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Do Both Descartes' and Hume's Epistemology Fall Victim to the Problem of

Circularity?

What are the Implications of this Circularity for Foundational Epistemology?

Word Count: 8231

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Contents:

1.1. Introduction: .................................................................................................................................... 4

1.2. Circularity and Self Refutation: .................................................................................................... 4

1.3. Normative vs. Descriptive Epistemology: .................................................................................... 5

1.4. Scepticism: ................................................................................................................................... 6

2.0. An Exposition of Cartesian Rationalism and Circularity: .................................................................. 7

2.1. The First Meditation: ................................................................................................................... 8

2.2. The Second Meditation: ............................................................................................................... 8

2.3. The Third Meditation: .................................................................................................................. 9

2.4. The Fourth Meditation: .............................................................................................................. 10

2.5. Discussion of Cartesian Circularity and the Arguments for and against it: ............................... 11

3.0. An Exposition of Hume’s Empiricism: ............................................................................................ 14

3.1. The Origin of Ideas and the Empiric Principle: ........................................................................... 15

3.2. The Impossibility of Metaphysical Knowledge:.......................................................................... 16

3.3. Hume’s Assault on the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature: .................................................. 19

4.0. On Necessary Presumption: ........................................................................................................... 22

5.0. Assumption within Other Foundational Epistemological Projects: ............................................... 24

6.0. Argument for the Elimination of Foundational Knowledge: .......................................................... 25

7.0. To Conclude: .................................................................................................................................. 31

Bibliography: ......................................................................................................................................... 33

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1.0. Abstract:

The epistemology found within Descartes’ Rationalism and Hume’s Epistemology is

categorised as being foundational, this means that both theories attempt to create or find a

foundation for knowledge and belief. However, it is my belief that both theories are

vulnerable to charges of circularity caused by them making assumptions they do not and

cannot justify. In Descartes’ case he presumes the validity of his notion of “Clear and

Distinct Ideas” and uses it to prove the existence of God, whose existence he then uses to

justify the veridical nature of his clear and distinct ideas. In Hume’s case he assumes that

the empiric principle’s validity is so obvious that he does not need to define its nature, he

then proceeds to use the empiric principle to establish both his empiricism, and his assaults

upon metaphysical knowledge and the “Principle of the Uniformity of Nature”. However, his

assumption of the empiric principles validity causes the empiric principle to become

vulnerable to the same methods he uses to assault metaphysical knowledge and the

principle of the uniformity of nature. By examining the nature of the circularity found

within both theories, in conjunction with the work of Collingwood, Quine and Sellars and

the use of “Proof by Contradiction”, I believe that it is possible to deductively argue that the

circularity found within Descartes’ Rationalism and Hume’s Epistemology implies that

foundational epistemology is impossible.

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1.1. Introduction:

My aims within this dissertation are to first demonstrate that the foundational

epistemological theories found within Descartes’ rationalism and Hume’s empiricism are

vulnerable to charges of circularity and then to analyse said charges of circularity to

establish the underlying causes. Then, I shall endeavour to demonstrate, by addressing the

implications of the work and theories of the philosophers Collingwood, Quine and Sellars,

that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the problems of circularity found within

Descartes’ and Hume’s theory’s of foundational epistemology occur because foundational

epistemology is impossible. Finally, by employing “Proof By Contradiction”, I intend to

demonstrate that the observed circularity does more than suggest the impossibility of

foundational epistemology, but allows us to construct a logically deductive proof for its

impossibility.

1.2. Circularity and Self Refutation:

Circularity, its implications and its solutions within the following theories are some of

the primary concerns of this dissertation, as such, I wish to be explicit about what I believe

constitutes circularity. I believe that circularity is made of two forms of circular reasoning

this is based on the views of Bryan Caplan in his paper “Common Sense and the Self-

Refutation of Skepticism” (Caplan, 1993). These are: circularity through self refutation and

circularity through presumption.

An argument is circular through presumption if it uses a premise whose validity can

only be proven through the result of the arguments conclusion. An example of a circular

argument is: “God exists because the bible says it is so. The bible is true because God says it

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is so.” (Cline, 2012). Clearly this argument is fallacious as, according to the first premise, God

exists because it is stated in the bible, but the indubitability of the bible is only secured

because God ensures it. This is clearly circular in nature and as such is untenable. I aim to

show that Descartes use of his notion of clear and distinct ideas, whose validity is

dependent upon God’s existence, within his proof for God’s existence results in his

argument being circular through presumption.

In the first instance an argument is circular in this manner if the conclusion of the

argument renders an element of the premises used to establish the conclusion false. A

simple example of this is: “The following sentence is false. The preceding sentence is true.”

(Clark, 2012). Clearly the predicate “the following sentence is false” causes the initial

predicate to falsify the conclusion, which in turn causes the initial predicate to then be false,

thus causing a logically untenable situation, this situation is called self refutation. I aim to

show that a similar relationship exists between Hume’s empiric principle and his attacks on

metaphysics and the principle of the uniformity of nature.

1.3. Normative vs. Descriptive Epistemology:

Before we begin to dismantle and assess the two theories on their own merits, an

understanding of the difference between Normative and Descriptive epistemology is

necessary. When Hume wrote his theory of empiricism he always made it clear that his work

was intended to be one of a descriptive epistemology. Hume claimed that there were two

kinds of epistemology: the first, normative epistemology, was primarily concerned with

justifying our belief that something exists; the second, descriptive epistemology, was

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primarily concerned with where our beliefs come from, not if the beliefs existence is

justified (Stewart, 2002).

This is a distinction of some significance for, as we shall see when we examine each

theory in isolation, it explains many of the differences of approach found between the

theories. Descartes’ rationalism is normative in nature, where as Hume’s epistemology is

descriptive. Thus, because of this distinction the two theories become of even greater

interest to us. For, if two theories with entirely different epistemological foundations both

fail to be successful and fall victim to charges of circularity; it stands to highlight just how

difficult logically sound foundationalist theories are to create. Furthermore, it makes any

investigation involving the comparison of the two theories theoretically more insightful and

so of greater value in answering the question at hand.

1.4. Scepticism:

Scepticism is the school of thought to which all foundational theories are opposed

for it aims to prove the opposite of the foundationalist’s endeavour: that we can know

nothing. Descartes formulation of scepticism, found within The First Meditation, would have

been of the kind most commonly thought of when Descartes and Hume were constructing

their epistemology. It is this form of scepticism that acts as a backdrop to both philosophers

theories; informing both the positions and logical traits of each philosopher’s arguments,

thus I believe that it is worth taking the time to fully understand its potency.

Descartes starts this formulation by stating that: “…if I find some reason for doubt in

each of my beliefs, that will be enough to reject all of them.” (Descartes, 1998). This

assertion of what ideas he considers to be retainable means that if any idea, concept or

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figment of his existence can be subject to even the slightest doubt, he must cast it out, for

only complete certainty can be an adequate foundation for indubitable knowledge of the

world.

By following this principle he arrives at the conclusion that the ultimate sceptical

position could only be reached by supposing the existence of an omnipotent evil being, the

evil daemon, whose sole purpose is to maliciously subvert and deceive Descartes about

everything in reality. How he arrives at this point is irrelevant, but its results are not.

Because the daemon is omnipotent it can deceive Descartes about information from his

senses, memory, mind, the very existence of reality and even the most basic deductive

truths; such that he could be fooled into thinking that a sum such as is logically

sound. This places him in a position of seemingly inescapable scepticism, where it would

appear he could know nothing.

2.0. An Exposition of Cartesian Rationalism and Circularity:

The problem of circularity within Cartesian rationalism is well documented and is

one of the most common criticisms of Descartes work within The Meditations. While many

would argue that lengthy exposition of the meditations is necessary to gain a detailed

understanding of Cartesian circularity, for the purpose of this project only an understanding

of the basic charge of circularity and the main arguments is necessary to facilitate the

required discussions. Thus, I have attempted to strike a balance between detailed

exposition and cutting out irrelevant or unnecessary information. The Meditations as a

piece of literature is made up of 6 sections: the 5 meditations themselves with a final 6th

section devoted to Descartes’ responses to criticisms offered by his contemporaries.

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2.1. The First Meditation:

Descartes opens his quest for knowledge in the First Meditation, this meditation

deals with the nature of scepticism. Crucially, it is here that he states that he is looking for a

solid foundation for the sciences, by which he means the natural sciences of Maths, Physics

and Biology. This informs his approach to the rest of The Meditations, implying that he

cannot settle for anything less than a completely unshakeable foundational theory of

epistemology and metaphysics, otherwise sceptics could devalue his work. Thus, he starts

by outlining his account of scepticism which we covered previously.

At this point it is crucial to reflect on exactly how potent this form of scepticism is, as

presumably, Descartes must now find a way out of this scepticism to a point of certainty. If

the scepticism he has laid out is too potent, he may have no way of escaping it; this is the

problem at the centre of Cartesian circularity: does Descartes force himself to make

unjustifiable assumptions about the eventual conclusions of his arguments from a position

of inescapable uncertainty?

2.2. The Second Meditation:

There are a number of purposes towards which the Second Meditation finds itself

being used, of which one is of extreme interest to our overall discussion of circularity. At the

opening of the Second Meditation Descartes and the reader find themselves in a position of

seemingly inescapable scepticism; having previously spent the entirety of The First

Meditation showing that he can doubt everything in his perception, reality and logic itself.

Through an examination of his predicament Descartes asserts that in order for the evil

daemon to be deceiving him about anything he must first exist in some capacity. He reasons

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that it is impossible for the daemon to deceive nothing, thus, there must exist some

element of himself for the daemon to deceive. Upon reflection on this new thrust in his

argument he reasons that his physical body is not a necessary part of him, for he can still

doubt its existence, thus what remains must be a thinking thing. This process of proof that

he exists so long as he thinks, regardless of if his every thought is a distorted product of

deception or not, he calls the cogito.

Remembering that Descartes aim within this project is to be able to possess ideas

that he cannot doubt; he inspects the nature of the cogito in an effort to understand why it

is that he can be so certain of its indubitability, writing:

“I am certain that I am a thinking thing. Do I not therefore also know what is required

for my being certain about anything? In this first item of knowledge there is simply a clear

and distinct perception of what I am asserting; this would not be enough to make me certain

of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with such

clarity and distinctness was false. So I now seem to be able to lay it down as a general rule

that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true”. (Descartes, 1998)

Thus Descartes formulates his notion of clear and distinct ideas (formally CDI). This

formulation is at the very heart of the problem of Cartesian circularity, as Descartes uses CDI

as a guarantee of his veridical perception throughout the rest of the Meditations.

2.3. The Third Meditation:

The end of The Second Meditation leaves the reader with some questions about the

nature of CDI: what makes an idea clear and distinct? How does an idea being clear and

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distinct cause it to be indubitable? Thus, Descartes spends the start of The Third Meditation

clarifying what makes an idea clear and distinct, as well as dealing with what he believes

may be some early objections to them. This analysis is made irrelevant by what he goes on

to state in The Fourth Meditation, thus no further analysis of this meditation is required.

The rest of this meditation is spent on two topics, the first is “The Natural Light of

Reason” and the second is his cosmological argument for the existence of God. The actual

proof of Gods existence is of little interest to this debate, it doesn’t particularly matter if we

believe his argument is successful or not. However, what is of great interest is a number of

lines from within his argument that read, “However, I recognise all these things as true more

clearly and distinctly as I examine them further and in greater detail.” and “this idea of God

[…], has the highest clarity and distinction” (Descartes, 1998). As the previous paragraph

points out, he has not yet explicitly used circular reasoning, although the assertion is there.

What he has done at this point, is to make it clear to the reader, beyond doubt, that his

proof for the existence of God is completely reliant upon him having a CDI of God.

2.4. The Fourth Meditation:

The Fourth Meditation is where Descartes project runs into difficulties; having now

established that God exists he must still make steps towards his ultimate goals: providing an

indubitable foundation for the sciences; explaining why this means that the evil daemon

doesn’t exist; why it is not within Gods nature to deceive us; to explain why it is that we do

make errors of judgement; and finally to explain beyond doubt why we can trust CDI.

The vast majority of The Fourth Meditation is given over to Descartes discussing why

it is that human beings can draw false conclusions from evidence provided by the senses;

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why this does not conflict with God’s benevolent nature; and how we, as humans, should

attempt to avoid error in the future. This discussion is at best extremely tangential to my

project until the very last section when he writes:

“[…] it is evidently impossible for me to be mistaken because every clear and distinct

perception is certainly something and, consequently, cannot come from nothing but

necessarily has God for its author - God, I say, the supremely perfect being for whom it is

repugnant to be a deceiver - and hence the perception is undoubtedly true.” (Descartes,

1998)

Here Descartes is clearly saying that the reason he can trust his CDI is because their

validity is ensured by the existence of a benevolent and non-deceiving God. This of course

would seem to imply the use of circular reasoning, as in the prior Meditation he was using

his CDI of God to prove God’s existence. By his own admission his CDI’s are only indubitable

if God exists, yet he must use a supposedly CDI of God to prove Gods existence in the first

place. Thus, he clearly leaves himself vulnerable to a charge of cyclic circularity.

The last Meditation is not of any direct relevance to the problem of Cartesian

circularity, and so we shall not delve into it at this juncture.

2.5. Discussion of Cartesian Circularity and the Arguments for and against it:

The existence of circularity within The Meditations is not as cut and dried an issue as

I have made out above. While many philosophers, including Descartes himself, acknowledge

that there is the potential for a charge of circularity at this point, many believe either that

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such a problem has a solution, or that there is no problem and that some simple clarification

is required.

The latter view, that the problem can be solved through clarification, is supported by

Descartes himself as well as other commentators of rationalism such as Dicker (1993) and

Hatfield (2003). This clarification first comes up within The Meditations themselves in the

final chapter, entitled “Objections and Replies” (Descartes, 1998). Within this chapter

Descartes address many of the concerns raised by his contemporaries; the problem of

circularity is raised within the “Fourth Objections” written by Antoine Arnauld (Clarke,

1998). In response to Arnauld’s charge of circularity Descartes states that the reason that

Arnauld believes that there is a problem of circularity is because he is taking the notion of

CDI to be a “general rule”, when it is not. Rather, what Descartes is saying is that there are

certain ideas that he perceives so clearly and distinctly, such as the cogito or his idea of God,

that they cannot possible be doubted. However, other more general objects of his

perception that he clearly and distinctly perceives could be doubted if it were not for God’s

existence; it is these ideas that Descartes is talking about within The Fourth Meditation, and

not his much more vivid ideas like the cogito from previous Meditations.

This argument, which would later be called “The General Rule Defence” (Dicker,

1993), has been expanded upon by Dicker and Hatfield. Their expansion of this defence

brought to light the fact that if this defence were not true, then supporters of the argument

for circularity would have to explain why it is that we seemingly cannot doubt the cogito.

This is much harder to do as many consider the cogito to be logically unassailable.

Arguments against the cogito generally attempt to show that the cogito is dubitable

because we are still vulnerable to the deception of the omnipotent evil demon (Walter

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Dunne, 1901), or that certainty of this nature is in fact either meaningless or impossible

(Ayer, 1953).

However, examining such assaults on the cogito would take us away from my main

goals while adding little to the overall potency of my argument so I shall move on to

discussing the second style of defence: “The Psychological Solution” (Loeb, 1992). The

psychological solution is strongly supported by Loeb in his 1992 article “The Cartesian

Circle”. Loeb argues that Descartes’ notion of CDI is not a logical criterion for truth, as most

people would like to believe, but rather is a psychological criterion for certainty. Loeb

postulates that in the early parts of The Meditations, when Descartes talks about having

clear and distinct perceptions of the cogito and his idea of God, he is not saying that he

“knows” anything beyond doubt, rather he is saying that he is “certain” beyond doubt. The

crucial difference between the two is that certainty is a psychological state of disposition

towards something, where as “to know something” is an absolute logical position. Thus,

when Descartes states in The Fourth Meditation that God guarantees all that he clearly and

distinctly perceives, he is saying that at this point God guarantees, not just that he can be

certain of his perception, but that he can know what he perceives without being subject to

doubt.

I however, find that both these solutions come up short for one simple reason: they

would not have satisfied the spirit in which Descartes writes The Meditations. His goal,

which he must reach, is that of an indubitable foundation for the sciences which he intends

to set up using the most precise, in depth and infallible methods possible. Thus, the

adaption of a general rule or psychological defence to this criticism of his argument would

not be in keeping with the very rules he himself set down in The First Meditation. The

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general rule defence is based on a technicality and, as far as I can see, would still be open to

doubt simply because Descartes does not provide us with a criterion for identifying those

clear and distinct perceptions which are more clear and distinct from the others. The

psychological defence has a similar problem; Descartes wants complete logical certainty, not

psychological certainty. Psychological certainty is not an unshakeable foundation, for if we

think about the nature of things that we consider to be certain, we find that often things we

are certain about one moment can become uncertain the next, this is not a stable enough

foundation for the Descartes of The First Meditation.

Thus, I believe that at this point that there is strong motivation to conclude that

Descartes rationalist endeavour does fall victim to the charge of circularity. Even if you were

not convinced, it is clear that there is a problem of some kind within his reasoning. What I

believe the cause of this is, and why the problem of circularity and its cause is important, is

only really appreciable with an understanding of Humean circularity, thus I shall deal with

Hume’s theory of Empiricism next.

3.0. An Exposition of Hume’s Empiricism:

David Hume is famous for being somewhat of a sceptic, however to say that his

theories were intentionally sceptical would, I believe, be false. Rather than setting out his

theory of Empiricism with the aim of drawing sceptical conclusions, I believe that he simply

set out to address many of the problems he believed he saw in Descartes rationalism, and

with the epistemological assumptions he believed many philosophers were continually

making at the time. What makes Hume stand apart from philosophers like Descartes was

that his epistemological theory wasn’t constructed with a particular end in mind, except

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perhaps wanting to undermine the rationalist principle (Stewart, 2002). Hume started on a

similar tack to Descartes with one key principle from which he intended to build his enquiry,

however, rather than trying to take his theory in one strict direction with one goal in mind

that he must reach, he instead let his theory develop more organically. Because of this he is

much more willing to accept the conclusions of his argument, regardless of their sceptical

implications. Because of this I believe that he avoids arguing in a cyclic manner as Descartes

does, however, he still has the potential to fall victim to self-refutation.

Hume puts forth his arguments for empiricism within his book “An Enquiry

Concerning Human Understanding” (formally ECHU) (Hume, 1999). Unlike Descartes, his

arguments for empiricism and its consequences do not develop in such a linear fashion, as

such there is little to no loss of understanding caused by picking the parts of his arguments

that concern us the most and examining them in isolation. Thus, I shall deal with only the

three most relevant parts: the establishment of the empiricist principle; the impossibility of

metaphysical knowledge; and Hume’s assault on the “Principle of the Uniformity of Nature”.

3.1. The Origin of Ideas and the Empiric Principle:

The method by which Hume arrives at the principle of empiricism and its essence

according to Hume’s own theory of the classification of ideas has incredible import to the

rest of my argument, thus I shall discuss it first. Hume’s first account of the empiric principle

occurs during section 2 of EHU entitled “Of the Origin of Ideas” (Hume, 1999). Hume states

that the contents of the mind can be divided into 2 categories, ideas and impression.

Impressions are the raw feelings we gain from experience, such as the feeling of pain from

burning a hand. While ideas, or thoughts, are just weaker, less vivid, mental representations

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of an impression. Furthermore, he argues that although we believe that our minds can

create almost any new, never before seen concept, from scratch, this is actually impossible.

Rather, our imagination constructs “new” ideas from the simple impression of older ones.

Thus, Hume concludes that nothing can have entered the mind, which was not first in our

experience; this is the first form of the empiric principle1.

The first formulation is incredibly important as it informs the whole of Hume’s

endeavour. Although it is clear from the manner in which Hume ends the section that he

believes he has shown that the principle is obviously true, at no point does he explicitly

examine the genetics of the statement. This, I feel, leaves many aspects of the principle

open to debate, for example: is the principle itself grounded in experience? Is it analytic or

synthetic in nature? Clearly Hume assumes that the empiric principle is true, assumes that

the reader will also, and then carries on with his endeavour, very much in a manner similar

to that in which Descartes appears to presume that the cogito and his notion of CDI is true.

3.2. The Impossibility of Metaphysical Knowledge:

Hume firmly believed that the work of rationalists such as Descartes was unhealthy,

impotent and lazy. His primary reason for thinking this was that he believed that

metaphysical knowledge was impossible. To understand this position we must first

1 There is a second formulation of the empiric principle which Hume introduces later on in the same section

which states: If we can find no sense impression for an idea we believe we posses, then said idea is meaningless. This formulation, however, is of little relevance to the problem at hand as for the most part it is just a reformulation of the first version of the principle and so there is no need to examine it further.

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understand his theory of the classification of thoughts, ideas2 and propositions which would

later become known as “Hume’s Fork”.

Hume believed that based on experience of the world, all statements could be

classified as one of two kinds of propositions: relations of ideas and matters of fact.

Relations of ideas encompass deductive statements concerning logic, maths and

geometry. A proposition that is a relation of ideas, according to Hume, can tell us nothing

about the external world, for example: the statement “bachelors are unmarried men”

informs us that all unmarried men must by definition be bachelors, however, it does not

follow that there exists any bachelors. The statements validity does not depend on, or

entail, the existence of any physical thing. This phenomena Hume calls existential import.

Thus, relations of ideas have no existential import.

Matters of fact are aposteriori observations concerning relations of experience and

physical objects. An example of a matter of fact proposition would be: “Ted is a bachelor”.

This statement is only valid if there exists a man, named Ted, who is also unmarried. The

validity of this statement is entirely dependent upon the existence of a certain set of

conditions all pertaining to one physical situation. There is no element of the definition of

Ted entails that he must be a bachelor, and there is no element of the definition of bachelor

that entails there must exist a bachelor named Ted. Thus matters of fact have existential

import.

2 It is worth noting that Hume used the terms “thoughts” and “ideas” interchangeably throughout EHU despite

the fact that we would argue that there is a semantic difference. Hume would of course argue that the contents of the mind is entirely made up of impressions and so such a difference is just that, semantic, and so meaningless.

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Hume then applies the reasoning of his fork to the concept of metaphysical

knowledge. Metaphysical knowledge, as Descartes understands it, is deductive, apriori

propositions that aim to inform us about the reality of the physical world. Now according to

Hume’s fork, deductive apriori claims make a statement a relation of ideas. However,

metaphysical knowledge also tells us about the physical world, thus, it must have existential

import. Hume concludes that metaphysical knowledge must be impossible as it is

attempting to be a proposition concerning the relation of ideas that has existential import,

which he believes is impossible.

This is the first instance that Hume’s earlier failure to fully expose the nature of the

empiric principle becomes a problem. Let us follow the same methodology through that he

has applied to the concept of metaphysical knowledge and apply it to the concept of the

empiric principle. If we think of the empiric principle as being genetic, that it tells us the

origin of our thoughts, then we are forced to make a worrying conclusion. For, if we state

that all our ideas are just the product of our impressions, which are themselves the product

of our experiences of an external world of some kind, then reverse this statement. We are

forced to conclude that if there was not an external world of some form to cause our

experiences, impressions and finally our thoughts, then we could have no conception of an

empiric principle in the first place. Thus, the assumption of the empiric principle’s validity

results in Hume accepting a proposition which deductively implies the existence of an

external world. This makes the empiric principle a relation of ideas which also entails

existential import, which in keeping with Hume’s own assault on the idea of metaphysical

knowledge, must be impossible. This is clearly a case of circularity through self refutation, as

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Hume’s first assumption has lead to a conclusion of his argument falsifying one of its

premises, this is logically untenable.

The main way I foresee supporters of Hume defending against this charge of

circularity through self refutation is by claiming that the empiric principle is not a relation of

ideas, but that it is inferred from experience and so does not deductively entail the

existence of the physical world. Rather than being a deductive proposition, it is a theory that

attempts to surmise what we perceive the relationship is between our impressions and the

contents of our minds. However, I aim to show that whether or not you accept this defence

of this specific charge of circularity is immaterial, as accepting this form of defence leaves

the empiric principle open to another form of attack.

3.3. Hume’s Assault on the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature:

To explain what “The Principle of the Uniformity of Nature” (formally PUN) is and

why Hume believes that we should discard it, we must first understand Hume’s theory on

the association of ideas. Hume believed that ideas are not random and that ideas generally

will introduce one another based on three principles of association, these are: Resemblance:

the mind will naturally move from one idea to another that resembles the original in some

way. Contiguity in space and time: the mind naturally associates ideas that happened at the

same time or in similar locations together. Cause and effect: when thinking of a particular

event our minds will think of either the cause of that event or what said event will cause.

However, Hume believes that the third principle of association, cause and effect, is

highly questionable. Hume believed an inductive inference, one based on cause and effect,

is when we move from an observed fact, something that happened in the past, to an

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unobserved fact, something that will happen in the future. We cannot know the effects of a

cause through deductive means, for example: it is impossible to know purely through visual

inspection that having never encountered water before, it will quench your thirst. “Our

reason, unassisted by experience, [can never] draw any inference concerning real existence

and matter of fact.” (Hume, 1999). Thus it should be completely irrational to believe in

induction, yet we all do. Hume puts this down to a hidden premise that we all assume to be

true: that the future will always resemble the past and that nature is uniform and follows

strict patterns and rules. Thus there is an unobservable necessary connection between all

related events. He calls this assumption “The Principle of the Uniformity of Nature” (Hume,

1999).

Having established what the PUN is Hume starts his assault against it in a similar

manner to his attack on the concept of metaphysical knowledge, by examining its

propositional identity. Firstly, he believes that the PUN cannot be known apriori; the water

example above illustrates this. Thus, it is not a relation of ideas. Secondly, it cannot be

known through the empiric principle, it is an unobservable necessary connection, so it has

no existential import and so cannot be a matter of fact. Therefore Hume concludes that

there is no rational justification for holding beliefs based on the PUN.

If we, as before, apply the same method that Hume used on the PUN on the empiric

principle, Hume’s failure to clarify its propositional identity and his presumption of its

validity is problematic. This same methodology is also used against Hume by Collingwood

(D'Oro, Forthcoming). Firstly, the only way that Hume, and defenders of Hume, can have

reached this point in his argument is if they already have, or have had, to accept the non-

deductive account of the empiric principle as true. If this were not the case then they would

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have fallen victim to my first charge of circularity based on Hume’s own assault on

metaphysical knowledge. Secondly, if we examine the empiric principle we find that it bears

a large similarity to the PUN; in that the empiric principle is a cause and effect relation

between our experiences, our impressions and our ideas. Hume is assuming that our

impressions are caused by something external to us, and that these impressions then cause

our ideas, or at least that there is a relation between an impression and an idea that causes

the decrease in vivacity3. These connections, just like those covered by the PUN between

physical causes and effects, are unobservable necessary connections. So if we now look at

the empiric principle in light of these advancements, we can reinterpret it as saying that

there exists an unobservable necessary connection between our experiences and the

contents of our minds. Just like the PUN, this is not a relation of ideas or a matter of fact,

neither is it possible to verify the empiric principle by empiric means. Thus, by Hume’s own

logic, there can be no rational reason for holding the empiric principle.

Clearly Hume’s failure to classify the nature of his central starting point, the empiric

principle, leaves it open to two charges of circularity. This is directly caused by the fact that

he assumes that the principle is valid and does not take the time to explicitly state how he

justifies his assumption. Despite the fact that there are solutions to both charges of

circularity, the solution to one charge results in Hume’s argument being weak to the other,

thus there is a seemingly inescapable charge of circularity.

3 Hume states in EHU that the only real difference between an idea and an impression is its degree of vivacity,

with an impression being the most vivid at the time of experience, it then fades to an idea after the initial impression.

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4.0. On Necessary Presumption:

Thus far it has been my aim to demonstrate that both foundational theories of

epistemology fall victim to circularity despite seemingly very different starting points and

methodology. Having looked at the specifics of each theory’s circularity it is now worth

looking at the charges of circularity from a more general view point.

Both theories appear to run into difficulties when an initial premise results in a

conflict with a later conclusion. To be more specific, in both theories cases it is one of their

central starting premises. For Descartes this is his notion of CDI, while for Hume it is the

empiric principle. So what is it about these two premises that cause them to come into

conflict with later parts of each philosopher’s arguments? If we look at Descartes notion of

CDI: a tool for veridical perception of ideas based on an analysis of the cogito before his

revelations in The Fourth Meditation. We can see that Descartes’ only method for justifying

CDI is either by assuming that the cogito and thus CDI is true, or by showing that the cogito

is true because he clearly and distinctly perceives it, which would force him to assume his

notion of CDI. No matter how Descartes formulates this part of his reasoning, he is forced to

assume that his notion of CDI is certain. The empiric principle is clearly assumed to be true

by Hume, or at least he considers its truth to be so self evident that there is no need to state

how it is so. This tells us then that the elements of both philosophers’ arguments which

appear to result in circularity are assumptions.

This seems perplexing in light of the fact that both Descartes and Hume are regarded

as being some of the greatest minds to have engaged in philosophy. In everyday life making

decisions based on assumptions is considered to be foolish, so the founding of arguments

designed to show what it is possible to ever know on assumptions seems even more so. This

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results in an interesting question: why would both philosophers make such large

assumptions at the very start of their theories?

The reason I believe is very clear: both theories must find some way of escaping the

scepticism explored at the very start of this paper. Said scepticism is so potent that finding

an initial indubitable point from which to build the rest of a theory upon is seemingly

impossible when taking into account the fact that you can doubt the reliability of all of

reality, including logic itself. This puts both philosophers in a difficult position. It is

undeniable that there is evidence to support both assumptions main results; evidence for

Hume’s empiric principle is written throughout many human endeavours, for example

psychology. While Descartes final conclusion that the reason human perception seems

flawed is because we simply make false judgements based upon poor examination of what

our senses tell us, also seems to ring true. However, to reach this point from a position of

total scepticism is a considerable feat.

The fact that both philosophers, despite considerable differences, choose to start

their epistemological endeavours based on assumptions, clearly says something about the

nature of foundational epistemology and metaphysics. It is my belief that both philosophers

are forced to make some form of primary assumption, because such assumptions are an

unavoidable entailment of any attempt to find foundational structures for knowledge. Due

to the very severe nature of scepticism, making such an assumption is seemingly

unavoidable. If they had not both made such assumptions, then neither of their theories

would have been able to move past the initial problems scepticism poses for foundational

epistemology, resulting in both theories failing to provide foundations for knowledge.

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So what conclusions can be drawn from this? That foundational epistemology is

impossible without having to make some kind of starting assumption. Or, that because two

of the greatest epistemological philosopher’s arguments fail due to forced assumptions, this

would suggest that foundational knowledge is impossible, that there is no foundation for

knowledge. Both possible conclusions are extremely bold statements with massive

repercussions should they be found to be true. Thus, it is now of paramount importance to

access the evidence for and against said conclusions so that a picture of how likely they are

to be true can be created.

5.0. Assumption within Other Foundational Epistemological Projects:

It would be imprudent to not assess the limitations of the argument presented

within this paper. I am acutely aware of the narrow range of foundational epistemological

and metaphysical theories that have been given direct consideration here. However, this is

not to say that I have not given other epistemological projects due consideration. While

there are not the words here to go into any real level of detail, I have found considerable

evidence to suggest that the work of Philosophers such as Kant, with his Transcendental

Idealism, and Berkeley, with his Subjective Idealism, also have problems with assumption

and circularity. Arguments for the failure and circularity of Transcendental Idealism are

provided in a manner which is most relevant to this endeavour by Malpas (2006)4 and

4 “It is in fact the synthetic a priori structure of transcendental reasoning that leads directly to a form of

circularity in the transcendental project that seems to lie at the very heart of that project.” “Kant draws our attention […] to the basic structure of transcendental reasoning as a form of demonstration that aims to exhibit the basic principles on which experience must rest (principles such as 'that every event has a cause') and which proceeds, not through concepts alone, but through the connecting of concepts in relation to experience, that is, through a structure that is itself an instance of the synthetic a priori, and which, insofar as it 'makes possible the very experience which is its own ground of proof', is itself essentially circular.” (Malpas, 2006).

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Westphal (2004)5. Arguments of a similar nature but for circularity within Subjective

Idealism are provided by Dicker in his book “Berkeleys Idealism: A Critical Examination”

(Dicker, 2011)6 which provides a summary and analysis of all the main arguments for

circularity within idealism. I think it is fair to say that these two theories cover the main

types of foundational epistemology not directly covered within this paper. The fact that

there is evidence supporting the notion that both theories are vulnerable to circularity due

to assumption, in conjunction with Taylor’s paper “Overcoming Epistemology” (Taylor, 1995)

within which he argues for the failure of the epistemology of Descartes, Hume and Kant,

provides further evidence that all foundational epistemology has this one same problem.

6.0. Argument for the Elimination of Foundational Knowledge:

It is clear that scepticism is an incredibly powerful opponent to the establishment of

any foundationalist view of experience, reality and logic. It is the key obstacle that any

foundational epistemological theory must overcome. Thus, the manner in which it has

shaped both Descartes’ and Hume’s work is incredibly important.

Upon inspection of Descartes’ rationalism and Hume’s empiricism I have found that

they both fall victim to circularity. My initial examination of the theories suggested that this

circularity was due to the presumption of a single starting premise within both philosophers’

arguments. The fact that said assumptions occurred at the start of both philosophers

arguments suggested that both philosophers needed to make some kind of assumption in

5 Westphal states that “Kant’s proof that matter consists of forces is fallacious. I then […] substantiate the

circularity in Kant’s definition of density. These two fundamental problems demonstrate the untenability of Kant’s metaphysical method”. (Westphal, 2004). 6 Dicker provides a number of arguments against the Idealism of Berkeley, of which a number attempt to show

that Berkeleys arguments for and dependence upon universals seem to render his argument circular.

26

order to make any kind of progress away from absolute scepticism. This notion is supported

by the work of Collingwood.

Collingwood took an interesting and very relevant position on assumption

within the contexts of philosophical arguments and society as a whole. Collingwood

theorised that presumptions were not necessarily bad and that presumption was at the

heart of many valuable aspects of human enquiry. He famously argued that there was no

non-circular justification for knowledge, this is called the Logocentric Predicament (D'Oro,

Forthcoming). Collingwood argued that assumptions should be judged based on what they

make possible, so for example: it is impossible to logically justify the use of logic, because

our only way of doing so would be to use logic, thus we must assume that logic is justifiable.

Collingwood argues that this assumption is justified because it enables us to make, very

beneficial and valuable, claims about our entire range of experience.

If we apply this to the theories of Descartes, Hume and epistemology in general,

then Collingwood would argue that the assumptions within their arguments can be ignored

so long as their conclusions make something of value possible. In Descartes case, the

conclusions of his argument allow us to escape scepticism, with all its tropes, and allows us

to make claims to knowledge based on our perceptions without being vulnerable to extreme

doubt. These are results that would be very difficult to interpret in a negative manner.

However, he also concludes that humans are a product of dualism between a mind and a

body, that God exists and that it is because of his benevolence that we can escape

scepticism. These are conclusions that many would find difficult to support for a wide

number of reasons, for example: advocating dualism is frowned on within most

philosophical circles. While the idea of an omnipotent and benevolent God results in both

27

logical and ethical contradictions. Hume’s epistemology is equally as contrived, as he does

end up drawing many sceptical conclusions, more than many would be comfortable with.

However, if Hume is right, then he has done humanity a great service by stripping it of much

of its social, linguistic and philosophical dead weight.

This highlights how the value of each theory is difficult to measure, which in turns

makes it hard to conclusively decide if its assumptions should be ignored. Collingwood’s

theory does offer some form of redemption for foundational epistemology, providing it with

an argument to defend its existence, however, it is clear that Collingwood’s theory does

result in some ambiguities. Collingwood’s theory places epistemological knowledge in an

interesting position, on the one hand it supports the claim that foundational epistemological

knowledge is only possible by making assumptions, but on the other, as it does not

eradicate the assumption, it merely justifies its existence. This suggests that it would be

acceptable to conclude that assumption is a necessary part of foundational epistemology.

However, even if this were to be the case it would not diminish the fact that both theories

were still based on assumptions, which philosophically is unsatisfactory.

A more powerful explanation of why assumption would appear to be necessary for

foundational epistemology is provided by Quine and Sellars, whose web of belief theory

seems to explain the behaviour of Descartes’ and Hume’s theory’s incredibly accurately.

Sellars was the first to argue that there were no foundations for knowledge: he

agreed with Hume’s criticism of rationalism and its metaphysics, but he also believed that

Hume’s work was equally flawed. He believed that Hume was committing the “myth of the

given” (Sellars, 1997); assuming that sensations are self conceptualising, that understanding

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is contained within an experience. Because of this he believed that there could be no

foundation for knowledge, rather he thought that there was only a web of belief (Sellars,

1997). This web is holistic in nature; it is not founded upon anything, rather it is made up of

ideas that our culture deems to be true at a given time.

Quine developed this idea by theorising that the web was formed of language; that it

was through our use of language to relate one idea to another that results in the holistic

web of knowledge that Sellars believed existed (Quine, 1951). Crucially Quine stated that

while it may appear that there are foundations for this web there are in fact none. This is

because the more concepts an idea supports the closer to the centre of the web an idea will

get until it appears to be structurally integral to it. However, any attempt to justify its

existence within the web will always be circular as its location is dependent upon all other

ideas in the web that relate to it (Quine & Ullian, 1978). Thus, nothing in the web relates to

anything external to it, implying that the web cannot have a foundation external to itself.

Thus, it is not a great leap of reasoning to suppose that the reason that Descartes

and Hume have to resort to making assumptions, construct arguments that result in

circularity and contradiction or, in Hume’s case, result in highly sceptical conclusions, is

because they are not only searching for something that does not exist, because a holistic

epistemology has no foundation, but are also trying to prove the existence of a holistic

entity which, as Collingwood highlights though the Logocentric Predicament, is not possible

as any attempt at self justification will be inherently circular. Thus, we are presented with

strong evidence to suggest that foundational epistemology is impossible. However, the fact

that the behaviour of both theories appears to cohere with a holistic approach to

epistemology does not mean that this conclusion is logically entailed.

29

Within Mathematics one of the most powerful methods for proving the validity of

arguments, results and theories that can have an infinite number of permutations through

deductive means is “Proof by Contradiction” (Allenby, 1997) (Formally PBC). To prove a

statement by contradiction you first suppose that the opposite of what you are trying to

show is true. You then demonstrate how your supposition results in a situation that is

impossible or “contradictory” (Hammack, 2009). If a contradiction does arise, that would not

if the original statement held true, then logically you can conclude that the original

statement must be true for all cases, otherwise the opposite would not result in an

impossible contradiction. For example: if I want to show that in all cases a negative number

multiplied by another negative number results in a positive number (1). I simply suppose

that the opposite is true (2).

I can then demonstrate that this leads to a contradiction:

Thus both equations are equal:

Dividing through by gives:

Which of course is impossible, we have a contradiction.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1)

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Thus, by PBC we have shown that in all cases the product of two negative numbers is

always positive. The reason that this technique is so powerful is that to show that something

is possible in an infinite number of situations by demonstration would be almost impossible

e.g. in the above example working out the products of all possible negative numbers.

However, proof by contradiction allows us to prove such results very quickly and simply as

we only need to show one contradiction, rather than all possible contradictions, which is

often very easy to do.

We can use this same technique when arguing that successful foundational

epistemology and metaphysics is impossible. If we suppose that the opposite is true, that

successful foundational epistemology and metaphysics is possible, and that the work of

Descartes and Hume exemplifies those types of theories. Then, as previously explored, both

theories fail due to them entering into logically untenable situations. Because PBC only

requires us to demonstrate a single contradiction, yet in this case both paradigms of

foundational epistemology fail due to logical contradictions, we have very strong logical

evidence that we should reject our supposition and accept the original hypothesis.

Attempting to prove that foundational epistemology is impossible in this manner is

certainly powerful, it uses the very fundaments of deductive logic to establish its

conclusions and requires the demonstration of only one contradiction. However, much of

the potency of PBC, especially in Mathematics, comes from the nature of the subject matter

it is dealing with. When attempting to prove a mathematical statement or a problem of pure

logic, all the predicates that the hypothesis you wish to prove sits upon are themselves

already proven to be logically sound, there is no possible confusion of meaning, context or

purpose. Philosophical arguments on the other hand are not nearly so certain in their

31

foundations. Within a philosophical hypothesis there are numerous points where confusion

and misunderstanding can occur, or that the often numerous supporting statements are not

themselves logically certain, thus calling into question any possible conclusions. This

weakens the power of any conclusion drawn using PBC. To make our conclusion that

foundational epistemology is impossible using PBC we must assume that the rest of both

Descartes’ and Hume’s reasoning is logically sound and that it is free from ambiguity.

However, the use of this defence ultimately only supports my claim, as if the reason for PBC

failing is that both theories have logical or semantic ambiguities, then said ambiguities will

also weaken any claims to them being successful, further supporting my argument. This

provides the purely logical proof that dramatically increases the potency of my argument.

Before using PBC, my argument was at best a suggestion of a possible explanation for the

behaviour that was being exhibited by both theories. However, through the use of a logically

deductive system for proof, such as PBC, I have shown that the only way such behaviour

could arise is if there is no foundation for knowledge in the first place.

7.0. To Conclude:

Thus, it is clear that both Descartes’ and Hume’s theories of foundational

epistemology fall victim to charges of circularity. Through an examination of both theories I

have shown that the primary reason for this circularity is the use of unjustifiable

assumptions. Through the use of Collingwood’s methodology concerning the Logocentric

Predicament, I have shown that although said assumptions have the potential to be

justifiable, they are not due to the fact that assumptions, even justified ones, are still

assumptions, and that by the very nature of assumption, this weakens any argument based

on them. The induced failure said assumptions cause, I believe, can be accounted for by the

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holistic theory of epistemology, where knowledge has no foundations, of Quine and Sellars.

If there is no foundation for knowledge then it is no surprise that attempts to find one fail.

However, this explanation does not rule out foundational epistemology completely, it

merely suggests why a holistic understanding of knowledge could explain such behaviour.

Thus, through PBC, a deductive method for ascertaining the validity of statements, I have

shown that the existence of circular behaviour due to assumption logically informs us that

foundational epistemology is impossible. While there is always the possibility of an

ambiguity of meaning upsetting my PBC, it is clear that such ambiguities would inherently

weaken any claim for the existence of foundational epistemology as well. Thus, I believe

that there is clear evidence to support the claim that the foundational epistemology of both

Descartes and Hume falls victim to circularity and that said circularity informs an argument

for the impossibility of foundational epistemology.

33

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