Europe’s Responsibility

Tomis Kapitan published as "Die Verantwortung Europas," in Georg Meggle, ed., Deutschland, Israel, Palästina.

Hamburg, Eurpäische Verlagsanstalt, 2007: 41-70. 1. Introduction My topic today is Europe’s responsibility for the creation and resolution the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most bitter and explosive political struggles in the world today. In the past 60 years, it has consumed thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and endless hours of debate. It is not localized; it is at the heart of on-going tensions between the West and the Islamic world, and it is directly related to the current American aggression in southern Asia. The fate of international relations during the 21st century depends on its resolution as, arguably, it is single greatest threat to world peace.

The situation is made even more serious by the fact that there are no immediate prospects of a resolution of this conflict, a fact that should cause anyone concerned about justice, peace, and international stability to give serious thought about what ought to be done. This requires an effort to understand the historical roots of the dispute. The neglect of history, an ignorance of past causes of present conflicts, grievances, passions, and trends, is dangerous for any country, especially for a democracy where citizens need reliable information if they are to make wise decisions, and most crucially, for a democracy that is, or aspires to be, a superpower. 2. The Core of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict The conflict among Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs concerns territorial rights—rights of use, possession, residency, and sovereignty—over the area traditionally designated as “Palestine.” As territorial conflicts go, it is fairly recent. It is misleading to think that Arabs and Jews have been fighting each other for centuries, as is sometimes said, and that what we are now witnessing is just more of the same. The state of Israel was created only in 1948, with tensions between the two communities going back to the beginning of the century. While the conflict is chiefly centered on control of territory, at stake are the prospects for future self-determination of each group.

The conflict dates from the inception of Zionism among Jews in late 19th century Europe, where “Zionism” is a term coined in 1893 to describe the political movement for Jewish “self-emancipation” and nationalism. It emerged among Jews in response to (1) the popularity of nationalism; (2) traditional European antisemitism; (3) the threat posed by the emancipation of the Jews to the survival of a distinctive Jewish culture. As their vision matured, the Zionists called for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, the historic homeland of the Jewish people.

From the outset, Zionism faced a moral problem, namely, that its vision of a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority could be fulfilled only at the expense of another people, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine who had maintained a majority during the thirteen centuries since the Islamic conquest, if not longer given their descent from ancient Canaanites, Hittites, and Philistines. According to Ottoman records, in 1878, just prior to the first wave of Jewish immigrants from Europe, there were about one-half million people living in the region, approximately 85% Muslim, 10% Christians, and 5% Jews. By 1917, the percentage of Jews had risen to 8%.

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Faced with this population imbalance, how could Zionism succeed? Zionist leaders like Theodore Herzl came to favor a two-step program for demographic change: first, to promote massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, and second, to encourage the emigration of the Arabs into the neighboring countries.1 Publicly, the Zionist movement advocated peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, insisting that there was ample room in Palestine for both peoples. But the maximalist idea—that there is no room for two peoples sharing sovereignty in Palestine—predominated among Zionist leaders such as Chaim Weizmann (came Israel’s first president), David Ben-Gurion (Israel’s first prime minister), and Vladimir Jabotinsky (leader of revisionist Zionism from which the Likud Bloc emerged), and with it, the prospect of forcibly transferring the Arabs came to be seen as the “obvious and most logical, solution to the Zionist’s demographic problem.”2 How was the Zionist vision to be achieved? The Arabs would oppose any attempt to establish a Jewish state on land that had been part of the Arab and Islamic worlds since the seventh century, and they certainly had no intention of evacuating their traditional homeland. The Zionists understood this clearly and never assumed they would achieve Arab consent.3 So, they adopted a threefold strategy of (1) strengthening Jewish national aspirations, (2) securing both the endorsement of major world powers for the idea of a Jewish state, and assistance from them in fostering Jewish immigration into Palestine, and (3) preparing the Jewish community in Palestine for armed conflict. They had their first diplomatic success with a wartime British government whose Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, was sympathetic to their aims. Britain took control of Palestine in late 1917 after joining with the Arabs in 1915 to end Ottoman rule over Arab lands. While promising the Arabs independence in their homeland, Britain also conspired with the French to divide up the Middle East into separate zones of influence. Then, in November 1917, Britain’s foreign minister, Arthur Balfour, issued a declaration in which the British Government pledged to facilitate the establishment of “a national home for the Jewish people.” in Palestine.4

The Balfour Declaration was not only inconsistent with the promises that the British had made to the Arabs in 1915, it violated the principle of self-determination which, in the words of its chief advocate, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, specified that the “settlement of every question, whether of territory, of sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship” is to be made “upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for sake of its own exterior influence or mastery.” Wilson insisted that observance of this principle is not only a natural extension of democratic theory, but an essential measure for preventing future wars:

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property. (Pomerance 1976, 2)

In subsequently advocating the treaty establishing the League of Nations Wilson stated, the principle underlying the treaty was that every land belonged to the native stock that lived in it, and that nobody had the right to dictate either the form of government or the control of territory to those people who were born and bred and had their lives and happiness to make there. (Wilson 1927, vol. II, 49)5

In 1919, an American Commission on the political situation in the Near East reported to the Paris Peace Conference that the wishes of Palestine's population must be decisive if the principle of self-determination is to rule. Since the non-Jewish population of Palestine—nine-tenths of the whole—were “emphatically against the entire Zionist program,” then, “to subject a people so

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minded to unlimited Jewish immigration, and to steady financial and social pressure to surrender the land, would be a gross violation of the principle just quoted and of the peoples' rights, though it kept within the forms of law.” The British were unmoved, and Lord Balfour's own response to the commissioners' recommendations was blunt:

In Palestine we do not propose even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American Commission has been going through the form of asking what they are. The Four Great Powers are committed to Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prejudices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient land.6

3. The European Role in Creating and Sustaining Israel The British and French refusal to apply the principle of self-determination in the Near East initiated a pattern that European nations have followed for the past 85 years. It was next manifested in 1920 at the San Remo conference, when the Supreme Allied Council of the victorious powers in the great war decided to give Britain mandatory powers in Palestine, incorporating the language of the Balfour Declaration into the terms of the Mandate.7 As a result, not only was the Zionist vision supported by the victorious powers in the war, it was given international sanction through the League of Nations.

Prior to the First World War, most Jewish immigrants to Palestine came from Eastern Europe, but as British authorities opened the doors to Jewish immigration in 1920, Jews began to enter Palestine from other parts of Europe. By 1930, the number of Jews in Palestine had risen to 17% of the total population. Then, from 1932 to 1943, another 230,000 European Jews immigrated to Palestine, swelling the Jewish portion of the population to 31%. An estimated two-thirds of these came from Germany and areas under German control.8 Nazi policy was instrumental here. The World Zionist Organization (WZO) saw an opportunity to capitalize on the Nazis’ antisemitism, and in August 1933, signed the Ha’avara (transfer) agreement with the German Government, which regulated and facilitated Jewish emigration from Germany to Palestine and gave Zionists a monopoly over German Palestinian trade, allowing emigrating Jews to take a fixed portion of their assets in terms of German goods. Some 60% of all capital investment in Palestine between August 1933 and September 1939 was channeled through this agreement,9 which not only served to strengthen German economy and combat a boycott of German goods, but hasten the removal of Jews from Germany. After the Nuremberg Laws of September 1935, the only Jewish newspaper allowed to appear was the Judische Rundschau—published by the Zionist Federation of Germany—and the Zionist party was the only other party legalized in the Reich at that time, with its flag permitted to fly in Germany. In 1938, the popular slogan had become: Juden Raus! Auf nach Palastina.10 In these ways, then, Hitler’s government did more than any other government during the 1930s to support Jewish development in Palestine. Jewish immigration engendered a predictable Arab reaction, first a general strike, then a revolt of Arab fighters against the British military (1936-39). By the time the British crushed the rebellion in 1939, over 5000 Arabs had lost their lives. However, the British Government changed it policy and began to call for the establishment of a single state within ten years in which Arabs and Jews would share authority in government. Despite this, Churchill stated in 1941 that if the British and the Americans prevail in the war, then the “creation of a great Jewish state in Palestine inhabited by millions of Jews will be one of the leading features of the peace conference discussions.”

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Britain passed the problem of Palestine on to the newly formed United Nations (UN) after the war.11 Although the Jews were but one-third of the population and had acquired ownership of only 7% of the land, in November 1947, the General Assembly recommended partitioning Palestine into two states, a Jewish state on 53% of territory, an Arab state on 46%, with Jerusalem to be an internationalized under UN control. Except for Britain and Greece, very European member of the UN voted in favor of the resolution. The Arabs rejected the recommendation on the grounds on the grounds of its manifest injustice, specifically, its violation of the principle of self-determination, while the Zionists accepted it, selectively, for they never acquiesced neither to establishment of an Arab state in Palestine nor to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Fighting between Jews and Palestinians began immediately, with Jewish forces better trained, better armed, and consequently, able to take the offensive. Weapons purchased from Czechoslovakia in 1948, with Russian approval, were instrumental in helping the Jews to maintain a military edge. The State of Israel was declared in May 1948 as the British evacuated. It was immediately recognized by the new superpowers, the USSR and the USA. During the war of 1948-49, Israel was able to consolidate the hold on the territory of Palestine it had captured, and to turn back the threat posed by a combined military force that five Arab countries sent to support the Palestinians. By the 1949 armistice, Israel had control over 77% of Palestine, and would have taken all of Palestine save for the intervention of Arab armies the West Bank and Gaza Strip.12 Egypt took control of the Gaza Strip and Jordan took control of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. No Palestinian Arab state was created and Jerusalem was not internationalized. Over 750,000 Arabs were made refugees in this conflict, at least half fleeing because of fear caused by massacres, and the remainder expelled at gunpoint. Israel rejected UN-GA Resolution 194 calling for their repatriation, claiming that since Arab countries had waged war in defiance of the international community then they could absorb Arab refugees, just as the Israel was now accepting Jewish refugees not only from Europe, but also from the Middle East and north Africa.13 The UN negotiator on this matter, Count Folke Bernadotte, was murdered by a Jewish underground group in August 1948. Israel settled the newly arrived Jewish immigrants in Palestinian villages and homes, but also, destroyed some 400 Palestinian villages entirely. Hebrew names were given to all the places, mountain, valleys, springs, and roads, etc. of the country.14 The “transfer” alternative had now become reality, and for Palestinians, their Catastrophe (al-Nakba). Today, the descendents of these Palestinian refugees outside Palestine number over 4.5 million (making approximately 9.5 million Palestinians in total). The Arabs that remained under Israeli control and became Israeli citizens—ruled by separate system of military laws until the mid 1960s—today constitute approximately 18% of the population of Israel. So, the state of Israel was able to begin with a decisive Jewish majority, just as the Zionist movement had always wanted.15

European support for the Jewish state has continued to the present. Germany has been the second largest donor to Israel. In 1945, Chaim Weizmann requested “reparations, restitution, and indemnification to the Jewish people from Germany” and, in 1951, Chancellor Adenauer concurred. So, in September 1952 a reparations agreement was signed between Adenauer, Israel’s Moshe Sharett, and Goldmann. During the 1950s and 1960s one third of investment goods imported into Israel came from West Germany, which also installed five power plants between 1953-56, and laid 280 kilometers of pipelines for the irrigation of the Negev. Israel acquired 65 German built ships, and by January 1965, West German arms sales to Israel had reached $80 million. By late 1987 the West German Government announced that 80 billions marks had already been paid out to Israel in reparations.

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The West Germans were not alone in assisting Israel militarily. Besides the Russian- Czech arms shipments in the late 1940, the French sold Mirage jets to Israel in 1950s, and the French and British together collaborated with the Israelis during the 1956 invasion of Egypt. Arms sales have continued until the present day, for example, last year the British Government authorized the sale of vast quantities of arms and equipment to Israel. These include leg-irons, electric shock belts, and chemical and biological agents. 4. Israel’s Expansion Israel did not declare its borders in its Declaration of Independence. Ben Gurion stated that a “partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning,” that he wanted a “dynamic state, bent on expansion,” and that after Israel organizes a modern defense force, then “we will not be prevented from settling in the other parts of the country.”16 The major step towards this expansion was taken during the June 1967 War in which Israel defeated Egypt, Syria and Jordan, and came into possession of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights.17 This quick and decisive war increased Israel’s popularity among Jews and led to an increase in Jewish immigration. Nearly 250,000 more Arabs were expelled, Nasser’s Arab nationalism was deflated, and Palestinian resistance emerged as an independent political force.

For Israel, the most important result was acquisition of additional territory. Although the Security Council passed Resolution 242 calling for (1) withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories, (2) security and recognition for all states in region, (3) just resolution of the refugee problem, the resolution has never been fully implemented. Although Israel has evacuated the Sinai, it has not left the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or the Golan Heights, and it interprets these resolutions in such a way that they do not call for total withdrawal. By the early 1980s, it annexed the Golan and an expanded East Jerusalem. In the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip it imposed a military rule that has now lasted for 38 years. This has meant no democratic rights for Palestinian population, taxation without representation, Israeli control over land, resources, and economic development, and separate legal systems for Jews and Arabs living there.

The first Israeli settlement in the West Bank was founded in September 1967, the WZO declaring that “no political victory, no proclamation can convert these territories into Jewish territories if they are not settled by Jews.” In 1983, the WZO developed a Master Plan for settlement in “Judea” and “Samaria”—Israeli designations for the southern and northern West Bank respectively—that envisaged the eventual incorporation of these areas into Israel. Government officials acknowledged that the aim was to create a Jewish presence there that would prevent Palestinians from forming a state in the West Bank. By now, at least 42% of the West Bank is under the direct control of the settlement network. Satellite images show 282 Jewish built-up areas in the West Bank, including east Jerusalem and 26 in Gaza, all connected by an extensive system of highways and bypass roads for Israeli use only. They are home to over 230,000 settlers in the West Bank and another 7000 in Gaza, some motivated by affordable housing, others by religious and national sentiments. They are often built on high ground, and they surround every major Palestinian population center. Some settlement blocs are built above large aquifers from which Israel gets over one-third of its water supply. Around East Jerusalem there is a ring of settlements—home to another 175,000 Jews—that effectively cuts the West Bank into two, depriving Palestinians of access to the city which has always been the center of their economic and cultural lives.18

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The administration of territories occupied as a result of war is subject to the norms of the 4th Geneva Convention, and the 1977 Geneva Protocols. This is the UN position reinforced by International Law experts. Israel’s occupation policies violate several provisions of the 4th Geneva Convention, including Article 49 which states that an occupying power shall not transfer its own civilian population into the occupied territory, Article 50 which forbids closing education institutions in occupied areas, Article 53 which forbids destruction of homes, property, and crops, and land confiscation for the purpose of establishing its own civilian colonies, and Article 76 which makes it illegal to take people accused of offences outside areas of occupation.

The last three years have seen the construction of a massive eight-meter high wall within the West Bank—not on the Green Line (the border between the West Bank and Israel)—that will eventually extend for some 720 kilometers. When completed, some 160,000 Palestinians and 320,000 Israeli settlers will live between the wall and the Green Line. This area is defined as a “closed area” and Palestinians living in it cannot move in or out of it without special permits, though Israelis will be free to move to and from the area without a permit. This is not a wall of “separation,” as sometimes called, since there will be Israelis on both sides of it. Instead, it is more akin to a prison wall, with guard towers, having the effect of enclosing centers of Palestinian population within increasingly smaller areas, within bantustan-like regions. Already, the town of Qalqiliya, 40,000 people, is completely surrounded by this wall, with only one gate that the Israelis can close at will. Next, Bethlehem will be enclosed. Unable to move goods without permits, the Palestinian economies in these regions will suffer even further. In 2004, the World Court ruled that the wall is manifestly illegal.

Human rights abuses are an immediate consequence of Israel policy. Obviously, Palestinians protest against Israeli policies, especially the land confiscations, and their protests have routinely been met with force and brutality including house demolitions, destruction of agricultural property, e.g., fruit orchards and olive trees, curfews, deportations, torture, use of tanks, attack helicopters, F-16 fighter bombers in civilian areas, extra-judicial targeted killings. Palestinian protests against Israel policy steadily increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as did the brutality of the Israeli response. During the first intifada (1987-1991), 1,283 Palestinian civilians were killed and over 130,000 were sent to hospitals with injuries.19 5. The Illusion of a Peace Process The facts on the ground reveal that the Israel has no intention of giving the Palestinians a state in the West Bank, despite public pronouncements to the contrary. Israel has poured billions of dollars into the creation of a settlement network so as to solidify a division between different segments of the West Bank that will make a continuous Palestinian state impossible. As recently as May 23, 2005, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon declared that Israel will “never” give up the large settlement blocks of Ariel, Etzion, and Maale Adumin.20

You might ask; why doesn’t Israel simply annex the West Bank? The answer to that is plain. The Zionists have always insisted that a Jewish state must have a decisive Jewish majority. Annexation would require extending citizenship rights to the Arab population. Currently, there are approximately 10 million people living in territory of mandated Palestine. Israel has about 6.5 millions citizens, and among these are approximately 1 million Arabs. There are about 3.5 million Arabs in the occupied territories (1.3 million in Gaza and 2.2 million in the West Bank), so that there are about 4.5 million Palestinian Arabs in Palestine and 5.5 million Jews. Given current birth rates, and barring any massive immigrations, emigrations, or genocides, the number of Arabs in Palestine will eventually exceed the number of Jews. For the present, annexation is out of the question. The

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other alternatives are (i) genocide, (ii) forcible expulsion (a solution that has grown in popularity among the Israeli Jews in the past four years), (iii) negotiated evacuation of Arab population, or, what is now taking shape, (iv) establishing an apartheid-type system whereby the centers of Palestinian population are confined to increasingly small bantustans separated from each other. None of these last four alternatives are acceptable to the Arabs.

Of course, there is international pressure upon Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate an end to their hostilities. In 1988 the PLO accepted the right of Israel to exist, and accepted the UN partition plan, and the Arab states have expressed their willingness to accept a two state solution. Yet, Israel has resisted every call for an international conference, preferring instead to have the United States serve as the sole arbitrator and guarantor of any peace settlement. Since 1991, when the Americans brought the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table, there has been an “illusion” of a peace process perpetrated by the Western mass media. The major steps in this process were the agreements concluded in Oslo in 1993 and 1995. These agreements called for establishment of an interim Palestinian Authority which would govern certain regions evacuated by Israeli troops, security and economic cooperation, and a five-year period of negotiations to resolve the final status of the territories, borders, refugees, security, settlements, and Jerusalem. While existing Israeli settlements were allowed to stay in place during the periods of negotiation it was specified that there be a “cessation of all actions that may preempt negotiations on the final settlement, including the termination of all colonial settlement activities whether old or new.”

Some progress towards normalization of Palestinian life did occur, but throughout 1993-2000 Israel expanded its settlement and road network in the territories by 72%, creating at least 30 new settlements, and doubling the number of settlers living in the territories. It expropriated more land from Palestinian owners, uprooted some 80,000 olive and fruit trees to permit Israeli construction, and established various mechanisms of control that included fencing of Palestinian “self-rule” pockets form other regions by means of checkpoints and other fortifications. The Gaza Strip was encircled by a huge wall, electric fences, and guard towers in the mid 1990s, effectively turning it into a huge prison camp. These actions violated the terms of the Oslo Declaration of Principles, e.g., article 31, clause 8 which declared the West Bank and Gaza Strip are ”a single territorial unit the integrity of which will be preserved during the interim.” and article 34, clause 7 which stated that “neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the territories pending the outcome of permanent status negotiations.”

The effect upon the Palestinians in the Territories was twofold. On one hand, Palestinians gained control of 17.2% of West Bank and 60% of Gaza, and partial control of another 23% of the West Bank. Yet, the areas under Palestinian control were divided and separated from each other. This meant a kind of bantustanization of the occupied territories, and because of Israeli checkpoints and frequent limitations of access, it became increasingly difficult for Palestinians to move about and to transport goods within the territories, and between the territories and Israel. The Palestinian economy declined significantly.22 In short, the Oslo Accords brought only more settlements, more restrictions, a weaker economy, and more frustrations to Palestinians.

The Oslo accords amounted to an abandonment of International Law in favor of bilateral negotiations between a weak partner (the Palestinians) and a strong partner (the Israelis) backed by the USA. This is a bad recipe, and as many observers predicted, it failed. Sensing this, U.S. President Clinton brought both sides together at a summit at Camp David (July 11-25, 2000). Israel’s Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, reportedly was willing to offer the Palestinians limited sovereignty over some 91% of the West Bank, but a West Bank divided into three regions with Israel controlling access between them. Israel would retain control of borders, of the airspace, of the

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underground water aquifers, and the Jordan valley. A Palestinian capital would be allowed only in the suburbs of Jerusalem. The Haram Ash-shariff (the Al Aksa Mosque and Dome of the Rock compound) and all of East Jerusalem would remain under Israeli sovereignty. Nothing was said about right of Palestinian refugees to return. After the Palestinians rejected that plan, the American media declared that the Palestinians had spurned a very “generous” Israeli offer. But in truth, there was no way that the Palestinians could have accepted that plan, for no Palestinian leader is willing to relinquish a Palestinian claim to East Jerusalem, and the degree of control that Israel wanted would have effectively prohibited the establishment of a viable, contiguous Palestinian state. As Abu Mazin, currently the Palestinian President, said: “I want a map of Palestine that Palestinian children can draw.”23

Talks continued up until the end of January 2001, and some progress was made.24 But a cloud had gathered. In late September 2000, Ariel Sharon, opposed to the Oslo process, paid a provocative visit to the Haram, accompanied by 1000 Israeli police. Arafat pleaded with Barak to prevent this from taking place, but Barak refused. The next day Sharon dispatched 2000 military presence at the Al-Aqsa compound prior to the start of Friday prayers. This inflamed the worshippers and led to clashes the resulted in 4 Palestinians dead and 220 wounded. The next day, 12 more Palestinians were killed and 500 wounded as protest demonstrations against Israeli actions spread throughout the territories. Against a background of continuing violence, Barak withdrew from the talks on January 27, and shortly thereafter Sharon became the Israeli Prime Minister.25 Despite the fact that it was the Israelis—not the Palestinians—who broke off negotiations in January 2001, the impression lingered that it was the Palestinians who had rejected the hand of peace.

As of today, the second intifada has result in the deaths of approximately 4000 Palestinians and 1000 Israelis. The UN human rights commissioner, Mary Robinson, after visiting the territories in 2002, accused Israel of using “excessive force” and called for immediate creation of an “international monitoring presence” there. Israel refused to allow in any international monitors, and the American Administration concurred with Israel. The Americans have sent in various commissions to find some way stopping the violence. The Mitchell Report of May 2001 pinpointed Israeli settlement activity as a cause of tensions and called for its immediate halt and an end for violence on both sides. The subsequent Tenet Plan focused on a cease-fire, not political negotiations. While both Palestinians and Israelis accepted these plans, their terms were not implemented.

In October 2002, the Bush Administration unveiled the so-called “Roadmap” plan for peace. It was endorsed by the Quartet (the USA, UN, EU, and Russia) and presented to Israel and the Palestinians on April 30, 2003. It aims at a comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 2005, calling for a two state solution, an end to Palestinian violence, and a freeze on Israeli settlement activity.26 It is vague on sequencing (who does what when?), definitions (what is a “freeze” on settlement activity?), mechanisms for assessing compliance, and sanctions for noncompliance. In the absence of international monitors, Israel alone may determine whether Palestinians establish a genuine cease-fire and cease all resistance activity. There is no mention of “human rights” or “international law” in the 2221 words that make up the roadmap.27

6. The United States is a Partner to this Conflict Since Israel is not interested in any peace that would involve a viable Palestinian state in the West Bank, and since Palestinians show no signs of abandoning their claims of self-determination in their homeland and continue to have considerable support from much of the Arab and Islamic worlds, then the immediate future involves continued hostility. The Israeli leadership is well aware of this, and knows that it must remain in a state of war for the foreseeable future in order to maintain its

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territorial gains. It prefers that this be part of a much larger conflagration involving the USA and Israel’s enemies, real or potential. The Zionist intention is for the USA to occupy, disarm, and pacify the Islamic world, cause Muslims in other areas to be preoccupied with local problems, and thereby, make the Middle East safe for Israeli expansionism. Israel cannot survive without marshalling a massive military machine to either police the entire region or to wage war against its enemies. The American occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq are the beginning of this pacification campaign.

There are several reason for this virtually unqualified American support for Israel, too numerous to list here, but here are some of the ways in which this support is extended. U.S. Military Support of Israel • The U.S. has long been the largest supplier to Israel of military equipment since the 1960s.

During both the 1967 and 1973 wars, shipments of American armaments were instrumental in allowing the Israelis to retain a military edge over the Arabs.

• Since 1979, Israel has been averaging at least $2 billion in US military aid per year, and this has allowed it to purchase some of the most advanced weaponry in the American arsenal, most recently (April 2005), the “bunker busting” bombs designed to penetrate underground facilities.

• During each of Israel’s military ventures against Arabs, and after every “peace” agreement, the Americans have enhanced Israel’s military capabilities. The Clinton Administration rewarded Israel with at least 24 new military deals after signing the Oslo Accords in 1993, including the April 1994 sale of up to 25 F-151 fighter-bombers. After the second intifada began, the U.S. agreed to supply Israel with 50 advanced Apache attack helicopters and another 50 F-151 fighter jets.

• Israel is now among the top five military powers in the world, equipped with over 200 nuclear weapons, and massive stockpiles of biological and chemical weapons.

• The Palestinians have none of this military equipment. The idea that Palestinians pose a “threat” to the existence of Israel is ludicrous.

U.S. Economic Support of Israel • The US gives more than 30% of its total aid budget to Israel, more than any other country, even

though Israel has just 0.1% of the world's population. • Over $1 billion in purely economic aid is given to Israel every year. The U.S. gives this aid to

Israel in a lump sum at the beginning of each year without conditions on its use. • In the past four decades, it is estimated that aid to Israel has cost American taxpayers over $140

billion, including the amount granted and the interest on that amount. • This is just a fraction of the total. If you add in all the other expenses that are used to finance a

pro-Israel foreign policy, then the costs become staggering. For example, aid to Egypt has run at roughly $2 billion per year since 1979, so that’s another $50 billion. The invasion and occupation of Iraq—largely an Israeli-inspired venture for the benefit of Israeli security—has already cost the US over $150 billion, and over the next three years, is projected to cost at least another $200 billion. Private contributions to Israel are tax-deductible, and each year this amounts to over $1 billion.

U.S. Political Support of Israel • The U.S. has consistently championed the cause of Israel in the UN. It was the force behind the

UN-GA partition resolution in 1948, pressuring small countries like Liberia, the Philippines and Haiti to vote in favor. Since then, the US has vetoed nearly 40 Security Council resolutions

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critical of Israeli policy, and in at least 15 of these resolution, the U.S. cast the single dissenting vote.23 The U.S. prohibited the use of ‘the’ before ‘territories’ in the 1967 Security Council resolution 242, a fact that Israelis have exploited in insisting that it is in compliance with that resolution. In Dec. 2000, the US vetoed a UN-SC resolution calling for sending international observers to monitor reduction of violence in the territories.

• In 2001, the U.S. walked out of the Durban conference on racism because of criticism of Israeli policies in the occupied territories.

• The U.S. voted against the UN-GA resolution that endorsed the ruling of the International Court of Justice against the Israeli separation wall (the vote was 150 for and 6 against).

• The U.S. said that the settlements were “illegal” until the Reagan Administration changed the language and claimed merely that the settlements are “obstacles” to peace. Subsequent administrations have followed this policy.28 The U.S. has thereby spurned international law in support of Israeli policy.

• The U.S. has supported Israel’s military aggression, e.g. the 1967 War, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982, where 20,000 Lebanese and Palestinians lost their lives, and the bombing of PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985. American public opinion is now being shaped for the acceptance of an Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

• The U.S. Congress has approved Israeli tactics in the territories, In the spring of 2002, Amnesty International (AI) pointed out that the Israeli army violated human rights and international law. The House of Representatives rejected AI’s findings by a vote of 352-21, declaring that “Israeli military operations are an effort to defend itself . . . and are aimed only at dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian areas.” The Senate echoed this sentiment in a 94-2 vote, referring to the Israeli assault as “necessary steps to provide security to its people.” After the attack on the Jenin refugee camp during which Israel fired missiles into houses where no fighters were present, used Palestinian civilians as shields, and leveled entire residential districts with armored bulldozers—actions that Human Rights Watch called “clearly disproportionate to any military objective that Israel aimed to achieve”—President Bush called Sharon a “man of peace.”

• Bush supported Israel’s claims to major settlements on the West Bank (spring 2004), despite the fact that Sharon has not complied with the terms of Bush’s own “road map” for peace. In April 2005, Israel announced plans to build 3500 new housing units in Ma-aleh Adumim, and to expand two other settlement blocs (Ariel and Gush Etzion), again, in violation of the Road Map, the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Kurtzer, stated that this was not against US policy. At present, no American politician can afford to be critical of Israeli policies. You don’t have to

look far for evidence of the power of the Zionist lobby. In 1973, Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, for 25 years one of the most prominent members of the Senate, founder of the Fulbright Scholarship program, stated on US television that the Senate had become “subservient” to Israeli policies, and that over 80% of the Senate is “controlled” by Israel. Fulbright was defeated in the primaries in the following year and virtually disappeared from the public scene until his death in the mid 1990s. Others have met a similar fate.29 In 1989 Fulbright wrote: “AIPAC and its allied organization s have the effective working control of the electoral process. They can elect or defeat nearly any congressman or senator that they wish, with their money and coordinated organization.”30 What’s more remarkable, is that Israel can even strike against American interests without penalty, including espionage against the U.S., attacks on American military, and killing of American citizens in the occupied territories.31

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Admiral Thomas Moorer, formerly Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the United States, said in 1999: “I’ve never seen a president – I don’t care who he is – stand up them [the Israelis]. It just boggles your mind. They always get what they want. The Israelis know what’s going on all the time. I got to the point where I wasn’t’ writing anything down. If the American people understood what grip those people have on our government, they would rise up in arms. Our citizens don’t have any idea what goes on.”32 But there is little chance that people will understand what is going on because there is a kind of “thought-control” exercised in the US when it comes to the Middle East. As a consequence, there is no public debate on an issue that matters most to the future of the entire world. It has gotten to such a stage that one cannot even speak out in criticism of Israel without being branded “anti-Semitic.” 7. Europe and a Moral Solution I have spent most of this lecture on the historical background to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and on some relevant current trends, notably, Israel’s expansionist designs, the subservience of the American political reality to Zionism, and the growing threat of this unresolved conflict to international stability.33 Let me devote these last few minutes to my principal normative claim concerning European responsibility.

I begin by noting that a peaceful international cooperation is more imperative than ever with increased globalization and economic interdependence, the development of dangerous technology, and growing populations that place a phenomenal stress on the environment and natural resources. Persistent international disputes are a threat to this cooperation, and every effort must be made towards their peaceful resolution lest they spin out of control. Such resolution requires a background framework of acknowledged norms that express a shared conception of justice, a commitment to abide by those rules, and a resolve to act collectively by imposing sanctions against offenders. The norms are there; an admirable body of international law has developed within the last century, enshrined in the UN Charter and in the various conventions and declarations that reflect common sentiments of the world community. At the center of this body of law is set of regulations regulating warfare (the various conventions on war), a growing consensus on what constitutes human rights (the Universal Declaration, the Conventions of 1966), and a principle of self-determination that embodies the democratic conviction that prevailing laws, institutions, and political agreements should be based on the popular consent of those whom they govern.

The turmoil that has plagued the Middle East in the past half century is a direct result of European refusal to apply the principle of self-determination during the Mandate period, the Euro-American refusal to apply this principle at the end of second world war, and a persistent European, American, and Israeli refusal to take any concrete steps to observe this principle for the past 60 years. The effects of this refusal are no longer confined to the Near East; they are also felt in such far-flung places as Kabul, Bali, Madrid, and New York. These effects will become much more deadly unless concrete steps are taken to put an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As I have argued above, no peaceful resolution to the conflict can be expected from the Israel-American alliance. The Palestinians are far too weak to bring about any solution themselves. The Arab countries and the Islamic countries do not have the power or organization to resolve the conflict, nor will they acquire that power as long as the pacification campaign continues. The east Asian powers are unlikely to risk getting too deeply involved in this dispute. For these reasons, I think that the European countries, working collectively through the European Union, are, or can be, sufficiently independent of the American-Israel axis, and have an interest in working more decisively towards a resolution of the conflict.

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There are five additional sources of European responsibility. First, as I have argued, European intervention in the Near East during the 20th century—against the backdrop of several centuries of European antisemitism—is the fundamental cause of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Second, more than the Americans, Europeans have a greater proximity to the Near East, larger Muslim populations, and a much better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Third, Europe is committed to a stable world order based on the observance of international law. The EU is bound by its own laws and diplomatic language to defer to international law in the resolution of all interactions and disputes. The EU explicitly endorses the norms set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention, and on December 5, 2001, the EU affirmed the applicability of this convention to the Israeli-occupied territories and called upon Israel to observe international law. A fourth source of European responsibility derives from the explicit positions it has already taken on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Among these are the following: • In June 1980 in Venice, the EC affirmed the right of Palestinians to self-determination, stated

that it would not accept a unilateral declaration on Jerusalem, that the Israeli colonies in the occupied territories are illegal and a grave obstacle to peace, and that Israel must withdraw from territories occupied in 1967.

• The EU has consistently opposed the acquisition of territory by force. • The EU has called upon Israel to stop construction of the separation barrier, claiming that it

imposes further humanitarian and economic hardship on Palestinians, and could prejudge future negotiations and make a two-state solution physically impossible to implement. The EU has condemned Israeli destruction of Palestinian homes, and has urged the Israeli government to take no actions that aggravates the humanitarian and economic plight of the Palestinians.

• In the Berlin Summit of March 1999, the EU heads of state explicitly recognized the right of the Palestinian people to a state.34

• In March 16, 2002, the European Commission declared its support of UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 1397. It declared that it is committed to ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the creation of a state of Palestine and an end to the occupation of 1967.

• On April 26, 2004, the EU declared that it is “determined to pursue vigorously the course set out in the Roadmap,” and its expressed criticism of the Bush Administration’s acceptance of the notion that major settlements will stay with Israel.

• In April 2005, the EU stated that Israeli settlement activities violate international humanitarian laws and relevant UN resolutions and may render the Roadmap physically impossible to implement.

• On May 9, 2005, the EU—as a member of the Quartet—reiterated its commitment to the Roadmap, to a two-state solution, to a Palestinian state with contiguity in the West Bank, and a permanent peace and end to occupation that began in 1967. The fifth source of European responsibility stems from the relations that the European countries

already have with both sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The EU follows a policy of “constructive engagement” which involves a host of agreements and levels of cooperation between the EU and both Israel and the Palestinians. The EU is the biggest single contributor to UN Refugee Works Agency (UNRWA) which has provided assistance to Palestinian refugees since the outset of their expulsion from Palestine. Since the Oslo Accords, the Europeans countries have been active in helping the Palestinians develop economic infrastructure. The EU has developed increasingly strong ties with Israel. Over $25 billion in goods and services passed between Europe and Israel in 2001. About 40% of Israeli imports come from the EU, and about 30% of Israeli exports are directed to the

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EU. The EU is Israel’s largest trading partner, ranking number 1 in Israel's imports and number 2 in its exports. Israel is the EU's 21st largest export market, and 28th in EU's imports.35

So, Europe is involved, there are good reasons for it to be so, and it is to be commended for its comparatively balanced approach. And yet, it has not been morally consistent. For example, the preamble of the EU/Israel Association Agreement emphasizes the importance of the United Nations Charter, in particular the observance of human rights, democratic principles and economic freedom. Yet, the EU has not held Israel to these standards; it has not penalized Israel for its illegal policies in the occupied territories, and, as recently as November 2004, it delayed action on five draft resolutions in the UN critical of Israeli practices in the occupied territories. And while the EU condemns Israeli’s extra-judicial killings as well as Palestinians terrorism, but the EU has been unbalanced in public criticism and assessments of blame.36

If the European countries have any hope of promoting a just resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian, then the EU and its members must have the courage of their convictions. They must adhere to their own principles and vision of justice. If they think that an observance of international law is essential to just and lasting resolution of political conflicts, they must act accordingly. If they are committed to international law and a two-state solution, then they are hypocritical in developing stronger relations with an Israel that consistently violates international law and steadily creates new “facts” that will render a two-state solution impossible

Stronger European involvement will place pressure upon the U.S. and Israel to take a more balanced approach, despite what the Israeli leadership wants and despite the initial criticism the Europeans will encounter. The American commitment to Israel is solid, but it is not invincible. It has developed because there has not been significant pressure on the U.S. to adopt a more balanced approach. A coordinated effort between the Europeans and the Islamic countries could produce such pressure. It won’t be easy, but it is both the obligations of the European countries, acting jointly, to seek peace, and it is in the European interests, for the alternatives are far worse. And there is some urgency. If this war between the Israel-USA alliance and Islamic peoples widens, then the Europeans will find it increasingly difficult to stay neutral. Their own economies, their own populations will force difficult decisions.37

I have no magic formula for bringing about a more responsible European involvement. I am a philosopher, not a politician, not a political strategist. Hopefully, I have enough moral and historical awareness to understand that our acts, and our failures to act, affect people around the world, and therefore, that our application of elementary principles of justice must not be confined to the people in our immediate vicinity. We have learned from Thucydides that ignoring the demands of morality in international affairs—as in our daily lives—is a recipe for conflicts among countries, among peoples, among different regional, ethnic and religious groups, conflicts whose consequences are often far-ranging and difficult to predict.

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Notes

1. In his diary Herzl wrote: “We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country. . . . Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly” (Patai 1960, vol. I, p. 88) 2. Jabotinsky, stated that intentional demographic change was a necessary evil that was neither unprecedented nor a historical injustice (Gorny 1987, 137), and that to achieve this, the Jewish community must build an “iron wall” to protect its colonial efforts (Brenner 1984, 78). In 1937, Ben-Gurion noted in his diary that, “we must first of all cast off the weakness of thought and will and prejudice – that [says that] this transfer is impracticable. . . . Any doubt on our part about the necessity of this transfer, any doubt we cast about the possibility of its implementation, any hesitancy on our part about its justice may lose [us] an historical opportunity that may not recur. The transfer clause in my eyes is more important than all our demands for additional land” Speaking before the Jewish Agency in 1938, Ben-Gurion declared, “I am for compulsory transfer; I don’t see anything immoral in it.” (Flapan 1987, 103, and see Morris 1999, 91, 140-1). 3. Khalidi 1997, 15. British authorities in Palestine realized in 1919 that Arabs would resort to force to prevent establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. One Palestinian, Pasha Dajani, summed up the Arab attitude in 1919: “If the League of Nations will not listen to the appeal of the Arabs, this country will be come a river of blood” (Morris 1999, 91). 4. Balfour issued the declaration in a letter to the Zionist financier, Baron Edmund de Rothschild. It’s crucial portion read: “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” This carefully crafted document—the Balfour Declaration—was the product of extensive Zionist diplomacy. Overt reference to a Jewish state was avoided in favor of the euphemism "national home" for fear of inflaming Arab passions against the Jewish minority, though Lloyd George subsequently acknowledged that a Jewish state was intended. The Arabs, 92% of Palestine's population, were referred to as members of "non-Jewish communities", and while their "civil and religious rights" were recognized, nothing was said about their political rights or their national aspirations. On the other hand, explicit reference was made to the "political status" of Jews in other countries. Boundaries had not been fixed, though Zionists lobbied for a Jewish state on both sides of the Jordan. The British leadership was under no illusions about what this implied. In 1919, Winston Churchill stated: “There are the Jews, whom we pledged to introduce into Palestine, and who take if for granted the local population will be cleared out to suit their convenience.” 5. Wilson's principle did not make its way into the Covenant of the League of Nations gave some recognition of the idea in its Article 22, fourth paragraph:

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory until such

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time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Exceptions were specified in subsequent paragraphs of the Article, and since Palestine was not mentioned by name, the assumption is that it was covered in the fourth paragraph. Britain countered that Palestine was a special case, expressing its policy of deliberately ignoring the principle of self-determination. 6. Ingrams 1972, 73. A fuller version of Lord Balfour's text appears in Khalidi ed. 1971, 201-211. See also the discussion in Lloyd George 1939, 750. 7. The Mandate preamble noted the “historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine" and called for a reconstitution of their "national home in that country” (Qumsiyeh 2004, 147). In 1921, Britain removed Trans-Jordan from the promises of the mandate, and in 1922 the League of Nations officially awarded the mandate to Britain. The American Administration had already supported the Balfour Declaration in August 1918, and in 1922 the U.S. Congress endorsed an essentially similar document in a joint resolution. 8. In comparison, 170,883 Jews immigrated to the USA (figures by the American Jewish committee in 1946 – cited in Khalidi 1997, fn 18). See Brenner 1983, for figures on Jewish immigration. 9. Brenner 1983, 65 10. The preferred solution to the “Jewish problem” for the German anti-Semites in the early 1930s was that Jews are to go to Palestine (Brenner 1983, 81-82). Although Zionism was widely despised, the SS was one of the branches of the Nazis that was warmest to Zionism. See, for example, a statement by Rudolph Heydrich cited in Brenner 1983, 85. 11. In the UN debates, the Zionists defended their claim to Palestine by citing (i) the promises to them made in the Balfour Declaration and League of Nations Mandate; (ii) the historical connection of Jews and Jewish culture to Palestine; (iii) the need for Jews to have a secure place of refuge after Nazi persecutions; and (iv) the Principle of Self-determination. For their part, the Arabs also cited (i) the Principle of self-determination, (ii) British pledges to the Arabs for Arab independence; (iii) the long established historical and cultural connection to Palestine, an integral part of the Arab homeland forming a vital land bridge between the eastern and western portions of the Arab world; (iv) the fact that the vast majority of inhabitants in Palestine are indigenous Arabs; and, thus, (v) that establishing a Jewish state in Palestine would not only be a massive injustice to the Palestinian Arabs, but it would sow the seeds for future conflict. 12. Allon, cited in Hirst 2003, 267. 13. These Jewish immigrants numbered 335,000 from 1949-1952, with a total number of Jewish refugees coming in during this period being (684,000 from 1948-1951 – Quigley 1990, 101). 14. Pappe 2004, 147

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15. The forcible expulsion of the Arabs was part of the general strategy for securing a decisive Jewish majority. Another part was legislation: the 1951 Law of Return gave every Jew a right to settle in Israel and the Nationality Law conferred Israeli citizenship on any Jew who settles in Israel—its purpose is to ingather Jewish exiles. 16. Flapan 1987, 103, Morris 1999, 659, and Morris 2001, 42-44. Ben-Gurion also observed that the American Declaration of Independence similarly indicated nothing about territorial limits.. Tom Segev writes that despite attempts by Ben-Gurion’s biographers to distance Ben-Gurion from the idea of forcible transfer, his “stand on deportation, like that of other Zionist leaders is unambiguous and well-documented” (1999, p. 407). The expedient of forced transfer also entered into the recommendations of the 1937 Peel Commission Report which first recommended a partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The Commission stated that if the Arabs who lived in the area assigned to the Jews did not leave of their own accord, then their removal should be “compulsory” (Morris 1999, 138).

17. A lot of mythology has been propagated in Western media about the occasion for this war, about how Israel was the victim of aggression and was forced to fight for its very survival. Israeli leaders like Levi Eshkol and Abba Eban were partly responsible for publicly perpetrating this impression. The facts are otherwise; Israel launched the initial attack, and Israeli generals and statesmen, e.g., Rabin, Begin, Peled subsequently acknowledged that Egyptian forces posed no threat to Israel. General Matiyahu Peled stated that “The thesis that the danger of genocide was hanging over us in June 1967 and that Israel was fighting for its physical existence is only bluff, which was born and developed after the war: “to pretend that the Egyptian forces massed on our frontiers and were in a position to threaten the existence of Israel constitutes an insult not only to the intelligence of anyone capable of analyzing this sort of situation, but above all an insult to the Zeal (Israeli Army.” 18. The Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are effectively “weapons” in a campaign aimed at incorporating the territories, or large segments thereof, into the Jewish state. To maintain and protect them, the Israeli army has to maintain a heavy presence throughout the territories and regulate the movement of Palestinians near these settlements. 19. Israeli policies also violate the freedom of movement called for in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in the 38 years it has governed these territories, Israel has denied any democrat rights to the Arab citizens—a direct violation of Article 21 of the Declaration. Every major human rights organization in the world has criticized Israel’s behavior, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the UN Human Rights Commission, the Palestinian human rights group, Al Haq, Israel’s own B’tselem, and the Human Rights Desk of the U.S. State Department. Countless resolutions in the UN have been passed critical of Israel treatment of the Palestinians, but all have been ineffective in reversing Israeli policy. 20. Sharon's statement conforms to the long-standing refusal of Israel’s leadership to permit a viable Palestinian state to be established in the occupied territories, extending from Moshe Sharett’s agreements with Abdullah (Rogan 2001), to Ehud Barak’s breaking off talks at Taba in Jan. 2001 (Reinhart 2002, chp. II), to Ariel Sharon’s rejection of the 2002 Geneva Accords between moderate Israelis and Palestinians (Shuman 2003) and his government's violations of the provision in the Bush Administration's 2002 "Road Map” for peace.

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21. This happened in 1982 with the Fahd Peace Plan, and it was reiterated in March 28, 2002, at the summit in Beirut with a declaration issued from a meeting of the Arab Heads. 22. Per capita GNP declined from $2,684 i/n 1992 to $1896 in 1999; unemployment rates tripled: over 100,000 Palestinians from the territories were regularly employed by Israel in 1992, but that number had been cut in half by 1999; the import/export imbalance increased from 3/1 to 4.5/1; poverty increased throughout the territories. 23. Arafat was reluctant to attend the Camp David since he felt that time was not ripe for a full agreement, and after 7 years of negotiations within the Oslo framework, Palestinians came to believe that all American proposals originated with the Israelis. Arafat came after Clinton solemnly promises that if the summit failed, that Arafat would not be held responsible. John Mearsheimer, of the University of Chicago, wrote that “it is hard to imagine the Palestinians accepting such a state. Certainly no other nation in the world has such curtailed sovereignty” ("The Impossible Partition," New York Times, 11 January 2001). 24. The principle of a return of the equivalent of 100% of the territory captured in 1967 was agreed upon, and the Palestinians agreed that some major settlement blocks could remain in exchange for land in Israel. The Palestinians would have full sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem, and the map indicated that the Palestinians would get 92% of the West Bank. The refugee issue was discussed, though the issue of control over the holy sites in Jerusalem was not addressed. 25. Sharon who was elected Israeli Prime Minister in February 2001, has been unwilling to offer what Barak was. He established the following “red lines” as a condition of any negotiated settlement:

• Jerusalem is to remain under full Israel sovereignty • Israel will retain control security zones (including Jordan valley, and the line of West Bank

hills commanding the coastal plain; • Israel will retain control of water sources; • Jewish towns in the OTS and the roads connecting them remain under full Israeli control; • Air space under Israel control. • Palestinian refugees from 1948-67 will not be resettled in Israel or the territories, but must

be resettled where they live today. Israel bears no responsibility for their plight. • All territories under control of PA must be demilitarized.

26. The Roadmap plan calls for a resolution to be implemented in three phases. Phase 1: end to violence and normalization of Palestinian life; end of terrorism and incitement to violence; building of Pal. institutions; end to provocations by Israel; no new settlements beyond March 2001; freezing of all settlement activity, including in existing settlements. Phase II: transition to a Palestinian state with “provisional borders” by 2003. An international conference is to be convened to solidify this process of establishing a Palestinian state. Phase III: establishment of a “permanent status agreement” between Israelis and Palestinians aimed at ending the I-P conflict. Another international conference to support and finalized this agreement. The basis of this agreement must be UN-SC

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resolutions 242 and 338 that call for an end to the occupation and normalization of relations between Israel and Arab states. Security Council Resolution 1397 of 12, March 2002, demands an end to Isralie-Palestinian violence. envisions a two-state solution, and calls upon both sides to cooperate in implementing the Tenet plan and the Mitchell recommendations and resuming negotiations. 27. The Palestinians accepted the Road Map (as the U. S. Secretary of State Powell said in Cairo on May 12, 2003). Sharon said that the Gov of Israel is “prepared to accept the steps set out in the road map” ("U.S. Says Sharon Is Set To Endorse Bush's Peace Plan" The New York Times, 23 May 2003). However, the Israeli Government insists that the “limitations of sovereign attributes of the Palestinian State” be interpreted to mean, demilitarization, Israeli control over exit and entry points and over airspace, and a ban on Palestinians alliances with the enemies of Israel. Israel also wants the USA alone, not the Quartet, to monitor compliance. Sharon stated that he agrees with the draft road map “in principle” but that he would not accept a detailed timetable, that all violence must cease before any steps toward peace could be made, and that accepting the road map did not mean that he agreed with the aim of creating a Pal. state by 2005, and subsequently Sharon criticized the EU for being unbalanced and “pro-Palestinian” (Journal of Palestine Studies 127, vol. 32, no. 3, Spring 2003, 121-123). On Jan 19, 2003, Sharon’s spokesman said that Sharon believed that the road map is “not realistic,” that the Quartet is nothing, and that the US does not take the Quartet seriously ("Sharon Says Europe is Biased in Favor of the Palestinians," The New York Times 20 Jan. 2003).. See also the Journal of Palestine Studies 128, vol. 32, 4, Summer 2003. 29. In 1980, Charles Percy of Illinois, also Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a possible Republican presidential candidate, was unseated after being portrayed as too pro-Arab. In 2002, Cynthia McKinney, a five-term black female representative from Georgia, dared to be critical of Israel, and she was promptly defeated in the primaries by another black female candidate with massive funding from pro-Israel groups around the country. 30. American politicians, whether liberal or conservative, are well aware of this, and adjust their behavior and speech accordingly. In February 2002, one U.S. senator visiting Israel called for "total U.S. support of Israeli policy." When a reporter asked whether Palestinians also deserve U.S. sympathy, this senator replied: “The United States' role is to support Israel's decisions." That was Hillary Clinton, senator from New York (Chicago Tribune, 25 February 2002). When she spoke before an AIPAC convention on May 23, 2005, she did everything she did all she could to reaffirm this absolute subordination of U.S. policy to Israeli aims and, thereby, outdo her political rival, Condoleezza Rice, who had spoken in equally warm terms about the U.S.-Israel relationship the day before. Rabbi Michael Lerner of Tikkun said on National Public Radio May 20, 2005, that Congressional representatives said they agree with his peace views but that they “are scared of AIPAC.” 31. Some examples: Israel attacked an American reconnaissance ship, the USS Liberty, in June 1967, killing 37 American sailors and injuring over 200. To this day, there has not even been a Congressional investigation of this attack. In the mid-1980s, an American naval official, Jonathan Pollard, was caught passing top secret military information to Israel (which very likely ended up in Soviet hands soon after). There is an ongoing spy scandal in which officials of the pro-Israeli lobby, AIPAC, have been indicted for passing on secret information from a Pentagon employee to Israel. Americans citizens have been imprisoned, tortured, and killed by Israeli forces, and it goes without

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notice in the American media. The most vivid example of this is the March 2003 killing of Rachel Corrie, a young American woman who was crushed to death by an Israeli bulldozer while standing in front of a Palestinian’s home in Rafah. (I taught in Istanbul, Turkey a few months after Rachel’s murder, and saw huge posters of this courageous American student on the walls of the Turkish Student Union Building. Yet, on my own campus in the middle of the United States, no one had heard of Rachel Corrie.) 32. Hirst 2003, 413. 33. One might suppose, as some Israelis think, that the Palestinians will just be another “defeated people,” with a few of them clinging to shreds of their traditional homeland, the remainder dispersed, quarantined, or otherwise marginalized. Something like this has happened to indigenous people on the American continents during four centuries of European invasions. But the situation is different in Palestine, and there is much more at stake. Palestine has a significance to three major world religions that few other places in the world have. The Palestinian Arabs are not like an isolated tribe of American natives; they are part of the much larger Islamic world that takes a vital interest in this conflict. At present, a good part of the Arab and Islamic worlds are bitter and resentful at Israel’s treatment of Palestinians. This was what motivated Mohammed Atta, who led the attack on the World Trade Center. It was the first item mentioned in Osama bin Laden’s speech shortly before the American invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001. These are some illustrations why the situation in Palestine is so explosive. 34. However, at the urging of Dennis Ross, they also said that the final arrangement is a matter of negotiations (Ross 2004, 491). 35. According to the EU/Israel Association Agreement (signed in 1995, implemented in 2000), goods originating in Israel may be imported into the EU at preferential rates of duty, including zero rates. Products from settlements—not recognized by the EU as part of Israel—are not entitled to these preferential rates, and have been subject to higher duties, and some countries place duties on all products from Israel, though EU countries have not been consistent on this. The Israeli Government insists on all products originating from Israeli settlements as being stamped “made in Israel”, but it has agreed to indicate which town or city they came from. Israeli firms can get around this by shifting business address to Israel proper. The settlement trade dispute has blocked expansion of wider trade agreements with Israel, but Israel is still aiming at being included within the “New Neighborhood Initiative” in which Israel is allowed to participate in EU’s market and acquire the four freedoms of movement in persons, good, services, and capital. 36. Following an attack by Palestinian fighters on an Israeli army facility in the occupied Gaza Strip on 13 January 2005, which killed several Israeli subcontractors of the occupation forces, the presidency of the EU, currently held by Luxembourg, issued a statement condemning the action as "terrorist" and offering "its sincere condolences to the Israeli government and the families of the victims." By contrast, the EU presidency stayed absolutely silent when on January 4, 2005 Israeli occupation forces in Gaza killed seven Palestinian children with a tank shell, literally shredding their bodies to pieces according to eyewitnesses. Nor did the EU find it worthy of comment when the day following the Palestinian election, the Israeli army revealed a plan to demolish an additional 3,000 homes in Rafah refugee camp in southern Gaza. This activity has previously been condemned as a

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war crime by Amnesty International and by John Dugard, the UN's Special Rapporteur for the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 37. Are the Europeans aware of the severity of this conflict? There is good reason to think so. According to a public opinion poll of 15 EU countries commissioned by the European Union and released November 3, 2003, the public in all 15 member states was asked to look at a list of countries and say which they considered potential threats to peace. Europeans ranked Israel as the greatest threat to peace in the world (59 percent of respondents). The next three ranked countries were Iran and North Korea, and the United States (53 percent each). Israel was selected as the most dangerous by a majority in almost all the EU member states, with 74% of Dutch citizens putting the country at the top of the list as a threat to peace and 69% of Austrian citizens. Italy is the only country where opinions are divided with 48% of respondents confirming that they perceive Israel as a threat to peace in the world and 46% of the opposite opinion. So, there should be ample support from European citizens for a more active role by the EU in bringing about a just peace in the Middle East.

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