591Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

Culture in the Context ofIntercultural NegotiationIndividualism-Collectivism and Pathsto Integrative Agreements

DEBORAH A. CAIUniversity of MarylandSTEVEN R. WILSONPurdue UniversityLAURA E. DRAKEUniversity of Maryland

This study explores culture’s effect on behaviors and outcomes in intercultural negotiation andexamines how those effects are moderated by role. Eighty U.S. and international students tookpart in a previously developed negotiation task (Pruitt, 1981) and completed Hui and Triandis’s(1986) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) scale. Negotiation interactions were coded forinformation sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Findings show that a negotiation dyad’scollectivism is positively associated with higher joint profit. The effects of culture on both com-munication behaviors and joint outcomes, however, differ by role of the negotiator. In particular,seller collectivism has larger and more consistent effects on communication behavior and jointprofit than buyer collectivism. Results support a “culture in context” perspective of negotiationthat takes into account negotiator qualities, contextual and structural features of the negotia-tion, and mediating processes in addition to cultural values.

Deborah A. Cai (Ph.D., Michigan State University, 1994) is an assistant professor in the Depart-ment of Communication at the University of Maryland, 2110 Skinner Building, College Park,MD 20742, phone: (301) 405-6524, fax: (301) 314-9471, e-mail: debcai@wam.umd.edu; StevenR. Wilson (Ph.D., Purdue University, 1989) is an associate professor in the Department of Com-munication, Purdue University, 1366 LAEB 2114, West Lafayette, IN 47907-1366, phone:(765) 494-7547, e-mail: swilson@sla.purdue.edu; Laura E. Drake (Ph.D., Michigan State Uni-versity, 1995) is an assistant professor at the Department of Communication, University ofMaryland, 2120 Skinner Building, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, phone:(301) 405-6530, e-mail: ldrake@wam.umd.edu. The research reported in this study was ap-proved by the University Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects at MichiganState University. We wish to thank Edward L. Fink and two anonymous reviewers for theirhelpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Please direct correspondence to first author.

onflicts often contain potential for mutually beneficial outcomesthat go unrealized (Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991; Pruitt & Rubin,1986); thus, scholars have identified communicative and cogni-

tive factors that impede joint gain (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Pruitt, 1981;Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), such as distributive tactics (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;

C

Human Communication Research, Vol. 26 No. 4, October 2000 591–617© 2000 International Communication Association

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Putnam & Jones, 1982; Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988) or fixed-sum percep-tions (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). With few exceptions (Brett & Okumura,1998; see Graham, 1993), this research has not been replicated amonginternational participants. Consequently, we understand little aboutculture’s influence on integrative bargaining (Cai & Drake, 1998; Weiss,1996). To complicate matters, scholars historically have assumed thatculture directly affects negotiation behavior (Graham, 1985; Pye, 1982),but recent research suggests that buyer-seller roles and norms of nego-tiation can moderate effects of culture (Cai, 1998; Drake, 1995) and thatintercultural contexts bring about significantly different negotiation pro-cesses than intracultural contexts (Adler & Graham, 1989). Thus, our chal-lenge is to isolate the effects of culture from those of structure or contextwhen assessing integrative outcomes.

To this end, our paper pursues two goals. First, we examine how cul-ture (here, individualism-collectivism) affects behavior in interculturalnegotiation. Although a few studies look at reaching integrative outcomesamong international partners (Adler & Graham, 1989; Brett & Okumura,1998), none analyzes behaviors for reaching such outcomes. We look athow cultural values affect communication behavior. Second, we examinehow the effects of culture on negotiation are moderated by role. Afterdefining individualism-collectivism, we offer a rationale for the relation-ship between collectivism and high joint gain. Next, we examine culture’seffect on communication processes. Finally, we suggest a basis for expect-ing qualifying effects of structural and contextual features on outcomes.

Culture and Cultural Values

Culture is defined as socially transmitted beliefs, behavior patterns,values, and norms of a collection of individuals identifiable by their rules,concepts, and assumptions (Salacuse, 1991). Janosik (1987) describes thevarious research traditions for understanding culture’s influence on ne-gotiation. The most frequently employed tradition is a culture as sharedvalues approach, which suggests that unique negotiating styles are theresult of underlying cultural values such as individualism-collectivismthat drive communication behavior (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Trompenaars,1993). A second tradition, labeled culture in context, is discussed later.

Defining Individualism-Collectivism

The individualism-collectivism continuum is adopted frequently to re-flect a culture’s value preferences and emphasis on certain goals over oth-ers (Schwartz, 1990). Individualist cultures emphasize autonomy and in-dependence, self-determination, and protection of self-interests. Collec-

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tivist cultures emphasize interconnection, conformity to group norms,relational harmony, and protection of in-group interests (Hofstede, 1980;Hui & Triandis, 1986; Schwartz, 1990). Collectivist cultures draw clearerdistinctions between in-group and out-group, and place greater empha-sis on status and role authority, than do individualist cultures (Gudykunst,1987; Hui & Triandis, 1986). Nations often are characterized as having apredominant value orientation; for example, the United States is viewedtypically as individualistic, whereas China’s culture is viewed as collec-tivistic (Adler, Brahm, & Graham, 1992). A culture as shared values ap-proach suggests these contrasting orientations should produce differingapproaches to negotiation.

Cultural Values and Negotiation Outcomes

Graham and his colleagues have made notable contributions to theshared values approach (see Graham, 1993; Weiss, 1996; Wilson, Cai,Campbell, Donohue, & Drake, 1995). Employing Pruitt’s (1981) integra-tive bargaining simulation, these studies compare U.S. business students’negotiating with the negotiating of students from Brazil and Japan (Gra-ham, 1983), Canada and Mexico (Adler, Graham, & Gehrke, 1987), Brit-ain, France, and Germany (Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner, 1988),China, Japan, and Korea (Graham, Kim, Lin, & Robinson, 1988), and Rus-sia (Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1992). The authors find cultural differ-ences in perceived use of integrative versus competitive tactics, partnersatisfaction, and reciprocation of tactics.

We extend this body of research in four ways. First, the studies by Gra-ham and his colleagues measure individual profit but not joint profit.Integrative negotiation, however, involves concern for maximizing bothone’s own and the other party’s outcomes (Fisher et al., 1991; Pruitt, 1981).According to Pruitt and Lewis (1975), joint profit is the best measure ofintegrative outcomes because it reflects whether parties can “increase thesize of the pie” in a way that benefits both. Only by measuring joint profitcan we learn about the link between culture and integrative potential.Second, the research by Graham and his colleagues tends to rely on glo-bal and perceptual measures of the bargaining process, such as askingnegotiators to rate their use of bargaining strategies (Graham et al., 1992)or their perceptions of using distributive behaviors and the importanceof information (Graham et al., 1992; Graham et al., 1988; Graham, Mintu,& Rodgers, 1994).1 Studies of perceived conflict styles, however, demon-strate that participants’ views of their own behavior often are not sharedby others. For example, both participants in organizational conflicts tendto perceive their own behavior as collaborative but the other party’s be-havior as competitive (Thomas & Pondy, 1977). By coding communica-

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tion tactics as they occur in the negotiation, we can examine the actualrelationship between culture, communication behavior, and integrativeoutcomes.

Third, the work by Graham et al. assumes cultural values based on theparticipants’ country of origin. Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, andLucca (1988), however, argue that within-country variance may also besignificant. Therefore, results based on assumptions about national cul-ture do not demonstrate how specific cultural values are related to be-haviors and outcomes. Because we want to draw conclusions about theeffects of cultural values on communication behaviors and integrativeoutcomes, we assess individualism-collectivism at the individual level.

Fourth, these prior studies draw generalizations for international ne-gotiation based on country-by-country comparisons. Brett and Okumura(1998) demonstrate, however, that intra- and intercultural dyads operatedifferently in their ability to realize integrative potential by providingevidence that interdependence between negotiators results in lower jointoutcomes for intercultural dyads than intracultural ones. Recognizing thecomplexity of negotiator relationships, we examine the effects of bothparties’ collectivism on the use of bargaining tactics and the realization ofintegrative outcomes during intercultural negotiation.

As these four points make clear, research to date has not explored rela-tionships between cultural values (measured at the individual level) andintegrative outcomes. This study contributes to existing research in inter-cultural negotiation by exploring these relationships.

Although it has been argued that individualist negotiators may stimu-late each other to achieve higher joint gain (Brett & Okumura, 1998), weprovide four reasons to suspect that collectivism affects integrative negoti-ating to achieve higher joint outcomes. First, collectivist negotiators mayhave more concern for the opponent’s outcome because collectivist culturesmeasure success in terms of maximizing group interests.2 Second, collectiv-ist negotiators may engage less often in fixed-sum assumptions—the beliefthat negotiators’ interests are necessarily related in zero-sum fashion (Th-ompson & Hastie, 1990)—because collectivism is characterized by a greaterconcern for the welfare of the group as a whole. Third, collectivist negotia-tors may consider issues simultaneously rather than sequentially, becausecollectivist cultures emphasize holistic over field independent thinking(Gudykunst, 1987). Packaging issues allows negotiators to find integrativesolutions while incurring minimal concessions (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975;Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990).Finally, collectivistic negotiators may avoid distributive tactics, because col-lectivist cultures value relational harmony (Kim & Wilson, 1994) and es-chew forceful conflict styles (Kumagai & Straus, 1983; Lee & Rogan, 1991).Based on the culture as shared value view, we predict that:

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H1: A negotiation dyad’s profit will increase as the dyad’s total collectivismincreases.

The preceding rationale presumes culture affects negotiation processesassociated with integrative outcomes. Tutzauer and Roloff (1988) suggestthree such processes: information sharing, heuristic trial and error (i.e.,making simultaneous offers), and avoiding distributive tactics. Becausecollectivism is associated with the value of group goals over individualones, we expect that negotiator collectivism may lead to asking more ques-tions about the other’s needs, preferences, and interests. Further, becausecollectivism is associated with holistic problem solving, we expect nego-tiator collectivism to result in greater frequency of packaging multipleissues. And because collectivism values maintaining group harmony, weexpect negotiator collectivism to reduce the use of distributive tactics.Thus, we expect that:

H2: During intercultural negotiation, negotiator collectivism will be (a) posi-tively associated with the frequency of asking for information about theother’s needs and interests, (b) positively associated with the frequency ofoffers that package multiple issues, and (c) negatively associated with thefrequency of using distributive tactics.

To our knowledge, this study is the first to measure individualism-collectivism at the individual level in order to explore relationships be-tween culture, communication processes, and a dyad’s integrative po-tential. Aside from testing implications of the culture as shared valuesview, our study assesses whether predictions made so far are stated toogenerally. This line of reasoning is suggested by Janosik’s (1987) culturein context view.

Culture in Context

In contrast to the culture as shared values view, the culture in contextview assumes a multicausal, contingency-based perspective in which notonly culture but negotiator qualities, structural and contextual features,and mediating processes affect bargaining. Negotiator qualities that canaffect the negotiation include personality and bargaining experience.Structural features affecting negotiation include role, number and link-age of issues, time limits, and cultural composition of the bargainingdyad (intra- versus intercultural). Finally, mediating processes affectingnegotiation include reciprocity of bargaining tactics (Adler & Graham,1989; Cai & Donohue, 1997). As a result of such contextual features, the

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effects of individualism-collectivism on outcomes may be moderated byother variables. This study goes beyond the culture as shared values viewby focusing on two possible moderators: the role of buyer and seller, andthe collectivism of the bargaining partner.

Buyer-Seller Roles

Roles are “sets of rights, obligations, and normative expectations at-tached to social positions, and impose limitations on task-characteristicresponsiveness . . .” (Neale, Huber, & Northcraft, 1987, p. 230). In busi-ness negotiations, the roles of buyer and seller carry with them estab-lished expectations for behavior. If buyers stress different expectationsand goals than sellers (Wilson & Putnam, 1990), then these roles may beimportant modifiers of individualism-collectivism’s effect on joint prof-its. For example, Neale and her colleagues consistently have found thatU.S. buyers earn higher profits than sellers during negotiation simula-tions (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986; Nealeet al., 1987; Neale & Northcraft, 1986). Graham reports similar advan-tage for buyers across culture, with the qualification that buyer-sellerdifferences are more pronounced in highly collectivistic cultures such asJapan (Graham, 1983), Korea (Graham et al., 1988), and Mexico (Adler etal., 1987).

The effects of bargaining role on negotiation outcomes may reflectdifferences in power. Emerson (1962) suggests that Individual A is de-pendent on Individual B to the extent that (a) Individual B can influencethe goals of Individual A, and (b) Individual A has few alternatives avail-able for achieving those goals. Applying this to negotiation, sellers mayperceive a dependency on each and every buyer to earn a profit, becausethere may be only a limited number of buyers with whom they can closea deal. Buyers may not perceive the same dependency on sellers, be-cause alternative suppliers often are available. Thus, buyers frequentlymay have more power than sellers. Even a collectivistic buyer is likely toconsider alternatives to find the best deal; if one seller cannot provide agood deal, the buyer will seek another. As a result, despite levels of col-lectivism, the buyer’s role may encourage individualistic behavior to gainthe largest share of a fixed set of resources. In contrast, the seller, beingin a less powerful role, may benefit more when facilitating joint problemsolving in a manner that increases resources available to both parties.Thus, collectivistic behavior may be more advantageous to the seller. Inthis way, social roles may moderate the effects of cultural values on com-munication behavior (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Schwartz, 1990). In light ofthis reasoning, we ask:

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RQ1: Are the effects of individualism-collectivism dependent upon negotia-tor role? More specifically, (a) are seller collectivism and buyer collectiv-ism both associated with a dyad’s joint profit, and (b) are the effects ofseller collectivism on seller’s negotiation tactics different than the effectsof buyer collectivism on buyer’s negotiation tactics?

Partner Collectivism

The culture in context view suggests that a negotiator’s collectivismcould influence joint profit not only by affecting the negotiator’s ownbehavior, but also by influencing the behavior of the other party. Nego-tiators often reciprocate integrative and distributive tactics (Adler et al.,1987; Graham et al., 1988, 1992; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Putnam & Jones,1982; Weingart et al., 1990), so highly collectivistic negotiators may facili-tate joint profit in part because their own integrative behavior encour-ages the other party to behave integratively as well. Thus, we ask thefollowing:

RQ2: During intercultural negotiation, (a) is seller collectivism associated withthe buyer’s communication tactics, and (b) is buyer collectivism associatedwith the seller’s communication tactics?

Further, if negotiators employ distributive tactics, then even highly col-lectivistic partners may reciprocate (Kelley, 1966), resulting in the reduc-tion of integrative behaviors to achieve higher joint gain. Therefore, itmay be only when both negotiators are collectivistic that higher joint gainis achieved. Therefore, we ask the following:

RQ3: During intercultural negotiation, do seller collectivism and buyer collec-tivism interact linearly in their effect on joint profit?

METHOD

Eighty U.S. and international students (45 females, 33 males, 2 unre-ported; M age = 25.70, Mdn= 24, SD = 6.67 years) at a large Midwesternuniversity participated in this study.3 Aside from the U.S. (36), countriesof origin were Taiwan (12), India (5), China (3), Japan, Pakistan, Senegal,Singapore, and Ukraine (2 each), Bermuda, Cameroon, Hong Kong, Ko-rea, Malaysia, Namibia, Nepal, Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Vietnam,and Zambia (1 each), and 2 unreported.4 Twenty-two participants re-ported previous job-related negotiating experience.5 Three participantsdid not fully complete the measure of individualism-collectivism.

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Participants were recruited via three methods. We asked members ofinternational student organizations on campus to participate; we re-quested volunteers from classes that typically enroll international stu-dents; and we advertised a $100 raffle for international students in the cam-pus newspaper and on campus-wide flyers. Each participant in the studyreceived a raffle ticket for a random drawing at the close of the experiment.

Procedures

Three persons from different countries were scheduled for each timeslot to increase the likelihood of having two persons available to partici-pate. When all three persons arrived, one was randomly selected to com-plete only a questionnaire for use in another project with the provisionthat the two “negotiators” always were from different countries of origin.

The two negotiators were separated so they could ask questions aboutthe instructions without giving away information to the opponent. Par-ticipants completed a consent form briefly describing the task, then theywere given instructions randomly identifying their role as either buyer orseller. Both participants received instructions manipulating cognitive fram-ing.6 Next, participants completed a brief pretest to ensure they under-stood the instructions. Participants then were moved to the negotiationroom and given 30 minutes to complete the negotiation task. All negotia-tions were conducted in English. Sessions were videotaped from behinda one-way mirror, and a tape recorder was placed on the negotiation tableto ensure sound quality. After completing the negotiation task, bargain-ers completed a final contract spelling out the settlement points for eachissue. Dyads not finished negotiating were stopped at the 30-minute mark.

Participants again were separated and asked to complete two ques-tionnaires assessing (a) satisfaction with their own performance and out-comes and (b) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) and demographicinformation, including four questions assessing English ability (how longthey had been in the U.S., when they first learned English, how long theyhad been conversing in English, and how competent they felt conversingin English). Finally, participants were debriefed about the purpose of thestudy but asked not to share this information with others.

Negotiation Task

The negotiation task was a variable-sum simulation (see Pruitt, 1981)involving a retailer (buyer) and wholesaler (seller) negotiating the pricefor three appliances (see Table 1). The retailer was described as a largeregional chain-store that currently did not carry the brand name manu-factured by the nationwide wholesaler. There were nine possible settle-

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ment options for each appliance (marked “A” through “I”), each withassigned profits for both parties. Participants read and were told explic-itly, “You can approach the task in any fashion you choose. The only re-strictions on your behavior are that you may not show your own profitsheet to your counterpart and you may not ask to see your counterpart’sprofit sheet.”

Each negotiator could earn a maximum of $4,000 or a minimum of $0.According to Table 1, an obvious compromise agreement would be E-E-E,yielding for each negotiator an individual profit of $2,000 and a joint profitof $4,000. A more integrative solution is possible if negotiators logroll,because TVs are the most profitable appliance for the seller, whereas laptopcomputers are most profitable for the buyer. A-E-I yields an individualprofit of $2,600 for each negotiator, for a joint profit of $5,200. To encour-age integrative bargaining and remain consistent with prior research,negotiators were instructed to achieve at least $2,200 profit across the threeappliances (Bazerman et al., 1985; Huber & Neale, 1986; Pruitt & Lewis,1975). To induce concern about the other, participants were told that theirown company would incur long-term benefits from working with theother company if an acceptable agreement was reached.

We chose Pruitt’s (1981) simulation to facilitate comparison of our find-ings with the large body of prior research on integrative bargaining con-ducted both with U.S. and international participants (see Graham, 1993;Neale & Bazerman, 1991). In support of the task’s external validity, Nealeand Northcraft (1986) compared expert (real estate agents) and amateur(undergraduates) negotiators using a similar version of this simulation.Pairs of experts reached more profitable joint agreements than pairs ofamateurs, as would be expected if the task taps an important aspect ofskill at integrative bargaining.

TABLE 1Negotiators’ Payoff Schedules for Bargaining Simulationa

Big screen TVs Personal copiers Laptop computers

Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller

A $000 $2,000 $000 $1,200 $000 $800B $100 $1,750 $150 $1,050 $250 $700C $200 $1,500 $300 $900 $500 $600D $300 $1,250 $450 $750 $750 $500E $400 $1,000 $600 $600 $1,000 $400F $500 $750 $750 $450 $1,250 $300G $600 $500 $900 $300 $1,500 $200H $700 $250 $1,050 $150 $1,750 $100I $800 $000 $1,200 $000 $2,000 $000

a Adapted from Pruitt (1981).

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Independent Variables

Bargaining role. Participants were randomly assigned the role of buyeror seller.

Individualism-collectivism. A modified version of Hui and Triandis’s(1986) individualism-collectivism (INDCOL) scale was employed. TheINDCOL is a 66-item multidimensional Likert scale designed to assess anindividual’s level of collectivism by measuring attitudes and behaviorstoward six relational domains (e.g., coworkers, neighbors, extended fam-ily). Scale modification occurred in three steps. First, we deleted itemsthat lacked clarity or face validity (22 items were removed). Next, weassessed the remaining 44 items for internal consistency and parallelismof the relational domains using confirmatory factor analysis (Hunter, 1980).Three subscales, based on relational domain, passed this test with errorsnot exceeding those expected by chance: neighbor, spouse, and coworker.Finally, these three subscales were tested for second-order unidimension-ality so they could be summed into a single collectivism score for eachnegotiator.7

The modified INDCOL demonstrated second-order unidimensional-ity with a “three-domain” reliability of alpha = .75 (for the 11-item scale,alpha = .76). Higher scores on the resulting 11-item index (possible range= 7–77) indicated greater collectivism (see Table 2). To substantiate the

TABLE 2Modified Individualism-Collectivism (INDCOL) Scalea

1. It is enjoyable to meet and talk with my neighbors regularly.2. I would not let my neighbors borrow things from me or my family (R)

b.

3. Neighbors should greet each other when they come across each other.4. I am not interested in knowing what my neighbors are really like (R).5. Married people should have time alone every day undisturbed by their spouses (R).6. If a person is interested in a job about which the spouse is not very enthusiastic, the

person should apply for it anyway (R).7. It is better for a husband and wife to have their own bank accounts than to have a

joint account (R).8. It is desirable that a husband and wife have their own set of friends instead of having

only a common set of friends (R).9. When I am among colleagues/classmates, I think I should do my own thinking

without minding about them (R).10. A person ought to help a colleague at work who has financial problems.11. In most cases to cooperate with a coworker whose ability is lower than one’s own is

not desirable as doing the thing alone (R).aFor all items, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. Higher score = greater collectivism.b(R) represents reverse scored items.

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validity of our 11-item solution, total scores from this solution were cor-related with the total scores of the revised 33-item version of INDCOLsuggested by Hui and Yee (1994). We found the 33-item version to havean alpha reliability of .72 and the correlation between this scale and our11-item solution is .86 (p < .0001), which supports the comparability ofour index with their revised solution.

Dependent Variable

Joint profit was obtained based on the final contracts signed at the endof the simulation. Of the 40 dyads, 34 (85%) reached agreement within 30minutes. Because joint profit is a measure of integrativeness, and wewanted to retain deadlocked dyads, it did not seem appropriate to assignjoint profits of $0 to dyads that did not reach agreement. Following pre-vious studies (e.g., Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Tutzauer, 1990), we treated thesix deadlocked dyads as if they had reached the least integrative solutionof a straight compromise agreement E-E-E, resulting in an individual profitof $2,000 for each negotiator (see Table 1).

Communication Variables

Information sharing. The videotapes were coded for information shar-ing tactics by three independent coders. Four 1-hour sessions were de-voted to training coders to recognize information sharing, based on cat-egories developed by Pruitt and Lewis (1975; Pruitt, 1981) and Thomp-son and Hastie (1990). Information sharing was coded separately for buy-ers and sellers.

Information sharing includes both asking for and giving information.To address the hypotheses and research questions, we identified threetypes of “asking for information.” We also identified three “giving infor-mation” categories because it seemed reasonable to look at this aspect ofinformation sharing as well. Asking included (a) numerical requests—details about the opponent’s profits in dollar amounts (e.g., “What doyou make for TVs at price D?”); (b) priority requests—details regardingthe opponent’s comparative importance of issues (e.g., “Would you ratherget a good price on TVs or on computers?”); and (c) directional requests—queries about the opponent’s desire to move the price of any item up ordown (e.g., “You want a higher price for televisions?”). Similarly, givinginformation included numerical, priority, or directional disclosures (e.g.,“I make $1,200 for E,” “I make my greatest profits on the personal copiers[in comparison to the other two products],” and “I need a lower price forthe copiers”).

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To establish unitizing reliability, the coders independently counted thenumber of asking and giving units present within each of 7 (out of 40)negotiations. Guetzkow’s U, an index of disagreement in unitizing, rangedfrom .01 to .10 for the three pairs and averaged .06. Folger, Hewes, andPoole (1984) describe scores below .10 on this index of disagreement as“quite low,” indicating acceptable unitizing reliability. Categoryreliabilities were estimated using Cohen’s kappa to compare coders’ la-beling of the units into one of the asking and giving categories. Cohen’skappa ranged from .86 to .93, with an average of .89 for the three pairs ofcoders. Discrepancies in categorization were resolved through discussionand consensus. The three coders then divided the remaining videotapesfor coding information asking and giving. Because of extremely low fre-quency of asking and giving priority information (total number of occur-rences in 40 dyads, asking priority: seller = 0, buyer = 2; giving priority:seller = 4; buyer = 1), these categories were dropped from further analy-ses. Frequencies of asking numerical information and asking directionalinformation were standardized and then summed separately for buyerand seller as an index of “asking for information.”

Heuristic trial and error. In four 1-hour sessions, three new coders weretrained to recognize single- and multiple-item offers. Single-item offerswere defined as suggestions regarding the contract price for one appli-ance only (e.g., “How about price B for TVs?”). Multiple-item offers weredefined as suggestions to combine the contract price for two or more ap-pliances in a package offer (e.g., “Price C is okay for copy machines if Ican have price F for computers.”). Multiple offers often occurred as asimple listing of prices (e.g., “How about D, E, and G?”). Single- andmultiple-item offers were coded separately for buyers and sellers.

The unit of analysis was the uninterrupted talking turn, all talk occur-ring by one negotiator between the end of the opponent’s previous talkand the beginning of the opponent’s next turn. Only turns in which offersoccurred were coded; all other turns received a “null” code. Unitizingreliability was determined based on the match in coder performance across8 (of 40) videotaped negotiations (187 offers). Using this method,Guetzkow’s U reached .04 (agreement rate 96%). To establish categoriz-ing reliability, units consensually recognized by coders were compiledand listed. Coders then watched the same videotapes again, labeling eachunit as a single- or multiple-item offer. Agreement among coders produceda global kappa of .96. Categorical kappas (103 single units, 50 multiple) were.94 for single-item offers and .88 for multiple-item offers. For testing Hy-pothesis 2, we report the use of multiple offers, but a sum of standardizedscores for single-item and multiple-item offers for each role was calculatedas an index of “heuristic trial and error” to address the research questions.

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Distributive tactics. A third group of four coders was trained to recog-nize put-downs, threats, demands, and refusals, according to Pruitt’s(1981) guidelines. Put-downs were negative comparisons between theopponent’s and the bargainer’s own company or demeaning commentsaimed at the opponent (e.g., “You’re being completely unreasonable!”).Threats were implied or explicit commitments to impose harmful conse-quences, such as a walk-out, if the listener failed to comply with the speaker’swishes (e.g., “There’s no use in trying to negotiate a contract with [yourcompany] if you won’t let us make some profit.”). Demands were directorders that the listener make accommodations for the speaker (e.g. “Just doit! Tell your boss this was the best offer you could get.”). Refusals were ex-plicit rejections of an opponent’s offer (e.g., “No way at price C.”). Distribu-tive tactics were coded separately for buyers and sellers.

The unit of analysis was the uninterrupted talking turn. Only turns evi-dencing distributive behaviors were coded. Other turns received a null code.Unitizing reliability was determined based on coder performance across 6(of 40) videotapes (168 distributive acts). Guetzkow’s U reached .02, or 98%agreement. Category reliabilities were determined when units consensu-ally recognized by coders were compiled, listed, and then assigned a codeduring a second viewing of the same videotapes. Based on 126 talking turns,Cohen’s kappa for the coding scheme as a whole reached .92. Judging fromthe categorical kappas, some distributive moves were more difficult to rec-ognize consistently (putdowns = .75; threats = .53), whereas others wereeasier to identify consistently (demands = .85, refusals = .92).

Examination of the relationships among the four distributive tacticssuggests that the four tactics, although generally grouped together as“distributive” in previous research, are not unidimensional. The meancorrelation (after r to z transformation) among put-downs, threats, anddemands is r = .42. In contrast, the mean correlation between refusalsand each of these three tactics is only r = .14. This suggests that refusalsare not as strongly associated with the other three tactics as the otherthree are among themselves; therefore, refusals were not included in fur-ther analyses of distributive tactics. Standardized scores for put-downs,threats, and demands were summed to represent “distributive tactics”for the remainder of the analyses.

Transforming Variables

Descriptive statistics for the nine communication variables coded inthis study appear in Table 3. All of the communication tactics, with theexception of giving directional information, were significantly skewedin a positive direction. Consequently, we transformed each communica-tion variable (except giving directional information) using x.1 (see Winer,

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605Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

1971). Because many variables had a modal value of zero, we followedWiner’s recommendation of adding the constant of 1 to information ask-ing and giving tactics (except seller’s giving directional information,which did not require transformation) and distributive tactics beforetransformation. In all cases, the transformation resulted in the skews beingreduced by one third to one half. The transformed variables were usedfor the remaining analyses.

RESULTS

Dyad Collectivism and Joint Profit

Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 is based on a culture as shared values per-spective, positing that a negotiation dyad’s profit will increase as thedyad’s total collectivism increases. This prediction was evaluated by aPearson correlation conducted with “dyad” as the unit of analysis.8 Eachmember of the dyad’s score on the INDCOL scale was summed to createa dyad joint index (M = 96.73, SD = 11.60); this index was then correlatedwith joint profit. Dyads on average reached agreements with $4,383 jointprofits, higher than the $4,000 resulting from a straight compromise (E-E-E; see Tables 1). The dyads’ summed collectivism was associated signifi-cantly with joint profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed, n = 37; one-tailed testsare used for correlations whenever directional relationships are tested). 9

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Joint Profit

Research Questions 1a and 3. Given that a dyad’s overall level of collec-tivism is associated with joint profit, Research Question 1a asks whetherseller collectivism and buyer collectivism both are associated with a dyad’sjoint profit, and Research Question 3 asks whether seller collectivism andbuyer collectivism interact linearly in their effect on joint profit. Pearsoncorrelations demonstrate that only seller collectivism is significantly andpositively associated with a dyad’s total profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed,n = 38); buyer collectivism is not significantly related to total profit (r =.12, ns, n = 39). We then regressed total profit simultaneously onto buyercollectivism, seller collectivism, and a mean-corrected interaction term ofbuyer and seller collectivism. The mean-corrected interaction term is theproduct of the buyer’s and seller’s mean-corrected collectivism score,obtained by subtracting each buyer’s [seller’s] collectivism score fromthe mean of buyers’ [sellers’] collectivism. The regression was significant,R2 = .23, F (3, 33) = 3.23, p < .04.10 Inspection of the unstandardized regres-sion weights revealed that, once again, only seller collectivism was posi-

606 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

tively associated with joint profit (b = 13.72, p < .05, one-tailed). The rela-tionship between buyer collectivism and joint profit, although positive,was not statistically significant (b = 11.52, p = .13), and the interactionterm also was not significant (b = 1.26, p = .11). Thus, for RQ1a, the re-gression analysis demonstrates joint profit is only associated with sellercollectivism regardless of the level of buyer collectivism, and for RQ3,buyer and seller collectivism do not interact to affect joint profit. Thesefindings become easier to interpret when examining the effects of buyerand seller collectivism separately on communication tactics.

TABLE 4Correlations Between Total Profit, Buyer Collectivism, Seller Collectivism, and

Communication Processesa

Tacticsb Role Total profit Seller collectivism Buyer collectivismAsk InformationAsk numerical Buyer .10 .05 -.16

Seller .23* .19 .06Ask directional Buyer .19 .32** -.03

Seller .23* .38** .12Sum Buyer .19 .24* -.09

Seller .34** .41** .13Give informationGive numerical Buyer .13 .10 .09

Seller .08 .14 .11Give directional Buyer -.38** -.30** .02

Seller -.20 -.08 .16Sum Buyer -.19 -.15 .08

Seller -.08 .04 .19OffersSingle offers Buyer .02 -.07 .24*

Seller .08 -.05 .29**Multiple offers Buyer -.01 .00 .06

Seller .12 .33** .00Sum Buyer .00 -.05 .23*

Seller .12 .18 .18Distributive TacticsThreats Buyer -.45** -.10 -.07

Seller -.32** -.09 .23*Put-downs Buyer -.30** -.16 -.05

Seller -.25* -.26** .17Demands Buyer -.08 -.11 -.32**

Seller -.06 -.26** .23*Sum Buyer -.38** -.17 -.20

Seller -.30** -.29** .30**

a Correlations performed on transformed variables.b Buyer role, seller role, total profit, and buyer collectivism, n = 40. Seller collectivism, n = 38.*p < .10 (one-tailed).**p < .05 (one-tailed).

607Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

Role, Communication Tactics, and Joint Profit

Prior to examining whether culture affects the use of communicationtactics as predicted, we look at whether buyer and seller use of commu-nication tactics affects total profits in ways presumed by previous re-search in which role distinctions are not made. The first data column ofTable 4 provides correlations between each tactic and total profit sepa-rately for buyers and sellers.

The correlations for asking information show that only the seller’s useof asking information has a significant positive relationship to total profit(r = .34, p < .05, one-tailed). As in prior research (e.g., Thompson, 1991;Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988), joint profit is associated with sellers asking morequestions about the buyer’s needs and preferences. In contrast, the buyer’sdegree of asking for information is not associated with total profit. Theonly information-giving tactic that is significant is the buyer’s degree ofgiving directional information, and it is negatively associated with totalprofit (r = -.38, p < .05, one-tailed). Buyers appeared to give directionalinformation (e.g., “I need lower prices on copiers”) as a way of demand-ing better outcomes for themselves rather than to facilitate problem solv-ing. In sum, as sellers ask for more information, total profits increase, butas buyers give more directional information, total profits decrease.

The use of offers, both single and multiple, did not function as theliterature predicts. No significant relationships were found between theissuing of offers and total profit for either buyer or seller. Distributivetactics, however, functioned as expected for both roles. Increased use ofdistributive tactics by either buyer or seller is significantly and negativelyassociated with total profits (buyer: r = -.38, p < .05; seller: r = -.30, p < .05,one-tailed). Specifically, as putdowns and threats increase, total profit de-creases (see Table 4, Column 1).

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Communication Tactics

Hypothesis 2 and Research Question 1b. We know, then, that seller collectiv-ism is significantly associated with joint profit, and that the degree of askinginformation by the seller and the degree of buyer and seller distributivetactics affect joint profit. Next, we examine how culture influences the use ofthese tactics. Hypothesis 2 posits that during intercultural negotiation,negotiator’s collectivism will be (a) positively associated with the frequencyof asking for information, (b) positively associated with offers that packagemultiple issues, and (c) negatively associated with the frequency of usingdistributive tactics. Further, RQ1(b) asks whether the effects of seller collec-tivism on seller’s negotiation tactics are different than the effects of buyercollectivism on buyer’s negotiation tactics.

608 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

The second and third data columns of Table 4 provide Pearson correla-tions between buyer and seller collectivism and the use of communicationtactics. For H2a, seller collectivism has a significant positive relationshipwith the degree of asking for information by the seller (r = .41, p < .05, one-tailed). Buyer collectivism, however, is not associated with the buyers’asking for information (r = -.09, ns). As for making offers that packagemultiple issues (H2b), once again seller collectivism is significantly andpositively associated with multiple offers by sellers (r = .33, p < .05, one-tailed), but buyer collectivism is not associated with multiple offers bybuyers (r = .06, ns). Similarly, for H2c, seller collectivism has a signifi-cantly negative association with the seller’s frequency of using distribu-tive tactics (r = -.29, p < .05, one-tailed), but buyer collectivism is not sig-nificantly related to the buyer’s use of distributive tactics (r = -.20, ns).

In sum, Hypothesis 2 receives partial support in that seller collectiv-ism has significant effects on the seller’s use of all three communicationbehaviors that previous research has associated with integrative outcomes,but buyer collectivism has no such effects. Further, the answer to RQ1,which asks whether the effects of individualism-collectivism are depen-dent on negotiator role, is affirmative. Seller collectivism affects the seller’suse of all three communication behaviors, but buyer collectivism onlymarginally affects the buyer’s use of distributive tactics.

Role, Negotiator Collectivism, and Partner Communication

Research Question 2. To look at whether the partner’s collectivism af-fects a negotiator’s communication behavior, we posed Research Ques-tion 2, which asks if (a) seller collectivism is associated with buyer’s com-munication tactics, and (b) buyer collectivism is related to seller’s com-munication tactics. Once again, the second and third data columns inTable 4 provide Pearson correlations to address these questions.

For asking information, seller collectivism marginally affects buyers’behavior (r = .24, p < .10, one-tailed), and buyer collectivism does notaffect sellers’ behavior (r = 13, ns). In particular, seller collectivism af-fects asking directional information by buyers (r = .32, p < .05, one-tailed).Seller collectivism results in a decrease of buyers giving directional in-formation (r = -.30, p < .05, one-tailed), a tactic that tends to promotedistributive bargaining (see above). No other information-giving tacticsare significantly related to buyer or seller collectivism.

Seller collectivism has no affect on the number of offers that buyersmake, but buyer collectivism is positively associated with sellers mak-ing single offers (r = .29, p < .05, one-tailed). Finally, although seller col-lectivism does not significantly affect buyers’ use of distributive tactics(r = -.17, ns), buyer collectivism is significantly associated with an in-

609Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

crease in sellers using distributive tactics (r = .30, p < .05, one-tailed). Inother words, as buyer collectivism increases, sellers tend to respond withmore distributive behavior.

The answer to Research Question 2, then, is that seller collectivismdoes affect buyers’ communication behaviors of asking for more infor-mation and giving less directional information, and buyer collectivismaffects seller communication behaviors of making more single offers andusing more distributive tactics.

Summary

Based on the above analyses, we can draw significant links betweenseller and buyer collectivism to joint profit through various communica-tion behaviors. There are three paths by which seller collectivism leadsto higher joint profit (see Figure 1). Seller collectivism leads to (a) theseller asking more information, which is positively associated with higherjoint profits, (b) the seller using fewer distributive tactics, which is nega-tively associated with higher joint profits, and (c) the buyer giving lessdirectional information, which is negatively associated with higher jointprofits. For all three, seller collectivism leads to greater joint gain, whichaccounts, in part, for the significant relationship between seller collec-tivism and joint profit (r = .38, p < .01, one-tailed).

In contrast, buyer collectivism has mixed effects on joint profit throughcommunication behaviors (see Figure 2). First, buyer collectivism is mar-ginally associated with a decrease in the buyer’s use of distributive tactics,which is negatively associated with higher joint profits, so buyer collectiv-ism leads to higher joint gains. But buyer collectivism affects the seller’s useof distributive tactics in the opposite direction; buyer collectivism increasesseller distributive tactics, which leads to a decrease in joint profits. This rela-tionship accounts, at least in part, for the low correlation between buyercollectivism and joint profit (r = .12, ns). The effects of buyer collectivism arecontradictory, with one path increasing but the other decreasing joint profit.

Figure 1: Summary of the Effects of Seller Collectivism on Negotiation Tactics andJoint Profit

610 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

DISCUSSION

In this study of individualism-collectivism and integrative bargaining,two views shape our discussion of culture and negotiation. The cultureas shared values view implies that collectivist negotiators should be moreadept than individualist bargainers at reaching mutually beneficial out-comes. The culture in context view suggests that effects of a negotiator’scultural orientation are likely to be moderated by structural and contex-tual factors (Janosik, 1987). Two such factors examined in this study werethe negotiator’s role, and the partner’s collectivism.

The following discussion summarizes our findings about the effects ofbargaining role and partner collectivism as moderators of cultural valueson communication behavior and joint profit. Directions for future researchand limitations of the study are also provided.

Summary of Findings

From a culture as shared values perspective, this study predicts that anegotiation dyad’s profit will increase as the dyad’s collectivism increases(H1). This hypothesis was supported, with the dyad’s summed collectiv-ism correlating significantly with joint profit. Our study is the first to showthat, consistent with the culture as shared values perspective, the morecollectivistic the dyad is as a whole the higher joint profits the dyad islikely to achieve. More importantly, our study provides support for a morecomplicated culture in context perspective, in which buyer and seller roleinteract with culture to affect communication tactics and joint profits.

In response to our hypotheses and research questions, our study iden-tified five ways in which bargaining role moderates the effects of culturalvalues on communication behavior and negotiation outcomes. First, theeffects of negotiator collectivism on joint profit vary by role. Only sellercollectivism was significantly associated with total profit, whereas buyercollectivism was unrelated to joint profit (RQ1). Moreover, seller and buyercollectivism did not interact in their effect on joint profit (RQ3). The impor-tance of seller collectivism did not depend on levels of buyer collectivism.

Figure 2: Summary of the Effects of Buyer Collectivism on Negotiation Tactics andJoint Profit

611Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

Second, the effects of negotiator collectivism on communication be-haviors also vary by role. Seller collectivism is significantly associatedwith the use of three tactics (i.e., asking for information, making offersthat package multiple issues, and avoiding distributive tactics) in thedirections hypothesized; buyer collectivism is associated only margin-ally with one behavior: decreased use of distributive tactics. As a resultof these findings, H2 is supported for the seller but not the buyer. Theeffects of seller collectivism on seller’s tactics is markedly different thanthe effects of buyer collectivism on buyer’s tactics. Seller collectivism is auseful predictor of the negotiator’s own communication behaviors, whereasbuyer collectivism has almost no predictive value in this regard (RQ1b).

Third, the effects of information exchange differ by role. Seller askingfor information is positively associated with joint profit, whereas buyergiving directional information is negatively associated with joint profit.Although previous research on information sharing suggests asking andgiving of information should lead to higher joint gain, these findings sug-gest that more attention be given to the role of the bargainer because buy-ers’ and sellers’ use of these tactics have different effects on profit.

Fourth, each parties’ collectivism affects their partners’ behavior, butwith opposite implications for reaching integrative outcomes. Our find-ings showed that seller collectivism is associated with buyers asking formore information and giving less directional information (RQ2a); buyercollectivism is associated with sellers making more single offers and us-ing more distributive tactics (RQ2b). Thus, negotiator collectivism affectssome behaviors of the bargaining partner, but seller collectivism tends topromote integrative behavior by the buyer, whereas buyer collectivismtends to promote distributive behavior by the seller.

Fifth, seller collectivism affects both buyer and seller behaviors, andall of these behaviors are associated positively with joint profit (see Fig-ure 1). In contrast, buyer collectivism affects several behaviors; some pro-mote but others hinder achieving higher joint profit (see Figure 2).

Why does role moderate the effect of cultural values in so many re-spects? As argued previously, sellers tend to be more dependent on buy-ers than buyers on sellers; thus it seems plausible that sellers should havea greater need to encourage an integrative process that will lead to higherjoint outcomes. Whereas the buyer may turn to alternative suppliers ifthey are not satisfied with either the process or the agreement, it is in theseller’s best interest to pursue satisfactory outcomes with every possiblebuyer. Collectivism should make this effort more likely for the seller. It ispossible, however, that when the buyer behaves in a collectivistic man-ner, the seller may no longer feel it necessary to yield or give in to thebuyer to facilitate an integrative process. Because the buyer is acting outof role by being integrative, the seller may view this as an opportunity topursue personal gain and, as a result, use more distributive tactics.

612 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

Future Directions and Limitations

The communication behaviors associated with collectivism and themechanism by which an increase in buyer collectivism leads to more dis-tributive tactics by sellers merit further research. Direct evidence is neededto demonstrate that role effects reflect differences in perceived depen-dency. Questions to be addressed in the future include: Which cognitiveframes and normative expectations surrounding the roles of buyer andseller lead to differences in behavior, especially as these roles interact withcollectivism? Would results from our study reverse if a buyer perceived ahigh dependency on the seller to achieve important goals or if the sellerperceived alternative options for obtaining a profit apart from the currentbuyer? What normative expectations are associated with roles in other con-texts (e.g., labor versus management), and do these roles also moderate theeffects of cultural values on negotiation outcomes? Future research shouldexamine expectations and assumptions related to bargaining roles, how theyvary across culture, and how they impact communication behaviors.

Future research also should examine relevant negotiation processesthat mediate the effects of role and collectivism on joint profit. This studyexamined three sets of communication behaviors addressed in previousresearch: information sharing, offers, and distributive tactics. Of thesethree, only findings for distributive tactics were consistent with predic-tions. The effects of asking and giving information varied by role, whereasmaking offers had no effect on joint profit. These findings suggest furtherresearch should explore additional communication processes, such as ar-gument, to explain the effects of seller collectivism on joint profits. Al-though some (Pruitt, 1981; Roloff, Tutzauer, & Dailey, 1989) define argu-ment narrowly as a distributive tactic (i.e., giving reasons why the otherparty should concede) that impedes joint gain, Putnam and her colleagues(Putnam & Geist, 1985; Putnam & Wilson, 1989; Putnam, Wilson, Waltman,& Turner, 1986) conceptualize argument more broadly as a process of giv-ing reasons about how issues should be defined and proposals evalu-ated—a process that can facilitate issue reframing and joint gain. Futureresearch should explore whether argument, conceptualized from thisbroader perspective, mediates the effects of collectivism and role on jointprofit. Argument seems promising because participants who enact dif-ferent roles tend to specialize in making particular types of arguments atdifferent points in a negotiation (see Putnam, Wilson, & Turner, 1990).

Limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, external va-lidity is restricted in that we observed students with limited bargainingexperience enacting a simulated negotiation. Although Neale andNorthcraft (1986) have shown that experienced and inexperienced nego-tiators have similar decision biases when facing new situations, they havealso demonstrated that inexperienced negotiators are more likely than

613Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

experienced negotiators to approach negotiations with a distributive, win-lose perspective. Second, many participants conducted the simulation ina non-native language, given that English often was the only languagespoken by both participants. It is difficult to know the extent to whichacculturation and language constraints may have affected negotiator be-haviors. Third, the sample size is insufficient for testing the summarizingpath models found in Figures 1 and 2. Future research can test such struc-tural equation models if substantially larger sample sizes are included.Fourth, the negotiation task involved three issues, so that logrolling po-tential could be studied. Future research, however, will benefit by em-ploying simulations that capture integrative processes other than logroll-ing (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), especially as they occur in naturalistic negotia-tions (e.g., see Putnam & Wilson, 1989).

Despite these limitations, our study provides insight into the contex-tual effects of individualism-collectivism on integrative bargaining. Thisstudy also demonstrates the utility of a culture in context approach tonegotiation research. Although the shared values approach is sufficientfor showing that a dyad’s collectivism affects joint profit, this perspectivewould have missed the subtle and more interesting effects of buyer ver-sus seller collectivism. Future research will benefit from viewing negotia-tion processes and outcomes from the culture in context perspective be-cause it provides insight into the complex interaction between culture,norms of bargaining, and communication behavior.

NOTES

1. Three studies by Graham and his colleagues actually examine transcriptions or video-tapes for communication behaviors (Graham & Andrews, 1987; Graham et al., 1992, 1994). Nocoding scheme is used in the Graham and Andrews study; the other two studies comparenational cultures on frequencies of behaviors. Although both perceptual and behavioral mea-sures are used in Graham et al. (1992), correlations between these measures are not reported.

2. This assumption continues to be problematic for prediction because a negotiator’sconcerns may center on whether the opponent is perceived as an in-group or out-groupmember. Even within highly collectivist cultures, concern for others’ needs may be con-fined only to those who are in-group members. Competition and distributiveness may bedirected toward out-group members (Triandis et al., 1988). Negotiators’ perceptions of in-group versus out-group membership are rarely measured and probably vary widely de-pending on contextual and structural features of the negotiation. For instance, when negoti-ating in the U.S., non-U.S. negotiators may perceive an opponent who is not North Americanas an in-group member. However, expatriates new to the U.S. and intending to seek citizen-ship may perceive the same opponent as an in-group member and perceive all opponents notfrom the U.S. as members of the out-group. In the present analysis, this problem was ad-dressed partially by creating “future relationship” concerns within the induction. We assumedthat collectivism and its emphasis on relational harmony would foster in-group feelings to-ward an opponent with whom the negotiator would have an ongoing business relationship.Showing concern for the opponent’s goals is one means of fostering that relationship.

614 HUMAN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH / October 2000

3. In comparison to prior research, 40 intercultural dyads is a substantial number foranalyzing communication behaviors during negotiation interactions. For example, in stud-ies that analyze transcripts or videotapes for communication behaviors, Graham et al. (1994)use 3 intracultural dyads from each of 10 countries for a total of 30 dyads; Graham andAndrews (1987) use 3 intracultural dyads from the U.S., 3 intracultural dyads from Japan,and 6 intercultural dyads for a total of 12 dyads; and Graham et al. (1992) use 3 intraculturaldyads from each of the Soviet Union and the U.S., for a total of 6 dyads.

4. The two participants who did not report their country of origin were paired withparticipants from Taiwan and Bermuda. Participants were sought from a variety of nationsso that stronger conclusions could be drawn about the causal effects of collectivism. Fre-quently, research compares participants from two or a few nations that are considered indi-vidualist or collectivist (e.g., the U.S. vs. Japan). These nations, however, may vary alongnumerous cultural dimensions other than collectivism, and collectivism may be related toother cultural dimensions within a specific national culture. By drawing participants from awide variety of nations we hope to rule out possible spurious conclusions about other cul-tural dimensions. In addition, although nations may vary in their overall level of collectiv-ism (e.g., Japan > U.S.), there is also substantial interpersonal variation in collectivism withinany given nation (Triandis et al., 1988). By measuring individual participants’ collectiv-ism, we also can examine within-nation variance, thus maximizing the ability to detectcultural effects.

5. Previous negotiation experience was not associated significantly with collectivismnor with any other experimental variable.

6. Originally we also manipulated psychological framing (positive versus negative) as athird independent variable, using instructions adapted from Neale and Bazerman (1985) byinstructing participants in positively [negatively] framed dyads to make gains [avoid losses]as desired by their supervisor. No significant results were found between framing and jointprofit or the communication variables, however, so framing was eliminated from furtheranalyses and discussion.

7. Second-order unidimensionality employs confirmatory factor analysis to test internalconsistency and parallelism of subscales. Subscales are treated as items and observedintercorrelations are tested against those expected based on parallelism and internal consis-tency. Parallelism is tested against the remaining subscales. If residuals (i.e., observed mi-nus expected correlations) are less than those expected by chance, the subscales are said tobe internally consistent and parallel and items comprising those subscales may be summedinto a single index.

8. Each Pearson correlation used in this study was tested for assumptions of linearity,homogeneity of variance, and normal distribution of the residuals. We regressed one mem-ber of each pair of variables being correlated on the other and obtained plots of the ob-served and expected distribution of residuals; all residuals appeared to be relatively nor-mally distributed. We also examined the scatterplots and stem and leaf plots of standard-ized residuals and observed no structured patterns of residuals. The skew and kurtosis ofthe residuals for each pair of variables being correlated were small and not significant. As aresult, we concluded that all of the correlations met the necessary statistical assumptions.

9. All eight dyads in which collectivism of both the participant and his or her partnerwas above the average level of collectivism included one U.S. participant. Thus, a rivalexplanation that high outcomes or integrative behaviors resulted from international stu-dents having a greater sense of in-group when paired with other collectivist internationalstudents does not seem plausible.

10. The regression performed was tested for the assumptions of linearity, homogeneityof variance, and normal distribution of the residuals. We plotted the observed and expecteddistribution of residuals and observed the residuals were relatively normally distributed.

615Cai et al. / CULTURE IN CONTEXT

We also examined the scatterplot and stem and leaf plot of standardized residuals and ob-served no structured pattern of residuals. Both the skew and kurtosis of the residuals wassmall and not significant. Thus, we concluded the regression met the necessary statisticalassumptions.

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