For Performance Epistemology, (ed.) M. Fernández, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming)

DISPOSITIONAL ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

VERSUS

ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard

University of Edinburgh

ABSTRACT. Ernest Sosa has offered a distinctive virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, which we describe as dispositional robust virtue epistemology. It is argued that this view is ultimately untenable because it cannot accommodate what we refer to as the epistemic dependence of knowledge. In addition, it is claimed that there is an alternative proposal available, which we refer to as anti-luck virtue epistemology, that can accommodate epistemic dependence and which can thus offer a more satisfactory account of knowledge.

0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

It is difficult to express the tremendous importance of Ernest Sosa’s work for contemporary

epistemology. One litmus test in this regard is the fact that Sosa’s work is so much a part of

the furniture of mainstream epistemology that the student of this discipline simply ‘swallows

down’ a grip on his ideas in virtue of studying the area.1 Our interest in this paper is one

particular aspect of Sosa’s thinking in epistemology, which is his distinctive theory of

knowledge.

In §1, we set out Sosa’s theory of knowledge, which we refer to as dispositional robust

virtue epistemology. In §2-3, we contend that Sosa’s view is nonetheless ultimately untenable. In

particular, we argue that Sosa’s account of knowledge is unable to accommodate what we

call the epistemic dependence of knowledge, where this epistemic dependence is shown to have

2

both a negative aspect (§2) and a positive aspect (§3). Finally, in §4, we demonstrate that

there is an alternative proposal available, anti-luck virtue epistemology, which can accommodate

the phenomenon of epistemic dependence, and which should thus be preferred to Sosa’s

proposal.

1. SOSA’S DISPOSITIONAL ROBUST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

Sosa is the father of contemporary virtue epistemology (indeed, arguably he is the father of

contemporary epistemology simpliciter). While there are many different variants of virtue

epistemology, the core idea is that the notion of an epistemic virtue should play a

fundamental role in one’s epistemology. It is through Sosa’s pioneering work in this area that

virtue epistemology has gone from being largely an ignored option to one of the central

movements in contemporary philosophy.2

Our interest here is in the specific virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge which Sosa

advances. In particular, we are interested in Sosa’s claim to have offered a theory of

knowledge along exclusively virtue-theoretic lines. This is controversial, for while there is a

strong prima facie case for the weak claim that there should be some sort of virtue-theoretic

condition on knowledge, the case for the strong claim that one could offer an exclusively

virtue-theoretic theory of knowledge is prima facie problematic.

The motivation for the weak claim, in broad outline, is that a virtue-theoretic

condition on knowledge is required in order to capture the sense in which when one knows

it is down to the proper exercise of one’s cognitive agency. The point is that virtue theory

offers us the best way of understanding what the proper exercise of one’s cognitive agency

involves. That is, it involves the exercise of cognitive abilities!epistemic virtues, broadly

conceived!where these are stable and integrated features of one’s overall cognitive

character.

On the face of it, however, the strong claim that knowledge might be nothing more

than cognitive success (i.e., true belief) which is due to one’s epistemic virtue looks dubious.

After all, doesn’t the agent in a typical Gettier-style case exhibit epistemic virtue in their

formation of a true belief and yet nonetheless lack knowledge?3 In a number of works,

however, Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2013; forthcoming) has developed a

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particular rendering of virtue epistemology which can offer a compelling account of

knowledge.

In terms of Sosa’s terminology, knowledge has a ‘triple A’ structure. A belief which is

true is accurate, and a belief which is formed via an epistemic virtue is adroit. In addition, Sosa

delineates a further epistemic category whereby the subject’s belief is not only adroitly

formed and accurate, but also accurate because adroitly formed. Sosa refers to this as apt

belief. Apt belief, for Sosa, is knowledge. It is held to be precisely aptness which is lacking in

the Gettier-style cases, in that while there is accuracy (the agent believes truly) and while

there is adroitness (the agent forms her belief via a reliable cognitive disposition), the belief

is not accurate because adroit, and that’s why it doesn’t amount to knowledge.

This requires some unpacking. First, another piece of terminology, this time of our

own. We will refer to a theory of knowledge which is purely virtue-theoretic!i.e., which

requires of a knowing agent who has a true belief only that, in addition, they meet a virtue-

theoretic condition!as robust virtue epistemology. Sosa’s proposal is of this sort, since there is

nothing in his theory of knowledge beyond epistemic success (true belief, or accuracy as he

calls it) and the appropriate relationship between this epistemic success and the

manifestation of epistemic virtue.

Second, we need to note that Sosa explicitly understands epistemic virtue (or

adroitness, in his terminology) in terms of the manifestation of a cognitive disposition, where

these cognitive dispositions have a physical basis resident in the cognitive subject (see, e.g.,

Sosa 2007, 29; 2009, 135). Relatedly, when Sosa talks of knowledge (i.e., apt belief) being the

result of accuracy that is because of adroitness, the ‘because of’ at issue here should be

understood in terms of a particular kind of manifestation of a disposition. This dispositional

aspect of Sosa’s view is distinctive, and this is why we will henceforth refer to his position as

dispositional robust virtue epistemology, or ‘DRVE’ for short.4

To understand the distinctiveness of Sosa’s position on this score, it is worthwhile

comparing it with a leading alternative robust virtue-theoretic proposal, due to John Greco

(2003; 2007; 2008; 2009a; 2009b; 2009c). Although superficially similar to Sosa’s proposal

(and for good reason, since it was largely inspired by Sosa’s pioneering work on virtue

epistemology), in that it also regards knowledge as being true belief that is because of

epistemic virtue, Greco’s account of knowledge differs on a fundamental level by offering a

very different account of what this ‘because of’ relation amounts to. In particular, according

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to Greco we are to read the ‘because of’ not in terms of the manifestation of a cognitive

disposition, as Sosa suggests, but rather along causal explanatory lines. That is, to say that an

agent’s cognitive success (i.e., true belief) is because of epistemic virtue is on this view to say

that the agent’s epistemic virtue is the most salient part of a causal explanation of that

cognitive success.5

To see how these two accounts of the ‘because of’ relation can come apart, consider

a glass that was broken as a result of someone dropping it onto a wooden floor. Ordinarily,

the most salient part of the causal explanation of why the glass broke will be that someone

dropped it on the floor, and in this sense it will be true to say that the glass broke because it

was dropped in this way. Note, however, that this is consistent with the claim that it was

because of the glass’s fragility that it broke, since here we are talking about the manifestation

of a disposition and not offering a causal explanation. If fragility is the (second-order)

property of having a property that causes breaking if dropped, then we cannot causally

explain why the glass broke when dropped in terms of its fragility. We can say the glass

broke when dropped because the glass has a (first-order) molecular bonding property. What

is causally responsible for the shattering is this micro-structural property together with the

dropping. The dispositional property itself, thus understood, is causally inefficacious of the

effects in terms of which it is defined.6

In the same way, according to Sosa we are to think of apt belief in terms of a belief

which is accurate because adroit in the specifically dispositional, rather than causal

explanatory, sense that the accuracy manifests an epistemic ability on the part of the subject.

Unlike Greco’s alternative proposal, then, Sosa’s virtue epistemology thus trades on a

broader metaphysical picture of dispositions and powers, where the manifestation of a

cognitive disposition mirrors the manifestation of dispositions and powers more generally.

We suggest that this is an attractive feature of the view.7

We will not be delving into the relative merits of DRVE over its causal explanatory

counterpart here.8 Our interest is rather in whether DRVE is a tenable theory of knowledge.

We will be arguing that it isn’t.

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2. DRVE AND NEGATIVE EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE

The problem that we will be posing for Sosa’s DRVR is that it is unable to accommodate a

phenomenon which we have elsewhere termed epistemic dependence.9 This phenomenon

concerns the fact that the conditions under which knowledge is possessed, and fails to be

possessed, can be significantly dependent upon factors outwith the cognitive agency of the

subject. In particular, knowledge possession can be dependent upon factors outwith the

cognitive agency of the subject to an extent which is inconsistent with a robust virtue-

theoretic account of knowledge like DRVE.

There are two sides to epistemic dependence, negative and positive. Negative epistemic

dependence is when an agent who would ordinarily count as knowing fails to know because

of factors outwith her cognitive agency. Positive epistemic dependence is when an agent

who would ordinarily not count as knowing nonetheless possesses knowledge on account of

factors outwith her cognitive agency. We will take these two types of epistemic dependence

in turn.

The kind of negative epistemic dependence that interests us is one which is extensive

enough to be incompatible with a purely virtue-theoretic account of knowledge like DRVE.

In particular, and contrary to DRVE, negative epistemic dependence occurs when an agent’s

belief meets the conditions that Sosa lays down for aptness and yet does not constitute

knowledge because of factors external to the cognitive agency of the subject. That

knowledge is subject to negative epistemic dependence of this sort can be neatly brought out

by appealing to what we call epistemic twin earth cases.10

Standard twin earth arguments run as follows.11 Despite appearances there is no

water on twin earth. Water is essentially H2O, and all the watery stuff on twin earth has the

different microstructure XYZ—earthlings call that ‘twin-water’. When S on earth utters

‘water is wet’, she expresses the proposition that water is wet, but when S’s intrinsic physical

duplicate on twin earth utters the same sentence, twin-S expresses the proposition that twin-

water is wet. Since S and twin-S refer to different kinds of stuff when they token ‘water’ the

truth-conditions of their respective utterances differ. Assuming the contents of their beliefs

are fixed by the truth-conditional contents of the sentences that they use to express those

beliefs, then these belief contents also fail to supervene on their intrinsic physical properties.

Indeed if belief states are individuated in part by their contents, then what belief states S and

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twin-S are in fail to supervene on their intrinsic physical properties. Instead these states

depend partially for their individuation on which patterns of causal relations S and twin-S

bear to their respective physical environments.

Consider now epistemic twin earth on which most watery stuff is H2O. In between there

is some scattered twin-water the exact location of which varies from case to case. Our

contention is that an epistemic twin earth argument shows that whether a subject is in a

perceptual knowledge state cannot merely be a question of getting things right through

exercising her cognitive abilities in the way that robust virtue epistemology suggests.

Let’s divide epistemic twin earth into three regions. The subject’s local environment is

where the subject is currently located. It contains the objects and properties that are the

proximate causes of her current perceptual experiences. Take facts to be objects instantiating

a property at a time. If the subject now perceives that p, then the fact that p (the ‘p-fact’) is

one that concerns her local environment—i.e., it is a local fact. Other local features have to do

with aspects of the perceptual process and various background conditions on

perception!e.g., distorting noise, brightness, and so on.

The subject’s regional environment is neither where the subject is currently located, nor

where she typically forms any beliefs. Still, it contains the objects and properties with which

she might easily have been causally connected. If the q-fact is such that if the subject had not

now perceived that p then she would have perceived that q, then the q-fact is one that

pertains to her regional environment—i.e., it is a regional fact. Regional facts, thus understood,

are nearby perceptual possibilities, but they play no causal role in producing the subject’s

current perceptual experience on which she bases her belief that p.

Finally, the subject’s global environment is where she is normally located although not at

present. It contains the objects and properties with which she ordinarily causally interacts.

The global facts thus comprise all the facts that extend in space-time beyond the regional facts.

Assuming the subject now perceives the local fact that p, the fact that r is a global fact only if

she would not have perceived that r had she not perceived that p. Given the subject’s current

location, global facts are not only distant perceptual possibilities, they are also causally

inefficacious in producing her current perceptual experiences.

We can now mount an epistemic twin earth argument to the effect that robust virtue

epistemology is an inadequate account of knowledge. The subject, S, is on earth where all

watery stuff is H2O. S’s perceptual apparatus is highly reliable in that a high frequency of S’s

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perceptual beliefs is both actually true and true across relevantly close worlds. Based on a

perceptual experience as of water, S forms the demonstrative belief that that’s water. There

is no question that S thereby comes to know just that.

On epistemic twin earth S has an intrinsic physical duplicate called ‘twin-S’. S and

twin-S are conceptually competent but chemically ignorant. On epistemic twin earth all

watery stuff in twin-S’s global environment is H2O. Not only is twin-S therefore able to

entertain water-thoughts, a high frequency of twin-S’s water-beliefs as formed in her global

environment is true both in actual fact and across relevantly close worlds. Twin-S’s

perceptual apparatus, as exercised in that environment, is thus equally reliable. Moreover, all

watery stuff in twin-S’s local environment is H2O. When twin-S forms the demonstrative

belief that that’s water on the basis of a perceptual experience as of water, her belief is true.

Yet, unbeknownst to twin-S, twin-water is abundant in her regional environment. The basis

on which twin-S holds that belief is thus such that her belief is only luckily true!it is unsafe,

to use contemporary terminology!in that given the basis for her belief it could very easily

have been the case that she would have formed a false belief (e.g., had she been interacting,

unbeknownst to her, with twin-water). That is to say, very easily could twin-S have believed

that that’s water on the same basis—a perceptual experience as of water—without that being

so.12 On the plausible assumption that knowledge excludes such environmental luck!in

virtue of the fact that knowledge requires safe belief; i.e., true belief formed on a basis such

that it that could not have very easily been formed on that basis and be false!it follows that

twin-S lacks knowledge.13

We can illustrate what is going on here with the following diagram:

Earth Epistemic Twin Earth

Global: H2O

Regional: H20

Local: H20 S

Global: H20

Regional: XYZ

Local: H20 Twin-S

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The explanation a robust virtue epistemic account of knowledge like DRVE offers of why S

has knowledge on earth is that her cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability. That

is, her belief is apt. The challenge, however, is to explain why twin-S lacks knowledge on

epistemic twin earth, since her belief seems to be no less apt. Indeed, the fact that S and

twin-S are intrinsic physical duplicates embedded in physically identical global environments

means that the one subject cannot possess a cognitive ability that the other lacks. And the

fact that S and twin-S are currently located in physically identical local environments rules

out the possibility that only one of them manifests that ability. So if S’s belief is apt, then so

too must be twin-S’s belief.

To use an analogy that Sosa is himself fond of, suppose S is an expert archer. S

possesses that ability in virtue of relevant bodily/psychological features and mostly

occupying an environment that is conducive for her to frequently hit the innermost rings

when dispatching arrows. Given that the latter are equally true of twin-S, she will be an

expert archer too. And the fact that both S and twin-S currently occupy physically identical

local environments means that their cognitive successes must arise in the very same way. To

use the analogy, the ways in which S and twin-S propel their respective arrows into the

yellow ring are identical. After all, fletching, bow strings, body positions, prevailing winds,

distances to target, energy imparted to arrows, and so on, are identical in the two cases.

Combining these two facts spells trouble for DRVE, for it deprives Sosa of a principled

basis on which he can treat the two cases differently!on Sosa’s view, both agents exhibit

apt belief. And yet there clearly is an epistemic difference between them, in that twin-S,

unlike her counterpart S, lacks knowledge.

It’s not clear how Sosa could respond to this argument. Recall that he explicitly

conceives of cognitive abilities in terms of cognitive dispositions which have a physical basis

resident in whoever has those dispositions (see Sosa 2007, 29; 2009, 135). If that’s right,

however, then it is difficult to see why twin-S should lack a cognitive ability that S possesses

given that they are physically identical. For whatever physical basis is sufficient for S to

possess her cognitive ability is a basis shared by twin-S. Of course, which cognitive abilities S

possesses depend on environmental features such as operative laws or law-like regularities

and physical background conditions. But the relevant environment here is the one in which

S is typically embedded. There are neither nomological differences between earth and

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epistemic twin earth, nor any physical differences between S and twin-S’s global

environments.14

The analogy with other physical dispositions, such as solubility, is instructive here.

After all, these dispositions are such that the instantiation by an object of the physical base

property for the disposition physically necessitates the instantiation of the dispositional

property. So, taking the case of solubility as an example, as long as the laws of physics are

fixed, any intrinsic physical duplicate of a solute is also soluble. To find such a duplicate that

is not soluble you must go to a world with deviant laws of physics. It is hard to see why

cognitive dispositions should be so different as to come and go with hidden variations in

particular physical facts in the regional environment.

Following Greco (2009c, 21-22), one possible response to the epistemic twin earth

argument is to maintain that twin-S lacks the cognitive disposition to tell water from non-

water when occupying the particular local environment we have sketched due to the fact that

manifesting that discriminatory disposition in that environment is unreliable, where reliability

requires a high frequency of true beliefs, actually and across relevantly close possible worlds.

In contrast, twin-S clearly does possess that disposition relative to her global environment,

because manifestations in that environment does issue in a high frequency of true beliefs as a

matter of fact and in nearby possible worlds. In reply, we agree that disposition possession is

both environment-relative and require reliability. But we maintain that whether a cognitive

disposition is possessed in a given environment depends on whether the agent reliably

manifests that disposition in her global environment. On the assumption that twin-S

possesses the disposition to discriminate between water and non-water relative to her global

environment she also possesses that disposition in her local environment. True, manifesting

that disposition in the latter environment could very easily lead S astray, but that does not

rob her of the disposition. Compare with archery. Suppose an expert archer dispatches an

arrow which then propels through the innermost ring. Nothing in the local environment

prevents her from manifesting that ability. Suppose a sudden and unexpected gust could very

easily have diverted the arrow off course. That regional fact does not imply that she fails to

possess her archery ability. All it shows is that in her local environment manifestations of

that ability could very easily have resulted in her missing the target. Contrast with a novice

archer who surprisingly also hits the target in identical environmental conditions, despite not

10

having previously dispatched a single arrow. Surely, the expert deserves more praise, because

only her achievement stems from a praiseworthy ability.

On our view, dispositions—cognitive or not—are characterized by a kind of modal

sturdiness that knowledge lacks in the sense that nearby unactualized possibilities may well

undermine reliability and hence knowledge, while leaving dispositions and their

manifestations intact. Once cognitive dispositions are acquired through nurture or nature,

they are retained even when the regional facts prevent their manifestations from being

reliable. Indeed, to appreciate that possession of such dispositions are relative only to global

environments they need only be specified in sufficient detail. For instance, on the

assumption that one has the disposition to tell liquids that resemble water from those that do

not, having the disposition to tell water from non-water consists in having the dispositions

to tell water from distinct resembling liquids and to tell water from distinct non-resembling

liquids. Consequently, on the one hand, as S and twin-S do not possess the former

disposition to tell water from twin-water relative to their shared global environment, neither

possesses that disposition in their identical local environment. That is not a disposition they

possess anywhere. On the other hand, as S and twin-S do possess the latter disposition to

tell water from, say, beer or petrol relative to their shared global environment, both possess

that disposition in their identical local environment. That is a disposition they possess

everywhere. The upshot is that the difference in regional environments between S and twin-

S makes for no difference in which dispositions are possessed.

Although Sosa has not responded to the problem of negative epistemic dependence

as presented in the way that we have just described it (i.e., via an epistemic twin earth case),

he does offer remarks in recent work which suggest how he might be inclined to deal with

this problem.

Sosa draws a distinction between first-order, animal knowledge, and second-order

reflective knowledge. The former is just apt belief, as described above. The latter, however, is

more demanding, in that it is, as he puts it, ‘apt belief, aptly noted’, where this means that it

is an apt second-order belief that one has the corresponding first-order apt belief. Elsewhere

in his work Sosa exploits this distinction between animal and reflective knowledge in order

to explain why on his view subjects have knowledge in cases where epistemologists often

deny that the subject concerned is a knowing subject. That is, in such cases he contends that

what the subject is lacking is not knowledge simpliciter (i.e., animal knowledge), but

11

specifically reflective knowledge.15 Perhaps, then, Sosa could extend this strategy to the

epistemic twin earth argument and hence contend that while S on earth has both animal and

reflective knowledge, twin-S on epistemic twin earth qualifies only for the former. In this

way, he could argue that while it is true that if S has knowledge of the target proposition

then so does twin-S, there is nonetheless an epistemic difference between the two subjects

just as intuition dictates, albeit an epistemic difference which is at the level of reflective

knowledge rather than knowledge simpliciter. In effect, the idea would be to bite the bullet of

our objection, while nonetheless mitigating the overall force of the objection for the view.

One immediate problem with this line of argument is that it does not seem at all

essential to the epistemic twin earth argument that either of these subjects should even have

the relevant second-order belief. But insofar as they lack this belief then they are thereby both

excluded from having reflective knowledge, and hence one cannot explain away the intuition

that there is an epistemic difference between these two virtue-theoretic duplicates by

appealing to the thought that one of them has reflective knowledge that the other lacks.

Furthermore, note that this problem does not trade on the particular rendering of robust

virtue epistemology that is in play.16

Even if we ignore this problem and allow that the subjects concerned have the

relevant second-order beliefs, however, this line of response to the epistemic twin earth

argument still flounders. The reason for this is that we appear to be perfectly able to run a

corresponding epistemic twin earth argument which is specifically focussed on reflective

knowledge.

Recall that animal knowledge and reflective knowledge differ on Sosa’s view in terms

of the different cognitive dispositions that are being manifested in each case. Whereas animal

knowledge involves the manifestation of a first-order cognitive disposition, reflective

knowledge involves the manifestation of a second-order cognitive disposition which is

tracking the cognitive success of the relevant first-order cognitive disposition. Presumably,

however, all dispositions, whether first or second-order, have physical bases which are

resident in whoever has the disposition. Certainly if, as Sosa acknowledges, first-order

cognitive dispositions have physical bases, then the claim that second-order cognitive

dispositions lack physical bases would seem ad hoc. But then how is the proponent of this

hypothetical line of response to the epistemic twin earth argument to explain how S on earth

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and twin-S on epistemic twin earth could enjoy different second-order epistemic statuses

when they and their local and global environments are physically identical?

The foregoing may be thought slightly unfair to Sosa. In response to his

‘kaleidoscope’ case, Sosa (2007, 33; cf. Sosa 2009, 238-9) proposes that S’s meta-belief is true

because of a competence only if “it derives from the exercise of that competence in

appropriate conditions for its exercise, and that exercise in those conditions would not then

too easily have issued a false belief.” The latter supplementation is certainly fit for purpose.

Since the identical, local environments in which S and twin-S are embedded are identical to

their global environments, both form true beliefs in conditions appropriate for exercise of

their respective cognitive abilities. But while S’s exercise of her cognitive ability results in

true beliefs across nearby worlds, twin-S’s exercise would indeed all too easily have issued a

false belief. For that reason S has animal knowledge that she has animal knowledge, but

twin-S lacks such reflective knowledge. Assuming with Sosa (2007, 31-40) that first-order

animal knowledge does not also require that the exercise of the pertinent cognitive ability in

normal conditions would not very easily have issued a false belief, twin-S can retain such

knowledge.

It should be pretty obvious by now why this proposal offers no comfort for DRVE.

The explicit recommendation is that reflective knowledge requires the exercise of a cognitive

ability in conditions that would not lead to such knowledge being undermined by epistemic

luck. For what prevents twin-S from having reflective knowledge is that the conditions in

which she exercises her meta-cognitive ability are such that her cognitive success could very

easily have been cognitive failure. A non-virtue-theoretic condition designed to deal with

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck is thus explicitly built into reflective knowledge.

Consequently, the proposal cannot explain away the intuition that S and twin-S differ

epistemically in a way that is consistent with the fact that DRVE is meant to be a type of

robust virtue epistemology.17

Finally, note that if Sosa does respond to the epistemic twin earth cases by appealing

to the distinction between animal and reflective knowledge, then he is committed to allowing

that knowledge!animal knowledge at any rate!is compatible with lucky (i.e., unsafe)

cognitive success. In particular, he is committed to allowing that one can have animal

knowledge even while forming one’s true belief on an unsafe basis!i.e., such that one could

very easily have formed a belief on that basis and believed falsely. Given that it is widely

13

accepted that knowledge demands safety, or a similar modal condition, this is far from being

a negligible concession for Sosa to make.18

If the epistemic twin earth argument goes through, however, then it will not be

possible to offer a pure virtue-theoretic account of knowledge of the sort that Sosa offers

with DRVE. The problem is that such a proposal cannot accommodate the extent to which

knowledge can be negatively epistemic dependent. In the epistemic twin earth case we have

two subjects who are internal duplicates and who manifest their cognitive abilities to the

same extent within identical local and global environments (the only environments relevant

to the manifestation and possession, respectively, of a cognitive disposition, as we have

seen), but where factors outwith one of the subject’s cognitive agency ensures that she fails

to have knowledge, unlike her counterpart. In particular, in terms of the specifics of DRVE,

both the beliefs in play in these two cases meet the conditions for aptness, but only one of

them, because of the negative epistemic dependence in play, meets the conditions for

knowledge. The moral to be drawn is that knowledge should not be identified with aptness

as DRVE suggests.19

3. DRVE AND POSITIVE EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE

We come now to positive epistemic dependence. The kind of positive epistemic dependence

that interests us is one which is extensive enough to be incompatible with a pure virtue-

theoretic account of knowledge like DRVE. In particular, and contrary to DRVE, positive

epistemic dependence occurs when an agent’s belief fails to meet the conditions that Sosa

lays down for aptness and yet nonetheless constitutes knowledge because of factors external

to the cognitive agency of the subject. We can illustrate the phenomenon of positive

epistemic dependence by appeal to a certain kind of testimonial knowledge.

On standard views of the epistemology of testimony, in epistemically favourable

conditions it is possible to gain testimonial knowledge by, for the most part, simply trusting

the word of one’s informant. That is, while one will be expected to exercise some significant

degree of epistemic skill in one’s acquisition of this testimonial knowledge!for example, it

had better not be that one would believe anything that one is told, no matter how

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outlandish!it is nonetheless the case that to a large extent one’s cognitive success is down

to factors which are outwith one’s cognitive agency.20

To take a standard kind of example to illustrate this point, imagine an agent who is

newly arrived in an unfamiliar city and who asks for directions.21 Let us stipulate that the

conditions are epistemically favourable, in the sense that all the informants in the vicinity

would be inclined to offer truthful and informative answers, and that there is nothing else

epistemically amiss occurring which might lead our hero to form false beliefs on the basis of

the testimony provided. Moreover, let us stipulate that our hero is exercising some degree of

epistemic skill in acquiring her testimonial belief. She would not just ask anyone, but only

plausible informants; she would not just believe anything she is told, even something

outlandish; and so on. This is thus not a case where our agent is merely trusting an informant,

since the intuition that someone can gain knowledge from mere trust is far from secure.

Nonetheless, the intuition is that a testimonial belief formed via the exercise of relatively

minimal levels of epistemic ability can in epistemically favourable circumstances amount to

knowledge. Indeed, if one does not gain testimonial knowledge in epistemically favourable

circumstances like these, then testimonial knowledge is far less often possessed that we

ordinarily suppose.

Here is the crux. While our hero is manifesting her cognitive abilities to some degree

in this case, it does not seem at all plausible to suppose that her cognitive success is because

of her cognitive abilities. That is, it does not appear that our hero’s belief qualifies as apt.

Indeed, it seems that her cognitive success is to a large degree due to factors outwith her

cognitive agency, such as the cognitive abilities of her informant and the epistemically

favourable nature of the environment. And yet she does seem to have knowledge

nonetheless.

We can bring this point into sharp relief by imagining, as before, two agents who are

internal physical duplicates who occupy essentially the same local and global environments,

and who thus manifest the very same cognitive abilities. As before, the only difference

concerns the regional environment that the agents are in. For one of the agents, the regional

environment is epistemically favourable, just like the conditions faced by our hero in the

example just considered. For the other agent, in contrast, the regional environment is not

epistemically favourable, but in fact one which is highly unfavourable. Perhaps, for example,

15

the agent’s environment could so very easily have been populated by dishonest informants

rather than the honest informants she happens to interact with.

The problem should now be manifest. For while the agent who has an epistemically

favourable regional environment gains testimonial knowledge, her internal duplicate who has

an epistemically unfavourable environment does not gain testimonial knowledge. And yet, as

we have seen, there can be no difference in these agents’ possession or manifestation of

cognitive abilities. Whatever the reason for why they differ in terms of what they know, then,

it is not a difference which is a function purely of their manifestation of their cognitive

abilities. In short, the epistemic difference between these agents cannot be explained by

DRVE, since neither of them are forming apt beliefs, and hence neither of them should on

this view count as having knowledge.22

Now Sosa does have something to say about such a case. He remarks that in such cases

the agent’s cognitive success is “attributable to a complex social competence only partially

seated in the individual believer.” (2007, 97) It is unclear how to understand this suggestion,

however, and Sosa doesn’t offer much by way of explanation. We take it that his idea is that

whereas in standard cases of knowledge the epistemic competences on display are solely that

of the individual knowing agent, in testimonial cases like the one under consideration there is

instead a shared ‘social competence’ which is displayed by the cognitive whole of a ‘testifier-

and-testifiee’.

The problem with this proposal is that it is entirely antithetical to the spirit of robust

virtue epistemology. This, after all, is the view that an agent has knowledge when her

cognitive success is because of her cognitive ability (only then is her belief apt, as Sosa

himself puts it). Here, for example, is Sosa describing what constitutes a competence:

“[A] competence is a disposition, one with its basis resident in the competent agent, one that would in appropriately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of any relevant performance issued by it.” (Sosa 2007, 29, our italics)

But what Sosa is now claiming is directly in tension with this claim, since he seems to be

conceding that at least in some cases an agent can gain knowledge not in virtue of the

exercise of their own epistemic competences but instead as a result of the part they play in

some wider social epistemic competence. This is not a minor ‘tweak’ to DRVE, but rather a

radical departure, one that requires explanation and motivation.

16

Whereas the phenomenon of positive epistemic dependence demonstrates that there

is sometimes much more to knowledge than cognitive success that is because of cognitive

ability, the phenomenon of negative epistemic dependence demonstrates that there is also

sometimes much less to knowledge than cognitive success that is because of cognitive ability.

Either way, the upshot is that knowledge cannot be analysed along robust virtue-theoretic

lines purely in terms of the manifestation of the subject’s epistemic virtues, and hence

DRVE is untenable.

Finally, note that this problem of epistemic dependence, in virtue of having both a

negative and a positive aspect, effectively pulls the proponent of a robust virtue

epistemology like DRVE in two directions. Negative epistemic dependency puts pressure on

the proponent of DRVE to strengthen the proposal, to make it less permissible; whereas

positive epistemic dependency puts pressure on proponents of DRVE to weaken the

proposal, to make it more permissible. In this way, the two aspects of epistemic dependency

pull a robust virtue-theoretic account of knowledge like DRVE asunder.

4. DRVE VERSUS ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

What makes matters worse for DRVE is that there is a different proposal available!anti-luck

virtue epistemology, or ‘ALVE’ for short!which can accommodate the phenomenon of

epistemic dependence, in both its negative and positive aspect. In its most general form,

ALVE maintains that knowledge is safe cognitive success that is due to the exercise of the

agent’s relevant epistemic virtue, where a safe cognitive success is a cognitive success that

could not very easily have been a cognitive failure.

We saw above the plausibility of having a virtue-theoretic condition on knowledge.

By incorporating a safety condition as well in this way, ALVE can effectively eliminate the

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck that is in play in such scenarios as Gettier-style cases.

But with this epistemic luck eliminated by the safety condition, there is no need to ‘beef up’

the virtue-theoretic element of the proposal in order to deal with the problem posed by

knowledge-undermining epistemic luck in the first place. In particular, one does not need to

demand that one’s cognitive success be because of one’s cognitive ability, and thus one can

allow that apt belief is not necessary for knowledge. One can instead rest content with safe

17

cognitive success which is due to the exercise of one’s relevant epistemic virtue. In Sosa’s

terminology, knowledge entails accuracy and adroitness, but it does not entail aptness.23

In cashing out what it means for one’s safe cognitive success to be ‘due to’ the

exercise of one’s relevant epistemic virtue one can go down either the dispositional (Sosa-

style) or causal-explanatory (Greco-style) route. On the latter rendering, knowledge is safe

cognitive success that is to a significant extent creditable to one’s cognitive agency, where

this means that one’s cognitive agency (i.e., the exercise of relevant epistemic virtue) is a

significant factor, but not necessarily the primary or overarching factor, which causally

explains one’s safe cognitive success. On the former reading, knowledge is safe cognitive

success that is the product of the exercise of the relevant epistemic competence, but where it

is not demanded that the agent’s cognitive success, much less the agent’s safe cognitive

success, be because of the manifestation of this epistemic competence.

In order to keep the debate between DRVE and ALVE as clean as possible, let us

opt for the dispositional reading of ALVE. A good way of fleshing out what this account to

demands is to see how it deals with Gettier-style cases. Recall that DRVE responds to these

cases by arguing that while there is accuracy and adroitness there is not accuracy because

adroitness (i.e., aptness), and hence there is not knowledge. ALVE agrees. In contrast to

DRVE, however, ALVE explains the lack of knowledge in play here not in terms of the

failure of the belief to be apt, but rather in terms of the fact that the belief so formed is

unsafe. In this way, it avoids making aptness necessary for knowledge.

Note how the problems of both negative and positive epistemic dependence do not

arise by the lights of such a rendering of ALVE. Consider first negative epistemic

dependence. What is the epistemic difference between S and twin-S’s beliefs which explains

why S has the knowledge which twin-S lacks? Well, the difference is clearly not down to

their manifestation of a relevant epistemic competence, since as we’ve noted above both

subjects are identical on this score. According to ALVE, however, there is more to having

knowledge than merely forming a true belief via the manifestation of a relevant epistemic

competence, since one’s true belief should also be safe. Clearly, however, this is lacking in

twin-S’s case, since given the nature of her regional environment it could very easily have

been the case that she forms a belief on the same basis and yet believes falsely. ALVE thus

delivers the right result. In particular, it can account for the phenomenon of negative

epistemic dependence because it can accommodate the idea that a display of cognitive

18

agency that would normally suffice for knowledge will not suffice in those conditions where

features of the environment ensure that the belief so formed is nonetheless unsafe.

Now we turn to positive epistemic dependency. Recall that ALVE does not treat

aptness as necessary for knowledge. As a result, it does not follow on this view that because

the two counterpart agents in the testimonial cases described earlier do not form apt beliefs

that they thereby lack knowledge. Both agents form accurate beliefs by exercising relevant

epistemic competences, however, even if the accuracy is not because of the manifestation of

these competences. What differentiates the agent in the epistemically favourable

environment from the agent in the epistemically unfavourable environment is thus not the

degree of cognitive agency on display (i.e., the adroitness of her belief), but rather the fact

that unlike her counterpart her belief so formed is safe. This is why in incorporating a safety

condition ALVE can deal with such cases of positive epistemic dependency. In particular, it

can account for how the manifestation of a very limited degree of cognitive agency can

sometimes suffice for knowledge when the conditions in which this cognitive agency is

displayed are sufficiently epistemically friendly to ensure that the belief so formed is safe.

We can diagnose where robust virtue epistemologies like DRVE go awry when it

comes to the phenomenon of epistemic dependence in terms of their aspiration to

exclusively analyse knowledge in terms of a virtue-theoretic condition, thereby avoiding a

separate anti-luck requirement. In doing so, they make it impossible to account for how

knowing can sometimes involve a lot more, and sometimes a lot less, than cognitive success

that is because of cognitive ability, where in both cases what is making the difference is the

epistemic favourability/unfavourability of the environment. In contrast, by incorporating a

safety condition into its theory of knowledge, ALVE doesn’t face these problems. So not

only does DRVE face formidable difficulties when it comes to dealing with the

phenomenon of epistemic dependence, but, worse, there is also an alternative proposal

available which doesn’t face these difficulties. We conclude that the prospects for DRVE do

not look bright.24

19

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NOTES 1 We here adopt an analogy offered by Wittgenstein (1969, §143). 2 For some helpful surveys of the literature on virtue epistemology, see Axtell (1997), Greco (2002), Baehr (2004), Greco & Turri (2009), Kvanvig (2010), and Turri & Sosa (2010). See also Baehr (2008). 3 Indeed, many virtue epistemologists have gone down the route of arguing that virtue epistemology should not be in the business of offering a theory of knowledge in the first place; that virtue epistemology should instead be seen as ‘re-orienting’ the concerns of traditional epistemology rather than responding to them. See, for example, Code (1987), Kvanvig (1992), Montmarquet (1993), Hookway (2003), and Roberts & Wood (2007). 4 In more recent work, Sosa (2013; forthcoming) proposes a triple-S analysis of a complete competence comprising an innermost S-competence, which is the seat (or skill), an inner SS-competence, which is the combination of seat and shape, and a complete SSS-competence, which is the conjunction of seat, shape and situation. The connection between the triple-A analysis of a performance and the triple-S analysis of a competence is the following: a performance is apt when its success manifests competence, which happens just in case the innermost skill causally produces the success in combination with the appropriate shape and situation. The seat of the competence is determined as the causal basis for a success-response of an object when subjected to a stimulus in certain shape and situation combinations. Since a complete competence is necessarily a competence to succeed when trying for some outcome such that if one tried, one would very likely succeed, no such competence can bring about that outcome. Only the innermost seat can do that when the shape and situation are conducive to the outcome. 5 For example, Greco (2009a, 12) writes that “the term “because’ […] marks a causal explanation.” Later on (ibid.) he makes clear that the agent’s abilities must be the overarching element in the causal explanation in question when he states that “in cases of knowledge, S’s believing the truth is explained by S’s abilities, as opposed to dumb luck, or blind chance, or something else.” 6 Even so, dispositional properties frequently enter into causal explanations in science. For instance, Richard Feynman explained why the space shuttle Challenger blew up in terms of the failure of an O-ring in one of the solid rocket boosters to expand at lift-off. Jackson (1996, 397) suggests that causal explanations by dispositional properties provide two kinds of information: (i) the effect was caused by the categorical basis of the disposition, and (ii) the effect is one of the outputs in terms of which the disposition is defined. (ii) is required because some base properties can ground more than one disposition!e.g., electrical and thermal conductivity in metals share the same categorical basis. What Feynman discovered was that the categorical basis of the rigidity caused the disaster, and the disaster resulted from the kind of output distinctive of rigidity: the O-ring failed to expand after compression and its failure lead to the disaster. 7 We explore the metaphysical foundations of Sosa’s proposal in more detail in Kallestrup & Pritchard (2013b). Is the causal explanatory reading of ‘because of’ the only viable alternative to DRVE? Arguably, it is the only alternative which has been properly developed in the literature. Zagzebski (e.g., 1999) favours a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge which treats the ‘because of’ relation as an undefined primitive. While this is a dialectical option, it is obviously preferable to have a virtue-theoretic account of knowledge which can spell out what this relation amounts to. In his most recent statement of his view, Greco (2012) explores some possible ways of cashing out the virtue-theoretic account of knowledge, and sketches a variant on the ‘causal-explanatory’ proposal we have noted above, one that puts more of an emphasis on pragmatic factors. 8 One potential advantage that Sosa’s DRVE has over Greco’s competing view is that the latter is clearly wedded to a form of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology, a consequence of the view which Greco has increasingly embraced. See especially Greco (2012), but also the exchange between Greco (2008) and Pritchard (2008a). While pragmatic encroachment is not without its defenders!see, for example, Hawthorne (2004), Stanley (2005), and Fantl & McGrath (2009)!it is nonetheless a highly controversial thesis. Accordingly, that Sosa’s rendering of robust virtue epistemology can avoid pragmatic encroachment potentially puts it at an advantage. 9 See, especially, Kallestrup & Pritchard (2013a). 10 We first proposed epistemic twin earth cases in Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011). See also Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013a; 2013b). It is worth noting that the epistemic twin earth argument that we propose is significantly different to the moral twin earth argument that has been proposed by Horgan & Timmons (1991; 1992) and Timmons (1999, ch. 2), and which calls into question a certain form of moral naturalism. 11 See, for example, Putnam (1975). For a recent discussion of standard twin-earth arguments, see Kallestrup (2011, ch. 3).

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12 If twin-S uttered ‘that’s water’ while demonstrating twin-water she would express the false proposition that that’s water. We assume that the concept of water as deployed on both earth and epistemic twin earth is a natural kind concept that applies to all and only H2O. One might envisage a loophole here for the robust virtue epistemologist if twin-S’s utterance has the purely descriptive truth-condition: ‘that’s water’ is true iff that’s watery stuff, or the disjunctive truth-condition: ‘that’s water’ is true iff that’s water or that’s twin-water. We find both views implausible. The presence of small amounts of twin-water on epistemic twin earth implies neither that water is a functional kind in the way that, say, vitamin is, nor that water is a disjunctive kind in the way that, say, jade is. Even those with descriptivist or semantic internalist leanings insist that, to a first approximation, ‘water’ in someone’s mouth picks out the dominant watery stuff of their acquaintance. XYZ is neither dominant nor stuff with which adequate causal connections are sustained. In fact, Chalmers (1996, 58) is explicit that if the watery stuff in our world turned out to be a mixture of 95% H2O and 5% XYZ, the primary intension of ‘water’ would pick out only H2O. For more details, see Kallestrup (2011, chs. 3 & 4). 13 For some key elaborations of the safety condition, see Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999), Williamson (2000, ch. 5), Pritchard (2002; 2005; 2007; 2008b; 2012a; 2012b; forthcominga; forthcomingb), and Luper (2003; cf. Luper 1984). For a recent debate regarding the necessary of safety for knowledge, see the exchange between Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013). 14 Sosa’s more recent account of competences, as sketched in note 4, offers no solution to the current problem. Sosa takes cases of environmental and situational luck to be cases where the agents are completely competent even though they are in danger of lacking the situation required for possession of such competences. Barney in fake-barn country and Simone in the cockpit are cases in point. What the threat of the barn façades/simulation cockpit takes away is not their complete competence, but rather the safety of their belief. Barney and Simone’s beliefs are apt yet unsafe. It should be clear that by Sosa’s own lights, twin-S is completely competent if S is. Their seat and shape are certainly identical, but so is also their situation. Keep in mind that Sosa understands a situation as pertaining to local features: Barney is not too far away, and Simone is not too far up. Both are in good light, with a clear line of vision, and so on. It follows that the situations (required for complete competence) that S and twin-S are in are identical since their local environments are identical. 15 For example, Sosa (e.g., 2007, ch. 5; cf. Sosa 2011) grants that on his view the subject in the ‘barn façade’ case can have knowledge, even though most epistemologists deny this (on account of the fact that the belief in question is only luckily true, and hence unsafe). His explanation of what is going on here is that the subject concerned merely has animal knowledge of the target proposition, and not also reflective knowledge. For a specific discussion of Sosa’s view on this score, see Pritchard (2009). 16 This point is also discussed in Kelp (2012). 17 In Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011, §5) we raise a similar complaint against a modification of DRVE offered by Turri (2011). Roughly, Turri argues that we should require for knowledge not just apt belief, but also ample belief, where this means that the belief is safe and where its safety manifests adroitness. To take such a line is, however, to move away from the project of offering a robust virtue-theoretic account of knowledge of a kind exemplified by DRVE. Moreover, this proposal will not have the advantages that we show anti-luck virtue epistemology (‘ALVE’) to have below. For while ALVE also incorporates a safety condition, it is crucial to the success of this proposal that it does not merely add a safety condition to aptness. Instead, ALVE combines a safety condition with a weaker virtue-theoretic condition than aptness. 18 Though widely accepted, the idea that knowledge demands safety has been contested in the recent literature. For a good overview of the issues in this regard, see the exchange between Hetherington (2013) and Pritchard (2013). See also Pritchard (2012b; forthcominga; forthcomingb). 19 The problem that epistemic twin earth cases poses for robust virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge is explored in more detail in Kallestrup & Pritchard (2011). 20 That is, most epistemologists of testimony are inclined towards some version of anti-reductionism, which is epistemically more liberal than its reductionist counterpart. It is precisely because of their anti-reductionism that most epistemologists would tend to treat the subject in this case as having testimonial knowledge. Reductionists, in contrast, would tend to regard this subject as lacking knowledge on account of the degree of trust in play. While reductionism is not a popular view in the epistemology of testimony, it does have some adherents. See, for example, Fricker (1995). For a very useful survey of contemporary work on the epistemology of testimony, with special focus on the reductionism/anti-reductionism distinction, see Lackey (2010). See also Carter & Pritchard (2010). 21 The basic kind of case in play here is attributable to Lackey (2007). Note, however, that we have made certain changes to the case in order to ensure that it demonstrates the point that we have in mind (which is

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importantly different from that which is the focus of Lackey’s paper). For more details, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012, §2). 22 For a more detailed discussion of positive epistemic dependence, and its relevance to virtue epistemology, see Kallestrup & Pritchard (2012; 2013a). 23 For the key defences of anti-luck virtue epistemology, see Pritchard, Millar & Haddock (2010, ch. 3) and Pritchard (2012a). See also Pritchard (forthcomingb). 24 Thanks to J. Adam Carter, Miguel Fernández, and to two anonymous referees who supplied comments on a previous version of this paper. We are also very grateful to Ernie Sosa, for many long and enlightening (for us at least!) conversations about epistemology over the years.