like to have female problems on board of my ship. I don’t want to be responsible for that. For myself I feel better in a male environment” (HN5, 33 years-old Dutch navy lieutenant commander, logistics).

Macho: Like the Pragmatist, the ‘macho’ type stresses women’s inferiority and favors

conditional integration. However, unlike the previous type, he does not require that

women follow exactly the same criteria as men to access military functions. Instead, he

believes that women’s presence is acceptable only in support functions such as logistics

and administration. In his view, women’s characteristics (weakness) and presence

210 A variation within this type is what we may consider a specifically Portuguese fatalist version of the pragmatist discourse. It stresses the irreversibility and almost ‘fatality’ of the event: women entered the armed forces because there was a political decision and nothing can be done about it; there is no alternative but to comply to the decision: “Well, women’s entrance, sooner or later that was going to happen. It’s not worth resisting or opposing” (PM8). “Right now there is nothing to be done. Integration is unavoidable. For the armed forces it worked –and I believe that is the main reson for women’s recruitment– because it increases 100% the recruitment basis” (PM2).


303

endanger military tradition, performance and values, so they should not join ‘military

specialties’:

“I believe that in the army there are functions where women may perform well, but not here as parachuters! There are women who are very strong, even more than some men, right? But the image of a woman… the image itself creates fragility. That alone makes instruction different, less requiring. The spirit gets lost, that’s my idea” (PE3, 20 years- old, Portuguese Army lieutenant, parachutist)

Integrationist: The integrationist advocates gender equality, believes that the presence

of women is good for the organization and supports the full integration of women. He

recognizes the existence of problems but stresses their systemic more than individual

character and focuses on the need to solve them. This supposedly gender-blind

perspective is frequently associated with the ‘best person for the job’ argument:

“Perhaps every minority will have different problems, a lot has to do with circumstances I think. I talk about making it not an issue as much as possible. To make something a non- issue you must put the right people in the right place, the one who is fit for job. (…) For me it is not about being men or women, but about putting the right person in the right job” (HA4; 30 years-old Dutch army lieutenant, infantry).

Gentleman (Originally ‘in-need of care’): The ‘gentleman’ shares with the traditionalist

a sublimated conception of women but, unlike the latter, favors women’s presence in

the military, if only in traditionally female occupational areas:

“I think that women are more tender. A woman does not fit in a military profession, as warrior. Maybe she can be a soldier, yes, why not? In certain areas it is not necessary to be aggressive. I think women are more oriented for services, communications and logistics. Everything that requires less physical effort. As far as combat is concerned, the nature of women is not adequate to the spirit” (PE10; 35 years-old Portuguese army lieutenan, engineer ).

Although this analysis neither allows nor justifies the identification of

regularities that could then be generalized, the distribution of cases shows some

interesting results.

First, the characteristics of the sample explain to a great extent the typological

distribution of cases, namely the very residual presence of the ‘oppositional’ types

(sexist and traditionalist) and the total absence of the ‘antimilitarist’. The first aspect

certainly relates to a more ‘institutional’ or politically correct discourse on the part of

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officers –not willing to directly oppose what is viewed as an already consolidated, or at

least ineludible, policy measure— than might be expected among the other ranks. The

second aspect, in turn, derives from the absence of conscripts, since it would be – to say

the least- strange to find an officer who was antimilitarist. Nuances within the

‘acceptance’ types led to a separation between full and conditional acceptance.

Second, it should be stressed that these are also ideal types. Individuals have

been classified according to the dominant tendency in their respective discourses. To be

sure, there is also a great deal of ambivalence and even contradictory views revealed in

the same interview just as much as in women’s discourses. On the other hand, if we

consider individuals’ reports of personal change in attitude through time, here again

moving from one type to another is not uncommon. Although this happens on a limited

scale, it is an important element when trying to explain transformations induced by the

presence of women.

Third, national contexts also reveal different distributions (Table 7.6).

(�)��9�7�

�� ;��'��)��0��

COUNTRY

TYPES

PORTUGAL THE NETHERLANDS

TOTAL

Sexist 3 0 3 Traditionalist 1 0 1 Macho 3 3 6 Pragmatist 1 3 4 Integrationist 3 6 9 Gentleman 2 0 2 Total 13 12 25

Dutch officers are more supportive of women’s integration in the armed forces

than the Portuguese: half of the Dutch are coded as integrationist compared to less than

1/4 of the Portuguese. The latter, in turn, are much more dispersed through the various

types. Although some Dutch are coded as ‘macho’, the majority are identified as

integrationist and to a lesser extent pragmatist. In any case, all of them accept women’s

presence in the military, supporting either full or conditional integration.

Only the Portuguese are categorized as sexist and traditionalist, which means

that despite the limited absolute number, all those that oppose women in the military are


305

Portuguese. Besides, they are also the only ones classified as ‘gentleman’, which again

seems to indicate that only Portuguese officers share a sublimated conception of

women’s difference from men211. All these features are consistent with the identification

of Portuguese with a more ‘paleomodern’ vision of reality, whereas the Dutch seem to

have a more clear orientation to modernity. This is confirmed by other elements in the

analysis of the interviews.

If we focus on the problems men soldiers believe result from women’s presence,

a first general observation is that Portuguese men tend to resort to naturalist and

essentialist explanations of women’s difference, whereas the Dutch hardly ever use such

an argument. Instead, the latter have a clearly rationalistic discourse where differences –

whenever identified— are preferentially attributed to social and cultural aspects, such as

women’s education, as well as to organizational mistakes: bad selection at start or

deficient training.

Once again, rationalizations of gender difference resort to global organizational

orientations. Dutch officers have clearly internalized the ‘best person for the job’

official argument, coincident with the modern ‘utilitarian’ discourse; the Portuguese are

much more prone to using ‘pre-modern’ arguments:

“I have the feeling that when a man needs to kill he doesn’t think; a woman may shoot but then she will take care of him… shoots him but then feels very sorry. It is possible that in a group there may be four or five ferocious, but that is not the nature of women. It goes against… I don’t know… whether because of women’s physical and psychological characteristics, because of maternity. Maybe that is a woman’s own nature… I don’t know… unless she is totally crazy as we see in movies, but that must be a mental problem, not because it is woman’s nature.”(PE10, 35 years-old, Portuguese Army lieutenant, engineer).

In any case, independently of the discursive focus, a large number of problems

have been identified concerning women’s presence in military units.

Traditionalist and gentleman types underline the fact that the presence of women

in the military harms both military tradition and values:

“Women: no way! Naval History is History made by men. The opposite is the denial of our history and of our culture” (PM11, 45 years-old Portuguese Navy LtCdr, logistics).

211 A number of factors indicate, however, that this result should be carefully evaluated: the limited number of interviews, which does not allow for generalization; possible linguistic or interviewer effects; and, above all, the existence of some bias regarding the occupational fields of the interviewees since more Portuguese than Dutch come from operational areas.

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However, the most negative criticisms come, as expected, from sexist and

‘macho’ types, who echo the widespread idea that women’s presence harms military

performance (cf Chapter IV). For most Portuguese officers, this is considered a

consequence of women’s lack of physical capacities and of their biological and social

limitations deriving from pregnancy and family commitments. If women cannot

accomplish their tasks, either because they are not strong enough, get pregnant or have

to assist their family and children, the result is work overload for men:

“She stopped flying because she wants to get pregnant. So now I will have to work more because she will get pregnant…that pisses me off” (PAF3; 27 years-old Portuguese lieutenant, pilot).

Perceived inequity is even amplified when sailing assignments in the Navy or

international deployments (in the Dutch case) are at stake. The suspicion that women

may use pregnancy to avoid being sent away is not uncommon. Another current

argument is that the presence of women produces changes in men’s behavior, as for

instance, when it stimulates their protective feelings, which raises security concerns:

“men change to women, if you are in a small group you see… especially with a generation that is not used to the position of women in society. (…)You see especially in the beginning that if the man changes… he will be more protective, a father role or whatever you want to call it. And that’s an operational risk. The safety of your soldiers in the marines is affected, if their effectiveness is affected because their roles are changing (…) so they are not only focused on the enemy. (…) As we are in small groups, in extreme conditions, we say that we don’t want to have a gender tension there… I think that the combat effectiveness – to use that term – will not improve because some of the men will react differently under the presence of women” (HN7; 50 years-old Dutch navy commander, marines).

From the point of view of daily life, especially in more operational areas, the

presence of women is not always welcomed: it is often seen as introducing excessive

informality and producing constraint: men have to control themselves, “watch what we

do and what we say”. Privacy requirements, for instance, are a factor that is considered

to cause tensions and to induce unequal treatment between men and women. Officers

coming from Special Forces or referring to accommodation aboard ships, often stress

the idea that creating special arrangements to ensure women’s privacy is a potential

source of conflict. Sometimes this argument is even at the core of rationalizations for

the exclusion of women from certain specialties. The report of the above-mentioned

Dutch marine officer is enlightening in this respect:

“I think that it is an excellent idea to allow women in positions where they have the same capabilities as men, where they are not limited by physical things, by privacy.


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Privacy limits the quality of work you have to do. On a ship you have quite a bit of privacy. At the beginning of this year I was called in front of the court, in Holland, on discrimination charges. I was involved because the marines banned women from service. I had to explain to the three judges, two of which were women, why we were banning them, why we tried to ban women from the marines. I explained to them that it was on the basis of practical situations where there would be no privacy at all, either for the woman or the man, because they are living so on top of each other that we think that it will influence negatively the work in the marines. (…) I will be very practical. We operate in special areas… if you go there with a group of 8 marines, and to avoid that there is dehydration, every one of the 8 marines has to check how much he is drinking. How do you check that? Every time that they go peeing, we look whether it is yellow or white, if it’s white it’s ok, if it’s yellow then you don’t drink enough, so there is a risk for the group. If you are operating in the jungle, like in the Guyana, where we are operating every 12 hours you check especially here, but also between your legs, if there are any little bloodsuckers. If we have a small group, and we operate in groups of 4 or 8, we have 3 men and 1 woman in the group, then you see something change in men – even in younger men. It is counterproductive. So you send them away. There is no privacy for either side, for the men and the women. For the men don’t undress with a woman present” (HN7; 50 years-old Dutch navy commander, marines).

The reverse side of the coin of women’s acknowledgement and refusal of

‘positive discrimination’ is a very strong reaction against it on the part of male officers,

especially if they are young and Portuguese. Some feel ‘relative deprivation’ and think

they should also enjoy women’s benefits (e.g. preferential treatment by senior officers,

special showers, etc.):

“petty officers have more passions with females. For instance if a girl does something wrong he says, –Oh, it is ok and we will fix it- sometimes if a guy does it wrong he would say, --Oh, you fucked up, what kind of idiot you are. (…) The common idea is that the higher ranking personnel is softer on women and I think that one of the reactions taht can result from it is that, among each other, people are harder for women, so it is like’ if you are friend with the boss you are not friend of mine’” (HN6; 27 years-old Dutch navy lieutenant, administration).

Others complain about disloyal competition (e.g. lower requirements in physical

evaluation:

“Some of my friends wanted to become pilots and maybe they did not get in because they wanted to get a woman who probably had less capacity. That irritated me deeply and it still does” (PAF3; 27 years-old, Portuguese air-force lieutenant, pilot).

Still others believe that the presence of women is the reason for lowering

standards, which is harmful for the institution as a whole.

Among Dutch officers we find a more ‘sophisticated’ discourse regarding positive

discrimination. They prefer to explain women’s inadequacy or failure in terms of

deficient selection procedures and training, and recognize the organizational rather than

individual responsibility. Dutch soldiers emphasize mistakes supposedly made because

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of the political pressure to recruit women. According to various testimonies, standards

were lowered and women did not really comply with existing selection criteria.

Consequently, they were assigned to functions they could not fulfill. This caused

negative evaluations that lingered, leading to the stigmatization of women:

“they could not do their job, it was not their fault because they were not fixed for the job they were put on and it has a negative effect that lasts for years” (HA5, 42 years-old Dutch army captain, administration);

“girls are less skilled than men, because they had to come into the organization” (HN5; 33 years-old Dutch navy lieutenant commander, logistics).

Notwithstanding the variation in discourses, at the bottom line, the paradox

remains and the result of argumentation is the same: either because of their biology,

their physical capacities, their family commitments, or their inadequate selection and

bad training, women should not join operational areas.

To be sure, some interviewees recognize that women have to face a lot of

hardship and hostility (HAF5), that they are discriminated against and treated in a rough

manner, especially those in the enlisted ranks (HN7), that women are ‘encapsulated’ in

specific roles and find it difficult to manage the ambiguity of being a woman and a

soldier; some also recognize that men themselves may be the problem, either because

they did not know how to deal with change, or because they tend to protect and

paternalize women. Sometimes, they resent a similar kind of double bind, as reported by

a 50 years-old Dutch marine officer, regarding an assignment decision:

“Whatever you do, it’s not right. If you give her an easy mission, you are protecting her. If you are giving her the most dangerous mission, they say that you are exposing her to unnecessary risk. That’s not good” (HN7; 50 years-old Dutch navy commander, marines).

Even ‘integrationist’ officers are ready to accept that most men felt initial

difficulties in coping with change. There is mainly on the part of Portuguese officers a

general recognition of initial resistance due to feelings of uneasiness at the beginning.

Besides noting the absence of female officers who could act as role models for younger

enlisted women, male officers recognize that “men were not prepared for it”. But

uneasiness was not only related to hegemonic definitions of masculinity and its

overlapping with the soldiers’ identity. Dealing with practical issues was also

disturbing. Various interviewees report difficulties in talking directly to women about

intimate issues such as those related to the body.


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A common feature of all these reports is that these men do not seem to realize

that they are actually describing mostly problems that result more from men’s attitudes

than from women’s characteristics and behavior.

3. Concluding remarks

After reviewing some of the issues that lie at the core of WMP from the point of

view of the actors involved, at least one question remains to be answered: what changes

do men and women officers think that have taken place since women began to join the

military? Do they identify changes or do they believe that everything remains the same?

If women’s presence in the military ‘shakes’ the existing gender regime, albeit

in a piecemeal manner, and unintentionally, as some believe, we should expect the main

protagonists of change to acknowledge this to some degree. Surprisingly, however,

when asked this question directly, both men and women mention very few changes,

stressing instead superficial aspects related to the global social ‘atmosphere’ rather than

effective structural transformations: less ruthless behavior on the part of men, more

polite language, more relaxed (less macho) atmosphere, etc. This is also true in the

Netherlands, where, due to the longer presence of women, one might expect to find

perceptions of deeper transformation.

A majority of interviewees in the two countries thinks that the dominantly male

culture is not affected by gender integration. How are we to interpret this result?

Reviewing the main conclusions of this Chapter will help to shed further light on this

apparent paradox.

First, it is important to sum up those aspects where variation was found between

the two countries. The global economic and socio-political conditions, which influence

organizational policies of gender integration (Chapter VI), are equally related to

different value orientations at the micro level of interpersonal processes. As far as

women are concerned, this is particularly visible in a few issues. A first aspect relates to

motivations for initial enlistment: Portuguese female officers reveal significant

‘institutional’ motivations whereas the Dutch stress ‘postmodern’ reasons; this tendency

matches global organizational characteristics in the two countries; a second area refers

to the conciliation of work and family. All female officers perceive their family roles as

one of the greatest obstacles to their career development. However, unlike the

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Portuguese, if Dutch women have to choose between work and the family, they give a

clear preference to the latter. This is probably related to the positive economic climate

in the country (which makes it easier for Dutch women to leave and later to reenter the

labor market), but also to features of the global value-system such as the strong Dutch

maternalistic ideology associated with an individualistic work ethic.

As far as men are concerned, Dutch officers not only reveal a more positive

attitude towards gender integration (especially those men in support functions) but they

also have a more rationalistic discourse concerning women and the problems caused by

their presence in the military. Although there are not many differences between

Portuguese and Dutch males in terms of motivations to join the military (postmodern

factors are prevalent), their arguments reveal a rather different value pattern. In many

senses Dutch officers have a modern individualistic and efficiency-based discourse that

contrasts with the Portuguese focus on natural and traditional arguments. This again

matches overall organizational orientations towards modernity.

But beyond variation at the national level, there is a striking resemblance

between the negative consequences or hardships associated with WMP which are

mentioned by the interviewees and those identified in the literature on gender relations

in atypical contexts. Notwithstanding the different rationales used to justify problems

caused by gender integration, or even the various response patterns, there is a certain

level of cross-cultural stability of cognitive models of gender, visible in a set of other

issues:

a) Women officers in the two countries report symbolic and material obstacles to

integration that reproduce well-known patterns of segregation of women in atypical

occupations: performance pressures resulting from excessive visibility, social

isolation and role encapsulation. Very few, however, identify these problems as

‘discrimination’ in a negative sense. On the contrary, they feel far greater

resentment about the existence of ‘positive discrimination’, both in the form of

special policy measures and in the paternalistic attitudes of higher-ranking men.

b) Female integration strategies tend to be conservative: a majority responds to

organizational and cultural constraints in a ‘conformist’ manner, trying to play down

their difference and creating distance from the women’s group. They tend to

criticize other women who adopt supposedly inadequate integration strategies or

those who accept favoritism, rather than criticizing the organization, which issues


311

the policies associated with ‘positive discrimination’. This is particularly clear with

regard to the question of different physical standards. The objectivity of measures is

rarely questioned, whereas men’s perception of relative deprivation is interpreted as

‘understandable’;

c) Most problems described by men relate more to men’s attitudes or organizational

deficiencies than to women’s supposed inadequacies.

Therefore, the diagnosis of the absence of structural changes may be seen as

consistent with the reproduction of well-known mechanisms in the global dynamics of

gender relations.

To be sure, the results also show that there are inconsistencies, ambiguity and

paradoxes which point not only to the complexity of individuals’ adjustment to

structural arrangements but also reveal the way whereby the ‘gendering’ process at the

individual and interactional levels is often more flexible and contradictory than what

might be predicted. One of these contradictions refers to the impact of policies aimed at

promoting gender integration, especially in the case of the Netherlands, where, unlike

Portugal, these policies actually exist. Throughout the interviews, both men and women

made puzzling references to this topic. There is not only a general tendency to minimize

the importance of several policy measures, but some of them were even looked at with

suspicion. This is true of the strong resentment against positive discrimination,

perceptions of inequity derived from different physical requirements, the ambivalent

evaluation of part-time measures, resistance to women mentors, devaluation of the

importance of courses aimed at promoting gender equality, etc.

These references suggest a disturbing possibility as far as the evaluation of

organizational policies and programs aimed at promoting gender integration is

concerned: that the efficacy of policies will be limited by the way in which individuals

interpret them; or more, that policies aiming at formal integration may turn out to work

against social integration. Cultural values regarding masculinity and femininity as well

as those concerning women’s social roles can work as countervailing forces in the

process of WMP, even when all other conditions are favorable.

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Conclusion

The issue of women in the military has always been and is likely to remain one

of the most controversial in the study of military institutions. It has been a focus of

political conflict whenever questions such as citizenship rights, conscription, or wartime

mobilization have been discussed; it is also an extremely sensitive topic in debates of

cultural conceptions of gender or women’s social status.

Policy debates but also supposedly scientific perspectives have often reflected

ideological and normative points of view. Positions range from those who vehemently

oppose the presence of women in the armed forces, to those who accept women’s

presence in some areas, to those who welcome full integration. Within the multiplicity

of perspectives, some “strange quasi coalitions” have been identified (Kummel, 2002a:

617; Battistelli, 1997c: 31). This is the case of the apparently surprising convergence

between those who manage war and those who oppose it: between military

conservatism and pacifist feminism, both opposing the military participation of women.

Feminist theories on women and the use of military force reflect this

controversiality. Opposite views exist with regard to the general question of the

legitimacy of military force as well as with regard to the distinctiveness of women's

status in war and peace. Positions range from revolutionary feminist's defence of the

'right to fight', to pacifist, antimilitarist, radical standpoints; from Sara Ruddick's

'maternal thinking' to Tickner or Elshtain's refusal of the 'discriminatory' equation of

women with peace.

Most confrontations regarding the military participation of women or the roles

and functions they should perform, ‘operationalized’ this controversy by opposing

citizenship concerns to military efficiency. Although rationales have varied on each side

of the divide and the strict opposition between ‘rights’ and ‘readiness’ has been

considered a very inaccurate way of dealing with the problem, the debate is pervasive

and persistent. Democratic values concerning civil rights and citizenship are set in

opposition to military readiness and efficiency, as if endorsing one set of values would

involve a full rejection of the other.

All these discussions are important elements in the social and political history of

the problem of WMP and reveal the extent to which the military is a ‘privileged

observatory’ of gender dynamics, of the fascinating process through which history is


313

frequently transformed into nature and cultural contingencies into natural categories.

According to this perspective, the military can be considered an ‘exaggerated instance’

of global social trends, a setting where gender and sexuality are enacted in ways that are

more obvious both to insiders and observers than is the case in other organizations. The

integration of women in the military reveals a ‘critical-situation’, when a pre-existing

order is questioned, threatened, or deviates from its main organizing principle. This

helps explain the paradoxical nature of the debates and the process of women’s military

participation alike.

Factors affecting WMP: a synthetic account of empirical results

The history of women’s military participation shows that they have

systematically been excluded from warfare as warriors or have participated only in

exceptional circumstances. However, it also shows that when they have been involved

their participation has often been made invisible in the historical account of military

institutions. And yet, as clear as these exclusion and omission patterns are, so too is the

evidence of women’s systematic presence as combatants in revolutions, liberation wars,

partisan warfare as much as in auxiliary roles in regular international wars during the

XX century. But again, in all these cases, at the end of the war they were expected to

give up military roles and return to their traditional domestic sphere. Historical evidence

points to the durability of received cultural images of gender relations.

However, when, in the early ’70s, women began to join the armed forces with an

explicitly military status, new questions started to be raised: to what extent had these

changes contributed to revert the historically dominant patterns? What factors explained

variation in women’s military roles, cross-nationally and over time? Despite the

growing body of social science literature on this topic, it was necessary to wait more

than two decades to see the first steps being taken in the comparative study of women in

the military. In this research I have tried to contribute to this comparative effort and to

find some of the missing answers.

Taking the existing interpretative models of factors affecting women’s military

roles as a starting point, I proposed a more accurate definition of the dependent variable

‘women’s military participation’. At the macro analytical level this variable was

operationalized around various dimensions referring to both quantitative and qualitative

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indicators: besides structural variables such as the overall representation of women in

active duty forces, occupational sex segregation, and rank distribution, policy variables

have been considered regarding segregation practices, formal limitations in occupational

and hierarchical terms, and also implementation of social policies.

The comparison between NATO countries along these various dimensions

revealed some fundamental features concerning women’s military roles:

• At the turn of the century, women’s numerical representation in the armed forces

ranged from total absence (as was the case of Italy in 2000) to a significant 14% in

the United States. However, despite a notable increase in representation levels,

global percentages still pointed to a ‘token’ situation: women represented less than

15% of the active military forces in every country.

• The occupational distribution of military women revealed a strong cross-national

segregation pattern. Available data showed that more than two thirds (70.4%) of

military women were concentrated in support and medical functions, 17.5% in

technical areas and only 7% occupied positions in the more operational areas.

• Due to their very low absolute numbers, women had an extremely limited

representation in the various ranks. Despite the absence of legal limitations to their

hierarchical progression, female representation in the various ranks and promotion

conditions were still limited in formal and informal ways.

• Although in a few cases the possibility of women’s conscript recruitment was

foreseen in the case of general mobilization or war, all countries had incorporated

women on a strictly volunteer basis. Despite the fact that most of them did not

impose formal quantitative limitations on women’s recruitment, representation

levels have been conditioned by both formal mechanisms (rank restrictions,

establishment of maximum ceilings), if only in a few cases, and more extensively by

informal practices and arbitrary decision-making regarding women’s recruitment

and assignment. There were, however, other cases where recruitment difficulties

have forced the military to define recruitment ‘goals’ in terms of female

representation.

• There was also great variation between countries in terms of social policies aiming

at eliminating discrimination and promoting gender integration. Those countries that

had made more progress in terms of representation and occupational and


315

hierarchical desegregation were also those where specific policies concerning the

conciliation of work and family, equity monitoring and sexual harassment had been

implemented. In other countries these policies were totally absent.

All these variables have been used to build an index of gender inclusiveness that

classifies the NATO countries in terms of the degree to which they integrate women in

the armed forces. Without aiming at a complete test of the explanatory model, I then

moved to test the plausibility of some hypothesis that relate identified independent

factors to the various degrees of WMP. The results of this ‘large N’ analysis can be

summarized as follows:

As far as time effects are concerned, results show that, against existing

expectations, a longer presence of women in the ranks does not imply a consistent

increase in their relative numbers. Although time is positively correlated to the overall

degree of gender inclusiveness, this is only true for the group of countries that score

higher in inclusiveness. This means that time is positively related to the integration

process only when other conditions are met. Data support the idea that time, by and in

itself, does not automatically foster gender integration or contribute to eliminate

existing discriminations in terms of occupational or hierarchical segregation.

The hypothesis ‘the greater the percentage of conscripts in a country’s active

forces, the lower women’s numerical representation’, was confirmed. As expected,

evidence showed that the ‘organizational format’ of the armed forces affects

representation: the more a force relies on volunteer personnel, the higher is the

percentage of women. Inversely, the closer a military body is to the mass-army format,

the lower is female representation. However, the impact of the ‘conscript ratio’ seems to

be higher on relative numbers or hierarchical integration than it is in terms of

occupational role diversification.

Some ‘external’ variables related to the social-economic and political structures

seem to have a negligible influence over numerical representation of women in the

military but a significant impact on their global integration. Still, one must distinguish

between those factors that concern women’s ‘simple presence’ in the system, which are

not responsible for relevant variation in the qualitative status of military women, and

those referring to women’s ‘qualified’ presence, which relate significantly to gender

inclusiveness in the military. Against expectations, indicators of women’s ‘simple

presence’ in the system, such as women’s labor force participation, do not relate either

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to women’s representation or to gender inclusiveness. Instead, indicators of women’s

‘qualified presence’ such as the tested ‘gender empowerment measure’ reveal a stronger

relationship.

In sum, even considering the limited range of variation within NATO212, this

analysis has showed that WMP clearly reached higher levels in countries more exposed

to the democratization of gender relations in society at large and to external political

pressures to achieve gender equality in the military. Likewise, gender inclusiveness is

higher where the military has opened up to society due to organizational shifts towards

professionalization and where gender equality policies have been implemented in the

armed forces. Contrarily, and regardless of the moment when women joined the

military, in countries where those external influences have not been felt with the same

intensity, where the military remains closer to a mass-army format, were women have

not reached a ‘qualified’ position in the social structure, there are lower levels of gender

inclusiveness in the military. This points to potential spillover effects from society into

the military organization.

Given these results, I hypothesize that change towards greater gender equality in

the armed forces will not occur automatically as a consequence of time or the increase

in relative numbers. It will probably depend much more on the extent to which external

variables, such as women’s ‘controlling’ presence in society at large will determine

policy orientations and decision-making processes within the armed forces. Results of

the comparative case study confirm this hypothesis but introduce interesting ‘nuances’.

Data show that the causal process may be more complicated, especially when it comes

to evaluating the impact of policies on gender integration.

Portugal and the Netherlands have a different performance in terms of WMP.

Looking closely at indicators of the situation of women in the respective armed forces

revealed that their different positions in the ranking results not so much from

quantitative representation or hierarchical integration, but from occupational structure

and the existence of specific policies aiming at gender integration. Portugal presents a

more segregated pattern in terms of service and occupational distributions, with a much

lower representation of women in operational functions. Comparatively, the

Netherlands has a much more balanced distribution of women in the various branches

212 This calls for new tests of the hypothesis in broader empirical instances.


317

and within the occupational structure. While in the former country the process of

women’s recruitment has been marked by a dominantly instrumental approach,

consistent with a general lack of policies (a model referred to as ‘ex-post pragmatism’),

the Netherlands has, from the very beginning, issued plans of affirmative action which

developed into active policies aiming at managing diversity in the armed forces.

I have tried to show that these different approaches are consistent with global

social and organizational conditions, namely those regarding the impact of ideologies of

gender equality on military policies and the organizational move towards the

professionalization and ‘civilianization’ of the armed forces. However, there were also

puzzling features in the identified gender incorporation patterns. Notwithstanding the

different policy approaches, the two countries showed an unexpected tendency to

converge in some aspects where one might have expected major differences: relative

numbers and hierarchical distribution. Having started ten years later, Portugal

performed better than expected, showing a surprising tendency to accelerate integration,

even if only in the formal dimensions of inclusiveness. A few indicators were

surprisingly positive, considering both the absence of policies and a more

‘institutionally’ oriented military: representation of women has grown rapidly, formal

restrictions have been eliminated in a short period of time, and the number of women

applying for a military career is still high. Contrarily, the Netherlands performed worse

than might be expected, considering the efforts to promote equality at the global

governmental and military levels, and the prevalence of a clearly more civilian oriented,

‘postmodern’ military structure. Not only do women not feel attracted by the military,

but attrition prevents them from reaching higher hierarchical levels. Due to the

existence of a more competitive opportunity structure for women in society at large,

earlier progress in gender integration in the armed forces has not been easily sustained.

These results support the previous conclusion regarding the effects of time over

gender inclusiveness: apparently time has not helped correct the observed numerical

imbalance and uneven rank representation in the Netherlands. But the same results do

make us rethink the conclusion regarding the impact of policies, or at least reconsider

the conditions under which their efficiency may be blocked.

In the case of Portugal, the absence of policies does not seem to have affected

formal integration –at least thus far. However, it is also true that, because of a delayed

professionalization process, Portugal has not felt the impact of recruitment shortages

HELENA CARREIRAS

318

that have had such an effect on personnel management in the Dutch military; nor has it

felt extensively the impact of ‘erosion’ factors that may determine women’s options in

the future. In the Netherlands, the existence of policies, which determine a more

positive climate regarding the integration of women, does not seem to be sufficient to

keep them in the forces.

The analysis of the interviews revealed information that helps solve the puzzle

by shedding light on the importance of structural and cultural factors on individuals’

attitudes and decisions. It showed how cultural values concerning gender relations and

the social roles of women may limit or jeopardize the supposedly positive effects of

policies, thus functioning as countervailing forces in the process of WMP. If military

men feel overly pressured by institutional policies or these are interpreted by both men

and women as sources of inequity, blatant resistance to women’s integration “may fade

only to be replaced by more subtle, covert forms of discrimination and hostility”

(Yoder, Adam and Prince, 1983: 334). Organizational policies that discourage negative

behaviors against military women may not be as vital as some have supposed for the

failure or success of the integration process.

This hypothesis, which calls for further research (specifically designed to

evaluate the impact of policies on integration), coincides partially with those

perspectives that stress the limits of formal policies in redressing cultural entrenched

stereotypes (Katzenstein and Reppy, 1999). According to this standpoint, the real

problem is the clash between aspects of military culture that promote intolerance and

official policies on gender integration, and not necessarily the lack or inadequacy of

policies. However, the existence of contradictory findings, that is, accounts of situations

where institutional policy seemed to help change negative attitudes of male soldiers

towards women (Yoder, Adams and Prince, 1983; Rosen et. al., 1996), warns against

linear conclusions. It suggests instead the need to analyse the conditions under which

the efficacy of policies may vary, considering both external contextual variables (e.g.

institutional anchorage; articulation or conflict with policies of other gender regimes)

and internal features (flexibility vs. rigidity, stability vs. volatility, coherence,

coordination, forms of implementation and control), as well as its different impact on

global patterns or interactional patterns. In any case, the present results support the idea

that policies may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to ensure the sustainability

of the process of gender integration in the military.


319

These conclusions should help readdress a number of issues discussed

throughout the thesis.

Feminist theories, gender interests and women’s military participation

Against most normative feminist theories, this thesis underlines the need to

situate historically the analysis of gender relations. It contends that gender does not

have an epistemological or ontological primacy in explaining social reality (no more

than any other category of social analysis). However, it also tries to highlight the fact

that the military can be considered a gendered organization, not only because it is

structurally patterned through gender lines, because it is male-dominated, or because it

is ideologically conceived in terms of gender divisions – even if most of these features

are present - but mainly because characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity

and femininity (Connell, 1987) have some degree of ‘explanatory power’ in the

production, allocation and control over material and symbolic resources.

In this sense, this research departs from essentialist perspectives of gender,

which tend to conceive women as a group with common interests. These perspectives

ignore the social struggles around the definition of interests, as precarious products,

socially identified and mediated, subject to change and dissolution.

Empirical evidence shows that women in the military do not act as a group with

common interests. In fact, conflict among women regarding both the definition of an

ideal professional role and of adequate integration strategies is overwhelming. My

research points to the existence of multiple definitions of interests, framed by structural

and interactional contexts and constraints. For instance, the ‘practical’ interests of

women who seek for more rights and use ‘voice’ to assert their claims seem to be at

odds with those of women who identify as their interest the preservation of female

identity and believe that it may be accomplished by resorting to ‘accomplice’

integration strategies.

This does not deny the possibility that some women’s gender interests be

identified or that groups are formed on the basis of perceived common goals. As

mentioned in Chapter III, women’s groups have fought, in various instances, for a

number of identified interests such as the right to serve in a variety of military

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320

functions.213 However, the dominance of conservative answers to integration dilemmas,

the hostility towards ‘feminist’ action, and the conflictive pattern of female interaction

suggest that these women do not share a common ‘strategic’ interest in subverting

dominant patterns of gender inequality in the military, as some feminist theories

assume.

A non-essentialist and relational view of gender relations also militates against

those proposals that try to identify supposedly ‘objective’ women’s interests with regard

to military participation. Due to their predominantly normative focus, these perspectives

fail to account for the state of play of gender relations in the military. This is the case of

some radical feminist’s contention that it is in women’s interests to oppose the military,

seen as a basic patriarchical institution. Sharing with marxist feminists a vision of

gender as a global system of domination of women by men (patriarchy), these

approaches ‘demonize’ men as a supposedly unitary category responsible for the

victimization and oppression of women. By doing so, they fail to acknowledge and

explain the variety of women’s experiences in the military (including their willingness

to join or not to join the armed forces), the way how local gender regimes may depart

from the global pattern, as well as the variety of men’s positions regarding power

hierarchies and their potentially divergent ‘interests’ regarding women’s military

participation.

The same can be said about pacifist and maternal feminism’s equation of women

with peace and their consequent dismissal of women’s military participation. Likewise,

there seems to be little evidence to support the opposite, but equally essentialist,

revolutionary feminist contention that women have a fundamental interest in

participating in armed struggle whenever it becomes necessary to fight against unfair

social, economic or political orders.

While underlying the importance of policies, namely its relation to formal

integration, this research also warns against the linear and simplistic liberal feminist

presumption that gender inequalities can be erased by direct political action such as

legislation and positive action. In the U.S., feminist activists in the military have

engaged in an influence-seeking, liberal-like, interest-group type of protest

(Katzenstein, 1998), fighting for better laws, policies and education. They have had a

213 This has mainly happened in the U.S., where organizations such as DACOWITS or NOW have lobbied for expanding the opportunities for military women.


321

significant impact on policy decision, driving military authorities to open up positions to

women, change policies on academy admission, keep sexual harassment on the agenda,

etc. However, these forms of protest did not have great influence over the

transformation of cultural meanings that ensue when these issues are discussed.

According to Katzenstein, “the low reliance on discursive politics (…) has detracted

from the power of uniformed activists to challenge the authority of the institution”

(Katzenstein, 1998:170).

Neverthless, accepting the importance of ‘discursive politics’ should not imply

an understanding of gender only (or mainly) in terms of discursive differences or

symbolic systems of meaning, as post-structuralist feminists claim. While empirical

results suggest that cultural values and norms may have an enormous impact on framing

the objective reality of organizational policies, as well as individual behavior and

options, these are always situated options framed by context. As noted by Connell,

“practice cannot float free of its circumstances” (Connell, 1987: 95).

From the point of view of the interest reasoning, the idea that the definition of

interests may relate to a “controlling presence” confronting conditions of choice in the

system is not only theoretically more attractive but it also seems to have empirical

support. The finding that women’s ‘qualified’ presence in society has a strong

relationship with the level of integration of women in the military (if compared to

women’s ‘simple’ presence which does not), suggests that change towards greater

gender ‘inclusiveness’ may be fostered by an increase in women’s ‘controlling’

presence in the social and political realms, independently of what concrete definitions of

gender interests arise.

Military organizational change and women’s motivations

Studies on military organizational change and gender diversity have shown that

there is a clear relationship between the organizational format of the Armed Forces and

the representation of women. The more the armed forces are based on conscript forces,

the lower the presence of women, and vice-versa. Besides confirming that finding, this

research showed that all-volunteer systems of military service tend to be more gender

inclusive than conscript-systems. But one question that remains to be discussed is how

organizational models affect both the acceptance of women and women’s motivational

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322

patterns (to join or leave the military). Despite the fact that there is no direct overlap

between army-format and the global ‘institutional’ or ‘occupational’ organizational

trends described in the original Moskos’ model, the ‘institutional’ orientation has been

identified with larger mass-army forces and limited women’s employment, while the

occupational trend has been associated with smaller volunteer-based militaries,

increased female representation and greater career opportunities to women.

Likewise, the predicted changes in military organizations towards ‘postmodern’

features imply that greater cultural acceptance of diversity will favor greater formal

integration of women. Within this framework, recently proposed by Moskos, Williams

and Segal (2000), looking at the role of women is considered to be a particularly

revealing way to understand the trend towards postmodernism. While in the modern

period women were typically excluded from service, in the late modern period separate

corps were generally abolished, though restrictions persisted and the numbers of women

remained small. In the post-modern period, in turn, pressures have grown to incorporate

women into all assignments, including combat roles. While recognizing that those states

that have made more formal commitments are more likely to carry out integration, the

authors also note that “de jure policies do not automatically translate into de facto

opportunities, and domestic interest groups know they must use both legal and political

instruments to ensure that they do”(Moskos, Williams and Segal, 1999:270).

Although the model does not include any prediction regarding individuals’

propensity to enlist in the military, it implicitly assumes that greater acceptance of

women (at least in formal terms) may increase the attractiveness of the military activity

and thus foster women’s willingness to join. However, empirical evidence is

contradictory in this respect.

Previous studies have highlighted a paradox: against the predictions of the

occupational thesis, women have often adopted ‘institutional’ motivations to join the

armed forces. It has been hypothesized that to the extent that those orientations are

diluted at the organization level, women’s commitment will suffer. Likewise, the

dilution of these characteristics and values in ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’ type of forces

may result in a decrease of attractiveness. On the other hand, if young women are driven

by postmaterialistic values, which are at odds with perceived organizational

‘institutional’ or ‘ocupational’ orientations, their willingness to join or stay in the armed

forces may also be affected. The congruence or distance between perceived


323

organizational values and individual expectations is thus crucial. This problem, which

has been largely neglected in studies of organizational change in the military, reveals

tensions that are likely to affect not only the future of gender integration, but also global

personal management policies in the military.

Social change and the future of WMP

Addressing the problem of change with regard to the presence of women in the

military is a risky endeavor. Three decades is a short period in terms of ‘institutional’

time. If general conclusions, such as those proposed here, must always be interpreted

with caution, this is even more so when it comes to drawing possible scenarios and

trends.

The conclusions of this research entail a somewhat pessimistic view regarding

whether greater gender inclusiveness in the military will contribute to change or ‘shake’

the gender regime of the Armed Forces. To be sure, once normative perspectives are put

aside, empirical results do not allow for optimism. Above all, there is evidence that

women are still tokens in the military and are likely to remain so in the near future.

Besides minority status, gender ‘inapropriateness’ in a profession that is normatively

defined as masculine still accounts for women’s lack of organizational power and

influence. But most of the problems military women have to face – performance

pressures, blocked mobility, social isolation or sexual harassment – result from tensions

that are not revocable ‘by decree’ and that exist also beyond the military context. Two

main aspects are worth underlining: first, the persistence of a shared cognitive model

that support gender asymmetries; second, the disproportionate share of work and family

responsibilities between men and women.

With regard to the former, a puzzling conclusion of most studies on gender

relations is the durability of the asymmetry of representations of maleness and

femaleness (Amâncio, 1992, 1994), which remains relatively untouched by objective

changes in men’s and women’s activities. Although rationales to explain gender

differences may vary, this cognitive model –in which stereotypical male characteristics

are associated with the abstract, universal notion of individuality and female

stereotypical traits are ‘particularized’ and identified within the private space of family

and emotions- is still prevalent. Additionally, research has shown that men and women

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324

generally share the normative assumptions of the this model and reproduce them in their

behavior. Therefore, the reproduction of practices that institutionalize gender

inequalities, despite possible strong pressures for change, can be partially explained by

the fact that most women share with men the dominant and asymmetric cultural model

of gender relations.

A similar process has been identified in the military. Women’s military activities

have changed during the past decades, as they have been formally integrated in military

structures in unprecedented ways. The index of gender inclusiveness shows that, despite

the observed heterogeneity, some countries have reached high levels of integration.

However, even in such cases – e.g. the Netherlands– cultural resistance to women’s

presence is among the factors that are pushing women away from the military. Besides,

the way in which men and women officers make sense of the difficulties of gender

integration, as well as women’s conservative responses to integration dilemmas, help

sustain the idea that it is the ubiquitous existence of that asymmetric cognitive model

which prevents structured conflict to emerge.

With regard to the latter aspect, the conciliation of work and family, this

research has confirmed previous findings that relate patterns of women’s presence in the

labor market and problems in women’s career advancement to their options regarding

conciliation between family and work. General research has shown that despite change

towards greater equality between men and women in the share of domestic

responsibilities, the latter still undertake a disproportionate amount of both housework

and childcare. Women who choose or are constrained to combine both roles do often

face ‘structural ambiguity’: the choices in one sphere depend on the opportunities,

incentives and obstacles posed in the other. Interview data in this research has provided

information to evaluate how this factor – the conciliation between two ‘greedy’

institutions - may condition military women’s career advancement. While Dutch and

Portuguese female officers have reached a very similar ‘objective’ situation in terms of

their share of organizational power (i.e. similar hierarchical representation), differences

in attitudes and values are striking. This seems to happen not only because the perceived

opportunity structure is different – situation in the external labor market; characteristics

and requirements of military missions – but also because women’s values regarding

both the meaning of the military profession and family, differ considerably. More

‘institutionally motivated’ and committed to the ideal of career development,


325

Portuguese women tend to subordinate family to work; the Dutch, on the contrary, more

driven by a ‘post-modern’ conception of the military profession and clearly more

receptive to the general ideology of ‘maternity’ dominant in society at large, tend to

adopt the opposite attitude. Still, in both cases, the potential role conflict is

acknowledged and women officers seem to accept that, if they choose to pursue a

career, they may have to adapt to lower professional expectations or otherwise decrease

their career investment. Considering that other works have also shown that marriage and

maternity affect military women’s propensity to reenlist and condition their professional

ambitions, we may expect this pattern to be reproduced in the future. Even in the case of

Portuguese women, the contradiction between, on the one hand, the symbolic

orientation towards career development and gender equality and, on the other, the

reality of female subordination in the domestic sphere, raises skepticism as to whether

value orientations towards ‘modernity’ will be followed by congruent ‘modern’

practices.

The idea that polices may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for

integration – i.e. that their impact, while positive on formal integration, may not always

be so on social integration - suggests that conditions for change do not depend strictly

on formal organizational policies. Greater inclusiveness in WMP will probably depend

on change regarding women’s ‘controlling’ presence in society, its impact on cultural

conceptions of gender relations and on a more balanced distribution of domestic and

paid work between the sexes.

This conclusion may sound disappointing as far as the possibility of eliminating

obstacles to gender integration in the military is concerned. It certainly is if one shares

the view that “the perception that women’s subordination persists despite profound

changes in their economic and political activities suggests that status does not depend

on reaching a fixed position in the social order” (Higonnet et al. 1987: 2). However,

there is no reason to believe that equality will be achieved or perceptions will be

changed in the absence of formal equality and fair representation. If reaching objective

positions in the social structure does not guarantee equality (i.e., is not a sufficient

condition for), not reaching them will certainly ensure the reproduction of inequality.

HELENA CARREIRAS

326

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APPENDIXES

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SEGAL ISKRA ET. AL. KUMMEL

Social Structure

Social Structure

Society

HYPOTHESIS

Demographic patterns Idem Demographic trends When the supply of men does not meet the demand for military labor, women are drawn into service (Segal) Women’s labor force participation

Idem Structure of working population

The greater the percentage of women in the labor force, the larger will be their representation in the armed forces (Segal)

Labor force characteristics

Occupational sex segregation

Idem Gendered segregation of professions

[Not linear]The more gender integrated the civilian occupational structure, the greater the acceptance of women in military roles (Segal)

Economic factors State of the economy Idem Economic development High unemployment rates (especially among young men) are associated with a ready supply of men to serve in the armed forces and relatively low opportunities for women in the military (Segal)

Family structure Share of family responsabilities

Idem Family patterns The greater the family responsibilities for the average woman, the less women’s representation in the armed forces (Segal)

Culture

Culture

Culture

Values regarding ascription and equity

The greater the emphasis on ascription by gender (and thereby the less the emphasis on individual differences) the more limited women’s military roles (Segal)

Social values about gender equality

The more egalitarian the social values about gender, the greater women’s representation in the military (Segal)

Social construction of gender and social values about gender

Traditionalism (?)

Idem

Social construction of gender roles

The greater the proportion of religious fundamentalists in a country, the less women’s representation in the military (Segal)

Social construction of family and social values about family

Idem Social construction of the family;

The greater the movement away from traditional family forms, especially those based on nuclear family, the greater the representation of women in the military (Segal)

Public discourse regarding gender Idem Discourse on gender roles in society

[Superficial reference to religion, race and language] - Norm system of masculinity, femininity and family

Social construction of military Social values about force, power, domination

Key social values: power, equity

The greater the emphasis on power, authoritarianism, hierarchy and conformity, the more limited women’s participation in the military (Iskra et.al.)

Military

Armed Forces

Armed Forces

Level of threat (In political factors) (In international environment)

At the high end of threat to society, women’s military roles increase (Segal) In societies with low threats to national security, but with cultural values supporting gender equality, women’s military participation also increases (Segal) The extent of women’s participation in combat jobs will be minimized when there is a medium threat (Segal)

National security situation

Nature of military missions

Purpose/function of the armed forces

Military missions The greater the relative importance of actual war fighting (especially ground combat), the less the participation of women (Segal) The more offensive or aggressive the function or purpose of the armed forces is perceived to be, the more limited women’s participation. The more defensive the armed forces is perceived to be, the greater women’s participation. (Iskra et.al.)

HELENA CARREIRAS

358

Military technology Idem Idem [Not linear] The more technologically advanced a military, the greater the participation of women (Segal) Combat to support ratio - Idem Women’s involvement in military operations is negatively affected by the proportion of combat jobs (Segal) Force structure - - To the extent that combat functions are concentrated in the reserves, compared to active duty forces, women

will have higher representation in the reserves (Segal); In those cultures where mothers are not viewed as deployable, and the reserves constitute a large proportion of military forces, women will be less represented in military occupations (Segal)

Military accession policies Idem Idem Women’s military participation tends to increase under voluntary accession systems (Segal) Subculture ideology Changing images of war The more elitist and warrior-like the views of the members of the armed forces, the more limited the

participation of women (Iskra et.al) Organizational structure Idem The more bureaucratic and hierarchical the structure of the armed forces, the less women will participate

(Iskra et.al) Subculture demographics -

Leadership

Level of women’s integration

Soldierly Interactions

Political

Politics

National Security situation - Civil-military relations Idem In states with stable, well-defined, legitimate civilian-led governments, women’s participation in the armed

forces will be greater than in states where the military as an institution exercises substantial influence over political process (Iskra et. al.)

Political ideology of those in power

Idem The more liberal the political ideology of the political leadership in the state, the greater women’s representation in the armed forces (Iskra et.al.) The more egalitarian the public policy initiatives of the ruling power, the greater the rate of participation of women in the armed forces (Iskra et. al.)

Current leadership Political system and leadership

Public policy regarding race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality,etc.

Idem

Sources of change other than armed conflict

Modes of political change The greater the diversity of methods and opportunities for non-violent social change that exist in a historically patriarchal and discriminatory society, the less likely are women to join the armed forces (Iskra et. al.)

Parties and organized interests

Law Media International environment

Security political context Civil military relations

abroad

Armed Forces in foreign countries

International military cooperation

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HELENA CARREIRAS

360


PHD THESIS Gender and the Military: a Comparative Study of the Participation of Women in

the Armed Forces

Researcher: Helena Carreiras

COUNTRY SURVEY

The following survey is part of a comparative sociological study of the participation of

women in the Armed Forces of NATO countries. The goal of the research is to identify and

analyse the factors that explain and condition women’s military roles in each country. It also

aims at exploring relational dynamics, challenges and prospects for gender integration in the

Armed Forces.

Considering the lack of cross-national scientific research in this area and the difficulty in

collecting comparable data, your help in providing the required information is absolutely

crucial. I would therefore ask you to fill in this survey, and further, in doing so, I would

appreciate if you could give your answers according to the format provided in order to allow

valid comparisons. This sometimes may not be possible, due to the specificity of national

databases and to the variety of institutional situations. Where this is the case, please include the

maximum amount of information possible, adding specific notes whenever you feel this is

necessary in order to understand the particular case.

Hopefully, the research findings will help support informed decision-making, policy

definition and monitoring of the process of women’s integration in the Armed Forces at the start

of a new millennium. I will, off course, send you the results of my study as soon as they are

available.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

(Helena Carreiras)


361

Country: .......................................................................

1. Could you please fill in the following statistical tables?

*Please include as much data as possible, even if not complete. Refer to active duty personnel.

You may also add specific notes and complete the tables whenever necessary*

1.1 Total numbers of active duty personnel by service (year 2000)

Branch/Service Male Female Total

Army

Navy

Air Force

Total

Notes:................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................……………………………………………….

1.2. Previous evolution

(Number and percentage of women in the total force, by service and year)

Year (aprox) Army Navy Air Force Total

N % N % N % N %

1970 ( )

1980 ( )

1990 ( )

1994

1998

HELENA CARREIRAS

362

Notes:................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

1.3 Functions

(Number of Men and Women by occupational group and service. Complete the table if applicable)

Army Navy Air Force

Total Occupational

Groups M W M W M W M W M W M W

Operations (combat

arms)

Support (Personnel

/Admin./Finance)

Technical

(Engineer/Comm.)

Medical/Professional

Total

Notes:................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

1.4 Rank distribution (number of Men and Women by rank and service. Complete the table if applicable)

Army Navy Air Force

Total

Rank M W M W M W M W M W M W

Officers (OF6 and +)

Officers (OF4-OF5)

Officers (OF1-OF3)

NCO’s

Enlisted

Cadets

Total


363

Notes:................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

2. Recruitment

• Who (which body/entity...) is responsible for the definition and co-ordination of policies

concerning women’s presence in the Armed Forces?

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................................................................……………….

• Are there quantitative limitations on the number of women to be recruited?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

• Is there a quota/ceiling system defining the percentage of women to be recruited?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes, can you describe it?

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

• Are the recruitment requirements different or identical for men and women?

Identical [ ]

Different [ ]

HELENA CARREIRAS

364

If there are differences, can you describe them?

………………………………………………………………………..............................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................……………………………

• Are there presently any specific recruitment programs aimed at women?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes, can you describe them (or enclose examples)?

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................………………………….

• Can you provide statistical information about the number of women applying to the Armed

Forces (including Military Academies and Schools) across time?

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

3. Training and education

• Is basic training integrated or separated?

Integrated [ ]

Separated [ ]

Notes:...................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................................................................…………………


365

• Are there identical or different standards for physical tests and training?

Identical [ ]

Different [ ]

Notes:................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

• Are there any differences between men and women in the access criteria and educational

standards in Military Academies and Schools?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes, can you describe them?

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

.................................................................................................................................................…….

• During exercises and field operations, are there gender mixed or separated units?

Mixed [ ]

Separated [ ]

Notes:………………………………………………………………………………………………

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

4. Employment and career development

• Are there areas/functions that are closed to women?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

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366

If yes, which one(s)?

...................................................................................................................................……..

..........................................................................................................................................................

For what reason(s)?

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.......................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

• If in your country servicewomen have the formal possibility to access some combat related

functions, to what extent are they actually assigned to these positions?

To a large extent [ ]

To a certain extent [ ]

To a limited extent [ ]

• Do service members have the possibility of doing part-time work?

Yes, both men and women [ ]

Yes, only women [ ]

No [ ]

• Are there formal restrictions on women’s access to certain hierarchical positions?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

If yes, what are the existing restrictions?

……………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………….............................................................................................................

....................................................................................................................................................

• Is the promotion system identical or different for men and women?

Identical [ ]

Different [ ]


367

Notes:………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………......................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

• Can you provide some information on attrition rates (number of those who fail to

accomplish their initial enlistment) and of those who reenlist ? (as far as possible

chronologically)

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

• Can you provide some information about the participation of service women in

humanitarian and peacekeeping missions (number deployed,functions,etc…)?

………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

5. Family policies and social relations

• Are there specific regulations concerning pregnant servicewomen ?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

HELENA CARREIRAS

368


……………………………………………………………………………………………..............

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

....................................................................................................…………………………………..

• Are there specific measures or programs dealing with the conciliation of work and family

life (e.g. maternity and parental leave, childcare facilities, dual career couples, etc… )?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]


…………………………………………………………………………………………………..…

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

• Are there specific regulations concerning sexual harassment and/or fraternisation between

service women and men? If yes, can you describe them?

………………………………………………………….....................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.............................................................................................................................................

.........................................................................................................................................................

..........................................................................................................................................................

4. General information • Is there in your country some specific organ/commission/program dealing with issues of

discrimination and gender equity policy in the services? If yes, can you describe its

attributions and activities?


369

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

• What would you say is the main challenge(s) or difficulty(ies) regarding the process of

women’s recruitment and career development in your country?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

• Could you please add some references of your knowledge about studies published in your

country on the experience of women in the Military (produced by the Armed Forces, the

Defence authorities or other civilian authors and institutes)?

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………………

• Is there any thing else you would like to add?

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

Service or person who filled in this survey:

………………………………..........................................................................................................

THANK YOU VERY MUCH!

HELENA CARREIRAS

370

��/�5��

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Countries Formal restrictions Type of service Recruitment Programs

Recruitment Problems

Belgium No limitations Quota until 81 in Military Academy

Voluntary. 1984: possibility of joining in conscript terms. No success. Suspended in 1995 for all

Recruitment limited by personnel reduction. Difficulties in recruiting for short time

Canada No limitations Voluntary Long term recruiting goals (40% in Army and navy; 27% Air Force) ‘Aggressive’ campaign to increase women in combat arms. Programs in 3 services.

Attrition and retention problems

Czech Republic

No limitations Ceiling for military universities abolished in 1999

Voluntary No programs No identified problems (high number of candidates)

Denmark No limitations Voluntary 1998: possibility of joining in conscript terms

Aggressive recruitment campaign focusing on female role models

Recruitment shortages

France No limitations Quotas abolished in 1998

Until transition to AVF: Possibility of joining in conscript terms

No programs Possible male recruitment shortages

Germany No Limitations. Occupational restrictions until 2000

Voluntary No programs No identified problems

Greece Limited to 10% of service academies

Voluntary. Legal possibility of conscription in case of war or whenever decided by MoD

No programs (high number of applicants)

No identified problems

Hungary No limitations Voluntary No programs No identified problems Italy - - - -

Luxembourg No limitations Voluntary No program No interest of women in a military career

The Netherlands

No limitations Voluntary Ergonomics project; recruitment campaigns

Recruitment shortages and retention. Target of 12% in 2010

Norway No limitations Voluntary. Possibility of joining in conscript terms

Active campaign Recruitment shortages. Target of 7% in 2005

Poland No limitations Voluntary No programs No identified problems


371

Portugal No limitations Voluntary No programs Possible male recruitment shortages

Spain No limitations Voluntary No programs Male recruitment shortages

Turkey Ceiling of 4% in service academies

Voluntary No programs No identified problems (high number of candidates)

UK No limitations Voluntary Specific advertising for women

US Navy and Army establish recruitment goals based on limitations on billets open to women. Navy limit by posts aboard ships

Voluntary Comprehensive recruitment programs but not specifically for women

Recruitment shortages

Source: Organizational Survey, Annual Reports of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces

* The decision to admit women in the Italian Armed Forces was taken during the research data collection phase. At that moment, some general rules have been issued, namely the creation of ceilings for women (20% of the places in military academies and 30% in the enlisted ranks).

HELENA CARREIRAS

372

��/�5��

(��,�(1��###$ Training standards Countries

Segregation in basic training

Physical tests/training Non Physical selection criteria

Belgium No Identical (from 1986: new gender neutral tests) Different until 1981

Identical

Canada No Identical (Army : Gender free physical test)

Task based physical standards

Identical

Czech Republic No Different tests and standards Identical

Denmark No Different

Identical until 1999

Identical

France No Different Identical

Germany No Different Identical

Greece Partial (NCO’s and Navy have segregated training)

Different Identical

Hungary Yes Different Identical

Italy - - -

Luxembourg No Different Identical

The Netherlands No Identical Identical

Norway No Different (raised for men and women in 1999)

Identical

Poland Partially (officers segregated in field exercises)

Different Identical

Portugal No Different Identical

Spain No Different

Identical until 2000

Identical

Turkey No Different Identical

UK No Identical (Army)

After 1999 PSS replaces ‘gender fair’ tests

Other branches: no physical tests. Gender free tests in some trades

Identical

US Partial (Marine Corps)

Service specific fitness tests identical for men and women but with different physical standards

Identical

Source: Organizational Survey, Annual Reports of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces


373

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�Occupational areas

Support + Medical

Operational

(combat arms)

Technical

(eng/comm)

Other

Countries Formal restrictions

MW W MW W MW W MW W

Belgium No restrictions 26.8 46.7 24 8.8 49.2 44.5 - -

Canada214 Restricted from submarines 20.2 59.5 20.8 4.6 59 35.9 - -

Cz.Republic No restrictions 61.7 66.8 31 19.9 7.3 13.3 - -

Denmark No restrictions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

France Restricted from all functions implying direct contact with hostile forces and promiscuity

n.a. 69.8 n.a. 6 n.a. 13.5 n.a. 10.7215

Germany Restricted from all areas except medical service

n.a. 100 n.a. - - - - -

Greece216 Restricted from all combat areas 33.9 87.9 30.4 - 35.7 12.1

Hungary No restrictions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Luxembourg No restrictions 67.5 93.1 20.5 6.9 11.9 - - -

Italy - (Women allowed in 2000) - - - - - - - -

The Netherlands217

Some areas closed on grounds of effectiveness and practical reasons (marine corps, submarines)

n.a. 67,1 n.a. 22,5 n.a. 10,3 - -

Norway No restrictions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Poland Restricted from combat areas n.a. 100 n.a. - n.a. - - -

Portugal No restrictions

Areas closed in Navy: submarines, divers, mine-clearance

50.2 67.5 34.4 8 15.3 10.4 - -

Spain No restrictions n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

214 Only officers.** M+W refers only to men (data for 1998). Technical/Operational MOC in Navy and Air Force counted in Technical. 215 Gendarmerie and ‘others’ 216 Only Air Force and Navy; data not available for the Army. 217 Data only regards army women with long-term contracts for 1998 (CWNF, 1998).

HELENA CARREIRAS

374

Turkey Restricted from some combat areas (armored corps, infantry and submarines)

n.a. 89.2218

n.a. 10.8 - - - -

United Kingdom

Restricted from infantry, armored corps, cavalry, marine corps, mine-clearance divers and submarines.

AF: 96% positions open; Navy: 73%; Army: 70%

28.3 63.2 30.5 16.2 36.8 20.6 4.4 2.7

United States

Restricted from direct ground combat positions. Over 80% jobs and 90% career fields open in all services

49.2 70.2 20.4 6.6 26.6 18 3.8 5.2219

Source: Organizational Survey and Annual Reports from the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces

218 Support and technical functions. 219 Non rated.


375

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1.Formal restrictions from combat functions

(0 total; 1 many; 2 few; 3 none)

2. Percentage of women in traditional functions

(0 = 100%- 90%; 1 =66% -89%; 2= 50%-66%; 3 = - 50%)

3. Percentage of women in operational functions

(0= None; 1 = - 7%; 2 = 7%-15%; 3= +15%)

4.Assignment to combat-related functions

(0 = no assig.;1= limited extent; 2= certain extent; 3 = large extent)

Index (1+4)

0 - 12

Belgium 3 3 2 2 10

Canada 2 2 1 2 7

Czech Republic 3 1 3 1 8

Denmark 3 (2) (2) 3 10

France 2 1 1 2 6

Germany 0 0 0 0 0

Greece220 0 1 0 0 1

Hungary 2 (1) 1 1 5

Italy - - - - 0

Luxembourg 3 0 0 0 3

Netherlands 2 1 3 1 7

Norway 3 (2) (2) 2 9

Poland 0 0 0 0 0

Portugal 2 1 2 1 6

Spain 3 (1) (1) 1 6

Turkey 1 1 2 1 5

United Kingdom 2 2 3 2 9

United States 2 1 1 2 6

Note: Cf. Appendix 5.9 for methodological notes to the index. Scores between brackets are based on qualitative information due to the absence of precise statistical data.

220 Only Air Force and Navy. Data non available for the Army.

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376

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Officers NCO’s Enlisted Total

MW W %W MW W %W MW W %W MW W %W

Belgium 5079 227 4,5 17789 1021 5,7 19266 1945 10,1 42134 3193 7,6

Canada 13219 1562 11,8 43029 5101 11,9 57441 6663 11,6

Czech Rep. 14240 502 3,5 9481 1433 15,1 34479 0 0,0 58200 1935 3,3

Denmark 4262 112 2,6 5393 168 3,1 8499 716 8,4 18154 996 5,5

France 49816 704 1,4 121209 15152 12,5 146275 11202 7,7 317300 27058 8,5

Germany 50724 428 0,8 123418 2425 2,0 148942 455 0,3 323085 3308 1,0

Greece 22137 942 4,3 39367 5263 13,4 104166 0 0,0 165670 6205 3,7

Hungary 10666 640 6,0 9654 2317 24,0 23120 0 0,0 43440 2957 6,8

Luxemb. 54 0 0,0 176 5 2,8 456 23 5,0 686 28 4,1

Netherl. 9709 516 5,3 23636 1021 4,3 20189 2611 12,9 53534 4148 7,7

Norway 11645 619 5,3 1076 80 7,4 18144 274 1,5 30865 973 3,2

Poland 37782 234 0,6 91928 5 0,0 110940 0 0,0 240650 239 0,1

Portugal 6623 313 4,7 16244 693 4,3 13051 1750 13,4 35918 2756 7,7

Spain 19640 622 3,2 28816 45 0,2 69801 7595 10,9 118257 8262 7,0

Turkey 100323 864 0,9 244098 0 0,0 294579 0 0,0 639000 864 0,1

U.K. 31076 2589 8,3 98045 5321 5,4 74180 7834 10,6 203301 15744 7,7

U. S. 196125 29562 15,1 540693 59297 11,0 628178 104984 16,7 1364996 193843 14,2

Total 583120 40436 6,9 1414052 99347 7,0 1714265 139389 8,1 3711437 279172 7,5

N.B.: In the cases of Portugal, Spain and Denmark percentages were calculated excluding conscripts. Percentages refer to total within each hierarchical category.

In the cases of France, Poland, Germany and Turkey absent totals (MW) by category, necessary to calculate percentages were estimated on the basis of remaining NATO countries average (Off=15.7%; Nco’s = 38.2%; Enlisted = 46.1%)

* In Canada, the categories NCO and enlisted are aggregated and counted under NCO’s


377

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1. Formal rank restrictions

(0- Yes; 3 – No)

2. Percentage of women in officer’s corps

(0=0-1; 1 = +1-5%; 2=+5-10%; 3= +10%)

3. Index (0 - 6)

Belgium 3 1 4

Canada 3 3 6

Czech Republic 0 1 1

Denmark 3 1 4

France 3 1 4

Germany 0 0 0

Greece221 0 1 1

Hungary 0 2 2

Italy 0 0 0

Luxembourg 3 0 3

Netherlands 3 2 5

Norway 3 2 5

Poland 0 0 0

Portugal 3 1 4

Spain 3 1 4

Turkey 0 0 0

United Kingdom 3 2 5

United States 3 3 6

Note: Cf. Appendix 5.9 for methodological notes to the index.

221 Only Air Force and Navy. Data not available for the Army.

HELENA CARREIRAS

378

��/�56�3� ��/��@�� +��,�(1�3� �> ��###$�

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1. % of women in total force

(0 = 0-1%; 1=+1-5%; 2=+5-10%;3 = +10%

2. Formal occup. restrict. (0 total; 1 many; 2 few; 3 none)

3. % of women in traditional functions

(0 = 100%- 90%; 1 =66% -89%; 2= 50%-66%; 3 = - 50%)

4. Formal rank restrictions

(0- Yes; 3 – No)

5. % of women in officer’s corps

(0=0-1; 1 -+1-5%; 2-+5-10%; 3- +10%)

6. Trainning segregation

0= total; 1-=partial; 2= none)

7.Family programs

(0=no; 1= yes)

8.Harassment and equality monitoring

(0=no; 1= yes)

Total

(1+8)

0 - 19

Belgium 2 3 3 3 1 2 0 1 15

Canada 3 2 2 3 3 2 1 1 17

Czech Republic

1 3 1 0 1 2 0 0 8

Denmark 1 3 (2) 3 1 2 1 1 14

France 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 11

Germany 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 3

Greece222 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 4

Hungary 2 2 (1) 0 2 0 0 0 7

Italy - - - - - - - - 0

Luxembourg

1 3 0 3 0 2 0 0 9

Netherlands

2 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 14

Norway 1 3 (2) 3 2 2 1 1 15

Poland 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1

Portugal 2 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 11

Spain 2 3 (1) 3 1 2 0 0 12

Turkey 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 4

United Kingdom

2 2 2 3 2 2 1 1 15

United States

3 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 15

Note: Cf. Appendix 5.9 for methodological notes to the index. Scores between brackets are based on qualitative information due to the absence of precise statistical data.

222 Only Air Force and Navy. Data non available for the Army.


379

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The indexes are not supposed to reveal absolute positions, from total exclusion to complete inclusion. While having a low score means almost total exclusion, having the highest score by no means signifies full integration; a concrete score merely indicates a relative position between countries. The country with the highest score is simply the one that has reached the highest level of gender integration within the selected set of countries. 1. Index of Women’s Occupational Integration (IWOI)

• Formal exclusion from combat functions: Measurement: 0= total restrictions; 1= many restrictions; 2= few restrictions; 3= no restrictions Note: Specialities classified as ‘combat functions’ refer to the operational areas in ‘combat arms’: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry.

• % of women in traditional functions: Measurement: 0= extremely segregated (90%-100%); 1= segregated (66%-89%); 1 = Partially segregated (50% - 66%); 2 = Not segregated or balanced (50% or -). Note: Percentages refer to the total number of women in each country (unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain data which would allow to calculate the percentage of women within each occupational area).

• % of women in operational functions

Measurement: 0 = no presence; 1 = limited presence (7% or less); 2 = significant presence (+ 7 - 15%); 3 = very significant presence ( more than 15% ). Note: Percentages refer to the total number of women in each country (unfortunately, it was impossible to obtain data which would allow to calculate the percentage of women within each occupational area)

• Assignment to combat related functions

Measurement: 0 = no assignment; 1 = limited extent; 2 = certain extent; 3 = large extent. Note: This information was provided in the organizational survey. It is not based on precise statistical information, but on the subjective evaluation of the person who filled the questionnaire.

2. Index of Women’s Hierarchical Integration (IWOI)

This index varies between 0 = lower integration and 6 = higher integration. It was built with only two variables: ‘formal rank restrictions’ and ‘percentage of women in the officer’s corps’. The formal exclusion of women from the enlisted categories in a significant number of countries would introduce a strong bias if that variable (percentage of women in the enlisted ranks) were to be included. Unfortunately it was also not possible to include as a variable in the index another of the analyzed indicators: ‘distribution of women inside the officer’s category’ due to the absence of data for a number of countries.

• Formal rank restrictions: Measurement: 0-yes; 3 – no Existence of rank restrictions refers to formal exclusion of women from certain categories such as the enlisted ranks in the cases where enlisted personnel is only composed by conscripts

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(Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Greece and Turkey), or where there are limitations to women’s access to service academies (which again is the case of Greece and Turkey where there are ceilings for women of 10% and 4% respectively), and Germany (until 2000) where women’s access to military academies was limited due to existing functional restrictions.

• % of Women in the Officer’s Corps Measurement: identical to that of global representation: 0 = extremely limited presence ( 0-1%); 1 = limited presence (+1 - 5%); 2 = significant presence (+ 5% - 10%); 3 = very significant presence (+ 10%). Within an overall limited presence of women in the forces, the term ‘significant’ is of course to be understood in relative terms. Note: Percentages refers to the total numbers in each rank category.

3. Index of Gender Inclusiveness in NATO (IGI)

This index varies between 0 = lower inclusiveness and 19 = higher inclusiveness, and includes some of the variables of the partial indexes (variables 2 – formal occupational restrictions, 3 – percentage of women in traditional functions, 4 – formal rank restrictions, and 5 – percentage of women in the officer’s corps) as well as four others:

• Percentage of women in the total force Measurement: 0 = extremely limited presence ( 0-1%); 1 = limited presence (+1 - 5%); 2 = significant presence (+ 5% - 10%); 3 = very significant presence (+ 10%). Within an overall limited presence of women in the forces, the term ‘significant’ is of course to be understood in relative terms.

• Trainning segregation (basic training) Measurement: 0 = total segregation; 1 = partial segregation; 3 = no segregation Note: partial segregation refers to situations where women have separate training but only in specific trades or specialities.

• Family programs Measurement: 0 = yes; 1 = No Note: The variable is dichotomous, indicating not the intensity or effectiveness of policies and/or programs, but merely its presence or absence.

• Harassment and equity monitoring policies Measurement: 0 = yes; 1 = No Note: The variable is dichotomous, indicating not the intensity or effectiveness of policies and/or programs, but merely its presence or absence.


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This is a request for your collaboration in an international sociological study of the

participation of women in the Armed Forces, which is the subject of my PhD thesis at the European

University Institute in Florence. This research is being conducted in different countries and I have

chosen Portugal and The Netherlands as two central case studies.

Concretely, I would like to interview you about your own experience in the Army, as well as

have your personal opinion and evaluation about the process of gender integration in the Dutch

Armed Forces. I will thus ask you questions about your choice to join the Military, your training and

work experience and your opinions regarding women’s integration in the services.

The interview is, of course, totally confidential and your participation in this research must be

exclusively on a voluntary basis.

Your contribution is crucial for the success of the study. I thank you in advance.

Helena Carreiras

(Sociologist – European University Institute/Florence)

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Dutch Women Officers Code Age Rank Function/unit Family

Status InstitutionalOrientatation

Integration Strategy

HA1 24 1st Lt. Medical Service/Army Academy

Married/0 PM Conformity/ Assimilation

HA3 33 Captain Logistics/personnel management

Married/0 O Assertiveness

HA6 40 LtCol Logistics/central staff Married/0 PM Conformity HA7 41 Captain Communications Single /0 I/PM Assimilation HA8 27 Captain Logistics/Signal

Battalion Single /0 PM Complicity

HN2 37 LtCdr (Major)

Administration/personnel management

Married/3 O Conformity/Complicity

HN4 27 LtSenGr (Captain)

Weapons engineering Married/0 PM Complicity


Logistics/supply officer PM/I Assertiveness

HN10 50s Captain (Colonel)

Administration PM Complicity

HAF2 28 Captain Intelligence analyst Married/1 I/PM Complicity HAF3 39 LtCol Electronics Married/0 PM Conformity HAF4 39 Captain Helicopter Pilot Single /0 PM Conformity HAF7 50 Major Administration Married/0 O Conformity Portuguese Women Officers Code Age Rank Function/unit Family


Integration Strategy

PE1 31 Lt Parachutist Married/1 I Conformity PE5 39 Captain Veterinarian Married/2 I/O Conformity/

Assertiveness PE6 Lt Administration Single/0 PM Complicity PE7 Alferes Administration Single/0 PM Assimilation PE8 27 Lt Administration Single/0 PM/I Conformity/

Complicity PM1 35 1st Lt.

(Captain) Medical service/Doctor Married/3 O Conformity

PM3 24 2nd Lt. ‘Marinha’ Single/0 PM/I Conformity PM4 31 1st Lt. Psychologist O Conformity PM6 Cadet Administration (Naval

Academy) Single/0 O Conformity

PM10 25 2nd Lt. Administration Single/0 I/PM Conformity PAF1 24 2nd Lt. Navigator Married I Conformity/Ass

imilation PAF2 27 Lt Meteorologist Single I/PM Complicity/Con

formity PAF4 26 Lt. Engeneer Married/0 I Conformity PAF5 27 Lt. Air Force Police Single/0 I Assimilation PAF10 30 Lt. Pilot Married/0

(pregnat) I Conformity

PAF12 27 Cadet Pilot Single PM Assimilation/Assertiveness


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Dutch Male Officers Code Age Rank Function/unit Family


Attitude towards WMP

HA2 50 Major Logistics Married/2 O Integrationist HA4 30 1st Lt. Infantry Single /0 O Integrationist HA5 42 Captain Personnel officer Married/2 O Integrationist HA9 26 Lt. Signal Battalion Single PM/I Integrationist HN1 45 Captain

(Colonel) Administration/supply officer

Married/2 PM Pragmatist


Weapons Engineer Married/1 I Macho/Integrationist

HN5 33 LtCom (Major)

Logistics O Pragmatist


Administration PM Macho

HN7 50 Commander Marines Married/2 PM Macho/Pragmatist

HAF1 27 Captain Intelligence Married/0 PM Integrationist HAF5 54 Major (Ground defense

Air base) Married/1 O Macho

HAF6 51 LtCol Communications Married I Pragmatist Portuguese Male Officers Code Age Rank Function/unit Family


Attitude towards WMP

PE3 20 Lt. Parachutist Single/0 PM Macho PE4 22 Alferes Parachutist Single/0 PM Macho PE9 51 Lt Colonel Cavalry Married/2 I Integrationist PE10 35 Lt Engineer Married/1 O Gentleman PM2 30s LtCdr

(Major) ‘Marinha’ Commander of vessel

Married/1 I/PM Macho

PM5 27 2nd Lt. Marines Single/0 I/PM Sexist PM8 40 Cdr

(Lt. Colonel) Naval Engineer Married/2 I Pragmatist

PM9 29 Lt. Marinha Married/0 PM Sexist PM11 45 LtCdr

(Major) Logistics Married/2 I/PM Traditionalist

PM12 42 LtCdr (Major)

Administration Married/1 I Integrationist

PAF3 27 Lt. Pilot Married/0 PM Sexist/Pragmatist

PAF7 48 Colonel Doctor Married O Gentleman PAF9 36 Major Pilot Married/2 PM Integrationist Policy Makers

Code Name Position HPM1 Colonel Leight Deputy Director of Personnel - Ministry of Defense

(NL) HPM2 Lt Col. Eleke Overbeke Equal Opportunities Officer - Dutch Army

President of the Committee on Women in the NATO Forces (NL)

HPM3 Lt. Marjan van Damme Representative of Navy women at the CWINF (NL)

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HPM4 Appointment Officer/Department of Personnel – Dutch Navy (NL)

HPM5 Art Dekker Ministry of Defense (NL) PPM1 General Oliveira Simões Director General of Personnel - Ministry of Defense

(Portugal) PPM2 General Porto Director of Military Academy (Portugal) PPM3 Chief-of-staff of Air Force (Portugal) PPM4 Lawyer /Personnel Department – Navy (Portugal)


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A. Personal/institutional identity - I/O/PM Orientations

[Motivation to join/ meaning and perception of the Military]

Let’s start at the moment when you first joined the…………

• When did you first decide to join the Armed Forces? Have you ever though of joining this occupation before then? Describe to me how you came to decide to join. What were you doing then? What were your options? Have you though of having another profession? Which one? Is anyone in your family a servicemember? Did you discuss your decision with him/her? What were the reactions of your family/friends to your decision?

• Why did you decide to join? Why did you choose this branch? What was your image of the service/military at the time? What did you consider to be the positive features of…? And the drawbacks?

• To women: did you have any hesitation about joining because of your sex?

• What were your first impressions?

B. Training and Education

• Describe to me your training experience. Have you a specialization? How did you come to select this particular one?

• To women: In basic training do you think you were treated any differently because of your sex? Were you excluded from any aspect of training?

• Is there any part of your training that you would like to see changed? Do you think that there is a particular type of woman/man who is most likely to succeed in basic training? Is there a particular type who is unlikely to succeed?

• How many men/women were there at your class in the Military Academy? (Develop experience in Academy)

C. Employment and Career Development

• Could you describe your employment history? Where do you work now? Do you like your present job?

• How many men/women work with you at your present job? Have you ever faced problems with your peers because of your sex? With your superiors?

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With those under your command? Do you know anyone who has experienced discrimination?

• In your unit, do you think male and female soldiers are expected to achieve the same standards? If you compare their performance, what would you say?

• Do you think women and men are better suited for particular roles in the ….? Are there some functions where women/men are more likely to succeed?

• In your unit, how well do you think male and female soldiers work together as a team?

• Do you prefer to work with men or with women?

[ Future Perspectives and Expectations]

• How do you evaluate the development of your career until now? How did initial expectations match reality?

• Where would you like to work in the future?

• Where do you see yourself in ten years time?

• Do you think of leaving the....? Why? Under which conditions would you leave?

D. Leadership and Rank Relationships

• Is it different to command/train men and women? How?

• Does your supervisor equally encourage female and male soldiers to succeed?

• Do you think there is any difference between men and women in terms of their leadership/command styles? Which ones?

E. Gender Relations and Women’s Integration

• What do you think are the main characteristics of a man/a woman?

• During the time that you’ve been in the ......, have things changed? Did women’s presence produce changes? Was the institution prepared to accommodate women? Did women adjust? Did men adjust? How?

F. Fraternization, Socialization and Culture

• Do you socialize more with men or with women?

• What do you think about the fraternization rules?


387

• Sexual Harassment

G. Deployments and Combat

• Have you ever been deployed to missions abroad? Would you like to? Can you describe to me your experience(s)?

• Are there any differences between garrison and deployment situations in terms of gender relationships? Can you give me examples?

• Would you like the chance to serve in combat?

H. Family issues

• Are you married? Do you have children? Do you expect to marry and have children? If you had a daughter/son, would you encourage him/her to enter the Military?

• How do you feel about the part time leave? Have you/would you consider that possibility? Which are the advantages/ and the disadvantages?

• How do you do to conciliate work and family life? I. General issues

• Tell me about one good/bad experience in the Military • What do you think would have to happen to attract more women to the

Armed Forces? Are these things likely to happen? • If you had to do it all over again, would you enter the…. What would you

have done differently?

• Reaction on policies

• Why do you think women leave the ....? Do you think it is good to recruit more women?

• Sometimes there are measures of positive discrimination toward women. What do you think about it?

• If you had to define policies .......

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OFFICERS

Army/Air Force Navy

OF10 Fiel Marshall Admiral Fleet

OF9 General Gen Admiral Adm

OF8 Lieutenant General LGen Vice Admiral Vadm

OF7 Major General MGen Rear Admiral Radm

OF6 Brigadier Brig Commodore Cdre

OF5 Colonel Col Captain (Navy) Capt(N)

OF4 Lieutenant Colonel LtC Commander Cdr

OF3 Major Maj Lt Commander LtCdr

OF2 Captain Capt Lieutenant Lt

OF1 Lieutenant 1st Lt SubLieutenant Sublt

OF1 Second Lieutenant 2nd Lt

Officer cadets

OTHER RANKS

OR9 Warrant Officer Class 1 Warrant Officer

OR8 Warrant Officer Class 2

OR7 Staff Sargeant Chief Petty Officer

OR6 Sargeant Petty Officer

OR5 Sgt PO

OR4 Corporal Corp Leading Rating Led R

OR3 Lance Corporal

OR2 Private (classes 1-3) Able Rate

OR1 Private (class 4/junior) Ordinary Rate/Junior

OR1 Private Priv Junior Rating Jun Ra