framing international migration
TRANSCRIPT
Framing international migration
Sara Dehm*
Brian Opeskin, Richard Perruchoud & Jillyanne Redpath-Cross (eds),
Foundations of International Migration Law (Cambridge UP, 2012)
Jeremy Harding, Border Vigils: Keeping Migrants Out of the Rich World (Verso,
2012)
Sandro Mezzadra & Brett Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of
Labor (Duke UP, 2013)
This article brings into conversation three books that touch on the relationship
between international law, institutional authority and human mobility. Read
together, these books prod international lawyers to question where different
jurisdictional schema locate authority and to notice the particular ends at stake
in framing human mobility.
PRELUDE: FRAMING MIGRATION AS AN INTERNATIONAL
MATTER
To coincide with the United Nations General Assembly High Level Dialogue on
Migration and Development (HLD) held in October 2013, the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) launched an online campaign, entitled
‘Migrants Contribute’.1 Using the format of a simple, stylised website, the cam-
paign aims to ‘change the conversation’ about migration by putting forward the
‘real facts’ about migrants and promoting an understanding of the ‘bigger pic-
ture’ of how migration shapes our world. To do so, the website narrates the
* Senior fellow and PhD candidate, Melbourne Law School, The University of Melbourne; Visiting
Fellow, Faculty of Law, The University of New South Wales. Email: [email protected]. I am
indebted to Anne Orford, Ben Silverstein, Julia Dehm, Stephen Humphreys, Sundhya Pahuja and
two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions and astute readings of earlier versions of this
text, which have sharpened my reading of the books under review.
1 IOM, Migrants Contribute, available at: http://www.migrantscontribute.com/ (last visited 5 January
2015).
London Review of International Law, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2015, 133–168
doi:10.1093/lril/lrv004� The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.For permissions, please email: [email protected]
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‘moving’ stories of 11 people, each presented as notable migrants who have
‘boldly’ started new lives in different countries. There is, for example, the
smiling face of Carlos, a Peruvian doctor practising in Angola; Adrienne
Clarkson, the former child-refugee who went on to become, amongst other
things, the Canadian Governor General; and ‘globetrotting’ student Vera,
who temporarily migrated from her country of birth, Germany, to undertake
a degree at an elite North American university. For the IOM campaign, these
portraits represent the contemporary faces of migration, shining a ‘spotlight not
on where migrants come from, but on what they bring’, including not only
‘diverse skills, new points of view, and . . . determination and courage’, but
also—notably—an estimated US$592 billion dollars in remittances to their
home countries in 2012. Through such accounting, migrants—both as individ-
uals and as a collective—are depicted as overwhelmingly beneficial and desir-
able subjects, as forces that should be ‘harnessed’ for productive social,
economic or political ends and as actors who need to be placed at the
‘centre’ of the conversation: ‘instead of being the passive subjects of enquiry,
migrants should be given the opportunity to tell their stories’.2
The IOM’s ‘migration-positive’ campaign reflects the contemporary inter-
est that international institutions have shown in the regulation of human move-
ment across national borders and in the mobilisation of migrants as
participatory subjects of global development efforts. For example, at the 2013
HLD—only the second such event dealing with migration to be held at the
UN—institutional actors stressed the need for an ‘effective and inclusive’ inter-
national agenda that promotes the ‘freer and safe movement of people across
borders’ while also respecting the human rights and dignity of migrants.3 These
Dialogues, sitting alongside other recent institutional initiatives such as the
state-led Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), are heralded
as an important step towards actualising a broader project of ‘managed migra-
tion’ that seeks to promote ‘safe, orderly and regular’ forms of migration. For
the IOM, the paradigm of ‘managed migration’ means developing a ‘fully and
effectively functioning’ international migration management system (including
the increased use of border surveillance and enforcement technologies and
other regularisation techniques) that simultaneously reduces forced and ‘ir-
regular’ migration while encouraging ‘voluntary migration through authorized
channels’. Such a globally-managed system, if implemented properly, the IOM
suggests, can ‘restor[e] the element of choice to individuals and governments’,
2 IOM, World Migration Report: Migrant Well-Being and Development (IOM, 2013) 176.
3 UN General Assembly, Declaration of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and
Development, GA Res. 68/L.5, 1 October 2013.
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meet the ‘needs of the global economy and mobile populations’ and ultimately
lead to benefits for countries of departure and destination as well as the
migrants themselves.4
Yet outside the UN compound in New York, the framing of migration was
a radically different affair. The previous day, a vocal protest had gathered in
Washington Square Park to convene the fourth International Assembly on
Migrants and Refugees (IAMR) over three days in response to the UN HLD.
Organised primarily by the Philippines-based International Migrants Alliance
(IMA), the IAMR is an international grassroots-level dialogue of migrants and
refugees that seeks to foreground the human consequences of poverty- or
conflict-induced migration. Calling on the UN to abolish the GFMD, the
IAMR argues that migration, in its current form, neither can nor will lead to
economic development in the Global South.5 Instead of a ‘process’ that can be
reformed, the IAMR frames mass labour migration as a political, social and
economic ‘concern’ that stems from underdevelopment in countries of origin
and that must be addressed through structural changes.6 In contrast to the IOM
campaign, the stories foregrounded at the IAMR counter-event included that of
Maria Peniche-Vargas, a 22 year-old undocumented activist, who had spent a
fortnight in US immigration detention as part of the Dream 9 campaign for US
immigration reform, and 14 year-old Saul Arellano, whose mother had been
deported from the US to Mexico in the previous year. Their testimonies spoke
to the lived reality of the institutional policing of state borders, individual
bodies and recognised rights, and emphasised the issues many migrants deal
with on a daily basis, including ‘family separation, labour exploitation, wage
theft, detention, deportation, criminalization and discrimination’. In asserting
the presence of those disempowered by the global ordering of mobility, the
IAMR expressed a public rejection of the ‘managed migration’ paradigm’s at-
tempts to shape life through the commodification of human mobility and the
unequal distribution of rights, capital, exploitation and vulnerability.7
4 IOM, World Migration Report: Managing Migration – Challenges and Responses for People on the
Move (IOM, 2003) 110.
5 IAMR, ‘“We Are Workers! We Are Not Slaves!” Migrants and Refugees Challenge UN High-Level
Talks’, Press Release, 11 October 2013, available at http://iamr4.com (last visited 5 January 2015).
6 Migrante International, ‘Migrants Dance vs Modern Day Slavery, Social Injustice and Pork Barrel’, 3
October 2013, available at http://migranteinternational.org/2013/10/03/migrante-dance-vs-
modern-day-slavery-social-injustice-pork-barrel/ (last visited 5 January 2015).
7 For a good discussion of the counter-discourses mobilised by migrant civil society, see S Rother, ‘A
Tale of Two Tactics: Civil Society and Competing Visions of Global Migration Governance from
Below’, in M Geiger & A Pecoud (eds), Disciplining the Transnational Mobility of People (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013) 41.
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This staged encounter between two conflicting framings of international
mobility occurred on the same day as a third event that captured international
attention. Far away from the auditoriums of the UN Headquarters and streets of
New York, a boat travelling from Libya reportedly caught fire and capsized off
the coast of the small Italian island of Lampedusa. As a result, an estimated 366
people drowned.8 Many of these people were from Eritrea and Somalia, both
considered ‘refugee-producing’ countries by the UN.9 The resulting efforts to
make sense of and respond to the mass drowning reveal the competing frames
through which particular forms of human mobility become viewed, and in
particular the governmental impetus to treat unauthorised migration simultan-
eously through humanitarian and criminal lenses. Inside the UN General
Assembly, the news of these deaths prompted HLD delegates to observe a
one-minute silence to ‘honour the victims’ and ‘express their shock and
grief’ about the humanitarian disaster while reaffirming their commitment to
tackle the perceived ‘evils’ of ‘all forms of human trafficking’.10 This paradoxical
logic was most tellingly illustrated by the Italian Prime Minister’s much-lauded
decision to declare an official national day of mourning in Italy and posthu-
mously grant Italian citizenship to those who had died,11 while the migrants
who had survived the boat sinking were (less publicly) denied this status, and
remained liable to administrative detention, criminal prosecution and forced
deportation under Italian law that criminalises ‘clandestine immigration’.12
This triangulated scene offers an entry-point into both the contested
frames that shape understandings of human mobility and how particular
8 ‘Italy Boat Sinking: Hundreds Feared Dead off Lampedusa’, BBC, 3 October 2013, available at http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24380247 (last visited 5 January 2015).
9 UNHCR, Global Trends 2013: War’s Human Cost (UNHCR, 2013).
10 UN Deputy Secretary-General, ‘Remarks at the Closing of the High-Level Dialogue on International
Migration and Development’, New York, 4 October 2013; ‘Statement by Italy’, New York, 4 October
2013.
11 ‘Letta Declares Lampedusa Shipwreck Victims Italian Citizens’, ANSA English, 4 October 2013.
Italian Premier Enrico Letta later clarified that no actual citizenship would be conferred, resulting
in his earlier statement that ‘the hundreds who lost their lives off Lampedusa . . . are Italian citizens
as of today’ becoming a rhetorical—rather than legal—gesture, although the dead did receive a state
funeral. In addition, the Italian government also launched operation Mare Nostrum, an EU-funded
cross-border project, in the aftermath of the drownings, which has resulted in over 150 000 migrants
being rescued at sea in the year since October 2013. IOM, ‘IOM Applauds Italy’s Life-Saving Mare
Nostrum Operation: “Not a Migrant Pull Factor”’, 31 October 2014.
12 For an historical account of Italy’s 2002 Bossi-Finn law, see C Finotelli & G Sciortino, ‘The
Importance of Being Southern: The Making of Policies of Immigration Control in Italy’ 11
European Journal of Migration and Law (2009) 119. On the effect of this law on those who survived
the October 2013 ship sinking, see S Scherer, ‘Italy Migrant Tragedy Unveils Plight of Survivors’,
Reuters, 5 October 2013.
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frames are used to authorise different institutional practices and paradigms for
action. Both the IOM and IAMR campaigns frame the issue of human mobility
in ways that make a direct appeal to specific international institutions to locate
migration within their mandates, whether as a concern for ensuring order or for
challenging global inequality. As Martti Koskenniemi reminds us, the ‘choice’
of frame in legal matters is often a struggle over institutional hegemony, where
‘political conflict is waged on the description and re-description of aspects of
the world so as to make them fall under the jurisdiction of particular institu-
tions’.13 For international lawyers, at stake in acts of framing are questions of
authority, jurisdiction and institutional responsibility, where particular frames
set the conditions for apprehension, recognition and regulation but also make
the frame and that which is enframed always open to redescription, contest-
ation and reconfiguration.
The article brings into conversation three recently published books that
touch on the relationship between international law, institutional authority and
human mobility. Substantively, each book demonstrates how human mobility
becomes conditioned or even captured by law through different frames, making
human mobility into a subject of and for international institutional action. This
article argues that books, when read as legal devices, can reveal the epistemic
and material construction of international law for ordering human mobility.
Methodologically, this article suggests that a careful reading of how human
mobility is framed can illuminate the different modes of arranging and enga-
ging legal relations. I argue that each book presents a different jurisdictional
schema for apprehending how law orders human mobility and for understand-
ing the different subjects and actors that constitute this international legal
order.14 In my reading, each book is representative of a different strategy for
framing and calling sovereign power to account for its exclusionary logic and
practices towards those deemed to be outside of the recognised political com-
munity of citizens. These strategies engage specific juridical gestures in relation
to international law, whether through a positivist enunciation and systemisa-
tion of foundational norms that seek to shape or limit sovereignty, an empirical
evaluation of the human and ethical consequences of sovereignty, or a critical
prognosis and reformulation of the activity, practices and subjects of law.
13 M Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Cambridge UP, 2011) 336-38. Luis Eslava has
eloquently argued that frames make possible the ‘re-embodiment’ of the international in mundane,
domesticised settings: L Eslava, ‘Istanbul Vignettes: Observing the Everyday Operation of
International Law’ 2 London Review of International Law (2014) 3.
14 Here, the etymology of the word ‘schema’ is instructive. Derived from the Greek word skhema
(meaning form or figure), it denotes a ‘representation of a plan or theory in the form of an outline
or model’, sometimes equated to a particular form of reasoning. Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford
UP, 2013), available at http://www.oed.com (last visited 5 January 2015) (OED).
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THE JURISDICTIONAL WORK OF BOOKS
All three of the books reviewed in this article speak to the discipline of inter-
national law—and the office of the international lawyer—in distinct ways,
offering their own account of how law conditions human mobility.15 The
first book is Foundations of International Migration Law, an edited collection
published by Cambridge University Press in conjunction with the IOM.16
Written in the genre of the contemporary textbook, this edited collection
aims to be a ‘foundational’ compendium that addresses a perceived ‘gap’ in
both existing scholarly literature and practical understandings of international
migration law.17 It purports to provide a ‘comprehensive’ but not ‘exhaustive’
account of the principal themes in international migration law, serving as a
practical manual for students, policy-makers, diplomats and legal practitioners
alike. True to this purpose, Foundations of International Migration Law is writ-
ten in a clear and accessible style, adopting an efficient and expository tone that
helps familiarise readers with the basic legal principles and institutional pro-
cesses that constitute this ‘fragmented and unfamiliar’ area of international
law.18 Of the three books, Foundations of International Migration Law is most
closely attached to the office of the international lawyer, devised as an artefact of
law that is necessary for recognising a distinct legal ‘domain’, creating a pro-
fessional community and transmitting legal relations across time and space.
The second book, Jeremy Harding’s Border Vigils, in contrast, is a jour-
nalistic account of the workings and effects of contemporary sovereignty and
borders, focusing in particular on the European Union and Mexico–US
region.19 More akin to the genre of travel writing, Border Vigils compiles
Harding’s tales of encounters as he journeys to what others have named
15 I offer this reading despite the fact that only one book—Foundations of International Migration
Law—is framed explicitly as an ‘international law’ book (that organises its pages around ‘interna-
tional migration law’ and addresses international jurists as part of its readership). Rather, Border
Vigils touches only sporadically on what would conventionally be recognised as ‘international mi-
gration law’ when dealing with international norms that govern refugees or criminalise human
smuggling, while Border as Method uses law (including at times international law) as one site or
institution for discussing the emergent ‘boundary conflicts’ between different governmental regimes
that are constituted through law as well as to understand changing contemporary configurations of
authority.
16 B Opeskin, R Perruchoud & J Redpath-Cross (eds), Foundations of International Migration Law
(Cambridge UP, 2012).
17 B Opeskin, R Perruchoud & J Redpath-Cross, ‘Preface’, in Opeskin et al. (eds) (2012) xi, xii.
18 Ibid xi.
19 J Harding, Border Vigils: Keeping Migrants Out of the Rich World (Verso, 2012)
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‘borderscapes’20—spaces where the boundaries of a nation-state are articulated
and that are marked by rival discourses and practices that imagine, instigate,
police or contest the values and limits of political communities in complex
ways. Harding’s stories attest to the material and affective dimensions of con-
temporary borders, tracing the ‘unorthodox, dangerous routes’ that refugees
take to get to ‘safe’ countries while also providing snapshots into the economic,
legal, political and cultural forces that both frame contemporary understand-
ings of migration and shape, in part, the practices of migrants themselves.21 As a
contributing editor of the London Review of Books, Harding epitomises a par-
ticular type of public intellectual that holds the entirety of the world in their
deliberative, part laconic, yet part probing gaze. Written for a popular reader-
ship presumably located in what Harding refers to as the ‘rich world’, the book’s
style is thickly descriptive, attentive to the specifics of each story he tells while at
the same time mounting a convincing argument about the perverse role that the
zealous instigation and policing of state sovereignty and borders plays in en-
trenching global inequality and ‘keeping migrants out’ of the Global North.
Border Vigils, in contrast to Foundations of International Migration Law, calls on
international lawyers to be aware of the effects of their craft in bolstering sov-
ereign claims to exclusion or upholding out-dated legal regimes and categories,
while also fleetingly suggesting the possibility of a more ethical or expansionist
international domain to fulfil its proclaimed humanitarian promise.
The third book, Border as Method, is framed as a work of political theory,
jointly written by two academics, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, engaging
with myriad political traditions.22 As both a scholarly and political contribu-
tion, Border as Method is concerned with positing a ‘new theoretical approach’
for understanding the materialisation, proliferation and contestation of borders
in contemporary processes of what they term ‘postcolonial capitalism’.23 The
book is a ‘deliberately wide-ranging’ study that draws on a range of literature
and disciplines in order to offer a diagnosis of the production of global space
and to rethink some familiar and expansive analytical concepts such as the
20 See PK Rajaram & C Grundy-Warr (eds), Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s
Edge (Minnesota UP, 2007), especially S Perera, ‘A Pacific Zone? (In)Security, Sovereignty, and
Stories of the Pacific Borderscape’, in Rajaram & Grundy-Warr (eds) (2007) 201.
21 Harding (2012) vii. Harding’s book is representative of a small but growing literature concerning
journalistic accounts of borders: see, e.g., V Longhi, The Immigrant War: A Global Movement against
Discrimination and Exploitation (Polity Press, 2013); TG Sterling, Illegal: Life and Death in Arizona’s
Immigration War Zone (Lyons Press, 2010); D Bacon, Illegal People: How Globalization Creates
Migration and Criminalizes Immigrants (Beacon Press, 2008); P Mares, Borderlines: Australia’s
Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers (UNSW Press, 2001).
22 S Mezzadra & B Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor (Duke UP, 2013).
23 Ibid 9.
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international division of labour, governmentality, and the politics of the com-
mons.24 Of particular interest to Mezzadra and Neilson is the ‘world configur-
ing function’ of borders—the ‘strategic role [they] play in the fabrication of the
world’ and how they configure—both spatially and temporally—relations of
capital, subjectivity, authority and knowledge-production.25 Adopting the
genre of a (carefully articulated) research manifesto that they hope will be
deployed for activist purposes,26 the study contributes to a broader political
project of observing and inserting the antagonism of ‘border struggles’ into
reified narratives of globalisation’s ‘smooth’ flows of capital and people.
Deeply critical of the work of borders, Mezzadra and Neilson nonetheless
warn their readers from the outset that they ‘will not find a recipe for a border-
less world’ within the pages of the book.27 Border as Method rather asks readers
to attend to how global life is shaped through the workings of the border, where
legal forms such as sovereignty play a constitutive role in both enabling the
expansion of capital and the stratification of jurisdictions and subjects as well as
animating migrant struggles that imagine alternative forms of political
communities.
Each of the three books, then, contrasts markedly in genre, tone, intended
audience and political purpose. Yet, in this article, I suggest that it is productive
to read these three contrasting books alongside each other in order to illuminate
their different orientations towards the nature of sovereign power and how each
represents the international jurisdiction over human mobility.28 Each book
provides a functional account of law ‘as it is’—asserting, against a construction
of sovereignty that emphasises the absolute power to exclude non-citizens, that
there is, in fact, an international jurisdiction that regulates migration—but
where the three books differ is in how they imagine sovereign power, arrange
its institutions and actors and frame its operations and effects. Books—whether
legal textbooks like Foundations of International Migration Law, popular non-
fiction works like Border Vigils or expositions of political theory like Border as
24 S Mezzadra & B Neilson, ‘Geography Is Not Enough’ 3 Dialogues in Human Geography (2013) 332.
25 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) vii.
26 G Yanoshevsky, ‘Three Decades of Writing on Manifesto: The Making of a Genre’ 30 Poetics Today
(2009) 257.
27 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) 13.
28 On scholarship that attends to jurisdictional relations in the international domain, see A Orford,
International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge UP, 2011); S Pahuja, ‘Laws of
Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’ 1 London Review of International Law
(2013) 63; S McVeigh & S Pahuja, ‘Rival Jurisdictions: The Promise and Loss of Sovereignty’, in C
Barbour & G Pavlich (eds), After Sovereignty: On the Question of Political Beginnings (Routledge,
2010) 97; R Joyce, Competing Sovereignties (Routledge, 2013).
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Method—can, as Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh have suggested, act as
jurisdictional devices that—through the technology of writing—craft, organise
and transmit legal relations.29 In this reading, books are representational prac-
tices and ordering tools that give us an account of the legal relations that shape
the authority to control migration. In doing so, the books provide different
modalities of knowledge-production to organise, rationalise or critique legal
epistemologies, institutions and techniques that order human mobility.
SCHEMATIS ING THE INTERNATIONAL JURISDICT ION TO
ADMINISTER MIGRATION
To found:
1. The action of founding or building upon a firm substructure; the state or fact
of being founded.
2. fig. The action of establishing, instituting, or constituting on a permanent
basis . . . .30
This section reads Foundations of International Migration Law as a legal
artefact that is deeply invested in the project of international law and intimately
tied to the office of the international lawyer, both as a pedagogical device ne-
cessary for taking up this office and as a classificatory system for recognising,
understanding and transmitting a particular domain of law. In particular, the
book represents a familiar mainstream gesture within international law that
seeks to hold sovereign power to account through the development and sys-
tematisation of legal norms. Yet in doing so, Foundations of International
Migration Law instantiates an epistemic and jurisdictional frame for under-
standing and administering human mobility, that straddles the tension between
seeking to bestow rights upon those otherwise abandoned by sovereign power
(e.g., asylum seekers or migrant workers otherwise deemed to be outside of the
sovereign polis) while at the same time reinforcing the sovereign decisionism
that adjudicates the binary between lawful and non-lawful conduct, or between
legitimate and non-legitimate forms of movement. In the terms offered by
Foundations of International Migration Law, the making of sovereignty, as an
international legal form, becomes a technocratic undertaking.
Central to the project of Foundations of International Migration Law are
the substantiation and development of a field of ‘international migration law’.
As the architectural metaphor in the book’s title suggests, the book aims to
provide clear ‘foundations’ for framing the basic principles and institutional
29 S Dorsett & S McVeigh, Jurisdiction (Routledge, 2012) 60.
30 OED.
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processes of international migration law vis-a-vis the migration laws of par-
ticular states. This endeavour hopes to achieve greater recognition for ‘inter-
national migration law’ as an identifiable field of law as well as to contribute to
its evolution in practice. Against the dominance of the national frame for com-
prehending the regulation of human mobility, the book offers a jurisdictional
schema where the international domain is imagined as already regulating
human mobility but in an insufficiently recognised manner. For example, in
the Preface to Foundations of International Migration Law, the editors assert that
few have paid international migration law ‘the attention that it deserves’. While
international policy-makers have been attending to the topic of international
migration ‘for a very long time’, the editors suggest that overwhelmingly inter-
national jurists either remain unaware of the richness of international norms
regulating migration or even respond with a ‘long and puzzled silence’ to the
assertion that a body of law called ‘international migration law’ exists.31 This
claim is central to understanding the rationale and contribution of Foundations
of International Migration Law, functioning both as a descriptive assessment of
the body of law that the book seeks to champion (that is, as a law, in their view,
‘as yet unfinished’) and as the implicit project statement for the book (to rectify
the marginal and ‘unfinished’ nature of international migration law through the
task of legal description and exposition). Through this reconstruction, the book
crafts a distinct and multifaceted role for international lawyers in relation to
human mobility, thereby widening the assumed jurisdictional purview and
professional competency attached to this professional or scholarly office.
The task of schematising how the international domain orders human
mobility undertaken by Foundations of International Migration Law aligns
with the function of legal textbooks as a genre of writing that is invested in
the organisation of social and legal relations. Legal textbooks as a tradition
historically emerged at particular disciplinary moments as exercises in know-
ledge construction, organisation and consolidation. Like professional manuals
or scholarly treatises, legal textbooks act as jurisdictional devices that contribute
to the establishment and arrangement of a particular body of law. For legal
substance to be recognised as a distinct ‘domain’ of law, textbooks must ‘ef-
fectively create’ their topic as a coherent and intelligible subject and posit this
knowledge in ways that is recognised and received as authoritative.32 Through
their systemisation of legal knowledge and practice, textbooks craft the sub-
stance of law into particular domains and give shape to its technical practices
31 Opeskin et al., ‘Preface’ (2012) xi.
32 C Warbrick, ‘Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law: An Assessment’ 11 European Journal
of International Law (2000) 621, 629.
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and institutional forms.33 Legal textbooks, as ‘repositories of codified know-
ledge’, thus facilitate the creation and transmission of legal knowledge across
time and space, constructing the boundaries of what is considered acceptable
and accepted within an interpretative community. Textbooks also allow for the
pedagogical training of a new generation of international lawyers, facilitating
technical apprenticeships and initiating readers into the values, vocabularies
and methods of a disciplinary community.
The survey approach adopted in Foundations of International Migration
Law is faithful to this purpose of delimiting the jurisdictional purview of inter-
national lawyers over human mobility as well as providing a plausible and
methodical description of an ‘emerging’ domain of (international) law. The
edited collection is a collaborative effort that brings together scholars and prac-
titioners of international migration law, and consists of 15 individual chapters.
The authors of each chapter expertly compress complex legal regimes, state
practices and court decisions to provide a clear overview of a particular area
of international migration law. Topics span themes familiar in the literature on
international migration law (see, for example, David Weissbrodt and Michael
Divine’s chapter on the human rights of migrants or Ryszard Cholewinski’s
chapter on international labour migration) to areas considered emerging or oft-
overlooked (such as Jacqueline Bhabha’s chapter on children’s law, Karoline
Popp’s chapter on regional institutions and process on migration, or Natalie
Klein’s chapter on the laws regulating the particular modes of international
travel by sea and air).34 Through the technique of highlighting ‘case studies’,
statistical ‘figures’ and geographical ‘maps’, the book is able to move quickly
across different regional contexts, historical moments and institutional regimes,
offering a juridical gaze to its readers that seeks to make legible and contain the
idiosyncrasies of human movement. What emerges through the pages of
Foundations of International Migration Law is, unsurprisingly for its genre, an
engagement with the regulation of human mobility in a very administrative or
technocratic register.
Most importantly, Foundations of International Migration Law makes a
significant contribution to international legal scholarship and practice as a
field-building exercise, as an extension of the dominantly-recognised categories
33 Dorsett & McVeigh (2012) 74-75.
34 While there is at times some overlap in substance between the eclectic assortment of topics compiled
in the book for pedagogical purposes, this has the advantage of each chapter providing a compre-
hensive snapshot of a particular theme and means that the chapters need not be read sequentially.
Rather, the book lends itself nicely to being simply grabbed by a student—the aspiring international
migration lawyer—needing to get a cursory overview of, for instance, the customary sources of
international migration law or a recent decision of the European Court of Human Rights.
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of international law. It carves out a space for recognising the regulation of
migration as well as attempts to consolidate and constitutionalise its many
tenets.35 To date, few international law textbooks have been written about or
addressed ‘international migration law’ as a distinct and standalone field of legal
scholarship.36 With the exception of international laws on refugeehood, nation-
ality and diplomatic immunity, international norms dealing with migration,
more broadly, scarcely make a mention in generalist international law
textbooks.
The lack of scholarly attention to international norms governing interna-
tional migration can be explained through the predominance of jurisdictional
schemas that have emphatically placed the administration of migration within
the competency of sovereign states. These schemas are the product of both how
modern international law has been historically conceived after its emergence as
a positivist-scientific project in the late 19th century as well as the politically
charged treatment of migration by sovereign states. Two brief examples illus-
trate this: first, the work of international jurist Lassa Oppenheim exemplified
this shift to rationalise the nationalisation of migration controls in the writings
of early international legal positivists. In his influential International Law,
Oppenheim argued that states are ‘masters in their own house’ and could not
be obliged by international laws to ‘allow foreigners to remain within [their]
boundaries’.37 As a consequence of their personal and territorial sovereignty,
Oppenheim emphasised that states had full discretion when deciding to admit
‘unobjectionable aliens’. Even on the question of asylum, Oppenheim was reso-
lute, characterising the granting of refuge to non-nationals as falling wholly
within the competency of states bestowed through their discretion, rather than
as a right that an individual could assert against a state. For migrants,
Oppenheim suggested that this configuration of international law meant that
they would be under ‘two concurrent jurisdictions’ at the one time: the personal
jurisdiction of their home state and the territorial jurisdiction of the state in
which they were present. However, conversely, it also meant that, in some
matters, a migrant may be under no jurisdiction at all, ‘since a State is not
obliged to exercise jurisdiction for all matters over aliens on its territory, and
35 On the rise of ‘global constitutionalism’, see J Klabbers, A Peters & G Ulfstein (eds), The
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford UP, 2009).
36 These notably include R Plender, International Migration Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 1972); R Lillich,
The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law (Manchester UP, 1984); TA
Aleinikoff & V Chetail (eds), Migration and International Legal Norms (TMC Asser, 2003); R
Cholewinski et al. (eds), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges
(TMC Asser, 2007). These latter two books are more akin to edited collections than textbooks.
37 L Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed. (Longmans, Green & Co, 1920) 494.
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since the home State is not obliged to exercise jurisdiction over its subjects
abroad’.38 Oppenheim’s project—in excluding from the purview of interna-
tional law the authority to administer migration—rationalised the broader
trend of states increasingly to consolidate and monopolise control over the
‘legitimate means of movement’,39 at the expense of a qualified individual
freedom of movement espoused under earlier articulations of the jus gentium.40
Despite the proliferation of international treaties, institutional norms and
processes concerning human mobility in the 20th century, particularly since the
drafting of the Refugee Convention in the aftermath of World War II, contem-
porary iteration of such ‘sovereignty thinking’ in the sphere of migration law
persists, perhaps more noticeably among state actors than jurists.41 Catherine
Dauvergne argues that states have fixated upon migration control as the ‘last
bastion of sovereignty’ in response to a particular anxiety around the waning
power of the nation-state in the face of transformations brought about through
economic globalisation. This, for Dauvergne, has resulted in states enacting
domestic legislative measures that paradoxically facilitate a freer movement
of international capital and goods while increasing the scrutiny and regulation
of human mobility.42 Here, a second—infamous—example is provided by
former Australian Prime Minister John Howard’s uncompromising approach
to refugee politics in the wake of what became known as the ‘Tampa affair’. In
September 2001, Howard doggedly refused to allow a ship—the MV Tampa
that rescued 433 (mainly Afghan) asylum-seekers—to enter the nearest
Australian port by asserting that ‘we decide who comes to this country and
the circumstances in which they come’.43 Howard’s rhetorical refusal to recog-
nise Australia’s obligations under international refugee law or the law of the sea
38 Ibid 238-39.
39 J Torpey, The Invention of the Passport (Cambridge UP, 2000) 2.
40 For a discussion of the right of travel under earlier articulations of the jus gentium see A McKeown,
Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders (Columbia UP, 2008).
41 On ‘sovereignty thinking’, see Pahuja (2013). On the proliferation of international treaties and
norms concerning human mobility in the 20th century, see the nine-page Appendix 2 in
Foundations of International Migration Law, which lists over 120 treaties and other international
instruments that make up the field of international migration law. This Appendix is particularly
useful for anyone who may still need convincing that international norms historically have and
continue to regulate human mobility, starting with the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) and 1910
International Convention for the Suppression of the ‘White Slave Traffic’ through to the 2011
General Assembly resolution on migration and development.
42 C Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and Law (Cambridge
UP, 2007) 3.
43 This affair is also discussed in detail as a case study in Natalie Klein, ‘International Migration by Sea
and Air’, in Opeskin et al. (eds) (2012) 278.
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reflects a long-held construction of sovereignty—that is emboldened through
international legal writings such as Oppenheim’s—that insists that states have
absolute control over migration.44 For the purpose of this article, I shall call the
jurisdictional schema offered by Oppenheim and taken up by state actors such
as Howard as one of ‘rightful absence’, where the regulation of migration is seen
as the ‘proper’ domain of states and relegated outside the jurisdictional purview
of international law.45
The project of Foundations of International Migration Law is best read
against this inherited, and at times dominant, jurisdictional schema of ‘rightful
absence’. Theirs is a project of restumping, if you like, Oppenheim’s metaphor-
ical jurisdictional ‘house’ in which only the sovereign state is ‘master’.46 For the
editors, the key challenge that this jurisdictional reconfiguration must address is
international migration law’s struggle for recognition within dominant ac-
counts of international legal scholarship and practice. While few contemporary
jurists would agree today with some of Oppenheim’s claims—such as that states
have unfettered discretion regarding the admission of foreigners or that indi-
viduals are not subjects of international law—nonetheless, the centrality that
Oppenheim placed upon the personal and territorial sovereignty of states for
the authorisation and inscription of permissible forms of mobility remains
within contemporary jurisdictional schemas that frame migration regulation,
appearing at times as an insurmountable barrier to acknowledging the existence
or efficacy of a domain of law called ‘international migration law’.47 But even
where international migration law is recognised within legal scholarship or
practice, the terms of that recognition remain largely open. Is it a distinct
field, branch, area, or regime of international law? Or is it too dependent
upon national jurisdictions for its articulation and evolution? What are its
44 Howard’s appeal to sovereign decisionism in invoking a rhetorical ‘we’ was despite the fact that the
Australian government nonetheless rationalised its refusal to allow the Tampa to disembark its
passengers at the nearest Australian port using international legal arguments. On the different
and conflicting constructions of international refugee and maritime law that either condemn or
condone the Australian government’s actions, see M Crock, ‘In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting
Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management of Refugee Flows’ 12 Pacific Rim Law and
Policy Journal (2003) 49.
45 This construction of sovereignty has a long genealogy connected with state claims about empire,
race, labour and land that have been rearticulated across the globe: see generally McKeown (2008).
46 For an account of the pervasiveness of architectural metaphors in legal thinking about public law see
M Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford UP, 2010) 98-101.
47 This is despite the fact that international treaties governing human mobility have existed since the
early 20th century as well as scholarly endeavours to systematise the domain of law: see especially the
early work of Plender (1972). Nonetheless, scholarly anxiety around the existence, status and rec-
ognition of international migration law persists, with the repeated calls for recognition, reconstruc-
tion and renewal shaping the identity of the field itself.
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particular jurisdictions or institutions? Is it primarily a subset of human rights
law? Or does it have its own institutional ‘preferences and orientations’?
Largely, I argue, contemporary legal scholarship and practice appear am-
bivalent regarding the status and scope of international migration law, split
between characterising it either as practically impotent to affect the policies of
sovereign states or functionally fragmented across different regimes of interna-
tional law.48 In the jurisdictional schema of ‘practical impotence’, international
norms regulating human mobility exist, but they lack effectiveness in their im-
plementation.49 Thus, the political response is, at its most ambitious, to create a
new regime for international migration governance (to counter its ‘neglected’
or ‘missing’ character50) or, as a compromise, to strengthen the existing (weak)
norms.51 In contrast, the jurisdictional schema offered through the narrative of
‘fragmentation’ represents international norms regulating human mobility in a
functionally effective but diffuse manner. Migration scholar TA Aleinikoff as-
serted this position most powerfully when describing the contemporary inter-
national migration regime as one of ‘substance without architecture’.52 Both
48 These ways of understanding international migration law cannot be disentangled from broader
jurisdictional schemas for understanding international law. In this regard, the marginalised position
of international migration law may be useful as a paradigm for mapping the disciplinary anxieties
and representational practices around international law more generally.
49 For example, Joel Trachtman suggests that the right to migrate seems ‘neglected’ in international
law, and that there is a ‘remarkable scarcity of international law establishing commitments of states
to admit foreigners’: J Trachtman, The International Law of Economic Migration (WE Upjohn
Institute for Employment Research, 2009) 11.
50 B Ghosh, ‘Managing Migration: Towards the Missing Regime?’, in A Pecoud & P De Guchteneire
(eds), Migration without Borders: Essays on the Free Movement of People (UNESCO & Berghahn
Books, 2007) 97, 97-98.
51 See, e.g., B Lyon, ‘The Unsigned United Nations Migrant Worker Rights Convention: An
Overlooked Opportunity to Change the “Brown Collar” Migration Paradigm’ 42 NYU Journal of
International Law and Policy (2010) 389.
52 TA Aleinikoff, ‘International Legal Norms on Migration: Substance without Architecture’, in R
Cholewinski, R Perruchoud & E MacDonald (eds), International Migration Law: Developing
Paradigms and Key Challenges (Asser Press, 2007) 479. Similarly, Vincent Chetail suggests that
the contemporary fragmentation of international migration law has resulted in a framework that
is ‘scattered throughout a wide range of principles and rules belonging to numerous branches of
international law’, weakening the understanding and application of these principles. For Chetail, this
necessitates an ‘exercise of reconstruction’ in order to develop a ‘comprehensive, coherent and
contextual’ framework. V Chetail, ‘The Transnational Movement of Persons under General
International Law: Mapping the Customary Law Foundations of International Migration Law’, in
V Chetail & Celine Bauloz (eds), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration (Routledge,
2014). Yet, as Chantal Thomas has astutely argued, the fragmented nature of international migration
law has given rise to a regulatory terrain deeply stratified by foundational political and philosophical
tensions between the various treaty projects and orientations, whose tensions cannot be alleviated
through technical endeavours. This means that, for Thomas, international migration law consists of
numerous treaties that may ‘converge doctrinally’ but ‘diverge normatively’ in substance and effect.
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these schemas counter the narrative of ‘rightful absence’ by suggesting, in their
own ways, that such a body of law (international migration law) exists but that
it remains, as Richard Lillich described in his seminal 1984 book, a ‘giant
unassembled juridical jigsaw puzzle’ where a ‘number of pieces are uncertain
and the grand design is still emerging’.53
The tension between characterising the international jurisdiction to ad-
minister migration as either practically impotent (in need of new or strength-
ened institutional norms) or functionally fragmented (in need of systemisation
and institutionalisation) animates the pages of Foundations of International
Migration Law. The editors appear alive to this tension, suggesting that while
international migration law presently lacks a ‘coherent and integrated form’,54
it is best characterised as a ‘non-autonomous field’ of international law.
Moreover, they suggest that such problems of classification should be attributed
more to a ‘descriptive failure’—a failure of framing—than to any lack of sub-
stantive content.55 In order to reframe international migration law as a recog-
nisable domain, the editors identify three main pillars that structure the legal
field, namely, state sovereignty, human rights norms, and cooperation amongst
states. These pillars offer the reader a guide or set of identifiable ordering
principles to apprehend the schema and rationality of international migration
law. However, unfortunately, the relationship between these three pillars is not
elaborated or theorised in any sustained manner in the textbook.56 Greater
elaboration of the ‘pillars’ of migration law, or even their use as a structuring
device for approaching the substantive content of the book’s chapters, would
have opened up the possibility to examine how the different regimes that make
up international migration law could or do interact with each other as they
govern individuals. Given that migration scholars have long called for increased
acknowledgement of the ‘mixed flow’ of people as well as the instability of legal
categories that inscribe a person (as a citizen, refugee, economic migrant, etc.),
this shortcoming is not only a missed opportunity to interrogate key regime
C Thomas, ‘Convergences and Divergences in International Legal Norms on Migrant Labor’ 32
Comparative Labor Law and Policy Journal (2011) 405, 406.
53 Lillich (1984) 122.
54 B Opeskin, R Perruchoud & J Redpath-Cross, ‘Conceptualising International Migration Law’, in
Opeskin et al. (eds) (2012) 1, 7.
55 Ibid 8.
56 The effect of this deficiency means that the reader is left to perceive these three pillars in overt
tension with each other, rather than interrogating the particular understandings of sovereignty,
juridical rights or interstate relations that are at work throughout the book or that may posit
such a blanket tension.
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interactions or envision unconventional conceptualisations of the international
domain but also results in replicating, through the very order of the textbook,
the narrative of fragmentation that it purports to hold as its object.57
The tension between state sovereignty and human rights reappears, for
example, in Richard Perruchoud’s chapter on ‘state sovereignty and freedom of
movement’ when discussing the global ‘securitisation’ of migration since 2001.
For Perruchoud, the task for countries that wish to ‘secure their territory and
keep their nationals safe’ is to find the ‘appropriate balance between facilitating
migration, protecting human rights, and border control’.58 How this ‘equilib-
rium’ is to be achieved remains unarticulated, with the technical task for inter-
national lawyers appearing to be to find the most legitimate alignment between
these pillars (ensuring, in Perruchoud’s words, that security measures are
always ‘justified by, and proportionate to, the level of threat faced by a
State’), rather than challenging the intimate place of discourses of security
and selfhood in the governance of mobility. Similarly, the tension between
the ‘pillars’ of human rights and state cooperation is masterfully articulated
in James Hathaway’s chapter on ‘Refugees and Asylum’. While Hathaway
argues that the ‘normative structure’ of refugee law is ‘sound’, he suggests
that the regime is threatened by ‘its atomised system of implementation’ and
the ‘absence of a meaningful mechanism’ for responsibility-sharing among
states.59 For Hathaway, this has resulted in a ‘global apartheid regime’, which
forces most refugees to remain in poorer regions of the world, where their rights
and lives are seriously threatened.60 Yet in Hathaway’s framing, the increased
securitisation and abrogation of refugee rights are a problem of deviant states
within a sound structure, not vice-versa, to be rectified through a more expan-
sive international regime with the power to distribute people rationally across
the globe. Aside from the problematic overtone of treating refugees as objects to
be administered by international institutions,61 this appeal to burden-sharing,
57 For an alternative way of conceptualising regimes of migration governance, see, e.g., A Betts,
‘Survival Migration: A New Protection Framework’ 16 Global Governance (2010) 361.
58 R Perruchoud, ‘State Sovereignty and Freedom of Movement’, in Opeskin et al. (eds) (2012) 123, 136.
59 JC Hathaway, ‘Refugees and Asylum’, in Opeskin et al. (eds) (2012) 177, 203. For Hathaway, the
problem is that the developed world has stigmatised and criminalised refugees, distorting the ‘true
object and purpose of the refugee convention’ and abrogating its protection obligations. To deal
with this uneven distribution of refugees worldwide, Hathaway advocates for a shift away from the
‘system of unilateral, state-by-state implementation of refugee law’ towards a system that rather
facilitates ‘common but differentiated responsibility’.
60 Ibid 200.
61 See, e.g., G Noll, ‘Why Refugees Still Matter’ 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2007) 538,
who argues in part that such proposals are illiberal (in that they abandon Kantian notions of
cosmopolitan hospitality) and result in the greater disenfranchisement of migrants.
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offered through a humanitarian framing, not only reinforces the problematic
idea—already dominant in much popular and academic writing on displace-
ment and refugeehood—of the refugee-as-burden, but also elides the structural
tensions in the international refugee law regime itself.62
Given these elusive tensions in the ‘foundations’ of international migra-
tion law, what sort of future then does the book envision for international
migration law? Here, the editors canvass two possible—and entirely famil-
iar—‘solutions’ to the ‘search for order’ in the ‘chaotic web’ and ‘tangled net-
works’ that are international migration governance. The first ‘solution’, echoing
Jagdish Baghwati’s call for a World Migration Organization,63 proposes to es-
tablish a new supranational institution specifically mandated to govern migra-
tion, while the second advocates developing a comprehensive framework—
perhaps a new treaty—that sets out the rights and duties of states and migrants
and would consolidate all current norms ‘in a single place’. These two solutions
map onto the political projects advanced by those positioned within the juris-
dictional schemas of ‘practical impotence’ and ‘functional fragmentation’
sketched above. The editors quickly dismiss the first proposal as too ‘difficult
to put in motion’ and increasingly considered ‘unproductive’.64 And they assess
as ‘unrealistic’ any comprehensive treaty as the field of international migration
law is ‘too diverse’ with too little political will on the part of states (although
they concede that there is some ‘merit’ in attempting to codify discrete aspects
of international migration law). In the end, despite the editors’ fleeting appeal
to the possibility of an alternative international migration regime, the reader is
left with the current law—with, in Oppenheim’s words, law ‘as it is, not as it
ought to be’—which the editors claim may be a ‘good starting point for the
development of a well-regulated framework for managing international migra-
tion’ based on and developed through state cooperation.65
Yet where is authority located within this textual jurisdictional schema?
Certainly not with those governed—as an account of migrants, migrant agency
or organisations is largely absent.66 If migrants appear in the pages of
Foundations of International Migration Law, it is as people in need of regulation,
62 See, e.g., Patricia Tuitt’s argument that refugee law ‘contains’ individuals seeking asylum through a
‘narrow legal identity’ and denies them the political autonomy to determine their identities and
futures: P Tuitt, False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee (Pluto Press, 1996) 7.
63 J Bhagwati, ‘Borders beyond Control’ 82(1) Foreign Affairs (2003) 98, and more recently J Bhagwati,
In Defense of Globalization, 2nd ed. (Oxford UP, 2007) 218.
64 Opeskin et al., ‘Conceptualising International Migration Law’ (2012) 10.
65 Ibid 7.
66 This is not unlike much of the recent literature on international migration governance, which, as
Stefan Rother put it recently, ‘apparently ignores the ones who are governed’. S Rother, ‘Global
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either as ‘flows’ to be managed or ‘subjects’ to be bestowed with a legal cat-
egorisation or better protections.67 In eliding the human dimension of mobility
or excluding discussion of how migrant actions shape the international juris-
diction for administering migration, Foundations of International Migration
Law repeats a familiar narrative whereby the principal actors in the interna-
tional order are states, whose intentions and commitments are given effect
through international or regional institutions. This framing extends the sym-
bolic exclusion of migrants from the national to the international level, where
migrants may be included in the physical space and territorial jurisdiction
(terra) of the state as well as its economic activity (oikos) but are excluded
from the recognised political community (polis), denied the ability to shape
the normative foundations of community or be seen as constitutive actors that
affect institutional practices and concerns.68 The image that remains of the
international jurisdiction to administer migration after reading Foundations
of International Migration Law is of a steady move towards norm-harmonisa-
tion or functional cooperation, whereby migrants’ means to empowerment will
occur through the implementation of human rights norms, agreed to by states,
in order to counter the heightened vulnerability to exploitation and precarious-
ness that they may face.
BORDER FRAGMENTS
If Foundations of International Migration Law fills the reader with a sense of the
necessity of developing international migration law as a political project for
ensuring order, in which the conferral of human rights acts as an effective
protective shield for migrants, then this confidence is troubled—even resound-
ingly shaken—by Border Vigils. In this book, Harding foregrounds the anec-
dotes of various migrants to provide glimpses into the contestatory politics and
diffuse actors that constitute the global regulation of human mobility.
Politically, he places the question of global inequality at the forefront of the
book’s concerns, arguing that unauthorised migration has ‘much to tell us
about the inequalities at the heart of human movement and the gulf, in
Migration Governance without Migrants? The Nation-State Bias in the Emerging Policies and
Literature on Global Migration Governance’ 1 Migration Studies (2013) 363.
67 This is despite the acknowledgement that, as Natalie Klein puts it in her chapter, it is ‘hard to deny
the very human factor involved in international migration, as people endure risks, sacrifices and
hardships’ in their travels to different places. Klein (2012) 260.
68 See G Noll, ‘Why Human Rights Fail to Protect Undocumented Migrants’ 12 European Journal of
Migration and Law (2010) 241.
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terms of wealth and opportunity, between more and less developed parts of the
world’.69 In contrast to Foundations of International Migration Law, Border
Vigils presents us with a jurisdictional schema much more attentive to the
material embodiment and systemic effects of institutions, with Harding framing
his story as one concerning the all too human effects of the ‘enduring asymme-
tries between the needs and entitlements’ of migrants and rich states.70 His
book could be read as a plea for the liberalisation of migration or for a better
form of internationalism: in his words, as a ‘spirited defence’ of poorer migrants
who migrate—unauthorised and unwelcomed—‘because of circumstances
which richer economies have conspired to create’.71
A major strength of Harding’s book is how it tracks the hardening of
borders in Europe and North America against poorer migrants and asylum-
seekers since the 1990s. Border Vigils is organised around five untitled chapters
that derive from essays that Harding wrote from the 1990s onwards and has
updated for publication in the book. With Harding as the reader’s guide, the
chapters travel across multiple sites with interwoven narratives, lingering briefly
to introduce some paradigmatic characters that constitute or encounter border
regimes. Harding is particularly concerned with the affective conditions and
human consequences of regulation, whether it be in narrating the perilous
journeys migrants undertake (and their, at times, deadly ends in the
Mediterranean sea or punitive consequences in British detention centres) or
the concerted campaigns of state lawmakers to denounce undocumented
people (through, for example, legislation in Arizona that reduces the availability
of state-run bilingual education programmes or that place increased pressures
on employers to police the immigration status of their workers). This historical
perspective serves, in Harding’s words, as a ‘prism of the recent past’,72 con-
textualising the gradual but by no means linear shifts in state practices towards a
more exclusionist consensus.
The book’s title, Border Vigils, is certainly evocative, even if Harding never
directly addresses the concept of ‘border vigils’ in the text. The staging of a vigil
implies ceremonial conduct, perhaps ritualised interactions and slow encoun-
ters at border regions. It also denotes a certain watchfulness, even if it is not
always clear who is watching or being watched: is it the vigilant migrants
defying border enforcement regimes, or the nationalist vigilantes who take
policing borders into their own hands? Or perhaps it is Harding himself—
69 Harding (2012) viii.
70 Ibid ix.
71 Ibid x-xi.
72 Ibid xi.
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and with him, his readers—who are enticed into these border vigils? In this
framing, the reader is intimately drawn into these encounters, implicated in the
impetus to bear witness to the stories recorded in the book as well as to rethink
the consequences of exclusionist policies adopted in the name of state sover-
eignty and of those in the ‘rich’ world. It is here that his book resonates most
with the genre of travel writing, using the concept of ‘border vigils’ as a device to
situate and ‘dramatize . . . an engagement between self and the world’.73
Through Harding’s journey, we get a sense that, as Casey Blanton writes of
another form of travel writing, the search for understanding becomes a ‘process
of unravelling, the coming-apart-at-the-seams kind of experience’ that de-
mands both outward engagement and deep introspection.74 It is a process
that allows Harding to move slowly through the worlds he explores, gently
questioning them in a way that could be read as a concrete attempt to hold
the forces that construct such worlds to account. Never bluntly didactic nor
brazenly moralistic, Harding uses the technique of describing physical places
and the people enmeshed within them to foreground an international world of
wire fences, surveillance databases, migrant holding camps and desert grave-
yards and weaves it together with the political decisions and structural dy-
namics that compel people to leave their homes and migrate: war and
intervention, a dearth of work and trenchant poverty, drastic economic
policy, ineffective aid and financial crises, colonial policies, historical injustices
or religious, racialised or gendered persecution. Importantly, from the frag-
ments offered in Harding’s chapters, the reader gets a sense of a world that is
created and held together through seemingly minute, unspectacular or
dispersed actions. At times, the stories appear too dispersed—leaving the
reader wondering about the direction of Harding’s argument or desiring further
analysis across the different narrative fragments. But it is these fragments and
their associated imagery that, as Harding intends, ‘stay in the [reader’s] mind
when the last round of statistics is no longer accurate and the arguments have all
been rehearsed’.75 It is here that Harding’s fragments and fragmentary view-
point are most powerful: they, in the words of Gyandendra Pandey, offer a
subject-position and gaze that ‘resist[] the drive for a shallow homogenization
and struggles for other, potentially richer definitions of the “nation” and the
future political community’.76
73 C Blanton, Travel Writing: The Self and the World (Routledge, 2012).
74 Ibid.
75 Harding (2012) ix.
76 G Pandey, ‘In Defense of the Fragment: Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today’ 37
Representations (1992) 27, 28-29.
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To reveal how Harding frames the international regulation of migration, it
is worth drawing out one fragment that Harding shares in the opening chapter.
Here, he details how he accompanied Italy’s Financial Police, the Guardia di
Finanza, patrolling the coast of Southern Italy in 1998. The Guardia are re-
sponsible for law enforcement and customs activities, combating drug-smug-
gling operations and financial crimes, but through their patrolling of Italy’s
territorial waters they are also the front-line for receiving asylum-seekers. In the
late 1990s, migrants—primarily from the former Yugoslavia, Turkish or Iraqi
Kurdistan, or West Africa—put their hopes in the scafisti (or people-smugglers)
to deliver them undetected to European shores crammed onto inflatable speed-
boats known as gommoni. Harding describes how the gommoni have the ad-
vantage of moving at a frightening pace, much faster than the sturdy Guardia
vessels, but they leave migrants vulnerable to the whims of the sea and climate.
The Guardia’s patrol sparks, for Harding, an adrenalin-fuelled game of cat and
mouse between the scafisti boats carrying asylum-seekers and the police.77 In
this ‘dramatic’ and morose game, each side negotiates the waters—‘pursuing,
circling’, ‘thrashing across the bows at a tremendous pace’, ‘loitering, veering,
running straight again’—in an attempt either to avoid or capture, with one side
desperately seeking to reach the promise-invested shores of Italy, while the
other side determinedly sets out to thwart its efforts, steadfast in its endeavour
of defending Italy’s ‘frail territorial integrity, and with it, the integrity of
Fortress Europe, bounded by a single external border’.78
This is a thoroughly modern operation (with the Guardia using expensive
but fallible technology such as infra-red binoculars and vessel detection radar)
that amounts to, for Harding, a ‘bruising, violent and strangely abstract hunt’.79
Elsewhere, Harding explicitly parallels the manhunts of border policing and
those of state warfare when depicting the US border as an ‘operational front in
yet another desert conflict’. Here, war functions as ‘the model for curbing illegal
immigration [with] territorial integrity and the preservation of national iden-
tity [as] the goals’, as a ‘domestic version of America’s interventions overseas’.80
These ‘warlike methods of [border] enforcement’ are part of a broader
77 Harding’s metaphor of a ‘game’ resonates with other writings on borders: see especially P Andreas,
Border Games: Policing of the US-Mexico Divide (Cornell UP, 2000).
78 Harding (2012) 5, 9. For Harding, this ‘game’ is played at the US–Mexico border as well as within the
US itself: ‘In Arizona, the pursuit of aliens is no longer confined to a cat and mouse game along the
frontier. It is a grim paper chase that takes place in traffic queues and metered parking zones in
phoenix, the kitchens of fast-food restaurants, mechanics’ workshops and building sites miles from
the fence’. Ibid 97.
79 Ibid 9.
80 Ibid 89-90.
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competition for ‘limited’ rights and resources, involving a ‘bitter struggle over
who can or can’t access them’.81 Harding’s description recalls what Gregoire
Chamayou describes in his philosophical history of manhunts as a form of
‘ontological policing’ where certain people (those entering spaces delineated
by international law as sovereign territory, without the authorisation of that
sovereign) become ‘humans who can be hunted’.82 For Chamayou, following
Hannah Arendt, modern techniques of exclusion operate at the level of status: a
person is no longer excluded from the polis by virtue of their behaviour (e.g., as
punishment for a crime), but rather ‘he himself is the infraction, by the simple
fact of existing, by his sole presence on the territory of the nation-state’.83 This
is powerfully illustrated by Harding as he recounts how he watched from a
distant patrol boat as some migrants waded ashore, witnessing a moment in
which—in Harding’s framing—people that appear from afar as ‘tiny, pale and
alien’ creatures are transformed into ‘illegal immigrants’—in his words, they
become ‘clandestini, irregolari, extra-communitari’.84
Unlike the image of international law as the creation and projection of
contracting and circumscribed sovereign states that emerged in Foundations of
International Migration Law, in these fragments, international law appears as
both absent and constitutive. On the surface, the scene depicted above is per-
haps best described as one of unruliness or even, on a cursory glance, lawless-
ness. The state, international law’s privileged subject embodied here in the
Guardia, appears as an impotent and ‘cumbersome’ figure, outmanoeuvred
by the faster speedboats of the scafisti (who have ‘few allegiances and no juris-
diction to defend’) and overwhelmed by the desperation and determination of
individuals to defy border regulations. Yet, on another reading, this scene is
filled with laws that structure the behaviour of the Italian Guardia and our
understandings of those migrating. For instance, on a procedural level, Harding
notes that the Guardia are allowed to pursue the scafisti only once they have
delivered their passengers, allegedly for fear that the scafisti may throw people
overboard as a way of slowing down their chasers. On a categorical level, the
very schema offered by international law—the distinction between legal and
illegal entry,85 between citizen and alien—determine how Harding understands
and frames the unfolding scene. International law bestows upon these arrivals a
81 Ibid 87.
82 G Chamayou, Manhunts: A Philosophical History (Princeton UP, 2010) 2-3.
83 Ibid 135.
84 Harding (2012) 6.
85 For an affirmation of the categories of legal/illegal entry (even if, in the former treaty but not the
latter, this distinction is deemed to be immaterial for recognising refugeehood), see Convention
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status that means that they will either be received as asylum-seekers—as refu-
gees-in-waiting—or as unauthorised migrants, arriving without state approval
and to be seen by many, in Harding’s words, as ‘importunate, active, invasive,
always other than ourselves’.86 It is thus a scene that reveals the intimate con-
nection between the international legal order and states, notions of selfhood,
and the construction of political communities.
Similar to the project of Foundations of International Migration Law,
Harding’s account of the international domain is also of a space filled with
norms and practices in need of reconceptualisation and rejuvenation. But
unlike the Foundations of International Migration Law’s project of creating
typologies of law, for Harding, the stories he collects rather demonstrate the
tiredness of such categorical distinctions. In particular, Harding argues that the
distinction between asylum-seekers and other disadvantaged migrants has ‘been
worn away’ and should no longer be uncritically accepted. In such a framing,
international norms around refugeehood are positioned as outdated, ‘obsolete’
and ‘anachronistic’, even if the Refugee Convention provides the ‘very founda-
tions of our thinking on asylum’.87 Yet he holds on to the potential of the
international domain as a site of action, suggesting that the plight of asylum-
seekers would not be so dire if the UNHCR resettlement programmes were
more effective and administered on a larger scale.88 In these brief reformist
moments, Harding envisions an expansionist notion of international authority
that could overcome the current deficiencies of the international system based
on statism.
Like Hathaway, Harding makes a moral appeal for the mandates of certain
international institutions to be bolstered so that they can bestow rights upon
people forsaken by national policies. But, unlike Hathaway, Harding is suspi-
cious of mobilising economic discourse to frame arguments for welcoming or
administering refugees. Economic arguments, for Harding, are used to justify
policies of refugee ‘regionalisation’ that act to keep the bulk of the world’s
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 31(1); International Convention on the Protection of the
Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, Article 68.
86 Harding (2012) 6. Under international law, refugee status is declaratory rather than constitutive: see
JC Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge UP, 2005) 11.
87 Harding (2012) 35-37, 54.
88 As testimony to the curtailed nature of such resettlements, Harding cites figures attesting to a
significant decrease in the size and scale of these programmes: in the 1970s, over a quarter of a
million refugees were resettled annually by the UNHCR, compared to less than 75 000 today.
Ibid 4, 16.
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refugees in the poorest regions of the world.89 Moreover, suggesting that the
Global North would benefit economically from admitting more refugees would
‘impose another qualification on the right to asylum which many refugees,
damaged by experiences in their countries of origin, may be unable to
meet’.90 Rather, Harding argues that refugees need a more ‘open’ defence, a
defence not necessarily grounded in legal principles and ‘without proviso,
which makes no appeal to the self-interest of host communities’.91 In tracking
the economic and philosophical arguments for the freer movement of people,
Harding seeks to question the ideals of law with its rights-based schema, noting
that multiple paradoxes have emerged in Europe and North America, where
‘gated communities are anathema to the egalitarian ideal’ and rights are uni-
versal in name only, available only to those who can access them and increas-
ingly ‘rationed by a subset of rules about sovereign boundaries’.92
One of the strengths of Harding’s book is the way in which he frames his
material through the perspectives he captures and the stereotypes he compli-
cates. Through depicting the act of travelling, Harding is able to be physically
close to the people he writes about, even if their movements and territorial
presence are framed by law in entirely different ways.93 If migrants, in
Foundations, appear dominantly as objects of regulation who do not actively
shape international legal norms, the picture of migrants that emerges in Border
Vigils is much more explicit yet ambiguous. At times, Harding depicts migrants
as victims trapped by capricious laws (as ‘prisoners, shackled at their feet and
handcuffed’, shuffling around a US courtroom ‘like hobbled animals’, and
having their sentences of imprisonment ‘handed down at breakneck speed’)94
or as subjected to irrational, protectionist sentiment (for Harding, it is the ‘non-
white immigrant’ who has to ‘bear the cost of Europe’s fears for its own sta-
bility’).95 Here, instead, migrants are imagined as abject, rejected, suffering
beings—‘the undesirables’ of Europe and North America96—who should
elicit the reader’s sympathy. At other times, migrants are presented as
89 On refugee ‘regionalisation’, see Hathaway (2012) 203; JC Hathaway, ‘Why Refugee Law Still
Matters’ 8 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2007) 89. In response, see Noll (2007).
90 Harding (2012) 49.
91 Ibid 49.
92 Ibid 78, 86.
93 It is telling that Harding does not reflect upon his own legal status or ability to move unhampered by
law in the course of the book.
94 Ibid 117.
95 Ibid 3.
96 Ibid 26.
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economically risky subjects who trouble the social distribution of rights and
resources within nations, with Harding noting that ‘there’s no question that
[asylum seekers are] competing with host citizens for resources’ when claiming
benefits ‘at the public expense’.97 Yet, more frequently, the migrants of
Harding’s tales are overwhelmingly political actors, actively negotiating borders
or taking conscious risks in order to take control of and shape their lives—
realising, for example, as the Cameroonian migrant Joseph did, that he would
need to strike out on his own to ‘breach the wall’ of Europe in order to escape
his ‘political predicament’ of grinding poverty, economic stagnation and spir-
alling national debt.98
If there is a limitation of Border Vigils, it is its narrow focus on only par-
ticular groups of migrants, namely asylum-seekers in Europe and undocu-
mented workers in the US. Given that the book is intentionally presented as
‘fragments’ pieced together in the course of a journalistic investigation, this need
not necessarily be a weakness. However, unfortunately—except for a very brief
note in the introduction—the scope of the book is not explicitly addressed or
explained to the reader. This has the effect of confirming the common (mis-
placed) perception that Europe and North America are the only desired destin-
ations for refugees or poorer people all around the world, while disregarding
other forms and places of ‘border vigils’. While Germany and the US remain the
world’s largest recipients of individual applications for asylum, receiving
109 600 and 84 400 in 2013 respectively, South Africa received the third highest
number of claims, totalling 70 000.99 Despite these figures, tellingly, the vast
majority of the world’s refugees reside in countries in the Global South,100 with
only a fraction of these people making the hazardous journey to seek asylum
in countries in the Global North. Incorporating other border conflicts—such
as in Israel,101 South Africa102 or Qatar103—may have strengthened the
97 Ibid 54.
98 Ibid 155.
99 UNHCR (2013) 3.
100 The UNHCR estimates that developing nations host 86 per cent of the world’s refugees: ibid 2.
101 See, e.g., B Kalir, ‘The Jewish State of Anxiety: Between Moral Obligation and Fearism
in the Treatment of African Asylum Seekers in Israel’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
(2014), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1369183X.2014.960819#.
VM2T92SUeYQ (last visited 5 January 2015).
102 See, e.g., J Klaaren & J Ramji, ‘Inside Illegality: Migration Policing in South Africa after Apartheid’
48 Africa Today (2001) 35.
103 R Jureidini, Migrant Labour Recruitment to Qatar (Qatar Foundation, 2014); Amnesty
International, The Dark Side of Migration: Spotlight on Qatar’s Construction Sector Ahead of the
World Cup (AI, 2013).
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contemporary feel and analysis of the book. But more importantly, greater at-
tention to the connections between North America and Europe as sites of border
vigils would have been interesting, particularly in relation to the flow of ideas,
governmental practices, corporate capital and migrant strategies of resistance.
Ultimately, Harding’s Border Vigils moves our attention away from a prin-
cipal fixation upon sovereignty within the established discourses of interna-
tional law offered in Foundations of International Migration Law, and towards
embodied practices of statecraft. While sovereignty continues to function as the
way states claim the authority to exclude, this claim in itself is shown to be
insufficient and necessarily reliant upon an array of techniques, practices, figures
and rationalities to make authority and sovereignty meaningful. For Harding,
while the border is mainly depicted as a physical barrier, functioning—as the
book’s subtitle suggests—to lock migrants ‘out’ of the rich world, it is an insti-
tution that is both created and challenged through human activity. The borders
that Harding draws our attention to take the form of walls that must be built and
scaled, checkpoints to be staffed and avoided, immigration regulations to be
legislated and outmanoeuvred, and bodies of water to be patrolled and crossed.
He points us both to the futility of policing borders (the US–Mexico border
stretching, after all, 2000 miles through inhospitable terrain) as well as their ever
militarised enforcement (with privatised immigration prisons and biometric
surveillance systems increasingly the norm). Reading Border Vigils against
Foundations, Harding’s fragments leave the international legal reader with a
sense of the illusive nature of the project of ‘managed migration’ where its
projection of ‘safe and orderly migration’ is framed not only as an administra-
tive fantasy but—more sinisterly perhaps—as a proxy for the increased securi-
tisation of migration and hardening of borders against impoverished people of
the ‘poor’ world. Nonetheless, Harding’s tales also suggest an unfulfilled prom-
ise of the international, the potential for a different international if only eco-
nomic processes were more just, international cooperation more humane,
border enforcement less exclusionary and violent, economic migrants had
more rights, and the rich world lived up to its ‘egalitarian ideals’.
DIFFERENTIAL INCLUSION IN THE INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN
We live in a time and space in which borders, both literal and
figurative, exist everywhere.104
104 A Morales, ‘Dynamic Identities in Heterotopia’, in JA Gurpegui (ed.), Alejandro Morales: Fiction
Past, Present, Future Perfect (Bilingual Press, 1996) 14.
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This brings us to the third and last book under review: Sandro Mezzadra
and Brett Neilson’s Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor. If
Harding’s contribution leaves the reader feeling burdened, oscillating between
political indignation or despair and a desire for a more expansive internation-
alism, then Mezzadra and Neilson’s book offers a different way of naming,
framing and transforming the institutionalised and epistemic violence towards
migrants. Border as Method frames human mobility within a vision of global life
that is irreducibly active and heterogeneous, where the proliferation of borders
‘continuously divide[s] and redivide[s]’ spaces while also producing a prolif-
eration of situated border struggles. It is in these encounters that new hetero-
geneous political subjectivities are made and the politics of the commons is
contested.
The central concern of Border as Method is to understand how the insti-
tution and antagonisms of borders shape contemporary lives, subjectivities and
social worlds, as well as what forms of knowledge and action can effectively
intervene in the dynamic of borders.105 It is a project that is less interested in
identifying where or what borders ‘are’ (that is, the location or ontology of
borders), than in theorising the dynamics they inaugurate and sustain as well as
appreciating the relation between ‘radical heterogeneous borderscapes’ (that is,
borders as spatially- and temporally-situated and shifting relations).106
Juridically, their project attends to how borders are crucial institutions in the
production of jurisdictions, where the framing of different domains of law,
including the international domain, is intimately placed within and in relation
to normative questions of world-making. Rather than offering a fixed jurisdic-
tional schema, Border as Method facilitates a more open-ended and critical
engagement with law and draws our attention to the creation of a world ordered
by borders such as those of and within capital, territory, race and gender.
Unlike the ‘Fortress Europe’ image that resonates in Border Vigils, for
Mezzadra and Neilson, the work of borders is not primarily directed towards
keeping migrants ‘out’ of the Global North. Rather, Mezzadra and Neilson
emphasise that the border is both an ‘epistemological device’ necessary for
creating and sustaining the metaphysical distinction between subject and
object as well as an institution of ‘differential inclusion’.107 Borders are ‘devices
of inclusion’ that act to ‘filter, select and channel’ the movement of people in
‘no less violent’ ways than measures that simply exclude people from
105 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) 17.
106 Ibid 9.
107 Ibid 16.
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territorialised spaces.108 This means that the forms of inclusion facilitated by
borders, for Mezzadra and Neilson, exist on a ‘continuum of exclusion, rather
than in opposition to it’.109 Here, borders are never unidirectional, always
spaces of control and resistance that are ‘hardening and softening at the same
time’110 while generating new subjectivities (‘new figures of capital’ such as
international students, migrant workers or financial traders). This dual orien-
tation of borders—as ‘at once sites for the restriction of mobility and sites of
struggle’111—enable the authors to frame borders as crucial sites for political
interventions, allowing the reader to attend, on the one hand, to how the in-
stitution of the border is deployed for the expansion of capital and legal logics as
well as, on the other hand, how the border can be put to work in and for radical
political thought, struggles and activism.
Across nine chapters, the book weaves together a diverse range of con-
cerns. It moves from an initial examination of the multiplication of labour in
postcolonial capitalism (a dynamic that has seen the disarticulation of the figure
of the citizen-worker and the appearance of a ‘heterogeneous array’ of figures of
labour in its place) to a discussion of what they term the ‘sovereign machine of
governmentality’ (a theoretical manoeuvre that conjoins principally the works
of Giorgio Agamben on the sovereign exception and Michel Foucault on gov-
ernmentality), and finally, reflecting upon the task of translating the commons
in an effort to rethink concepts of unity and class in order to ‘embolden the
workers of the world in all their heterogeneity and multiplicity’.112 It is hard to
isolate the influences on this ambitious work, which draws heavily on pre-
existing scholarship (including their own).113 There is, for example, a clear
108 Ibid 165. This claim that there is no ‘clear-cut’ distinction between those who are included or those
who are excluded echoes a wealth of migration and border studies literature that has long claimed
that borders are constituted through active practices that must be continuously enacted, rather than
as static objects to be policed.
109 Ibid 7.
110 Ibid 175.
111 Ibid 183
112 Ibid 130.
113 See in particular their earlier piece by the same name where they set out their general political and
research project: S Mezzadra & B Neilson, ‘Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor’,
European Institute for Progressive Cultural Policies, 2007, available at http://eipcp.net/transversal/
0608/mezzadraneilson/en (last visited 5 January 2015). See also their individual or collaborative
work with others, for example: S Mezzadra & B Neilson, ‘Borderscapes of Differential Inclusion:
Subjectivity and Struggles on the Threshold of Justice’s Excess’, in E Balibar et al. (eds), The Borders
of Justice (Temple UP, 2013); S Mezzadra, ‘The Gaze of Autonomy: Capitalism, Migration and
Social Struggles’, in V Squire (ed.), The Contested Politics of Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity
(Routledge, 2011); S Mezzadra, ‘How Many Histories of Labour? Towards a Theory of Postcolonial
Capitalism’ 14 Postcolonial Studies (2011) 151; B Neilson, ‘The World Seen from a Taxi:
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desire to think with and extend concepts developed in European Marxist trad-
ition, particularly by thinkers like Etienne Balibar, who argues that borders act
as instruments of differentiation ‘transported into the middle of political space’,
and Mario Tronti’s elaboration of the subjective face of labour within the Italian
operaismo tradition.114 But Mezzadra and Neilson’s concerns also have a con-
stitutive indebtedness to the political commitments and intellectual rigour of
postcolonial theorising (in particular Dipesh Chakrabarty’s Provincialising
Europe) and feminist projects (particularly those of Carla Lonzi and Carole
Pateman).115 Most notably, there is an espoused orientation to learning from
actually-existing migrant and worker struggles, although—with the exception
of a brief discussion of migrant slogans and tactics in Chapter 3 as well as
mention of speaking to workers in Chinese factories—the degree to which
the materiality and specificity of these struggles directly inform the text remains
unclear. While at times the tensions between the divergent theoretical and
methodological approaches that the book brings together or the subtleties of
the empirical discussions are subordinated to the authors’ desire to demon-
strate the power of the book’s key analytical concepts, Mezzadra and Neilson
nonetheless approach their analytical framing with a refreshing self-reflexivity.
Elsewhere, they suggest of the book’s method:
Concepts for us must be adequate to concrete situations. They are not
carved in stone or inscribed into totalizing systems. At the same time,
concepts do not merely reflect material realities. If their interface with
concrete situations is no longer interesting or productive, we can
always make new ones.116
In this frame, scholarship and acts of scholarly framings are irreducibly creative.
While many of the concepts, orientations, conversations or ethnographic stu-
dies drawn on in the book may be familiar to those engaged within these
traditions or disciplinary interventions, a key contribution of Border as
Student-Migrants-Workers in the Global Multiplication of Labour’ 29 Subjectivity (2009) 425; B
Neilson & N Rossiter, ‘Precarity as a Political Concept, or, Fordism as Exception’ 25 Theory, Culture
and Society (2008) 323; B Neilson & A Mitropoulos, ‘Cutting Democracy’s Knot’ 8 Culture Machine
(2006), available at http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewarticle/40/48 (last
visited 5 January 2015).
114 See, e.g., E Balibar, We, the People of Europe? Reflections on Transnational Citizenship, trans. J
Swenson (Princeton UP, 2004) 110.
115 For discussion of the influence of feminist thought, see Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method
(2013) 159-60.
116 Mezzadra & Neilson, ‘Geography Is Not Enough’ (2013) 334.
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Method is how it assembles and curates these diverse existing literatures in a new
and agenda-setting way.
A good example of this scholarly curatorship is their discussion of inter-
twining geographical and cognitive borders in Chapter 2. Here, Mezzadra and
Neilson weave excerpts from novels (specifically, Amitav Ghosh’s Shadow
Lines) and postcolonial critiques of race with an unpacking of the etymology
and material function of the 16th-century geographic term, Fabrica mundi,
meaning the ‘fabrication of the world’.117 For Mezzadra and Neilson, fabrica
as a term moved from describing a process of creation—the fabrication of
order—to designating the actual order or work being created. This, for
Mezzadra and Neilson, represents a ‘form of disavowal’ that reflects a broader
tendency within geographic thinking, where the territorial units of modern
cartography and practices of mapping conceal and naturalise processes of cap-
italist production and primitive accumulation at various stages of imperial
appropriation and colonial expansion.118 In particular, the map conceals the
historical processes of land appropriation as well as the ontological moment of
the production between self and other, ‘constructing its epistemology on the
idea of a natural proportion and measure of the world, an abstracted fabrica
mundi to be projected onto maps’.119 Their concern is to show how ‘ontological
questions of world-making are neither prior nor anterior to social, political, and
economic processes of spatial transformation but, indeed, historically and tem-
porally coeval with them’.120
Mezzadra and Neilson’s gesture of troubling established cognitive and
geographic ways of understanding the world and generating ‘new geogra-
phies-in-the-making’ can also be read juridically as a challenge to, and decon-
struction of, the international legal form of the sovereign state with its territorial
imperative.121 Unlike the homogenous, stable and universal form of sovereignty
that is projected in Foundations of International Migration Law, Border as
Method’s careful unpacking of border practices foregrounds the material,
historically-contingent and relational nature of sovereign power as well as the
contemporary strategies deployed in border struggles. For Mezzadra and
Neilson, sovereign power needs to be understood both by holding on to the
117 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) 35.
118 Ibid 32.
119 Ibid 35-36.
120 Ibid 65.
121 Ibid 58. On the ‘territorial imperative’ of sovereign states in international law, see D Kritsiotis,
‘Public International Law and its Territorial Imperative’ 30 Michigan Journal of International Law
(2009) 547.
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power to exclude as well as by uncovering the multiple and overlapping pro-
cesses that have resulted in the ‘disaggregation and reconfiguration’ of sover-
eign authority.122 For example, this means examining the heterogeneous
supranational actors and conflicting institutional rationalities enmeshed in
the production of border regimes, wherein the nation-state and its associated
immigration laws merely function as one ‘container’, albeit a forceful one,
among many that shape border struggles. The authors’ approach to human
rights as a juridical form is another telling example: for Mezzadra and
Neilson, the international human right regime is simply another jurisdictional
arrangement with its own particular rationality that can be invoked in border
struggles rather than an enunciation of foundational norms whose violations
can be deduced. This descriptive orientation enables the authors to make two
gestures: first, to posit a critique of human rights as a juridical discourse en-
meshed within governmental practices—whereby human rights, rather than
being a ‘crucial element in the system of checks and balances that keep
power at bay’ external to the exercise of power, are instead increasingly internal
to practices of border control; and second, to notice how migrants may stra-
tegically appeal to human rights in order to ‘trigger’ regime conflicts between
national and international authorities. Crucially, this necessitates not focusing
solely on the actions of states as determining border regimes (as the gaze offered
in Foundations of International Migration Law entails), but rather seeing the
actions and strategies of migrants as constitutive forces. This means that mi-
grant practices—for example, in using the ‘incompatible logics of action’ be-
tween legal regimes to their own advantage—cannot be framed as ‘passive
reactions to changing circumstances but [as] deliberate and strategic acts of
refusal that confuse and fluster both nation-states and international bodies’
alike.123
On a methodological level, Border as Method challenges both the framing
of the border as a set object or as confined to a geographical site (as a ‘neutral
line’ or constructed wall) and the idea of method as a ‘set of pre-given, neutral
techniques that can be applied to diverse objects without fundamentally altering
the ways in which they are constructed and understood’.124 But the authors are
also clear that the notion of ‘border as method’ is ‘something more than meth-
odological’, suggesting that to take the notion of ‘border as method’ seriously
entails a series of political questions, about the relationship between thought
and action and about the reconfiguration of more just social worlds and less
122 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) 195.
123 Ibid 186.
124 Ibid 17
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violent subjectivities through border struggles. Ultimately, for the authors, this
entails a reimagining of the global commons through a ‘fundamental question-
ing of processes of differential inclusion that are constitutive of the public and
its subjective figurations epitomised by citizenship’ as well as a refusal to ‘turn
the border into a justice-seeking institution’.125 This takes us to a very different
form of justice to that glimpsed through either Foundations of International
Migration Law or Border Vigils. While for the former two texts the challenge was
either to create a more regulated form of sovereignty or to prod the rich world
to be more inclusive and faithful to its egalitarian ideals, here instead it is the
very notions of sovereignty, subjectivity and community that need to be re-
worked in order for a form of justice to be envisioned. This is necessarily a
material and responsive process. For international lawyers, at stake in such
strategic acts of reworking is an initial invitation to notice how the international
domain is configured through processes of differential inclusion that stratify the
different forms and subjects of mobility. Through this awareness, international
lawyers could then contribute to collective projects that strategically engaged
and reimagined the international domain and its legal forms otherwise.
CONCLUSION: READING IN THE SHADOW OF LAMPEDUSA
In Frames of War, Judith Butler theorises the ‘selective and differential framing
of violence’ that regulates our ethical constitution and make certain lives ap-
prehended as grievable. For Butler, frames are operations of power that produce
particular forms of life and thereby act to ‘delimit the sphere of appearance
itself’.126 Paying attention to acts of enframing, or calling a particular frame
‘into question’, Butler suggests, can reveal the instability of frames, showing
how they ‘never quite contain . . . the scene’ and ‘never quite determined pre-
cisely what it is we see, think, recognize, and apprehend’.127 There is always
something that ‘exceeds’ and challenges the frame. Breaking with a frame
not only generates the possibility of new frames and new content, but—
importantly—discloses a ‘taken-for-granted’ reality, ‘exposing the orchestrating
designs of the authority who sought to control the frame’.128
This article has engaged with the different frames offered by three con-
trasting books for apprehending how law orders human mobility. Returning to
my opening scene, the contested framing of international migration within and
125 Ibid 279.
126 J Butler, Frames of War (Verso, 2009) 1.
127 Ibid 9.
128 Ibid 12.
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outside of the UN High Level Dialogues signals two struggles—over making
human mobility legible and over jurisdiction. There, I suggested that acts of
framing are intimately connected to the task of rationalising authority and
authorising institutional action. Extending Butler’s reading to frames as legal
devices reveals how frames also intimately mould forms of life, attaching indi-
viduals to institutions and scripting how their conduct is juridically
apprehended.
For Foundations of International Migration Law, the recognition and sys-
temisation of an existing domain of law, international migration law, was
framed as a way of overcoming the problems of sovereign power and unilateral
action in the face of human mobility. The book employs a positivist legal
framing in order to represent the international domain as a technical space
for articulating normative content and promoting institutional action in pur-
suit of the harmonisation of state practice. At its most optimistic, the interna-
tional domain is depicted as offering a site of order-making, with increased state
cooperation and the further juridicalisation of human mobility facilitating
increased channels for different types of migrant. In this frame, what is
needed is the constitutionalisation of international regimes of mobility, both
on the level of description and practice. On an institutional level, the interna-
tional domain is offered as a site of remedy and redress to avoid migrant ex-
ploitation and deaths, even if, at present, the international jurisdiction to
administer migration appears fragmented and in need of reconstruction.
In contrast, Border Vigils uses a descriptive, narrative approach to illustrate
the effects of the operations of sovereign power. Through mobilising the af-
fective dimensions of migration, the book asks international lawyers to pay
attention to the broader political terrain of structural inequality that interna-
tional migration law operates within and holds together. The jurisdictional
schema depicted in Border Vigils makes the reader painfully aware that despite
the present articulation of a plethora of migrant rights in the international
domain, their realisation is constrained not simply because of a lack of political
will to implement them or because of the fragmented nature of international
regimes, but due to a paradox that lies at the heart of the very struggle over the
form and boundaries of political communities themselves. For Harding, the
paradox of enforceability of rights has resulted in migrants appearing less as
absent or benign objects of regulation—as they do in Foundations of
International Migration Law—but rather as unwelcome, even ‘hunted’, persons.
In this reading, the estimated 366 people who drowned off the coast of
Lampedusa cannot be framed as isolated deaths, or even as an accident that
results from a problem of lawlessness. Rather, Harding’s fragments are testa-
ment to how the ‘migrant cemetery’ that the Mediterranean and other parts of
the world have become is the product of embodied lawfulness, of legal
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exclusions from authorised entry and of concerted border-enforcement prac-
tices that push migrants to attempt ever more dangerous routes, deeming un-
authorised migrants as people outside of the rights and entitlements belonging
to political communities that have mobilised economic wealth.129 Harding’s
description of the hardening and militarisation of borders invites the reader to
ponder whether perhaps a budding international migration lawyer should—
rather than abandoning her office—also have a competency in norms regulat-
ing the use of force in a new kind of surveillance and warfare, ‘border wars’, a
chapter that tellingly does not appear in Foundations of International Migration
Law.
For Border as Method, these border struggles draw our attention to how the
border as institution is constitutive of the production of order and stratification
in the international domain. Yet, as Border as Method also reminds us, this
proliferation and heterogenisation of the border has resulted in a propagation
of sites of pushback and resistance and given rise to the possibility of articulat-
ing forms of community and commonality differently. In this sense, perhaps
international lawyers could notice how the island of Lampedusa is shaped as a
site of contestation, as a site for the making and unmaking of borders, where, in
recent years, it has become a destination for border pilgrimages or ‘vigils’
(visited by authority figures from Pope Francis to the President of the
European Commission) as well as a site of migrant protest and solidarity.
For example, over three days in late January and early February 2014, over
300 people from different civil society organisations and social movements
gathered on the island collectively to draft the ‘Charter of Lampedusa’, which
articulates an alternative conception of the international domain and insists
upon a radical freedom of movement as well as the right to stay that also
‘implies freedom from any form of exploitation and . . . requires access to
healthcare, housing, work, education, communication and legal information’
for all.130 While, for Mezzadra and Neilson, the Charter could be seen as an
articulation of a form of radical justice and a questioning of how the commons
is conceived, they insist that such collective work needs to go beyond the
moment of articulation—beyond the ‘rhetorical invocation of a world without
borders’—in order to rethink fundamentally social relations, including those of
capital, private property and state-based welfare regimes. Such counter-hege-
monic practices then could engender new political subjects and forms of
129 The IOM recently estimated that—shockingly—over 40 000 people have died since 2000 at world
borders: IOM, Fatal Journeys (IOM, 2014).
130 Charter of Lampedusa, available at http://www.lacartadilampedusa.org/ (last visited 5 January
2015).
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internationalism. Here, the international lawyer may be called upon to adopt an
activist orientation within office, attending to, as Mezzadra and Neilson urge,
the ‘ontological moment[s] of production’ that reveal how cognitive and geo-
graphical borders pattern the world as well as an array of legal practices and
rationalities that give form to the subjects of migration in a highly differentiated
manner.131 This entails noticing if and how international law has been or may
be used by migrant resistance on Lampedusa while also tracing connections to
other places where the migrants at Lampedusa may come from or will go to,
and how border practices and struggles are linked to such other sites.
Ultimately, while all three books challenge the framing of migration regu-
lation as a stubbornly national affair, as the ‘last bastion of sovereignty’ in a
globalising world, each offers a radically different glimpse into the makings and
unmakings of authority, borders, subjectivity and mobility in an internationa-
lised world. Read together, these three books prod the international lawyer to be
more attentive to the tools of her craft, to question where each jurisdictional
schema locates authority, and to notice the particular ends that are at stake in
framing the international jurisdiction to administer migration.
131 Mezzadra & Neilson, Border as Method (2013) 38.
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