ethics and society in contemporary shin buddhism (lit verlag 2007)

Contents Acknowledgements

Introduction

Chapter 1. Ethics and Society in the Shin Buddhist Tradition The Shin Buddhist Tradition Shin Buddhist Ethics Modern Views on Shin Buddhist Ethics

Chapter 2. The Doctrinal Foundations of Social Ethics in Contemporary Shin Buddhism Ethical Implications of the Concept of ‘Birth’ Shinjin and Morality The Equalitarian Dimension in Shin Buddhism Shin Buddhism and Social Criticism Anthropocentrism and Humanism

Chapter 3. Shin Buddhism and Social Practice in Contemporary Japan War, Peace, and Yasukuni Shrine The hisabetsu buraku Issue Hansen’s Disease and Discrimination Social Welfare

Chapter 4. Shin Buddhist Ethics in the Perspective of Globalization

Appendices

Bibliography

Index

7

9

21 24 38 62

79 83 92

105 111 131

141 144 163 172 182

191

209

229

255

Acknowledgements I should like to express my sincere gratitude to Michael Pye for his gener-ous, precious and continuous assistance as my advisor during the writing of my doctoral dissertation on which this book is based. I am also grateful to the staff of the Fachgebiet Religionswissenschaft and Religionskund-liche Sammlung of the Philipps-Universität in Marburg.

Part of the research in Japan (October 2004-April 2005) necessary for the completion of this study was funded through the Fellowship for Pure Land Studies granted by The Eastern Buddhist Society (Shinsh tani-ha), which allowed for my stay at tani University in Ky to. This has been subsequently extended to the present position as a research fellow thanks to the interest of the Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Insti-tute at the same University. To all these institutions and to the Interna-tional Office of the Shinsh tani-ha I should like to express my sincere appreciation. A particular thanks is also due to Yasutomi Shin’ya, profes-sor of Shin Buddhist studies at tani University, for his patience in reply-ing to my questions during our many, and for me invaluable conversa-tions, and for his encouragement. I am equally grateful to Inoue Takami and Peter Lait for their generous and friendly help on various occasions during my time spent at tani University, and to the staff of the Admin-istration Office and the tani University Library.

I should like to express the same appreciation to a number of persons who contributed to, or encouraged me in different ways in my research: Galen Amstutz, Hino Keigo, Hishiki Masaharu, Anne Holzapfel, Sybille Höhe, Honda Tomoko, Kaku Takako, Kud Miyako, Kurihara Masami, the Ky gy shinsh o Yomukai, Marcel Martin, Nishimura Yuri and Hanatani Megumu, Nitta Tomomichi, Osa Ry ko, Martin Repp, Robert Rhodes, Sawai Yoshitsugu, Lillo Sciascia and Annamaria Binetti, Suzuki Kimiyo, Tamamitsu Junsh , the activists of the T zai, Christopher and Katja Triplett, Silvia Vignoli, Watanabe Narumichi, Paul Watt, Yama-moto J h , and Yamauchi Sayoko.

Last, but certainly not least, thanks to Elisabetta for her continuous en-couragement, advice, and support. Ky to, July 2007 Ugo Dessì

Introduction __________________________________________________ About fifteen years have passed since Damien Keown lamented, in the pages of his book The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, a neglect in the study of the ethics of the Buddhist tradition, and especially of its Mah y na com-ponent, by “Western scholarship.”1 Although some other relevant studies had been previously published, it was thanks not least to this work and other publications which have since followed, and to the scholarly debate which has occupied the electronic pages of the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, that there has been in the last decade a growing interest in this topic by a section of English-language academia.2 An important part of this phe-nomenon also concerns the ethical dimension of Japanese Buddhism. In this regard, a significant influence on this increase of attention has been exercised by various factors, starting especially from the 1960s and 1970s.

One of the most noteworthy among these factors, which also partly ac-counts for the interest in Buddhist ethics at a general level, is the role which has been played by contemporary ‘Engaged Buddhism’—a term coined by the Zen monk Thich Nhat Hanh at the time of the Vietnam war. This refers to the possibility of the application of Buddhist teachings to pressing social issues. It must be said that a considerable part of this en-gagement has been in fact due to the efforts of western-educated Buddhist activists and writers in the last few decades. Among other concurrent fac-tors, it is worth mentioning the writings of Ienaga Sabur (1913-2002),

1 Keown, 1992: 2-4. 2 See, for example, Reynolds F., 1979; Hallisey, 1992; and Harvey, 2000: 439-460. The Journal of Buddhist Ethics is available at [http://jbe.gold.ac.uk].

Ethics and Society in Contemporary Shin Buddhism 10

and Ichikawa Hakugen (1902-1986), who denounced Japanese war atroc-ities and the support that Japanese Buddhist institutions had earlier given to imperialist policies. These contributions anticipated the debate on war responsibilities in Japan by various Buddhist organizations and have also exerted a certain influence on the general ongoing discussions on Bud-dhist ethics. Again, in the so-called Machida Incident of 1979, the then president of the Japan Buddhist Federation and secretary of the S t branch of Zen Buddhism, Machida Muneo, denied the existence of any form of social discrimination in Japan at the World Conference on Reli-gion and Peace held in Princeton—an episode which led to strong internal protest in Japan by some of the discriminated minorities. This further stimulated the debate, leading to the emergence of original positions like those of Critical Buddhism, which have been the focus of other studies published in the United States and Europe. Or, to cite one more example, it is appropriate to mention Abe Masao (1915-2006), who developed his discourse on Buddhist ethics especially in the context of an inter-religious dialogue with Christianity, elaborating some themes distinctive of the first generation of philosophers of the Ky to School, whose ethical think-ing, in turn, has become the object of further analysis.3

Unfortunately, also due to the peculiar nature of these concurrent fac-tors, mostly linked in one way or another to Zen Buddhism, there has been a marked tendency to focus on the ethics of this particular form of Japanese Buddhism, or on streams of thought which have resorted in Ja-pan to Zen ideas for speculations which are relevant in the field of reli-gious ethics. This emphasis, though allowing for useful discussions on various aspects of Zen ethics, has however often amounted to a relative neglect of the ethical dimensions of other forms of Buddhism, to many of which may even be ascribed a stronger presence within Japanese society, and whose study might well provide analogous help in defining the com-plex picture of Japanese Buddhist ethics. This is the case, for example, of the Shin Buddhist denomination (J do Shinsh ), the object of this present study.

Despite the well-known problematical nature of the statistics compiled annually in Japan by the Agency for Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of

3 Ample references to the aforementioned points may be found, for example, in Yarnall, 2000; Ives, 1992; Heisig and Maraldo, 1995; Hubbard and Swanson, 1997; Victoria, 1997; and Bodiford, 1996.

Introduction 11

Education (Bunkach ), the data published in 2004 by this institu-tion may at least provide a suggestion concerning the enduring relevance of Shin Buddhism for the study of Japanese Buddhism. Here, the two main branches of this denomination, the J do Shinsh Honganji-ha

and the Shinsh tani-ha , alone amount to about nineteen thousand temples and twelve million affiliates. This e-quals to about 25% of all the Buddhist temples and more than 20% of the population of (presumed) Buddhist practitioners in Japan.4

Given the liveliness of the discussions on ethics and the interesting amount of social activities within the Shin Buddhist denomination in present-day Japan, not to speak of its significant presence in Japanese his-tory at least from the fifteenth century onwards, the relative disinterest in Shin Buddhist ethics in the contemporary scholarly debate in English might perhaps be considered a particular case of the general marginal-ization to which this Buddhist tradition has been subjected in modern reli-gious studies, which is probably the result, as shown by Galen Amstutz, of its “little usefulness” for the agendas underlying orientalist presenta-tions of Japanese culture.5

This study, far from being an apologetic enterprise on behalf of Shin Buddhism, is intended as a contribution to the Study of Religions, as this is generally understood within the context of the International Associa-tion for the History of Religions (IAHR). That is to say, in spite of the va-riety of methodological emphases found there in different scholarly ap-proaches, the Study of Religions as an academic discipline is aimed not at promoting religion, but rather at the inter-subjectively testable investiga-tion, and explanation, of religious phenomena as empirical and historical data. Needless to say this requires not only historical studies but also the contributions made by the social sciences.6 Within this framework, the

4 See Bunkach , 2004. The exact figures provided by the Bunkach in 2004 refer respecti-vely to 10,301 temples and 6,940,938 affiliates (J do Shinsh Honganji-ha; usually re-ferred to as ‘Hongwanji-ha’), and 8,647 temples and 5,533,146 affiliates (Shinsh tani-ha), the total number of Buddhist temples and practitioners in Japan account respectively for 74,488 and 57,122,619 units. For the problems inherent in the Bunkach ’s statistics, and especially in the classification of adherents, see Tamaru and Reid, 1996: 217-221. 5 Cf. Amstutz, 1997a: x. 6 See, for example, Pye, 1999, and 2000; Wiebe, 2000; Martin, 2000; and McCutcheon, 1996. For a general overview on various contemporary approaches to the Study of Reli-gion(s), see Antes, Geertz, and Warne, 2004.


necessity of going beyond what Ivan Strenski has termed a “dogma be-deviling the progress of ideological critique,” that is, the “wholesale dele-gitimizing of views because they rest on relative foundations,”7 also as-sumes, for the present writer, a particular significance. As Strenski con-vincingly argues, “ideological critique needs to move forward by accept-ing the provisional and corrigible nature of human knowledge, rather than lusting after absolutes,” because “some ‘conditioned’ or ideologically in-formed theories may be better than others,” and, in the final analysis, “some views in some contexts are to be preferred over others.”8 Thus, “claims about the ideological intrusions into thinking about religion”—as well as into the fabric of religion itself—should also be integrated, as a powerful interpretative tool, in the Study of Religions, provided that they are “empirical,” “testable,” and “falsifiable.”9

On these bases, the present research is directed at describing and ana-lysing aspects of contemporary Shin Buddhist ethics both for their intrin-sic interest, and to help in redressing the aforementioned imbalance in the study of Japanese Buddhist ethics. In this connection, attention will be focused both on doctrinal and practical aspects of Shin Buddhism, and on its interplay with Japanese society over the last few decades, with particu-lar reference to the above-mentioned two major branches of this Buddhist denomination based in Ky to, whose believers are found all over the country. In addition, the ethical implications of the responses which are being given by these institutions and their followers to the ongoing proc-ess of globalization, together with the contradictions embedded there, will be taken into account and compared with other reactions found in differ-ent religious traditions.

Shin Buddhist ethics will be considered, in the following pages, within the framework of mainstream Mah y na ethics, of which, as is generally accepted, it represents a distinct East Asian adaptation. This is a process which, through the elaboration of themes of the Pure Land teachings, has resulted in the characteristic formation of a tradition where one’s self-ef-fort (jiriki ) at performing good deeds is seen not only as unneces-sary, but even as an obstacle to achieving religious liberation. This is due, mainly, to the stress which was placed by Shinran (1173-1262),

7 Strenski, 2004: 286-287. 8 Strenski, 2004: 286-287. 9 See Strenski, 2004: 274.

Introduction 13

who is regarded as the founder of Shin Buddhism, on the necessity of a-bandoning all calculations (hakarai ) in order to access Amida Buddha’s compassion.

This drastic approach to Buddhist liberation has not implied, in the course of Shin Buddhist history, the abandonment of any attempt to cope with reality in moral terms. If it is true, in fact, that antinomian interpreta-tions had already emerged at the time of Shinran, among those of his fol-lowers who thought that birth in the Pure Land could be achieved by pur-posely doing evil,10 it is possible in traditional terms to differentiate two main poles encompassing a wide spectrum of graded approaches to ethics. On the one hand, there is a tendency to emphasize a purely interior ap-preciation of religious contents and to resort to external sources which may provide guidance for social behaviour. On the other hand, the adher-ence to the teaching of other-power (tariki ), that is, absolute reli-ance on the working of Amida’s compassion, has provided, as it may be generally argued for the case of Shinran himself, a framework to rethink the link between religious commitment and the meaning of the funda-mental tenets of Mah y na ethics. In order to clarify the basic standpoints on ethics in Shin Buddhism, it will be necessary, then, to start from their deep dependence on general ideas found in the Mah y na tradition, and from the adaptations to which they have been subjected in this new con-text.

It has been noted that the practice of the bodhisattva provides the en-tire framework for the story of Dharm kara (H z ), the mythical bodhisattva who is later presumed to have become the Tath gata Ami-t bha (Amida Nyorai ), as found in one of the earlier Mah -y na texts, the Larger Sukh vat vy ha-s tra (Mury ju-ky ), one of the main scriptures of the Pure Land tradition and Shin Bud-dhism.11 Here, and in the Chinese translation commonly used in East Asia,12 it is narrated that in the distant past the monk Dharm kara, in his desire to attain enlightenment and establish a Pure Land “where living be-ings could attain liberation effortlessly,” made a series of forty-seven

10 See CWS I: 671. On this point, see also Pye, 1989; and Rambelli, 2004. 11 See Gómez, 1996: 28. The earliest translation of the Sukh vat vy ha-s tra into Chinese dates back to the second century CE. See Nattier, 2003: 189-190; and Williams, 1989: 251-252. 12 For the problems concerning the traditional attribution to Saõghavarman (ca. third cen-tury CE) of this translation, see Gómez, 1996: 126.


vows—forty-eight in the Chinese translation—and entered upon the path of the bodhisattva.13 After “inconceivable millions of long cosmic ages” of practice of “the six perfect virtues of the bodhisattva,” he finally “at-tained buddhahood and experienced liberation,” thus becoming Amit bha, the presiding Buddha of sukh vat (j do , or gokuraku ), the Pure Land situated “in the western regions of the universe.”14

The fact that Dharm kara “collected merits” and “increased his vir-tues” through the practice of the six p ramit or perfect virtues (hara-mitsu ),15 d na or giving, ÷ la or morality, kù nti or patience, v rya or energy, dhy na or meditation, and prajñ or wisdom,16 places his re-ligious path squarely within the framework provided by mainstream Ma-h y na ethics. Still more important, however, is the assumption made in the text that the bodhisattva Dharm kara, during the inconceivable length of his path towards buddhahood, “remained firm in his awareness of the reality of emptiness.”17 This means that the basis of his practice is none other than the insight into the “true nature of the elements or factors of experience,” which, as stated in the famous passage of the Heart S tra, are regarded as empty in their “own-being.”18 The typical Mah y na nex-us between wisdom and compassion, where the former, “correlating all living beings in a network of interdependence,” provides the “source of ethics,” can thus be seen at work in the Larger S tra.19 Apart from this, it is stated in the text that all the bodhisattvas who are reborn in the Pure Land “cultivate the samadhi of emptiness,” possess “the powers of gen-erosity, morality, patience, spiritual vigor and determination, concen-trated meditation, and discerning wisdom,” and “assuage the pain of the afflictions in living beings.”20

13 Gómez, 1996: 25-26. 14 Gómez, 1996: 174-175. 15 Also widely translated as ‘perfections.’ 16 Also translated as ‘insight.’ 17 See Gómez, 1996: 174-175. 18 Pye, 1993: 174. Gómez observes that the list of ten perfect virtues, where skilful means, perfect vows, power, and perfect knowledge are added, seems “to have been unknown to the compilers of the two Sukhavativyuha sutras.” Gómez, 1996: 316. 19 Pye, 1989: 171-172. 20 Gómez, 1996: 195, 197-198. For the permissive interpretation of the moral code of the bodhisattva expressed by various texts within the context of the doctrine of skilful means,

Introduction 15

Moreover, according to this s tra, a “full bodhisattva career” is still open for those who adopt “the special vows of the bodhisattvas,” and de-vote themselves “to bringing the whole world of living beings to perfect nirvana.” This is, however, counted as an exception, since all beings and bodhisattvas, once reborn in the Pure Land, can attain enlightenment without any further transmigration, which is allowed for them because Dharm kara transfers to others the merits he has accumulated along his bodhisattva path.21

In this way, another characteristic aspect of mainstream Mah y na, the transference of merits or pariõ ma, which is possible for the bodhi-sattva in that the “karmic fruitfulness” of such acts is itself “empty,” and for this reason “does not inherently ‘belong’ to any particular ‘being’” and can be thus applied to other purposes and circumstances,22 comes to represent the central motif itself in the text. Here, human actions are also seen as having a moral value that can be accumulated, but the power of these practices of self-cultivation derives primarily “from the power of buddhas.”23 That is, the merit gained through the cultivation of the “roots of virtue” guarantees birth only because Amit bha is “the guarantor.”24

A limitation to the universality of salvation mediated by Amit bha’s compassion is instead provided by the clause contained in the Nineteenth Vow—Eighteenth in the Chinese translation—which excludes from birth in the Pure Land those who have committed any of the “five heinous sins” entailing immediate retribution, that is, the immediate rebirth in the Av ci Hell.25 This is a passage which, at the same time, seems to indicate

see, for example, Harvey, 2000: 134-140; Keown, 1992: 151-154; and McFarlane, 2001: 195-200. 21 Gómez, 1996: 38, 71-72. See also Gómez, 1996: 168. 22 See Harvey, 2000: 128. See also Kajiyama, 1989: 13. 23 See Gómez, 1996: 27. 24 See Gómez, 1996: 31. 25 Gómez, 1996: 167. The “five heinous sins” (also ‘five grave offenses’) or nantarya (gogyakuzai ) are variously presented in the Buddhist tradition. A list found in early Buddhism is: 1) Patricide. 2) Matricide. 3) Killing an arhat. 4) Wounding a Buddha. 5) Creating dissention in the saïgha. See Gómez, 1996: 325; and Dobbins, 2002: 175. One of the various lists used in the Mah y na tradition is reported—quoted from the S tra Taught to Nigranthas—by Shinran himself in the Ky gy shinsh : “1) Destroying stupas, burning sutra repositories, or plundering the belongings of the three treasures. 2) Speaking evil of the teaching of the three vehicles, saying they are not the sacred teachings, obstructing and censuring it, or attempting to hide and obscure it. 3) Beating those who


an expectation of some form of ethical conduct on the part of the prac-titioners,26 and it was later interpreted by Shandao (613-681), and H nen (1133-1212) and Shinran afterwards, as not constituting any kind of obstacle to the universality of Amida’s Eighteenth Vow. However, references to karmic retribution found in the Chinese text adopted by Shin Buddhism, such as pointing out that those who transgress will be low-born or physically challenged in the next life, continue to pose a challenge to modern interpreters, since they entail a fatalistic notion of karma often used to justify social discrimination.27

Shinran’s mention in the Ky gy shinsh of the “five grave offenses” as including the performance of the “ten transgressions,” links this discourse directly to that on the Buddhist precepts.28 The ten trans-gressions refer, in fact, to one of the major canonical formulations of moral precepts, the ten good paths of action, which include abstention from taking life, taking what has not been given, sexual misconduct, ly-ing, slanderous speech, harsh speech, idle talk, with the last three being non-covetousness, non-malevolence, and right views.29 Damien Keown has noted that this list consists of “the first seven items of the Short Tract,” which are related to bodily acts (1-3) and verbal acts (4-7), with the addition of three new items related to “mental attitudes” and “synony-mous with the three Cardinal Virtues.”30 The Short Tract is the primary version of the three tracts into which the passage on s la in the Brahma-

have abandoned homelife, whether they observe precepts, have not received precepts, or break precepts; persecuting them, enumerating their faults, confining them, forcing them to return to lay life, putting them to menial labor, exacting taxes from them, or depriving them of life. 4) Killing one’s father, harming one’s mother, causing blood to flow from the body of the Buddha, disrupting the harmony of the sangha, or killing an arhat. 5) Speaking evil by saying there is no cause and effect and constantly performing the ten transgressions throughout the long night of ignorance.” CWS I: 150. See also Dobbins, 2002: 175; and Harvey, 2000: 24-25. 26 Gómez, 1996: 42. According to Luis Gómez, although “a reading of the vows along the lines of a doctrine of absolute pure grace” remains problematical, it is however “difficult to imagine the two sutras, especially the Longer Sutra, as anything but a challenge to the other extreme—a doctrine of absolute reliance on self-cultivation and the efficacy of human effort.” Gómez, 1996: 140. 27 See Gómez, 1996: 205, 253-254. 28 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 150. 29 See Keown, 1992: 30. 30 Keown, 1992: 30-31.

Introduction 17

j la-sutta found in the Pali Canon, considered by Keown to be the foun-dation of Buddhist ethics, is divided.31 In fact, he argues also that the other “major preceptual codes of Buddhism, which are common to the Small and Large Vehicles, are formulated directly on the Short Tract,” like the five precepts for the laity, the eight precepts, and the ten pre-cepts.32

It is to all these canonical formulations, plus the precepts found in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (Shibunritsu ), later adopted in China and Japan, and the Mah y na precepts derived from the Fanwang-jing (Bon-m -ky )—which, with Saich (767-822) came to take their place in Japanese Tendai Buddhism—that Shinran will refer in his writ-ings that “it is impossible to be born in the true, fulfilled Pure Land by simply observing precepts,” and that “those who break precepts or have no precepts as well as those of deep evil karma will all attain birth.” 33

Another theme typical of Buddhist ethics, which is found in the Larger S tra, is the emphasis on peace and non-violence, which emerges in passages like those, for example, describing the Pure Land as a place where “the people live in peace,” and there is “no need for soldiers or weapons” (hy ga muy ),34 or lamenting that in this world “the strong oppress the weak” and all beings “harm and kill each other.”35 This emphasis is not only central in early Buddhism, but also consistent in the Mah y na tradition, as is immediately visible, for example, by the placement of the precept of not killing as the first in the list of the five precepts for the laity.

Nonetheless, significant exceptions have been noted by various schol-ars.36 Among the well-known Mah y na sources which justify killing on doctrinal grounds, there is, for example, the Up ya-kau÷alya-s tra, where the Buddha affirms that in one of his previous lives as a bodhisattva he killed a robber, to prevent him from killing five hundred bodhisattvas and hence suffering the karmic consequences of this act.37 A similar inter-

31 Keown, 1992: 25-29. 32 Keown, 1992: 29-31. 33 See CWS I: 458, 516. 34 Gómez, 1996: 215. 35 Gómez, 1996: 205. 36 See Harvey, 2000: 250-270. 37 See Harvey, 2000: 135.


pretation of the notion of skilful means, which contemplates the recourse by buddhas and bodhisattvas to various devices in order to bring all be-ings to liberation, is offered, for example, in the Bodhisattva-bh mi by Asaïga (fourth-fifth century CE), who attempted to justify such cases as positive acts which confer merits to the bodhisattva. Such considerations were based on the assumption that the latter, though openly breaking his precepts, could at the same time avoid worse karmic consequences for someone else.38 The notion of skilful means was still present in Shinran’s writings, in typical Mah y na fashion, to indicate bodhisattvas and bud-dhas as provisional expressions of “ineffable Buddha-nature.”39 Other commonly cited passages which justify war on religious grounds are found, for example, in texts like the rya-bodhisattva-gocarop ya-viùa-ya-vikurvaõa-nirde÷a-s tra, where, among the various types of advice addressed to a king one can find war strategies, though it is stated that the guiding principle of his actions should be the compassionate protection of his subjects,40 or in the rya-satyaka-parivarta-s tra, an early Mah y na text, where it is said that the righteous ruler, in order to defend the coun-try, should seek to attain victory while trying to protect all life.41 The idea is also found, most significantly, in the Mah y na Mah -parinirv õa-s tra, a very influential text in East Asian Buddhism, where the lay fol-lowers are encouraged to fight to defend the monastic community.42

These and other sources, together with the institutional history itself of East Asian Buddhism, seem to indicate that Mah y na Buddhism, when considered as a “total social phenomenon,” and not only through the cat-egories of enlightenment and compassion, can also be seen as containing options for an approach to social reality mediated by “the values of power and force.”43 Adaptations to the last of the aforementioned themes are to be found later in East Asian Buddhist history as well as in Rennyo (1415-1499), a cardinal figure in Shin Buddhism.

38 See McFarlane, 2001: 198-199; Harvey, 2000: 136-137; and Demiéville, 1973: 293-294. For a comprehensive study of the notion of skilful means, see Pye, 1978. 39 See Pye, 1984: 72. 40 See Harvey, 2000: 137. 41 See Harvey, 2000: 253. 42 See Demiéville, 1973: 292; and Williams, 1989: 159. 43 See Smith, 1995: 167. See also McMullin, 1989. Analogous considerations may be made concerning the institutional history of Therav da Buddhism; see Harvey, 2000: 255-263; and Reynolds C., 2005: 219-223.

Introduction 19

In what is apparently an interpolation on the “five evils” contained in the ‘Saõghavarman’ version of the Larger S tra,44 where the above-men-tioned description of the Pure Land as a place having “no need for sol-diers or weapons” is found, clear references to Confucian morality also appear. Here, in fact, not only the five constant virtues (goj ),45 but also the five obligations (gorin ) between sovereign and subject, par-ent and child, husband and wife, older and younger brothers, and friends are adopted and intermingled with Mah y na themes.46 Since in the his-tory of Shin Buddhism, these Confucian concepts have been largely used in order to provide a standard for the behaviour of the practitioners—as in modern adaptations of the Two Truths (shinzoku nitai ) doctrine, which are the object of widespread criticism by contemporary Shin Bud-dhist scholars—their presence in the Chinese version of the Larger S tra makes the interplay between Confucian ethics and Japanese Pure Land Buddhism even more problematical.47 However, it is apparent that Shin-ran did not put any emphasis on these passages. Rather, he gave unques-tioned primacy to the selected practice of the nenbutsu and, as it will be argued in the following pages, to the ethical dimensions of Mah y na Buddhism. It is in fact to Shinran’s own interpretation of the Pure Land teachings, through a brief presentation of the Shin Buddhist tradition, that reference will be made in the next chapter, so as to illustrate the founda-tions of social ethics in this denomination of Japanese Buddhism.

44 See Gómez, 1996: 205-215. 45 See Gómez, 1996: 215, 331. 46 See Gómez, 1996: 206-210. 47 For the presence of the idea of filial piety in the early formulations of Buddhist ethics, as found in the Aïguttara Nik ya, see Bellah, 1957: 71.

Chapter 1 __________________________________________________ Ethics and Society in the Shin Buddhist Tradition

Devotion to Amit bha (“the Buddha of Immeasurable Light”) or Amit -yus (“the Buddha of Immeasurable Life”), both of which are rendered by the Japanese term Amida , can be traced back to the earlier period of the development of the Mah y na tradition in India.1 Its textual basis lies essentially in three s tras, the above-mentioned Larger Sukh vat -vy ha-s tra (Mury ju-ky , S tra of the Buddha of Immeasur-able Life), 2 the Smaller Sukh vat vy ha-s tra (Amida-ky ),3 and the Guanwuliangshou-jing (Kanmury ju-ky , S tra of the Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life), also referred to as Amit yur-dhy na-s tra, which has however no extant Sanskrit original, and is likely to have originated in China or in Central Asia.4 These three s tras, also known as the Triple S tra (Sanbu-ky ), have exer-cised a deep and enduring influence upon the development of East Asian Buddhism.5

1 The term Amida derives from Amituo, the Chinese transliteration of the Sanskrit amita (“immeasurable”), which is common to both Amit bha and Amit yus. See Gómez, 1996: 282. 2 Chinese: Wuliangshou-jing. 3 Chinese: Amituo-jing. 4 See Nattier, 2003: 189; Williams, 1989: 255; and Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 32-33. 5 See Williams, 1989: 251.

Ethics and Society in Contemporary Shin Buddhism

22

The Mury ju-ky , commonly known as the Larger S tra, was first translated into Chinese during the second century CE, and focuses on the description of the “wondrous qualities” of the Pure Land and the “virtues of its Buddha, Amitabha.”6 It contains the story of the monk Dharm kara (H z ), which has been briefly mentioned above, whose forty-eight vows found in the ‘Saõghavarman’ translation, have come to occupy a central position in the Pure Land tradition, and, notably, in Shin Bud-dhism.7 The Eighteenth Vow in particular is crucial to Shin Buddhism, and appears in the Mury ju-ky in two different versions. The first, ut-tered by Amida before the achievement of buddhahood, reads:

May I not gain possession of perfect awakening if, once I have attained buddhahood, any among the throng of living beings in the ten regions of the universe should single-mindedly desire to be reborn in my land with joy, with confidence, and gladness, and if they should bring to mind this aspiration for even ten moments of thought and yet not gain rebirth there. This excludes only those who have committed the five heinous sins and those who have reviled the True Dharma.8

The second formulation, which is referred to as the description of the ful-filment of the Vow, after the achievement of buddhahood by Amida, states that:

Any living beings who hear his name and vow to be reborn in his realm, with a trusting mind, rejoicing even if only for a single moment of thought, single-mindedly dedicating their thoughts with the resolution to be reborn there, immediately gain rebirth there and dwell in the condition of not falling back—except only those who have committed the five abominable sins or have reviled the True Dharma.9

The Amida-ky , also known as the Smaller S tra, was first translated into Chinese by Kum raj va at about 402 CE, and this version remains the ba-sic text adopted in East Asian Buddhism.10 It mainly consists of the de-

6 Gómez, 1996: 24. 7 See Bloom, 1965: 3; and Dobbins, 2002: 3. 8 Gómez, 1996: 167. See also Dobbins, 2002: 3-4. 9 Gómez, 1996: 187. See also Dobbins, 2002: 4. 10 See Williams, 1989: 252.

1. Ethics and Society in the Shin Buddhist Tradition 23

scription of the Pure Land and indicates that those who “embrace” the name of Amida, and “keep it in mind single-mindedly and without dis-traction,” at the time of their death, “their minds free of any distorted views,” “will be able to be reborn” there.11

The Kanmury ju-ky , also known as the Meditation S tra, presents the teachings as given by ø kyamuni in the form of a series of visualiza-tions and meditations, on how to attain birth in the Pure Land. These teachings were given to the Indian Queen Vaideh , while she was impris-oned by her son Aj ta÷atru.12 In the text of this s tra, a new element for the universality of salvation is introduced, namely that “even the lowest individual guilty of the worst sins is capable of attaining the Pure Land on the eve of death if he recites the name of Amit yus up to ten times.”13

From a historical point of view, the devotion to Amida Buddha has been related, as already mentioned in the Introduction, to the emergence in Indian Buddhism of the idea of transfer of merit, or pariõ ma (ek

), which is at the basis of the assumption that “Amit bha transfers to sentient beings” the “merits of his virtuous deeds accumulated by him during his eons of religious practice” as a bodhisattva.14 It has also been suggested that the “introduction of the notion of other buddhas presently living and teaching elsewhere in the universe” emerged within the Bud-dhist community as a “response to difficulties inherent in the practice of the bodhisattva path as understood in early Mah y na.”15 Along this in-terpretative line, it is argued that this idea, which was the result of med-itational experiences, offered to aspiring bodhisattvas an escape from the dilemma posed by the fact that, on the basis of the early Buddhist as-sumption that “only one buddha can appear in the world at a time,” they had to wait for the appearance of the next Buddha, Maitreya, presently

11 Gómez, 1996: 148. 12 See Williams, 1989: 255; Bloom, 1965: 4; and Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 32-34. 13 Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 34. See also Bloom, 1965: 5. 14 Kajiyama, 1989: 13. According to Kajiyama Y ichi, the emergence of this tendency, which characterized Mah y na Buddhism as a whole, was basically aimed at transcending the traditional doctrine of karmic retribution; see Kajiyama, 1989: 1-20. 15 Nattier, 2003: 193. The activity of these buddhas, who, through the practice of “the Bodhisattva Way,” “have thoroughly realized the true nature of all things, understanding that all things are empty and without a self,” is characteristically related to the promotion of the “spiritual health” of their world system, or buddhakùetra (“buddha-field”). Gómez, 1996: 190, 289.


24

residing in Tuùita Heaven, before finally “being born in the presence of a buddha” and hence attaining their goal.16

THE SHIN BUDDHIST TRADITION

Although the Pure Land tradition developed mainly as a popular form of Buddhism in China as a component of various Buddhist schools and prac-tices, Shinran (1173-1262), the founder of the J do Shinsh

(“True Pure Land Buddhism”) tradition, or Shin Buddhism, estab-lished a line of continuity from Indian Buddhism, that is from ø kyamuni himself, by including N g rjuna (Ry ju ) and Vasubandhu (Tenjin

) among the seven patriarchs of this tradition.17 This choice, in fact, amounted both to presenting a “transhistorical unity in the teaching” and, by appropriating these two seminal figures, better known for representing the highly influential M dhyamika and Vijñan v da schools respectively, to the provision of legitimation to the Pure Land tradition.18

The role which has been attributed in Shin Buddhism to N g rjuna (ca. second century CE), lies mainly in the distinction between two ways of attaining the stage of non-retrogression along the path to bodhisattva-hood,19 the easy practices, and the difficult practices, which appear in the Da÷abh mika-vibh ù -÷ stra (Commentary on the S tra of the Ten Stages), although this text, which is traditionally ascribed to N g rjuna, survives only in Chinese, with its Indian origin put into question.20 A sim-ilar role is played by the other Indian patriarch, Vasubandhu (ca. fourth century CE), to whom the Sukh vat -vy hopade÷a, or Treatise on the

16 See Nattier, 2003: 183, 193. According to Jan Nattier this idea of “newly discovered worlds,” which in East Asian Buddhism came to be known as “pure lands,” found its earliest expression in the Akùobhyavy ha; see Nattier, 2003: 184-188. 17 See Bloom, 1965: 7. The other two independent Pure Land traditions in Japan are the J dosh , founded by H nen, Shinran’s master, and the Jish , founded by Ippen (1239-1289). Various elements of Pure Land Buddhism continue to hold a trans-sectarian status in Japanese Buddhism to date. 18 See Pye, 1987a: 40-42. 19 See Dobbins, 2002: 4; and RTS I: 8. 20 See Gómez, 1996: 119. The Chinese title of the work is Shizhu-piposha-lun (J j -biba-sha-ron ).


Pure Land (J do-ron )21 is traditionally attributed, and in which five forms of devotion to Amit bha are enumerated and the structure of the Pure Land is delineated.22 On a more general level, the influence of N g rjuna and Vasubandhu respectively lies in the influence exercised by the M dhyamika and Vijñan v da thought for which they are the key fig-ures on both Tanluan and Shandao.23

The first Chinese patriarch, Tanluan (Donran ; 476-542), intro-duced in his commentary on the Sukh vat -vy hopade÷a ( j -ronch

)24 various themes which contributed to the development of the Pure Land tradition in China. On the basis of the distinction between dif-ficult and easy practices, he characterized the path to the Pure Land in the present period “defiled with the five stains”25 as being based on the other-power of Amida (tariki ).26 He was also the first to clearly discuss the duality implied in the concept of self-power (jiriki ),27 and to clarify that the way of other-power was “easy,” but also “superior” in that it “transcended all dualism between self and the goal.”28 Thus, according to Tanluan, Vasubhandu’s five forms of devotion were efficacious not be-cause of the effort of the practitioner, but because they were derived from Amida’s power, which is manifested in their underlying component, the “singleness of heart” (isshin ).29 Tanluan also clarified the Mah y na foundations of the Pure Land teachings, distinguishing between dharma-body as suchness and dharma-body as compassionate means. Amida is thought to be in one respect the dharma-body, but he also differs from suchness in that he has assumed a particular form in order to save all be-ings, and therefore, for Tanluan, he is at the same time the dharma-body as compassionate means.30 Tanluan also applied N g rjuna’s doctrine of

21 Chinese: Jingtu-lun. For the uncertain attribution of the Sukh vat -vy hopade÷a, see Gómez, 1996: 119-120; and Williams, 1989: 257. 22 See Band , 1971: 79; RTS I: 8; and Williams, 1989: 257. 23 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 23. 24 Chinese: Wangsheng-lunzhu. 25 Bloom, 1965: 8. 26 Chinese: tali. 27 Chinese: zili. 28 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 25; and Bloom, 1965: 10-11. 29 Chinese: yixin. See Dobbins, 2002: 5. 30 See Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 113; and Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 53.


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÷ nyat to the concept of the Pure Land, stating that birth there repre-sented the “birth of non-birth.” However, he believed that any religious practice, and not only the recitation of the nenbutsu, could be viewed in terms of other-power.31

Daochuo (D shaku ; 562-645), the author of the Anrakush (Collection of Passages Concerning the Pure Land),32 placed great em-

phasis on the belief that, in the present age, people were no longer ca-pable of rigorous religious practices, and Pure Land was the form of Bud-dhism best suited for the age of the decline of the Dharma (mapp , or masse ).33 He divided the Buddhist tradition into the Path of the Sages (sh d mon ),34 based on “difficult practices” and on the ef-forts of the adherent, and the Path of the Pure Land (j domon ),35 including “easy practices” and the power of Amida, which is viewed as the only way through which one can achieve salvation.36 He also main-tained that the Pure Land, represented as “the birth of non-birth,” was not suitable for all individuals, and, concerning the nenbutsu, he did not con-sider recitation to be the sole practice for the attainment of birth in the Pure Land, still believing that meditation was equally important.37

Shandao (Zend ; 613-681), the third Chinese patriarch, argued, on the basis of the Meditation S tra, on which he wrote a commentary in four volumes (Kangy sho ),38 that even an incorrigible evil person could be born in the Pure Land, and interpreted the exclusionary clause at the end of the Eighteenth Vow as aiming at discouraging evil, but not ex-cluding anyone from salvation.39 However, he considered as essential for birth in the Pure Land the so-called three minds found in the Meditation S tra, the second of which, the deep mind, he characterized both as a “profound sense of our own incapacities,” and as a “deep faith in the sav-

31 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 25, 41, 53. 32 Chinese: Anleji. 33 Chinese: mofa; moshi. 34 Chinese: shengdaomen. 35 Chinese: jingtumen. 36 See Dobbins, 2002: 5; Williams, 1989: 259-260; Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 25-26; and Bloom, 1965: 12-13. 37 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 40. 38 Chinese: Guanjingshu. 39 See Dobbins, 2002: 5; and Gómez, 1996: 136-137.


ing power of Amit bha promised in his vows.”40 He also enumerated five devotional or right practices that lead to the Pure Land, including reciting the scriptures, meditation, worship, uttering Amida’s name, and praises and offerings, though among them he considered the uttering of Amida’s name, namu-amida-butsu or nenbutsu ,41 as the act allowing for salvation, while the other four were considered secondary, auxiliary acts.42 Shandao’s dependence on the Meditation S tra, which relates the recitation of the nenbutsu “to the removal of sins” as “hin-drances to enlightenment,”43 apparently led him to consider the directing of merit as an “intrinsic part of genuine aspiration for birth,” whose cen-tral meaning for the practitioner consisted in “dedicating the merit result-ing from saying the Name or worship toward attainment in the Pure Land.”44

The nenbutsu was also the focal point of the j -y sh (The Collection of Essentials Concerning Birth [in Amida’s Pure Land]) written by the Tendai monk Genshin (942-1017), the first Japanese patriarch, who contributed to the spreading of the Pure Land tradition in Japan. However, he also asserted, on the basis of the Meditation S tra, that the nenbutsu itself was, in its highest form, a meditative practice in which one visualizes Amida and his Pure Land while chanting his name.45

The last patriarch and Shinran’s master H nen (1133-1212), whose main work is the Senchaku-hongan-nenbutsu-sh

(Passages on the Selection of the Nenbutsu in the Original Vow), or Senchakush , 46 maintained that the nenbutsu was the exclusive Pure Land practice (senju nenbutsu ), and, in the Last Dharma-age, the only way through which all people could be saved.47 Besides rejecting the other practices and thus initiating Pure Land Buddhism as an

40 Chappel, 1996: 162. Cf. RTS V: 91; and CWS II: 176. 41 Chinese: namo-amituo-fo; nianfo. 42 See Dobbins, 2002: 5; Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 135; Williams, 1989: 261-262; and CWS II: 209. 43 Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 61. 44 Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 142. 45 See Dobbins, 2002: 5-6. 46 Senjaku-hongan-nenbutsu-sh and Senjakush in the Shin Buddhist tradition. 47 Cf. Band , 1971: 77.


28

independent movement in Japan,48 he followed Shandao by focusing on the nenbutsu as a verbal rather than meditative act. H nen also asserted that “Amida’s Vow was established to be universal,” “without discrim-inating between the good and the evil,” and that one’s effort to direct one’s merit towards the attainment of birth in the Pure Land was unneces-sary.49

Shinran had been trained as a Tendai monk since his childhood on Mt Hiei, where Pure Land practices such as the ninety-day meditation retreat (j gy zanmai ) and the continual nenbutsu chant (fudan nen-butsu ) had been “incorporated into the framework of Tendai meditation and doctrine.”50 However, being unsatisfied with the results of his religious practices, Shinran left Mt Hiei, and, after a short retreat at the Rokkakud in Ky to, he joined H nen’s hermitage at Yoshimizu in 1201. Following the persecution of nenbutsu practitioners, he was among the disciples of H nen to be exiled together with the master in 1207, when he was sent to Echigo province (present-day Niigata prefecture). After being pardoned in 1211, Shinran, who had previously married, chose neither to return to Ky to, nor to his previous status of a monk. He moved to Hitachi province, north of present-day T ky , instead, where he lived for about twenty years, and probably completed at least a draft of his major work, the Ken j do shinjitsu ky gy sh monrui

(A Collection of Passages Revealing the True Teaching, Prac-tice, and Realization of the Pure Land Way), commonly known as Ky gy shinsh (Teaching, Practice, Shinjin, and Realization), a collection of quotations from various Buddhist s tras in six fascicles to-gether with his own interpretations written in kanbun prose.51 The Ky -gy shinsh is likely to have been completed in Ky to, where Shinran re-turned in 1234 or 1235, leaving in the Kant area a number of d gy

(“fellow practitioners”), or d b (“fellow companions”),52 organ-

48 Cf. Dobbins, 2002: 6. 49 See Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 29, 143. 50 Dobbins, 2002: 23. 51 The six fascicles (kan or maki ) of the Ky gy shinsh deal in succession with: ky , teaching; gy practice; shin , shinjin or entrusting faith; sh realization or enlightenment; shinbutsudo , true Buddha and Land; and keshindo , transformed Buddha and Land. 52 See, for example, CWS I: 549, 551, 554. Shinran characteristically addressed those followers of the nenbutsu by using the honorific prefix on , from which the expression


ized in congregations, who had established their meeting-places in modi-fied private homes known as d j . While staying in Ky to, Shinran wrote a number of letters, which were later preserved in several collec-tions such as the Matt sh (Lamp for the Latter Ages) and the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush (A Collection of Let-ters by Shinran Sh nin). These letters were written to instruct these com-munities of nenbutsu practitioners, where many problems began to arise in connection with moral behaviour, especially because of a belief in li-censed evil (z aku muge ). For the same purpose he sent his son Zenran as an emissary, but he was eventually disowned by Shinran himself for “misleading all the people of the nembutsu in Hitachi.”53

Shinran’s hymns in Japanese, or wasan , where his teachings are presented in a more accessible way,54 also date to the later part of his life, as also do other important works as the Yuishinsh mon’i (Notes on ‘Essentials of Faith Alone’), and the Ichinen tanen mon’i

(Notes on ‘Once-Calling and Many-Calling’).55 As H nen had previously done, Shinran also took the utterance of the

nenbutsu as the sole practice of the Pure Land path, but he emphasized that this was not a calling to Amida by the practitioner, but Amida’s work to awaken all beings without discrimination, that is, his other-power. Ac-cordingly, Shinran “attributed the act of ‘extending religious merits to others’,” which is included in the Eighteenth Vow, “to Amida” himself, by adding the honorific suffix seshime tamaeri to the word ek (“transfer of merit”), in the kanbun text of his Ky gy shinsh :56

All sentient beings, as they hear the Name, realize even one thought-mo-ment of shinjin and joy, which is directed to them from Amida’s sincere mind, and aspiring to be born in that land, they then attain birth and dwell

on-d gy is often found in his Letters, and currently used by various interpreters. Recent translations waver between ‘practicers’ and ‘companions’ for d b . 53 CWS I: 583. 54 Shinran wrote three major collections of hymns, the J do wasan (Hymns of the Pure Land), the K s wasan (Hymns of the Pure Land Masters), and the Sh z matsu wasan (Hymns of the Dharma-Ages), and also other hymns on Sh toku Taishi (574-622 CE); see CWS I: 319-447. 55 For a detailed account of Shinran’s life, see Dobbins, 2002: 22-46. For a complete list and translation of Shinran’s works, see CWS I and II. 56 See Dobbins, 2002: 175. See also Band , 1971: 74; and Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 143.


30

in the stage of nonretrogression. Excluded are those who commit the five grave offenses and those who slander the right dharma.57

The way Shinran arrived at his conception of faith is traditionally de-scribed as the conversion through the three vows, or sangan tenny

, an expression which was not used by Shinran himself, but which was based on a passage in Chapter VI of the Ky gy shinsh , where he refers to his departure from the “temporary gate” (kemon ) and the “true gate” (shinmon ) to the “ocean of the selected Vow” (senjaku no gankai ):

Thus I, Gutoku Shinran, disciple of ø kyamuni, through reverently ac-cepting the exposition of [Vasubandhu,] author of the Treatise, and de-pending on the guidance of Master [Shan-tao],58 departed everlastingly from the temporary gate of the myriad practices and various good acts and left forever the birth attained beneath the twin ÷ la trees. Turning about, I entered the “true” gate of the root of good and the root of virtue, and wholeheartedly awakened the mind leading to the birth that is non-comprehensible. Nevertheless, I have now decisively departed from the “true” gate of pro-visional means and, [my self-power] overturned, have entered the ocean of the selected Vow. Having swiftly become free of the mind leading to the birth that is noncomprehensible, I am assured of attaining the birth that is inconceivable. How truly profound in intent is the Vow that beings ultimately attain birth!59

The significance of this passage lies in the fact that the temporary gate expressed by the Nineteenth Vow, and the true gate expressed by the Twentieth, which imply respectively “contemplative exercises and good acts,” and the “utterance of the Name as one’s own good act,” are indi-cated by Shinran as a progression from self-power (jiriki) to the complete

57 CWS I: 80. The passage in the Ky gy shinsh reads: “

.” SSZ II: 49; and RTS V: 90. 58 Shandao. 59 CWS I: 240. See also Dobbins, 2002: 182.


reliance on the work of Amida (tariki) as expressed in the Eighteenth Vow, the Primal Vow (hongan ) of Amida.60

The concept of mapp exercised a considerable influence on Shinran’s own understanding of the Mah y na teachings. According to this distinctive view of Buddhist history which in the Pure Land tradition had been emphasized especially by Daochuo, Buddha’s parinirv õa was followed by three successive stages, which also signalled a progressive degeneration, from the period of the true Dharma (sh b ) and the imitated Dharma (z h ), to that of the decline of the Dharma, or Last Dharma-age (mapp ).61 According to Shinran, in this age of mapp , the “evil world of the five defilements” (gojoku akuse ),62

only the verbal teaching remains; there is no practice or realization. If there were precepts, then there would be the breaking of precepts. But al-ready there are no precepts; by the violation of what precept can the pre-cepts be said to be broken? And since there is not even the breaking of precepts, how much less is there the observance of precepts!63

H nen had already affirmed that the “original vow” did not require prac-titioners “to observe the precepts and abide by the monastic rules,” which are included within the “various other practices,” whose performance

60 CWS II: 66. The Nineteenth and Twentieth Vows read respectively: 19) “May I not gain possession of perfect awakening if, once I have attained buddhahood, any among the throng of living beings in the ten regions of the universe resolves to seek awakening, cul-tivates all the virtues, and single-mindedly aspires to be born in my land, and if, when they approached the moment of their death, I did not appear before them, surrounded by a great assembly.” 20) “May I not gain possession of perfect awakening if, once I have attained buddhahood, any among the throng of living beings in the ten regions of the universe hear my name, fix their thoughts on rebirth in my land, cultivate all the roots of virtue, and single-mindedly dedicate this virtue desiring to be born in my land, and yet they do not attain this goal.” Gómez, 1996: 168. 61 “Considering the teachings concerning the three dharma-ages, we find that the date of the Tathagata’s parinirvana falls on the fifty-third year (the year water/monkey) of the reign of King Mu, the fifth emperor of the Chou dynasty. From that year of water/monkey to the first year of our Gennin era (the year wood/monkey) it is 2,173 years. Based on the Auspicious Kalpa Sutra, the Benevolent Kings Sutra, and the Nirvana Sutra, we find that we are already 673 years into the last dharma-age.” Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 244. 62 CWS I: 400. 63 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 247. See also CWS I: 42.


32

would limit the attainment of birth to a minority of beings.64 Also, for Shinran, no good acts are required, rather only the selected practice of the nenbutsu through other-power allows for birth in the Pure Land. In fact, “the dharma has become extinct,” and the teachings of the Path of the Sages (sh d mon) are no longer appropriate, or “in accord with beings.” Thus, amidst the distortion and concealment of the “teachings left by ø kyamuni,” the only practicable way to enlightenment was, according to Tanluan and Daochuo, the path of easy practice, the “Pure Land way” (j domon) as opposed to the difficult practices. This was the only effec-tive means to attain salvation.65 In this way, although the process had been originally initiated by Saich , the founder of the Tendai school, with the rejection of the ‘H nay na’ precepts in 818, the foundations for the es-tablishment in Japan of Shin Buddhism as a preceptless Mah y na tradi-tion were laid.66 Such an adaptation of Buddhist monastic codes to the Japanese context eventually led to extreme conclusions.

According to Shinran, who followed Tanluan’s interpretation, Amida Buddha is none other than the “dharma-body as compassionate means” (h ben hosshin ), that is, the form in which the “dharma-body as suchness” (hossh hosshin ), the “supreme Buddha,” which is “formless” and cannot be grasped nor described, manifests itself.67 Thus, it was by “taking this form,” that “the Buddha announced the name Bhikùu Dharm kara and established the Forty-eight great Vows,”68 and, through his “spontaneous working” (jinen ),69 enables both “our go-ing forth to the Pure Land” and “our return to this world.”70 In this sense, and in adherence to the essential features of the bodhisattva path, the “outgoing merit-transference” ( s ek ) is the aspect through which sentient beings are brought to enlightenment, while the “returning

64 See Senchakush English Translation Project, 1998: 77-78, 92. 65 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 240; and the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 403. 66 See also the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 458. The rejection by Saich of the Shibun-ritsu precepts, which were at that time commonly used both in China and Japan, was followed by the adoption of the Mah y na precepts derived from the Fanwang-jing (Bonm -ky ), as the only basis for ordination in Tendai Buddhism. See Dobbins, 2002: 177; Fu, 1994: 254-256; Tsomo, 1994: 126-127; and Matsuo, 1997: 182. 67 See the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 461; and the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 428. 68 CWS I: 461. 69 Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 115. 70 CWS I: 7.


merit-transference” (gens ek ) implies the return to this world to help other beings to achieve enlightenment.71

For Shinran, the only way for human beings to follow this path to en-lightenment is to “avoid calculating in any way,” and to entrust them-selves completely to the Tath gata’s Vow.72 Given the inefficacy of the reliance on sundry practices (z gy ), required by the other tradi-tional forms of Buddhism, and on good deeds for attaining salvation (ken-zen sh jin ), it is through the spontaneous working of jinen that the individual can move beyond “the mind of self-power” by “transcend-ing crosswise” ( ch ),73 so as to attain shinjin , the entrusting faith which is accompanied by saying Amida’s name, the nenbutsu, as a sign of “gratitude” to the “Buddha’s benevolence.”74

Shinjin, which is the central religious experience of Shin Buddhism, is described by Shinran as “one thought-moment” (ichinen ),75 through which the practitioner, though still a foolish being (bonbu ) pos-sessed by blind passions, is “grasped, never to be abandoned” (sesshu fu-sha ) by Amida,76 and immediately enters the stage of the truly settled (sh j ju ) and of non-retrogression (futaiten ), which means that he/she will attain enlightenment without fail:77

When foolish beings of delusion and defilement awaken shinjin, They realize that birth-and-death is itself nirvana; Without fail they reach the land of immeasurable light And universally guide sentient beings to enlightenment.78

71 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 103. Cf. the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 454. 72 See the Matt sh , in CWS I: 537. 73 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 223. 74 See the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 560. 75 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 110. See also the Ichinen tanen mon’i, in CWS I: 474: “One thought-moment is time at its ultimate limit, where the realization of shinjin takes place.” 76 CWS I: 4. Shinran’s belief that the “evil person,” he/she who realizes this unability to obtain liberation through his/her own efforts, is the primary object of the Primal Vow (akunin sh ki ), finds a typical expression in the well-known passage in the Tannish (A Record in Lament of Divergences): “Even a good person attains birth in the Pure Land, so it goes without saying that an evil person will.” CWS I: 663. 77 See the J do wasan, in CWS I: 341; and the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 455. 78 CWS I: 72. See also CWS I: 28: “The ‘birth’ to which Bodhisattva Vasubandhu aspires refers to being born through causal conditions. Hence it is provisionally termed ‘birth.’


34

And, in fact, according to Shinran, “this shinjin” is none other than “Bud-dha-nature,” which in turn, is “Tathagata.”79 The centrality attributed to shinjin by Shinran also finds expression in his belief that although in the Primal Vow Amida discloses a “sincere mind” (shishin ), “entrust-ing” (shingy ), and “aspiration for birth” (yokush ), “the true cause of attaining nirvana is shinjin alone.”80 Thus, the three aspects, be-ing characterized by “truth and reality” and “untainted by the hindrance of doubt,” are summarized into the mind that is single (isshin ), the “diamondlike true mind” (kong no shinshin ) which is “true and real shinjin.”81 According to Shinran, all “past, present, and future evil karma” of those who realize shinjin, “is transformed into the highest good,” and they are considered “people equal to the Buddhas.”82

However, shinjin is not meant to be equated with perfect enlighten-ment in this life, as other forms of Buddhism, notably Shingon, generally maintain. This point of view is clearly expressed in the second part of the Tannish , whose compilation is attributed to Yuien-b , a direct follower of Shinran. Here, in a passage upon “the assertion that one at-tains enlightenment even while maintaining this bodily existence full of blind passions,” it is in fact affirmed that “This statement is completely absurd,” and that “The attainment of Buddhahood with this very body is the essence of the Shingon esoteric teaching,” which figures among the above-mentioned difficult practices entailing self-effort.83

Shinran died in 1262, and his ashes were deposited in a tomb at tani in Ky to, whose proprietary rights were later granted to the Kant con-gregations by Shinran’s daughter, Kakushinni (1224-1283), who had as it were become the caretaker of the small mausoleum.84 Kaku-

This does not mean that there are real beings or that being born and dying is real, as ordinary people imagine.” 79 See the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 463. 80 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 93-94. The three are called sanshin , or threefold shinjin. 81 CWS I: 94, 107. See also CWS II: 211. Shinran also viewed the implicit meaning of the threefold shinjin as identical with that of the three minds (sanshin ) which appear in the Kanmury ju-ky ; see CWS II: 212. 82 See the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 453, 463. 83 CWS I: 674. See also the Matt sh , in CWS I: 546. 84 See Dobbins, 2002: 83; and Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 112.


shinni’s grandson, Kakunyo (1270-1351), accomplished the institu-tional tasks “to raise Shinran to the status of founding father,” “transform the tani memorial into a formal temple,” the Honganji , and “es-tablish a religious lineage for the Honganji based on heredity.”85 In-strumental in the realization of his task was also the composition of Shin-ran’s biography, the Godensh , and the text of the H -onk shiki

(Liturgy of Gratitude), used in the annual memorial service for Shinran.86

However, it was not until the time of Rennyo (1415-1499), the eighth head priest, also regarded as the ‘restorer’ of the tradition (ch k sh nin ), that most of the Shin Buddhist communities con-verged “to form one of Japan’s largest schools of Buddhism” under the leadership of the Honganji.87 Rennyo, a complex figure who was also a denominational organizer and an energetic propagator of the teachings, mainly through his pastoral letters (Ofumi , or Gobunsh ), had to face violent opposition from Mt Hiei over the expansion of Shin Buddhism into the provinces near Ky to, which eventually led to the de-struction of the Honganji itself in 1465,88 and the turbulence of the War-ring States period (1467-1568). At the same time he had to deal with the emergence of the phenomenon of the ikk -ikki , the uprisings of Shin Buddhist followers against the secular authorities, which represented for the Honganji at once a threat, because of the suppression which could have followed, but yet a “valuable opportunity for growth” as well.89

It was in this context that Rennyo established the rules of conduct for followers (okite ), and developed the two principles, secular authority as fundamental ( b ihon ), and the defence of the Dharma (goh )—which “acknowledged the use of military means” when the “welfare or existence of religion” was at stake. Both of these were aimed at the “prosperity of religion,” that is, of the Honganji institution itself.90 Rennyo’s successful proselytizing activities in Yoshizaki in Echizen province, which were started in 1471, ended up by strengthening the in-

85 Dobbins, 2002: 81. 86 See Dobbins, 2002: 81-82. 87 Dobbins, 2002: 88. 88 See Dobbins, 2002: 135. 89 Solomon, 1996: 407. 90 See Solomon, 1996: 401, 407, 412-418.


36

stitution and laid the basis for his return to Ky to and for the plans to re-construct the Honganji at Yamashina, to the east of that city, the complex being completed in 1483.

Characteristic of his doctrinal approach was the emphasis he put on faith as “the true cause of birth in Pure Land” (shinjin sh in ), on the nenbutsu as an “expression of gratitude to Amida” (sh my h -on

), and the use he made of the term anjin , together with shinjin, to refer to entrusting faith.91 Under Rennyo, the H -onk , the memorial service for Shinran, became a major annual ceremony, and the Sh shinge (Hymns of True Shinjin and the Nenbutsu) con-tained in the Ky gy shinsh was adopted as the most popular religious chant for Shin Buddhist followers.92

It is also due to Rennyo’s efforts that the Honganji was able to achieve, among the Shin Buddhist branches, the status of a strong religious and political power, and its headquarters at Ishiyama, near saka Bay, repre-sented perhaps the most difficult obstacle for Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582) in his attempt to unify the nation, taking ten years of war before the final surrender in 1580.

In 1591, Kennyo , the eleventh successor to Shinran, was granted the site of the present Nishi Honganji temple by Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-1598), and Shin Buddhism became established anew in Ky to. However, at the time of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616), a split oc-curred following a legal dispute about the succession, and the donation by Ieyasu himself of the site of the present-day Higashi Honganji temple to Ky nyo , Kennyo’s eldest son. This division, through which Ieyasu is likely to have pursued a stronger control over the institu-tion, was formally completed in 1619, with the official acknowledgement of the two branches, the current J do Shinsh Honganji-ha

(head temple, Nishi Honganji), and Shinsh tani-ha (head temple, Higashi Honganji), as separate entities by the govern-

ment.93

During the Tokugawa period, in connection with the mandatory tem-ple registration system (terauke seido ), and the general growth of Buddhism in Japan, Shin Buddhism gradually became “the major Bud-

91 Dobbins, 2002: 144-145. 92 See Dobbins, 2002: 150-151. 93 See Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 124-125.


dhist institution,” and promoted both accommodational policies towards the bakufu and “the increased incorporation of Confucian language into Shin rhetoric.”94 It has also been noted, however, how Shin Buddhism gave several distinctive contributions to relatively progressive political features of pre-modern Japanese society, like for example, “near-freedom of assembly, near-freedom of the press, near-freedom of religious speech, partial protection of religious minorities, and freedom of property,”95 and how it succeeded in maintaining a relative level of independence largely guaranteed by its economic base, which depended on the donations of the practitioners to the head temple—an approach which differed markedly from those of other Buddhist institutions based on estate income.96 It was also on these grounds that Shin Buddhism could avoid major damage from the anti-Buddhist persecution (haibutsu kishaku ), which took place in the early years of the Meiji period, and even entered the modern period by becoming a financier of the new government and or-ganizer of a large educational system.97

In present-day Japan, the Shin Buddhist denomination (J do Shinsh ) includes another eight branches, besides the J do Shinsh Honganji-ha and the Shinsh tani-ha which are characteristically based upon family lineage. However, all take part in the Shin Buddhist Federation (Shinsh Ky dan Reng ) inaugurated in 1969.98 The doctrinal de-bate and the social activities within the two major branches, the J do Shinsh Honganji-ha, and the Shinsh tani-ha, which are preponderant within the denomination as a whole, will be the special focus in the fol-lowing chapters.

94 Amstutz, 1997a: 22-23. 95 Amstutz, 1998: 747. 96 See Solomon, 1996: 422, 427-428. 97 See Amstutz, 1997a: 26-27. For the role of both the Nishi and Higashi Honganji in supporting the Meiji government, see, for example, Ketelaar, 1990: 71-73. Concerning the policies of the two Honganji during the Pacific War, see Chapter Three. 98 The other eight branches are: Shinsh Takada-ha ; Shinsh Bukk ji-ha

; Shinsh K sh -ha ; Shinsh Kibe-ha ; Shinsh Izumoji-ha ; Shinsh J sh ji-ha ; Shinsh Sanmonto-ha

; and Shinsh Yamamoto-ha ; see Matsunaga and Matsunaga, 1976: 125-127; and the official website of the Shinsh Ky dan Reng [http://www.shin.gr. jp], accessed 22 April 2004.


38

SHIN BUDDHIST ETHICS

The characteristic stress on religious liberation, open to all, is perhaps the aspect of Pure Land Buddhism which presents the most apparent implica-tions for the discourse on ethics in Shin Buddhism. The universality of Amida’s Primal Vow, which has come to be understood in Shin Bud-dhism, through Shandao and H nen, as including anyone “without a sin-gle exception,”99 though not necessarily implying the realization of equal-ity in the secular world, recognizes at least in religious terms the equality of all nenbutsu practitioners. In this connection, Shin Buddhism, together with other popular Buddhist devotions which emerged during the Kama-kura period, represented a further adaptation in Japan of the Mah y na teachings, since the goal of religious liberation which had been until then practically open to only a minority of monks within various monasteries also became available to the masses.100

It is interesting to note that this stress on the universality of liberation was accompanied in Japanese Pure Land Buddhism by the progressive erosion of the significance of the precepts in order to achieve birth in the Pure Land. Thus, in Shin Buddhism, the equalitarian dimension of the teachings is paralleled by the denial of good acts as a medium for reli-gious liberation, since they would obstruct the working of other-power. This view, which opened the way to the development of a tradition with-out precepts, has at the same time drastically limited the use of prescrip-tive language which could link the contents of religious experience to everyday life in the secular realm.101

H nen, who is considered the founder of the J dosh , had already stressed the significance of the nenbutsu as the easy practice aimed at di-recting all sentient beings without exception towards birth in the Pure Land. In the following passage from the Senchakush , H nen expresses in a forceful way this religious standpoint:

99 See the Song shinz meimon (Notes on the Inscriptions on Sacred Scrolls), in CWS I: 494; and SSZ II: 578. 100 See Foard, 1980; Pye, 1989: 171-173; and Rambelli, 2004: 174-177. In the case of Shin and Nichiren Buddhism, the real dramatic growth started from the Muromachi pe-riod; see Foard, 1980: 283. 101 On the precepts as instruments of social control in Kamakura Japan, see Rambelli, 2004: 175-176.


If the original vow required us to make images of the Buddha and to build st pas, the poor and destitute would surely have no hope of birth, but the fact is that the rich and highborn are few, while the poor and lowborn are exceedingly many. If the original vow required us to have wisdom and in-telligence, the dull and foolish would surely have no hope of birth, but the fact is that the wise are few and the foolish are very numerous. Again, if the original vow required us to hear and understand many teachings, those who have heard and understood little would surely have no hope of birth, but the fact is that those who have heard much are few and those who have heard little are very many. Further, if the original vow required us to observe the precepts and abide by the monastic rules, those who have broken the precepts and those who have never undertaken them surely have no hope of birth, but the fact is that those who observe the precepts are few, while those who have broken them are exceedingly many.102

According to H nen, who, in turn, refers to the religious tradition based on the Pure Land s tras, it was out of universal compassion that Amida Buddha, when he was still the monk Dharm kara in the distant past, se-lected the “single practice” of reciting the nenbutsu, instead of the so-called “manifold practices,” in order to lead all sentient beings to salva-tion.103 The seriousness of H nen’s personal commitment to the Pure Land path, as well as Shinran’s reverence for his own master, are still echoed in the verses of the K s wasan, when, referring to H nen as the seventh patriarch of the tradition, Shinran himself states that:

Genk emanated a radiance Which he always revealed to his followers, Without discriminating between the wise and ignorant Or between those of high station and low.104

For Shinran, who placed himself within the same Pure Land tradition, without any claim of founding a separate school,105 the “sacred Name of

102 Senchakush English Translation Project, 1998: 77. 103 Senchakush English Translation Project, 1998: 78. 104 “ / / /

.” K s wasan, in CWS I: 389; SSZ II: 514; and RTS VI: 135. 105 See especially the Sh shinge , in CWS I: 68-74; and SSZ II: 43-46; and the K s wasan, in CWS I: 361-393; and SSZ II: 501-515.


40

the Tathagata” was accordingly “the Name of the Vow embodying great love and great compassion, which brings all sentient beings into the su-preme nirvana,”106 and the “Vow of compassion” (higan ) was “like an immense cart, for it carries all people—whether ignorant or wise—wherever they may be.”107

According to Shinran, due to the fact that the decline of the Buddhist teachings had reached its lowest point in the current “last dharma-age” (mapp ), sentient beings had become “incapable of practice and re-alization,” that is, they could no longer eradicate their karmic evil through their own efforts. Thus, in this “evil world of the five defilements,” sen-tient beings can attain birth in the Pure Land through the working of the Primal Vow, the other-power, once they had abandoned their own self-power.108

Other Power is entrusting ourselves to the Primal Vow and our birth be-coming firmly settled; hence it is altogether without one’s own working. Thus, on the one hand, you should not be anxious that Tathagata will not receive you because you do wrong. A foolish being is by nature possessed of blind passions, so you must recognize yourself as a being of karmic evil. On the other hand, you should not think that you deserve to attain birth because you are good. You cannot be born into the true and real ful-filled land through such self-power calculation (hakarai ).109

As mentioned above, Shinran calls shinjin this entrusting faith in the Primal Vow, which is the only essential requirement for religious lib-

106 “

.” Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 452; and SSZ II: 621-622. 107 “ .” Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 66; SSZ II: 41; and RTS V: 74. 108 See the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 399-401; SSZ II: 516-517; and RTS VII: 1-12. See also the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 70: “ø kyamuni Tathagata appeared in this world / Solely to teach the oceanlike Primal Vow of Amida / We, an ocean of beings in an evil age of five defilements / Should entrust ourselves to the Tathagata’s words of truth.” 109 “

.” Matt sh , in CWS I: 525; and SSZ II: 659.


eration open to all, that is, for birth in the Pure Land. In fact, for him in shinjin there is “no discrimination between noble and humble or black-robed monks and white-clothed laity,” and “no differentiation between man and woman, old and young.”110 The centrality of shinjin, and its meaning for the construction of a community of equals, is clearly ex-pressed in this passage of the Tannish , where the following words of Shinran are reported:

… however precious a treasure one may offer before the Buddha or give to a teacher, it is meaningless if one lacks shinjin. And even though one may not make a donation of even a single sheet of paper or half a penny to the sangha, if one yields one’s heart to Other Power and one’s shinjin is deep, one is in accord with the essential intent of the Vow.111

If Shinran had been concerned about stressing the significance of the equality of the Primal Vow for everyone to the point of stating the fa-mous words “For myself, I do not have even a single disciple” (Shinran wa deshi ichinin mo motazu ), in view of the fact that all practitioners “say the nembutsu having received the working of Amida,”112 he also provided, following Shandao, an interpretation of the exclusionary clause contained in the Eighteenth Vow which aimed at eliminating any obstacle for its universal applicability. Shinran, himself, quotes frequently the text of this vow as found in the Larger S tra, which in its final part states that “This excludes [from birth in the Pure Land] only those who have committed the five heinous sins and those who have reviled the True Dharma.”113 In the initial part of the Song shinz mei-mon, Shinran provides a commentary to this passage, where, despite re-

110 “ .” See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 107; SSZ II: 68; and RTS V: 113. See also CWS I: 661. 111 “

.” Tannish , in CWS I: 677; SSZ II: 790; and RTS II: 73. 112 “ .” Tannish , in CWS I: 664; SSZ II: 776; and RTS II: 28. 113 Gómez, 1996: 167. ‘Reviling’ or ‘slandering’ the True Dharma (hih sh b ) means “to deny the existence of the Buddha and to turn one’s back on his teachings.” Dobbins, 2002: 175. See also CWS I: 80, 493.


42

affirming the gravity of those offenses, he also makes clear reference to birth in the Pure Land for all sentient beings without exception:

Excluded are those who commit the five grave offenses and those who slander the right dharma: Excluded means that those who commit the five grave offenses are rejected and reveals how grave the evil of slandering the dharma is. By showing the gravity of these two kinds of wrongdoing, these words make us realize that all the sentient beings throughout the ten quarters, without a single exception, will be born in the Pure Land.114

Shinran’s attitude towards those who were considered “difficult to cure” (nanji )115 is even clearer in other passages, such as the verses of the Sh shinge, where it is written that “When ignorant and wise, even grave offenders and slanders of the dharma, all alike turn and enter shinjin / they are like waters that, on entering the ocean, become one in taste with it,”116 or again, in Chapter III of the Ky gy shinsh , where Shinran states that

when the three types of beings difficult to save—those afflicted with the three kinds of sickness difficult to cure—entrust themselves to the univer-sal Vow of great compassion and take refuge in the ocean of shinjin that is [Amida’s] benefiting others, the Buddha is filled with pity for them and heals them, commiserates with and cures them.117

114 “

.” CWS I: 494; and SSZ II: 578. 115 See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 125; SSZ II: 81; and RTS V: 133. 116 CWS I: 70; SSZ II: 44; and RTS I: 23. 117 “ .” CWS I: 143; SSZ II: 97; and RTS V: 134. The meaning of the expression “difficult to cure” (nanji

) is explained in the Ky gy shinsh : “Concerning beings who are difficult to cure, the Buddha has taught the following. The Nirvana Sutra states: K ÷yapa, there are three kinds of people in the world who are hard to cure: those who slander the great vehicle, those who commit the five grave offenses, and those who lack the seed of Buddhahood (icchan-tika). These three sicknesses are the most severe in the world; they cannot be treated by sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, or bodhisattvas.” CWS I: 125.


Thus, for him “even grave offenders and slanderers of the dharma, all alike turn about and enter shinjin,”118 and there is no reason at all to dis-parage those low people who cannot observe the precepts. In fact, “such peddlers, hunters, and others are none other than we, who are like stones and tiles and pebbles” (ishi, kawara, tsubute ),119 since “if the karmic cause so prompts us, we will commit any kind of act.”120 In terms of religious salvation, there is, then, no discrimination whatsoever among sentient beings. In this sense, as William LaFleur has shown, Shinran’s approach offered a way “to transcend the law of karma” and of escaping the suffering of the “six courses” (rokud ).121 And it may be argued that conceiving karma as being “cancelable” through the working of Amida, instead of “inexorable,”122 as was the common belief in Kamakura Buddhism, might have had implications not only concern-ing religious salvation, but also at the level of social ethics.

In several letters of the Matt sh , however, there seems to remain a residual discriminative attitude towards those aforementioned ‘difficult to save,’ which, though not compromising the universal applicability of the Pure Land path, stands somehow in contradiction to Shinran’s admoni-tion “to abandon the judging of people as good and bad.”123

People who look down on teachers and who speak ill of the masters com-mit slander of the dharma. Those who speak ill of their parents are guilty of the five grave offenses. We should keep our distance from them.124

118 See the Song shinz meimon, in CWS I: 519; and SSZ II: 575. 119 See the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 459; and SSZ II: 629. 120 “ .” See the Tannish , in CWS I: 671; SSZ II: 784; and RTS II: 53. 121 LaFleur, 1983: 51-52. For a description of the taxonomy of rokud in medieval Japan, that is, the “depiction of the universe as regulated by the law of karma and consti-tuted by six basic modes of being,” kami (“gods”), ningen (“humans”), ashura

(“asura”), chikush (“animals”), gaki (“hungry ghosts”), and jigoku (“creatures of hell”), see LaFleur, 1983: 26-59.

122 Cf. LaFleur, 1983: 52. 123 See the Yuishinsh mon’i, in CWS I: 459; and SSZ II: 628. 124 The entire passage states: “

.” CWS I: 551; and SSZ II: 688.


44

This and other passages where Shinran exhorts his followers not to asso-ciate with those persons in the community who have given themselves to “wrongdoings” equated to “slandering the dharma” and “committing the five grave offenses,” and to “keep a respectful distance”125 from them, besides indicating the compelling necessity for the religious community of those times to take extreme measures in order to preserve its unity, might also imply, to some extent, the limited applicability of this set of religious ideas concerning equality in the context of everyday social prac-tice.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that in Shinran’s writings, the underlying idea of Mah y na compassion lacks sufficient articulation. However, the implications for the possibility of moral action within soci-ety are carefully thought out within the framework of a strict adherence to other-power since any reliance on good acts and calculations automati-cally constitute an obstruction to birth in the Pure Land, that is, to reli-gious salvation. This central concern is eminently expressed in Chapter XI of the Tannish :

Next, people who discriminate good and evil acts and consider them aids or hindrances to birth, interposing their own calculation, do not entrust themselves to the inconceivable working of the Vow and, striving to do acts that will result in birth with their own designs, they make the nem-butsu they say their own practice. People with such an attitude do not en-trust themselves to the inconceivable working of the Name either.126

Thus, Shinran could consistently affirm that “for those who entrust them-selves to the Primal Vow, no good acts are required, because no good sur-

125 The full passage recites: “

.” CWS I: 554; and SSZ II: 692. 126 “

.” CWS I: 668; SSZ II: 779-780; and RTS II: 40.


passes the nembutsu.”127 However, this departure from what he calls the “temporary gate of the myriad practices and various good acts” (shozen

),128 and the adoption of a Buddhism without precepts,129 seem oc-casionally also to imply an almost complete inability to benefit sentient beings. This tendency is evident in passages of the Sh z matsu wasan, where Shinran affirms that he lacks even “small love and small compas-sion” (sh ji sh hi ),130 and of the Tannish , where, contrasting it with the Path of the Sages, he states that

Compassion in the Pure Land Path should be understood as first attaining Buddhahood quickly through saying the nembutsu and, with the mind of great love and great compassion, freely benefiting sentient beings as one wishes. However much love and pity we may feel in our present lives, it is hard to save others as we wish; hence, such compassion remains unfulfilled. Only the saying of the nembutsu, then, is the mind of great compassion that is thoroughgoing.131

In this classic quotation, although the possibility of compassionate action in this present life is not completely denied, there seems to be an indica-tion that benefiting others is an activity reserved for those who have al-ready achieved liberation. Similarly, it is stated in the Matt sh that “As for becoming friends with those who are given to wrongdoing, it is only after we go to the Pure Land and return to benefit sentient beings that we

127 “ .” Tanni-sh , in CWS I: 661; SSZ II: 773; and RTS II: 16. 128 “ .” Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 240; SSZ II: 166 and RTS V: 197. 129 Cf. Fu, 1994: 263-265. 130 See the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 422; SSZ II: 527; and RTS VII: 98. See also CWS I: 429; SSZ II: 531; and RTS VII: 120. 131 “

.” CWS I: 663; SSZ II: 775-76; and RTS II: 25.


46

can become close to and friendly with them.”132 Again, in the J do wasan, it is stated that

Those who reach the Pure Land of happiness Return to this evil world of the five defilements, Where, like the Buddha ø kyamuni, They benefit sentient beings without limit,133

where the reference to the second aspect of Amida’s directing of virtues, that of the return to this world (gens ek ),134 seems to imply the necessity of going to the Pure Land after death before benefiting oth-ers. The same theme appears in the Ky gy shinsh , in a passage directly focused on the aspect of returning, where Shinran writes that “This is the benefit we receive, the state of benefiting and guiding others,” which “arises from the Vow of necessary attainment of the rank of succession to Buddhahood,” also known as “the Vow of succession to Buddhahood af-ter one lifetime” (issh fusho no gan ).135

One can also see, however, that in other passages the activity of ben-efiting others seems to be allowed for those practitioners who have com-pletely abandoned calculations, as in these verses of the Sh z matsu wa-san:

132 “

.” CWS I: 554; and SSZ II: 692. 133 “ / / /

.” CWS I: 329; SSZ II: 488; and RTS IV: 48. See also CWS I: 370, 674-675. 134 The first aspect of Amida’s directing of virtue being that for one’s “going forth” ( s ek ) to the Pure Land. See the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 7; SSZ II: 2; and RTS V: 29. 135 “

.” CWS I: 158; SSZ: 106-107; and RTS V: 144. See also the verses in the J do wasan, in CWS I: 329: “The countless great bodhisattvas of the land of happiness / Have reached ‘succession to Buddhahood after one lifetime’ / Entering the compassionate activity of Samantabhadra / They unfailingly work to save beings in de-filed worlds.” For the presence of dualistic motives in Shinran’s thought and life, see, for example, Dobbins, 2004: 69-73.


Persons who enter Amida’s directing of virtue to beings And realize the mind that seeks to attain Buddhahood Completely abandon their self-power directing of merit, Thus benefiting sentient beings boundlessly.136

Moreover, the state of being established in the “stage of the truly settled” through shinjin and attaining the status that Shinran regards as being “equal to the Tathagatas” (Nyorai to hitoshi ) and to be “the same as Maitreya” (Miroku to onaji ),137 whose meaning is explained by Shinran himself, namely that “the heart of the person of shinjin already and always resides in the Pure Land,”138 carries evident consequences also for one’s conduct in the present life, as is illustrated in several passages. Not only “Virtues indescribable, inexplicable, and in-conceivable / Fill those practicers,”139 and “the minds, good and evil, of foolish beings” are “transformed into the mind of great compassion,”140

but, as is stated for example in Chapter XVI of the Tannish , “If shinjin has become settled,” then “gentleheartedness and forbearance will surely arise in us through its spontaneous working.”141 Similarly, in the Ky -gy shinsh , other passages seem to indicate the same direction, as the ref-erence made in Chapter II to the “Good, in contrast to evil” (zen’aku tai

)142 of the practitioner, which is found in the midst of a compari-son between “the nembutsu and the various good practices” (nenbutsu shozen ).143 It may also be seen in the benefits of “being pos-sessed of supreme virtues” (shitoku gusoku ), “our karmic evil being transformed into good” (ten’aku j zen ), and “constantly practicing great compassion” (j gy daihi ), which are included

136 / / /

.” CWS I: 404; SSZ II: 518; and RTS VII: 22. 137 See the Matt sh , in CWS I: 528; and SSZ II: 662. See also CWS I: 351. 138 “ .” CWS I: 528; and SSZ II: 662. 139 See the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 406; SSZ II: 519; and RTS VII: 31. See also CWS I: 332, 371. 140 CWS I: 409; SSZ II: 520; and RTS VII: 40. 141 “ .” CWS I: 676; SSZ II: 788; and RTS II: 68. 142 CWS I: 64; SSZ II: 41; and RTS V: 73. 143 CWS I: 65; SSZ II: 41; and RTS V: 70.


48

within the “ten benefits” gained “in the present life” (gensh ni jisshu no yaku ) after the realization of the “diamondlike true mind” (kong no shinshin ), a synonym for shinjin.144

However, it is especially in the letters addressed by Shinran to his fol-lowers in the last part of his life that the Mah y na concept of compas-sion is articulated within the framework of the Pure Land path, so as to provide the foundation for a social ethic. In one such letter, found in the Matt sh , Shinran clearly states that

Signs of long years of saying the nembutsu and aspiring for birth can be seen in the change in the heart that had been bad and in the deep warmth for friends and fellow-practicers; this is the sign of rejecting the world. You should understand this fully.145

The meaning of the expression “sign of rejecting the world” (yo o itou shirushi ) becomes clearer in another letter in the same collection, where the following passage is found:

One must seek to cast off the evil of this world and to cease doing wretched deeds; this is what it means to reject the world and to live the nembutsu. When people who may have said the nembutsu for many years abuse others in word or deed, there is no indication of rejecting this world.146

According to Shinran, since the “desire to cast off the evil”147 from one-self always accompanies the practice of the nenbutsu and the aforemen-tioned ‘rejection’ of the world, it flows quite naturally that “Even that

144 CWS I: 112; SSZ II: 72; and RTS V: 120-121. 145 The entire passage runs: “

.” CWS I: 551; and SSZ II: 688. 146 “

.” CWS I: 547; and SSZ II: 682-683. 147 “ .” CWS I: 553; and SSZ II: 691.


person who has been inclined to steal will naturally undergo a change of heart if he comes to say the nembutsu aspiring for the land of bliss.”148

In various other letters, as well as in the Tannish , Shinran defends his doctrinal approach and its underlying ethical meanings against the false views which were spreading among his disciples in the Kant area. There were in particular two major kinds of deviations concerning, respectively, a “formalistic practice of recitative nembutsu” and a “subjective grasp of shinjin,” which tended to emphasize the “strength and quality of ‘faith’ in the Primal Vow of Amida.”149 The latter view gave rise, in turn, on the basis that “with strong faith one would not suffer the consequences of any evil act,”150 to the antinomian tendency of condoning and encouraging e-vil, the so-called practice of licensed evil (z aku muge ), which Shinran deplores in this passage of the Matt sh :

Formerly you were drunk with the wine of ignorance and had a liking only for the three poisons of greed, anger, and folly, but since you have begun to hear the Buddha’s Vow you have gradually awakened from the drunkenness of ignorance, gradually rejected the three poisons, and come to prefer at all times the medicine of Amida Buddha. In contrast, how lamentable that people who have not fully awakened from drunkenness are urged to more drunkenness and those still in the grips of poison encouraged to take yet more poison. It is indeed sorrowful to give way to impulses with the excuse that one is by nature possessed of blind passions—excusing acts that should not be committed, words that should not be said, and thoughts that should not be harbored—and to say that one may follow one’s desires in any way whatever. It is like offering more wine before the person has become sober or urging him to take even more poison before the poison has abated. “Here’s some medicine, so drink all the poison you like”—words like these should never be said.151

Shinran’s concern in confronting these antinomian views is echoed in the famous passage found in Chapter XIII of the Tannish , where the com-piler, Yuien-b , writes that

148 “

.” CWS I: 547; and SSZ II: 682. 149 CWS II: 158-159. 150 CWS II: 159. 151 CWS I: 553; and SSZ II: 690-691. See also CWS I: 547, 550.


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There was, in those days, a person who had fallen into wrong views. He asserted that since the Vow was made to save the person who had com-mitted evil, one should purposely do evil as an act for attaining birth. As rumors of misdeeds gradually spread, Shinran wrote in a letter, “Do not take a liking to poison just because there is an antidote.” This was in order to put an end to that wrong understanding. It by no means implies that evil can obstruct one’s attainment of birth.152

If, however, strength was needed to reassert the fundamental religious standpoint that evil did not constitute a “hindrance to birth,”153 equally important and pressing for Shinran was the exigency to stress the in-congruence of the attitude to do wrong with the profound meaning of the nenbutsu, since, as he reaffirmed in his Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , “it is not stated in the Pure Land teachings that, because it is for the evil person, one should purposely think what is wrong in one’s mind, act it bodily, or speak it verbally.”154 What Shinran recommended to his fol-lowers was then to “seek to respond in gratitude to the Buddha’s benevo-lence” (button )155 by rejecting both “the evil of this world” (gose no ashiki ) and “the evil in themselves” (mi no ashiki

).156 This gratitude finds expression also in the respect for other reli-gious beliefs, and in a compassionate attitude even towards those who disparage the teachings, as shown in the following passage from the Matt sh :

You should know that this shinjin is bestowed through the compassionate means of ø kyamuni, Amida, and all the Buddhas in the quarters. There-fore you should not disparage the teachings of other Buddhas or the peo-ple who perform good acts other than nembutsu. Neither should you de-

152 CWS I: 671; SSZ II: 783; and RTS II: 51. 153 See the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 565; and SSZ II: 704. 154 CWS I: 564; and SSZ II: 701-702. 155 See CWS I: 564; and SSZ II: 702. Cf. the J do wasan, in CWS I: 337; SSZ II: 491; and RTS IV: 78: “I praise Amida’s wisdom and virtue / So that beings with mature conditions throughout the ten quarters may hear. / Let those who have already realized shinjin / Costantly respond in gratitude to the Buddha’s benevolence.” 156 See the Matt sh , in CWS I: 553; and SSZ II: 691.


spise those who scorn and slander people of nembutsu; rather, you should have compassion and care for them. This was H nen’s teaching.157

And again, it is out of this gratitude for the Buddha’s benevolence that Shinran exhorts his followers to “pray for the present life and also the next life of those who slander [the nenbutsu],”158 and, in this passage of the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , for universal peace:

Those who feel uncertain of birth should say the nembutsu aspiring first for their own birth. Those who feel that their own birth is completely set-tled should, mindful of the Buddha’s benevolence, hold the nembutsu in their hearts and say it to respond in gratitude to that benevolence, with the wish, “May there be peace in the world (yo no naka an’on nare

), and may the Buddha’s teaching spread! (bupp hiromare )”159

From the above-mentioned quotations, it may be argued that Shinran’s religious thought, despite the claim of non-discriminating between good and evil, and the inherent reluctance to formulate a code of ethics, which is ultimately due to the strict reliance on the other-power of Amida and the rejection of any calculation whatsoever, is far from presenting a pas-sive or non-ethical approach to society. Especially those passages of Shinran’s Letters, where the morality of the nenbutsu practitioner is pic-tured in a more concrete way and is substantially linked to the main framework of religious experience, seem to provide sufficient elements as to avoid what has been termed the “disjunction” between “one’s inner life of faith” and “one’s outer life of words and deeds.”160

In the structure of Shinran’s thought, not only the idea of compassion of Mah y na Buddhism, grounded in liberation through other-power as its source, continues to play a fundamental role in providing the “direc-

157 The full passage states: “

.” CWS I: 527; and SSZ II: 660. 158 See the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 570; and SSZ II: 710. 159 CWS I: 560; and SSZ II: 697. 160 See Dobbins, 2002: 62.


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tion of ethics,”161 but also the idea of the interrelatedness of all sentient beings, mediated by Shinran’s understanding of karma, concurs in shap-ing a distinctive universal ethics, as illustrated, for example, in this pas-sage from the Tannish :

As for me, Shinran, I have never said the nembutsu even once for the re-pose of my departed father and mother. For all sentient beings, without exception, have been our parents and brothers and sisters in the course of countless lives in the many states of existence. On attaining Buddhahood after this present life, we can save every one of them.162

Another interesting element which is found in this passage is Shinran’s reference to the Confucian concept of filial piety (k y ), which, as a good act linked to self-power practices, is clearly distinguished from the unique practice of the nenbutsu. Thus, it would seem that Shinran, while stressing the universal dimension of Mah y na teachings, expresses a critical attitude towards the elements of traditional morality as well. The same may be argued through a reference to Chapter VI of the Ky gy -shinsh , where Confucius, together with Laozi and others, are portrayed as following “wrong paths” (ja ), since their teachings are only con-cerned with “mundane good” (seken no zen ), and through them it is not possible to “part from the worldly and attain the sacred.”163

Shinran’s stress on the practice of the nenbutsu also implied a guarded attitude towards the worship of kami, and more in general some level of criticism towards the interconnected system of rites and politics which was dominant at that time.164 It is noteworthy that H nen, with his stress on the exclusive practice of the nenbutsu (senju nenbutsu ), had

161 Cf. Pye, 1989: 172-174. 162 “

.” CWS I: 664; SSZ: 776; and RTS II: 26. 163 CWS I: 286; SSZ II: 199. Here, however, also Shinran’s praise of the Seventeen-Article Constitution traditionally ascribed to Sh toku Taishi (573-621 CE), where the Confucian values of harmony and loyalty are strongly emphasized, should be mentioned; see CWS I: 443. 164 For the role of Buddhism in the ‘protection of the nation,’ see, for example, Kuroda, 1996a: 274-276; and McMullin, 1989: 12-19.


already implicitly rejected the worship of kami as long as they were con-cerned with salvation, that is, birth in the Pure Land, though he admitted visits to shrines by practitioners in order to obtain worldly benefits.165

It was Shinran who rejected any form of kami worship, although he did not deny the existence of the kami themselves and their protection given to nenbutsu practitioners.166 This aspect of Shin Buddhist religios-ity is clearly expressed in various passages of Chapter VI of the Ky gy -shinsh , most notably through a quotation from the Hanju zanmai-ky

(S tra of the Sam dhi of All Buddhas’ Presence):

… Take refuge in the Buddha yourself, take refuge in the dharma, take refuge in the sangha. Do not serve other teachings, do not worship devas, do not enshrine spirits, do not heed days considered lucky.167

The idea that the nenbutsu practitioner should neither take refuge in vari-ous gods nor worship spirits is also found in other passages, like these verses of the Sh z matsu wasan, where Shinran deplores

How lamentable it is that monks and laypeople Select “fortunate times” and “auspicious days,” And paying homage to gods of the heavens and earth, Engage in divination and rituals of worship. … How lamentable it is that at present All the monks and laypeople of Japan, While following the Buddhist rules of conduct, Venerate gods and spirits of the heavens and earth.168

Also in this wasan, a few verses later, Shinran’s lament for the present decadence of the Buddhist community, seems to imply a non-conformist stance towards the established religious system as well:

The sorrow of this evil world of the last dharma-age Is that Buddhists of the southern capital and the northern peak

165 See Rhodes, 1994: 55-57. 166 See Rhodes, 1994: 61-66. 167 CWS I: 255; SSZ II: 175; and RTS V: 204. See also CWS I: 259, 273-274, 289. 168 CWS I: 422-423; SSZ II: 528; and RTS VII: 101, 104.


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Call servants “palanquin-carrier monks” and “serving dharma teachers” To show deference to the high-ranking priests.169

What is perhaps Shinran’s most famous note of protest against the au-thorities can be found in the Postscript to the Ky gy shinsh . Here, while recollecting the events that, through the petition of the scholar-monks of the Nara powerful Buddhist complex of the K fukuji (K fukuji s j

)170 against H nen and his disciples, led to the suppression of the nenbutsu and to the eventual banishment of the master and of Shinran himself to Echigo, he laments the fact that

The emperor and his ministers, acting against the dharma and violating human rectitude, became enraged and embittered. As a result, Master Genk —the eminent founder who had enabled the true essence of the Pure Land way to spread vigorously [in Japan]—and a number of his fol-lowers, without receiving any deliberation of their [alleged] crimes, were summarily sentenced to death or were dispossessed of their monkhood, given [secular] names, and consigned to distant banishment.171

In the same passage, Shinran also describes himself as “neither a monk nor one in worldly life” (s ni arazu zoku ni arazu ),172 an ex-pression which refers to his condition after he was defrocked and sent into exile with a secular name. After he was pardoned, he did not return, in fact, to his previous status of a monk, which may be taken to suggest the independent character of the founder of Shin Buddhism in an age when belonging to the monkhood was a matter for decision by powerful religious institutions and the state, and his approach to matters of author-ity.173 The same can be said also to his other claim, that he did not have even a single disciple, that is, no religious authority was necessary to me-diate the working of Amida, which evidently stood in contrast with the intermingling of power and religion which dominated Japanese society in the Kamakura period. An exception to this attitude seems to be implied

169 CWS I: 423; SSZ II: 529; and RTS VII: 108. 170 See McMullin, 1989: 18. 171 CWS I: 289; SSZ II: 201; and RTS V: 206. See also Kuroda, 1996a: 280-281. 172 CWS I: 289; SSZ II: 201; and RTS V: 206. 173 Cf. Matsuo, 1997: 180-181.


by a passage contained in the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , where Shinran, writing to Sh shin-b , notes that

it would be splendid if all people who say the nembutsu, not just yourself, do so not with thoughts of themselves, but for the sake of the imperial court (ch ka no on-tame ) and for the sake of the people of the country (kokumin no tame ni ).174

As the post-war debate in Japan illustrates, this is a controversial passage which, though not necessarily invalidating Shinran’s general approach to authority, certainly represents an obstacle for any understanding of his thought which would aim at emphasizing a strict antagonism to the politi-cal sphere for Shin Buddhists.175

Various distinctive aspects of Shinran’s approach to society under-went successive changes starting with his early successors. Not only did the idea of compassion in the Mah y na tradition apparently lose its fun-damental role in providing the direction of ethics, but also the aforemen-tioned elements indicating a critical attitude towards the interconnected system of rites and politics, that is, the mutual dependence between b

(“the Law of the State”), “the system of power represented by the nation’s sovereign (the emperor) as well as the various secular parties of influence,” and bupp (“the Buddhist Law”), which indicates both the Buddhist doctrines and “the major temple-shrine complexes as a so-cial and political force,” progressively led the way to accommodations to mainstream religiosity and the existing social customs.176

Kakunyo had already stated that the practitioners “should observe be-nevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom and sincerity,” that is, the “five vir-tues” derived from Confucianism,177 and used the honji suijaku

174 “.”

CWS I: 560; and SSZ II: 697. 175 See, for example, Bloom, 1999: 63-64. For recent reflections upon Shinran’s am-bivalence in matters of authority and social customs, and, more in general, upon his strong dependence on the medieval cultural context, see, for example, Dobbins, 2004: 119-121, 130-134. 176 See Kuroda, 1996a: 276. 177 Rogers, 1991: 310. The reference is to the five constant virtues (goj ) of Confu-cian ethics: benevolence (jin ), righteousness (gi ), propriety (rei ), wisdom (chi


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theory to reconcile reliance on Amida Buddha with the worship of kami. This well-known doctrinal formulation, in fact, which “became the most influential theory during the medieval period,” implies the belief that “the kami are ‘traces’ (jaku) which the buddhas and bodhisattvas (honji or the ‘original ground’) manifested (sui) in Japan to save the beings of this na-tion.”178

The same stream of thought, and the “accommodation of Shinran’s teaching to Japanese folk tradition, inseparably bound up with the kami,”179 were followed by Zonkaku (1290-1373), Kakunyo’s dis-owned son. As Robert Rhodes has noted, Zonkaku, mainly through his influential work Shojin hongaish (On the Original Intention of the Various Kami), tried to “reconcile the Shin Buddhist position with the worship of the kami by arguing that the ultimate source of the kami, and hence the sole true object of faith, is Amida Buddha.”180 Indeed, for Zonkaku, b and bupp had become a single law with two aspects, “just like two wings of a bird or two wheels of a cart,” and the main theme in the ethical sphere was to be found in “gratitude as social obligation.”181

These earlier developments provided the basis for Rennyo both in his articulation of the b -bupp dialectic and in his attitude towards the kami. As regards the latter point, Rennyo, although “rejecting the worship of the kami,” used the above-mentioned honji suijaku theory and Zon-kaku’s original interpretation in order to present the kami themselves as “manifestations of the buddhas and bodhisattvas,” and, in turn, the bud-dhas and bodhisattvas as “discrete manifestations of Amida.”182 This ap-proach emerges quite clearly in one of his Letters dated 1474, where he states:

By kami manifestations (shinmei ), we mean that [buddhas and bodhisattvas] appear provisionally as kami to save sentient beings in whatever way possible; they lament that those who lack faith (shin) in the

), and loyalty (shin ). For the presence of Confucian themes in the Chinese version of the Sukh vat vy ha-s tra, see the Introduction. 178 Rhodes, 1994: 54. 179 Rogers, 1991: 311. 180 Rhodes, 1994: 75. 181 Rogers, 1991: 311. 182 Rhodes, 1994: 77.


Buddha-dharma fall helplessly into hell. Relying on even the slightest of [related past] conditions, they appear provisionally as kami through the compassionate means to lead [sentient beings] at last into the Buddha-dharma. Therefore, sentient beings of the present time [should realize that] if they rely on Amida and, undergoing a decisive settling of faith, repeat the nen-butsu and are to be born in the land of utmost bliss, then all the kami [in their various] manifestations, recognizing this as [the fulfillment of] their own fundamental purpose, will rejoice and protect nenbutsu practicers. Consequently, even if we do not worship the kami in particular, since all are encompassed when we rely solely on one Buddha, Amida, we give credence [to them] even though we do not rely on them in particular.183

This process of accommodation of the kami was accompanied in Rennyo by a tendency to emphasize the disjunction between b and bupp . In-deed, his position on this issue is not without ambiguities. If it is true, in fact, his call to the community of the nenbutsu practitioners to take “out-wardly” the “laws of the state as fundamental” ( b ihon ) and “inwardly,” to “rely single-heartedly and steadfastly on Amida Tath -gata,” which appears in various passages of his Letters,184 the apparently contrasting standpoint that “we should take Other-Power faith established by the Primal Vow as fundamental,” also finds adequate scriptural evi-dence.185

What is quite obvious, however, is that Rennyo’s approach implied, as in the cases of Kakunyo and Zonkaku, the adoption of principles of mo-rality derived from Confucianism. This is clearly affirmed by Rennyo when he makes reference to the contents of the outward behaviour of the nenbutsu practitioner, where the observance of the laws of the state is combined with that of the principles of “humanity, justice, propriety, wis-dom, and sincerity.” (jin-gi-rei-chi-shin ).186

It is noteworthy that the above-mentioned reference to Confucian principles, as well as the okite , the regulations for the practitioners, where these and other ethical prescriptions appear, were attributed to Shinran by Rennyo. Thus, although “there is no evidence to suggest that

183 Rogers , 1991: 176. See also Rogers, 1991: 210. 184 Rogers, 1991: 215-216. 185 See Rogers, 1991: 213, 249. See also Kuroda, 2006: 43. 186 Rogers, 1991: 213. See also Rogers, 1991: 215, 216, 218.


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Shinran ever used the term okite,” Rennyo speaks in his Letters of “the regulations established by the founding master,”187 whose precedent is based on, in fact, various sets of congregational rules in use among the followers.188 An example of Rennyo’s okite is provided in a letter dated 1474, where it is stated that

If there are any of you who have heard the meaning of our tradition’s Other-Power faith and become decisively settled, you must store the truth of that faith in the bottom of your hearts; do not talk about it with those of other sects or others [not of our tradition]. Furthermore, you must not praise it openly (in the presence of [such] people) on byways and main roads and in the villages where you live. Next, do not slight the provincial military governors and local land stewards, claiming that you have at-tained faith; without fail, meet your public obligations (kuji ) in full. Further, do not belittle the various kami and buddhas and the bodhisattvas, for they are all encompassed within the six characters (na-mu-a-mi-da-butsu). Besides this, in particular, take the laws of the state as your outer aspect, store Other-Power faith deep in your hearts, and take

187 Rogers, 1991: 212. 188 See Dobbins, 2002: 66-68. Here the first extant example of these congregational rules of conduct, which date back to 1285, is also reported and translated: “Among adherents to the single-minded and exclusive nembutsu, the following items are prohibited: 1. As fol-lowers of the exclusive practice, do not denigrate other Buddhas or Bodhisattvas, or people of other persuasions and practices. 2. Do not indulge in arguments with people of other persuasions and practices. 3. Do not be slack in your respect for rulers and parents. 4. Do not denigrate the kami just because you say the nembutsu. 5. Do not enter the d j laughing or whispering or with an air of haughtiness. 6. Do not give your teacher a bad reputation by preaching heresies (jagi) and by wrongly calling them the single-minded and exclusive teaching. 7. Do not punish disciples, simply because you are the teacher, without establishing what is right and wrong. 8. Do not denigrate your religious teacher or your fellow believers. 9. Whenever there are falsehoods spoken between fellow believers who appeal to you for judgment, listen to what is right and wrong on both sides, and show them what is correct and what is not. 10. On the day of nembutsu worship when you meet for services, do not do such things as eat fish or fowl. 11. Men and women should not sit together when they perform the nembutsu, since it will be a disruption. 12. Do not act as a merchant of horses and human beings, for it is known to be disreputable. 13. In selling something, do not lie and charge even a single mon of money in excess, and, if you do, return the difference. 14. Do not indulge in illicit sexual relations with another person’s wife, and do not slander others by saying that they do. 15. As nembutsu adherents, when you drink liquor, do not get drunk and lose your senses. 16. As nembutsu practitioners, do not steal or gamble. 17. Do not do such things as envy those who are superior or belittle those who are inferior.”


[the principles of] humanity and justice (jingi ) as essential. Bear in mind that these are the rules of conduct that have been established within our tradition.189

Thus if, on the one hand, Shinran’s apparent reluctance to formulate any set of moral prescriptions in order to avoid calculations which obstruct religious liberation was progressively abandoned, perhaps also due to the changing necessities of the growing religious community and its struggle to survive, on the other hand heterogeneous elements were imported so as to provide a guide for the ethical conduct of practitioners. As a conse-quence, in Rennyo’s instructions for his followers, it is not the Mah y na concept of compassion which indicates the direction of the ethical, but rather ideas mainly based on the conventional morality of the time, strongly influenced by Confucian ethics. And whether or not these steps are to be considered the unavoidable result of that “critical juncture for the Honganji’s survival, renewal, and expansion,”190 and of the need to make the teachings “socially more acceptable,” 191 they nonetheless marked, from an ethical point of view, a significant shift from the Shin Buddhist tradition as established by Shinran. It is within this framework, that is, both as a reaction and adaptation to changing external circum-stances and as a substantial deviation from the principles expressed by Shinran, that Rennyo’s justification of the use of military means to protect the denomination, which is expressed by the principle of defence of the Dharma (goh ), should also be understood.192

Of course, this does not imply that in Rennyo, other aspects of Shin-ran’s and more in general, of Pure Land religious ethics, are neither pres-ent nor vital. The already noted egalitarian aspect of the Pure Land teach-ing as a path of liberation, open to all, was preserved by Rennyo with its relevant implications for ethical discourse, as is evident in various pas-sages, among which this clear statement found in the Letters indicates:

189 Rogers, 1991: 180. See also Rogers, 1991: 86, 158, 173, 175, 209, 213, 231. 190 Rogers, 1991: 158-159. 191 Rhodes, 1994: 55. 192 See Solomon, 1996: 407, 413; and Rogers, 1991: 83. For Shinran’s standpoint on the same issue, see the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 568.


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… sentient beings of the present [age] should aspire to birth in the Pure Land through Other-Power faith. To receive that faith, there is no need at all for wisdom or learning, for wealth and status or for poverty and distress; it does not matter if one is good or evil, male or female.193

For Rennyo, in accordance with Shinran’s teaching, “we are one an-other’s companions and fellow practicers,”194 and the universality of A-mida’s directing of virtues is assured without exception also for those who have committed the “five great offenses,” and “who slander the dharma” or “lack the seed of buddhahood.”195 Nonetheless, Rennyo’s own interpretation of karma seems to introduce a new discriminative ele-ment towards those who lack good karmic conditions from the past.196 In a letter dated 1476, it is stated:

When we consider presenting our tradition’s Other-Power faith, we must first distinguish between the people who have good from the past and those who lack good from the past. For, however long ago a person may have listed his name as a participant in this [tradition], it will be difficult for one who lacks good from the past to attain faith. Indeed, faith (shin) will of itself be decisively settled in the person for whom past good has unfolded.197

Here, as in the statement “in teaching others, one must determine the presence or absence of good from the past,”198 the influence of past good (shukuzen ) is essentially presented as an element which is necessary for a successful transmission of the teachings. However, another letter, dated 1475, might be taken to suggest that it constitutes an unavoidable requirement for the attainment of other-power faith and religious salva-tion:

193 Rogers, 1991: 181. 194 Rogers, 1991: 143. See also Rogers, 1991: 144-145; and Yamamoto K., 1968: 21, 88. 195 Rogers, 1991: 147. See also Rogers, 1991: 160, 182, 195, 201. 196 Rogers, 1991: 197. 197 Rogers, 1991: 214. 198 Rogers, 1991: 218.


… if there are people who have not realized the faith that is the truth and reality of the Primal Vow, we must indeed conclude they have not re-ceived the prompting of good from the past. If there were not people for whom good from the past had unfolded, all would be in vain and the birth that is to come [in the Pure Land] could not be settled.199

At the same time, slight but meaningful changes are introduced concern-ing the interpretation of birth in the Pure Land. Thus Shinran’s under-standing of shinjin as a stage of non-retrogression towards buddhahood is preserved, as is clear from Rennyo’s claim that

People who understand [the teaching] in this way are precisely those who have attained Other-Power faith. Moreover, this state is described as “dwelling in the company of those [whose birth in the Pure Land is] truly settled,” “[being certain to] reach nirv õa,” “reaching the stage equal to perfect enlightenment,” and “[being of] the same [stage] as Maitreya.”200

The Mah y na idea of the identity between saüs ra and nirv õa, which is suggested by Shinran in various passages, does not seem, however, to find adequate articulation in Rennyo, because of the latter’s stress on life after death as the most important matter (gosh ichidaiji ). One of the central themes in his Letters is, in fact, the idea that “what we should earnestly aspire to is [birth in the Pure Land in] the afterlife.”201 This concern is typically accompanied in Rennyo by a stress on the im-permanence of all things, what he calls “the wind of impermanence” (muj no kaze ), as in the famous passage from On White Bones:

… because the impermanence of this world creates a condition of uncer-tainty for young and old alike, we should all immediately take to heart the most important matter, the afterlife, and, deeply entrusting ourselves to Amida Buddha, say the nenbutsu.202

199 Rogers, 1991: 208-209. See also Rogers, 1991: 150, 184, 229. The term shukuzen appears only once in Shinran’s works, in Chapter XIII of the Tannish . 200 Rogers, 1991: 172-173. 201 Rogers, 1991: 162. 202 Rogers, 1991: 255. See also Rogers, 1991: 160, 200, 313. For Rennyo’s references to the “wind of impermanence,” see Rogers, 1991: 161, 255.


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And indeed, as has been previously noted, this approach ultimately tends to accentuate the other-worldly dimension of Shin Buddhism, and to weaken the social implications of Mah y na ethics, leaving room for the consideration of “life merely as a ‘waiting room’ for birth in the Pure Land.”203

MODERN VIEWS ON SHIN BUDDHIST ETHICS

Shinran’s immediate successors’ formulations of the relationship between the Law of the State ( b ) and the Buddhist Law (bupp ), where the two aspects are viewed as the ‘two wings of a bird,’ opened the way up to-wards the attribution to the former, at least outwardly, of a prominent po-sition.204 This tendency can be traced in Rennyo, although he fostered, at the same time, the contrasting principles of other-power faith as funda-mental and the defence of the Dharma (goh ). Kuroda Toshio has argued that in this way “the strict tension between the bupp and the b was ul-timately lost,” leading to a rhetoric which was far less independent from the political domain than that possessed by medieval mainstream formu-lations.205

These early approaches contributed to the collaborative and uncritical attitude of Shin Buddhism towards the state, which was later codified in the so-called shinzoku nitai doctrine. While this expression is related to the two truths of Mah y na, that is, Ultimate Truth or shintai

(param rtha-satya), and Mundane Truth or zokutai (saüvŸti-satya), within the Shin Buddhist tradition the two terms came to indicate the aforementioned concepts of b and bupp , and the prescription for all practitioners to conform to existing social norms.206 This doctrinal ap-proach is typically exemplified by the so-called ‘Testament’ of the Hon-ganji-ha head priest K nyo (1794-1871), who relied largely on Ren-nyo. Here, the nenbutsu followers are instructed to “take imperial law as fundamental,” “take humanity and justice as foremost,” “revere the kami,

203 Rogers, 1991: 313. 204 See Kuroda, 1996a: 279-284. 205 Kuroda, 1996a: 283-284. A different standpoint is provided by the same author in Kuroda, 2006: 43. 206 See Rogers, 1991: 314.


and uphold morality.”207 And this is a view of the relationship between Shin Buddhism and society which, with the creation of the modern na-tion-state in the Meiji period, was fully accepted as part of the orthodox teaching and included by both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha in their new sets of sectarian prescriptions and temple rules (Sh sei jih

), as authorized by the Meiji government for the two branches in 1886.208 In this way, the social and ethical dimensions of Shin Buddhist teachings were “subordinated to the interests of the state,” 209 and referred to either Confucian values or the Imperial Rescript on Education (Ky iku chokugo ), issued by the Meiji government in 1890, through which loyalty and filial piety became “the hallmarks of civilized moral behavior.”210

A different point of view concerning the shinzoku nitai structure and the place of morality within the life of the practitioner was expressed by the tani-ha thinker Kiyozawa Manshi (1863-1903). Kiyo-zawa’s belief that worldly truth was not to be identified with moral teach-ings, is typically articulated in the following statement, which appears in a writing of 1903:

… it is a great misperception to think the worldly truth teaching exists in order to compel people to uphold standards of human behavior or by ex-tension to benefit society and the nation.211

In Kiyozawa’s view, in fact, the “purpose” of “Shinsh worldly truth” was rather to lead the individual to the paradoxical realization that one cannot in fact perform these moral tasks, or, in the case of those who have already attained shinjin, “to deepen one’s thoughts of gratitude to-ward the infinite compassion [of the Buddha]” as a consequence of the difficulty of one’s praxis. 212 His standpoint on morality was mainly based on Shinran’s original view that people are totally incapable of attaining

207 Rogers, 1991: 320-321. 208 See Rogers, 1991: 327; Ikeda, 1998: 32; and Ama, 2001: 39. 209 Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 198. 210 Johnston, 1991: 32. 211 Kiyozawa, 1989: 107-108. 212 Kiyozawa, 1989: 103-104. See also Kiyozawa, 1989: 107; and Kiyozawa, 1984: 55-56, 59.


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salvation through their own self-power. Being aware of one’s limited condition is thus the requirement for the attainment of the level of a truly religious life, which Kiyozawa called “spiritual awareness” (seishinshugi

), that is, the encountering, through other-power, with the “Infi-nite,” the “wondrous working of Tath gata,”213 which goes beyond any distinction of the “internal” and the “external.”214 And, in this sense, Kiyozawa’s approach meant a rediscovery, against any simplistic as-sumption of the exclusive other-worldly character of the Pure Land, of the Mah y na conception that “the absolute does not live beyond this world.”215 His subjective standpoint on faith finds typical expression in his famous statement that “We do not believe in gods or Buddha because they exist,” rather, “Gods and Buddha exist because we believe in them.”216

Another novelty of Kiyozawa’s position lies in his claim that the dis-appointment and frustration which inevitably follow any serious attempt “to mould one’s behavior to conform to ethics or morality” is an “indis-pensable condition” in order to reach the level of a true religious life.217 Thus, the moral elements which are implied in worldly truth are only of secondary importance, and need to be firmly separated and distinguished from the realm of religion. This is clearly stated by Kiyozawa in the fol-lowing passage:

In other words, [Buddhist worldly truth] is not a teaching of morality but a teaching of religion; it is not a teaching about the way of men but about the way of Buddhas. Seeing it in this way, it goes without saying that worldly truth is something to be explained by a religious person and that its goal must be to produce religious results.218

His strong affirmation of the religious character of worldly truth, which

213 Kiyozawa, 1984: 15, 39. See also Kiyozawa, 1984: 34, 42. 214 Kiyozawa, 1984: 15. 215 Kiyozawa, 1936: 40. 216 “

.” Kiyozawa, 1936: 42; and tani Daigaku, 2003: 284. 217 Kiyozawa, 1989: 103. See also Kiyozawa, 1984: 31-33; and Kiyozawa, 1989: 100. 218 Kiyozawa, 1989: 108.


proceeds together with the separation between the “domains” of “religion and morality,” does not imply, however, a rejection of the contents of what he considers “common, ordinary morality.”219 In fact, the aforemen-tioned disappointment which is fundamental for the experience of becom-ing truly religious

may occur in reference to an assortment of different moral schemes: the teachings of Shinsh worldly truth, the teachings of contemporary social ethics or [current norms of] morality, the five precepts, the ten wholesome aspects of behavior, an attempt to do good in all actions, etc.220

It might be argued that what Kiyozawa was questioning was the role of the ethical in the religious life of the practitioner, though not necessarily its general character. Thus his claim that, with the achievement of “spiri-tual awareness,” the practitioner is not made “indifferent to the world”221 and that this “is never the creed of hermits or passivists” is not surpris-ing.222 As he put it:

… spiritual awareness implies neither an overriding self-concern nor an indifference toward others. It simply recognizes that we cannot help oth-ers establish a firm religious footing unless we first establish it for our-selves.223

It was on these premises that Kiyozawa could affirm that “such virtues as love of parents and love of country should be abandoned as matters be-neath the concern of religion,” since the “crucial matter” is that “we, in our minds, should be independent of our homes, jobs, families, friends, country, education, and knowledge, and single-mindedly take refuge in the spirit of the Buddha,” 224 although, once other-power is working through the practitioner and all self-efforts have been abandoned,

219 Kiyozawa, 1989: 102, 108. 220 Kiyozawa, 1989: 103-104. 221 Kiyozawa, 1984: 16. 222 Kiyozawa, 1984: 17. Cf. Kiyozawa, 1984: 33. See also Blum, 1988: 76; and Johnston, 1991: 47. 223 Kiyozawa, 1984: 16. 224 Kiyozawa, 1984: 22.


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We follow him [the Buddha] wherever he leads. We take care of our par-ents out of filial piety. We work faithfully for the ruler … We help or-phans and the poor. We care about those who engage in hard labor … We engage in various activities for the benefit of the world and of people, not because we do them, but because the Buddha makes us do them.225

That is, once the perspective of the practitioner on the role of morality in one’s life has changed, and it has become clear that “whether or not one is able to actuate the worldly truth teaching in Shinsh ” has not “the slightest relation to the most important fact of one’s salvation,”226 it is possible to acknowledge, as “Buddha’s work,”227 ethical elements which are not necessarily characteristic of Mah y na or Shin Buddhism. Thus, together with the “concern for good and evil” implied in the “ten kinds of worldly benefits” which “naturally and inevitably” flow from shinjin,228 uncritical reference is also made by Kiyozawa to values derived from various external sources. Among these, the dominant morality of the Meiji era, which was heavily indebted to Confucianism, can also be found. In this sense, the controversial passage, found in his essay, entitled The Indispensable Conditions for Religious Conviction (Sh ky teki shin-nen no hissu j ken ), published in the Seishinkai journal in 1901, may also be interpreted, namely:

When a person has come this far, he may live a moral life. He may seek academic knowledge. He may engage in politics or business. He may go fishing or hunting. When his country is endangered, he may march to war with a rifle on his shoulder.229

Indeed, it is also possible to find in Kiyozawa’s writings other formula-tions which seem to develop themes from mainstream Mah y na ethics,

225 Kiyozawa, 1984: 34. See also Kiyozawa, 1936: 149-150, 155. 226 Kiyozawa, 1989: 106. 227 Kiyozawa, 1984: 35. 228 Kiyozawa, 1989: 101-102. 229 Kiyozawa, 1984: 23-24. See also Kiyozawa, 1984: 22. Another interesting element in this writing is the choice, made by Kiyozawa, to conclude by quoting the well-known passage from Rennyo’s Letters, where the “King’s law” is regarded as fundamental, in-dicating it as the “truly religious person’s attitude toward worldly concerns.” Kiyozawa, 1984: 24. See also Kiyozawa, 1936: 82-83, 173.


or which remind us of Shinran’s concern about the problem of licensed evil. Such a case can be found in his reference to the two elements of “compassion and wisdom,” which “work harmoniously” in the Buddhist who “dwells in oneness,”230 or, elsewhere, to the teaching of no-self, as in a passage of his writing Peace Beyond Ethics (Rinri ij no an’i

) published in 1902. Here, Kiyozawa states that for one who “sim-ply witnesses the working of Tath gata without discriminating between right and wrong, good and evil,” it is not permissible to commit acts like killing and stealing. In fact, according to him:

The truly selfless person will never say “I will do this or that. I will kill. I will steal.” Such statements are not manifestations of selflessness at all, but arrogant assertions of the speaker’s ego.231

Indeed, for Kiyozawa, selflessness, to be obtained through spiritual a-wareness, is not only the necessary condition for the achievement of inde-pendence and freedom,232 but seems also to work in providing the basis for a social ethics. In fact, he affirms, “If you do not feel discontentment with what you have, you will not seek after what others have, you will not have conflicts with others.”233 And, on other occasions, it even sug-gests a critical approach to social reality, such as when, for example, Kiyozawa criticizes the “extreme servility” of his contemporary “Bud-dhist clergymen.”234 However, his stress on the necessity of the independ-ence of the individual from external factors also finds expression in his claim that “to be rich or poor does not necessarily depend on material a-bundance,”235 or in other reflections where he manifests a passive attitude towards social inequality.236

Thus, Kiyozawa’s articulation of the social significance of the Bud-dhist teaching of no-self is not without ambiguities either, and shows a considerable level of dependence upon heterogeneous elements and the

230 See, for example, Kiyozawa, 1984: 66. 231 Kiyozawa, 1984: 39-40. 232 See Kiyozawa, 1984: 17-18, 28; and Kiyozawa, 1936: 88, 92, 149, 182. 233 Kiyozawa, 1984: 28. 234 Kiyozawa, 1984: 61-73. 235 Kiyozawa, 1936: 93. 236 See, for example, Kiyozawa, 1936: 43-44, 111, 114-115.


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implicit acceptance of salient aspects of that vision of social life which was propagated by the Meiji government. Also, at the general level, it may be argued that this tendency was reinforced by his strict distinction of the ethical from the religious, which posed serious limitations to his elaboration of the doctrinal discourse on Shin Buddhist morality through the lines provided by the idea of Mah y na compassion.237

Another, yet different, view of the ethical dimension of Shin Buddhist teachings is that represented by Takagi Kenmy (1864-1914). Takagi was one of the few Shin Buddhist priests who opposed Japanese imperialism and, since he was implicated in the so-called High Treason Incident (Taigyaku Jiken ) in 1910, imprisoned, and excom-municated by the tani-ha institution, he could not exercise any signifi-cant influence upon the discourse on Shin Buddhist ethics of those years. His writing My Socialism (Yo ga shakaishugi ) is however interesting, in that here Takagi attempts to articulate the implicit ethical meanings of Shin Buddhist teachings in the sense of a compassionate ac-tivity within society. The socialist ideas by which he was admittedly in-fluenced do not seem to have caused an imbalance, at least from the ex-tant writings, in the coherence of his religious ideas. At most, they may have provided the occasion to explicate religious meanings which were already implied in the teachings of Shin Buddhism. Takagi fully ac-knowledged the equalitarian aspect of the Pure Land teachings, and, con-sistent with the Shin Buddhist tradition, set at the basis of ethical life the working of the other-power of Amida, which creates in the practitioner a “revolution of thought:”

… by hearing the voice of the savior Amida calling to us, we then gain peace of mind, feel great joy and become vigorous in spirit. 238

What distinguished his approach to ethics from the dominant understand-ing of the teachings in those times was, however, the direct link he estab-lished between faith and “practical action.” In fact, since he thought that the “revolution of thought” was “the result of a profound empathy with the Buddha’s universal love,” Takagi concluded that one could not keep it within oneself, as an exclusively inner dimension, but rather one

237 Cf. Pye, 1989: 167. 238 Takagi, 2001: 58.


needed to open oneself up “to the Tath gata’s mind of compassion” and “practice it.”239 Hence, through the nenbutsu and the working of “abso-lute transcendental compassion,” the practitioner gains the determination to fight against the injustices of “this world of defilement,” where “the poor are treated like animals at the hands of the wealthy,”240 and to aspire for peace, according to the actual meaning of Shinran’s words “May there be peace in the world, and may the Buddha’s teachings spread,” which at that time were misused by religionists in order to justify war.241 Thus, for Takagi the profound meaning of the nenbutsu was that “we must proceed from the spiritual realm and completely change the social system from the ground up,” propagating “the saving light, peace, and happiness” of the name of Amida Buddha.242

Another example of the elaboration of ideas on ethics within the doc-trinal structure of Shin Buddhism in modern Japan is provided by a fur-ther thinker of the tani-ha, Soga Ry jin (1875-1971). Shin-ran’s elaboration of the two complementary aspects of saüs ra and nir-v õa in Shin Buddhism is echoed by Soga’s affirmation that the very spirit of the Buddha dies in those “who simply determine that this world is a burning house and is absolutely bad.” In fact, according to him, they

go on with this as the only reason to postulate a Pure Land existing some-where far away and to believe that they will attain buddhahood there. Such people think of becoming a Buddha completely apart from actual re-ality.243

For Soga, this did not imply, as he made clear in his writings, that the Pure Land is completely affirmed in this world. However, a further sug-gestion that for him the element of the bodhisattva’s compassion might play a role in this very life may be found in his affirmation that, when we receive “the Buddha’s wisdom” at the point of the “desire for Birth,”

239 Takagi, 2001: 59. 240 Takagi, 2001: 55, 58. 241 See Takagi, 2001: 60. The quotation is from the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush ; see CWS I: 560. 242 Takagi, 2001: 59-60. 243 Soga, 2000: 124-125.


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there is not the least uncertainty about the way we ourselves have to go, with the result that we are also able to guide others. Moreover, the direc-tion the country and even the world should follow is shown here.244

Another aspect in Soga’s thought which may be considered relevant from an ethical point of view is his reference to the doctrine of karma. Accord-ing to him, Dharm kara is “none other than the consciousness of kar-ma,”245 which, in the final analysis, with explicit reference to Chapter III of the Tannish , “means to shoulder the evil of all sentient beings.”246 Thus, the immediate ethical consequence of the self-awareness of the “e-vil person” is that:

In the world of karma, nobody is an island by himself or herself; everyone is linked with everyone else. All sentient beings—and not only sentient beings, but all things in the world—are linked in mutual empathy. The world of karma is a world of mutual resonance and co-respondence (kann d k ).247

And indeed, Soga’s reference to a world where we all “become compan-ions to one another,” and, instead of putting “our solitary ego forward against others,” we come to consider “the deeds of all humans” as “our own responsibility,” taking “upon our own shoulders the sins and pains of all sentient beings,” seems to provide a valuable contribution to the de-velopment of a Shin Buddhist ethical thought.248

A concern for ethical issues emerges also in some of the speculations of Yasuda Rijin (1900-1982), one of Soga’s foremost disciples, when, for example, he stresses the idea that the Dharma finds its con-creteness only when it incarnates itself in the socio-historical reality of the community of believers (sanga ), where it finally becomes avail-able for everyone.249 It may also be seen in his discussion about “human as bodhisattvas” (bosatsuteki ningen ), where he argues that

244 Soga, 1984: 234. 245 Soga, 2001: 13. 246 Soga, 2001: 17. Cf. CWS I: 664. 247 Soga, 2001: 11. 248 See Soga, 2001: 11-12. 249 See Shinsh Ky gaku Kenky sho, 1983: 18, 21.


the standpoint of the bodhisattva consists in the awareness of the con-tradictory structure of existence, that is, of its karmic structure, that re-sults in a sense of responsibility for life which encompasses the ethical sphere.250

In the doctrinal discussions of Kaneko Daiei (1881-1976), it is also possible to find significant references to ethical issues. Kaneko shared Soga’s stress on the interrelatedness of all beings as ordinary be-ings (bonbu ) in the world of karma, and saw this mutual relation-ship, because of its inextricability from the human condition, as an “inner togetherness.”251 According to Kaneko,

As long as our fellow beings are unhappy, none of us can remain aloof from them. We can not but share the unhappiness with them. Because of the inner togetherness of man, sympathy can be awakened within us.252

In this passage, the awareness of karma is apparently placed as the foun-dation of one’s “sympathy” for other fellow beings. And, quite signifi-cantly, it is linked, a few lines further on, to the element of compassion in Mah y na Buddhism, as expressed by the principle “seeking for emanci-pation from suffering together with fellow beings.”253 In other passages, Kaneko illustrates what he terms the “fruits” which faith in the Pure Land bears “in actual life.”254 Explaining the nature of these “fruits,” Kaneko makes reference not only to “humility,” which for him takes the place of “arrogance,” and finds concrete expression in the aspiration that all be-ings “might awaken to Amida’s boundless sincerity and boundless com-passion,” but also to another aspect of the “life of naturalness” made pos-sible by the nenbutsu, that is, “tenderness.”255 This “tenderness,” which is described by Kaneko as a kind of “tolerance,” and “essentially rooted in repentance and humility for the fact that the same evil (which is ‘toler-ated’) is finally characteristic of us all,” is, according to him, what allows

250 See Yasuda, 1962: 83, 88. I am indebted for this point to Paul Watt, who drew my at-tention to this essay, and made his translation available to me. 251 Kaneko, 1965: 50. 252 Kaneko, 1965: 50. 253 Kaneko, 1965: 50. 254 Kaneko, 1965: 60. 255 Kaneko, 1965: 61.


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the practitioner “to confront every problem open-mindedly, flexibly and unprejudicedly.”256 And, together with the aforementioned aspect of hu-mility, it “helps to purify others,” since the “selflessness” from which both arise naturally “calms” and “induces them to reflect upon them-selves.”257 Thus, although the nenbutsu practitioners “can never do good in the complete sense of the term,” they, nonetheless, out of Amida’s compassion and sincerity which enable “humility” and “tenderness” to arise, and without any connection to the domain of “moral obligation or duty,” try to achieve “a warm reconciliation and communion with oth-ers,” and help to “bring about genuine peace” in the “local community.” It is on the basis of these concepts that Kaneko could claim that, in the present world situation, “the doctrine of Pure Land Buddhism may well be rediscovered as a valuable source” for the attainment of “World peace.”258

Modern views which are related to the ethical dimension of Shin Bud-dhist teachings can be found in other thinkers who belonged, loosely or strictly, to the Ky to School of philosophy. These reflections, although not actually the expression of Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies in a close sense, are nonetheless noteworthy in that they have exerted a certain in-fluence on the contemporary debate on Shin Buddhist ethics and as such deserve to be briefly adduced.

One of these thinkers, the Ky to-school philosopher Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), compared his philosophical experience of conver-

sion in “metanoesis” (zange ) to the experience that led Shinran “to establish the doctrine of the Pure Land Shin Sect.”259 Although the adher-ence of Tanabe’s thought to the fundamental tenets of Shin Buddhism has been seriously questioned, his Philosophy as Metanoetics (Zanged to shite no tetsugaku , 1946) presents some interesting elements in relation to the general discourse on Shin Buddhism and ethics. One of the aspects for which Tanabe’s approach to Shin Buddhism has been most criticized, that is to say, the notion of “metanoesis” or zange, which he defines as “repentance for the wrongs I had done, with the ac-companying torment of knowing that there is no way to expiate my sins,”

256 Kaneko, 1965: 61. 257 Kaneko, 1965: 61. 258 Kaneko, 1965: 62-63. 259 Tanabe, 1986: lii.


and “shame for the powerlessness and inability that have driven me to de-spair and self-surrender,”260 also provided him with the basis for his reli-gious philosophy. For Tanabe, zange corresponds to the acknowledge-ment of the powerlessness and lack of freedom of the individual, and, as such, represents the way to negate the self and to obtain access to other-power, which is quite in tune with Shinran’s teaching of humans as fool-ish beings (bonbu).261 However, it is Tanabe’s stress on the “continuous repetition of zange,” which, according to some of his critics, carries the risk of reintroducing the element of calculation, a major obstacle for the working of other-power.262

Tanabe’s approach, though assuming, at a general level, the contours of a philosophical ‘transfiguration’ of the catastrophic events leading up to Japan’s defeat in World War II, provides some elements as to the es-tablishment of a link between life in other-power and that in society, es-pecially in his articulation of the significance of zange as the negation of the self.263 For Tanabe, “metanoetics is more than a mere exercise carried out in the realms of abstract thought,”264 because, since the “self-affirm-ing ego” is “cause of all conflict among people,” this conversion opens the way for a realm of “absolute peace,” where all people help “one an-other in a spirit of reconciliation and cooperation.”265 Further, he spells out on the basis of the idea of “returning to this world from the Pure Land” (gens ek ), taken to represent “the ideal of the compassionate way of the Bodhisattva in Mah y na Buddhism,” a “distinctive theory of religious society established on the ideal of ‘fraternity’.”266 The ideal of a “horizontal fellowship” was seen by Tanabe as having been clearly af-firmed by Shinran in the Tannish , when, against the “authoritarian teacher-disciple relationship,” the latter states that he “had not a single disciple.”267 Again, according to Tanabe, this is the way in which meta-

260 Tanabe, 1986: li. 261 Tanabe, 1986: li. See also Tanabe, 1986: 5. 262 See, for example, Ueda, 1990; Unno, 1990; and Heisig, 2001: 323. Cf. Tanabe, 1986: lii. 263 Tanabe, 1986: li, 4. 264 Tanabe, 1986: lv. 265 Tanabe, 1986: lxii. 266 Tanabe, 1986: lv. 267 Tanabe, 1986: lxii.


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noetics, as the “philosophy of Other-power,” can overcome the “deficien-cies of individualism” and realize responsibility in “social solidarity.”268

While Tanabe was still cautious of what he called the “‘in-itself’ ten-dency” of Zen and its risk of “falling prey to unmediated self-identity,”269 the case is quite different from that of other writers who mainly focused on Zen Buddhism, or rather, on its intellectualized form.270 One thinks here of Suzuki Daisetsu (1870-1966) and the leading expo-nents of the Ky to School, Nishida Kitar (1870-1945) and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990), whose reflections upon Shin Bud-dhism continue nonetheless to exercise a certain influence on the current doctrinal debate.

Among these thinkers, Suzuki Daisetsu maintained for decades a close connection with tani University, among other things working on the English translation of the Ky gy shinsh , He was also the founder of the

tani-ha-related The Eastern Buddhist Society. According to Suzuki, whose main interest remained in the field of Zen Buddhism, 271 the “Jiriki” aspect of Zen and the “Tariki” aspect of Shin Buddhism are like two “extremes” which meet in “saying ‘yes’” to “the kaleidoscopic changes of the objective world.”272 They both differ, though, in their fun-damental attitude towards the “Other,” which in Shin Buddhism is char-acterized by the prominence of the “affective or emotional.”273

Kiyozawa’s words seem to resound in Suzuki’s affirmation that, though “we cannot reach religion by means of morality,”274 “we must strive, exhausting all our efforts to cross the stream by ourselves,”275 so as to acquire religious consciousness. This is accompanied by a clear dis-tinction between the domain of “morality” which is still permeated by self-power, and that of “religion” which “belongs in a higher order of

268 Tanabe, 1986: li, lvi-lviii. Cf. Tanabe, 1986: 290-291. 269 Tanabe, 1986: 171. 270 Cf. Sharf, 1995: 43. 271 See also the assessments of contemporaries like Soga Ry jin and Kaneko Daiei, in Suzuki and Soga, 1994: 88, 91, 95; and Takemura, 2002: 132-133. 272 The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 96-97. 273 See The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 28, 97. See also Suzuki, 1972: 21, 77. 274 The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 150. See also Suzuki, 1970: 84-85. 275 Suzuki, 1990: 2. See also The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 150-151.


meaning or values.”276 Suzuki, while stressing that aspect of Shin Bud-dhism which is seemingly more congenial to Zen, that is, the non-dis-criminative stance beyond good and evil,277 was also eager to clarify that this did not imply that morality did not have “its own function to perform in human society” or that moral laxity should be justified.278 Rather, the meaning of the “doctrine of non-ego” which is implied by other-power is that, it “aims at morally fortifying ourselves against undue attachments to things not really worth while clinging to,” and allows the “awakening of karuõ heart which is the Buddha-heart itself.”279

At the same time, in the various writings on Shin Buddhism by Suzuki, there does not appear to be a great deal of emphasis on the equalitarian dimension of the Pure Land path, or on the critical dimension of Shin-ran’s teachings. Indeed they are also weakened in the final analysis through their reference to an implicit “Japanese spirituality.”280 Rather, the central place in Suzuki’s reflections seems often to be occupied by the stress on what he terms the ‘yes’ attitude towards the world, which is re-flected by his interest, as has been noted by Galen Amstutz, for the sim-plicity and piousness of the my k nin, whom Suzuki considers to be the true followers of Shin Buddhism.281

The significance of Nishitani Keiji’s contribution to the current debate on Shin Buddhist ethics lies especially in his reflections on the “problem of time” in Shinran’s thought.282 Nishitani’s approach consists essentially in a reappraisal of Shinran’s understanding of the complementarity of saüs ra and nirv õa, as expressed in the concept of “the stage of the Truly Settled,” from the point of view of what he calls “simultaneity,” that is, “the synthesis of time and eternity.”283 According to Nishitani,

276 The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 148, 150, 153. 277 See, for example, Suzuki, 1990: 5-6. 278 See The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 150. 279 See The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 149, 156. 280 Suzuki, 1972: 20. 281 See Amstutz, 1997c: 74-84. See also The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1973: 78, 96. My k nin is the name by which ‘saintly people’ have come to be known in the Shin Buddhist tradition, one of their prototypes being D sh of Akao, a disciple of Rennyo. See Rogers and Rogers, 1991: 264, 291-293. 282 See Nishitani, 1978. 283 Nishitani, 1978: 18, 24-25.


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since the stage of the truly settled “consists precisely in the emerging presence of this simultaneity,” it follows that in shinjin, “the Pure Land which is always the future is also the present, without ceasing to be the future.” 284 The inextricability of Amida’s Vow from “the actual existence of the person who, while bearing his own karma in some particular age and place, is living entangled in passion and desire,”285 is also expressed by Nishitani through direct reference to the language of Mah y na, when he affirms that

immanence in the world and transcendence of the World—in Buddhist terms, “the principle of the profane” (zokutai) and “the principle of truth” (shintai)—come to conform mutually in simultaneity.286

This seems to have indirectly opened a way, in certain respects, for a re-thinking of the role of the bodhisattva’s compassion in this life.

With regard to Nishida Kitar , his interest in the Pure Land teachings is significantly reflected by the fact that both in the last part of his semi-nal work, Zen no kenky (A Study of Good, 1911),287 and in his final essay Bashoteki ronri to sh ky teki sekaikan

(The Logic of Place and the Religious Worldview, 1945),288 spe-cific references are made to Shin Buddhism, suggesting a link between the life of faith and life in society. Also Nishida maintained that Zen and Shin Buddhism hold essentially the same views in their tendency to “self negation,” and that “religion does not necessarily take morality as its medium.”289 Rather, “true moral practice” is grounded in “true individual-ity,” where the self transcends itself.290 That is, the reliance on the other-power of Amida through abandoning any self-effort is the prelude to an “absolute dynamism,” which is manifested in the “I and the Thou becom-

284 Nishitani, 1978: 24. 285 Nishitani, 1978: 23. 286 Nishitani, 1978: 23. 287 See Nishida, 1960. 288 See Nishida, 1987: 47-123. 289 Nishida, 1987: 79-80. 290 Nishida, 1987: 111.


ing one” and in “mutual love and respect.”291 That Nishida had in mind, despite his references to Shinran and Amida Buddha, an intellectualized and decontextualized form of Shin Buddhism, is however testified not only by his claim that other-power, from which morality and learning both emerge,292 is a feature of any true religion—since, for him, what is essential to the religious life is “the effort of self-negation”293—but also by his reference to Shinran’s thought, like in the case of Suzuki, as a real-ization of an underlying “Japanese spirit.”294 Equally problematical is Nishida’s claim that “the nation is the fountainhead of morality” and “the mirror image of the Pure Land in this world.”295 This casts a shadow, not least because of the historical circumstances of its formulation, in the last stages of World War II, not only over his affirmation that “this corrupt world reflects the Pure Land, and the Pure Land reflects this corrupt world,”296 but also, on a more general level, over his understanding of the meaning of Mah y na compassion.

291 Nishida, 1987: 101-102. Cf. Nishida, 1987: 107; and Nishida, 1960: 186: “Our loving a thing means our casting aside the self and merging with the other.” 292 See Nishida, 1960: 188. 293 Nishida, 1987: 80. See also Nishida, 1960: 188-189. 294 Nishida, 1987: 102, 112. 295 Nishida, 1987: 122-123. 296 Nishida, 1987: 123.

Chapter 2 __________________________________________________ The Doctrinal Foundations of Social Ethics inContemporary Shin Buddhism The characteristic configuration assumed by the Pure Land teachings in Shin Buddhism, with its drastic approach to the issue of religious libera-tion in terms of a complete renunciation of self-power (jiriki ) and calculations (hakarai ) has rendered difficult the use of norma-tive language to connect the dimension of other-power (tariki ) to the everyday social practice of the believers. This difficulty may be said to derive from the thought of Shinran himself.

Although in Shinran’s writings it is possible on the one hand to find clear reference to the position that the ethical life of the nenbutsu practi-tioners cannot be conceived outside the framework provided by Mah y -na teachings,1 on the other hand there is also a strong emphasis on the impossibility, from the standpoint of shinjin , to truly know good and evil, and on the position that good acts cannot in themselves provide access to birth in the Pure Land.2 What is found in the writings of the founder of Shin Buddhism is indeed both a delicate and problematical balance, which represents, in a sense, a challenge posed to the future community of Shin Buddhist practitioners up to the present day.3 This

1 See Chapter One. 2 See, for example, the Tannish , in CWS I: 663, 668, 679; and SSZ II: 775-776, 779, 792; the Matt sh , in CWS I: 525; and SSZ II: 659; and the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 413, 414, 421, 429; and SSZ II: 523, 524, 527, 531. 3 The centrality of this issue for Shin Buddhism has already been indicated by others. See,


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challenge has been made more difficult, throughout the historical devel-opment of Japanese Buddhism, by the strong role assumed by Confucian values in the general frame of reference for social relations and moral standards,4 and by the emergence of the Honganji, later to split into Nishi and Higashi, as a huge institution responsible for mediating the needs of its organizational structure and, in the worldly arena, of a multitude of followers all over Japan.

The above-mentioned intricacy, inherent in the articulation of the ethi-cal discourse within Shin Buddhism, emerges with great clarity in a re-cent contribution to the debate offered by the tani University professor, Kigoshi Yasushi .5 Kigoshi admits that there is some hesitancy, in Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies, in addressing directly the issue of reli-gious “practice” (jissen ),6 and the link between the practitioner and society. As an attempt to clarify the subject, he distinguishes “practice as cause” (in to shite no jissen ), and “practice as effect” (ka to shite no jissen ).7 Concerning practice as “cause,” he points out that for Shinran, as is evident from many passages and notably from his reference to jinen in the Yuishinsh mon’i, the “spontane-ous working” of the Vow, whose transformative action takes place “with-out the practicer’s calculating in any way whatsoever” (gy sha no haji-mete tomokaku mo hakarawazaru ni

), has the meaning of freeing oneself from calculations (hakarai), that is, from the mind of self-power.8 And in this sense, for Kigoshi, no kind of practice is prescribed.9 As regards the second point, he argues that, when practice is considered as “effect,” that is, as the result of “attain-ment” or “realization” (sh ), and as a new subjective approach to life

for example, James Dobbins’ affirmation that the history of Shin Buddhism itself could be “construed to be an attempt to explicate the meaning of faith as manifested in thought and action.” Dobbins, 2002: 62. 4 Cf. Collcutt, 1991; and Kasulis, 1990. 5 tani University ( tani Daigaku ), which is located in Ky to, is affiliated with the tani-ha. 6 The term jissen is widely used to indicate the ‘actual practice’ of a religious path and in some cases may presuppose ‘self-power’ which of course is not intended in the Shin Bud-dhist context. 7 Kigoshi, 2002: 16. 8 Kigoshi, 2002: 17-18. Cf. CWS I: 453; and SS: 548. 9 See Kigoshi, 2002: 21.

2. The Doctrinal Foundations of Social Ethics 81

based on faith,10 there is no clear indication in Shinran’s works about the practice of the Shin Buddhist follower. According to Kigoshi, this aspect is apparent for example in the passage of the Tannish , where Shinran’s claim that he knew “nothing at all of good or evil” (zen’aku no futatsu s -jite motte zonji sezaru nari ) can be found.11

Thus, Kigoshi’s conclusion is that for Shinran, as later for Kiyozawa Manshi, tariki or other-power was a “peace beyond ethics” (rinri ij no an’i ) related to the realm of non-discrimination.12 How-ever, for Kigoshi, none of this implies a lack of interest in society on the part of the believers,13 and he stresses, following Yasuda Rijin, the cen-trality of the community of the nenbutsu practitioners (sanga ), which, as the embodiment of Amida’s Vow in socio-historical reality,14 involves the opening up of “togetherness” (warera ), 15 and a shared sense of fellowship.16 From this example, it is clear how the em-phasis placed on the avoidance of a descriptive ethics does not necessar-ily entail the renunciation of all claims to the presence of an ethical di-mension inherent in Shin Buddhist teachings.

That Shin Buddhism is not, in principle, synonymous with the promo-tion of a passive attitude towards society, has been recently argued by various Shin Buddhist writers, often as a reaction to statements made by other commentators. This has been the case, for example, of Shigaraki Takamaro’s account of various criticisms referring to the lack, in Shinran’s teachings, of a solid connection between shinjin and action in the midst of society. Examples of such criticisms are those presented by Tsuda S kichi, Kat Sh ichi, and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, and their weakness is related by Shigaraki himself to an undue focus on the aspect

10 Kigoshi, 2002: 16. 11 Kigoshi, 2002: 19. Cf. CWS I: 679; and SS: 640. 12 Kigoshi, 2002: 20. 13 See Kigoshi, 2002: 31. 14 See Kigoshi, 1998: 58-61. 15 Kigoshi, 1991: 50. Literally ‘us.’ 16 Kigoshi, 2002: 21.


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of “returning” (gens ).17 The tani-ha scholar, Yasutomi Shin’ya , has criticized the claim made by the historian Bit Masahide

that there is in Shinran a lack of historical consciousness, which is a con-sequence of Buddhists’ general understanding of society as an aggregate of individuals in need of salvation. Against this he sets Shinran’s rejec-tion of monastic Buddhism and his adoption of the life of the house-holder.18 Yasutomi has also argued that the tendency to define Shin Bud-dhism as a “do-nothing religion,” because of the lack of precepts and self-power practices, is contradicted by the evidence itself if one takes into ac-count, for example, the active presence of Shin Buddhism in society, es-pecially in the educational sphere.19 Other Shin Buddhist thinkers have pointed out that the idea of a passive attitude of Shin Buddhism towards society comes from a mistaken understanding of the concept of other-power. Tokunaga Michio , for example, has suggested that this attitude is rooted in the emphasis which has been traditionally put on shinjin as a means to arrive at birth in the Pure Land after death.20 Honda Hiroyuki , and Ama Toshimaro , have similarly ques-tioned the influence of past doctrinal approaches where other-power is depicted as a form of self-surrender.21

While there seems to be a large consensus, in the contemporary debate on Shin Buddhism and society, that the teachings carry some implications for the life of the nenbutsu practitioner also at the ethical level, what is notable is the variety of ways through which contemporary Shin Buddhist thinkers have—though in some cases only incidentally—expressed this idea, resorting to a wide range of doctrinal points, while trying to remain within the limits posed by adherence to the teaching of other-power.

17 See Shigaraki, 1992: 219-221, 245. Shigaraki Takamaro is the former president of Ry koku University (Ry koku Daigaku ) in Ky to, which is affiliated with the Honganji-ha. 18 See Yasutomi, 1996: 159-160. 19 Yasutomi, 2002: 12. 20 See Tokunaga, 1989: 15-16. Tokunaga Michio belongs, like Shigaraki Takamaro, to the Honganji-ha. 21 See Honda H., 1996: 25; and Ama, 2001: 38. On the same point, see also Inoue, 2001: 78; and Tanaka and Nasu, 1998a: xiii. Honda Hiroyuki is the director of the tani-ha’s Center for Shin Buddhist Studies (Shinran Bukky Sent ) located in T ky , while Ama Toshimaro is a professor emeritus at Meiji Gakuin University in T -ky who is close to the tani-ha circle.


In this regard, the complexity of the debate notwithstanding, it is pos-sible to differentiate a few selected themes, reference to which continues to characterize relevant parts of the ongoing discussions. Given the huge amount of related material which has been published over the last few decades, any claim to exhaustiveness would be inappropriate. The aim of the following sections is instead to describe and analyse, thematically, some of the main trends and attitudes which are most visible in the recent debate on Shin Buddhist ethics.

ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF BIRTH

Many Shin Buddhist scholars, before Tokunaga Michio, have called at-tention to the shortcomings of the understanding of the Pure Land as an afterdeath abode, and of shinjin as the way to gain access to it. More of-ten than not, rather than the clarification of ethical issues, the affirmation of the spiritual dimension of the Shin Buddhist teachings together with their soteriological value for the individual have occupied a central posi-tion, often in relation to the core problems of Mah y na Buddhism. It is interesting to note, however, the relevance that this discourse also carries for the definition of the believers’ practice within the Shin Buddhist con-text.

Broadly speaking, this theme is often related within the tani-ha to the legacy of Kiyozawa Manshi, who, from his standpoint that “We do not believe in gods or Buddha because they exist,” but “Gods and Buddha exist because we believe in them,”22 gave a strong impulse to the demy-thologization of the concept of the Pure Land, further developed by other Shin Buddhist thinkers like Kaneko Daiei and Soga Ry jin.23 Among the Honganji-ha scholars, however, stress is often placed upon the non-dual-istic dimension of the Mah y na teachings. Significant here is the influ-ence of philosophers such us Nishida Kitar and Nishitani Keiji, and,

22 Kiyozawa, 1936: 42. See also tani Daigaku, 2003: 284. 23 A concurrent, but far less influential, approach to the demythologization of the concept of Pure Land within the Honganji-ha, is found in the writings of Nonomura Naotar

, who published his J doky hihan (Critique of Pure Land Bud-dhism) in 1923. See, for example, Futaba, 1988: 53; and Kigoshi, 2003. For a brief sum-mary of the role of Kaneko Daiei and Soga Ry jin within modern doctrinal studies, to-gether with a selection from their contributions, see Yokoyama, 1995: 123-154. See also Yasutomi, 1999a.


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more recently, of the interpretations of distinctive Shin Buddhist doctrinal tenets offered by Ueda Yoshifumi.24

An interesting example of the ethical implications of the understand-ing of the concept of birth in the Pure Land ( j ), is the authorita-tive discussion provided by Terakawa Shunsh , one of the leading scholars within the tani-ha, concerning the concept of gansh j do . Following the interpretation of the Pure Land elaborated by modern doctrinal studies, and especially by Soga Ry jin, Terakawa assumes that, for Shinran, the Pure Land was not understood in a substan-tial way, as a place to which one may transmigrate after death,25 even though he did not accordingly consider this world itself to be the Pure Land.26 Thus, for Terakawa, Shin Buddhism, though it has been mistak-enly considered a path to attain birth in the next life, should be interpreted as a “path of life in the Pure Land of the Vow” (gansh j do),27 which means that birth in the Pure Land is the way of living in this world that follows the attainment of shinjin. For him, this is unequivocally stated by Shinran, for example, in the passage of the Ichinen tanen mon’i, where “the meaning” of attaining birth is described as the establishment in the “stage of the truly settled” (sh j ju ), at the very moment when the practitioner is grasped by Amida’s compassion.28 At the ethical level, there are various implications in Terakawa’s claim that gansh j do is the life in faith which is the purport of the stage of the truly settled. In fact, not only does it arise from the desire to actualize the virtues of the Pure Land,29 but also implies that one thereafter does not revert to a life of delusion, but can live according to the truth, even in the midst of the pas-sions of this world.30 Still more significant, however, is Terakawa’s affir-mation that this is a life where, as expressed by Shinran in the Ky gy -shinsh , all nenbutsu practitioners “within the four seas are brothers and sisters” (sore shikai no uchi mina ky dai to suru nari

24 See also Dobbins, 2004: 70-71. 25 See Terakawa, 1993: 13. 26 See Terakawa, 1994: 24; and Terakawa, 1993: 6. 27 See Terakawa, 1994: 14; and Terakawa, 1996: 156-157. 28 See Terakawa, 2002: 23; Terakawa, 1997: 5-6; Terakawa, 1996: 153; and Terakawa, 1994: 15. Cf. CWS I: 475; and SS: 535. 29 See Terakawa, 1994: 26; and Terakawa, 1993: 10-11. 30 See Terakawa, 1996: 163; and Terakawa, 1993: 11.


),31 and, as exemplified by Kiyozawa Manshi, faith be-comes the premise for activity, revealing itself as a dynamic awareness which orients the practitioner towards “avoiding evil and doing good.”32 A similar position is expressed by Hirose Takashi’s affirmation that “rebirth” in the Pure Land is the overcoming of one’s self-centred at-titude,33 and that the concept of futaiten (“the stage of non-ret-rogression”) illustrates the point of view according to which life is “the Buddha Way itself.”34 Hirose too, like Terakawa, stresses the positive and active dimension of a life in shinjin, and, furthermore, its deep relation-ship with love and magnanimity.35

The rejection of the understanding of the Pure Land as a substantial entity, with the consequent view of other-power as something coming from the outside, is also emphasized by the above-mentioned writer Hon-da Hiroyuki.36 Honda values the contribution presented by Soga Ry jin, who developed Kiyozawa Manshi’s ideas on the relationship between the Tath gata and the self, and finds an emblematical testimony of his at-tempt to overcome a passive understanding of other-power in the affir-mation “Die in faith and live in the Vow.”37 Also for Honda, other-power, far from being a self-surrender and an unquestioning acceptance of the world, means “the death of self-power” and of the “deluded self,” which provide the starting point for the “autonomous” and “active self,” so as to “recover a truly positive meaning to human life.”38

Reference to Soga’s approach to “the dynamic aspect of faith,” with reference to the shift from the idea of Shin Buddhism as “grace-ism” and dualism, is also made by Yasutomi Shin’ya. He argues, in fact, that one of the most important aspects of Soga’s legacy lies in his clarification of the

31 See Terakawa, 2002: 27-28; Terakawa, 1996: 176; and Terakawa, 1994: 26. Cf. CWS I: 155; and SS: 282. Shinran’s quotation is from Tanluan’s j -ronch . 32 See Terakawa, 1994: 20-21. 33 See Hirose, 1989a: 111. 34 Hirose, 1989a: 106. 35 See Hirose, 1989a: 108-110. Hirose Takashi is, like Terakawa Shunsh , a former presi-dent of tani University. 36 See Honda H., 1996: 19. 37 Honda H., 1996: 22-25. For Soga’s expression (“shin ni shi shite gan ni ikiyo

”) see Soga, 1964: 283. 38 Honda H., 1996: 25.


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meaning of shinjin not only as a “firm personal belief” (anjin ), but also “as the participation of each nembutsu believer in the historical de-velopment of Amida’s Primal Vow.” 39 The meaning of all this, for Yasu-tomi, is that it is possible to “realize the Pure Land in a mundane worldly life by relying on shinjin” and in the consequent death of the ego, a view that he finds expressed by Soga through the aforementioned motto, “die in shinjin and live in the Vow.”40

A further link between Soga’s thought and the believers’ practice is suggested by the tani-ha scholar, Tamamitsu Junsh .41 Tama-mitsu, who refers to ‘birth’ as a “continuous spiritual liberation in the present moment,”42 suggests that an indication of an approach to the Pure Land not only as a reality inside the believer, that is, as a means to intro-spection, but also as openness to the world, can be found in Soga’s treat-ment of the subject of Amida’s transference of merits (ek ), and in his af-firmation that “individual life is in the going aspect and social life is in the returning aspect” (kojin no seikatsu wa s de aru, dantai seikatsu wa gens de aru ). In this regard, Tamamitsu argues that this intuition unfortunately has not become a relevant doctrinal theme as of yet.43

Ichiraku Makoto , also from the tani-ha, affirms that for Shinran, who had in mind Tanluan’s interpretation of the Pure Land, birth was not related to another world, but rather to a turning-point in one’s life from self-power to Amida’s power.44 Like Terakawa Ichiraku refers to the idea of gansh j do, in connection with the stage of the truly settled (sh j ju),45 as the basis for the practical conduct of the believers. He also argues that the significance of this concept is further emphasized by Shin-ran in the Ky gy shinsh in his treatment of the ten benefits in the pres-ent life, where sh j ju is listed, as a component of the lifestyle of the

39 See Yasutomi, 1999a: 37-38; and Yasutomi, 2000: 109. 40 Yasutomi, 2002: 17. 41 See Tamamitsu, 2004a: 4. Tamamitsu Junsh is the former head of the tani-ha Research Institute for Doctrinal Studies (Shinsh tani-ha Ky gaku Kenky sho

). 42 Tamamitsu, 2002: 9. 43 See Tamamitsu, 2004a: 5-6. 44 See Ichiraku, 1999: 55; and Ichiraku, 2001: 9, 11, 13. 45 See Ichiraku, 2001: 2, 13.


practitioner, as the tenth “benefit of entering the stage of the truly settled” (ny sh j ju no yaku ).46 On this basis, Ichiraku claims that birth in the Pure Land is the true realization of the Buddhist way in the midst of existence, where liberation from suffering is accompanied by a clear view of the problems of this world.47 And although he maintains, similarly to Kigoshi, that it is not the task of doctrinal studies to articulate a prescriptive Shin Buddhist ethics,48 he also affirms that it is still possi-ble to find a suggestion, on the basis of Shinran’s gansh j do, for an adequate way of living for the practitioner.49

Another example of the ethical implications of the contemporary dis-course on birth in the Pure Land is provided by the writings of another

tani-ha scholar, Ogawa Ichij . Ogawa affirms that birth in the Pure Land does not imply going to another world after death,50 but rather that, by means of the “other-power’s compassion” (tariki no jihi

), we can awaken to the interrelatedness of birth and life, and to the empty nature of the self.51 This is, for him, the standpoint from which it is possible to benefit other sentient beings, following genuinely the compassion of the Pure Land path, as explained in the Tannish , where Shinran’s reference to the possibility of “freely benefiting sentient be-ings” (shuj o riyaku suru ) is found.52 Therefore, Ogawa claims, it also provides the basis for a true “life” (inochi ), which is ex-emplified by the experience of the my k nin Asahara Saichi.53

The Honganji-ha writer Ueda Yoshifumi (d. 1993) has ex-erted, through his interpretation of Shinran’s “two meanings of birth,” a considerable influence on the contemporary debate on Shin Buddhist eth-ics. Ueda distinguished between birth occurring “at the moment of death,” and “at the moment one realizes shinjin,” and argued that, when these two aspects of birth are considered within the framework of the

46 See Ichiraku, 2001: 14; and Ichiraku, 1999: 56. Cf. CWS I: 112; and SS: 241. 47 See Ichiraku, 2001: 14; and Ichiraku, 1999: 58. 48 In this connection Ichiraku refers to Shinran’s claim that he knew “nothing at all of good or evil.” Cf. CWS I: 679; and SS: 640. 49 See Ichiraku, 2001: 2. 50 See Ogawa, 2002c: 148; and Ogawa, 2002b: 167. 51 See Ogawa, 2002c: 218; and Ogawa, 2002b: 167. 52 Ogawa, 2002c: 219, 222. Cf. CWS I: 663; and SS: 628. 53 See Ogawa, 2000: 37, 85-86.


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overall Mah y na tradition, they can be seen as an expression of the iden-tity of saüs ra and nirv õa.54 Thus, Pure Land Buddhism, far from in-volving a linear process towards birth through the negation of this world, presents a structure of transformation typical of Mah y na Buddhism,55 where the significance of religious liberation, that is, transcending saü-s ra, is something to be found in the present, being the eternal “one with the world of impermanence.”56 In this respect, Ueda also made reference to Nishitani’s treatment of the structure of the one thought-moment (ichi-nen ), where it is argued that the course of time for a person of shinjin is not merely linear.57

The principal implication of this discourse from an ethical point of view is that, according to Ueda, shinjin involves a radical transformation, through which, as stated by Shinran in the Yuishinsh mon’i, the prac-titioner is “turned into gold,”58 that is, one naturally receives Amida’s wisdom and virtue,59 is liberated from blind passions, and is led to a vital and positive life.60 For Ueda, Shinran’s statements found in the Tannish , “I know nothing of what is good or evil,”61 and “entrusting yourself to the Primal Vow requires no performance of good,”62 do not imply the rejec-tion of morality. In fact, Ueda claims on the one hand that exerting one-self to reach one’s limits makes it possible to reject self-power and to “enter the mind of Amida,”63 and on the other hand that the fundamental standpoint of Buddhism, “not to do evil but practice good and purify the mind,” in the case of the other-power teaching of Shinran, is “accom-plished without consciousness of any ethical imperative but as the result of a sense of humility and the natural working of Amida’s Primal Vow.”64

54 See Ueda, 1984b: 30; and Ueda, 1984a: 71. 55 See Ueda, 1984a: 60. 56 Ueda, 1984b: 36-37. See also Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 169-173. 57 See Ueda, 1986: 91-92. 58 Ueda, 1985: 23. Cf. CWS I: 459; and SSZ II: 629. 59 See Ueda, 1985: 23. 60 See Ueda, 1986: 87-88. 61 Cf. CWS I: 679; and SSZ II: 792. 62 Cf. CWS I: 661; and SSZ II: 773. 63 See Ueda, 1985: 23. 64 Ueda, 1990: 135.


Also, in great agreement with Ueda is, for example, Murakami Soku-sui , when he claims that Shinran’s concept of birth, though not implying the attainment of enlightenment in the present life as in the Path of the Sages, does not simply indicate the afterlife.65 That is, the Pure Land is not something that exists only in the future and has nothing to do with our present lives, but rather, when realized in shinjin, it is present in the “now.”66

Another influential scholar within the Honganji-ha, Futaba Kenk (d. 1995), has argued that, although in Shinran’s writings it is

possible to trace the idea of “rebirth” in the Pure Land after death,67 its true meaning was for him the realization, through shinjin, of the true mind free of ego-centredness, and the identification with Amida’s com-passion, which does not need “to wait for rebirth in the Pure Land in the after-life.”68 Takeda Ry sei , also from the Honganji-ha, though admitting that there is also “a linear aspect to the idea of birth,” has indi-cated in this regard that any understanding of birth in the Pure Land as a matter for the afterlife can provide no meaningful framework for modern religious sensibility.69

Dennis Hirota, who has co-authored an introduction to Shinran’s thought with Ueda,70 and has been the head translator of the Shin Bud-dhism Translation Series published by the Honganji-ha, similarly claims that the Pure Land cannot be conceived as a final abode. Like Ueda, he believes that the fundamental aspect of the Pure Land path consists in “an existential Mahayanic awakening to nonduality,”71 a dimension in which the practitioner acquires “a new awareness of the self” and can positively be involved in everyday life.72 According to Hirota, the transcendence of good and evil along the Pure Land path does not involve the acceptance of the world as it is, as “morally homogeneous.”73 In fact, the overcoming

65 See Murakami So., 2001: 17. 66 See Murakami So., 2001: 16, 18. Also Murakami Sokusui belongs to the Honganji-ha. 67 Futaba, 1988: 51-52. 68 Futaba, 1988: 54. 69 See Takeda, 2000: 32. 70 See Ueda and Hirota, 1989. 71 Hirota, 2000c: 164. See also Ueda and Hirota, 1989: 169-173. 72 See Hirota, 1991: 20; and Hirota, 2000b: 42. 73 Hirota, 2000b: 66.


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of the reified self opens the way for a stronger sense of solidarity with other beings, and of gratitude for the realization that one’s life is the place of Amida’s compassion.74 Thus, the abandonment of self-power does not mean that no positive action can be performed. Rather, compassionate acts can then arise “naturally and inevitably” (jinen ), and the dis-covery of a dimension where one is not possessed by blind passions any more, as implied by Shinran’s “revulsion at worldliness” (yo o itou

), becomes possible.75 The relevance of the discourse on birth for the ethical sphere is also

evident in mine Akira’s writings.76 mine refers to Shinran’s words in the Matt sh , that “at the moment that shinjin is settled, one’s birth is settled,” to affirm that the meaning of birth is not to go to the Pure Land after death, but to live truly in this world.77 The settlement of shin-jin (shinjin ketsuj ) is, for mine, the experience of encounter-ing the “eternal now” as discussed by Nishida, which surpasses any linear conception of time and life,78 implying an active dynamism within sam-saric existence.79 According to mine, the idea that the Pure Land ac-tively works in this world is also expressed by Shinran’s reference to a “constant coming and going” between the present world and the Pure Land, that is, to the “great circulating current” of the Tath gata mani-fested in the aspect of “going” ( s ek ) and “returning” (gens ek ).80 mine claims that when one participates in this current of life through shinjin, it is possible to approach this world, by discarding one’s ego and calculations, in a positive way.81 And, since the idea of the mutual relationship between “benefiting oneself” and “benefit-

74 See Hirota, 2000b: 66; and Hirota, 2000c: 179. 75 Hirota, 2000c: 180. Cf. CWS I: 551, 554; and SSZ II: 688, 691. 76 mine Akira is the head of the Honganji-ha’s Shin Buddhist Centre for Doctrinal Studies (J do Shinsh Ky gaku Kenky sho ).77 See mine, 1993: 14-15, 92; mine, 2000: 14, 16; and mine, 1999: 52. See also CWS I: 523; and SSZ II: 656. 78 See mine, 1999: 57; and mine, 1993: 15-19. 79 See mine, 2000: 14-15; and mine, 1999: 52. 80 See mine, 2000: 19. 81 See mine, 1993: 18-19, 93, 102; and mine, 2000: 19-20.


ing others” (jiri rita ) is expressed here, the social dimension, the relationship to others, is also necessarily involved in this process.82

In addition to the aforementioned response by Shigaraki Takamaro to various kinds of criticism concerning the lack of social consciousness in Shin Buddhism, the notion of birth is significantly connected by him to the practitioners’ active presence in society. According to Shigaraki, in fact, it is not in the aspect of ‘returning’ that it is possible to find the basis for social action, but in the aspect of directing one’s life towards birth in the Pure Land, an approach which he found exemplified in Nishida’s statement that the character of social action is “to reflect the Pure Land in this world.”83

In the case of Tokunaga Michio, the understanding of shinjin as a means to achieve birth in the Pure Land after death has been put in rela-tion to a passive approach to other-power and society. For Tokunaga, the realization of shinjin is accompanied, according to Shinran’s concept of sokutoku j , by “immediate birth” in the Pure Land, which surpasses, as argued also by other authors, any reference to linear time.84 Moreover shinjin, Tokunaga argues, implies the appreciation on the part of the practitioner, now “equal to Buddhas,”85 of the compassion which is the working of Amida—a sign that one is following the bodhisattva path86—and opens up the way for a horizontal relationship to others in daily life.87 A similar view is expressed by Ishida H y , also from the Honganji-ha, for whom the notions of the past, the present, and the future are “merely concepts,” and that existential time is in the “here and now” of one’s realization, whose qualities are wisdom and compas-sion, that is, the essence of the bodhisattva ideal.88

A common feature of the positions expressed by these contemporary Shin Buddhist scholars is the strong affirmation of the significance of the idea of birth ( j ) for the present life of the believers. Admittedly, this

82 See mine, 1993: 103. 83 Shigaraki, 1992: 245. For the problematical nature of Nishida’s statement, see, however, Chapter One. 84 See Tokunaga, 1989: 22-23. Cf. CWS I: 79, 475; and SSZ II: 48, 605. 85 Cf. CWS I: 532; and SSZ II: 667. 86 See Tokunaga, 1989: 26-27. 87 See Tokunaga, 1993: 44-45. 88 See Ishida, 2002: 99, 115, 123.


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represents a reaction to past other-worldly representations of the Pure Land, and operates within the framework of the process of demythol-ogization which is ascribable to modern Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies, and to the reappraisal of the Mah y na structure of Shinran’s thought with related implications of the identity between saüs ra and nirv õa. Although the main concern of these doctrinal approaches is not the clari-fication of the ethical dimension of the teachings, but rather of the soteri-ological one, they carry at the same time profound implications for the characterization of the behaviour of the practitioners. In fact, the assump-tion that the Pure Land is immanent in the present world, makes the prac-titioners (at least those who accept this) responsible for finding at some level, in the present, an appropriate way to connect the meaning of their religious commitment with instances and problems of social life.

In the examples illustrated above, the understanding of birth is associ-ated with the realization of shinjin, which is generally assumed to provide access to a deeper appreciation of everyday life and human relations. The distinctive character of shinjin, and its centrality for the ethical life of the practitioner, has been variously investigated, especially with reference to passages of Shinran’s writings, where the relation between entrusting faith and moral action seems to appear in a clearer way. Indeed, this focus characterizes a noticeable part of the contemporary debate on Shin Bud-dhist ethics to which reference will be made in the following section.

SHINJIN AND MORALITY

An interesting example of the contemporary use of doctrinal sources be-ing related to shinjin in order to clarify aspects of the conduct of the nen-butsu practitioner, is provided by the Honganji-ha scholar, Asai J kai

, whose discussion assumes a distinctive significance because it is also substantially related to the position formally expressed by the Hon-ganji-ha head priest (monshu ) in November 2000, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the foundation of the D b Und (Fellow Companions’ Movement).89 On that occasion, emphasis was laid on the social dimension of shinjin as opposed to those “abstract” doctrinal interpretations according to which faith alone is sufficient to put an end to

89 For the role of the D b movement within both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, see especially Chapter Three.


the practical reality of discrimination within society.90 And, for Asai, a reappraisal of the meaning that shinjin had for Shinran is indeed neces-sary in order to counter traditionally mistaken interpretations.91 Asai, who stresses the affinity of Shin Buddhism’s approach with the Mah y na idea of the “inextricability of benefiting oneself and benefiting others” (jiri soku rita ),92 affirms that the “sociality of shinjin” (shin-jin no shakaisei ) emerges, for example, from the idea of practising “great compassion” (daihi ), included by Shinran within the ten benefits acquired by the practitioner in the present life, which carries the meaning of “sharing one’s faith with others” (jishin ky ninshin

).93 Moreover, he claims—similarly to other positions ex-pressed in the previous section—that for Shinran the “mind that seeks to attain Buddhahood in the Pure Land” (j do no daibodaishin

) is such that, once one attains the state of the truly settled, it be-comes possible, thanks to the working of Amida’s compassion, to “ben-efit sentient beings boundlessly” (riyaku uj wa kiwa mo nashi

).94 Shigaraki Takamaro has pointed out that for Shinran, as is stated in

the Ky gy shinsh , life in shinjin means aspiring to save sentient beings, a development of the bodhisattva path within the Mah y na tradition. 95 This feature is also clear, for Shigaraki, from Shinran’s mentioning of the benefit of practising great compassion in the present life.96 Although this ability is limited, because of human nature, it means that it is really possi-ble, while living this life, not only to guide other people to the Buddhist teachings, but, in a broader sense, also to help them in concrete ways.97 This can also be seen, for example, from Shinran’s call for “prayers for the world” (yo no inori ni kokoro irete ), and

90 See Asai, 2000: 81. 91 See Asai, 2000: 10. 92 See Asai, 2000: 5, 66. 93 Asai, 2000: 7-8, 49-50. Cf. the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 119-120; and JSS II: 260-261. 94 Asai, 2000: 71-72. Cf. the Sh z matsu wasan, in CWS I: 403-404; and JSS II: 603-604. 95 See Shigaraki, 1992: 235-237. Cf. CWS I: 113; SSZ II: 72. Here, reference is made also to the Sh z matsu wasan; see CWS I: 403; and SSZ II: 518. 96 See Shigaraki, 1992: 239-240. Cf. the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 112; and SSZ II: 72. 97 See Shigaraki, 1992: 242.


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for “peace” (yo no naka an’on nare ).98 Therefore, Shin Buddhism is, for Shigaraki, a “religion of path,”99 and reliance on tariki implies that the nenbutsu gradually realizes the growth of the practitioner as is expressed in Shinran’s reference to the person of shinjin as “equal of all the Tathagatas.”100 What is at stake for Shigaraki in Shin Buddhism is then much more than a simple longing for birth in the Pure Land after death through the guidance of Amida taken as a substantial entity, which, he claims, would make shinjin nothing more than a belief in magic.101

Reference to various selections from the ten benefits gained in the present life (gensh ni jisshu no yaku ) as a consequence of the realization of shinjin is made also by other authors in the attempt to provide a characterization of the conduct of the practitioner. Kikufuji My d , for example, affirms that the practice of the nenbutsu follower can be understood through reference to the benefits of “our kar-mic evil being transformed into good” (ten’aku j zen ), “having great joy in our hearts” (shinta kangi ), “being aware of Amida’s benevolence and of responding in gratitude to his virtue” (chion h toku ), and “constantly practicing great compassion” (j gy daihi ).102

Arai Toshikazu has stressed the significance of the second and ninth benefits, which are related respectively to the attainment of the “supreme virtues” (shitoku gusoku no yaku ), and to the ability to carry out “the acts (of the Buddha’s) Great Compassion” (j gy daihi),103 because they refer to the fact that the nenbutsu practitioner, by means of the transformation of “Immediately Attaining Birth in the Pure Land” (sokutoku j ), has received the benefit of Buddha’s compassion, and can partake of the quality of the bodhisattva.104

The relation of the benefit of “constantly practicing great compassion” (j gy daihi) to the practice of the nenbutsu follower, has also been ana-

98 See Shigaraki, 1992: 243-244. Cf. the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 560; and SSZ II: 697. 99 See Shigaraki, 2001a: 42. 100 See Shigaraki, 2001a: 43-45. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 529; and SSZ II: 662. 101 See Shigaraki, 2001a: 35. 102 Kikufuji, 2002: 228. Cf. the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 112; and JSS II: 251. 103 Arai, 1997: 48. Cf. CWS I: 112; and SSZ II: 72. 104 See Arai, 1997: 42-43.


lysed by Kenneth Tanaka, who belongs, like Kikufuji My d and Arai Toshikazu, to the Honganji-ha. Tanaka claims that the interpretation of the ninth benefit as ‘reciting the Name’ is the result of the conservative doctrinal approach which has characterized the Honganji-ha since the end of the Sang Wakuran (“Controversy over the three kinds of religious acts”) in 1806.105 According to him, however, in other represent-ative pre-modern and modern commentators, j gy daihi has not always been interpreted simply as one’s act of oral recitation, but has included, as argued also by the Honganji-ha scholar Fugen Daien (d. 1975), a large range of activities to be performed in the midst of daily life, including benefiting others and guiding them towards shinjin. As such, he claims, it can provide the basis of a renewed involvement in the world for Shin Buddhist practitioners.106

The characterization of shinjin as the foundation for the practitioners’ ethical behaviour is to be found, for many authors, in other passages se-lected from Shinran’s writings, and especially from the Letters. An artic-ulated example is offered in this regard by the above-mentioned author, Kikufuji My d . Kikufuji points out that in Shinran, contrarily to his suc-cessors Kakunyo and Zonkaku, the morality of those who have attained shinjin is not characterized in terms of the “five constant virtues” (goj

) of Confucian ethics.107 Kikufuji notes that, in fact, Shinran’s rejec-tion of the five constant virtues is all the more apparent when one consid-ers his reference to the fact that Laozi and Confucius followed “wrong paths” (ja ), their teachings being concerned only with “mundane good” (seken no zen ), and, for this reason, “through them, one cannot part from the worldly and attain the sacred.” 108 According to

105 See Tanaka K., 1998b: 92-93. The Sang Wakuran started within the Honganji-ha in the last years of the eighteenth century, and saw the contraposition of professors of the official academy in Ky to (Gakurin ), who argued that aspiration for birth manifests itself through “the three modes of action” (sang ), that is, thought, speech and ac-tion, and scholar-priests outside the academy, who maintained the view that actively ex-pressing aspiration for birth was a form of self-power. The controversy ended after the intervention of the government which ruled in favour of the scholar-priests, while Chid

(1736-1805), the head professor of the academy, “died of sickness while in custo-dy.” See Hirota, 2000a: 8-13. See also Rogers, 1991: 282-284; and Shimazu, 2004. 106 See Tanaka K., 1998b: 99-100. 107 Kikufuji, 2002: 227. 108 See Kikufuji, 2002: 228; and Kikufuji, 1995: 167. Cf. the Ky gy shinsh , in CWS I: 286; and JSS II: 468.


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Kikufuji, the realization of shinjin opens up the way, instead, to a sponta-neous ethical approach to life,109 whose features are apparent in various passages of Shinran’s writings. He cites, for example, Shinran’s claim that the nenbutsu practitioner “must not do what should not be done” (su majiki koto ), “think what should not be thought” (omou majiki koto ), or “say what should not be said” (iu majiki koto ), thinking that all this cannot obstruct birth in the Pure Land.110 Moreover, Kikufuji argues, the ethical character of shinjin is also apparent in Shinran’s affirmation that the effect of many years’ practice of the nenbutsu manifests itself in the practitioners’ signs of the desire to cast off “the evil in themselves” (kono mi no ashiki koto

), and in the gradual rejection of the “three poisons” (sandoku ), that is, “greed, anger, and folly.”111 And, again, it can be seen in

Shinran’s claim that the realization of shinjin allows one to part from “the five evil courses” (goakushu ), and that, through the working of Amida, one’s “obstructions” (shosh ) finally fall away.112

The ethical concern expressed by Shinran in the Letters has been emphasized also by other interpreters. Futaba Kenk , for example, has pointed out the ethical significance of Shinran’s statement that the prac-titioner “must seek to cast off the evil of this world and to cease doing wretched deeds.”113 Also Nabeshima Naoki , besides stressing the significance of Shinran’s words in the Matt sh against antinomian tendencies,114 has noted that in certain passages he encourages people to do good deeds as “ethically right conduct,” as in the aforementioned ref-erence to “cast off the evil of this world,” and in the characterization of “stop doing wrong” as a “sign of having rejected this world” (yo o itou

109 See Kikufuji, 1995: 169. 110 Kikufuji, 2002: 228. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 550; and JSS II: 744. Here Shinran is possibly referring to the ten transgressions (j aku ); cf. CWS I: 88; Keown, 1992: 30-31; and the Introduction. 111 Kikufuji, 1995: 169. Cf. CWS I: 553; and JSS II: 739-740. 112 Kikufuji, 1995: 168. Cf. the Song shinz meimon, in CWS I: 520; and JSS II: 673; the K s wasan, in CWS I: 376; and JSS II: 588. 113 Futaba, 1988: 58. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 547; and SSZ II: 682. 114 See Nabeshima, 2004: 33. Cf. the Tannish , in CWS I: 671; and SSZ II: 784; and the Matt sh , in CWS I: 553-554; and SSZ II: 691-692. Nabeshima Naoki belongs to the Honganji-ha.


shirushi).115 From these passages, Nabeshima claims, emerges the fact that the practitioners who entrust themselves in Amida gradually acquire the capacity of overcoming self-centredness and the three poisonous delu-sions, namely, “greed, anger, and ignorance.” That is, he argues, their a-wakening to the “mind of entrusting” is characteristically accompanied by aversion to “the evilness of this world.”116

An author already mentioned, Tamamitsu Junsh , has insisted on the necessity of going beyond the understanding of religion as a personal ac-tivity, that is, on the need to reconstruct the practitioners’ connection to a life in shinjin so as to overcome self-closure and become more open to the world.117 Therefore, for him, due attention should be paid, in the search for the true self, to the issue of social responsibility.118 In this re-spect, he maintains that Shinran’s reference to the change “in the heart that had been bad” (moto ashikarishi waga kokoro o mo omoi kaeshite

), and his call to fellow com-panions and practitioners to embrace “prayers [for peace in the world] in their hearts,” can provide a concrete example for the lifestyle of the nen-butsu practitioner.119

Similarly Arai Toshikazu has emphasized that Shinran’s reference to the “sign” that the practitioners “detest this life of birth-and-death” indi-cates that, as a consequence of one’s practice of the nenbutsu, one pro-gressively avoids committing evil deeds.120 Also for him, then, the en-trusting in the Primal Vow results in a “change in the heart that had been bad” and in a “deep warmth for friends and fellow-practicers.”121 This is possible, for Arai, because shinjin is not only the awakening to Amida’s Vow, but also the realization of Buddha’s wisdom and compassion in this very life, though within the limits imposed by one’s own nature as an ordinary being.122

115 See Nabeshima, 2004: 10-11. Cf. CWS I: 547, 553-554; and SSZ II: 682, 691-692. 116 Nabeshima, 2004: 10-11. 117 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 5-7. 118 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 4. 119 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 17; and Tamamitsu, 2003a: 3-4. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 551; and SS: 563; the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , in CWS I: 560; and SS: 568. 120 Arai, 1992: 113. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 553; and SSZ II: 691. 121 Arai, 2002: 135. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 551; and SSZ II: 688. 122 See Arai, 1992: 114; Arai, 1997: 43; and Arai, 2002: 137.


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Other Shin Buddhist scholars have emphasized another distinct and traditionally well-known aspect in Shinran’s teaching, the concept of “re-sponse in gratitude” or “return of benefits” (h -on ), in order to jus-tify the link between shinjin and compassionate action within society. Tokunaga Michio and Alfred Bloom, for example, also following the suggestions offered by Futaba Kenk , have maintained that other-power takes, in a person of shinjin, the form of “gratitude” and “sharing one’s faith with others” (jishin ky ninshin), a dimension which also implies the relationship to other people.123 Bloom, in particular, a Shin Buddhist priest and scholar based in Hawai‘i who has taken some part in the Japa-nese debate, has referred to the traditional idea of gratitude to Amida ex-pressed by Shinran in the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush as the founda-tion of the ethical life of the practitioner.124 Tokunaga has shown that, for Shinran, shinjin does not only refer to the vertical relationship of the indi-vidual with Amida Buddha, remaining thus confined to the inner spiritual world.125 For Tokunaga, this aspect is apparent, for instance, in the Ky -gy shinsh , where is to be found Shinran’s statement, “In reflecting on the ocean of great shinjin, I realize that there is no discrimination between noble and humble or blackrobed monks and white-clothed laity, no dif-ferentiation between man and woman, old and young.” Tokunaga points out that these words express the Mah y na aspect of benefiting both one-self and others (jiri rita), whose source is now placed in Amida’s com-passion.126 Within this framework, he claims, since it is the negation of one’s attachment to the efficacy of doing moral good that now assumes special significance, as if it were a “negative medium” for attaining en-lightenment, doing good remains nonetheless a central issue for those who are seeking shinjin.127 Ishida H y has similarly argued that, for Shinran, shinjin should be followed, as a sign of gratitude, by one’s work for the happiness of all people and for peace.128

A different point of view on this issue has instead been expressed by Kenneth Tanaka, who also refers to the aforementioned passages in the

123 Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 199. 124 See Bloom, 1999: 52. See also CWS I: 560, 564; and SSZ II: 697, 702. 125 See Tokunaga, 1993: 30. 126 See Tokunaga, 1993: 31-32. Cf. CWS I: 107; and SSZ II: 68. 127 Tokunaga, 1993: 34. 128 See Ishida, 1997: 237.


Letters so as to argue that Shinran was concerned with ethical issues and “never condoned unethical behaviour,” since he assumed that the practi-tioner would try naturally to lead an ethical life.129 Accordingly, Shin-ran’s acknowledgement of the relevance of ethics was substantially re-lated to his view that Amida does not participate directly in one’s “ethical decision making.”130 However, he notes, the basis for ethical action in a Shin Buddhist context has been traditionally explained as a response in gratitude to the Buddha, and this interpretation presupposes the realiza-tion of shinjin on the part of the practitioner. In this respect it is signifi-cant that Shinran also admitted in the Letters the category of the practitio-ner without shinjin.131 For this reason, Tanaka, developing here some of Ueda Yoshifumi’s suggestions, proposes the idea of a “trans-ethical re-sponsibility,” which may also address those without shinjin. This ap-proach, he claims, is beyond both obligatory and goal-oriented ethics, and aims at a deeper participation of the practitioner in the “reflective process of a soteriological quest,” which implies that through ethical involvement one comes to be “gradually illuminated” by the principles which refer to a “higher soteriological life,” rather than “by conventional worldly expec-tations” and “self-centered values.”132 Tanaka also clarifies that this ap-proach should not be intended as a means to realize shinjin, which would represent another expression of self-power.133 Rather, he maintains, it opens up the possibility for the practitioner—although one cannot help as fully as one wishes—to be more responsibly involved in daily life and give a contribution towards a better society.134

The relationship of a life in faith to an active approach to society has been also analysed among others by Yasutomi Shin’ya, through reference to the legacy of Kiyozawa Manshi. Yasutomi claims that, for Kiyozawa, the dimension of “spiritual awareness” (seishinshugi ) did not

129 Tanaka K., 1989: 98. 130 See Tanaka K., 1998b: 103. 131 See Tanaka K., 1989: 106. Tanaka’s reference is to the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush ; see CWS I: 560; and SSZ II: 697. 132 Tanaka K., 1989: 107-108. 133 See Tanaka K., 1989: 109. 134 See Tanaka K., 1989: 110-111. Tanaka’s reference is to Shinran’s assertion that “However much love and pity we may feel in our present lives, it is hard to save others as we wish; hence, such compassion remains unfulfilled.” Tannish , in CWS I: 663; and SSZ II: 775-776.


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imply a passive attitude towards society, but rather the assumption that a right approach to the problems of everyday life implies a preliminary “transformation of one’s mind through introspection and self-reflec-tion.”135 And Yasutomi indicates that for Kiyozawa the result of such self-examination was not only independence, which is the true way to avoid conflicts, but also “the desire to do good,” which, in a circular way, “leads to Other Power faith,” and “develops into gratitude,” the premise for opening “oneself up to others.”136 Along this interpretative line, Yasu-tomi argues that it was on the basis of the acknowledgement of the lim-itedness of the individual, and the opening up to other-power faith (tariki shink ), that Kiyozawa could conceive the development of an “authentically peaceful civilization” (shinsei no heiwateki bunmei

), based on fellowship and compassion.137 This is, according to Yasutomi, a significant aspect of Kiyozawa’s thought that also e-merges from his criticism of social Darwinism, which he saw as a mani-festation of egoism,138 and in his notion of banbutsu ittai , that is, the understanding of “the whole universe as a unity.”139

Related to the aforementioned contributions by Tanaka and Yasutomi is the position expressed by John Yokota. Yokota, who belongs to the Honganji-ha, takes into account the problem posed by any assumption that the basis for Buddhist ethical action is self-enlightenment, in view of the fact, as he observes, that the present world is one where “everyone is not enlightened.”140 He claims that Shin Buddhism, on the other hand, with its stress on the inability of ordinary beings (bonbu) to achieve en-lightenment by themselves, can offer a clue for regarding this issue with more realism.141 Accordingly, though the possibility of fully compassion-ate activity within society is denied from a Shin Buddhist perspective, this does not exclude that an attempt should be made by the practitioners, within their present conditions, to approximate to the standard which is

135 Yasutomi, 2003a: 109. 136 Yasutomi, 2003a: 106. 137 Yasutomi, 1999c: 182-183. 138 See Yasutomi, 1999c: 181. 139 Yasutomi, 1991: 88. 140 Yokota, 1987: 27. 141 See Yokota, 1987: 14-15.


characteristic of the enlightened condition.142 In this sense, he assumes that self-power and other-power do not represent a dichotomy, rather, other-power acts as a transformative force in the midst of everyday ex-perience, becoming a new source of power for the self.143 In Yokota’s view, however, the actual problem for a productive Shin Buddhist ap-proach to ethics is presented by the emphasis which has traditionally been placed upon the soteriological understanding of compassion,144 which makes it difficult to transpose self-awareness into social awareness, and to reflect Amida’s compassion in society.145 In fact, he argues, when the soteriological aspect is stressed, there typically follow formulations like the shinzoku nitai doctrine, which distinguishes between “matters of heaven” and “secular matters.”146 Conversely, for Yokota, the awareness of one’s own limitations, far from being an excuse for disinterest and pas-sivity, should entail the recognition that “compassion and going beyond self-concern are the ideals of one’s life and behavior,” and lead to action within society.147

Although he values Tanaka’s approach to social ethics, Yokota has criticized the emphasis on the soteriological dimension and the lack of so-cio-historical consciousness implied by the latter’s presentation of “teach-ing others the name of Amida so as to gain salvation” as in itself ethically good, arguing that this position would not differ from that of funda-mentalist Christians, who consider the teaching of the Gospel as an ethi-cal action in itself.148 And, for Yokota, helping another person to achieve enlightenment would not be sufficient, because compassion, as the actual-ization of suchness, the interpenetrating unity of all reality, is “concern for the whole person,” which cannot distinguish between spiritual and physical needs.149

It may be interesting to note that the theme of the interconnectedness of all things, which is a recurrent topic in general contemporary discus-

142 See Yokota, 1987: 28. 143 See Yokota, 2000a: 81. 144 See Yokota, 1987: 28; and Yokota, 2001: 69. 145 See Yokota, 1987: 29. 146 Yokota, 2001: 72. 147 Yokota, 1987: 31. 148 Yokota, 2001: 79-80. Yokota’s reference is to Tanaka K., 1998b. 149 Yokota, 2000a: 79.


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sions on Buddhist ethics, finds expression, as can be seen from some of the examples mentioned above, within the Shin Buddhist context as well. Because of the central position occupied within Mah y na Buddhism by the teaching of prat tya-samutp da or co-dependent origination (engi

), aspects of this theory are found in disparate configurations with other doctrinal points which are peculiar to Shin Buddhism and as such will be mentioned in the following sections. For the present, let us consider two further representative examples which are provided by Ogawa Ichij and by the Honganji-ha writer, Unno Taitetsu.

Ogawa’s claim that one cannot think of human beings as separate enti-ties is recurrent in his writings,150 and is directly related by him to the Buddhist teaching of the interconnectedness of all existence (engi no d ri

), whose logic provides one with the conditions to live, he thinks, in naturalness (jinen), as explained by Shinran.151

Unno stresses the idea of interdependence which underlies Shin Bud-dhism, since it is in shinjin, he affirms, that through Amida’s compassion a sense of “unique individuality” is gained which is “interconnected with all life.”152 More specifically, he has insisted, in the attempt to clarify the starting-point for a Buddhist approach to human rights, that the correct understanding of the doctrine of interdependence is unavoidably con-nected with the idea of no-self, which in turn, he assumes, finds its “full-est manifestation” in the Shin Buddhist teaching of other-power. 153

The examples illustrated in this section are representative of the need, for various Shin Buddhist scholars, to find in shinjin, besides the soteri-ological assurance of birth in the Pure Land, a direction for the ethical life of the practitioner as well. It is, in fact, in the life in shinjin that these au-thors generally see the closest proximity to the ideal of compassion repre-sented by Dharm kara’s practice and his vow to save all sentient beings. And this is an ideal that they find variously expressed especially, but not only, in selected passages of Shinran’s writings. Thus, Shinran’s treat-ment of the ten benefits in the present life, his call for prayers for peace in the world, the link he establishes between the practice of the nenbutsu and the rejection of evil from one’s life, together with other selected

150 See, for example, Ogawa, 2002c: 159; and Ogawa, 2002b: 12-13. 151 See Ogawa, 2002c: 153; and Ogawa, 2002a: 234-235. 152 Unno, 1998: 21-22. 153 See Unno, 1988: 129-130, 142.


sources, are typically used in the attempt to give a more concrete picture of the moral life of the practitioner.

It is worth mentioning, in this regard, the enduring influence that the traditional concept of h -on (“response in gratitude” or “return of benefits”), an ideal which indeed reflects core Japanese values influenced by both Buddhism and Confucianism, exerts on contemporary representa-tions of Shin Buddhist ethics.154 Within the context of the above-men-tioned discussions, in fact, moral obligation, understood as a response in gratitude to Amida’s benevolence, appears still to play a prominent role.

Another interesting point emerging here, is that the notion of benefits in the present life, as found both in the Ky gy shinsh and in the J do wasan,155 and which might be interpreted as a concession of Shin Bud-dhism to the theme of worldly benefits (genzeriyaku ),156 is cur-rently being used by various authors in order to articulate the social di-mension of shinjin. In this sense, it may be observed that this notion, though presenting “a close affinity with generally current Japanese reli-gious ideas” and apparently difficult to be “internationalised,”157 nonethe-less lends itself as a tool for the elaboration of contemporary Shin Bud-dhist discourses on social ethics, which may also be interpreted as at-tempts to adapt the religious tradition so as to meet the demands of a pro-gressively globalizing society.

Sources other than Shinran’s writings are also used in this attempt to relate the life in shinjin to moral action, as, for example, Kiyozawa Manshi’s stress on spiritual awareness, which is taken by some to be the premise for social action, and the teaching of co-dependent origination, with its implications for the interrelatedness of all beings, which others see emblematically manifested in the overcoming of the self-centred mind through other-power.

154 Cf. Davis, 1992: 157, 300. Winston Davis distinguishes in traditional Japanese Bud-dhism four types of duties based on the “Four Benefits” (shion ), which are received respectively “from 1. parents, 2. the sovereign, 3. the Three Treasures (Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha), and 4. all other sentient beings.” Davis, 1992: 157. See also Bellah, 1957: 70-71; Van Bragt, 1990a: 62; and Ornatowski, 1996: 223-224. 155 See CWS I: 352-355; and SSZ II: 497-499. 156 See Pye, 1987b: 197, 201. For the pervasiveness of the concept of genzeriyaku in Japanese religions, see Reader and Tanabe, 1998. 157 Pye, 1987b: 202.


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Various issues emerge from the discussions taken into consideration, all of which are, in fact, related to the unique nature of the experience of shinjin. In the first place, as has already been pointed out, one can trace the difficulty of making more explicit the suggestions found in the scrip-tures, so as to provide a standard for the behaviour of the practitioner. Consistent recourse is instead made to the idea that the ethical life should flow spontaneously from the working of Amida’s Vow, which prevents any conflict with a requirement to abandon any attempt to resort to cal-culation, that is, to self-power.

Another issue emphasized by some of the aforementioned authors is that, though shinjin is generally assumed to be the source of morality, the actual occurrence of this shift in the life of the practitioner remains some-what undecided and obscure. Moreover, self-certification of one’s reli-gious life as a life in shinjin runs the risk of falling once again into some form of self-power. Hence, from a doctrinal point of view, the result seems to be that any attempt to distinguish between acts that flow from tariki and those which are the effect of the persistent working of one’s jiriki attitudes remains difficult, and that, paradoxically, one could even be tempted to delay a positive approach to social life until the eventual attainment of shinjin, though avoiding, at the same time, the pitfalls of antinomianism. This cluster of problems seems to be exemplified in Shin-ran’s words, in this passage of the Matt sh :

Amida Buddha fulfills the purpose of making us know the significance of jinen. After we have realized this, we should not be forever talking about jinen. If we continuously discuss jinen, that no working is true working will again become a problem of working. It is a matter of inconceivable Buddha-wisdom.158

A direct consequence of this stress on shinjin is, as is also illustrated by some authors, that the status and the prerogatives of the practitioners who have not yet attained shinjin remain to a large extent undecided. In fact, if shinjin is considered to be the source of morality and the true access to social life, it is not completely clear what should orient in the secular realm those who are, say, still in search of this religious goal. A way out from this impasse is suggested by some of the above-mentioned authors

158 CWS I: 530; and SSZ II: 664.


through the characterization of Shin Buddhism as a “religion of path,” where the working of other-power effects the gradual transformation of the practitioners’ attitudes. This approach reflects the traditional Buddhist intermingling of soteriological and ethical concerns, as seen, for example, in the Eightfold Path, or in the practice of the bodhisattva. In this connec-tion, other authors have attempted to characterize the striving to achieve an acceptable ethical standard, in a way similar to Kiyozawa Manshi, as a negative medium for entering the dimension of shinjin. This is however a state of mind which of itself does not seem to establish any necessary link with the ethical dimension of Mah y na teachings.

THE EQUALITARIAN DIMENSION IN SHIN BUDDHISM

The relevance for the contemporary discussion on Shin Buddhist ethics of that dimension of the teachings which refers to the ideal of equality could be hardly overestimated. The ideal of fellow companions (d b ), for example, not only pertains to the scriptural tradition which can be traced back to Shinran,159 but has nowadays become, through the legacy of Rennyo, through modern doctrinal studies, and through the common practice of generations of believers, a key term in the language used by the various reform movements inside the two Honganji, and in their in-sistence on the need to shape a society based on fellowship.

The emphasis on equality found in the teachings of Shinran, not to forget H nen, can probably account for the current presence of this topic in various contexts which are related to the affirmation of the ethical di-mension of Shin Buddhist teachings. As such, it has already occasionally arisen in the previous pages. It is also interesting to note that the discus-sion on equality is often interwoven with that on karma, as for example in not a few of the authors who will be mentioned below. In such cases the awareness of karma is assumed to provide access to the shared condition of human beings as foolish beings, or ordinary persons (bonbu).

A clear formulation of the connection between equality and karma is provided for example by Hirose Takashi, who claims that the principle of equality in Shin Buddhism derives its strength from Shinran’s experience with the lowest classes at the time of his exile,160 and from his discovery

159 See Chapter One. 160 See Hirose, 1988: 47, 49; and Hirose, 1989b: 345-346.


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that those people who were forced to break the precepts in order to sur-vive—and for this reason forced away from society and considered inel-igible for salvation—were instead living life “as it had to be lived in the real world.”161 Hirose observes that, for Shinran, the law of karmic condi-tioning was the source of humankind’s basic equality, since he main-tained that all people were bonbu, foolish beings, whose actions and na-ture are determined by karmic conditions.162 The acknowledgement of this is, for Hirose, the opening up of the dimension of “togetherness” (warera) and the recognition of the equality of all.163 This is a claim which for him finds expression, for example, in Shinran’s words as re-ported in the Tannish , “If our karmic conditions were such, there is nothing we wouldn’t do,” which indicate that it is because of karmic ne-cessity that one commits good and evil.164 When the practitioners awaken to this equality, and to their true nature as human beings, Hirose asserts, then the social boundaries are transcended and it is possible to live a life in which all living beings exist in mutual harmony.165 He relates his dis-cussion on equality and karma in Shin Buddhism to the teaching of Soga Ry jin, who stressed the meaning of the “ki aspect of deep faith” (ki no jinshin ), that is, the awareness of one’s own karma which pre-cedes the placing of trust in the Vow, as an opening up to the dimension where all things are linked in mutual empathy. And, in this sense, the “ki aspect of deep faith” is to be regarded, for Hirose, as the principle of true humanity.166

The importance of Soga’s interpretation of karma within this doctrinal context is also emphasized by Yasutomi Shin’ya. Yasutomi claims that, although the idea of karma was used in traditional Japanese Buddhism to justify social differences, also with the complicity of many priests, in Shin Buddhism the concept of past karma (shukug ) is to be under-stood in a different, yet positive way.167 He maintains that, when consid-

161 See Hirose, 1988: 49. 162 See Hirose, 1978: 179-180; and Hirose, 1988: 51. 163 See Hirose, 1978: 143-144; Hirose, 1988: 51-52, 68; and Hirose, 1989b: 349. 164 See Hirose, 1978: 179; Hirose, 1988: 51; and Hirose, 1989b: 348. Cf. CWS I: 671; SSZ II: 784; and SS: 634. 165 See Hirose, 1978: 179-180; and Hirose, 1988: 51. 166 See Hirose and Nishida, 1993: 217, 222-224. See also Soga, 2001. 167 See Yasutomi, 2004: 133-136.


ered within the framework of Shinran’s treatment of the two aspects of deep faith (nij jinshin ), and a modern reassessment of them provided by Soga Ry jin, it is really the awareness and acknowledgement of one’s own karma that makes possible, together with the full assump-tion of one’s responsibilities and the placing of trust in the Vow, the opening up of the dimension of “togetherness” (warera).168

Another example of the emphasis on the importance of the “ki aspect of deep faith” as the awareness of one’s own evil nature is provided by Nakanishi Chikai , a Honganji-ha exponent, who assumes that, for Shinran, this concept represented a clue for “the awakening to the dimension of the ‘other’” (‘ware’ to ‘warera’ no ‘onaji koto nari’

). As such, it implies, for Nakanishi, a direct reference to sociality, representing the way to compassion, which is the foundation of Buddhist social practice, and to the consideration of re-sponsibility within society in “collective terms.”169 According to him, this openness to the ‘other’ and aspiration for equality, which is a conse-quence of Amida’s compassion, are well illustrated for example in the passage of the Matt sh where Shinran connects the practice of the nen-butsu to the “change in the heart that had been bad and in the deep warmth for friends and fellow-practicers.”170 It is also seen in Shinran’s claim that he did not have “even a single disciple” (Shinran wa deshi ichinin mo motazu ).171

A scholar mentioned above, Asai J kai, has stressed the significance of Shinran’s idea that “one’s salvation” (‘ware’ no sukui ) cannot be considered apart from “salvation for all” (‘warera’ no sukui

).172 Together with various other exponents, Asai has noted that the equality of all beings in respect of salvation, the dimension of “togetherness” (warera), is well expressed by Shinran’s ideal of “fel-low companions and practitioners” (d b , on-d gy , ),173 and by his affirmation, in the Yuishinsh mon’i, that the lowest in society, “peddlers, hunters, and others,” are our equals, because “we” are “like

168 See Yasutomi, 2004: 147, 154, 159. 169 See Nakanishi, 1994: 36, 50. 170 Nakanishi, 1987: 163. Cf. CWS I: 551; and SSZ II: 688. 171 Nakanishi, 1987: 164. Cf. the Tannish , in CWS I: 664; and SSZ II: 776. 172 See Asai, 2000: 5, 37. 173 Asai, 2000: 45.


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stones and tiles and pebbles” (ishi, kawara, tsubute no gotoku naru ware-ra nari ).174

Kikufuji My d has similarly noted that Shinran’s existentially and socially equalitarian view is particularly expressed by his sympathy for “the lowly who are hunters and peddlers” (toko no gerui ),175 and by the “spirit of fellowship” (d b seishin ) among practi-tioners which he fostered in his writings. In this respect, a classic passage is quoted by Kikufuji from the Ky gy shinsh , where Shinran refers to the nenbutsu practitioners “within the four seas” who are “brothers and sisters.”176 Similar concerns have been expressed by Wada Shigeshi

(d. 2006), of the tani-ha, who affirmed that a life in this world based on the “change of heart” (eshin ) is marked by equality, an ideal which he found emblematically expressed by the word on-d b , and by the well-known aforementioned passage where Shinran sympathetically refers to the oppressed in society, among whom were “hunters” and “ped-dlers”177

Anzai Kenj , another tani-ha writer, maintains that it is through the “encounter with the ‘other’” (tasha to no deai

) that one’s true self becomes clear, and the dimension of salvation it-self opens up.178 According to him, this is not only apparent from the Ma-h y na tradition in general, which teaches that salvation is not possible for one individual alone, but, in a more compelling way, from Shinran’s stress on equality.179 Anzai emphasizes the fact that Shinran, starting from his view of history culminating in mapp , opened up a path to sal-vation also for those who broke the precepts,180 and strongly valued the dimension of “togetherness” (warera) and of the community of “fellow companions and practitioners” (on-d b on-d gy ).181 Anzai also appre-ciates the contribution offered by Soga Ry jin, with his emblematical

174 Asai, 2000: 40-41. Cf. CWS I: 459; and JSS II: 708. 175 See Kikufuji, 2002: 228; and Kikufuji, 1995: 168-169. Cf. CWS I: 459; and JSS II: 707. 176 See Kikufuji, 1995: 169; and Kikufuji, 2004: 404. Cf. CWS I: 155; and JSS II: 310. 177 See Wada, 1997: 129; and Wada, 1987: 178-179, 182. Cf. CWS I: 459; and SS: 553. 178 See Anzai, 1998: 287-288, 297. 179 See Anzai, 1998: 297-300. 180 See Anzai, 1998: 106-107. 181 See Anzai, 1998: 112, 300.


claim that we should “die in faith, and live in the Vow,” and his sugges-tion that the realization that everyone is a foolish being (bonbu) is the ba-sis for the sharing of suffering, in underlining the social dimension in the life of the practitioner.182

Tamamitsu Junsh has similarly referred to the relationship between karma and equality, adducing Shinran’s claim that everything one does is connected to past karma. In Tamamitsu’s view, this implies that one is di-rectly or indirectly linked to whatever is happening in the world, and this realization of interdependency can teach us to accept differences and a-void discrimination.183

A further example of the continuing interest in the issue of equality in Shin Buddhist doctrinal studies is provided by Nabeshima Naoki, who points out that the equalitarian nature of Shin Buddhism is expressed by Shinran’s ideal that the evil person is the right object for salvation (aku-nin sh ki ).184 He notes that according to Shinran, all human be-ings are ordinary people (bonbu) characterized by their evil nature,185 and that to become aware of this basic fact, starting with the evil within one-self means in actuality to transcend good and evil, overcome discrimina-tory views, open up to the deep interconnection with others and feel com-passion for them.186 With reference to this, Nabeshima also argues that self-righteousness and authoritarianism are results of our self-attachment and of our tendency to think that we are good people,187 and that on the contrary, by accepting one’s evil nature, the way to a dimension where nenbutsu followers aspire to live together by not hurting each other is opened up.188 He has also linked his discussion on equality and karma to the teaching of co-dependent origination, since he assumes that being a-ware of the interconnected nature of all existence grants the possibility of seeing each other’s evil, thus transcending this evil together, realizing

182 Anzai, 1998: 85-86. 183 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 4. Cf. the Tannish , in CWS I: 670; and SS: 633. 184 See Nabeshima, 2004: 15, 30. 185 See Nabeshima, 2004: 11-12. 186 See Nabeshima, 2004: 2, 17-18, 32, 41-42. 187 See Nabeshima, 2004: 26-27. 188 See Nabeshima, 2004: 38-39.


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peace of mind and living with respect for the freedom of each human be-ing.189

The stress on the universality of salvation which is characteristic of the Pure Land teachings constitutes indeed a privileged source for the ar-ticulation of Shin Buddhist ethical views based on the ideal of equality. Equality in terms of salvation is not, needless to say, immediately equiva-lent to social equality. On the one hand this idea may have limited the use of religion as an instrument of social control which would exploit the practitioners’ concerns over their own salvation. On the other hand it did not inevitably exclude its application as an abstract principle which re-ferred ambiguously to the afterlife of the practitioners, and was apt to be used to provide a justification for social immobility and discrimination in this present life, with the promise of liberation in the next one.190

Several passages of Shinran’s writings, however, and his own experi-ence with the lowest classes, seem to provide various contemporary Shin Buddhist writers with evidence that his concern incarnated, to some ex-tent, in social reality. Among the sources selected by these interpreters, particular emphasis is therefore put on Shinran’s identification with the discriminated in society, the hunters and peddlers mentioned in the Yui-shinsh mon’i, and on his various references to the community of fellow companions and fellow practitioners, and to the warmth of their relation-ship. All of this provides the standard for the current self-representation of the two Honganji institutions as communities based on the ideal of fel-lowship (d b ).

Within this framework, a strategic importance is assumed by the idea of karmic conditioning, the awareness of which comes to be seen para-doxically as a clue for the understanding of human beings as equal in their total incapability of achieving liberation by themselves, that is, as foolish beings (bonbu). In this regard, it is typically argued that karma, rather than a concept sanctioning social differences as the result of past misdeeds, represents the opening up of the dimension of togetherness (warera) as a sharing of suffering, which is often expressed through ref-erence to the “ki aspect of deep faith.” For some authors, this is mediated in particular through its reassessment by the modern thinker, Soga Ry jin.

189 See Nabeshima, 2004: 28. 190 For a useful discussion on the revolutionary potential of “radical Amida cults” in pre-modern Japan, see Rambelli, 2004.


SHIN BUDDHISM AND SOCIAL CRITICISM

Another major theme within the contemporary debate on ethics in Shin Buddhism is the evaluation of the critical dimension of its teachings, which has often resulted in the interpretation of scriptural sources from an anti-authoritarian viewpoint, and in the mobilization of the Pure Land and other selected doctrinal points as a principle of social criticism. It is in-teresting to note that the multifaceted doctrinal debate on this theme is often linked, as in some of the authors previously cited, to the apprecia-tion of the equalitarian dimension of Shin Buddhism, and, typically, to various forms of Shin Buddhist social activism, which will be presented in the next chapter.

Another notable feature of this approach to Shin Buddhist ethics is that it is not unrelated to broader discussions within the Japanese intellec-tual milieu, as may be argued for most of the above-mentioned positions. Just to cite a few examples, the attention which has been paid to the criti-cal dimension of Shin Buddhism by leading post-war historians like Hat-tori Shis , Ienaga Sabur , and Kuroda Toshio is well known, and their scholarship, due to their personal interest in Shin Buddhism as well, has exerted a certain influence within the Shin Buddhist environment. Or, again, the critical engagement of various Shin Buddhist scholars and practitioners over the issue of Yasukuni Shrine, the Shint institution in T ky which was the wartime centre of Japanese militarist rhetoric, takes up an issue which has long been on the agenda of progressive political groups, citizens’ groups and intellectuals within Japanese society in gen-eral.191

An influential example of this distinctive approach to Shin Buddhist ethics is provided by an author already mentioned, Futaba Kenk , who has argued that the Shin Buddhist tradition has overlooked that dimension of Shinran’s teachings which focuses on the criticism of the prevailing codes of morality, concentrating instead on rebirth after-death, a line of thought which is typically represented, in his opinion, by Rennyo. Futaba acknowledges the contributions made by reformers like Kiyozawa Man-shi, who went beyond that mistaken notion of rebirth by stressing the link

191 For the Yasukuni Shrine issue and its relationship to Shin Buddhism, see Chapter Three.


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with the ‘Absolute’ in the present life, but he also notes how Kiyozawa manifested a tendency to take refuge in a kind of spiritual contentment and peace, without questioning evil, poverty, social ills, or the ethico-reli-gious and political systems. And, in a sense, this was also true, according to Futaba, of Nonomura Naotar , who stressed release from self-attach-ment but did not question state and institutionalized morality.192 However, Futaba argues that both H nen and Shinran stressed equality, which was based on the exclusive practice of the nenbutsu as a means to salvation equal for all.193 The critical potential of these teachings, for Futaba, repre-sented a formidable threat to the religious-political power of those times —as is testified by the very suppression of the nenbutsu movement—and is still reflected in Shinran’s criticism of the authorities as found in the Postscript of the Ky gy shinsh , where he lamented that “Lords and vas-sals who opposed the Dharma and justice bore indignation and resent-ment (to the Nembutsu teaching).”194 Thus, according to Futaba, the criti-cal aspect in Shinran’s thought lies in his idea of a new model of society open also to the lowest, a society where the norm of morality is not tem-poral, but is based on Amida’s compassion, which is to be realized dy-namically in history.195

Another substantial approach is provided by Shigaraki Takamaro, an author who has also long been engaged in social activism, especially in antagonism to Yasukuni Shrine. Shigaraki has focused on two aspects in Shinran’s treatment of shinjin, that is, the “‘arising’ of wisdom” and the experiencing of “truth and reality.”196 The former, the “arising of wis-dom” (chie ga ‘okoru’ koto ) is apparent, for Shiga-raki, in Shinran’s notations to the Sh z matsu wasan, and implies a pro-found understanding of the self (ki no jinshin), and the compassion of Amida’s Vow (h no jinshin ).197 The latter is related, he main-tains, to the “experiencing of ‘truth and reality’” (shinjitsu taiken

), through which the understanding, the de-absolutization, and the re-

192 See Futaba, 1988: 51-53. 193 See Futaba, 1988: 55. 194 “ .” See Futaba, 1985: 6-9; and Futaba, 1988: 56. Cf. CWS I: 289; and SSZ II: 201. 195 See Futaba, 1988: 57-58. 196 See Shigaraki, 1992: 223. 197 See Shigaraki, 1992: 223; and Shigaraki, 2001a: 37. Cf. CWS I: 407; and JSS II: 606.


jection of the emptiness and falsity of this world and its norms become possible.198 Moreover, Shigaraki argues, this dimension emerges clearly from Shinran’s critical attitude towards the rulers (koku furai ), citing, for instance, Chapter VI of the Ky gy shinsh , where, quoting from the Bosatsukai-ky , Shinran affirms that “the rule of the person who renounces worldly life is not to pay homage to the king” (shukke no hito no h wa koku ni mukatte raihai sezu

), a passage which is among those which were deleted from the Honganji-ha scriptures in 1940. 199 Apart from this, Shigaraki also quotes from the aforementioned Postscript of the Ky gy -shinsh itself, where Shinran laments the fact that the “emperor and his ministers, acting against the dharma and violating human rectitude” (shu-j shinka, h ni somuki gi ni ishi ) sup-pressed the nenbutsu,200 and from the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , where he deplores the fact that his fellow practitioners could rely “on outside people as powerful supporters” to spread the nenbutsu.201 The immediate relevance of this critical principle for social life is evident, ac-cording to Shigaraki, in the attitude shown by Shinran himself towards the people from the lower classes, and in his sympathy for “evil people,” namely, “peddlers, hunters, and others” who, he said, “are none other than we.”202 Shigaraki claims that the overlooking of this aspect of shinjin is due to the legacy of the interpretations given by Kakunyo, Zonkaku, Rennyo, and to the later formulation of the Two Truths theory (shinzoku nitai ron). According to Shigaraki, Kakunyo stated that shinjin should be maintained inwardly, while outwardly one should uphold the “five vir-tues” (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, knowledge, and sincerity) of Confucian ethics, while Zonkaku mixed Shint ideas and Shin Bud-dhist teachings, and fostered the idea that the “Buddha’s law and imperial law are a pair of laws,” thus compromising shinjin with the secular au-thorities and values.203 Also Rennyo, Shigaraki argues, maintained that

198 See Shigaraki, 1992: 223-224; Shigaraki, 1994: 27; and Shigaraki, 2001a: 37. 199 See Shigaraki, 1994: 3-5, 18; and Shigaraki, 1992: 234. See also Rogers and Rogers, 1991: 329-330. Cf. CWS I: 274; and JSS II: 454. 200 Shigaraki, 1994: 24. Cf. CWS I: 289; and JSS II: 471. 201 Shigaraki, 1994: 23-24. Cf. CWS I: 568; and JSS II: 773. 202 See Shigaraki, 1992: 229-231. Cf. CWS I: 460; JSS II: 708. 203 Shigaraki, 1992: 224-225.


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the nenbutsu practitioners should follow the laws of the state and the Confucian values of humanity and justice, which were thus adopted as the first principles for the person of shinjin.204 Later doctrinal studies have followed, according to Shigaraki, the way traced by Kakunyo, Zon-kaku, and Rennyo, with an increasing compromise between shinjin and secular values.205 Sh kai (1765-1838), for example, stated that all s tras expound the “imperial law,” and in the wartime period the shinzoku nitai theory even evolved to the point that entrusting in Amida’s compassion and loyalty to the emperor were considered equal.206 This historical trend, Shigaraki laments, has led Shin Buddhism to compromise with secular values, without exercising the aforementioned option for their de-abso-lutization and rejection, and to the current situation, in which a positive approach to society is lacking, and, with few exceptions, the community of believers and practitioners is centred on ceremonies for the dead.207

Reference to the shinzoku nitai theory has also been made by Toku-naga Michio on various occasions, within a broader discussion on the so-cial character of shinjin. In particular, he has argued that social participa-tion by Shin Buddhist members should be grounded in shinjin, in order to avoid any new bifurcation, as in the case of the aforementioned shinzoku nitai theory, between the teachings of Shin Buddhism, the “Buddha’s Law” (bupp ), and the “King’s Law” ( b ), which, used so as to force a “blind obedience to secular authority,” has long conditioned the Shin Buddhist community.208

Tokunaga and Alfred Bloom have recently emphasized the fact that shinjin, because of its direct link to Amida’s compassion, is independent of the state and the secular domain, a factor which they found expressed in Shinran’s idea of “despising the world” (yo o itou), critically referring to “the political authority and the primitive gods.”209 Shinran’s teachings thus imply, they affirm, an “understanding of ourselves and the world” which is the basis for a critique of current ideologies, and for the prac-

204 Shigaraki, 1992: 225. 205 See Shigaraki, 2001b: 550. 206 See Shigaraki, 1992: 226; Shigaraki, 1994: 22; and Shigaraki, 2001b: 551. 207 See Shigaraki, 1992: 224, 227-228; and Shigaraki, 2001b: 550. For Shigaraki Taka-maro, see also Chapter Three. 208 See Tokunaga, 1993: 26, 46. 209 Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 199.


titioners’ engagement in order to solve urgent problems of society.210 These two writers have also pointed out that, while the “highest truth” (shintai) and the “mundane truth” (zokutai) were later identified by means of the shinzoku nitai theory to the Buddhist Law and the Law of the State, in the thought of Shinran, who followed Tanluan’s understand-ing of the twofold dharmak ya (nishu hosshin ), the original M dhyamika sense of the “two truths” is still present in the notions of dharmak ya as suchness (hossh hosshin ), and dharmak ya as compassionate means (h ben hosshin ).211

Futaba’s criticism of a subjective approach to a faith centred on inner peace is echoed by another Honganji-ha writer, Kawamoto Gish

, within the context of his discussion on Shin Buddhism and peace. Ac-cording to Kawamoto, peace is not to be considered a matter of “interi-ority” (kokoro ), but rather concerns “the world and society” (yo no naka ).212 He points out that historically, however, the individ-ualistic focus on peace has been very influential in both of the Honganji, as, for example, in the tradition of doctrinal studies on “peace of mind” (anjin ) within the Honganji-ha, and in the formulation of “spiritual awareness”’ (seishinshugi) within the tani-ha.213 In this respect, Kawa-moto strongly asserts that any approach to faith only in terms of sub-jective salvation or liberation is meaningless.214 He quotes, instead, Shin-ran’s passage in the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush , “May there be peace in the world, and may the Buddha’s teaching spread” (yo no naka an’on nare, bupp hiromare),215 as the fundamental motif in Shinran’s life, noting that in this statement “peace” and the “spread” of Buddhist teach-ings are not to be taken as two separate things. In fact, according to Kawamoto, Shinran’s characterization of the followers’ practice as “re-

210 Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 200. 211 Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 192-193, 195. The reference is to the Yuishinsh mon’i; see CWS I: 461; and SSZ II: 630. 212 See Kawamoto, 1994: 137. 213 Kawamoto, 1994: 138. Cf. Shigaraki, 2001b: 557. Here, Kawamoto seems to be re-ferring, respectively, to the doctrinal orthodoxy following Rennyo’s formulation of anjin, which may imply an emphasis on inner peace and the piety of the my k nin, and to that following the legacy of Kiyozawa Manshi. 214 See Kawamoto, 1994: 139. 215 Cf. CWS I: 560; and SSZ II: 697.


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jection of the world” (yo o itou shirushi),216 makes it more than a simple prayer or longing for peace. Rather, what is implied is an anti-authoritar-ian stance and a critical attitude towards evil in society, through which peace is positively affirmed in concrete situations in everyday life.217

The acknowledgement of a critical dimension in Shin Buddhism is also found in Asai J kai. He notes that to respond in gratitude to Amida and saying the nenbutsu imply a critical attitude towards reality, which he also finds exemplified in Shinran’s words in the Ky gy shinsh lament-ing the suppression of the nenbutsu (“the emperor and his ministers, act-ing against the dharma and violating human rectitude, became enraged and embittered”),218 or, again, in the Sh z matsu wasan, where the found-er of Shin Buddhism deplores the fact that both monks and lay people “Select ‘fortunate times’ and ‘auspicious days,’ / And paying homage to gods of the heavens and earth / Engage in divination and rituals of wor-ship.”219

Wada Shigeshi, who was for a long time one of the leading figures of Shin Buddhist activism against Yasukuni Shrine, also credits the suppres-sion of the nenbutsu with a central position for the understanding of the critical potential of Shin Buddhism. Wada placed his activism within the framework of Shinran’s original position towards the kami, which is ex-pressed in various passages in Chapter VI of the Ky gy shinsh . He notes how the “false and misleading views” rejected by Shinran, as they obstructed the nenbutsu practice and the entrusting in the Vow,220 were part of the interconnected system of rites and power, and how this rejec-tion was, in fact, one of the main causes behind the suppression itself of the nenbutsu.221 Therefore, according to Wada, a form of subjective spir-ituality was first affirmed by Shinran,222 and the post-war attempts to pro-pose state patronage for Yasukuni Shrine are none other than a modern version of the suppression of the nenbutsu which occurred in Shinran’s

216 Cf. CWS I: 551; and SSZ II: 688. 217 See Kawamoto, 1994: 140-141. 218 Cf. CWS I: 289; and JSS II: 471. 219 Asai, 2000: 13-14. Cf. CWS I: 422; and JSS II: 618. 220 See Wada, 1997: 124-125, 128. 221 See Wada, 1997: 126. 222 See Wada, 1997: 136.


time.223 Wada thus clarifies that his position is not simply based on a ge-neric reference to freedom of religious faith, but is grounded on religious values, since Shin Buddhism fosters freedom of religion, and values hu-manity, and peace.224 As is clear from Shinran’s teaching, he adds, it is the basic attitude of a Shin Buddhist practitioner not only to be against oppression, but also to consider critically various aspects of the modern world such as the shortcomings of a society of consumerism and the issue of education, in close association with the activity of listening to the teachings, that is, the Dharma.225

A similar stress on the significance of the suppression of the nenbutsu is expressed by Odake Sh ky , a Honganji-ha scholar and so-cial activist.226 Odake claims that the suppression of H nen’s religious movement meant that he, and Shinran as well, with their stress on the unique practice of the nenbutsu, had broken the tradition of Buddhism as a perpetuator of religious and social discrimination. At the same time, Odake notes, all this implied also the acknowledgement of the potential of the nenbutsu for the emancipation of individuals through independence from oppressive political power.227 Odake, who has stressed with particu-lar energy the theme of discrimination within society, has argued that for Shinran the realization of no-self was not possible as far as separation from the ‘other’ remained unchallenged. Since this separation was the ob-stacle to the affirmation of the equality of all beings, it was this point which gave rise to the profound significance of his encounter with the marginalized classes.228

The critical dimension of Shin Buddhism also appears in the contribu-tion of John Yokota. In particular, he has argued that religious awareness of evil can offer the practitioner a clue to see the evil which is inherent in everyday life at the level of worldly institutions and thus to apply a criti-cal view to those aspects of society which can be recognized as uncom-passionate.229 This is all the more desirable, for Yokota, since the realiza-

223 See Wada, 1997: 154. 224 See Wada, 1997: 154-155. 225 See Wada, 1997: 176-179; and Wada, 2005: 25. 226 For Odake, see also Chapter Three. 227 See Odake, 2004: 8-9. 228 See Odake, 2004: 83-85. 229 See Yokota, 1987: 28, 31.


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tion of suchness is obstructed by both spiritual and socio-political struc-tures.230

The previous references to Kiyozawa Manshi’s passive stance toward society are usually reversed in the interpretation of other tani-ha schol-ars. Yasutomi Shin’ya, for example, claims that the historical significance of Kiyozawa lies not least in his attitude towards that secular morality, heavily indebted to Confucian values of loyalty and filial piety, which was at that time propagated within the Shin Buddhist community as well. According to Yasutomi, Kiyozawa’s opposition to the limitations inher-ent in common morality, and his affirmation of independence, should be interpreted as a critical approach towards society from the standpoint of the universality of Buddhist teachings.231 In this connection, Ichiraku Makoto has also stressed the value of Kiyozawa’s criticism of the shin-zoku nitai concept in its later function, a theory which he thinks illustrates the pitfalls of any prescriptive approach to ethics.232

Reference to Kiyozawa’s legacy within the framework of an articu-lated approach to the issue of Shin Buddhist ethics has also been made recently by Ama Toshimaro. Ama values a religious standpoint for the construction of a social ethics, because through religion and the tran-scendence of the secular domain, he claims, it is possible to relativize everyday reality and recognize the contradictions within society, as in the case of the Vietnamese Buddhists during the Vietnam war.233 Moreover, in his view, the basic teachings of Shin Buddhism, with their focus on the ideal of fellowship (d b ), which flows from the fact that Amida’s Vow is equally directed towards anyone as a means to liberation, can represent a fruitful starting-point in this regard. This is true, according to Ama, de-spite the distortions of the past and the collusion of Shin Buddhism with the emperor system—which he thinks were clearly against the non-au-thoritarian approach of Shinran—and despite some difficulties inherent in the discourse on Shin Buddhist ethics.234 With reference to this point, he argues against any passive interpretation of the teaching of other-power. While reliance on tariki is necessary in order to achieve enlightenment, it

230 See Yokota, 2000a: 80. 231 See Yasutomi, 1999c: 160, 184. 232 See Ichiraku, 2001: 2. 233 See Ama, 2001: 37. 234 See Ama, 2001: 38.


cannot in itself resolve the conflicts and contradictions of daily life, whose solutions are left to the initiative of the practitioners.235 Another major obstacle inherent in a Shin Buddhist approach to morality, accord-ing to Ama, is the fact that Shin Buddhist ethics avoids generalizations due to the variety of karmic configurations which condition each person unpredictably and in different ways.236 In this sense, he affirms that the practitioner would discover how to behave depending on the situation, and this would not lead to passivity, but rather would give priority to “the autonomous decision-making power of each individual,” which he con-siders a genuine condition for any Shin Buddhist approach to ethics.237 Ama maintains, however, that the activities of the practitioner should be in accordance with “Amida Buddha’s compassion,” which cannot be “in-different to what is happening in the actual world” and “to the contra-dictions and absurdities in contemporary society.”238 Thus, for him, the basis for a concrete engagement in society, beyond the mere repetition of slogans, is a faith sustained by compassion, which he finds exemplified in the thought and action of two key figures, Kiyozawa Manshi and Takagi Kenmy .239

According to Ama, Kiyozawa gave a great contribution to the reaf-firmation of the “supremacy of faith,” stated by Shinran and H nen a-gainst a morality which was ideologically subservient to the state.240 Ama affirms, following an interpretative line common to other scholars, that the basis for this ideological approach was provided by the shinzoku nitai theory, which developed from the principle of b ihon (“the Law of the State is fundamental”), spread by Rennyo in order to protect the Shin Buddhist community from the persecutions of the feudal lords at that time.241 He notes, however, that although in Rennyo’s approach the ele-ment of faith was still predominant, in the Tokugawa period its place came to be assumed by the “loyalty to the political system,” and as such the shinzoku nitai theory was accepted as orthodox teaching by the Shin

235 See Ama, 2001: 38. 236 See Ama, 2001: 42. 237 Ama, 2001: 42. 238 Ama, 2001: 49, 51. 239 See Ama, 2004a: 14; and Ama, 2001: 51. 240 See Ama, 2001: 40; and Ama, 2005: 42-43. 241 See Ama, 2001: 39.


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Buddhist institutions, providing a way “to cover up the contradictions and inequalities” in society.242 Kiyozawa’s move beyond the shinzoku nitai theory was based, in Ama’s view, on his religious standpoint that secular morality (zokutai) is taught in order to awaken in the practitioners “the impossibility of living a moral life” and “lead them to ‘religion’,” that is, to the other-power of Amida.243 Kiyozawa’s position did not imply, he claims, a passive attitude towards reality, since following other-power did not exclude, but rather suggested, “one’s moral connection with other fi-nite beings.”244 Ama finds further evidence for this in Kiyozawa’s per-sonal engagement for the reform inside the tani-ha, and in other pas-sages where Kiyozawa himself claimed that “finite beings” can be pres-ent in the world “actively and vigorously,” and that an active life is a “great source of welfare in the human world.”245 Thus, for Ama, the meaning of faith for Kiyozawa and his significance for the articulation of the Shin Buddhist discourse on ethics lies not in having indicated a refuge taking the form of a narrow peace of mind, but rather in the concrete manifestation of spiritual awareness through “practical actions.”246

For Ama, another key figure is represented by Takagi Kenmy , the tani-ha priest implicated in the 1910 High Treason Incident, who ac-

tively opposed social discrimination, prostitution, and war.247 According to Ama, the significance of Takagi’s figure lies in the fact that, for him, “opening himself to Amida Buddha’s mind of compassion” represented the first step towards a social practice focused on two aspects, namely, “progress” (k j shinpo ), the realization of peace through the opposition to war and the elimination of social injustice, and “commu-nity” (ky d seikatsu ), the liberation from the “struggle for ex-istence” that leaves no time for a spiritual life.248 Both these elements are emphasized by Ama as modern expressions of compassion, which may

242 See Ama, 2001: 39, 41. 243 Ama, 2001: 43 244 Ama, 2001: 45. 245 Ama, 2001: 46. 246 Ama, 2001: 47. 247 See Ama, 2001: 48, 49; Ama, 2002: 37; Ama, 2003: 22; Ama, 2004a: 14; and Ama, 2005: 43-45. 248 See Ama, 2001: 49-50; and Ama, 2002: 37.


act as a “potent force for transforming society.”249 In this sense, he argues that, in Takagi, the influence of socialist ideas is representative of the ten-dency of shinjin to utilize contemporary thought in order to find “the most effective means of realizing compassion.”250 The aforementioned contributions of Kiyozawa and Takagi, according to Ama, can offer valu-able support for the establishment of a Shin Buddhist ethics which might act as a critical force against the negative effects of capitalism.251 With regard to the necessity of confronting the problems inherent in a global society, Ama is also critical of the approach of the so-called contempo-rary ‘Engaged Buddhism,’ which he considers to be too confident, at times, in human capacities.252 A correct Shin Buddhist perspective on ec-onomic ethics should rather be grounded, he claims, on the notion of bonbu, which expresses the impossibility for the “ordinary person” of un-derstanding the net of relations of interdependence expressed by the Bud-dhist idea of co-dependent origination, and it should be basically aimed at restricting “the sources” of human “temptation” through “legislative pro-cedures.”253

The value of Takagi’s legacy is emphasized by, among others, Tama-mitsu Junsh , in the context of his evaluation of various critical aspects of Shin Buddhist teachings.254 Tamamitsu sees in the example of Takagi the indication that the nenbutsu may assume, as a life in shinjin, different forms, and as such may also support a concrete action in favour of the discriminated and the poor.255 This is, he argues, the kind of critical atti-

249 Ama, 2001: 51. 250 Ama, 2002: 38. 251 See Ama, 2002: 25-27. 252 See Ama, 2002: 32. 253 See Ama, 2002: 31-32; and Ama, 2003: 182-185. 254 For other recent contributions concerning Takagi Kenmy , see, for example, Yasutomi, 1999b, and the essays contained in the booklet published by the tani-ha, Takagi Kenmy : Taigyaku Jiken ni renza shita nenbutsusha

; see Tamamitsu, 2000. Takagi, who was officially reinstated by the tani-ha in 1996, thanks also to the research of the tani University professor, Izumi Shigeki , has been recently at the centre, together with other figures of anti-war Shin Buddhist priests, of the fifth edition of the Anti-war/Peace Exhibition (Hi-sen/heiwa ten ) held at the Higashi Honganji in Ky to in March-April 2004. See Chapter Three; and Ap-pendix 4. 255 See Tamamitsu, 2004c: 132, 135.


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tude towards society which is exemplified by Shinran’s reference to the “sign of rejecting the world” (yo o itou shirushi).256 Moreover, according to Tamamitsu, it finds further characterization through Shinran’s affirma-tion that he was “neither a monk nor one in worldly life” (his hizoku

), significant as it was made in times when only the authorities could sanction the status of a monk.257 It is also seen in the principle, ex-pressed by Shinran himself in his Letters, that there is no need for any ex-ternal justification for the practice of the nenbutsu, and that anywhere is the right place for practice.258 In this respect, Tamamitsu argues that re-flection on the Pure Land provides the practitioner with a principle for a truly independent standpoint which does not passively acquiesce in cur-rent dominant views (seken ). He calls this approach hi no shis

(“‘critical’ thinking”), a way of living the nenbutsu which is not intended as a mere repetition of the name of Amida, but as its actualiza-tion in the midst of society,259 towards the establishment of a genuine community as a network of individuals.260 Elsewhere, Tamamitsu also sees in Dharm kara’s vows listed from the fifth to the tenth, which de-scribe the “six spiritual powers” (roku jinz ), a basis for the prac-tical conduct of the believer, and another indication of a critical apprecia-tion of Shin Buddhism. According to him, in fact, the roku jinz can be referred respectively to the understanding of the historical and social con-text, the overcoming of narrow perspectives, the need to listen critically, the yearning for a life of interconnectedness through the sharing of sad-ness, spiritual independence, and the exhaustion of all the blind pas-sions.261

The discourse on the Pure Land as a “principle of criticism” (hihan genri ) has recently been elaborated within both the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha. In the writings of the tani-ha scholar, Obata Bun-

256 See Tamamitsu, 2004c: 135-137; and Tamamitsu, 2004b: 9. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 551; and SS: 563. 257 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 12; Tamamitsu, 2004b: 3. The reference is to the Postscript to the Ky gy shinsh ; see CWS I: 289; and SS: 398. 258 Tamamitsu, 2004c: 139. The reference is to the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush ; see CWS I: 568; and SS: 576. 259 See Tamamitsu, 2004c: 141. 260 See Tamamitsu, 2002: 20. 261 See Tamamitsu, 2003a: 7; 15-17; 26-27, 29-30, 32. Cf. Gómez, 1996: 166-167.


sh , this theme is found in close relationship with the inter-pretation of the “adornments of the Pure Land” (j do sh gon ), a concept found in the J do-ron (Treatise on the Pure Land), at-tributed in Shin Buddhism to Vasubandhu. Obata laments a tendency in Shin Buddhism to leave social reality unquestioned, which is often linked to a radically subjective understanding of the teachings, 262 and he resorts to selected doctrinal points which might enable a deepened awareness of the human condition and a critical view of the world.263 Obata’s concern with relating the doctrinal discourse to the current pressing issues of con-temporary society, notably war and social injustice, is reflected in its use of passages that have already been mentioned in connection with other authors. He refers, for example, to the social significance of H nen’s and Shinran’s claim that salvation is open to all, to the critical attitude shown by Shinran himself towards the authorities on the occasion of the sup-pression of the nenbutsu, and to his call for “prayers for peace” in his Letters. 264 Morevover, he also refers to the injunction against killing found in the Dhammapada.265 In this regard, Obata has emphasized the necessity of developing the Shin Buddhist discourse on peace (Shinsh heiwagaku ) beyond a simplistic opposition to war, since peace, he affirms, is not achievable unless the social conditions that lead to war are eliminated.266

A central place in Obata’s production is occupied, however, by his aforementioned speculation on the significance of the “adornments of the Pure Land” (j do sh gon) of Dharm kara found in the J do-ron. Here, he argues that through the two related aspects of the “purity of the world” (kiseken sh j ) and the “purity of the inhabitants” (shuj -seken sh j ), the unity of the environment and the subject, and the way to take others and the world into account while one acts in daily life, are demonstrated.267 Moreover, Obata focuses on the meaning of the vows of Dharm kara from the first to the fourth, where the absence of “hells,” “hungry ghosts,” and “animals,” and the equality in appear-

262 See Obata, 1994: 117. 263 See Obata, 1994: 123-124, 133; and Obata, 1997: 19. 264 See Obata, 1994: 118, 124, 135. 265 See Obata and Lummis, 2003: 29. 266 See Obata, 1994: 122-123. 267 See Obata, 2004: 45-46.


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ance of “humans and gods” refer, he claims, to the absence of discrimina-tion, oppression, and domination, thus providing the key for a critical ap-proach to this world.268 In this sense, he agrees with Hishiki Masaharu

that the Pure Land provides a standard to measure this defiled world (edo ), allowing the practitioner to question the absoluteness of values in secular society.269 This is a role which is possible for the Pure Land, Obata argues, since it does not correspond to the “other-world” (ano yo ), but, as explained in the Larger S tra and in the J do-ron, it “surpasses the paths of the three worlds” (sh ga sangai d

), that is, the past, the present and the future, and ultimately, because the Pure Land was established by Dharm kara as the place to save all sentient beings, one from which war, oppression and discrimination are necessarily absent.270 Thus, according to Obata, the Pure Land can shed light on the very nature of our existence, and show us how to live in society with others.271

Another relevant approach to the critical dimension of Shin Buddhist teachings, which also focuses on the Pure Land as a principle of criticism, is provided, as suggested above, by Hishiki Masaharu, also from the

tani-ha, who has long been engaged in social activism. Hishiki’s main concern is to delineate a “religion of liberation” (kaih no sh ky

), which could promote both theory and practice against discrimina-tion and oppression.272 According to him, though the original aim of Bud-dhism is not liberation from individual suffering, but rather from “suffer-ing rooted in society and history,” excessive attention has been paid, from its early development, to the “truth of suffering” (kutai ), which “fits well with a type of pessimistic religion.”273 However, for Hishiki, the two indispensable aspects for a religion of liberation are the principles ac-cording to which “all the dharmas are without self” (shoh muga

), and “all is impermanent” (shogy muj ),274 through which

268 See Obata, 1992: 44; Obata, 1997: 16, 19-20; and Obata, 2000: 78. See also Gómez, 1996: 166-167. 269 See Obata, 1994: 134. See also Obata, 2000: 89. 270 See Obata, 1997: 17, 19. 271 See Obata, 1997: 20, 21; and Obata, 2000: 89. 272 Hishiki, 2005: 67. 273 Hishiki, 2005: 67, 82. 274 Hishiki, 2005: 83.


ø kyamuni negated the idea of transmigration and the Brahman- tman doctrine, the rationale which supported the caste system. 275 Hishiki claims that the decline of the no-self theory has been historically paral-leled by the exclusive appreciation of the ontological dimension, related to inner desires and mental states, of the co-dependent origination the-ory.276 However, he argues, what ø kyamuni valued most was the practi-cal dimension of the co-dependent origination theory, which focuses on the socio-historical causes of suffering, as is evident from passages of the Pali Canon like the “simile of the arrow” and the injunction “one should neither slay nor cause to slay” found in the Dhammapada.277 Hishiki la-ments that these social implications have been neglected throughout the development of Buddhism and its transmission to East Asia, leading it to complement the power structure as an ideology of control, which has found concrete realization in Japan through the role assumed by Bud-dhism as the “protector of the nation,”278 and the formation of the “exo-teric-esoteric system of Buddhism” (kenmitsu Bukky taisei

).279 In this respect, he asserts that the Pure Land teachings of H nen and Shinran represented a revolutionary approach which questioned the entire structure of the kenmitsu Bukky taisei, and the interconnectedness of rites and political power.280 Both Shinran and H nen, Hishiki notes, claimed that nothing else was required, besides the selected practice of the nenbutsu, in order to achieve birth in the Pure Land.281 This position, first expressed by H nen in the Senchakush , where, for example, the value of creating images of the Buddha and building st pas to attain birth is completely denied, because it would exclude “the poor and destitute,” opened the way for a religious salvation equally directed towards every-one on the basis of Amida’s Vow.282 In this way, Hishiki affirms that the

275 See Hishiki, 2005: 84-85. 276 See Hishiki, 2005: 87-89. 277 Hishiki, 2005: 87-88. See also Radhakrishnan, 1988: 102-103. 278 Hishiki, 2005: 95. 279 Hishiki, 2005: 100. Here, implicit reference is made by Hishiki to the theoretical for-mulation of the kenmitsu Bukky taisei, elaborated by Kuroda Toshio; see, for example, Kuroda, 1996b. 280 See Hishiki, 2005: 107-110. 281 See Hishiki, 2005: 108, 114. 282 Hishiki, 2005: 109-110. See also Senchakush English Translation Project, 1998: 77-78.


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question whether the cause of suffering is rooted in the individual sphere or in society first came to the surface with the rise of the Pure Land school.283 And, he notes that this also signalled the emergence, from within the framework of Japanese intellectual history, of the idea of indi-vidual self-independence, and of a Buddhist tradition autonomous of ex-ternal authority, in this respect being significantly different from the of-ficially sanctioned Tendai and Shingon schools.284 This critical potential of the Pure Land teachings emerges, Hishiki claims, especially from two articles of the K fukuji petition, through which this powerful temple in Nara demanded the suppression of the nenbutsu, which charged H nen with the “errors” of “not revering the emperor” (koku furai), and “deny-ing worship to the kami” (jingi fuhai ), later polemically reaf-firmed by Shinran in the Ky gy shinsh .285

However, according to Hishiki, although in both H nen and Shinran the social context is highly regarded, it is also possible to find in their writings references to the Pure Land as an other-worldly dimension, which implies an “innovation in the transmigration doctrine,” and a devi-ation from the Buddhist teaching of no-self.286 For Hishiki, this factor still contributes to the displacement of the solution to human problems in an ideal heavenly sphere, and ends up in concealing the injustices of this world.287 Therefore, he insists, “those theories which would like to solve in the other life what cannot be solved in this world are basically religion as a control ideology.”288 Therefore, for Hishiki, H nen’s and Shinran’s religious views cannot serve, just as they are, as a religion of liberation.289 He acknowledges the significance of the approach of the modern doc-trinal studies initiated by Kiyozawa Manshi, exemplified by his claim that “the Tath gata exists as a result of one’s own faith,” for the negation of the essentiality of the Pure Land and the Tath gata itself. He also main-

283 See Hishiki, 2005: 115. 284 See Hishiki, 2005: 110, 114. 285 Hishiki, 2005: 108. 286 Hishiki, 2005: 110-111. See also Hishiki, 2003a: 51. Here, Hishiki also refers to the critical potential of Shinran’s aforementioned expression, the “sign of rejecting the world” (yo o itou shirushi), found in the Matt sh ; see CWS I: 551; and SS: 563. 287 See Hishiki, 2005: 115. 288 Hishiki, 2005: 116. 289 See Hishiki, 2005: 115.


tains, however, that such an approach, based on the rethinking of the rela-tionship between Amida and the individual, remains confined to the level of subjective faith, providing only a standard for one’s interior life.290 As such, for Hishiki, it remains basically closed to society and to the prob-lem of the interconnectedness of suffering, insight into which is made possible by the method of “exploring the causes and conditions.”291 What is needed then, for him, is a different approach which accounts for the lack of the dimension of the ‘other’ in modern doctrinal studies while tak-ing the “Pure Land” not as a substantial reality, but rather “as a principle of criticism” (hihan genri to shite no j do ). This implies, according to Hishiki, not only an internal critique of the individ-ual, but a critical approach to society starting from the model of the Pure Land.292 He claims, in fact, that as in the case provided by the Christian idea of the Kingdom of God, the Pure Land also “can offer a principle of criticism against discrimination and violence in society,” and a way to overcome the established dominant ideologies.293 Hishiki finds this prin-ciple eminently expressed, as does Obata, in the first four vows of Dharm kara, where the absence of hell, ghosts, and animals, together with that of external differences among the inhabitants of the Pure Land, stand for the complete elimination of discrimination, oppression, and vio-lence.294

Reference to Pure Land Buddhism as a principle of criticism is also found in the writings of the Honganji-ha scholars, Honda Shizuyoshi

, and Inoue Yoshiyuki . Honda’s contribution is related to the debate on the social nature of shinjin (shinjin no shakaisei), and to the official position of the Honganji-ha’s Kikan Und (Central Move-ment), according to which shinjin is not to be considered simply as a mat-ter of one’s interiority, but as having a social dimension as well. This di-mension, as previously found in other authors, has for him been over-looked on account of the doctrinal formulation known as the Two Truths (shinzoku nitai) theory.295 Indeed, according to Honda, when the experi-

290 See Hishiki, 1998: 196-198, 200-201. 291 Hishiki, 1998: 201. 292 See Hishiki, 1998: 197-199, 201. 293 Hishiki, 2005: 116. 294 See Hishiki, 2005: 259. 295 Honda S., 1996: 77.


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ence of shinjin is internalized, the potential for criticism of Shin Buddhist teachings is missed, opening up the way to conservative and authoritarian views.296 However, he does think there is another choice, namely, Pure Land Buddhism as a principle of criticism, which finds expression in the Matt sh , where Shinran indicated the “rejection of the world” (yo o itou) as a characteristic of life in the nenbutsu,297 and in the first four vows in the Mury ju-ky , where Honda, like Obata Bunsh and Hishiki Masaharu, sees an implicit call against war, discrimination, and oppres-sion.298

According to Inoue Yoshiyuki, Shinran’s assertion that he knew “nothing at all of good or evil” does not mean their simplistic rejection. Rather, it implies the rejection of what Shinran terms the “poisoned and sundry good” (z doku zasshu no zen ), namely, those ac-tions or practices which one performs for one’s own exclusive conven-ience, and therefore represent the exact opposite of the true practice of the bodhisattva Dharm kara, which was instead characterized by a “true and real mind” (shinjitsushin ).299 Thus, Inoue claims that Dharm -kara’s practice provides both an example to understand the true meaning of compassion,300 and a principle of criticism in order to cope with and relativize the contradictions of this world, which should guide the action of the practitioner in everyday life constantly.301 In other words, for Inoue, the rejection of good and evil is not a critique of good acts or morality in itself, but of one’s attachment to jiriki, which results in a lack of reflec-tion and criticism of the self, and in a variety of different egoistic views about values.302 In his discussion on the models for practitioners’ every-day practice, Inoue also relies on the Buddhist idea of the interconnected-ness of all beings, which he finds reflected in the teachings of “no-self” (muga ), “emptiness” (k ), and “co-dependent origination” (engi), and further argues how also in Shinran a clear position on the conduct of

296 See Honda S., 1996: 97. 297 See Honda S., 2003: 257; and Honda S., 2004: 155. Cf. CWS I: 551; and JSS II: 742. 298 See Honda S., 2004: 157. 299 Inoue, 2001: 84-85. Cf. the Tannish , in CWS I: 679; and JSS II: 853; the Ky gy -shinsh , in CWS I: 96, 98; and JSS II: 233, 235. 300 See Inoue, 2000: 191. 301 See Inoue, 2001: 89. 302 See Inoue, 2001: 86; and Inoue, 2002: 100-101.


the nenbutsu follower finds expression in the Letters, where it is stated that the practitioner must “cast off the evil of this world” and “cease do-ing wretched deeds.”303

Reference to the Tannish , within the framework of an attempt to ar-ticulate critical aspects of Shin Buddhism, is also made by Kawamura Kakush . According to Kawamura, Shinran’s words in Chap-ter I of the Tannish , namely, “no good acts are required, because no good surpasses the nembutsu,” are meant to contrast the relative good in one’s life to the absolute good which is the Vow.304 In fact, for Kawa-mura, it is the Eighteenth Vow, with its reference to the three minds, the ten moments of thought, and the five heinous sins, which sets the stan-dard for a Shin Buddhist social ethics.305 He maintains that this Vow pro-vides, beyond any characterization of morality in terms of the shinzoku nitai theory—which is to be avoided because the transcendent cannot be disconnected from the mundane—a universal standpoint to relativize good and evil and to criticize the secular sphere from the perspective of Buddhist teaching (bupp kara b e no hihan no shisei

).306 For him, in addition, its universal potential ensures that it can apply both to those who have, and those who have not yet ob-tained shinjin.307

The last example provided here refers to Anzai Kenj , another author who is especially well known for his activism in opposing Yasukuni Shrine. Anzai links this activism to Shinran’s hostility to the worship of kami (jingi fuhai) found in many passages of the Ky gy shinsh , as, for example, the quotation from the Bosatsukai-ky , “the rule of the person who renounces worldly life” is “not to worship spirits” (kijin o rai sezu

).308 Also for Anzai, therefore, the Pure Land, far from be-ing a “utopia” (ris ky ), can be understood as a principle which allows for a critical approach to social reality (hihan genri).309 This is all the more evident, for him, from the fact that in Shinran there is no escap-

303 Inoue, 2001: 88-89. Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 547; and JSS II: 801. 304 Kawamura, 1999: 27. Cf. CWS I: 661; and JSS II: 832. 305 See Kawamura, 1999: 28. 306 See Kawamura, 1999: 32. 307 See Kawamura, 1999: 30. 308 Anzai, 1998: 80. Cf. CWS I: 274; and SS: 387. 309 See Anzai, 1998: 133.


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ism, “no other-worldly tendency,” and that, as it is explained in the J do-ron, the Pure Land is not another world separated from the present one, since it surpasses the state of existence of the three worlds, the past, the present and the future.310 On this basis Anzai can refer, like other pre-viously mentioned authors, to the anti-discriminatory meaning he finds expressed in the Fourth Vow as a principle for the practice of the nen-butsu follower, and even affirm the path towards salvation “as a social practice,” which reveals itself only through the encounter with the ‘other.’311

The debate which refers to the presence of a potential for social criti-cism is indeed one of the most developed within the context of contempo-rary Shin Buddhist ethics, as is nurtured by a non-negligible amount of doctrinal sources, a tested reciprocal relationship with social activism, and themes related to the equalitarian dimension of the teachings. Indeed, it is especially from these discussions that various views emerge, suggest-ing an approach to social ethics which goes beyond the traditional Shin Buddhist characterization of morality as a response in gratitude to Amida.

However diverse the approaches to this subject might be, it is possible to identify some recurring topics, such as Shinran’s rejection of kami worship, the suppression of the nenbutsu, and his reference, found in the Letters, to the signs which accompany the practice of the nenbutsu, which are often developed in close connection with each other. Chapter VI of the Ky gy shinsh provides a useful starting-point in this regard for many of the above-mentioned authors because of the abundance of pas-sages denying the necessity of paying homage to the native gods (jingi fuhai), and Shinran’s own description, found in the Postscript, of the events relating to the suppression of the exclusive practice of the nen-butsu. Within this context, the K fukuji petition is typically taken to indi-cate that H nen’s and Shinran’s understanding of the Pure Land teach-ings represented a threat to the inextricable nexus of religion and power of those times, and that, therefore, it can provide a standard so as to chal-lenge, also in the present, the claims of authority made by secular institu-tions. With reference to this aspect, particular emphasis is placed, for ex-ample, on Shinran’s lament against the contempt of the emperor and his ministers, on his affirmation of the autonomy of the nenbutsu from politi-

310 See Anzai, 1998: 106, 134. 311 See Anzai, 1998: 126-127.


cal patronage, and his claim to be neither a monk nor a layman, taken as a declaration of independence from official authorization. This is a critical approach to social reality which is also suggested, for some authors, by Shinran’s reference to the rejection of the world (yo o itou), that is, the evil in society. These themes have often provided the doctrinal founda-tions for forms of Shin Buddhist social activism that are critical of Yasu-kuni Shrine and of war, which will be presented in the next chapter. In this connection, a typical way of articulating the discourse on social criti-cism in Shin Buddhism, which is generally intertwined with the previous one, is also the recourse to the Pure Land as a principle of criticism (hi-han genri). Along this interpretative line, the qualities of the Pure Land are meant to provide the standard to measure the inconsistencies of this world, and to realize a society free of discrimination, oppression, and vio-lence.

A further relevant element found in these texts is the consideration that the internalization of the experience of shinjin tends to facilitate the emergence of authoritarian views, as is evident, for many authors, in the Two Truths theory (shinzoku nitai ron), which is blamed for having com-promised the ethical potential of shinjin with the secular authorities and the values, often alien to the Buddhist tradition, that they have proposed as a model for social relations. In this connection, other voices have in-stead valued approaches like that of Kiyozawa Manshi, which are thought to achieve a weakening of the claims of secular morality from the stand-point of spiritual awareness. This implies the total independence of the practitioners from non-religious factors, although at the same time it means that it is impossible to develop the contents of faith in the form of direct moral imperatives.

ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND HUMANISM

To conclude this introduction to the contemporary doctrinal debate on Shin Buddhist ethics, mention will be briefly made to a topic which oc-casionally emerges from within the writings of some of the above-men-tioned authors, and also in other texts, namely the critique of “anthro-pocentrism” (ningench shinshugi ) and “humanism” (hy manizumu ). Although this is a theme in its own right, it presents some similarities with the previous one since it is also char-acterized by the use of religious sources to criticize various aspects of so-cial reality. As a result of a strongly interpretative approach to the Euro-pean concept of humanism, here reductively understood as a subject-cen-


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tred way of thinking exclusively concerned with the welfare of human be-ings, and therefore anthropocentric, these two terms have been used, al-ternatively or simultaneously, as synonyms, indicating a vision of reality to which pressing contemporary problems such as the destruction of the environment, exploitation, war, economic-centred society, and loss of spiritual values should be ascribed. And, as such, they generally appear within the wider discussions on jiriki, the mind of self-power.

It may be interesting to note, however, that within the context of this critique of anthropocentrism and humanism, which is by no means exclu-sive to Shin Buddhism, the characteristic Buddhist concern about self-at-tachment merges, often implicitly, with other philosophical and ideologi-cal themes. These are themes that were already present, for example, in Meiji Buddhism’s criticisms of ‘western civilization’—which also found expression at the World’s Parliament of Religions held in Chicago in 1893312—in the speculations of authors like Suzuki Daisetsu or others linked to the Ky to School,313 where these concerns are combined with the critique of rationality found in twentieth-century European thought, and, more generally, in the anti-individualistic rhetoric found in texts like the Kokutai no hongi (Fundamentals of National Polity, 1937),314 which in turn was dependent on various ideas elaborated much earlier by Japanese Learning (kokugaku ), which still contributes strongly to the discourse on Japanese uniqueness (nihonjinron

).315 There is here therefore, at least sometimes, an implicit polemical intention in these contemporary Shin Buddhist discussions regarding an allegedly homogeneous ‘western culture,’ which is suggested by the re-ductive use itself of the term humanism. Not only is this rhetoric related to wider discussions taking place in contemporary thought, but it also can be seen to have deep roots in Japanese intellectual history.

A typical formulation of the polemical approach to these issues is pro-vided, for example, by Ogawa Ichij , in his discussion on bioethics and organ transplantation. Ogawa has criticized the pitfalls of contemporary society and its scientific rationalism on various occasions, the latter, in

312 See Ketelaar, 1991. 313 See especially Faure, 1995; and Sharf, 1995. 314 See, for example, Monbush and Monbush Ky gaku Kyoku, 2003: 4-6, 50-51, 152-156; cf. de Bary, Gluck, and Tiedemann, 2005: 968-975. 315 See, for example, Rambelli, 1996.


his opinion, finding its cultural basis in European humanism (transcribed as “hy manizumu”). Humanism, although starting historically as a way to value the capacities of the individual, has ended up in modern times, he argues, in providing the basis for capitalist society, where competition and striving for material prosperity are dominant, and for a world-view which focuses almost exclusively on material prosperity in the present, and on one’s individual life.316 In this sense, according to Ogawa, human-ism manifests itself as egoism, which, in order to meet the endless de-mands of welfare and efficiency by human beings, does not hesitate to marginalize the weak, create clones, and resort to organ transplanta-tion.317 As regards the last issue, he has especially insisted that such trans-plantation, since the life process is still functioning at the time of brain death, is a way to save a life by causing the death of someone else.318 Against this approach to reality and to the modern striving for a long life and material prosperity, Ogawa has argued that, from a Buddhist point of view, death should instead be accepted in the light of the teaching of im-permanence,319 and that all life, without exception, is equal and inter-related (inochi wa by d ).320

Equally critical of approaches to the world which are based on human-istic ideas is Honda Hiroyuki. According to Honda, the standpoint of humanism, which has developed in the context of European thought, is basically different from that maintained by Buddhism, since its focus is on this world, where human reason, the self, is taken to be the criterion for its own values.321 In this respect, the humanistic approach is equiva-lent, for him, to that of jiriki,322 and the sensibility typical of humanism is rather expressed by the “pity,” “commiseration,” and “care for beings” which is illustrated by Shinran in Chapter IV of the Tannish as a feature of the “Path of the Sages.”323 However, Honda notes, for Shinran these

316 See Ogawa, 2002c: 74, 139, 153. 317 See Ogawa, 2002c: 82-83; and Ogawa, 2002b: 13-14. 318 See Ogawa, 2002c: 158. 319 See Ogawa, 2002b: 15. 320 See Ogawa, 2005a: 43. 321 See Tanni no Kai, 2000: 17-18, 28. 322 See Tanni no Kai, 2000: 27-28. 323 “ .” Tanni no Kai, 2000: 23. Cf. CWS I: 663; and SS: 628.


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demands are extremely difficult to accomplish, and this is why he pres-ented the compassion of the Pure Land (j do no jihi ), that is, the practice of the nenbutsu, as the right compassionate concern for hu-man beings. Honda’s approach to humanism is thus intended as a critique of the self from the point of view of tariki.324

Hirata Atsushi has similarly argued that the cause of the current crisis of spiritual values, which is made evident by serious social problems and by the emergence of nihilism, egoism, and the struggle for efficiency, is to be traced to the egocentrism which dominates contempo-rary society.325 According to him, a way out of this crisis and from the pitfalls of anthropocentrism can be found only by questioning one’s shin-jin. For Hirata, Shinran’s approach to tariki is the clue for overcoming “the mind of self-power” (jiriki no kokoro ) and for taking, as a nenbutsu follower, one’s responsibilities within society.326 Only in this way are the Shin Buddhist practice of “sharing one’s faith with oth-ers” (jishin ky ninshin) and the realization of the universality of the Bud-dhist teachings achievable.327

Kawamura Kakush , who was mentioned previously, laments the ex-clusive emphasis which has been placed in post-war Japan upon individ-ual rights and on the dignity of the individual as a being separated from society, a view which he thinks reflects the typical anthropocentric atti-tude characteristic of humanism and requires a corrective from a Shin Buddhist religious point of view.328 Also for Kawamura, since Shinran’s main concern was to emphasize the egocentric nature of the self and its being trapped in blind passions, a true Shin Buddhist approach to social ethics should start from the overcoming of this self-centredness through Amida’s compassion, and the opening up of the dimension of the ‘oth-er.’329

Two examples of a milder approach towards humanism are provided by Tokunaga Michio, and Yasutomi Shin’ya. Tokunaga has recently ar-gued that the humanistic approach should not be considered sufficient to

324 See Tanni no Kai, 2000: 24. 325 See Hirata, 2001: 26-27. Hirata Atsushi belongs to the Honganji-ha. 326 Hirata, 2001: 39. Cf. the Tannish , in CWS I: 663; and JSS II: 833. 327 See Hirata, 2001: 39. 328 See Kawamura, 2001: 18-19; and Kawamura, 2002: 26. 329 See Kawamura, 2001: 20, 23.


face urgent social issues, because in the light of Shinran’s teachings the limits of human action are to be clearly recognized. In this regard he re-fers to the Postscript of the Tannish where it is emphasized that “with a foolish being full of blind passions” “all matters without exception are empty and false, totally without truth and sincerity,” and the “nembutsu alone is true and real.”330 Thus, Tokunaga also acknowledges that Bud-dhism should start from the standpoint of impermanence and no-self in order to provide an alternative system of values. At the same time, how-ever, he maintains that humanism should not be discarded altogether, so as not to alienate religion from public opinion.331

Yasutomi has argued that in Shin Buddhism, social activism is often not sufficiently grounded on the teachings, and there is, instead, a diffuse tendency to refer to humanistic values.332 Yasutomi, though acknowledg-ing the importance of the “humanism of the Renaissance,” also points out its intrinsic limitation, which he ascribes to the exclusive focus on the “welfare of the human being,” a trait revealing an “anthropocentric” standpoint.333 More recently, however, he has expressed some reserva-tions about positions inside Shin Buddhism which propose a radical anti-humanistic approach. 334 In fact, in Yasutomi’s view, the humanistic standpoint also presents similarities with the dimension of “togetherness” (warera) present in Shinran’s thought, which should be taken into ac-count in order to counter solipsistic tendencies in Shin Buddhism. Fur-thermore, he thinks that the insistent criticism against humanism might have negative repercussions on the appreciation of the discourse on hu-man rights.335

An articulated critique of the anti-humanistic standpoint has been re-cently advanced by Hishiki Masaharu, who has noted the bias which characterizes this approach, as expressed particularly in the Joint Decla-ration for the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Shin Bud-dhist Federation issued by the Shinsh Ky dan Reng

330 Tokunaga, 2001: 33-34. Cf. CWS I: 679; and JSS II: 853-854. 331 See Tokunaga, 2001: 33. 332 Yasutomi, 2002: 13. 333 Yasutomi, 2002: 14. 334 See Yasutomi, 2005. 335 Personal communication, 7 November 2005.


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(Shin Buddhist Federation) in September 2000.336 Here, writes Hishiki, the emancipative aspects of humanism are systematically obliterated, opening up the way for blaming this contribution of European thought for the major problems of modern society.337 Contrary to this approach, he maintains that the contribution of humanism to the evaluation of the dig-nity of the human being is not to be discarded. Rather, it is to be synthe-sized with those ideas which focus on the concept of social equality, and stress the dimension of “interconnectedness” of existence—a tendency which, he observes, is evident in streams of contemporary “western phi-losophy” as a way to deepen the discourse on humanism as well.338 Ac-cording to Hishiki, while the supporters of the anti-humanistic rhetoric assume to be espousing, through the idea of the “equality of life” (inochi no by d ), a critical view of society, they are, in fact, reformulating one of the concepts of the Japanese Buddhist tradition which has most often been used in order to justify social control, that is, the idea, found in the Mah y na Mah -parinirv õa-s tra, that “all people possess the Buddha-nature.” He claims that this concept, which is based on an animistic wor-ship of nature, was later assimilated into medieval “exoteric-esoteric Buddhism” (kenmitsu Bukky ), coming then to be interpreted, by extension, as meaning that “all beings (mountains, rivers, plants, and trees) can reach enlightenment” (sansen s moku shikkai j butsu

). On this basis, Hishiki argues, the way for the confusion of the domains of nature and society was laid bare, a framework within which “no discontinuity” came eventually to be seen “between love for the scenery and patriotism,” which is also evident, for example, in the Fundamentals of National Polity (Kokutai no hongi).339 He notes that in the “anti-humanistic” rhetoric it is thus possible to find at work those same ideological traits which were used to justify Japan’s imperialism as

336 Shinsh Ky dan Reng kessei sanj sh nen ky d sengen

. See Hishiki, 2005: 19. Cf. Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. Cf. Appendix 5. 337 See Hishiki, 2005: 20. 338 Hishiki, 2003b: 21. 339 See Hishiki, 2005: 25-26, 100-101. Hishiki makes, in the text, explicit reference to the critique of hongaku shis formulated by the exponents of Critical Buddhism (Hihan Bukky ); see Hishiki, 2005: 120. See also Hubbard and Swanson, 1997. For a recent analysis of the ideological use of the s moku j butsu idea in Japanese Buddhism, see Rambelli, 2001.


a mission to liberate Asia from the menace of western powers. According to Hishiki, the supporters of this standpoint are however unwilling to ad-dress this genealogy critically.340

It is interesting to note that elements of the critique of anthropocen-trism and humanism emerge from within the two Honganji, and more in general from within the Shin Buddhist denomination, also at the official level. The position held by Ogawa Ichij , who is also the current head of the tani-ha Research Institute for Doctrinal Studies (Shinsh tani-ha Ky gaku Kenky sho ), has already been men-tioned. A further recent example is provided by the New Year’s speech of the Honganji-ha monshu in January 2006, in connection with the celebra-tions for the 750th anniversary of Shinran’s death.341 In it, the danger of the increasing influence of the “anthropocentric way of thinking” (nin-gench shin no kangae ) is stressed, which leads to a des-perate search for profit, leading to inequality, thus threatening the subsist-ence of many forms of life. This phenomenon is to be countered, it is stated, through a life in the nenbutsu guided by Amida’s wisdom and compassion.342

However, the most clearly articulated official Shin Buddhist statement related to anthropocentrism and humanism is perhaps to be found in the text of the above-mentioned Joint Declaration for the Thirtieth Anniver-sary of the Foundation of the Shin Buddhist Federation, issued in 2000.343 Reference to this theme had already been made by the same Shin Buddhist Federation in a previous statement issued on the occasion of its twentieth anniversary in 1989, where it affirmed that “the reliance on an anthropocentric standpoint is not possible” (ningench shinshugi ni tatsu koto wa dekimasen ) on the basis of an understanding of the human condition as that of “foolish beings” (bonbu).344 In the Declaration of 2000, however, which specifically ad-dresses “humanism” (hy manizumu), the criticism is formulated more di-rectly and combined with rhetorical elements already found in other au-thors. As such, and because it is meant to represent the view on contem-

340 See Hishiki, 2005: 20, 22-23. 341 The anniversary will recur in 2012 for the Honganji-ha, and in 2011 for the tani-ha. 342 See Honganji shinp , 1 January 2006: 6. 343 Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. See Appendix 5. 344 See Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 4 September 1989.


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porary society of the Shin Buddhist denomination in its complexity, it de-serves to be considered in some detail.

The text starts with a reference to the past responsibilities of the reli-gious community in discriminatory practices, and in supporting war, and emphasizes the importance for Shin Buddhism to return to the teachings of Shinran in order to give a positive contribution towards a better society. In the first section, one can find a critique of the pitfalls of modern mass production society, the dangers for the environment, competition as a key feature of the modern economy, and the consequent loss of common trust, the collapse of the family as an institution, and related problems in the educational field, the cause of which is identified in humanism. This is a critical situation, according to the text, which is aggravated by the fact that modern society is “proud of this humanistic approach” (hy mani-zumu e no ogori ), which fosters the view that pursuing the aim of wealth is a natural right. This “exclusive focus on the present world” (genseshugi ) manifests itself also in the yearn-ing for a healthy and long life, and in the interest in immediate, worldly benefits.

Organ transplantation and genetic manipulation, it is stated in the sec-ond section, are also conducted in “the spirit of humanism, which sees no limits for human knowledge,”345 and are, in fact, the expression of the tendency to see human life in purely utilitarian terms. “Buddhist spir-ituality” (Bukky seishin ) and the “Shin Buddhist teachings” (Shinsh no oshie ), it is affirmed, can however provide an alternative way to cope with these serious problems. From the beginning, ø kyamuni had taught that life is interconnected and equal for all beings due to the chain of cause and conditions,346 and this stress on the equality of all life is reflected, it is argued here, in the idea of “fellow companions and practitioners” (on-d b on-d gy ) fostered by Shinran. This attention to “life” (inochi ) is presented as a clue for opposing the lack of re-lationships in modern society—that is, the illusion that one can live inde-pendently from other beings and that one’s existence is a private affair (‘inochi’ o shiy ka shite iru arikata ‘ ’ )—

345 “ .” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. 346 “ ‘ ’

.” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000.


and the false belief that one can be satisfied by exclusive attention to a long and healthy life.

The text, then, illustrates that the source of this true “life” is the work of Amida’s Primal Vow (Amida Nyorai no hongan ), and that through the nenbutsu it is possible to awaken to it, and “to follow the path towards true happiness” (shin no shiawase o motomete ikiru michi ). In conclusion, the way of “living ac-cording to the Shin Buddhist teachings” (Shinsh no oshie ni ikiru

) is summarized in two points. Firstly, the importance of “becoming aware that we are living in a way that privatizes ‘life’,”347 and “to aim at peace and equality with all forms of ‘life’ on the earth” is stressed.348 And, secondly, the necessity of “insisting on questioning the meaning of human life”349 in the current “process of de-humanization” (hiningenka ) which is going on in the twenty-first century is emphasized.

The core of this text, therefore, lies in the articulation of the ideal of a true “life” (inochi) opposed to a “privatization of life” (inochi no shiy ka), along the lines provided by the co-dependent origination theory (mus mury no innen) and its expression found in Shinran’s teaching through the ideal of “fellow companions and practitioners”—which is here intend-ed to imply the equality of all beings. Awareness (jikaku) of a dimension of “life,” which is considered as the working of Amida’s Vow itself, is opened up through the practice of the nenbutsu and is the precondition for a world free of conflicts and discrimination. Within this framework, the critique of humanism comes to occupy a central place, not only in the analysis related to the past century (nij seiki no owari ni atatte

), but also in that which focuses on the present challenges for the new century (nij ichi seiki e no kadai

), providing throughout the text a negative standard for the right ap-proach of the practitioners to contemporary society.

347 “ ‘ ’ .” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. 348 “ ‘ ’ .” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. 349 “ .” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000.


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Absent from this text is any reference to the cultural legacy of human-ism in the development of the discourse on peace and the dignity of life, that one might suppose also finds its expression in “the principles of re-nunciation of war, freedom of religion, and separation of state and reli-gion” (sens h ki, shinky no jiy , seiky bunri no gensoku

) of the Japanese Constitution, all of which are critically defended by the Shinsh Ky dan Reng in other contexts.350 Here, instead, the positing of the “spirit of humanism” (hy manizumu no seishin) as a homogeneous, negative ‘other,’ is the premise for the affir-mation of Buddhist spirituality as the exclusive solution to the problems of the contemporary world. In fact, as it is stated in the final part of the second section, “along the search for a wisdom which can overcome hu-manism, there is no other way than that offered by Buddhism.”351

This pattern, which is traceable also in other texts, suggests how the contemporary discourse on ethics within Shin Buddhism may overlap with the rhetoric of occidentalism.352 In this regard, it is possible to note how equalitarian and critical aspects of the teachings can be used not only from an anti-authoritarian viewpoint, to justify an engagement for peace or social welfare as in many of the above-mentioned examples (and in the context of the social activism which will be illustrated in the next chap-ter), but also to affirm a hegemonic agenda which is aimed at reinforcing the prestige and the unique features of Buddhist spirituality, and affirm-ing its superiority. And these two strategies can coexist, as in the example given above, even within the same textual context.

350 See Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 14 January 2003. This is the text of a letter of protest related to the visit to Yasukuni Shrine made by Prime Minister Koizumi in January 2003. 351 “

.” Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 29 September 2000. 352 For some recent examples, see Ogawa, 2005: 118; Nakanishi, 2004: 22-27; and Shin-sh , July 2004: 37. For a similar approach within the broader context of Japanese Bud-dhism, see, for example, Japan Buddhist Federation, 2004: 58. For the place this rhetoric occupies in some of the Japanese new religions, see Chapter Four, and Kisala, 1999a: 158-188. For a more detailed discussion on Shin Buddhism and occidentalism, see Chap-ter Four. See also Dessì, 2006.

Chapter 3 __________________________________________________

Shin Buddhism and Social Practice in ContemporaryJapan Perhaps one of the most remarkable features in contemporary Shin Bud-dhism is represented by the simultaneous presence of an almost radical aversion to a normative approach to ethics, a rich and multifaceted debate on ethics—which was outlined in the last chapter—and an interesting amount of social activism. Among the five themes which have been se-lected in order to give an account of the current doctrinal debate, it is es-pecially those referring to the potential for social criticism and to the equalitarian dimension of the teachings that have a direct connection with the activities of Shin Buddhist practitioners aimed at confronting social problems. The ethical implications of the idea of birth ( j ) in the Pure Land and shinjin tend to occupy a more limited role though contributing with their basic assumptions to the general framework of ref-erence, while the issue of anthropocentrism and humanism seems to e-merge on an occasional basis.

Needless to say, engagement in society does not flow, in Shin Bud-dhism, directly from the doctrinal debate engaged at the scholarly level. That social practice may interact at some point with the reflection on the teachings, conversely, is suggested by the presence for instance of vari-ous scholars within the religious community who have been, and in many cases still continue to be, engaged in social activism. At a more general level, it may be argued that a similar exchange has allowed the D b movement inside the two Honganji, of which the doctrinal basis lies mainly in the ideal of equality as found in Shinran’s writings, to engage


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in issues of social discrimination, and thus stimulate new discussions which in many cases are still in progress at the scholarly level.

It is also noticeable that the traditional limitations posed by the doc-trine of tariki in the discourse on ethics in Shin Buddhism do not seem to impose a corresponding restriction either on expectations of high stan-dards of morality, or on the engagement of practitioners in social issues.1 That the expectation for the practitioners’ moral behaviour may be rather high among Shin Buddhists is suggested, for example, by various surveys conducted by the Honganji-ha. In the seventh of these surveys, which dates from 1996, the rate of practitioners (monto ) interviewed who “strongly agree with” or “agree with” the statement “A religious person should also be moral in all aspects of one’s daily life,” was about 68%, while only 3,4% of them “disagree with” or “strongly disagree with” this.

Interestingly enough, there also emerges here a conspicuous difference between the responses given by the monto, and by the priests of local temples (j shoku ) and their wives (b mori ). In fact, 48% and 10% respectively of the latter were reported to ‘strongly agree/agree with’ and ‘disagree with/strongly disagree with’ the aforementioned statement. The analysis of the same data provided by Kuchiba Masuo

and Funahashi Kazuo suggests that this discrepancy may be due to the “difference in the depth of understanding the relation-ship of religion and morals in Shin Buddhism, between the two catego-ries.” The issue remains however somewhat obscure, since no further characterization of the contents of the moral behaviour in question is pro-vided in the text of the survey.2

As far as Shin Buddhist social activism is concerned, it may also be suggested that the application of critical aspects of Shin Buddhist reli-giosity to particular social issues does not necessarily require the devel-opment of new discourses which might conflict with orthodoxy. An il-lustration of this case is provided by the activities related to the Yasukuni Shrine issue, which will be given below. In other cases, it seems that a

1 For the connection between “salvation and ethical action” in Shin Buddhism during the Tokugawa period, see, for example, Bellah, 1957: 117-122; and Van Bragt, 1990a: 59. 2 See Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 92, 106. The survey was conducted on a total of 10,105 monto (5,061 male and 5,044 female), 5,173 j shoku, and 5,173 b mori. The data provided by this survey should be taken with some caution, as they may represent the opinions of a particular sector of practitioners, which is closer to the local temples and their activities.

3. Shin Buddhism and Social Practice 143

generic reference to Shinran’s ideal of fellowship may have met the need for religious identity on the part of the groups involved.

Shin Buddhist activism in contemporary Japan has assumed various forms, from the recent strong commitment to peace, to an interest—which has indeed been prominent throughout the post-war period—in is-sues of discrimination, and social welfare. While the latter has a consoli-dated tradition in the history of Japanese Buddhism as a whole, despite the decline in the immediate post-war period, the anti-discrimination and anti-war activities inside this particular denomination represent in many respects a phenomenon typical of the twentieth century, which has be-come a central issue for Shin Buddhist institutions especially since the 1960s. In the following sections, attention will be paid mainly to these two aspects, which, far from being exhaustive of the totality of social ac-tivities that are currently carried out by Shin Buddhists, may nevertheless be considered representative of the main trends which currently char-acterize this religious denomination.3 These activities, despite their sub-stantial agreement with the official positions voiced by the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, are admittedly—perhaps with the sole exception of the Vih ra movement—the expression of a small minority of priests and practitioners inside these two branches of Shin Buddhism. Nor does the direct involvement of the institutions generally correspond to an in-creased participation in social activism, a fact which is occasionally re-marked and lamented upon by some of the writers who were mentioned in the previous chapter. While there are reasons to believe that important sectors of Shin Buddhism are wary of forms of engaged Buddhism which could entail the performance of good acts mediated by self-power (jiriki), the role that the institutions have often played (and in many cases are still playing) in supporting, or at least in providing a meaningful framework to those attempts to find a renewed link between the reference points of reli-gious identity and the demands of an increasingly complex social reality, should not be neglected.

Although the role of the leadership seems to remain central in mediat-ing between the doctrinal level and the reality of a huge number of fol-lowers and temples all around Japan, this is not to say that in Shin Bud-

3 For a recent detailed analysis of gender roles in Shin Buddhism, see Heidegger, 2006. Among the other important but less debated problems, it is worth mentioning, for example, the issue of the long history of discrimination against the indigenous Ainu and the question of the death penalty.


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dhist activism new directions or ideas automatically come from the insti-tutions themselves. In fact, the Shin Buddhist community is especially characterized by the presence of many groups at the local level, often small and short-lived, but nonetheless quite active, whose social practice, as in some of the cases which will be illustrated below, can achieve an appreciable degree of influence. Rather, it may be argued that up to now the central institutions and those sectors of the religious community pressing for a more positive involvement in society have occasionally succeeded in finding a significant balance, even if, quite understandably, it would satisfy neither many of the religious activists, nor those who stress the primacy of a rich interior spirituality. It is therefore subject to continuous renegotiation. This need for negotiation continues to inform significant statements addressed to large audiences of followers, as, for example, those indicating that the mind of shinjin, transformed through Amida’s compassion, can work “for the benefit of the world and other people” (yo no tame hito no tame ), or that “the aim” of Shin Buddhism is “to realize a society of fellow companions” (d b shakai o jitsugen suru koto o mokuteki to suru

).4

WAR, PEACE, AND YASUKUNI SHRINE

There has been in the last few years in Japan a progressive involvement of religious organizations in civil society over issues of war and peace. As has been recently noted by Helen Hardacre, this renewed confidence received attention from the media at the time of the military invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, but actually dates back at least to the debate over the New Guidelines Bill in 1999.5 On that occasion, which marked the deployment of a more aggressive stance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), clothed in the rhetoric of peace and security, over the issue of the employment of the Self Defence Forces (SDF) outside Japan, there was strong popular opposition with the participation of Japanese Buddhism,

4 The two references are respectively from the J do Shinsh hikkei (The Shin Buddhist Companion) published by the Honganji-ha, and from the Constitution of the tani-ha, the Shinsh tani-ha sh ken ; see J do Shinsh Honganji-ha, 2004: 82; and Shinsh tani-ha, 2004: 2. 5 See Helen Hardacre, 2004: 408.


New Religions and Christianity, as the new measures were perceived as a breach of the post-war Constitution, which enshrines in its Article 9 the “renunciation of war” (sens no h ki ).6

In June 1999, the tani-ha issued a statement against the enactment of that bill, on the basis of the ideals of d b (“fellow companions”) promoted by the founder Shinran, and hy ga muy (“no need for soldiers or weapons”) found in the Mury ju-ky .7 Since then, when-ever there have been particularly important political junctures, the two Honganji head temples have not failed to express their positions at an of-ficial level. At the time of the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, both the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha issued messages of condemnation and successive official calls to the United States and Great Britain for a peaceful solution and the stopping of military opera-tions against Afghanistan.8 On the occasion of the military attack on Iraq in March 2003, launched by the United States and Great Britain, both the Honganji head temples and the Shinsh Ky dan Reng issued statements against such military operations.9 Domestically, at the time of the submission and enactment of the Three Emergency Bills, con-

6 The text of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that: “1. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 2. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized” (

). See K dansha, 1985: 15-16, 114. Loose interpretations of both these paragraphs opened the way to the creation of the Self Defence Forces as early as 1954 and to a steady increase in the annual rate in Japan’s actual military expenditure. The same can be said, for example, of the progressive involvement of the Self Defence Forces in peace-keeping operations under the umbrella of the United Nations, and of Japan’s recent support to the so-called ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the United States and Great Britain and to its invasion of Iraq. Cf. Bailey, 1996: 44, 76, 119, 181-182. 7 For the Shinsh tani-ha statement against the enactment of the New Guidelines Bill, see Shinsh , July 1999: 3. For the concepts of d b and hy ga muy , see respectively Chapter One and the Introduction to this present study. 8 See Shinsh , October 2001: 7-10; and November 2001: 10; Honganji shinp , 20 Sep-tember 2001: 1; and 1 October 2001: 1. 9 See Shinsh , April 2003: 4; and Honganji shinp , 1 April 2003: 2.


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cerning Japan’s response to a potential military attack from abroad, the two Honganji protested,10 as they did in December 2003, when the gov-ernment approved a basic plan to dispatch SDF units to Iraq.11 These pub-lic positions, which are generally characterized by a clear-cut approach and a relative scarcity of direct references to doctrinal sources, represent both the reply of these large institutions to pressing external problems, and the result of a process of internal rethinking of the role of Shin Bud-dhism during the imperialistic period and its war responsibilities.

Shin Buddhism, in fact, like most of the Japanese religious denomina-tions, actively cooperated with the Japanese war effort starting in 1894 with the Sino-Japanese War. Indeed, both the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha had previously taken part, the former flanking the Tokugawa govern-ment, and the latter as supporter of the emperor, in the War of Res-toration (Boshin Sens ), the civil war which led to, and briefly followed, the Meiji Restoration of 1868. At that time, both head temples actively supported the armies of these factions, with financial resources and volunteers. Even illustrious Shin Buddhist figures like Nanj Bun’y

(1849-1927) and Shimaji Mokurai (1838-1911)served in units of Buddhist soldiers.12 The assistance given by Shin Bud-dhism, and especially by the tani-ha, to the colonization of Hokkaid , was a prelude to cooperation with the aggressive foreign policy inaugu-rated by the state with the Sino-Japanese War, when the Shin Buddhist denomination “encouraged its members to buy war bonds and donate money and valuables to the armed forces.”13 From then on also, “these missionary efforts became so closely associated with Japan’s continental policies that after each war Japan fought, Buddhist missionary efforts expanded accordingly,” even providing “shelter for Japanese troops” and espionage activities.14 At the same time various attempts were made to provide a religious justification for the wars of aggression.15 Among the religious arguments which were often used by Shin Buddhists to justify

10 See Shinsh , July 2003: 8-9; Honganji shinp , 20 June 2003: 3; and Bukky taimusu, 13 June 2002: 4. 11 See Shinsh , January 2004: 12; and Honganji shinp , 20 December 2003: 2. 12 See Ketelaar, 1990: 71-72, 249. 13 Davis, 1989: 326-327. 14 Victoria, 1997: 17, 65. See also Hishiki, 1993: 56. 15 See Victoria, 1997: 17; Ives, 1999; and Hur, 1999: 115.


their commitment in what was commonly presented as a holy war, classi-cal loci were the nexus between death on the battlefield/rebirth in the Pure Land, the identification of the emperor with Amida, and of the Na-tional Polity (kokutai ) with the Pure Land itself.16 The adherence of Shin Buddhism to Japanese imperialism and to its effort during the Pacif-ic War was so deep-rooted and pervasive, with the exception of the anti-war positions of an exiguous minority of priests, that although first the Honganji-ha and shortly afterwards the tani-ha formally joined the movement known as Buddhism of the Imperial Way (K d Bukky

) only towards the end of the war, there was, as has been noted by others, “nothing fundamentally new in this development,” which was on-ly a completion of the previous policy of the sect.17

The aforementioned process of the rethinking of past war responsibili-ties by the Shin Buddhist community has led to the issuance of anti-war declarations by both the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha and to the assump-tion of a clear pacifist stance on the basis of the teachings of Buddhism and Shinran. The tani-ha first acknowledged its war responsibilities in 1987, when, on the occasion of the Memorial for the Victims of All Wars, the then chief administrator (sh mus ch ) deplored the “er-rors” (ayamachi ) committed by the religious community in support-ing Japanese imperialism, and termed its “having presented the war as a ‘holy war’” as a “double lie” (sono sens o ‘seisen’ to yobu koto wa nij no kyogi de arimasu < >

).18 Later on, in June 1995, the tani-ha issued an anti-war resolution (fusen ketsugi ), where expression was once again given to re-gret for the support given to Japanese imperialism and for the great suf-fering inflicted especially upon Asian people, as well as to a “vow to avoid war” (fusen no chikai ), aiming at “the realization of a peaceful world” (heiwana kokusai shakai no kensetsu

) and “love for the fellow companions within the four seas” (shikai d b e no itsukushimi ).19

16 See Rogers, 1991: 331-332; Ives, 1999: 101; and Tokunaga and Bloom, 2000: 200-201. 17 Victoria, 1997: 85.18 See Shinsh , May 1987: 9-11; and Victoria, 1997: 152-153. See also Appendix 1. 19 For the anti-war resolution issued in June 1995, see Shinsh , July 1995: 14; and Tama-mitsu, 1995: 110.


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The Honganji-ha first acknowledged its war responsibilities in Febru-ary 1991, when, in an official statement mainly focusing on the Gulf War, reference was made to its own “collaboration in past wars” (kako no sens ky ryoku ), and to the fact that the denomination ended “by overlooking the essence of Shin Buddhism” (J do Shinsh no honshitsu o miushinawaseta jijitsu ), especially through a misuse of the “Two Truths” (shinzoku nitai

) theory. There followed in the text a call to the religious community to make “repentance” (sange ) for its misdeeds and to advocate peace, according to Shinran’s teaching expressed by the words “May there be peace in the world, and may the Buddha’s teaching spread” (yo no naka an’on nare, bupp hiromare ).20 Similar statements have been issued subsequently, and in April 1995 were even-tually reformulated on the occasion of the memorial held on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II (Sh sen goj sh nen zensen-botsusha s tsuit h y ).21 More recently, in May 2004, the Honganji-ha has officially invalidated wartime directives from 1931 to 1945 calling for war cooperation.22

Besides the various publications of the tani-ha and Honganji-ha, a focus on peace and war responsibilities currently characterizes other ac-tivities within these two branches of Shin Buddhism as well. The tani-ha, for example, holds annually in April the aforementioned Memorial for the Victims of All Wars (Zensenbotsusha tsuich h -e

) at the Higashi Honganji in concurrence with the Haru no h y (“Spring service”), which also hosts public lectures on the theme of

peace, and, in the same period, an annual Anti-war/Peace Exhibition (Hi-sen/heiwa ten ).23 Similar peace concerns are also found in the memorial held by the Honganji-ha for all the war dead (Zensenbotsu-sha tsuit h y ) at the Chidorigafuchi Memorial Park in T ky in September every year, and in the annual Exhibition on

20 Honganji shinp , 10 March 1991: 1. The quotation is from the Shinran Sh nin go-sh -sokush ; see CWS I: 560. See also Appendix 2. 21 See Honganji shinp , 1 May 1995: 1; and Kikan Und Honbu Jimukyoku, 2000: 40-52. 22 See Honganji shinp , 1 June 2004: 5. 23 See Appendix 4.


Human Rights (Jinken paneru ten ), held every December and January in the facilities of the head temple, the Nishi Honganji.24

The discourse on pacifism in Shin Buddhism is tightly linked to a strongly critical attitude towards Yasukuni Shrine and to the successive attempts which have been made by the ruling political parties to change the status of this Shint institution, in which the military dead from the Japanese wars since the Meiji period have been enshrined. Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni jinja ) was originally established in T ky in 1869 as T ky sh konsha , as a place to honour and worship those who had been killed in the Boshin War on the eve of the Meiji Res-toration, and became until the end of the World War II the centre of Japa-nese militaristic propaganda through the enshrinement and deification of the war dead as eirei (“glorious [war] spirits”). In this connection, one of the most controversial issues presently related to this institution is that since 1978 fourteen convicted Class-A war criminals, included T jo Hideki, Japan’s leader during World War II, have been enshrined there together with the other war dead as “martyrs of the Sh wa era” (Sh wa junnansha ).25 Yasukuni Shrine is registered, under the 1952 law, as a Religious Juridical Person (Sh ky h jin ) and there-fore, according to the Japanese post-war Constitution, it cannot receive any state support. However, starting from the 1950s, especially because of the pressure of conservative Diet members and the lobbying of groups like the Japan Association of the Bereaved (Nihon Izokukai ), various attempts have been made to re-establish such support for the shrine and to make it a public institution, as it had been under Japanese militarism. This trend culminated in the presentation by the Liberal Dem-ocratic Party of the so-called Yasukuni Bill (Yasukuni h an ), which was actually defeated on five different occasions during the period from 1969 and 1974, particularly because of the strong opposition by vast sectors of civil society, and religious groups, with the participation also of Shin Buddhism.26

There are different themes underlying Shin Buddhist opposition to Yasukuni Shrine, such as the passages of Shinran’s works against the

24 See Appendix 10. 25 See Hardacre, 1989: 148. 26 See Murakami, Sh., 1980: 158-159. Cf. Hardacre, 1989: 146-148; and Bailey, 1996: 158.


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worship of kami and the enshrinement of spirits (jingi fuhai ),27 the principle of the separation of religion and state, and the concern that the state officials’ homage to the eirei enshrined in Yasukuni, as an un-critical approach to past war responsibilities, may offer a negative model for the younger generations to follow.

Since the time of the presentation of the Yasukuni Bill in the late 1960s, Shin Buddhism, together with the majority of the Japanese reli-gious world, has challenged the Liberal Democratic Party and its policies over Yasukuni Shrine as well as, in particular, the visits of prime minis-ters to the shrine. This opposition has been pursued both at an institu-tional level and by the actions of individuals, especially with recourse to lawsuits.

Noteworthy, in this regard, is the series of official notes of protest which have been regularly issued by both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, individually or through the Shinsh Ky dan Reng , on the occasion of, or to warn against, visits paid by state officials to the shrine. This also applies to the recent annual visits to the shrine (Yasukuni sanpai

) commenced by former Prime Minister Koizumi after his election in April 2001, expressly to pay homage to those enshrined there who had died for their country. While concern regarding not worshiping spirits or kami (which is admittedly largely disregarded by many of the practition-ers themselves) does not appear in the text of the written protest issued by the Shinsh Ky dan Reng referring to the last of these visits, made by Koizumi in October 2005, great emphasis has been placed on one of the above-mentioned themes, the issue of “freedom of religion, and separa-tion of religion and state” (shinky no jiy to seiky bunri

). The visit as such is seen as state interference in the activities of Yasukuni Shrine, which is a religious organization (sh ky dantai

) honouring the eirei.28 In another statement issued by the Hon-ganji-ha in January 2004 to protest against the then Prime Minister’s New Year’s visit to the shrine, which begins with the issue of freedom of reli-

27 See, for example, CWS I: 255, and SSZ II: 175, for two of the classic passages which are found in the Ky gy shinsh : “If one has taken refuge in the Buddha, one must not further take refuge in various gods” ; and “Do not serve other teachings, do not worship devas, do not enshrine spirits, do not heed days con-sidered lucky” . 28 See Shinsh Ky dan Reng , 17 October 2005; and Appendix 3. Implicit reference is made in the text to Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution.


gion, themes of war responsibility and peace are also addressed and are directly linked to the motivations underlying the written protest. Here, plain reference is made to the responsibilities of Yasukuni Shrine in glo-rifying war and those who have died for the sake of Japanese militarism, to which the Shin Buddhist community also gave its support (kokka sei-saku ni sand shite ), even though this went “a-gainst the teachings of the founder Shinran” (Sh so Shinran Sh nin no oshie ni somuite ). From this text there emerges repentance for those errors, and the opposition to the Prime Min-ister’s visit to the shrine assumes, for the religious community, the mean-ing of a renewed longing for “no-war and peace” (hi-sen/heiwa

), the respect for the “dignity of life” (inochi no songen ), and the construction of a “society of fellow companions” (go-d b no shakai ).29

The concern of these Shin Buddhist institutions with the issue of Yasukuni Shrine is also seen in the contents of books and journals printed by the publishing sections of the Honganji-ha (Honganji Shuppansha

), and the tani-ha (Higashi Honganji Shuppanbu ), and by the fact that the same topic has found its way into the

curriculum for the training of ky shi (“teachers of the doctrine”) within the tani-ha, or, again, in the official programme of the Kikan Und (Central Movement) within the Honganji-ha (Kikan Und keikaku

).30

On the level of action promoted either by individuals or by groups of adherents to Shin Buddhism, it is interesting to note that in the 1980s and 1990s, Shin Buddhist priests led several groups of plaintiffs, as in the case of the Ehime tamagushiry lawsuit, and other lawsuits against the official visit to Yasukuni Shrine made by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1985. In the case of the Ehime tamagushiry lawsuit, for instance, which was brought in 1982 by a coalition of citizens and reli-gionists, the leader of the plaintiffs was the tani-ha priest Anzai Kenj

.31 The plaintiffs were seeking the restitution of funds expended by the Ehime prefecture for ceremonies held at Yasukuni Shrine and the

29 See J do Shinsh Honganji-ha, 1 January 2004. 30 See Kikan Und Honbu Jimukyoku, 2001: 17. 31 For Anzai, see also Chapter Two.


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local gokoku jinja ,32 which had started from 1981, and in April 1997 Japan’s Supreme Court finally ruled the unconstitutionality of the prefecture’s expenditure of public funds.33 In his book J do no kaifuku

(The Recovering of the Pure Land) published in 1998, Anzai acknowledges the backing given by the religious community to the group of plaintiffs during the fifteen years of their fight, and affirms that a criti-cal attitude towards Yasukuni Shrine comes directly from “living in ac-cordance to Shinran’s teachings.”34

This line of engagement in the public sphere through legal action by Shin Buddhist priests and practitioners remains strong even today, as has been shown on the occasion of the recent visits by former Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. In the majority of lawsuits which were filed in various Japanese District Courts following his first visit to the shrine in August 2001, the groups of plaintiffs were led and coordinated by Shin Buddhist priests of one, or both, of the two major branches, the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha.35 In the case of the so-called Shikoku lawsuit (Shikoku sosh ), which was filed in November 2001 in Matsuyama District Court demand-ing that Yasukuni Shrine no longer permit visits by the Prime Minister, the leader of the plaintiffs was the tani-ha priest Kikuchi Masaaki

. The lawsuit stated that “for no reason should death be glorified” (shi wa ikanaru imi de mo sanbi sarete wa naranai

), and Kikuchi himself claims that the state should ‘return the dead’ to their own relatives.36 Another example is offered by the so-called Asia lawsuit (Ajia sosh

), similar to that of the Shikoku one in that this is a legal ac-tion against Yasukuni Shrine, which, for the first time, was made a defen-dant. Here, the representative of the plaintiffs is the Honganji-ha priest Sugawara Ry ken , who links his action in court to Shinran’s

32 The gokoku jinja (“nation-protecting shrines”), are those honoring the war dead at a local level whose functions are similar to those of Yasukuni Shrine. See Hardacre, 1989: 90, 92. 33 See Anzai, 1998:17; and Tanaka N., 2002: 202. 34 Anzai, 1998: 19. 35 See Sh kan kin’y bi, 23 August 2002: 26-29; and 20 February 2004: 18-21; and Mai-nichi shinbun ( saka evening edition), 1 November 2001: 9. 36 See Sh kan kin’y bi, 23 August 2002: 29; and Tanaka N., 2002: 239-240.


teaching of jingi fuhai, while, at the general level, these activists under-stand their engagement, in the words of the secretary of the group of plaintiffs and tani-ha Shin Buddhist scholar Hishiki Masaharu

, as a “campaign for peace” against Prime Minister Koizumi’s “glo-rification of war.” 37 On 30 September 2005, the group of plaintiffs of the Asia lawsuit gained front stage in the Japanese media, when the saka High Court stated that the Prime Minister’s visits were to be considered both official acts and religious activities, thus violating Article 20 of the Constitution.38 In these lawsuits, where many of the hundreds who joined the group of plaintiffs were Taiwanese and Korean, and still in other cases, it is possible to detect an interesting level of interaction not only between the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, but also among other religious denominations and various citizens’ groups. While other lawsuits which have been recently filed are still going on in Upper Courts, the Yamaguchi-Ky sh one (Yamaguchi-Ky sh sosh

) which was filed in the Fukuoka District Court, was set-tled in April 2004, since the plaintiffs decided not to appeal after the Court, while not accepting their demand for compensation, did rule the unconstitutionality of Koizumi’s visit to the shrine on the grounds that he went there in his official capacity. In this case too the leader of the plain-tiffs was a Shin Buddhist priest, Gunjima Tsuneaki of the Hon-ganji-ha. The decision of the Fukuoka District Court received noticeable coverage by the media, and provoked vigorous reactions from the Shint establishment, while both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha issued, at that time, official comments emphasizing both the significance and the appro-priateness of the verdict.39

The aforesaid lawsuits filed in the 1980s against Prime Minister Naka-sone date back also to the formation at the institutional level of two groups, J do Shinsh Honganji-ha Han-Yasukuni Rentai Kaigi

(J do Shinsh Honganji-ha Anti-Yasukuni Joint Conference) and Shinsh tani-ha Han-Yasukuni Zenkoku Ren-rakukai (Shinsh tani-ha Anti-Yasu-kuni National Liaison Group). These two were closely related to those of

37 See Sugawara, 2004: 100, 106; and Hishiki, 2003c: 102. For Hishiki’s discussion on Shin Buddhist ethics, see Chapter Two. 38 See Mainichi shinbun (evening edition), 30 September 2005: 1, 21. 39 See Ch gai nipp , 10 April 2004: 1.


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the ongoing lawsuits, and through their activism they tried, despite lim-ited participation, to express in concrete ways a Shin Buddhist viewpoint on the issues of pacifism, war responsibilities, and discrimination. In 1999, they merged with two other Shin Buddhist groups, the Shinsh Izokukai (Association of Shin Buddhist Bereaved Families) and the Shinsh tani-ha Hi-bus heiwa o Negaukai

(Shinsh tani-ha Association for Weapon Free Peace), to form the 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d

(2000: Joint Action of East and West Honganji for Anti-war/Peace).40

The T zai , as the latter movement is commonly called, actually started in 1999, and is a joint organization of both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, with representatives of both branches, promoting, despite being limited to a minority of priests, various activities like demonstra-tions, symposia, and concerts. Interestingly enough, but perhaps not sur-prisingly, the representative of the Honganji-ha, Sugawara Ry ken, is also the leader of the plaintiffs in the above-mentioned Asia lawsuit, and the representative of the Shinsh Izokukai. The title itself and the Preface to his book Yo o itou shirushi (The Sign of Rejecting the World), published by the Honganji-ha in 2003, stress the significance of the idea of “rejecting the world” as a critical approach to oneself and the world which accompanies the practice of the nenbutsu, thus interpreting Shinran’s words in the Letters as the premise for a direct confrontation with war, discrimination, and injustice in society.41 The representative of the tani-ha, Kuboyama Ky zen calls from the pages of the newsletter T zai for the dismantling of any barrier between the two Hon-ganji, and stresses the values of peace and the separation of religion and state as expressed in the Japanese Constitution.42

In the founding declaration of the movement, issued in July 2000, a number of legislative measures adopted by the government, like the New Guidelines Law, the Communications Intercept Law, the Law Concern-ing the Flag and the Anthem, and others, are stigmatized as an attempt to transform Japan into a “country ready to fight” (‘sens ga dekiru kokka’

40 These facts are reported in the newsletter of the 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d , T zai 4, August 2000. 41 See Sugawara, 2003: 3-4. Sugawara’s quotation is from the Matt sh . Cf. CWS I: 551. 42 See T zai 3, May 2000: 2; and T zai 12, June 2004: 1.


), a plan which would be completed with the revi-sion of the Constitution and the establishment of state support (kokka goji

) for Yasukuni Shrine. The T zai is thus presented as a concrete way to actualize within society the assumption of past war responsibili-ties by the Shin Buddhist community, and its longing for freedom, equal-ity, and peace (jiy , by d , heiwa no negai ), which are obstructed by state oppression of the people (yokuatsu suru kokka ).43 Quite interestingly, while the religious tones in this document are nearly absent, except for the issue of the war respon-sibilities of the Shin Buddhist community, great use is made of the lan-guage typically uttered by other anti-authoritarian and anti-war groups of citizens in civil society.

From the attitudes shown by the activists involved, what emerges quite clearly is that there is a generally high level of awareness of follow-ing the stream of opposition to Yasukuni Shrine started in the late 1960S, and at the same time of the need to face an emergency situation and react to the renewed offensive against the Constitution. For many of them, the deep significance of opposing Yasukuni Shrine and the homage to the eirei (“glorious [war] spirits”) paid by state officials is that there is no need at all for people to die and kill for the country, since this is basically against the Buddhist teachings. Among the sources commonly used by these activists to justify their anti-war engagement is the well-known verse “one should neither slay nor cause to slay” (koroshite wa naranu, korosashimete wa naranu ) found in Chapter X of the Dhammapada,44 the above-mentioned expression hy ga muy (“no need for soldiers or weapons”), which appears in the passage on the ‘five evils’ in the Chinese version of the Mury ju-ky , and others found in the writings of the founder Shinran, as for example the classic quotation “May there be peace in the world” (yo no naka an’on nare) from the Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush .45

The activists of the T zai maintain that Shin Buddhist practice should go beyond the mere recitation of the nenbutsu, the utterance of the name of Amida Buddha, which alone had not been able to divert the religious community from cooperating with the Japanese war effort and foster in-

43 See T zai 4, August 2000: 8-9; and Appendix 6. 44 See Radhakrishnan, 1988: 102-103. 45 See Chapter One.


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stead the ideal of fellowship taught by Shinran. This movement has been quite reactive up to now on the occasion of major political changes which have taken place, and very often in tune with the instances of other non-religious groups within civil society, though there is a tendency to focus mainly on issues of war and peace. It takes part, for example, in the anti-war social network known as STOP! Iraku Hahei (Stop sending troops to Iraq!), and strongly opposes the dispatch of the Japa-nese Self Defence Forces outside Japan, government plans to change Ar-ticle 9 of the Constitution and the reform of the Fundamental Law of Ed-ucation (Ky iku kihonh ) in a more nationalistic sense. 46 On the occasion of a meeting held by this group in January 2006, it was decided that the theme for the next annual symposium to be held in July would deal, significantly, with the forthcoming (2007) anniversary of the suppression of the nenbutsu and the exile of Shinran to Echigo province, one of the central focuses of the discussion on the critical dimension of Shin Buddhism which was outlined in Chapter Two.

The data provided by a simple open-ended questionnaire which was distributed to twenty-two members of the T zai in January 2006, though limited in scope, may be of some interest concerning the relationship be-tween religious identity and social commitment in this small group of ac-tivists who come from different parts of Japan. From the replies of these members to the question concerning the reasons for their present engage-ment, to which more than one answer was allowed, it emerges that for ten of them there was a significant link between the Buddhist teachings and social action against war. Six among these referred to the Shin Buddhist teachings as the main reason underlying their social activism for peace, and three to the Dhammapada’s verses against killing. Eleven answers presented neither direct reference to Shin Buddhism nor to Buddhism it-self, while three referred to Yasukuni Shrine and two to the stimulus pro-vided by other practitioners. Regarding the activities of the members in-terviewed, ten of them stated their current engagement in the opposition to the revision of the Japanese Constitution, also at the local level, while of these six opposed changes to Article 9. Seven members were active in the Yasukuni Shrine issue—five of them as plaintiffs in court—while an-

46 See, for example, T zai 2, February 2000: 2; T zai 9, June 2002: 4; and T zai 12, June 2004: 3. See also Bukky taimusu, 12 July 2001: 1; Honganji shinp , 10 August 2001: 1; and D b , March 2002: 2.


other five were concerned with the military bases in Japan. As far as these data can tell us about the motivations of the members interviewed, it would seem that for less than one third of them there is a strong con-nection between Shin Buddhist doctrines and social activism for peace. However, it may be interesting to note not only the high rate of those di-rectly and personally involved in the Yasukuni Shrine problem (about one third), but also the great concern for the issue on constitutional revi-sion (about half of them), which entails both Article 9, namely, the renun-ciation of war, and other aspects, as those pertaining to Article 20, which sanctions the formal separation of state and religion.

Another model of engagement of Shin Buddhism in society, which is characterized by collaboration with other religious groups, is represented by the activities of the Kokuritsu Tsuit Shisetsu ni Hantai Suru Sh ky -sha Nettow ku (Religion-ists’ Network Against a National Site for Mourning), and the Heiwa o Tsukuridasu Sh ky sha Netto (Interfaith Peace Network). The former, also known as Tsuit Hantai , is a network of Shin Buddhist, Christian, and citizens’ groups, which was formed in November 2002, and presently consists of eleven groups and about one hundred participants. The secretary is a Shin Buddhist priest of the Honganji-ha, Yamamoto J h . These activists collaborate with other anti-war movements like the social network STOP! Iraku Ha-hei, and a national network against the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education, and, as is suggested by the name itself, the various organ-izations which are affiliated to this network have basically in common their aversion to a new National Site for Mourning (kokuritsu tsuit shi-setsu ), which, in the intention of the government, might become a substitute for Yasukuni Shrine. This line was pursued by the government especially after claims of unconstitutionality were raised by internal and foreign opposition at the time of Koizumi’s first visit to the shrine on 13 August 2001. In this connection, a consultative body on Mourning and Praying for Peace was formed in December 2001 at the governmental level, and the idea was unexpectedly well received by the then chief administrator of the Honganji-ha as well.47 According to the activists in this network, the creation of a new site for mourning would be merely a way of avoiding the problem. The real point of issue for them is

47 See Maekawa, 2003: 19.


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that Japan does not need a site to glorify its war dead, neither those of the past wars of aggression, nor the “new war dead” (aratana senshisha

) in the cause of peace and safety, whom the present govern-ment, with its aggressive foreign policy on the side of the United States, seems to expect and propose as a model for the living.48 According to Yamamoto, this standpoint flows directly from Shinran’s radical position on the kami, which is expressed by the concept of jingi fuhai, where the necessity of the practitioner to conform to the prescribed rites which were inextricably connected with the system of social control (shihai taisei to hy ri ittai ) is explicitly denied. Further, Yamamoto claims, in the present situation all this would clearly correspond to an “at-titude against the establishment” (hantaiseiteki yarikata ) and against the external obligations which obstruct one’s independence, freedom, and the access to the nenbutsu and shinjin.49 As in the case of the T zai, the antagonism to Yasukuni Shrine implies a critical view of the Japanese engagement in Iraq, of the recent emergency laws and the plans to revise Japanese legislation in a nationalistic sense.50

The second group mentioned above, the Heiwa o Tsukuridasu Sh -ky sha Netto, is a network of Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim religion-ists which emerged in 2002 at the time of the Emergency Bills. Its repre-sentative is the tani-ha priest Ishikawa Yukichi . This network has been especially active in opposing the war in Iraq and the deployment of Japanese Self Defence Forces overseas, and has promoted signature campaigns, demonstrations, and forms of dialogue with the Islamic world. It interacts with citizens’ groups at various levels, participating in diverse initiatives like the anti-war rallies in T ky and in the committee of the network, World Peace Now.51

48 See Kokuritsu Tsuit Shisetsu ni Hantai Suru Sh ky sha Nettow ku, 9 November 2002; and Yamamoto J., 2004: 32-33. 49 See Yamamoto J., 2005: 1; and, of the same writer, Kindai kokumin kokka no sh ky -sei to shinsh sha no taido: kokuritsu tsuit shisetsu hantai no konkyo o megutte

. On the official website of the Kokuritsu Tsuit Shisetsu ni Hantai Suru Sh ky sha Nettow ku [http:// joho.easter.ne.jp], accessed 11 March 2005. 50 See Yamamoto J., 2004: 32. 51 See Shinsh ky shinbun, 25 October 2002: 1; Hardacre, 2004: 407; and the web pages [http://www.jca.apc.org/ncc-j/statements/2004/st040420iraq.pdf], accessed 3 July 2004; [http://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik2/2003-12-26/05_01.html], [http://www.jca.apc.org/ncc-


A further example of Shin Buddhist engagement in social issues to-gether with Christians is provided by the recent formation in Ky to of the Kenp Nij j ga Abunai! Kinky Renrakukai

(Article 20 of the Constitution in Danger! Emergency Liaison Group). This network, which started in December 2005, includes various activists of both the Honganji-ha and tani-ha and other religionists espe-cially from the United Church of Christ in Japan (Nihon Kirisuto Ky dan

), but also Catholics, Baptists, other Buddhists, and pri-vate citizens as well. It is intended by the participants as a form of protest to the plans of the Liberal Democratic Party concerning the revision of Article 20 of the Constitution, which is related to freedom of religion.52 During the preliminary discussions which preceded its official start, this network argued that there is a strong connection between this issue and the visits to Yasukuni Shrine paid by the Prime Minister, and the planned revision of Article 9 of the Constitution. There seems to be, in fact, a gen-eral consensus among the participants that the principles of freedom of religion (shinky no jiy ) and separation of religion and state (seiky bunri ) established by the Constitution, together with their implications for one’s relationship to life and death, also express, at a more general level, the concern for human dignity which was so tragi-cally violated in the time of war through the institution of State Shint .

These themes have subsequently been articulated in the appeal which was issued by this network in January 2006. Here the earlier, manipula-tory negation of the status of religion to Shint is emphasized, which ac-companied its ideological instrumentalization in fostering imperialism, as are the risks involved in the Liberal Democratic Party’s project of shap-ing a new profile for Japan as a country for which an engagement in new conflicts could eventually come to be accepted as something normal (sens ga dekiru futs no kuni ). This appeal then ends, significantly, with a reference to the deep reflection made by the participants on the almost unanimous support that the religious world gave to war policies in the past. Among the activities of this network, whose participants numbered about one hundred at the beginning of 2006,

j/mimiyori/mimiyori-6.htm], and [http://www.nipponzanmyohoji.org/yobikake/sengen020 911.htm], accessed 1 March 2005. 52 For a summary of the ongoing discussion within the House of Councillors, concerning the framework of a complete Constitutional reform, see Research Commission on the Constitution, 2005.


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and which is purposely addressing non-religious groups and private citi-zens in civil society as well, is the collective editing and publication of a booklet in the form of Questions and Answers over this issue.53

Another recent development in the field of Shin Buddhist activism was the formation in July 2005, within the Honganji-ha community, of the Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai (Association of Nen-butsu Practitioners for Article 9), which in October of the same year counted more than six hundred adherents, mostly priests from all over Ja-pan. As is suggested by the name itself, this association, whose rep-resentative and secretary are respectively the aforementioned Honganji-ha scholars, Shigaraki Takamaro , and Odake Sh ky

,54 is mostly concerned with the plans of the government to change Ar-ticle 9 of the Constitution, which affirms Japan’s “renunciation of war” (sens no h ki ). However, as is clear from the Inaugural Ap-peal of the Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai (‘Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai’ hak-kai ni atatte ),55 this theme is closely connected with other concerns, such as, for example, that for freedom of religion (shinky no jiy ), and sexual equality (danjo no by d

), expressed respectively in Articles 20 and 24 of the Constitution. In this appeal, the engagement for peace is justified in religious terms through recourse to the Dhammapada verse “one should neither slay nor cause to slay” (koroshite wa naranu, korosashimete wa naranu), and Shinran’s reference to the fellowship of all the nenbutsu practitioners “within the four seas” (shikai no uchi mina ky dai ) and to the “sign of rejecting the world” (yo o itou ‘shirushi’)—taken here to imply a critical attitude towards social reality. This is a form of en-gagement that, according to the Shin Buddhist practitioners who partici-pate in this movement, is made all the more necessary because of the great responsibilities of their community in the past, when the teachings of Shinran were used to justify war atrocities.56

It can be seen that in many of the above-mentioned cases, those doc-trinal facets of Shin Buddhist teachings that entail a potential for social

53 See Kenp Nij j ga Abunai! Kinky Renrakukai, 2006. 54 For Shigaraki and Odake, see also Chapter Two. 55 See Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai, 2005: 28; and its official website [http://www18.ocn.ne. jp/~hongan9], accessed 22 November 2005. See also Appendix 7. 56 See Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai, 2005: 28.


criticism—which, as illustrated in Chapter Two, are also frequently dis-cussed at the scholarly level—often provide the starting-point for the par-ticipants in social activism as well. It can also be noted that the definite pacifist stance assumed by both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, based on the use of a few selected doctrinal sources, provides a framework at the institutional level for the present engagement of these groups of prac-titioners in civil society.

This safe doctrinal anchorage does not correspond, however, to a high level of participation of the ordinary practitioners in anti-war activism. On the one hand, the fact that there is a relatively scarce participation in these initiatives in Japan at a general level, suggests that this is not a problem specific only to Shin Buddhism but reflects Japanese society as a whole. On the other hand, the results of surveys like that of the publishing company Sh gakukan in April 2003, showed that in strongholds of Shin Buddhism such as Toyama, Ishikawa and Fukui prefectures, the rate of opposition to the war in Iraq was 87%, considerably higher than the 80% national figure found in other polls.57 This might even suggest that in Shin Buddhism there is an additional difficulty in channelling this appar-ently widespread anti-war sentiment. This state of affairs is often implic-itly referred to, within the framework of Shin Buddhism, as a conse-quence of the traditional distinction between b and bupp which, with its focus on external conformism and a rich internal religious world, is still assumed to condition the practitioners’ attitude towards society. Sim-ilarly, Shin Buddhist activists also lament the failure of the D b move-ment to shape a religion for individuals who can assume full responsibil-ity for their own actions within society as nenbutsu practitioners.

As regards the level of doctrinal articulation and the use of religious texts to justify the engagement for peace in Shin Buddhist activism, it is worth mentioning that there is a tendency to refer to selected passages from the Dhammapada (“one should neither slay nor cause to slay”), the Larger S tra (“no need for soldiers or weapons”), and Shinran’s Letters, where he alludes to the ideals of fellow companions and fellow practi-tioners, and “peace in the world,” which seem to provide for many activ-ists, and the institutions themselves, the basis for a definite anti-war standpoint. In addition, reference is often made to other sources, like, for

57 See Hardacre, 2004: 408.


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example, Shinran’s mention of the “change of heart” and the “signs of re-jecting the world” (yo o itou shirushi) in the nenbutsu practitioner.58

These are doctrinal facets, similar for example to Shinran’s call for “compassion and care” for “those who scorn and slander people of nem-butsu,”59 and his understanding of karma and mapp ,60 which apparently lend themselves to the interpretation of the complexities and contradic-tions of the present process of globalization, and to the provision of an-swers to the problems of modern society from a religious point of view. However, due perhaps also to the characteristic difficulty in Shin Bud-dhism about speaking of ethics on the normative level, there seems to be a lack, especially but not only on the part of the institutions, of a struc-tured reflection on the link between peace and social justice as a stable reference point for anti-war social activism.

Generally speaking, it is possible to detect some other distinctive fea-tures underlying Shin Buddhist attitudes towards the question of war and peace. It is apparent at the institutional level that there is a clear-cut anti-war position, which has been repeatedly affirmed through official state-ments and documents in the last two decades, and is closely connected to a serious process of rethinking of the past war responsibilities of the reli-gious community. The significance of this approach should not be under-estimated, especially when compared to the slow reaction to analogous issues offered by other religious traditions inside and outside Japan. It is also interesting that in contemporary Shin Buddhism there is no current tradition concerning the doctrinal justification of war analogous for in-stance to the just war doctrine in Christianity, which could lead to limita-tions or ambiguities in formulating the denial of violence.61 In this regard, it seems that the attempts which were made during the imperialistic pe-riod to articulate the doctrinal discourse in such a way as to provide a jus-tification for violence have been clearly rejected as being inconsistent with the tradition.

Another distinctive feature of Shin Buddhist anti-war activism may be seen in its strong connection to the issue of the separation of state and re-

58 See CWS I: 547, 551, 553, 554. 59 Cf. the Matt sh , in CWS I: 527; and SSZ II: 660. See also Chapter One. 60 Cf. Kasulis, 2001: 20-21. 61 One notable exception may be represented by Rennyo’s formulation of the concept of goh (“defence of the Dharma”); see Chapter One.


ligion. One of the bases of the current Shin Buddhist commitment for peace lies, in fact, in the acknowledgement that in the recent past, until the end of World War II, the religious community had become subservi-ent to the political power, thus contributing to the mixture of the religious and political spheres advocated by the government through the institution of State Shint and even to war atrocities, all of which was quite in op-position to Shinran’s teaching. Support for the current Shin Buddhist ad-vocacy of the separation of state and religion is typically found by activ-ists, just as in many of the aforementioned doctrinal discussions, in Chap-ter VI and in the Postscript of the Ky gy shinsh .62 At the same time this approach is also likely to have been conditioned by the traditional distinc-tion between b and bupp , as noted by Galen Amstutz.63 Since this doctrinal aspect is blamed by various Shin Buddhist scholars, as well as by the institutions themselves, as the main cause of the past capitulation of Shin Buddhism to the state, it may well be regarded as a “deeply embedded source of Shin ambivalence about politics.”64

THE HISABETSU BURAKU ISSUE

The general content of the issue of discrimination against the burakumin (“hamlet-people”), which has represented a central point in the

post-war debate on social responsibilities within Shin Buddhism, is effec-tively summarized in a recent publication of the Buraku Liberation Re-search Institute (Buraku Kaih Kenky sho ),65 where the authors state that:

A major characteristic of the Buraku problem lies in the fact that this is discrimination originating from the caste-like stratification of all Japanese nationals in feudal times.

62 See CWS I: 255-292; SSZ II: 173-203; and Chapter One. 63 See Amstutz, 1998: 736-737. 64 See Amstutz, 1997a: 95. In this connection, Amstutz has spoken of “missteps and distortions” of Shin Buddhism “between the Meiji Restoration and 1945.” Amstutz, 2002: 32. See also Ketelaar, 1990: 215; Rogers and Rogers, 1991: 337-339; and Kuroda, 1996a: 282-284. 65 In July 1998, the name of the institute was changed to Buraku Kaih /Jinken Kenky sho

(BLHRRI, Buraku Liberation and Human Rights Research Insti-tute).


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During a period of national reconstruction and consolidation at the begin-ning of the seventeenth century, the ruling classes, in order to divide and control the agricultural class—the major productive force at the time—placed the Burakumin at the very bottom of the social structure … These people were called by the derogatory terms “Eta,” (extreme filth) and “Hinin,” (non-human). Their work consisted of disposing of dead cattle and horses, tanning hides, sweeping the shrines and crafting bamboo. The group also included those who resisted the feudal rule.66

Although some of the features of the discrimination against the buraku-min were already present in medieval time, when this cultural and politi-cal minority came to be associated with those kinds of occupations which were considered unclean according to both the Buddhist prohibition of killing and eating animals and the Shint notion of pollution, it was espe-cially during the Tokugawa period that, through the use of registries, “the incidence of pollution within certain occupations became stigmatized and permanent in that not only was an individual deemed as inherently im-pure, but so too his or her family name.”67 In this way, the burakumin, as they have come to be known, became a subclass beneath the hierarchy of merchants, farmers, artisans, and samurai.

The hisabetsu buraku (“discriminated-against buraku”), to use a more politically correct term, are subject even today to persisting discrimination, especially in the areas of employment, marriage, and edu-cation. This is despite the efforts of the Buraku Kaih D mei

(Buraku Liberation League), the Zenkairen (All Japan Bu-raku Liberation Movement Federation), and the legislation known as the Law on Special Measures for Buraku Improvement Project68—through which, between 1969 and 1994, a considerable budget was spent on target districts especially in housing and infrastructures. Moreover, episodes of anonymous graffiti, name lists, harassment, and the like, continue to be

66 Buraku Kaih Kenky sho, 1991: 2. 67 Alldritt, 2000. 68 The Japanese term, freely translated by the Buraku Kaih Kenky sho as “Law on Special Measures for Buraku Improvement Project,” is D wa taisaku jigy tokubetsu sochi h . Besides the meaning of ‘social integration’ implied by the term d wa , in the language of government policy administration ‘d wa dis-tricts’ refer to buraku areas. See Buraku Kaih Kenky sho, 1991: 2.


documented.69 The association between Shin Buddhism and the hisabetsu buraku is-

sue has been historically very close, and as late as 1932 the great majority of the burakumin (about 85%), were credited with belonging to the two main branches of this denomination—80% of this total to the Honganji-ha.70 In this respect, it has also been suggested that the creation of the bu-rakumin as a means of silencing the voice of the masses and stabilizing the power base of political authority might have been connected to the re-ligious uprisings of the Shin Buddhist ikk -ikki, and to their subsequent suppression, which is historically coincident with the emergence of the Tokugawa government and the issuance of the Caste Regulations (Mibun t sei rei ) in 1591.71

The historically decisive factor determining the close connection be-tween Shin Buddhism and the hisabetsu buraku was apparently the deci-sion of the Tokugawa government to put those temples located in buraku areas under the jurisdiction of the Shin Buddhist denomination in order to maintain a more direct control over them. It seems probable, however, that Shin Buddhism, because of its equalitarian teachings and the mis-sionary work of Rennyo, had a particular appeal to the lower classes.72

During the Tokugawa period, the fixed status system among Shin Buddhist temples helped to support discrimination, since temples in the outcaste community were classified as eji (“polluted temples”) and treated separately from the others. The priests of those temples them-selves were discriminated as es (“polluted priests”), and in cases where non-buraku people also belonged to the same community, separate seats (eta-za ) were designated for discriminated practitioners.73

After the Meiji Restoration, although the Emancipation Edict (Kaih rei ) in 1871 officially removed official status from the term eta, renaming them shin heimin (“new common people”), discrimina-tion practices continued within Japanese society at large and in Shin Bud-

69 See McLauchlan, 1999: 8-38; and Alldritt, 2000. 70 See Wagatsuma, 1967: 89. 71 See Kitaguchi, 1999: 91-95. According to the author, the ikk -ikki in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries were not only religious uprisings, but rather insurgences of the Japa-nese masses. See also Chapter One. 72 See Wagatsuma, 1967: 89. 73 See Wagatsuma, 1967: 89-90. See also Yoshino and Murakoshi, 1977: 122-123.


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dhism as well, with priests wearing robes of different colours depending on their level, and the marginalization of the hisabetsu buraku also being maintained in the performance of religious rituals.74 At the beginning of the twentieth century, the clergy from these discriminated temples be-came more involved in activities aimed at social integration, and several movements were formed, among which the Shinsh Wag kai

(Shin Buddhist Harmony Association), and the Black Robes’ League (Kokui D mei ), which struggled against the differentiation of priests and temples based on the amount of donations and against the as-signment of different coloured robes. The name of the latter movement itself derives from the fact that these priests wore black robes, instead of those prescribed by the system of colour differences.75 In 1922, Saik Mankichi , the son of a Honganji-ha temple priest, founded, to-gether with other members of the Shin Buddhist community, the National Levelers’ Association (Zenkoku Suiheisha ). Started in the name of religious humanism and the ideal of equality implied in the teaching of Shinran, this movement progressively assumed, also because of the relative immobility of the Shin Buddhist institutions, a critical atti-tude towards religion, and laid the foundations for the present-day power-ful Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaih D mei).76 Not least in re-sponse to the increasing criticism coming from such groups, the Shin Buddhist institutions started directing some of their policies to “remove the old mistaken customs”77 and to improve the conditions of the buraku-min, and in 1924 the Honganji-ha organized the appositely named Ichi-nyokai (Unity Association), followed in 1926 by the tani-ha with the Shinshinkai (The True Body Association). Later, in 1950, following criticism by the Buraku Liberation League, the Honganji-ha formed the D b Und (Fellow Companions’ Movement), one of whose objectives was a campaign to remove discriminatory prejudices among its members through lectures at local temples, preaching and wel-fare services such as “counseling, occupation and marriage guidance, rec-reational activities, sanitary facilities,” and other cultural activities.78 To-

74 See Wagatsuma, 1967: 90. 75 See Wagatsuma, 1967: 91. 76 See Buraku Kaih Kenky sho, 1991: 5; and Heidegger, 2006: 285-288. 77 Wagatsuma, 1967: 91. 78 Wagatsuma, 1967: 91-92 . See also Heidegger, 2006: 289.


gether with the Monshintokai Und (Followers’ Associa-tion Movement) this movement merged in 1978 to become the Kikan Und , which is presently committed, together with the D wa Ky iku Shink kai foundation, to activities dealing with buraku discrimination. As regards the tani-ha organization, a similar process occurred, with the creation in 1962 of the general campaign called D b kai Und (Fellow Companions’ Movement), aiming at the democratization and reform of the denominational organiza-tion system, under the slogan “from a religion of the family to one of in-dividual awareness.”79 In 1977, the D wa Suishin Honbu , whose name has been recently changed to Kaih Und Suishin Honbu

(Head Office for the Promotion of the Liberation Movement), was founded as a further attempt to cope with the hisabetsu buraku issue.

In spite of these activities carried out by the Shin Buddhist institutions, which have often been intertwined, especially in the tani-ha, with in-stances of reform within the denomination, the relation with the hisabetsu buraku has not been easy, in particular because of the persisting occur-rence of episodes of discrimination by Shin Buddhist priests, which have been regularly denounced by the Buraku Liberation League.80 Also, in a publication of the Buraku Liberation Research Institute in 1977, strong statements were to be found, like those pointing out that “no modern reli-gious leaders” had assumed “the role of public spokesmen to protest the treatment of minority groups,” and that despite the creation of the D b movement, the actual contribution of Shin Buddhism to the Buraku lib-eration movement was “negligible.”81 An example of the fact that the ac-tivities of the D b movement have not always followed the line of a clear anti-discriminatory engagement, or, at least, of the difficulties im-plied by this project, is provided among others by an incident which oc-curred in 1987, when the initiator of the D b kai Und within the tani-ha was himself involved in the use of discriminatory expressions, provok-ing a campaign of protest by the Buraku Liberation League.82

79 “ .” Shinsh tani-ha Sh musho, 2003: 127. 80 See, for example, Shinsh tani-ha D wa Suishin Honbu, 1992: 337-339; D wa Ky -iku Shink kai, 2000: 40, 42, 46, 65-66, 69, 72, 75, 80; and Heidegger, 2006: 290-292. 81 Yoshino and Murakoshi, 1977: 122-123. 82 Cf. Heidegger, 2006: 290-292.


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Despite these difficulties, it would be perhaps unfair to underestimate the organizational effort made by main branches of the Shin Buddhist de-nomination in the post-war period to address the issue, which has devel-oped especially through reflection on the structure of religious discrimi-nation and its relationship to the ideal of equality fostered by the D b movement, and, more recently, through the support of the campaign started in 1985 by the Buraku Liberation League for a Basic Law on Bu-raku Liberation (Buraku kaih kihonh ).

Regarding the first point, the two main branches of Shin Buddhism have regularly organized educational activities to address the ‘soft’ side of the problem, that is, that which pertains to the psychological and cul-tural sphere, which is perhaps at present, in view of the visible improve-ments in the ‘hard’ side concerning the living conditions of the hisabetsu buraku, the most pressing issue.83 At the general level, the episodes of discrimination in which the denomination has been involved reflect those traits of the average Japanese mentality towards the hisabetsu buraku, which recent surveys have shown as being inculcated in children at an early age, especially through the educational system itself and by the par-ents.84

Among the religious issues related to the hisabetsu buraku, there are the abuse of temple registers for discriminatory purposes, such as the i-dentification of the status of potential spouses and employees, and the misuse of Buddhist names. In Japanese Buddhism in general, the posthu-mous Buddhist name is known as the kaimy (“precept name”), and it may also be given while the person is still alive.85 In many cases con-cerning the hisabetsu buraku, this name contained characters with derog-atory meanings recorded in temple’s registries or carved on gravestones, in order to trace the presence of a buraku lineage, in this way perpetuat-ing discrimination.86 In Shin Buddhism, since there are no precepts to be followed, in place of the kaimy the h my (“Dharma-name”) is used. This refers to indicate the believers’ personal Buddhist name which

83 Cf. McLauchlan, 1999: 29-37. 84 In a survey conducted among priests by the Honganji-ha D b movement in 1989, the rate of those who had learnt of the existence of the buraku, in elementary or middle school, was 80%, the most common prejudices being related to low status and occu-pations, forbidding of marriages, and violent behaviour; see Nakao and Nakao: 1994: 222. 85 Cf. Covell, 2005: 165-190. 86 See, for example, Bodiford, 1996.


can be conferred by the head temple at the time of the kiky shiki (a kind of “confirmation rite” which may be carried out at any age), al-though it can also be, and often is, given after death. In practice such dis-criminatory misuses have been discovered in recent past years in temple registries, leading both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha to conduct sur-veys in their temples all over the country.87

Another relevant religious aspect related to discriminatory practices concerns the interpretation of the notion of past karma (shukug ). Both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha have been urged to confront the usage which has been made of this notion in order to justify social dis-crimination, along the lines that a low social status or a physical handicap may be interpreted, following a tradition deep-rooted in Buddhist culture, as a retribution for evil deeds committed in past existences.88 Part of the problem is represented by the fact that the term shukug also appears in the Tannish ,89 though it seems established that, for Shinran, being influ-enced by past karma is a normal condition for any human being, and that the akunin , or ‘evil persons,’ are above all likely to attain birth in the Pure Land.90 This issue, and its relations with discriminatory practices, have been and continue to be discussed within Shin Buddhism, though the exposition of Shinran’s concept of karma remains to some extent con-troversial.91 In 1985, the department for religious doctrine of the Hon-ganji-ha established a Committee of Specialists for the Problem of Kar-ma, whose report was published in 1989, and in 1992 there followed another specialized research group to investigate the issue (G Mondai Kenky Bukai ), and further publications.92 Similarly, the tani-ha published in 1993 and 1998 two volumes of collected essays concentrating on the significance of the concept of shukug in Shinran’s thought.93

87 See Shinsh tani-ha D wa Suishin Honbu, 1992: 336; and D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2000: 50. 88 See LaFleur, 1983: 26-59. See also the Introduction. 89 See CWS I: 670, 672; and SSZ II: 782, 784. 90 See CWS I: 663, 670-672; SSZ II: 775, 782-784; and Chapter One. 91 Cf. Ueda, 1986; and Hirota, 2001: 45. 92 See D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2000: 50, 55. 93 The two volumes, published by the Shinsh tani-ha Research Institute for Doctrinal Studies (Shinsh tani-ha Ky gaku Kenky sho ), are titled


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The activities recently promoted by the Shin Buddhist institutions are still directed towards educating and informing members inside the de-nomination, and reflecting upon episodes of discrimination. In the Hon-ganji-ha this is done especially through the Kikan Und and the D wa Ky iku Shink kai, which publishes the journal D wa ky iku ronky

, through conferences, meetings, and the aforementioned annual exhibition focusing on human rights (Jinken paneru ten), besides similar initiatives at the local level.94 In the tani-ha, the main activities regard-ing the hisabetsu buraku issue are carried out by the Kaih Und Suishin Honbu, which similarly organizes meetings and lectures, together with a Workshop on Cooperative Education for Liberation (Kaih ky gaku ken-sh kai ) and an Exhibition on Human Rights (Jinken sh kan gyarar ten ) in the facilities of the head temple every year.95 This office also publishes the journal Shind , which includes regular contributions concerning the issue, and the news-letter ‘D wa’ suishin f ramu . A consistent part of the materials published and the activities conducted by the two main Shin Buddhist denominations focuses on the legacy of the above-mentioned Suiheisha movement, seeing it both as being based on Shin Buddhist val-ues and as a forerunner of the Buraku Liberation League, and on its sig-nificance in the search for a renewed connection between Shin Buddhism and the problems of contemporary society.

A related area of social engagement for Shin Buddhism is represented by the support given to the campaign of the Buraku Liberation League for a Basic Law on Buraku Liberation, which started in 1985. In the same year, tani K shin , the head priest (monshu) of the Honganji-ha, assumed the presidency of the Central Executive Committee for the National Movement to Demand for a Legislation of a ‘Basic Law on Bu-raku Liberation’ (‘Buraku kaih kihonh ’ Seitei Y ky Kokumin Und Ch Jikk iinkai

)—founded by members of society at large, together with representa-tives of the political, and religious worlds. This committee formulated the

Shinsh no ky gaku ni okeru shukug no mondai ; see Shinsh tani-ha Ky gaku Kenky sho, 1993-1998. 94 See Appendix 10. 95 See Appendix 8.


text of the bill itself to be submitted.96 The same committee, whose name was changed in July 2002 to Buraku Kaih /Jinken Seisaku Kakuritsu Y -ky Ch Jikk iinkai , is currently supporting the ongoing campaign for the enactment of a Law on Remedies for Victims of Human Rights Violations (Jinken shingai ky saih ).

Support for this campaign is being given also by the religious network D sh ren (Joint Conference of Religions Concerned with the D wa Problem), in which both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha partici-pate. The D sh ren was created in 1981, through the collaboration of fif-ty-nine religious institutions, as a reaction to the aforementioned Machida Incident of 1979.97 This organization holds a general meeting every year, and organizes regular symposia and lectures. Moreover, it finds expres-sion at the local level in the action of networks like the Daish ren , the Liaison Conference of saka Religionists Concerned with the D wa Problem.98

The educational activities currently carried on by the Shin Buddhist denomination are marked by a high level of institutionalization, that is, they are the expression, in both the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha, of a coherent and structured policy decided upon at the administrative level. This can be considered to be the result of the long-running post-war en-gagement with the hisabetsu buraku issue as embodied in the programme of the D b movement.

Though these activities might somehow lack the freshness of activists’ engagement pressing with their enthusiasm from the bottom of the or-ganization, they can be regarded as a valuable contribution towards fac-ing the complexity of this longstanding pattern of social discrimination. Indeed, it may be argued that, while the Shin Buddhist institutions are ad-dressing the religious aspects implied in discriminative episodes, and more generally those prejudices connected with the hisabetsu buraku which are deeply rooted in Japanese society as well as in the behaviour of many members and priests themselves, they are also giving a positive

96 See Buraku Kaih Kenky sho, 1991: 1, 26; and D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2000: 63. 97 See the Introduction; and Shinsh tani-ha D wa Suishin Honbu, 1992: 337. 98 See Buraku Kaih Kenky sho, 1991: 8; Alldritt, 2000; and D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2000: 49, 53. The name D sh ren is the abbreviation of ‘D wa mondai’ ni Torikumu Sh ky Ky dan Rentai Kaigi .


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contribution to the challenge of that widespread mentality which is sum-marized by the expression “don’t wake a sleeping baby” (neta ko wa sono mama ), that is to say, “so long as younger or unin-formed people in society do not know about buraku mondai, they will not discuss it or discriminate against burakumin.”99 The risk implied by such an attitude is that it can, in turn, lead easily to inaction, to a passive stance and thus to complicity in discrimination, especially in view of the fact that many people do still perform discriminatory acts like conducting “formal background investigations for hiring and marriage.”100

In this regard, the determination of the Shin Buddhist institutions to continue these educational activities despite the aforementioned difficul-ties, may be able to meet the needs of a long-term commitment to the stimulation of anti-discriminatory awareness in practitioners and believ-ers, the results of which will have to be evaluated in the long run. The more recent interest shown in issues of discrimination against other mi-norities in Japanese society may also be interpreted as a sign of the poten-tial of the Shin Buddhist community, even though it is in some respects undeveloped, to keep alive this critical attitude by adapting and linking the religious meanings which underlie its commitment to the challenges posed by a society in rapid change and to the general discussion on hu-man rights.

HANSEN S DISEASE AND DISCRIMINATION

A further significant aspect of present Shin Buddhist engagement in soci-ety is the renewed interest in the Hansen’s disease issue (hansenby mon-dai ), and the discrimination suffered in Japan by the for-mer patients affected by this illness, formerly known as leprosy.

As is well known, until 1996 a Leprosy Prevention Law (Rai yob h ) first established in 1907 and reinforced in 1931 and 1953,

had sanctioned the isolation of people affected by Hansen’s disease in various sanatoria inside Japan. This segregation policy was started at the time when there was no effective cure for the disease, and reached ex-treme measures such as the sterilization of patients. However, it contin-ued after the disease became curable through the introduction of the phar-

99 Su-lan Reber, 1999: 347. 100 Su-lan Reber, 1999: 347.


maceutical Promin in 1941, and even after the World Health Organization (WHO) declared in 1960 that there was no longer any reasonable basis for the isolation of Hansen’s disease patients.101 Thus, until 1996, when the government finally repealed the Leprosy Prevention Law, the existing Japanese sanatoria, generally located on small islands or in the mountains, remained as an anachronistic instrument to perpetuate discrimination against this minority under the pretext of social security. In the early twentieth century, this segregation policy was accompanied by ideologi-cally driven instances of racial purification (minzoku j ka ), and this gained the support of many religious organizations which concretely encouraged prejudice and discrimination against the patients. In the case of Japanese Buddhism, this attitude towards the illness was based in par-ticular on its interpretation as a manifestation of bad karma (g by ), or of divine punishment (tenkeiby ), due to evil deeds committed in one’s previous lives. This idea can be traced, for example, to such a fundamental scripture as the Lotus S tra, or to later Japanese texts, such as the Buddhist collection of tales known as the Nihon ry iki.102 In the new historical circumstances of the Meiji period however the religious belief in karma was used as a tool to justify the patients’ confinement and their sacrifice was said to open a path towards confession and salvation.

The role of institutional religions in supporting such discrimination appears quite clearly in the reports published by the relevant national committee (Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi

) created in 2001 within the Japan Law Association in order to investigate the responsibilities of both the government and Japanese society, and in a series of documents and studies which were published in particular by the tani-ha.

Particularly noteworthy among the interesting data presented in the fi-nal report brought out in March 2005 by this committee is the high rate of Shin Buddhist followers among the residents in the sanatoria. Of a total of 3,436 formerly confined patients still living in August 2004 inside the thirteen National Sanatoria (kokuritsu ry y jo ), 32,6% were members of religious groups related to Shin Buddhism—usually bodies merged from different denominational branches—which amounts to 67%

101 See Kitano 2002: 40-42. 102 See Maekawa, 2002: 55. See also Hurvitz, 1976: 336. For similar views of karma in the Mury ju-ky , see the Introduction.


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of the total number of Buddhists, a figure dramatically much higher than the national rate.103 If we consider the largest Japanese sanatorium, the Kikuchi Keif -en located in Kumamoto prefecture, where 547 persons were still living in 2004, as many as 64,9% of the residents belonged to the Shin Buddhist association Shinsh D shikai . In the second largest one, the Nagashima Aisei-en in Oka-yama prefecture (464 residents in 2004), which was established in 1930 as the first national sanatorium, 34,7% of the residents belonged to the Shin Buddhist group Shinsh D b kai , which included members of both the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha. This report, together with other texts which have been published, provide sufficient evidence to establish a link between the strong presence of Shin Buddhists inside the sanatoria and the complicity given by the institutions of this religious tradition to the isolation policy from its inception and to the discrimina-tion against the patients which had been promoted by the authorities. This cooperation also meant, in the case of Shin Buddhism, a higher number of denouncements, and led to more forced hospitalizations among the members of this religious community.

As early as 1910 in the then official journal of the tani-ha, the Sh h , an article appeared in which it was stated that the new facilities

founded by the goverment to implement the isolation policy “convey to miserable leprosy patients the tenderness and comfort of [Amida] Nyo-rai,” and that “the Buddhist priest Hasuoka is willing to take care of these people at the request of the authority.”104 Indeed, it was mostly through the efforts of this priest, Hasuoka H rin , that the tani-ha first developed the policy of sending regular missions to sanatoria in order to provide “comfort teaching” (ian ky ka ) to the patients, a prac-tice which was destined to last until the abolition of the law.105

In 1930, a “Campaign to eradicate leprosy in every prefecture” (Mu-raiken und ) was launched by the government, which re-quired the search, the denunciation, and forced seclusion of people af-fected by the disease. This campaign, which aimed at creating a “Japan

103 Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 413-414, 453. For the current rate of Shin Buddhists among Japanese Buddhists, see the Introduction. Significant, among the other religious traditions operating in Japan, is also the incidence of Nichiren Bud-dhists and especially Christians inside the sanatoria. 104 Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 414-415. 105 Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 415.


without leprosy” through the sacrifice of those unfortunately affected by the disease,106 was supported by various religious groups, among which was the tani-ha, that was especially active through the newly created Society of Light (K my kai ). The K my kai, founded in 1931, mounted a public awareness programme in order to increase acceptance of the correctness of the national policy of complete segregation, urging those persons infected with “leprosy” to “recognize their illness as quick-ly as possible,” ”for the sake of the emperor” and for the sake of the com-plete “eradication of the illness.”107 Through the action of the K my kai, the strategy of giving “comfort teaching,” the principal aim of which was to bring about resignation to their own condition on the part of the pa-tients by urging upon them the extreme efficacy of the power of faith, was strengthened and continued until the 1990s.

One of the few exceptions to the policies of the Shin Buddhist institu-tions and to the attitudes of Japanese academic and civil society of that time was the work of Ogasawara Noboru (1888-1970), a doc-tor and priest of the tani-ha. Ogasawara opposed the confinement and sterilization of Hansen’s patients, maintaining that leprosy, contrary to general opinion, was not incurable, and that this wrong approach was mostly due to superstition. His position remained very isolated, however, like that of a few others inside the Shin Buddhist community, and did not succeed in challenging the mentality which was encouraged by the reli-gious institution itself. The latter insisted on observance of the policy of sacrificing the minority in order to protect the majority as promoted by the government in a time of national mobilization.108

The effects of this long-standing attitude of Shin Buddhism towards the Hansen’s disease issue are described in the writings of a former pa-tient and Shin Buddhist priest of the tani-ha, Ina Ky sh (1922-1995), whose figure has become a symbol of the struggle of this submerged and de-humanized world to regain its dignity and its place within society. Ina was diagnosed with leprosy in 1947, and taken to the national sanatorium of Nagashima Aisei-en, which is located on a small island in Okayama prefecture. He renamed himself Fujii Zen , fol-

106 Kitano, 2002: 41. 107 Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 450. 108 See Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 442; and Maekawa 2002: 56. See also Hishiki, 2003b.


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lowing the secular name of Shinran during his exile in Echigo.109 Al-though he recovered in 1960 after being treated with the pharmaceutical Promin, he was rejected by his family and could not return home. This was and still is a common phenomenon among former patients as a result of the persisting discriminatory attitude within Japanese society. The ty-pology of religious discrimination practised inside the sanatorium is ef-ficaciously presented by Ina in his book Hansenby /kakuzetsu yonj nen: ningen kaih e no mess ji

(Hansen’s Disease: Forty Years of Isolation. A Message of Liber-ation), which was published in 1994, where he describes the effects of the “consolatory missions” (imon fuky ) promoted by the Shin Buddhist institutions. What emerges from the text is an attitude by the various Shin Buddhist priests who regularly visited the sanatorium of tak-ing for granted the forced segregation of the patients, addressed in their rhetoric as those who could, through the working of religious faith, achieve a deeper liberation, based on inner peace.110 For the patients themselves this liberation was to be attained by quietly accepting their present condition, while being secluded from the world with the task of recovering from their illness. In the end, this attitude reinforced among the patients an attitude of accepting the situation as unchangeable, and as a result, helped to prolong the isolation policy.111 The efficacy of such in-struction, together with the persisting discrimination towards ‘leprosy’ strongly rooted in Japanese society, accounts for the high rate of former patients who have decided to remain in the sanatoria instead of leaving them as has been recently found. In a poll conducted by the National As-sociation of Residents in Hansen’s Disease Sanatoria (Zenry ky

) in September 2001, among the 4,388 people living at thirteen national sanatoria, less than 2% replied that they wanted to live in normal soci-ety.112

The turning-point in the attitude of Shin Buddhism towards Hansen’s disease can be traced to the activities started in the 1980s by different groups of priests in various sanatoria around Japan, as a further non-insti-

109 See Kitano, 2002: 43-44. Cf. CWS I: 681. 110 See Ina, 1994: 187-194. 111 See Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, 2005: 413. On this theme, see also Burns, 2004. 112 See Mainichi shinbun, 4 November 2001: 26.


tutional development of the reflection on the hisabetsu buraku minority, which was, and still is, one of the central issues in the programme of the D b movement. An initial example of this kind of engagement is pro-vided by the work inside the Nagashima Aisei-en of the tani-ha priest Tamamitsu Junsh .113 In 1983 Tamamitsu together with other priests, also under the influence of Fukuchi K z ’s writings on the hisa-betsu buraku issue, began conducting his regular visits to the patients of Nagashima Aisei-en, in the spirit of what he calls “practice” (jikk j

). One of the patients was the aforementioned Ina. According to Tama-mitsu, the purpose of this “practice” was to stress the need for both the outside world and the patients themselves to overcome the oppressive structure of the imon fuky , and thus also their present condition as dis-criminated and isolated people without hope. Tamamitsu saw that it was not possible for him or for the other priests involved in those activities “to be really human” unless the patients themselves “recovered their lost dig-nity and human status.”114 Part of the effort of these Shin Buddhist priests was also directed towards encouraging the patients to take their real names again, which they had in very many cases changed when entering the segregated world, so as to avoid causing discrimination against their families. This new approach, while encountering at first the diffidence of the patients, who were marked by long years of suffering, has proven to be a help for many of them, like Ina himself, in questioning their own condition, and although this movement started from the activities of small groups of priests visiting various sanatoria, it has ended up in contribut-ing substantially to the change of tani-ha policies towards this painful and long-standing issue. Already before the repeal of the Leprosy Preven-tion Law, which was the final result of the patients’ decades of struggles, mainly through the efforts of the above-mentioned Zenry ky , this new presence of Shin Buddhism had gradually extended from the isolated ac-tivities of a few individuals to the other sanatoria throughout Japan, lead-ing to the formation of a non-official network. Indeed, in the following years, a considerable effort was devoted by Shin Buddhism at large to the rethinking of these episodes of past discrimination, and to the reformula-tion of an alternative approach towards those people who had suffered or were still suffering from the consequences of the disease or from pro-

113 For Tamamitsu’s standpoint on Shin Buddhist ethics, see Chapter Two. 114 Ina, 1994: 112.


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longed seclusion from society. In 1990, for example, the tani-ha pub-lished a booklet, entitled Hansenby to Shinsh (Han-sen’s Disease and Shin Buddhism), expressing sympathy for the Han-sen’s disease patients and regret for the segregation and prejudice to which Shin Buddhism itself had contributed. However, it was only after the enforcement of a law, in 1996, repealing the former legislation (Rai yob h no haishi ni kansuru h ritsu ), that a clear attitude against this kind of discrimination emerged in the

tani-ha at the institutional level as well. In April 1996, the tani-ha is-sued a statement (Hansenby ni kakawaru Shinsh tani-ha no shazai seimei ), expressing official apologies for past discrimination, and for its own role in the very con-struction of the Hansen’s disease issue. At the same time, the pre-existing unofficial network of tani-ha practitioners, engaged in activities on behalf of Hansen’s disease patients, assumed the form of Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai , a network within the Kaih Und Suishin Honbu (Head Office for the Promotion of the Liberation Movement).115

In April 2005 the Hansenkon , as the Hansenby ni Kan-suru Kondankai is commonly called, was composed of thirty-nine com-mittee members (iin ), and five liaison groups (renrakukai ) active at the local level. Thus, it currently remains limited, despite institu-tional efforts, to a minority of practitioners inside the tani-ha. It is how-ever in collaboration with sectors of civil society, and promotes a series of activities which are basically directed towards facilitating the social-ization of former patients (shakai fukki ) and the investigation and publication of materials concerning past episodes of discrimination. Among the various activities which are currently carried out, support is given to former patients for visiting family graves (bosan o shien

) and their original homes (satogaeri o shien ). Support is also given to a biennial exchange meeting (K ry sh kai ), which on various occasions has taken place inside the sanatoria them-selves, and to lectures, often held with the participation of former pa-tients’ representatives. Besides, considerable effort is being made, espe-

115 See the official website of the Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai [http://www.sarami. net/hansenkon], accessed 5 April 2005; and Shinsh tani-ha Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai, 1998: 120-121. See also Appendix 9.


cially through the Hansenkon’s newsletter, Negai kara ugoki e , to give voice to the testimony of victims of past discrimination.116

A questionnaire similar to the one distributed later to the members of the 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d , was also administered to fourteen members of the Hansenkon in June 2005, and this gives some suggestions, despite the small number of replies, con-cerning the motivations underlying the social activities within this group. The answers to the question asking the reasons for one’s participation within the Hansenkon, show that for eight of them there was a close con-nection between the Shin Buddhist teachings and commitment on social discrimination. In particular, four replies explicitly referred to the teach-ing of Shinran, and two to the need to cope, as Shin Buddhists, with the problems of society. No strong relationship was apparent between this af-firmation of religious identity and other factors such as the length of members’ engagement, the place of their activity, or their provenance. Among the other figures, four replies referred to the issue of the past re-sponsibilities of the religious community in supporting discrimination, four to the encounter with the ‘other,’ and three of them to the meeting with inspiring figures within the Shin Buddhist community.

At the institutional level, the tani-ha has also supported the struggle of the residents from various national sanatoria in the Kumamoto District Court, where a lawsuit (‘Rai yob h ’ iken kokka baish seiky sosh

) was filed in 1998 against the gov-ernment, asking for damages against the infringement of human rights.117 In May 2001, when the court upheld the plaintiffs’ appeal and there was a chance that the government would appeal the decision in a higher court, the tani-ha lobbied on behalf of the plaintiffs by issuing a petition.118 The same happened in December 2003, after a group of residents of the Kikuchi Keif -en sanatorium was refused by the Ai-Ladies Ky den Kurokawa Onsen Hotel in Kumamoto in November of the same year, because their condition might frighten other guests. At that time, the former Hansen’s disease patients were made the object of harsh public criticism because they had not accepted the hotel’s apologies on the

116 See the official website [http://www.sarami.net/hansenkon], accessed 5 April 2005. 117 See Shinsh tani-ha Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai, 2003: 310-312; and the web-site [http://www.sarami.net/hansenkon], accessed 5 April 2005. 118 See the website [http://www.sarami.net/hansenkon], accessed 5 April 2005.


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grounds that they found them insincere.119 On that occasion, the D wa Suishin Honbu issued a statement concerning the incident at the Kuma-moto onsen, and in January 2004 organized an open lecture about this event, with the participation of members of the Patients’ Association.120 As regards further investigation of past responsibilities, in 1998 a collec-tion of documents concerned with discrimination inside the Shin Bud-dhist denomination was published,121 while in December of 2004 and 2005 exhibitions with a display of documents were organized at the head temple, within the context of the aforementioned Jinken sh kan gyarar ten.122 An informative page about the Hansen’s disease issue is regularly published in Shinsh , the official journal of the tani-ha.

There have also been some contributions to the issue from the Hon-ganji-ha, though its role in the discrimination against Hansen’s disease patients seems to have been, according to the above-mentioned final re-port of the Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi, historically less significant. Starting from 1987, this branch of Shin Buddhism has had to deal with the problem of discriminatory sermons (hansenby sabetsu h wa mondai ), after the use of discriminatory words during a memorial service held in the sanatorium of Nagashima Aisei-en in 1984 was made public. This incident had considerable re-percussions at the time, and the discussions which followed within the institution through a specially established committee led the Honganji-ha to admit its responsibilities, and that it was not, in fact, only an isolated case. There followed the publication of documents related to this subject, and, in 1992 and 1995 respectively, two special issues of the journal D wa ky iku ronky , and a collection of essays, entitled Hansenby sabetsu to J do Shinsh (Discrimination Against Hansen’s Disease and Shin Buddhism), were published by the D wa Ky iku Shink kai office. 123 In May 2001, on the occasion of the historic decision by the Kumamoto District Court, which recognized the country’s responsibility resulting in a total victory for the plaintiffs, the Honganji-ha also issued a brief statement, which condemned the past role

119 See Negai kara ugoki e, 31 January 2004: 2-3. 120 See Negai kara ugoki e, 31 January 2004: 5. 121 See Shinsh tani-ha Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai, 1998. 122 See Appendix 8. 123 See D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2000: 51, 58-70.


of “the religious community in supporting, like the state, prejudices and discrimination” (ky dan mo mata kuni to d y ni henken to sabetsu o j ch shita ), and in which an ideal of a “society of fellow companions” (on-d b no shakai

) was fostered as a means to overcome discriminatory practices in accordance with the teaching of Shinran.124 As in the case of the tani-ha, another message addressed to the government was issued later to lobby against the probable appeal of the state to a higher court.125

The Honganji-ha community, especially through the activities of the D wa Ky iku Shink kai, established in 1962 and mainly focusing on the hisabetsu buraku problem, is also addressing the issue of discrimination against Hansen’s disease patients, as in the case of the Exhibitions on Hu-man Rights (Jinken paneru ten), which have already been mentioned, and the recent commencement of the publication of a booklet series which presents the testimony of former Hansen’s patients.126 Both in Ky to and in other religious districts (ky ku ) the ongoing activities include symposia and lectures, sometimes in collaboration with tani-ha activists, as well as the persisting tradition of priests visiting sanatoria.

Notable among these groups are the activities of the Hansenby Mon-dai Furusato Nettow ku Toyama

(Toyama Network for the Hansen’s Disease Issue), in Toyama prefec-ture, which involves priests of both the Honganji-ha and tani-ha, to-gether with members of the Japan Federation of Democratic Medical In-stitutions in Toyama. This network organizes a symposium every year on the occasion of the anniversary of the winning of the lawsuit in the Kumamoto District Court in May 2001, and is coordinated by Fujino Yutaka , professor at Toyama International University, and a member of the aforementioned national committee, the Hansenby Mon-dai ni Kansuru Kensh Kaigi.127

When we come to analyse the religious sources used by these groups in order to justify their commitment, it is not difficult to retrace some of the features which have been noticed already in the case of anti-war ac-

124 See Honganji shinp , 20 May 2001: 1. 125 See Honganji shinp , 10 June 2001: 3. 126 See D wa Ky iku Shink kai, 2005a, and 2005b. See also Appendix 10. 127 See Mainichi shinbun (Toyama edition), 1 February 2005: 21; and 28 October 2005: 26; and Asuka, 2005.


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tivism. Both in sources like official statements and in other materials such as newsletters and leaflets, the low level of articulation of the doctrinal discourse within the actual social practice of these groups is apparent. With the exception of the references to the ideal of d b , or fellowship, fostered by Shinran, it is hard to find passages or statements where the two aspects are interrelated so as to actualize the teachings in relation to the exigencies of modern times.

This is not to say that, at another level, the discourse on ethics and so-ciety inside Shin Buddhism is not present. In fact, there is both in the

tani-ha and in the Honganji-ha a significant, though minor, stream of scholarship, as was presented in the previous chapter, that is quite active in its attempt to use the sources of the religious tradition in order to cope with the ethical interrogatives emerging from both the religious commu-nity and Japanese society in general. Indeed, as has been mentioned above, some of these writers are also taking part in various groups of ac-tivists.

It is interesting to note, however, that the relative lack of doctrinal ar-ticulation is quite noticeable in the material destined for the popular level. A possible reason for this state of affairs might be the desire for an in-creased appeal to areas of civil society for collaboration with the religious groups involved. This could explain the scarcity of religious nuances in the language adopted. And indeed, whether or not this is the motivation, something of this sort is currently taking place, with normal citizens com-ing together at various levels with the Shin Buddhist activists. On the other hand, a possible consequence of this approach might be to reduce the impact of the activities of such minority groups inside the denomina-tion. In fact, it is not entirely clear how others inside the religious com-munity might be encouraged to participate, specifically as Shin Buddhist practitioners and believers, in undertakings of this kind.

SOCIAL WELFARE

In his study Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan, published in 1990, James Ketelaar notes the similarities between the response of Buddhism to “the establishment of the Kamakura bakufu,” when, attempting to gain the favour of the new rulers, the Buddhist institutions engaged in the elaboration of “purer versions” of the teachings, and came to place more “emphasis upon socially propitious action such as the building of roads, bridges, wells, and land preserves,” and the response to the persecutions which Buddhism itself suffered in the initial part of the Meiji period, one


of the main features of which also consisted in presenting Japanese Bud-dhism as a force useful to society.128

Indeed, Japanese Buddhism has always been concerned throughout its history with social action, providing services in different areas of social welfare such as healing or education, which were “not necessarily the re-sponsibility of the state.”129 This practical reality of Buddhism as both re-ligious and social activism continued during the Tokugawa period, as is exemplified by the educational system of the temple schools, the terakoya

.130 However, it was in the Meiji period that, in order to regain the lost status after persecution, and to counter the widespread criticism of the uselessness of priests and temples, and “the challenges set by Chris-tian models,”131

Temples, carefully linked to one another through the main-branch hierar-chy and intersectarian organizations, were newly conceived of as loci of social praxis. Each of the sects became engaged in long-term projects for the aid of the destitute as well as in short-term relief in times of famine, disaster, or economic hardship. Numerous hospitals and clinics were con-structed along with centers to train “Buddhist doctors and nurses” to staff them. Schools for the blind and physically disabled soon followed, as well as hostels for the aged and infirm. Special lectures were conducted among prisoners; rehabilitation centers were established to aid those recently released. Social movements, or advertising campaigns, were carried out, covering a wide range of issues including public health, temperance, anti-abortion, and anti-capital punishment, and extending even to the preven-tion of cruelty to animals.132

One of the most apparent aspects in the creation of this modern form of Buddhism in the Meiji period was represented by the educational efforts of the Shin Buddhist denomination, which gained prominence in this sec-tor especially through the action of the Honganji-ha.133 This renewed con-fidence of Shin Buddhism in the social arena also found an application in

128 Ketelaar, 1990: 178. 129 Reader, 1995: 5. See also Tatz, 1985: 52-53, 60-63. 130 Cf. Passin, 1965: 13-49; and Reader, 1995: 5. 131 Amstutz, 2002: 10. 132 Ketelaar, 1990: 132-133. 133 Ketelaar, 1990: 179, 268.


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the strong support for Japanese imperialism, both at home and abroad. The role of the tani-ha, for example, was crucial in the colonization of Hokkaid , through the opening of new roads, the creation of new settle-ments and the organization of groups of agricultural colonists. This was accompanied by missionary activities among the Ainu natives.134 The missionary work of the Shin Buddhist denomination accompanied and supported the successive imperial wars against China (1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905), by supplying military chaplains and carrying out so-cial welfare activities such us “operating Japanese language schools, pre-paring parcels of treats for soldiers in the field,” and “providing technical training for local employees of Japanese companies.”135 The development of systematic charitable work within Japanese society by the Shin Bud-dhist institutions continued during the Pacific War, following similar mo-dalities both at the central and local level, and the K my kai of the

tani-ha, which has already been mentioned, was nothing but an example of a more generalized trend.

After the war, Shin Buddhism suffered a period of crisis, as did the other Buddhist denominations, due both to the critical historical circum-stances and to the fact that the modern state had been gradually assuming many of the roles previously played by the religious institutions in the area of social welfare.136 Nonetheless, Shin Buddhism has continued to play a significant role in Japanese society in the educational sphere at all levels, and in operating kindergartens within the temple grounds, partly also after the decline of the post-war baby boom. Another aspect of Shin Buddhist social work is represented by relief activities like those started by the Honganji-ha in 1973 for Vietnamese orphans, and by the tani-ha in 1988 for Indo-Chinese and Cambodian refugees.137 More recently, fund-raising has been carried out by the two major Shin Buddhist head temples for the people of Western India after a violent earthquake in 2001,138 for Afghanistan refugees,139 and for the victims of the Niigata

134 See Ketelaar, 1997: 536-538; and Ketelaar, 1990: 248. 135 Victoria, 1997: 65. See also Hishiki, 1993: 49-57. 136 See Reader, 1995: 5-6. 137 See Murai, 2003: 52; and Sagae, 2003: 40. 138 See Honganji shinp , 20 July 2001: 2; and Shinsh : August 2001: 6. 139 See Honganji shinp , 1 November 2001: 1; and D b , March 2002: 2.


earthquake in 2004.140 The gathering of donations and other relief activities inside Japan are

often realized through volunteer work, as in the case of the tani-ha high school students collecting funds in front of the gates of the Higashi Hon-ganji after the Niigata earthquake, the activities carried out within the Ry koku Borantia NPO Katsud Sent NPO

(Ry koku University Volunteer NPO Activity Center), which is based in the Ry koku University in Ky to, or those of similar groups of Shin Buddhist activists.141 While various of these groups are currently particu-larly active in the field of support for the disabled and the aged, for whom the religious institutions operate various old people’s homes (r jin h mu

),142 many others are now focusing especially on an area of increasing interest for Shin Buddhist volunteers, the so-called Vih ra movement. The term vih ra (bih ra ) is a Sanskrit word indi-cating a Buddhist monastery or temple, and was first used in Japan to distinguish the concept of a Buddhist hospice from its Christian counter-part by Tamiya Masashi in 1985.143 This was the starting-point for a Buddhist movement beyond sectarian borders dealing with the suffering of patients at the terminal stage, which presently accounts for numerous groups of volunteers among diverse denominations of Japanese Buddhism.

The Honganji-ha currently shows a considerable interest in this issue, and as early as 1987 the Bih ra Katsud (Vih ra Move-ment) was started so as to provide terminal care for such patients, soon followed by the creation of various local branches all over the country.144 This project is considered as an alternative to the ‘western-Christian’ ap-proach to the problem, and is meant to provide support to terminal pa-tients and to alleviate their suffering and isolation through compassionate work carried out in the spirit of Buddhist principles, though not limited

140 See Ch gai nipp , 2 November 2004: 3. 141 See, for example, Sagae, 2003: 42-43; the official website of the Ry koku Borantia NPO Katsud Sent [http://www.ryukoku.ac.jp/npo], accessed 7 August 2004; D b , March 2002: 2; and Ch gai nipp , 11 December 2001: 8; and 28 October 2004: 4. 142 See Murai, 2003: 56-57. 143 See Bih ra Jissen Katsud Kenky kai, 1996: 31. See also Long and Chihara, 2000: 154. 144 See the official website of the Bih ra Katsud [http://www2.hongwanji.or.jp/social/ vihala/index. html], accessed 10 June 2005.


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only to Buddhist patients. As such, the Bih ra Katsud starts from the as-sumption that Buddhist spirituality can provide, through the overcoming of self-centred views, a way out of the technologization of medical care typical of modern society. From the doctrinal point of view, this move-ment is concerned with linking its activities not only to the teachings of ø kyamuni—notably to the implications of Buddhism as a healing prac-tice from the suffering of birth (sh ), old age (r ), illness (by ), and death (shi )—but also to Shinran’s teaching, with particular refer-ence to passages contained in the Matt sh . In a letter written to J shin-b at the age of eighty-eight, for example, Shinran stated that

It is saddening that so many people, both young and old, men and women, have died this year and last. But the Tathagata taught the truth of life’s impermanence for us fully, so you must not be distressed by it. I, for my own part, attach no significance to the condition, good or bad, of persons in their final moments. People in whom shinjin is determined do not doubt, and so abide among the truly settled. For this reason their end also—even for those ignorant and foolish and lacking in wisdom—is a happy one.145

This passage, in which, through the reference to the teaching of “im-permanence” (muj ) and to shinjin as the state of the “truly settled” (sh j ju ), equal dignity seems to be conferred to each moment of one’s life, figures among the selected sources used by the Bih ra Katsud to justify a sympathetic approach towards the patients, which might help them to recover their full dignity during the course of the natural process of illness and dying.146 The activities of this movement within the Hon-ganji-ha are coordinated by the Dend Shakaibu (Bureau for Mission in Society) of the central administration, and, since until recently there has been in Japan only one specialized facility operating as a Bud-dhist vih ra, that is, the West Nagaoka Hospital (Nagaoka Nishi By in

) located in Niigata prefecture, these groups are often assisting in clinics, hospitals, and senior citizens’ homes in various parts of the country.147 The Bih ra Katsud also organizes a national meeting, the Bi-

145 CWS I: 531. 146 See Bih ra Jissen Katsud Kenky kai, 1996: 86; and the official website [http://www2. hongwanji.or.jp/social/vihala/index.html], accessed 10 June 2005. Cf. CWS I: 523, 539. 147 See Murai, 2003: 55-56.


h ra Katsud zenkoku sh kai every year, which is open to other groups, as well as training sessions for volunteers, and lectures.148 Linked to the Honganji-ha is also the J do Shinsh T ky Bi-h ra , which was started in 1988 and operates similar undertakings in various facilities at a local level, together with a programme of counselling for the patients and their families.149

While we can find examples of networking and practical collaboration of Honganji-ha priests with tani-ha activists and other religionists of yet other denominations in groups like the Bih ra 21 , which operates in the area of saka and is particularly active in training new volunteers,150 it is noteworthy that the Vih ra movement is also rapidly developing inside the tani-ha, though it seems to occupy a less central role in the administration’s policies.

A Vih ra group was started in Nagoya in 1988 by the Shin Buddhist priest, Tashiro Shunk , professor at D h University, which is closely related to the tani-ha. This group differs from most of the other movements which “emphasize the education of priests” in that it is “meant primarily to be an organization for laypeople,”151 and, with the assistance of the Higashi Honganji Youth Group in Nagoya, sponsors a project to train volunteers. The training consists in basic Buddhist teach-ings, care-giving and counselling, and after eight months the participants start volunteering at hospitals and homes for the elderly.152 As is the com-mon feature of the Japanese Vih ra movement as a whole, it aims at re-viving the spirit of Buddhist hospices in the past history of India and Ja-pan, and takes the easing of pain as a “basic operating principle.” The ap-proach which is adopted is a “patient-oriented” one, aimed at facilitating “introspection” and providing a “peaceful atmosphere for terminally ill patients.”153 It is interesting to note that this group, in company with vari-ous other activists within the Vih ra movement, is addressing a sensitive

148 See, for example, Bunka jih , 9 October 2004: 2; and Murai, 2003: 58-59. See also Appendix 11. 149 See See Murai, 2003: 56; and Bunka jih , 14 July 2001: 2. 150 See the website [http://www.oct.zaq.ne.jp/vows/bihara/index.html], accessed 18 April 2006. 151 Ikeuchi and Freund, 1995: 64. 152 See Tashiro, 2004: 79. 153 Ikeuchi and Freund, 1995: 63.


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issue concerning the doctor-patient relationship within the medical care system, that is, the right to be informed of one’s own illness. Until re-cently it has in fact been common practice for the medical profession in Japan not to provide available information to patients, especially if the disease was cancer. The results of a survey commissioned in 1992 by the Japanese Ministry of Health and Welfare, for example, showed that only 20% of terminal cancer patients surveyed had been informed of their ill-ness.154 This attitude is interpreted by Tashiro as one of the pitfalls of modern medicine, and as indicating its inability to see in the patient any-thing more than an object of study. The shortcomings of such an ap-proach are further indicated by him with reference to the issue of organ transplantation.155 Medical care should therefore be integrated, according to Tashiro, into a Buddhist, spiritually oriented support system, which re-covers the meaning and value of the patient’s life and death.156 With ref-erence to this he stresses in particular Shinran’s teaching of jinen, or nat-uralness, which allows one to accept one’s own life and death, letting things happen as they do, beyond the calculation of the practitioners but through the working of Amida’s Vow.157 Tashiro sees in jinen the tran-scendence of the “egocentricity” through which one creates one’s own suffering, and, at the same time, a path beyond the distinctions between good and evil, and “the impression that life is good and death is evil.”158

Another figure particularly active within the Vih ra movement is Ta-bata Masahisa , a doctor who founded in 1990 the Kunisaki Vi-h ra Society (Kunisaki Bih ra no Kai ) in ita prefec-ture. Tabata, whose writings are also published by the tani-ha publish-ing department, thinks that we are entering an age in which “we can no longer ignore religion when thinking about death.”159 He stresses the nat-uralness of the process of aging and dying, and, on the basis of Shinran’s teaching, he promotes a practice in which the attitude “beyond self-at-tachment” and towards the acceptance of reality as it is, is intended to

154 See Morioka, 1995: 88; and Neary, 2002: 134. 155 See Tashiro, 1995: 68-70. 156 See Tashiro, 1995: 67, 72. 157 See Tashiro, 2004: 45. 158 See Tashiro, 2004: 92, 102. 159 Tabata, 2004: 36.


provide a way to reduce suffering.160 Tabata also shares the concern for correct information to be provided to patients concerning their illness, and is against what he terms the master-servant relationship established by specialists with patients.161 Moreover, like others within the Vih ra movement, he questions life-extending treatment and organ transplanta-tion.162 The volunteer activities by Tabata and his group within the hospi-tal are accompanied by regular study classes on the Tannish (Tannish ni Kikukai ).163

The activism of the above-mentioned groups indicates the increasing present-day interest within Shin Buddhism—as in Japanese Buddhism in general—in issues of social welfare, also going beyond the areas in which the denomination has been traditionally involved in the post-war period. The same concern for social welfare in the form of voluntary activities is suggested also by the previously mentioned Basic Survey carried out by the Honganji-ha in 1996, according to which about 20-30% of the prac-titioners (monto) see themselves as being “active in helping handicapped people” or “at a vihara.” Such a piece of information, though possibly overstated, is shown to be closely related to a high level of religious con-sciousness among the participants.164 While it is possible to speak, with reference to these activities, of an increased level of awareness of the reli-gious community in relation to specific problems of modern society, this general approach can also be viewed on the other hand as reflecting past Shin Buddhist social commitment in the pre-war period. Although those activities were largely uncritical of the political institutions and embraced the cause of Japanese imperialism, it is also undeniable that they repre-sented at the same time a concrete example of active engagement within society. All of this seems to illustrate the simple fact that an additional level of reflection is always required in religious social work (as well as

160 See Tabata, 2004: 7, 15-17. 161 See Tabata, 2004: 1, 20-21. 162 See Tabata, 2004: 7, 13. See also Bih ra Jissen Katsud Kenky kai, 1996: 161, 357; and the official website of the Bih ra Katsud [http://www2.hongwanji.or.jp/social/vihala /index.html], accessed 10 June 2005. 163 See also Honganji shinp , 1 August 2001: 2. 164 See Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 97-98, 118. In the same survey, the percentage of the monto who “join voluntary welfare groups” is 17,6%, more than the 13,5% registered among the monto s dai (“representative followers of local temples”) in the fifth survey carried out in 1983; see Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 102-103.


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in secular equivalents) which intends to qualify itself as conveying coher-ent and profound ethical meanings. It also shows that the institutional level has often played, and is still likely to play a very important role in the process of shaping the attitude of the religious community towards society, partly through selection from the sources used to present the fun-damental doctrines of the tradition, and above all in ways which can be regarded as more or less consistent with the universal message of Mah -y na and Shin Buddhist teachings. Finally, it indicates the limitations of any approach to the analysis of Shin Buddhist social ethics which over-emphasizes a connection between the doctrinal level and an alleged lack of social concern, a prejudice in which contemporary accounts sometimes indulge.

Chapter 4 __________________________________________________ Shin Buddhist Ethics in the Perspective of Globalization The variety of views emerging from the analysis presented in the previ-ous chapters makes it problematical to speak of a definitive Shin Bud-dhist social ethics. This is true not only of the doctrinal debate, which en-compasses approaches as diverse as those strongly affirming the priority of the inner spiritual life and those seeking a total dependence of the latter on the social context, but also of the institutional policies and social activ-ism carried out by Shin Buddhist practitioners. The discourse on ethics and society promoted by the two main Shin Buddhist institutions itself consists of various layers, some of which, such as those stressing equality and the occidentalist overtones noted in Chapter Two, may even appear to contradict each other. A wide range of options, often overlapping with each other, is also found in the social practice of Shin Buddhist activists. One can think, for example, of activities focusing on social welfare like those of the Vih ra movement, where engagement in society is not dis-connected from the affirmation of a pan-Buddhist identity to set against a ‘western-centred’ approach to medical care, and of those related to Yasu-kuni Shrine, generally implying the acknowledgement of Shin Bud-dhism’s past war responsibilities and a critical view of political reality.

This picture is made even more complex when one looks at the gen-eral religious attitudes of the practitioners which emerge from various discussions on contemporary Shin Buddhism, and, more specifically, from the data provided by the survey carried out by the Honganji-ha in 1996, which was already discussed in Chapter Three. Here on the one hand about 70% of those interviewed regarded themselves as having high expectations of moral behaviour in “all aspects of one’s daily life,” and


about 60% stated that they were engaged in some sort of social work. On the other hand, it appears that only 42% of the total are considered by the commentators “to have desirable daily religious behaviour and have the desirable Shinshu belief,” which confirms the common perception that moral behaviour—whatever that may imply—besides being framed in different styles of religiosity, can be grounded for many practitioners on sources external to Shin Buddhism.1

In this chapter, which is also meant as a conclusion to the present study, the complex picture of contemporary Shin Buddhist ethics ex-plored above will be set in the context of current discussions about glob-alization. This process, through which “the world is rapidly coming to be apprehended as ‘one place’,”2 implies in fact a relocation and respecifica-tion of religion in the face of dramatic changes within society and the progressive relativization of religious values, thus carrying important consequences for the discourse on social ethics as well. It seems to the present writer that the setting of distinctive aspects of contemporary Shin Buddhist approaches to ethics within this wider context also offers the advantage of highlighting their social significance and their underlying reciprocal relationships, as well as their similarities with the reactions of-fered by other religious institutions to the pressing problems of the pres-ent. In this connection, particular reference will be made in this conclud-ing analysis to the typological distinction which has been proposed by Pe-ter Beyer for the examination of reactions offered by religious traditions to the challenges of globalization.

Beyer has postulated two options, the “conservative” and the “liberal,” as the two main strategies adopted by religion in order to respond to the globalization of society.3 In this regard, the conservative option is char-acterized as “the reassertion of the tradition in spite of modernity,” which, though being ostensibly in conflict with dominant trends of globalization, seen as “prime manifestations of evil in the world,” is not so much a ne-gation but a vital feature of it which is itself contributing to making reli-gion “most visible in today’s world.”4 Among the main features of this option, for Beyer, there are the “approximate dichotomization of the

1 See Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 92, 94, 106. 2 Garret and Robertson, 1991: ix. 3 See Beyer, 1994: 86. 4 See Beyer, 1994: 90, 108.

4. Shin Buddhist Ethics in the Perspective of Globalization 193

world into the religiously pure and impure,” and the “great stress on a particular group-cultural moral code as the manifestation of divine will.” We also see the rejection of religious pluralism, “political mobilization” seen as the “service” of religious faith, and, more generally, a pressure for the “dedifferentiation” of “functional areas” such as those of “religion and politics,” “religion and the family,” “religion and education,” and “religion and economy.”5 According to Beyer, the main advantage of-fered by this option is “its attachment to the same socio-cultural particu-larisms that inform so many modern states.”6

For the liberal option, he argues that it implies a positive approach to globalization, without evading the challenge of addressing the problems that it engenders. For this option, the acknowledgement of the presence of evil in contemporary society is not accompanied by its clear localization or personification. In this sense, it represents more “a negative deficiency to be filled” on the basis of the “prevailing global values” than “a positive presence to be destroyed.”7 Religious pluralism, ecumenism, and toler-ance, with the acknowledgement of possibilities for salvation also in other religious traditions, are postulated as salient features of this ideal type, together with the interpretation of problems and conflicts in con-temporary society as largely due to the exclusion of minorities and, even more often, of majorities, from “systemic benefits like ‘adequate’ income, political participation, health care, education.”8 Thus, from this point of view, “humanity as a whole is the community and the religious task is to work for the fuller inclusion of all people in the benefits of this global community.”9 The solution to social problems, however, “while reli-giously inspired,” tends “to take on the characteristics of the target sys-tem,” focusing on “economic solutions to economic problems,” and on “political solutions to political problems.”10 Therefore, the adoption of the liberal choice should not lead one, as a general rule, “to advocate the legislation of religious norms.”11 One more aspect, which for Beyer rep-

5 See Beyer, 1994: 91-93. 6 Beyer, 1994: 94. 7 See Beyer, 1994: 86-87, 104. 8 Beyer, 1994: 86-88. 9 Beyer, 1994: 88. 10 Beyer, 1994: 87. 11 Beyer, 1994: 89.


resents at the same time “the central theological problem of this option,” is that it “makes few really religious demands,” thus leaving room for the criticism that it has “lost the specifically religious.”12

The fact that these two ideal types are not to be found in their pure form in reality, besides being a truism, may also be taken to indicate, in specific cases, the ambiguities underlying the strategies which are being adopted by various religious groups. Indeed, if one looks at current Shin Buddhist approaches to social issues, it is possible to detect the presence of a mixed set of items from the two aforementioned options.

One of the salient features of the Shin Buddhist doctrines is the uni-versality of their salvific message promising liberation to all living beings. Recent formulations of the ideal of fellowship (d b ) find expres-sion, for example, in the claim that Shin Buddhism “goes beyond social, ethnic, and national distinctions” (kaiky , minzoku, kokky o koete

), since for Shinran “this is a community of fellow practitioners” (d b ky dan ).13 This may also be seen in the “vow to avoid war” (fusen no chikai ) contained in the previ-ously mentioned resolution issued by the tani-ha in 1995, where com-passion for those “fellow companions living within the four seas” (shikai d b ) is taken to be a necessary step for “the realization of a peaceful world” (heiwana kokusai shakai no kensetsu

)14—which in turn might imply the extension of the idea of d b to those who are not specifically Shin Buddhists. The implications of this ideal for the discourse on social equality, which is a key modern value endorsed by the “liberal option,” appear quite clearly both in the doctrinal discussions which have been analysed in Chapter Two and in the social activities on behalf of discriminated minorities as illustrated in Chapter Three.

A distinctive tendency to religious tolerance can be traced in Shinran’s writings which seems to provide the direction for much of the general Shin Buddhist attitude towards other religions. This is reflected not only by its participation, in the Japanese context, in organizations like the Ja-pan Buddhist Federation (Zen Nihon Bukky kai ), but also,

12 See Beyer, 1994: 87-88. 13 See J do Shinsh Honganji-ha, 2004: 167-169. 14 See Shinsh , July 1995: 14; and Tamamitsu, 1995: 110. Cf. CWS I: 155; and SSZ II: 105.


for instance, in the more largely conceived World Conference on Reli-gion and Peace. Significantly, the Honganji-ha and the tani-ha are cur-rently engaged in forms of inter-religious dialogue especially if not only with Protestant Christianity in both Europe and the United States. Just to mention two examples, in the last few years scholars from the tani Uni-versity have been and still are involved, in regular discussions with Prot-estant theologians in Marburg, Germany, and the resultant proceedings have been published in three volumes in Japanese translation. Several Honganji-ha scholars, for their part, are also seriously pursuing a dia-logue with American Protestant theologians, through participation in symposia and various publications.15 These are indications that the course of Shin Buddhism is at present consciously directed, at least to some de-gree, towards opening itself up to other religious traditions, following in this regard the lines of the liberal option, which implies tolerance and ec-umenism.

However, there are reasons to believe that this choice is not without ambiguities. One of the underlying problems for Shin Buddhism is, just as in other religious traditions, the acknowledgement of salvation for non-believers. Shinran’s negative attitude towards the soteriological potential of other traditions, and his assumption that other forms of Buddhism also have no more than a provisional status, still seem, in fact, to co-determine the orientation of Shin Buddhist sensibility towards those who do not have a positive relationship with the nenbutsu.16 This is true, in particular, to forms of religiosity which are generally referred to as ‘superstitions,’ like divination and spirit worship, although a significant proportion of the followers themselves, as is commonly acknowledged and confirmed by statistical data, shares in similar practices and activities in the context of

15 The orientation of the Honganji-ha towards American Protestantism may be considered, in this regard, to be influenced by the stronger presence of missionary activities of this branch of Shin Buddhism in the United States. This significant presence is also reflected by the participation, within the Honganji-ha, of a higher number of English-language speakers in the scholarly debate, especially within the context of the International Asso-ciation of Shin Buddhist Studies (Kokusai Shinsh Gakkai ). As regards the tani-ha, the inter-religious dialogue taking place in Marburg possibly reflects a long-standing interest in German philosophy and theology cultivated especially at tani Uni-versity in Ky to. See, for example, Hirota, 2000; and Minoura, Kadowaki, Pye, and Barth, 2004. 16 See, for example, Van Bragt, 1990b: 30; and Yokota, 2002: 146-148.


Shint matsuri (festivals) at the neighbourhood level.17 Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that this attitude can also assume the form of organized campaigns, like those directed against the so-called karuto (“cults”), especially after the Aum Shinriky Incident of 1995.18 In this sense, it is also possible to trace, in contemporary Shin Buddhism, the presence of elements of exclusive religious particularism which are both representative of the conservative option and grounded on fundamental doctrinal assumptions.

It is in this perspective that one also finds much of the rhetoric which contributes to the Shin Buddhist discourse on humanism and anthro-pocentrism. The presence of occidentalist overtones in modern and con-temporary discourses on Japanese Buddhism has been recently pointed out in various studies. Within this context, the term occidentalism indi-cates, broadly speaking, a reverse form of orientalism, that is, of that con-struction of the “Orient-as-unity,” illustrated by Edward Said and other writers, which “became necessary in order to constitute the putative unity and universality of the West,” and to justify the hegemonic claims of the latter towards the ‘exotic other,’ whose civilization, it was arbitrarily as-sumed, “could never be fully achieved through the mimetic efforts of na-tive peoples.”19 In this regard, Bernard Faure and Robert Sharf have ef-ficaciously illustrated the selective use made by Suzuki Daisetsu and the Ky to School of elements of Zen Buddhism in order to construe an al-leged Japanese uniqueness through the opposition of ‘East’ and ‘West.’ This is, in fact, a nativist structure, where Japanese spirituality, taken to be the peak of a pan-Asian cultural legacy, is set forward as superior to the materialist and individualistic ‘western culture.’20 Robert Kisala has pointed out how, in new Japanese religions in the Nichiren lineage like the Nipponzan My h ji, the S ka Gakkai and the Rissh K seikai, a con-siderable stress on peace and inter-religious dialogue can be accompanied by a rhetoric emphasizing the uniqueness of particular socio-cultural val-ues. In the case of the Nipponzan My h ji, for instance, the world is di-

17 See Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 102-103, 106. 18 See, for example, the leaflet published by the Shinsh tani-ha Seish y nen Sent Junbishitsu , 1 October 2005; and the website of the same office, [http://www.tomo-net.or.jp/oyc/index.html], accessed 20 March 2006. 19 Ivy, 2005: 317. 20 See, for example, Faure, 1995; and Sharf, 1995.


vided into a material or “Scientific Civilization,” which is identified with the “West,” and a spiritual or “Religious Civilization” located in the “East,” which in virtue of this assumed moral superiority is destined to save the former from destruction.21 Regarding the S ka Gakkai, Kisala has noted that the vision of a new world order, beyond any division be-tween “East” and “West,” is meant to be mediated by Japan, whose cen-tral role is ultimately secured by its being the “meeting point of Western and Eastern civilization” and by the fact that “the tide of history has turned against Western materialism and towards Eastern, Buddhist spir-itualism.”22 Traces of the occidentalist rhetoric are similarly localized by Kisala in the Rissh K seikai. Here we find a combination of the belief that all religions are essentially one with the characterization of Bud-dhism as intrinsically tolerant in contraposition to the exclusivist ten-dency of Christianity.23

The critique of the two related ideas of humanism and anthropocen-trism found in the 2000 Declaration of the Shin Buddhist Federation, which was presented in Chapter Two, offers, together with other texts which have also been mentioned, another example of the same logic. Here, the assumption that humanism, as a view of reality centred totally on the human being, is the basic cause of the main problems of con-temporary society, corresponds to an “approximate dichotomization of the world.”24 For these critics there is on the one hand “the spirit of hu-manism,” the search for unlimited human knowledge which carries with itself the technologization of life and a striving for worldly benefits which can never be satisfied, while on the other hand there is a spiritual ap-proach to life which, on the basis of the equality of all beings, strongly rejects this “process of de-humanization” and “privatization.” The latter is an approach which only “Buddhist spirituality” can aptly provide, since for this anti-humanistic position there does not seem to be any other prac-ticable way to overcome the self-centred personality. Shin Buddhism is thus construed implicitly as the perfection of a pan-Asian spiritual herit-

21 See Kisala, 1999a: 159-161. 22 See Kisala, 1999a: 167. The same point had been made earlier by Anson Shupe in his study on the S ka Gakkai; see Shupe, 1991. 23 See Kisala, 1999a: 170-171. Kisala also specifies that these elements remain “in the background” both in the S ka Gakkai and the Rissh K seikai. 24 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 92.


age, and, more explicitly, as the ideal solution to pressing social problems of our time. This is a strategy which evidently fits in with the tendency, noted by Beyer for those religious groups which support the conservative option, to put “great stress” on their “moral code as the manifestation of divine will.”25 With reference to the aforementioned Shin Buddhist iden-tification with a pan-Asian dimension which opposes the ‘other’ (the ‘West’), this may also be aptly characterized as a vital idea lying at the basis of the emergence of Buddhism itself as a global phenomenon, and as a functional system differentiating itself from others in modern society. This is a process which started in Japan at latest from the Meiji period on-wards with the shaping of a new kind of Buddhism for the “new age of modernity,”26 and it may be justifiably compared to the creation of Hin-duism as a unified religious tradition under the British rule.27

As concerns Shin Buddhist activism, it may be suggested that the same dichotomizing logic, through the affirmation of a pan-Buddhist identity contrasted with the pitfalls of a western-based approach to medi-cine, also applies to sectors of the Vih ra movement. Thus it is stated for example that the question of support for terminally ill patients and other related issues cannot be resolved by “medicine and the other sciences,” but rather “Asian philosophy offers ways to solve” them.28

An example provided by Beyer which presents analogous characteris-tics to the rhetoric found here in Shin Buddhism is that of the New Chris-tian Right in the United States, where “secular humanism” functions “as a convenient label for all that is wrong with contemporary America and the world.”29 Still more interestingly, as he notes, it “refers to a view of the world, allegedly dominant among the New Christian Right’s opponents, which is not ‘God-centred’,” as illustrated quite clearly by Jerry Falwell’s statement that “humanism has its origins in man’s attempts to place hu-

25 See Beyer, 1994: 92. 26 See Ivy, 2005: 323; Ketelaar, 1990 and 1991; and Snodgrass, 2003. 27 See Beyer, 1998: 15-18. Beyer contrasts the case of Hinduism, intended as a category embraced by the Indians in the process of their “path to global incorporation,” to that of “Chinese religion,” which “as a whole” has not undergone the same “identification proc-ess,” to suggest that “the notion of religion as category and differentiated institutional sphere is of relatively recent historical origin and makes sense in the context of glob-alization.” Beyer, 1998: 21-22. 28 See Tashiro, 1995: 67. 29 Beyer, 1994: 124.


man wisdom above divine revelation,” and, similarly, by Pat Robertson’s belief that “the decline of twentieth century America” is due “to the movement that put ‘man at the center of the universe’.”30 Diverse though these two religious groups—and their perceptions of the idea of human-ism—may be at the general level, the affirmation of the “exclusive valid-ity of a particular group culture” through the opposition to the ‘other’ (humanism), is a way through which both the New Christian Right and Shin Buddhism—and the aforementioned cases within other Japanese re-ligious groups—try to “limit the inclusive tendencies of the global sys-tem” and the “compartmentalization of religion and the decline in reli-gious influence.”31 In this respect, Shin Buddhism, as a Japanese reality, provides another case study for the thesis that “ethno-cultural defence is often a way of competing for power in the major global systems.”32

One of the aspects which distinguishes the Shin Buddhist response to globalization quite clearly from those provided by the New Christian Right or the S ka Gakkai is on the other hand its attitude towards the is-sue of the separation of state and religion. Both the New Christian Right and the S ka Gakkai support “political mobilization” intended as the “service” of religious faith, and thus the “dedifferentiation” of the func-tional areas of religion and politics.33 This strategy, which for Beyer is typical of the conservative option and is underlined by the claim that “the public influence of religion should be supported by law,”34 can also be intended in many cases, as suggested by Margit Warburg, as a “renewed battle” over prerogatives which have long been assumed by national poli-tics.35 Indeed, one issue which has been noted to be among the most pressing for contemporary Shin Buddhism at various levels, namely the opposition to state support of Yasukuni Shrine, represents a vigorous de-fence of the opposite line, according to which religion tries to “establish its contribution as specifically religious.”36 In fact, the supporters of this strategy, which is characteristic of the “liberal option,” generally conform

30 Beyer, 1994: 124. 31 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 114, 116. 32 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 114. 33 See Beyer, 1994: 91, 93. 34 Beyer, 1994: 92. 35 Warburg, 1999: 53. 36 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 94.


to the differentiation of functional areas which lies at the basis of modern society, and tend to advocate “political solutions to political problems.”37 This means that, although Shin Buddhism may appear to be trying to in-crease the influence of religion within the public sphere even through Yasukuni Shrine issue, its performance may be better interpreted as a re-ply to those attempts, supported by influential conservative sectors of Japanese society—and emblematically symbolized by the former Prime Minister’s visits to the shrine—to weaken the borders between politics and religion. In fact it is precisely on Articles 19, 20 and 89 of the Japa-nese Constitution, where this principle of separation is enshrined, that the lawsuits which were mentioned in Chapter Three, filed by Shin Buddhist activists and supported by the religious institutions, are pivoted. Thus, the Yasukuni Shrine problem, far from being simply a local problem related to doctrinal formulations against the enshrinement and worship of spirits, may also be seen as the result of dynamics linked to the process of glob-alization.

That the Yasukuni Shrine issue is, properly speaking, a global issue, is illustrated by the very fact that the ideological use of it made by the Japa-nese government, which became the centre of militarist wartime propa-ganda until the end of World War II, responded to the need of Japan to react to the dramatic changes in international politics and economics through the violent affirmation of its ethno-cultural particularism. This is a global dimension that continues to reverberate down to present times through the strong protests of Japan’s neighbours—and past war vic-tims—China and Korea, on the occasion of the former Prime Minister Koizumi’s recent annual visits to the shrine, and is generally acknowl-edged also by many Japanese observers to be a destabilizing factor in the East Asian region.

In this regard, the Yasukuni Shrine question may also be seen as en-compassing two other aspects which can be characterized as representa-tive of the liberal option. It has been previously noted that the statements and activities within Shin Buddhism which are related to this question also combine a distinctive concern for peace. In particular, great stress is put on the link existing between the glorification of death performed through the enshrinement in Yasukuni Shrine of Japanese military per-sonnel who died in service, and the imperialist policies that led to the in-

37 See Beyer, 1994: 87.


justices and atrocities of war. Significantly, this criticism of past Japanese imperialism and militarism is typically accompanied in the Shin Buddhist discourse on peace by the admission of the war responsibility of the reli-gious community and repentance for it. It was pointed out that the tani-ha and the Honganji-ha have formally acknowledged their role in sup-porting Japanese wartime policies beginning respectively in 1987 and 1991, calling upon the Shin Buddhist community to reflect on its having betrayed Shinran’s teaching, and especially his concern for fellowship and a peaceful world. In this way, current Shin Buddhist emphasis on peace results in being closely connected with another distinctive trait of the liberal option as illustrated by Beyer, namely, the assumption of an “adaptive, cognitive style,” and the consequent espousal of the religious tradition as a “process of learning to learn.”38

The above-mentioned issue of the differentiation of functional areas within modern and global society may be correlated with three further as-pects to be found in Shin Buddhist approaches to contemporary society. To begin with, besides the differentiation of religion and politics, there are indications that those of religion and the family, and religion and edu-cation, have also been supported at some level within the Shin Buddhist community. The D b movement, started by the Honganji-ha and the

tani-ha in the post-war period, is perhaps the most visible aspect of the attempt made by these institutions to meet both the demands made on the structure of traditional society by the progressive industrialization, and depopulation of the rural areas, and at the same time the challenge repre-sented by the rapid expansion in membership of new religions like the S ka Gakkai in urban areas. This is a process in which instances of or-ganizational reform already in motion have sometimes come to be rad-icalized, leading, in the tani-ha, to dramatic changes in the administra-tional system of this branch of Shin Buddhism.39 It is interesting to note that another leading theme of the D b movement, as is clearly illustrated by the slogan of the tani-ha D b kai Und , has been the transition “from a religion of the family to one of the individual awareness.”40 Here, a programmatic intent to promote some form of differentiation between religion and the family, a trait which is typical of the “liberal option,” is

38 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 144-145. 39 See Cook, 1978 and 1989. 40 See Shinsh tani-ha Sh musho, 2003: 127.


apparent. It should be noted, however, that the attempt to open the way for a religion of the individual has remained largely unsuccessful. Even today in fact, not only is the usual way of counting the number of prac-titioners in both Honganji branches by household, but the religious be-haviour itself of the majority of Shin Buddhists also appears to be centred on motifs which are typical of the traditional style of religiosity, such as visits to family graves, offerings at the home altar, and rites for the ances-tors.41

As regards the positions among Shin Buddhists towards the differ-entiation of the two areas of religion and education, recent events suggest that there are forces presently pressing in the direction of a liberal-ori-ented performance. Thus there has been a strong reaction from sectors of Shin Buddhism, notably the tani-ha, to the plans of the government for a revision of the Fundamental Law of Education (Ky iku kihonh

) which would include among its objectives the cultivation of pa-triotism and the high evaluation of Japanese tradition and culture. Within this framework, the role of religion in education indeed represents a sen-sitive subject which entails once again reinterpretations of the issue of the separation of state and religion, and the freedom of religion, which are enshrined in the Japanese Constitution.42 The significance of the reaction to the plans of the government offered by sectors of Shin Buddhism for its positioning within the spectrum of the liberal performance might stand out better when contrasted with responses found in other Japanese reli-gions. The Japan Buddhist Federation, for example, in which the Shin Buddhist denomination itself participates, is in favour of the revision of the Fundamental Law of Education, and has proposed that it should in-clude the “fostering of religious sentiment,” a position which gains full support, for example, from the administration of the Tendai denomination. Shint , for its part, which is perhaps among the Japanese religions the one which, in view of the orientation of large sectors of the Liberal Dem-ocratic Party, might obtain the most immediate benefits from the planned revision, is one of its more enthusiastic supporters.43

The tendency which can be traced within Shin Buddhism to reflect the structures of global society as manifested in the aforementioned func-

41 See Kuchiba and Funahashi, 2000: 102-103; and Sasaki, 1988. 42 See Shinsh tani-ha, 8 June 2004; and Tsujimura, 2005: 28. 43 See Tsujimura, 2005: 28.


tional differentiation, is however not without ambiguities. A suggestion that other factors are also at play, in a manner coherent with the conserva-tive strategy, may be provided for example by the claim, not unheard of among practitioners, that Shin Buddhism is not a religion, but a ‘philoso-phy’ or a ‘way of life.’ This is not dissimilar to the attitude noted by Beyer among “devout Muslims”—but which is to be found in “all the major traditions”—which are trying to “resist secularization and priv-atization explicitly by denying or attempting to deny the religion/non-re-ligion distinction in the case of their tradition.”44 Another example may be seen in the issue of organ transplantation, which has been variously addressed within Shin Buddhist circles. A typical position is expressed by the 2000 Declaration of the Shin Buddhist Federation, and by some of the scholars presented in the previous chapters, where such organ trans-plantations are rejected because they are conducted from the standpoint of ‘humanism’—thus implying a utilitarian view of human life. It may be seen again in other pronouncements by the tani-ha and by sectors of the Vih ra movement. At a general level, this strategy represents the attempt to give a solution to problems relating to the area of medicine through re-course to resources provided by the religious tradition, and, as such, works for the dedifferentiation of the two subsystems. This tendency is well represented by the lobbying of Shin Buddhism within the political system, a recent example of this being the formation of the D b no Kai

(Association of Fellow Companions), grouping members of the tani-ha within the Japanese Diet. The objective of this lobbying is to op-

pose the enshrining of norms concerning the issue of brain death and or-gan transplantation in legislation, which could be considered as going against the Shin Buddhist vision of life. 45 This is a concern which seems also to indicate a corresponding exception to the liberal stance generally assumed by Shin Buddhism in relation to the subject of the separation of religion and politics, as mentioned above.

From some of these examples, it may be argued that although the in-terpretation of shinjin as centred upon one’s inner life may promote a passive attitude towards society and assist the emergence of authoritarian views (as is lamented by various Shin Buddhist authors, especially with reference to the Two Truths theory), the positing of a social nature for

44 Beyer, 1998: 19. 45 See Shinsh , July 2005: 118.


shinjin does not necessarily lead to the development of a Shin Buddhist ethics and activism in the sense of inclusive universalism. If there are clear signs that Shin Buddhism is in many ways endorsing the liberal op-tion, it is also evident that current attempts to address those social prob-lems which are the by-products of globalization—thus implying, more or less explicitly, the assumption of the social nature of shinjin—show a ten-dency to have recourse to strategies that emphasize differences and pro-mote hegemonic agendas, while at the same time speaking with the rheto-ric of equality. It may be argued that this is by no means unnatural at a general level for contemporary religious groups in their relationship to global society. It was already suggested above in the consideration of the point that this is a choice implied in the very formation of the current concept of religion(s) as a feature of modernity, and indeed of their con-crete reality, and in its close connection with the shaping of national iden-tities. In this sense, as has been suggested by Beyer, one of the advan-tages of the conservative option can be seen at work here, in terms of which the occidentalist and orientalist strategies find their reference point, that is, its attachment to the “socio-cultural particularism” which typically informs modern states.46 This is a tendency that can also be traced, to some extent, to forms of contemporary ‘Engaged Buddhism’ such as the movement founded by the Thai intellectual and activist Sulak Sivaraksa. In a recent contribution, Oliver Freiberger has shown that this particular form of ‘Engaged Buddhism’—a phenomenon which he re-gards at the general level as “an instance of the ‘globalization of religious orientations’ par excellence”—presents a recourse to the occidentalist op-tion comparable to that found in Anag rika Dharmap la, the leading fig-ure of the reform movement in Sri Lanka opposed to British colonial rule at the end of the nineteenth century.47 Similar traits may be found, as in-dicated above, in a current form of Japanese ‘Engaged Buddhism’ well

46 Beyer, 1994: 94. 47 See Freiberger, 2003b: 12; and Freiberger, 2003a: 80-81. Freiberger’s contribution is part of the discussions which were conducted within the Workgroup on the History of Asian Religions (AKAR, Arbeitskreis für Asiatische Religionsgeschichte) of the German branch of the International Association for the History of Religions (IAHR) in two con-ferences held respectively in Weikersheim (Germany) and Uppsala (Sweden) in 2002. Within this context a further heuristic distinction between ‘orientalism,’ ‘occidentalism,’ ‘auto-occidentalism,’ and ‘auto-orientalism’ was proposed, which is used by Freiberger in his analysis.


represented in Shin Buddhism, namely the trans-sectarian Vih ra move-ment, where the strong affirmation of a socio-cultural specificity to op-pose the ‘other,’ namely, similar positions in the context of Christianity, provides the starting-point for a positive approach to social issues.

Needless to say, this does not imply that just any criticism of the pit-falls of the processes of modernization and globalization of society and of the powers that currently govern them which resorts to a particular and even strongly group-centred religious tradition may be labelled as a form of occidentalism. Rather, it may be argued that since the risk of remain-ing entangled in some form of exclusive particularism seems to be a con-stitutive component of the spectrum of responses generally provided by religions to globalization, those activities which aim at a strict adherence to the liberal option are conditioned by a recurrent critical opposition be-tween the religious values on which the action of religiously-oriented so-cial activists rests and the instances of universalism that the process of globalization itself implicitly promotes without being able to fulfil them. This requires, ultimately, an activity based on “global values,” along the lines of “egalitarian and inclusive progress on the basis of an adaptive, cognitive style,” oriented towards an evaluation and selection of those doctrinal aspects that provide a better echo for these ideas than for those of cultural uniqueness.48

The relatively low level of articulation of a doctrinal discourse which was noted above in the context of Shin Buddhist social activism might be taken to indicate that these groups are actually leaning towards another specific characteristic of the liberal performance illustrated by Beyer, namely the tendency to make only a few “religious demands.” What this amounts to, he notes, is that this option generally “conveys little specif-ically religious information that would make a difference in how people choose, or that people could not get from non-religious sources.”49 In the case of Shin Buddhism, there are reasons to suppose that this strategy is being espoused, at least to some extent, by various groups of activists. Here, in fact, the scant use of doctrinal sources often corresponds to the attempt to interact with sectors of civil society on the basis of a shared set of values, that in Shin Buddhist terms are usually expressed as “fellow-ship” (d b ), “no need for soldiers or weapons” (hy ga muy ), and “may

48 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 104, 144. 49 See Beyer, 1994: 87.


there be peace in the world” (yo no naka an’on nare). Another suggestion in this sense may be drawn from the results of the interviews of the mem-bers of the 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d presented in the previous chapter, where a high rate of responses showing no direct link between Shin Buddhist doctrines and motivation for social action was accompanied by a great concern for issues which were not specifically religious, like those related to constitutional revision. This indication is partially confirmed by the data provided by interviews with participants in the organization Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai.

Generally speaking, it is likely that this state of affairs is also heavily influenced by the characteristic difficulty previously noted in the Shin Buddhist context in articulating the discourse on social ethics at the nor-mative level, due to the emphasis on the two dialectically related aspects of self-power (jiriki) and other-power (tariki). Within the Shin Buddhist framework, it is possible nonetheless that the tendency not to make reli-gious values fully explicit might somewhat limit the danger of losing the “specifically religious” otherwise entailed by the recourse to social activ-ism “as a way of bringing religious influence to bear outside the priva-tized, voluntary realm.”50 However, it may also be argued that the percep-tion of this danger represents in turn a further obstacle to the respecifying of religious meanings in response to present issues. And indeed, the very fact that, with few exceptions, there does not seem to be taking place within Shin Buddhist activist groups and institutions any deep reflection about the application of religious themes to the problems of global soci-ety in their complexity, might be well interpreted as a combined effect of the two aforementioned factors.

Finally, it might be interesting to consider yet another factor concern-ing the relationship between religion and social activism in the global context, that might represent an obstacle to the elaboration of the dis-course on social ethics in Shin Buddhism. It has been noted that, although

50 Cf. Beyer, 1994: 107. At a more general level, also the assumption that in Japanese Buddhism “religious choices are rarely matters of doctrinal commitment,” which for some is reflected by the fact that for the Japanese, it is possible “to be simultaneously parish-ioners of Shinto shrines (ujiko) and supporters of a Buddhist temple (danka),” might be taken into account; see Abe Y., 1994: 156. It should also be stated, however, that the ‘attention to doctrine’ is not necessarily an established fact for participants in non-Japanese religious traditions either. For the case of Roman Catholicism in Italy, see, for example, Nesti, 2002.


social movements represent a possibility for religious institutions to re-gain some level of public influence, this form of religious communication can hardly “counter the privatizing trend embedded in globalizing moder-nity.”51 This aspect has been shown by Beyer with special reference to the Latin American liberation theological movement, where “the tremen-dous amount of activity on a religious basis” has had “rather meagre re-sults.”52 In fact, the “growth in religious communication” in global soci-ety is taking place “away from the movements of protest,” Beyer notes, “in spite of them rather than because of them,” as is well illustrated by the fact that the “growth areas in Christianity are among the Pentecostals and the Evangelical churches,” while “liberation theology or new Christian rightism in the United States,” for example, “have had no noticeable ef-fect on that trend at all.”53 This factor may suggest that, although reli-gious traditions are “increasingly constrained to connect their theologies to the growing debate about globalization,”54 as has been suggested by Roland Robertson, rather than being encouraged to rely on social activ-ism as a strategy to counter the relativizing effects of globalization, they may be induced to pursue their growth exclusively as religious institu-tions, that is, more as “pure” than “applied” religion.55

This means that, in the case of Shin Buddhism as well, the religious institutions might feel encouraged to give exclusive priority to the func-tional element of religion—that is, what is commonly intended as pure re-ligious communication, encompassing worship, the soteriological dimen-sion, and so forth—and limit themselves to the implicit reproduction of those ethical traits which are characteristic of Japanese traditional values strongly indebted to Confucianism.56 This is not totally unrealistic, espe-cially in view of a certain decrease in membership of this religious tradi-tion, as in other traditional forms of Buddhism in Japan, over the last few decades.57 However, this is obviously only one among the potential sce-

51 See Beyer, 1994: 106. 52 Beyer, 1994: 157. 53 Beyer, 1997: 232-233. 54 Robertson, 1994: 132. 55 See Beyer, 1997: 233. 56 Cf. Collcutt, 1991: 146-154. For indications of post-war and more recent shifts in Japa-nese values see, for example, Huthwaite, 1978; and Kisala, 1999b. 57 See, for example, Bunkach , 1985, 1995, and 2004. Cf. Amstutz, 1997a: 141-142.


narios concerning future Shin Buddhist approaches to ethics and society, and it is at least partially contradicted by the interest in social ethics found in contemporary Shin Buddhism at various levels, which has been illustrated in this study.

Appendices

Appendix 1 Fig. 1: The tani-ha first acknowledged its war responsibilities on 2 April 1987 on the occasion of the Memorial for the Victims of All Wars (Zensenbotsusha tsuich h -e ) held at its head temple in Ky to. Here is the concluding part of the document containing these reflections, which was pub-lished in the journal Shinsh in May 1987.


Appendix 2 Fig. 2: The Honganji-ha first acknowledged its war responsibilities on 27 Febru-ary 1991 in this official statement, which appeared in the Honganji shinp

, the journal of this branch of Shin Buddhism, on 10 March of the same year.

Appendices 213

Appendix 3 Below is the text of the written protest issued on 17 October 2005 by the Shinsh Ky dan Reng (Shin Buddhist Federation), referring to the visit made by the then Prime Minister Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine on the same day. (On the official website [http://www.shin.gr.jp], accessed 17 May 2006)

17 2005 10 17


Fig. 3: Yasukuni Shrine in T ky . (Photo by author, March 2005)

Fig. 4: A Japanese 50 Sen banknote depicting Yasukuni Shrine issued in 1944 (Sh wa 19 ).

Appendices 215

Appendix 4 Fig. 5: Poster of the Fifth Anti-war/Peace Exhibition (Hi-sen/heiwa ten

) held in the facilities of the Higashi Honganji in Ky to from 17 March to 15 April 2004. The theme of this exhibition was Sens to s ryo (“War and [Shin Buddhist] priests”).


Appendix 5 This is the text of the Joint Declaration for the Thirtieth Anniversary of the Foundation of the Shin Buddhist Federation (Shinsh Ky dan Reng kessei san-j sh nen ky d sengen ), issued by the Shinsh Ky dan Reng (Shin Buddhist Federation) on 29 Sep-tember 2000. (On the official website [http://www.shin.gr.jp], accessed 26 July 2005)

30 21

20

20“ ”

21

Appendices 217

“ ”

20

2500

“ ”

“ ”

“ ”21

“ ”“ ” “ ” “ ”

“ ” “ ”

1. “ ”“ ” 2. 21

12 2000 9 29


Appendix 6 Figs. 6-7: The founding declaration (sengen ) of the 2000-nen T zai Hon-ganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d

(2000: Joint Action of East and West Honganji for Anti-war/ Peace), issued on 9 July 2000, with the concluding utterance of Amida’s name, namu-amida-butsu . (From the newsletter T zai 4, August 2000)

Appendices 219

Fig. 8: Activists of the 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d in the streets of Ky to during an anti-war demonstration held in July 2005. (Photo by author)


Appendix 7 Fig. 9: Below is the inaugural appeal (Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai hakkai ni atatte

) of the Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai (Association of Nenbutsu Practitioners for Article 9), which was issued

on 7 July 2005.

Appendices 221

Fig. 10: Shigaraki Takamaro at the inaugural national meeting of the Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai, held in Ky to (K sh kaikan) on 28 October 2005. (Photo by author)

Fig. 11: Activists of the Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai during the same meeting. (Photo by author)


Appendix 8 Fig. 12: Poster of the Exhibition on Human Rights (Jinken sh kan gyarar ten

), held in the facilities of the Higashi Honganji in Ky to from 2 December 2004 to 23 January 2005. The theme of this exhibition was Buraku mondai to hansenby mondai (“The buraku and Hansen’s disease issues”).

Appendices 223

Appendix 9 On 5 April 1996, the tani-ha issued a statement expressing apologies for past discrimination against Hansen’s disease patients. Here is the text of this official document (Hansenby ni kakawaru Shinsh tani-ha no shazai seimei

), issued shortly after the enactment of a law repealing the former discriminatory legislation (Rai yob h no haishi ni kansuru h ritsu ) by the Japanese Diet. (On the website [http://www.sarami.net/hansenkon], accessed 19 April 2005)

( )

70

80 50

1907 11

19311953

3 27

1931

Appendices 225

Fig. 13: Group of activists of the Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai during a visit to the Nagashima Aisei-en, one of the two national sanatoria located on the small island of Nagashima in Okayama Prefecture. (Photo by author, April 2005)


Appendix 10 Fig. 14: Leaflet of the Exhibition on Human Rights (Jinken paneru ten

) held in the facilities of the Nishi Honganji in Ky to from 6 December 2004 to 7 January 2005. The theme of this exhibition was By ki to sabetsu

(“Illness and discrimination”).

Appendices 227

Appendix 11 Fig. 15: Poster of the twelfth national annual meeting organized by the Bih ra Katsud of the Honganji-ha (Bih ra Katsud zenkoku sh kai

) held in June 2005 in Kumamoto, on the southern island of Ky sh . The theme of this meeting was Inochi ni yorisou (“Keeping close to life”).

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Index 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-

sen/Heiwa Ky d K d

; 154; 179; 206; 218; 219; see also T zai

Abe Masao ; 10 adornments (of the Pure Land); 123; see

also j do sh gon akunin ; 33; 109; 169 Ama Toshimaro ; 82; 118; 119;

120; 121 Amida-ky ; 21; 22 Amstutz, Galen; 11; 75; 163 Anag rika Dharmap la; 204 Aïguttara Nik ya; 19 anjin ; 36; 86; 115 Anrakush ; 26 anthropocentrism; 131; 132; 134; 137;

141; 196; 197; see also ningench shinshugi

anti-war; 121; 143; 147; 148; 154; 155; 156; 157; 158; 161; 162; 181; 215; 218; 219; see also hi-sen

Anzai Kenj ; 108; 129; 130; 151; 152

Arai Toshikazu ; 94; 95; 97

Article 9 (Japanese Constitution); 145; 156; 157; 159; 160; 220

Article 19 (Japanese Constitution); 200 Article 20 (Japanese Constitution); 150;

153; 157; 159 Article 24 (Japanese Constitution); 160 Article 89 (Japanese Constitution); 200

rya-bodhisattva-gocarop ya-viùaya-vikurvaõa-nirde÷a-s tra; 18

rya-satyaka-parivarta-s tra; 18 Asahara Saichi ; 87 Asai J kai ; 92; 93; 107; 116 Asaïga; 18 Asia lawsuit (Ajia sosh );

152; 153; 154 Beyer, Peter; 192; 193; 198; 199; 201;

203; 204; 205; 207 bih ra ; 185; 186; 187; 188; 227 Bih ra 21 ; 187 Bih ra Katsud ; 185; 227 Bih ra Katsud zenkoku sh kai

; 187; 227 Bit Masahide ; 82 Bloom, Alfred; 98; 114 Bodhisattva-bh mi; 18


bonbu ; 33; 71; 73; 100; 105; 106; 109; 110; 121; 137

Bonm -ky ; 17; 32 Bosatsukai-ky ; 113; 129 Brahmaj la-sutta; 17 Buddha’s Law; 113; 114; see also bupp Buddhist Law; 55; 62; 115; see also bupp bupp ; 51; 55; 56; 57; 62; 114; 115;

129; 148; 161; 163 Buraku Kaih /Jinken Kenky sho

; 163 Buraku Kaih /Jinken Seisaku Kakuritsu

Y ky Ch Jikk iinkai

; 171 Buraku Kaih Kenky sho

; 163 Buraku kaih kihonh ;

168; 170 ‘Buraku kaih kihonh ’ Seitei Y ky

Kokumin Und Ch Jikk iinkai

; 170 Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaih

D mei ); 164; 166; 167; 168; 170

Buraku Liberation Research Institute; 163; 167; see also Buraku Kaih Kenky sho

burakumin ; 163; 164; 165; 166; 172; see also hisabetsu buraku

by d ; 133; 136; 155; 160 calculation(s); 13; 40; 44; 46; 51; 59; 73;

79; 80; 90; 104; 188; see also hakarai Chidorigafuchi Memorial Park; 148 chion h toku ; 94 Christianity; 10; 101; 127; 145; 157; 158;

159; 162; 174; 183; 185; 195; 197; 198; 199; 205; 207

Class-A war criminals; 149 co-dependent origination; 102; 103; 109;

121; 125; 128; 139; see also engi

compassion of the Pure Land; 87; 134; see also j do no jihi

Confucian ethics; 19; 37; 52; 55; 57; 59; 63; 66; 80; 95; 103; 113; 114; 118; 207

congregational rules; 58 Critical Buddhism; 10; 136 d na; 14 Daochuo (D shaku ); 26; 31; 32 Davis, Winston; 103 defence of the Dharma; 35; 59; 62; 162;

see also goh demythologization; 83; 92 Dend Shakaibu ; 186 Dhammapada; 123; 125; 155; 156; 160;

161 dharma-body as compassionate means; 25;

32; see also h ben hosshin dharma-body as suchness; 25; 32; see also

hossh hosshin Dharmaguptaka Vinaya; 17; see also

Shibunritsu dhy na; 14 difficult practices; 24; 26; 32; 34 Dobbins, James; 80 d b ; 28; 29; 92; 105; 107; 108;

110; 118; 138; 141; 144; 145; 147; 151; 161; 166; 167; 168; 171; 174; 177; 181; 182; 194; 201; 203; 205

D b movement; 92; 141; 161; 167; 168; 171; 177; 201

D b no Kai ; 203 D b Und ; 92; 166 D b kai Und ; 167 d gy ; 28; 29; 107; 108; 138 D sh ren ; 171 d wa ; 164; 167; 170; 171; 180; 181 D wa Ky iku Shink kai

; 167; 170; 180; 181 D wa Suishin Honbu ;

167; 180 D wa taisaku jigy tokubetsu sochi h

; 164

Index 257

easy practices; 24; 25; 26 Ehime tamagushiry lawsuit (Ehime

tamagushiry sosh ); 151

Eighteenth Vow; 16; 22; 26; 29; 31; 41; 129; see also Primal Vow (hongan)

Eightfold Path; 105 eirei ; 149; 150; 155 ek ; 23; 29; 32; 33; 46; 73; 86; 90 emptiness; 14; 113; 128; see also k Engaged Buddhism; 9; 121; 143; 204 engi ; 102; 128 enshrinement of spirits; 149; 150; 200 equality; 38; 41; 44; 67; 105; 106; 107;

108; 109; 110; 112; 117; 123; 136; 138; 139; 141; 155; 160; 166; 168; 191; 194; 197; 204; see also by d

evil person; 26; 33; 50; 70; 109; 169; see also akunin

exclusionary clause (Eighteenth Vow); 26; 41

exclusive practice (of the nenbutsu); 52; 58; 112; 130; see also senju nenbutsu

Falwell, Jerry; 198 Faure, Bernard; 196 fellowship; 73; 81; 100; 105; 108; 110;

118; 143; 156; 160; 182; 194; 201; 205; see also d b

filial piety; 19; 52; 63; 66; 118 five (constant) virtues; 19; 55; 95; 113;

see also goj five evils; 19; 155 five grave offenses; 15; 16; 30; 42; 43; 44;

see also gogyakuzai five heinous sins; 15; 22; 41; 129; see also

gogyakuzai five obligations; 19; see also gorin five precepts; 17; 65 foolish being; 33; 40; 47; 73; 105; 106;

109; 110; 135; 137; see also bonbu freedom of religion; 117; 140; 150; 151;

159; 160; 202; see also shinky no jiy

Freiberger, Oliver; 204 Fugen Daien ; 95 Fujii Zen ; 175; see also Ina

Ky sh Fujino Yutaka ; 181 Funahashi Kazuo ; 142 Fundamental Law of Education (Ky iku

kihonh ); 156; 157; 202 fusen ketsugi ; 147 fusen no chikai ; 147; 194 Futaba Kenk ; 89; 96; 98; 111;

112; 115 futaiten ; 33; 85 gansh j do ; 84; 86; 87 Genshin ; 27 gensh ni jisshu no yaku

; 48; 94 gens ek ; 33; 46; 73; 90 genzeriyaku ; 103 globalization; 12; 162; 192; 193; 198; 199;

200; 204; 205; 207 G Mondai Kenky Bukai

; 169 g by ; 173 Godensh ; 35 gogyakuzai ; 15 goh ; 35; 59; 62; 162 goj ; 19; 55; 95 gokoku jinja ; 152 Gómez, Luis; 14; 16 gorin ; 19 gosh ichidaiji ; 61 Gunjima Tsuneaki ; 153 hakarai ; 13; 40; 79; 80 Hanju sanmai-ky ; 53 Hansen’s disease issue (hansenby

mondai ; 172; 173; 175; 178; 180; 181; 222


Hansenby Mondai Furusato Nettow ku Toyama

; 181 Hansenby Mondai ni Kansuru Kensh

Kaigi ; 173; 180; 181

Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai ; 178; 206; 225;

see also Hansenkon hansenby sabetsu h wa mondai

; 180 Hansenkon ; 178; 179; see also

Hansenby ni Kansuru Kondankai Hardacre, Helen; 144 Hattori Shis ; 111 Heart S tra; 14 heiwa ; 100; 121; 147; 148; 151; 154;

155; 157; 158; 194; 215 Heiwa o Tsukuridasu Sh ky sha Netto

; 157; 158 Higashi Honganji ; 36; 37; 121;

148; 151; 185; 187; 215; 222 Higashi Honganji Shuppanbu

; 151 hihan genri (to shite no j do) (

); 122; 127; 129; 131 hih sh b ; 41 Hirata Atsushi ; 134 Hirose Takashi ; 85; 105; 106 Hirota, Dennis; 89 hisabetsu buraku ; 163; 164;

165; 166; 167; 168; 170; 171; 177; 181

Hisamatsu Shin’ichi ; 81 hi-sen ; 121; 148; 151; 154; 179; 206;

215; 218; 219 Hi-sen/heiwa ten ; 148; 215 Hishiki Masaharu ; 124; 125;

126; 127; 128; 135; 136; 137; 153 his hizoku ; 122 h no jinshin ; 112 h ben hosshin ; 32; 115

h my ; 168 Honda Hiroyuki ; 82; 85; 133;

134 Honda Shizuyoshi ; 127; 128 H nen ; 16; 24; 27; 28; 29; 31; 38;

39; 51; 52; 54; 105; 112; 117; 119; 123; 125; 126; 130

Honganji Shuppansha ; 151 honji suijaku ; 55; 56 h -on ; 35; 36; 98; 103 H -onk ; 35; 36 hossh hosshin ; 32; 115 human rights; 102; 135; 149; 163; 170;

171; 172; 179; 181; 222; 226 humanism; 131; 132; 133; 134; 135; 136;

137; 138; 139; 140; 141; 196; 197; 198; 199; 203; see also hy manizumu

hy ga muy ; 17; 145; 155; 205 hy manizumu ; 131; 133;

137; 138; 140 ian ky ka ; 174 icchantika; 42 Ichinyokai ; 166 Ichikawa Hakugen ; 10 Ichinen tanen mon’i ; 29;

84 Ichiraku Makoto ; 86; 87; 118 Ienaga Sabur ; 9; 111 ikk -ikki ; 35; 165 imon fuky ; 176; 177 Imperial Law; 62; 113; 114; ; see also b impermanence; 61; 88; 133; 135; 186; see

also muj Ina Ky sh ; 175 inochi ; 87; 133; 136; 138; 139;

151; 227 Inoue Yoshiyuki ; 127; 128 International Association of Shin Buddhist

Studies (Kokusai Shinsh Gakkai ); 195

Ippen ; 24

Index 259

Ishida H y ; 91; 98 Ishikawa Yukichi ; 158 isshin ; 25; 34 issh fusho no gan ; 46 Izumi Shigeki ; 121 Japan Buddhist Federation (Zen Nihon

Bukky kai ); 10; 194; 202

Japanese Constitution; 140; 145; 150; 153; 154; 156; 157; 159; 160; 200; 202

Japanese spirit(uality); 75; 77; 196 Japanese uniqueness; 132; 196; see also

nihonjinron jinen ; 32; 33; 80; 90; 102; 104; 188 jingi fuhai ; 126; 129; 130; 150;

153; 158 Jinken paneru ten ; 149;

170; 181; 226 Jinken sh kan gyarar ten

; 170; 180; 222 jiri rita ; 91; 98 jiriki ; 12; 25; 30; 74; 79; 104; 128;

132; 133; 134; 143; 206 jishin ky ninshin ; 93; 98;

134; 276 Jish ; 24 j do no jihi ; 134 J do Shinsh Honganji-ha Han-Yasukuni

Rentai Kaigi ; 153

J do Shinsh Ky gaku Kenky sho ; 90

J do Shinsh T ky Bih ra ; 187

j do sh gon ; 123 J do wasan ; 29; 46; 103 j domon ; 26; 32 J do-ron ; 25; 123; 124; 130 J dosh ; 24; 38 j gy daihi ; 47; 94; 95 j aku ; 16; 96

Kaih ky gaku kensh kai

; 170 Kaih Und Suishin Honbu

; 167; 170; 178 kaimy ; 168 Kajiyama Y ichi ; 23 Kakunyo ; 35; 55; 56; 57; 95; 113;

114 Kakushinni ; 34; 35 kami ; 52; 53; 56; 57; 58; 62; 116; 126;

129; 130; 150; 158 Kaneko Daiei ; 71; 72; 74; 83 Kangy sho ; 26 Kanmury ju-ky ; 21; 23; 34 karma; 16; 17; 34; 43; 52; 60; 70; 71; 76;

105; 106; 107; 109; 110; 162; 169; 173

karuto ; 196 Kat Sh ichi ; 81 Kawamoto Gish ; 115 Kawamura Kakush ; 129; 134 Ken j do shinjitsu ky gy sh monrui

; see Ky gy shinsh

kenmitsu Bukky ; 125; 136 Kennyo ; 36 Kenp Nij j ga Abunai! Kinky

Renrakukai ; 159

kenzen sh jin ; 33 Keown, Damien; 9; 16; 17 Ketelaar, James; 182 ki no jinshin ; 106; 112 Kigoshi Yasushi ; 80; 81; 87 Kikan Und ; 127; 151; 167;

170 Kikuchi Keif -en ; 174; 179 Kikuchi Masaaki ; 152 Kikufuji My d ; 94; 95; 96;

108


killing; 15; 16; 17; 67; 123; 156; 164 King’s Law; 66; 114; see also bKingdom of God; 127 Kisala, Robert; 196; 197 kiseken sh j ; 123 Kiyozawa Manshi ; 63; 64; 65;

66; 67; 74; 81; 83; 85; 99; 100; 103; 105; 111; 112; 115; 118; 119; 120; 121; 126; 131

K fukuji petition (K fukuji s j ); 54; 126; 130

Kokui D mei ; 166 koku furai ; 113; 126 Kokuritsu Tsuit Shisetsu ni Hantai Suru

Sh ky sha Nettow ku ; 157

kokutai ; 132; 136; 147 Kokutai no hongi ; 132; 136 K my kai ; 175; 184 K nyo ; 62 K ry sh kai ; 178 K s wasan ; 29; 39 k ; 87; 128 kù nti; 14 Kuboyama Ky zen ; 154 Kuchiba Masuo ; 142 Kum raj va; 22 Kunisaki Bih ra no Kai

; 188 Kuroda Toshio ; 62; 111; 125 Ky gy shinsh ; 15; 16; 28; 29;

30; 36; 42; 46; 47; 52; 53; 54; 74; 84; 86; 93; 98; 103; 108; 112; 113; 116; 126; 129; 130; 163

Ky iku chokugo ; 63 Ky nyo ; 36 Ky to School; 10; 72; 74; 132; 196 LaFleur, William; 43 Larger (Sukh vat vy ha) S tra; 13; 14;

17; 19; 21; 22; 41; 124; 161; see also Mury ju-ky

Last Dharma-age; 27; 31; 40; 53; see also mapp

Law of the State; 55; 62; 115; 119; see also b

Letters (Rennyo); 35; 56; 57; 58; 59; 61; 66

Letters (Shinran); 29; 43; 48; 49; 51; 95; 96; 99; 122; 123; 129; 130; 154; 161

liberation theology; 207 licensed evil; 29; 49; 67; see also z aku

muge Lotus S tra; 173 loyalty; 52; 56; 63; 114; 118; 119 Machida Incident; 10; 171 Mah -parinirv õa-s tra; 18; 136 mapp ; 26; 31; 40; 108; 162 Matt sh ; 29; 43; 45; 48; 49; 50;

90; 96; 104; 107; 128; 186 Meditation S tra; 23; 26; 27; see also

Kanmury ju-ky Miroku to onaji ; 47 Monshintokai Und ; 167 monshu (Honganji-ha); 92; 137; 170 muga ; 124; 128 muj ; 61; 124; 186 muj no kaze ; 61 Muraiken und ; 174 Murakami Sokusui ; 89 Mury ju-ky ; 13; 21; 22; 128;

145; 155; 173 my k nin ; 75; 87; 115 Nabeshima Naoki ; 96; 97; 109 Nagaoka Nishi By in ; 186 N g rjuna (Ry ju ); 24; 25 Nagashima Aisei-en ; 174;

175; 177; 180; 225 Nakanishi Chikai ; 107 namu-amida-butsu ; 27; 58;

218 nanji ; 42

Index 261

Nanj Bun’y ; 146 National Site for Mourning; 157 Nattier, Jan; 24 naturalness; 71; 102; 188; see also jinen Nenbutsusha Ky j no Kai

; 160; 220; 221 New Christian Right; 198; 199; 207 New Guidelines Bill/Law; 144; 145; 154 Nhat Hanh, Thich; 9 Nichiren Buddhism; 38; 174; 196 Nihon Izokukai ; 149 Nihon Kirisuto Ky dan ;

159 nihonjinron ; 132 nij jinshin ; 107 Nineteenth Vow; 30; 31 ningench shinshugi ; 131;

137 Nipponzan My h ji ; 196 nirv õa; 31; 61; 69; 75; 88; 92 Nishi Honganji ; 36; 149; 226 Nishida Kitar ; 74; 76; 77;

83; 90; 91 Nishitani Keiji ; 74; 75; 76; 83;

88 no-self; 67; 102; 117; 125; 126; 128; 135;

see also muga Nonomura Naotar ; 83;

112 non-retrogression; 24; 33; 61; 85; see also

futaiten Nyorai to hitoshi ; 47 ny sh j ju no yaku ; 87 Obata Bunsh ; 122; 123; 124;

127; 128 b ; 35; 55; 56; 57; 62; 114; 119;

129; 161; 163 b ihon ; 35; 57; 119

occidentalism; 140; 196; 204; 205 Odake Sh ky ; 117; 160 Ogasawara Noboru ; 175

Ogawa Ichij ; 87; 102; 132; 133; 137

j -ronch ; 25; 85 j -y sh ; 27

okite ; 35; 57; 58 mine Akira ; 90

one thought-moment; 29; 33; 88 organ transplantation; 132; 133; 138; 188;

189; 203 orientalism; 196; 204 Original Vow; 27; 31; 39; see also Primal

Vow (hongan) s ek ; 32; 46; 90 tani K shin ; 170 tani University ( tani Daigaku

); 74; 80; 85; 121; 195 other-power; 13; 25; 26; 29; 32; 38; 40;

44; 51; 57; 58; 60; 61; 62; 64; 65; 68; 73; 74; 75; 76; 77; 79; 81; 82; 85; 87; 88; 91; 98; 100; 101; 102; 103; 105; 118; 120; 206; see also tariki

p ramit ; 14 pariõ ma; 15; 23; see also ek Path of the Sages; 26; 32; 45; 89; 133; see

also sh d mon peace; 17; 51; 69; 72; 73; 94; 97; 98; 100;

102; 115; 116; 117; 120; 121; 123; 139; 140; 143; 144; 145; 147; 148; 151; 153; 154; 155; 156; 157; 158; 160; 161; 162; 163; 176; 194; 196; 200; 201; 206; 215; 218; see also heiwa

peace of mind; 68; 110; 115; 120; see also anjin

perfect virtues; 14; see also p ramit Postscript to the Ky gy shinsh ; 54; 112;

113; 122; 130; 163 prajñ ; 14 prat tya-samutp da; 102; see also engi precepts; 16; 17; 18; 31; 32; 38; 39; 43;

45; 65; 82; 106; 108; 113; 168 Primal Vow (hongan ); 31; 33; 34;

38; 40; 41; 44; 49; 57; 61; 86; 88; 89; 97; 139


Pure Land path; 29; 39; 43; 45; 48; 75; 89; see also j domon

Rai yob h ; 172; 178; 179;

223 ‘Rai yob h ’ iken kokka baish seiky

sosh ; 179

rejecting the world; 48; 122; 126; 154; 160; see also yo o itou

Rennyo ; 18; 35; 36; 56; 57; 58; 59; 60; 61; 62; 66; 75; 105; 111; 113; 114; 115; 119; 162; 165

response in gratitude (to Amida); 98; 99; 103; 130; see also h -on

Rhodes, Robert; 56 Rissh K seikai ; 196; 197 Robertson, Pat; 199 Robertson, Roland; 207 roku jinz ; 122 rokud ; 43 Ry koku Borantia NPO Katsud Sent

NPO ; 185

Ry koku University (Ry koku Daigaku ); 82; 185

Saich ; 17; 32 Said, Edward; 196 Saik Mankichi ; 166 ø kyamuni; 23; 24; 30; 32; 40; 46; 50;

125; 138; 186 Samantabhadra; 46 saüs ra; 61; 69; 75; 88; 92 sanatoria; 172; 173; 174; 176; 177; 178;

179; 181; 225 Sanbu-ky ; 21 sandoku ; 96 sangan tenny ; 30 Saõghavarman; 13; 19; 22 Sang Wakuran ; 95 sanshin ; 34 sanshin ; 34

seiky bunri ; 140; 150; 159 seishinshugi ; 64; 99; 115 selected practice (of the nenbutsu); 19; 32;

125; see also senju nenbutsu Self Defence Forces (SDF); 144; 145;

146; 156; 158 self-effort; 12; 34; 65; 76; see also jiriki self-power; 25; 30; 33; 40; 47; 52; 64; 74;

79; 80; 82; 85; 86; 88; 90; 95; 99; 101; 104; 132; 134; 143; 206; see also jiriki

Senchakush ; 27; 38; 125 senju nenbutsu ; 27; 52 sens no h ki ; 145; 160 separation of religion and state; 150; 154;

159; see also seiky bunri sesshu fusha ; 33 Seventeen-Article Constitution; 52 Shandao (Zend ); 16; 25; 26; 27; 28;

30; 38; 41 Sharf, Robert; 196 Shibunritsu ; 17; 32 Shigaraki Takamaro ; 81; 82;

91; 93; 94; 112; 113; 114; 160; 221 Shikoku lawsuit (Shikoku sosh

); 152 Shimaji Mokurai ; 146Shin Buddhist Federation; 37; 135; 136;

137; 197; 203; 213; 216; see also Shinsh Ky dan Reng

Shingon Buddhism; 34; 126shingy ; 34shinjin ; 28; 29; 33; 34; 36; 40; 41;

42; 43; 47; 48; 49; 50; 61; 63; 66; 76; 79; 81; 82; 83; 84; 85; 86; 87; 88; 89; 90; 91; 92; 93; 94; 95; 96; 97; 98; 99; 102; 103; 104; 105; 112; 113; 114; 121; 127; 128; 129; 131; 134; 141; 144; 158; 186; 203; 204

shinjin no shakaisei ; 93; 127

shinky no jiy ; 140; 150; 159; 160

Index 263

Shinran Bukky Sent ; 82

Shinran Sh nin go-sh sokush ; 29; 50; 51; 55; 59; 69; 98;

99; 113; 115; 122; 148; 155 Shinsh Bukk ji-ha ; 37 Shinsh D b kai ; 174 Shinsh D shikai ; 174 Shinsh Izokukai ; 154 Shinsh Izumoji-ha ; 37 Shinsh J sh ji-ha ; 37 Shinsh Kibe-ha ; 37 Shinsh K sh -ha ; 37 Shinsh Ky dan Reng ;

37; 135; 140; 145; 150; 213; 216 Shinsh tani-ha Han-Yasukuni Zenkoku

Renrakukai ; 153

Shinsh tani-ha Hi-bus heiwa o Negaukai

; 154 Shinsh tani-ha Ky gaku Kenky sho

; 86; 137; 169 Shinsh tani-ha Seish y nen Sent

Junbishitsu ; 196

Shinsh Sanmonto-ha ; 37 Shinsh Takada-ha ; 37 Shinsh Wag kai ; 166 Shinsh Yamamoto-ha ; 37 shinta kangi ; 94 shintai ; 62; 76; 115 Shint ; 111; 113; 149; 153; 159;

163; 164; 196; 202 shinzoku nitai ; 19; 62; 63; 101;

113; 114; 115; 118; 119; 120; 127; 129; 131; 148

shion ; 103 shitoku gusoku ; 47; 94 sh b ; 31 sh d mon ; 26; 32

sh ga sangai d ; 124 sh j ju ; 33; 84; 86; 87; 186 Short Tract; 16; 17 Sh shinge ; 36; 42 Sh toku Taishi ; 29; 52 Sh wa junnansha ; 149 Sh z matsu wasan ; 29; 45;

46; 53; 112; 116 shuj seken sh j ; 123 shukug ; 106; 169 shukuzen ; 60 sh mus ch ( tani-ha); 147 Shupe, Anson; 197 Sh sei jih ; 63 Sh sen goj sh nen zen senbotsusha s

tsuit h y ; 148

s la/÷ la; 14; 16 skilful means; 14; 18 slandering the dharma; 30; 41; 42; 43; 44;

60; se also hih sh b Smaller (Sukh vat vy ha) S tra; 21; 22;

see also Amida-ky Soga Ry jin ; 69; 70; 71; 74; 83;

84; 85; 86; 106; 107; 108; 110 S ka Gakkai ; 196; 197; 199;

201 sokutoku j ; 91; 94 Song shinz meimon ; 38;

41 S t Zen Buddhism; 10 stage of the truly settled; 33; 47; 75; 76;

84; 86; 87; see also sh j ju State Shint ; 159; 163 Strenski, Ivan; 12 Sugawara Ry ken ; 152; 154 Sukh vat -vy hopade÷a; 24; 25 Sulak Sivaraksa; 204 ÷ nyat ; 26 suppression of the nenbutsu; 54; 112; 116;

117; 123; 126; 130; 156; 282


Suzuki Daisetsu ; 74; 75; 77; 132; 196

Tabata Masahisa ; 188; 189 Takagi Kenmy ; 68; 69; 119;

120; 121 Takeda Ry sei ; 89 Tamamitsu Junsh ; 86; 97; 109;

121; 122; 177 Tamiya Masashi ; 185 Tanabe Hajime ; 72; 73; 74 Tanaka, Kenneth; 95; 98; 99; 100; 101 Tanluan (Donran ); 25; 32; 85; 86;

115 Tannish ; 33; 34; 41; 44; 45; 47;

49; 52; 61; 70; 73; 81; 87; 88; 106; 129; 133; 135; 169; 189

Tannish ni Kikukai ; 189 tariki ; 13; 25; 31; 74; 79; 81; 87; 94;

100; 104; 118; 134; 142; 206 Tashiro Shunk ; 187; 188 ten benefits; 48; 86; 93; 94; 102; see also

gensh ni jisshu no yaku ten transgressions; 16; 96; see also j aku ten’aku j zen ; 47; 94 Tendai Buddhism; 17; 27; 28; 32;

126; 202 tenkeiby ; 173 Terakawa Shunsh ; 84; 85; 86 terminally ill patients; 187; 198 The Eastern Buddhist Society; 74 Therav da Buddhism; 18 three cardinal virtues; 16 three minds; 26; 34; 129; see also sanshin three poisons; 49; 96; see also sandoku togetherness; 71; 81; 106; 107; 108; 110;

135; see also warera Tokunaga Michio ; 82; 83; 91;

98; 114; 134; 135 T zai ; 154; 155; 156; 158; 179; 206;

218; 219; see also 2000-nen T zai Honganji o Musubu Hi-sen/Heiwa Ky d K d

transfer(ence) of merits; 15; 23; 29; 32; 33; 86; see also ek

Tsuda S kichi ; 81 Twentieth (Vow); 30; 31 Two Truths theory; 19; 113; 127; 131;

148; 203; see also shinzoku nitai Ueda Yoshifumi ; 84; 87; 88;

89; 99 Unno Taitetsu ; 102 Up ya-kau÷alya-s tra; 17 Vasubandhu (Tenjin ); 24; 25; 30; 33;

123 Vih ra movement; 143; 185; 187; 188;

189; 191; 198; 203; 205; see also bih ra

v rya; 14 Wada Shigeshi ; 108; 116; 117 war responsibilities; 10; 146; 147; 148;

150; 154; 155; 162; 191; 211; 212 Warburg, Margit; 199 warera ; 81; 106; 107; 108; 110;

135 Watt, Paul; 71 World Conference on Religion and Peace;

10; 195 World’s Parliament of Religions; 132 Yamaguchi-Ky sh lawsuit (Yamaguchi-

Ky sh sosh ); 153 Yamamoto J h ; 157; 158 Yasuda Rijin ; 70; 81 Yasukuni h an ; 149 Yasukuni Shrine (Yasukuni jinja

); 111; 112; 116; 129; 131; 140; 142; 149; 150; 151; 152; 155; 156; 157; 158; 159; 191; 199; 200; 213; 214

Yasutomi Shin’ya ; 82; 85; 86; 99; 100; 106; 118; 134; 135

yo no naka an’on nare ; 51; 94; 115; 148; 155; 206

Index 265

yo o itou ; 48; 90; 97; 114; 116; 122; 126; 128; 131; 154; 160; 162

Yokota, John; 100; 101; 117 yokush ; 34 Yuien-b ; 34; 49 Yuishinsh mon’i ; 29; 80; 88;

107; 110 Zen Buddhism; 10; 74; 75; 76; 196 Zenkairen ; 164

Zenkoku Suiheisha ; 166; 170 Zenran ; 29 Zenry ky ; 176; 177 Zensenbotsusha tsuich h -e

; 148; 211 z aku muge ; 29; 49 z h ; 31 zokutai ; 62; 76; 115; 120 Zonkaku ; 56; 57; 95; 113; 114

ethics and society in contemporary shin buddhism (lit verlag 2007)

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