critical observations on some philosophies of mysticism

CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON SOME PHILOSOPHIES OF MYSTICISM

I. THE CONTEXT OF OUR INQUIRY

"What is a legitimate philosophy of mysticism?" is the question to which this essay addresses itself. It hopes to arrive at least at some answers by considering the most prevalent mistakes commonly found in methods of philosophizing about mysticism. Let us note at the outset that our inquiry is limited to western philosophies of mysticism and to near eastern and western mystical and philosophical literature. Hense our findings may not be applicable to far eastern mysticism. Our theses can be formulated in the following five steps:

(i) While acknowledging both the historical and philosophic debt of mysticism to philosophy, we regard philosophical contributions to theories in mysticism of little use to our investigation about ,mysticism;

(ii) We hold it a mistake to assume that the philosophy of mysticism consists of a psychological analysis of "mystic states" or to infer that such analyses are relevant to the logic of arguments proffered by the mystics;

(iii) As philosophers have no means of determining whether or not it is legitimate to apply standards of "objectivity" to mystical experience, such ontological approaches to mysticism should be avoided;

(iv) We regard it possible to use philosophical tools to clari- fy issues c;bout mysticism; accordingly, we shall attempt to show that in a restricted sense, "the religious" and "the mystical" are not the same, in spite of the views of many historians of monotheistic religions and those of philosophers of religion who attempt to con- nect the two different inquiries.

In order to demarcate the limits of our inquiry, let us begin by distinguishing between three senses of "philosophies of mysticism," calling these respectively: "original contributions to mysticism,"

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" the cons t ruc t ion of in formal models for wor ld myst ic ism," and

" the pos tu la t ion of der ivat ive theories in myst ic i sm."

Phi losophers made "or ig ina l cont r ibu t ions to mys t ic i sm" in two

senses: whi le some la id the founda t ion for the deve lopment of

myst ica l ideas, others offered ref inements on common myst ica l

ideas. In the first place, concepts b o r r o w e d f rom some phi losophers ,

e.g. the al legory of the cave and the d iv ided l ine in The Republ ic

of Plato, 1 and the One of Plot inus, 2 which was to develop into Proclus '

system, 3 p layed his tor ica l ly a seminal role in the deve lopment of

myst icism. Any serious s tudy of myst ic ism must concern itself wi th

these s ignif icant passages. Secondly, whi le cer ta in concepts of philo-

sophical systems, such as the not ion of " the u l t imate be ing ," the Greek

to h e n / the Arabic -Pers ian al-W~/ib aI-Wu/Yzd/ and the Hebra ic

1 Plato is called "the father of European mysticism; see W.R. Inge, Christian Mysticism (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Company, 1964), p. 78. Certain features of the Platonic doctrine are significant for mysticism, e.g., the doctrine of the form of the Good, in Plato. The Republic, ed. and tr. P. Shorey (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, and London: William Heine- mann, 1930), 502 C-509 C; this concept became a model for the ultimate being; moreover, the allegory of the cave and the divided line (ibid. 509 D -531 C) was regarded as a model for viewing the way of mystical salvation as an eschatological series of stages in the ascent from the material world towards the One. 2 While some interpreters identify Plotinus as a mystic, e.g., I .N. Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute (London: Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 167, and W.R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), II, 145, others attempt to disassociate Plotinus from mysticism, e.g., J.M. Rist, Plotinus; The Road to Reality (London: Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 213-230. Objections to associating Plotinus with mysticism stern largely from attempts to challenge the assertion that Plotinus' system is more at home in the provenance of oriental mysticism than in classical Greek philosophy, e.g. Emile Br6hier, La Philosophie de Plotin (Paris, 1928), pp. 106-133. That this allegation is unwarranted appears to have been demonstrated by com- mentators of Plotinus, e .g .A.H. Armstrong, The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of PIotinus (London: Cambridge University Press, 1940), pp. 112-113.

Many of Proclus' theses were repeated in near eastern medieval mystical poetry. For example, Proclus asserts, "All that proceeds from any principle reverts in respect of its being upon that from which it proceeds." Proclus, The Elements oJ Theology, ed. and tr. E.R. Dodds (London: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 1963), p. 35. In a similar manner the greatest near eastern mystica! poet, I. RfxmL notes "Whatever has departed from its source-principle (asl), seeks once again its union with the former, "The Mathnawi o~ Jalglu 'ddin Rgmg, ed. R.A. Nicholson (London: Luzac, 1925), I, 3. Proclus' theorem depicts the principle of the mystical ascent, which is the converse of emanation from the One. 4 The to hen, or the One, Plotinus' first hypostasis is beyond being and cannot be qualified (Enneads, VI, 9, 3). In a similar manner, the to hen of Proclus is beyond all intellectual substances, The Elements, p. 23. 5 The term "aI-W6dib aI Wui'gd" means "the Necessary Existent"; it is to be contrasted with "a contingent being" (mumldn aI-wuif~d), and "an im-

SOME PHILOSOPHIES OF MYSTICISM 411

Eyn Sol ~ may serve as the basis of any myst ica l ontology, they have

also been t rea ted wi th pecu l ia r modi f ica t ions by ind iv idua l phi lo-

sophers, as it is evident f rom Spinoza ' s "One Substance God Na tu re , " 7

F indlay ' s " A b s o l u t e , " s and Buber 's G o d ? W e cons ider these philo-

sophical t rea tments legi t imate cont r ibu t ions made by phi losophers

with in the f ield of myst ic ism proper , for the reason that these philo-

sophical theories diverge f rom views commonly a t t r ibu ted to mys-

tics on the topic in quest ion. As the concern of this inqui ry is not

the content of a specific myst ica l doct r ine but ra ther ph i losophica l

methods app l i ed to doctr ines forming the core of myst ic ism, we shall

leave aside such or iginal cont r ibut ions in myst ic ism for fu ture s tudy.

In add i t ion to making or iginal contr ibut ions , phi losophers l ike

James, s~ Russel l , 11 Stace/~ Broad, 13 a n d A y e r , 1~ have a t t empted to expla in

possible being" (mumtanic a!-wujgd). Whereas the first concept usually signifies the ultimate being of the mystics, the second concept designates actual particular entities, and the third names general terms of essences which have no particular instances, e.g. "being a round square." See, P. More- wedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn S~nfi's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 92:3 (July-September, 1972), 425- 435. 6 The notion of the eyn so[ or "the limitiess" is used in the commentary of The Book of Zohar on Genesis I:I; see The Zohar, tr. H. Sperlinh and M. Simon (New York: Rebecca Bennet, n.d.), I, 63, and Zohar, The Book of Splendor, Basic Readings from the Kabba!ah, ed. G.G. Sholem (New York: Schocken, 1968), p. 27. Sbolem points that the eyn sol of Jewish Mysticism is the infinite and the Godhead, G.G. Sholem, On the Kabbalah and its Sym- bolism (New York: Schocken, 1969, p. 55). 7 Spinoza's concept of the One-Substance is of special significance to mysticism because in denying substantiality to persons it makes the union between "substance" and "process" languages, see P. Morewedge, "Ibn Sinfi's Concept of the Self," Philosophical Forum 4:1 (Fall, 1972), 49-73. 8 See Findlay, Ascent to the Absolute, especially, pp. 13-77. Findlay calls "the absolute" an individual or a set of individuals, ibid., p. 21; for this reason alone, his system cannot be regarded as being identical with or a model of many mystical domains in which the ultimate being is not a substance, e.g. ibn Sinfi's ontology. 9 Buber explicitly rejects what he terms gnosticism and rejects mysticism as well. In Buber's "I and Thou" account of the dialogue between man and God, man remains a person, while engaged in a "personal relationship" with a transcendent God: the relationship precludes an affinity between man and the Divine in which man becomes annihilated in the Divine. See Martin Burber, "Replies to My Critics," in The Philosophy of Martin Burber, ed. P. A. Schilpp and M. Friedman (La Salle: Open Court, 1967), p. 716. i0 William James, The Varieties of Religious ExFerience (New York: Long- roans, Green and Co., 1923), pp. 379-429. 11 Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York: Doubleday, 1957), pp. 1-31. 12 Walter T. Stace. The Teaching of the Mystics (New York: Mentor, 1960),

412 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

themes common to all branches of universal mysticism as though

they were constructing "informal models for mysticism." Evidently

these constructs add no more to mysticism than does Carnap 's space-

time topology to physical theoriesJ 5 We shall focus on the most

common mistakes encountered in the works of the aforementioned

philosophers of mysticism.

Even though a philosopher working within his system may choose

at times not to approach the topic of mysticism directly through his

primitive terms and basic axioms, one may nonetheless derive signi-

ficant statements about mysticism from his premisses. We wish to

call such views "derived theories in mysticism" since often, as is

illustrated by the case of Wittgenstein/6 one finds that philosophical

doctrines such as logical atomism and the picture theory of meaning,

constitute the bases of his conclusions about mysticism. In addition

we shall include in this group depictions of mysticism based on sys-

tems of monotheist ic religions. Our own method, explained and illustrated below, will conclude this essay.

Mysticism and Philosophy (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1960), and Religion and the Modern Mind (Philadelphia and New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1960), pp. 313-318. 13 C.D. Broad's remarks on mysticism are contained in basically three essays included in the collection, Religion, Philosophy, and Psychical Research (New York: Humanities Press, 1969); the specific essays are "The Validity of Belief in the Personal God,"; ibid., 159-174; "Arguments for the Exis- tence of God," ibid., pp. 175-201, and "The Present Relations of Science and Religion," ibid., pp. 220-246. ~4 A.J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 4-7. 1~ R. Carnap, Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, tr. W. H. Meyer and J. Wilkinson (New York: Dover, 1958), pp. 197-213. Carnap's concern in this particular "philosophy of physics" is whether or not topological properties of the physical world can be expressed by purely topological methods using the logic of relations. Thus his analysis consists of an exa- mination of the language about physics rather than of a theory in physics. Carnap's attitude towards philosophy of science constitutes clearly a philosophical approach to a domain without involving an empirical inquiry on part of the philosopher. Moreover, in a letter to Quine, Carnap notes that his interest in constructing a modal language does not imply his philosophical support for intensional concepts:

I do not indulge in this vice generally and thoroughly... Although we do not like to apply intensional languages nevertheless I think we cannot help analyzing them. What wou!d you think of an entomologist who refuses to investigate fleas and lice because he dislikes them?

W.V. Quine, "Homage to Rudo!f Carnap," in Boston Studies in the Philo- sophy o] Science, Proceedings of the 1970 Biennial Meeting, Philosophy of Science Association, in Memory oJ RudoIJ Carnap, ed. R.C. Buck and R.S. Cohen (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, and Humanities, New York, 1971), p. xxv. 16 L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophieus, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F.


II. ERRORS IN PHILOSOPHY OF "MYSTICAL EXPERIENCE"

Mystics of renown often write reverently about their own so-called mystical states and the significance of mystical experience, e.g., Por- phyry's report on Plotinus' mystical experienceJ 7 For this reason, and perhaps erroneously as we shall illustrate, a popular approach to the philosophy of mysticism has been to undertake a psychological study of mystical experience. For example, W . T . Stace notes,

"Our question 'what is mysticism?' really means 'What is mystical experience?' " ,8 In answering this question he describes a unique consciousness labelled as "mystical," devoid of both sensation and thought. Stace states, "accordingly it (mystical consciousness) cannot be analy- zed in terms of any element of the sensory-intellectual consciousness, with which it is wholly incommensurable."19 Stace's conclusion on the essential features of mysticism is that its core is the apprehension of an ultimate nonsensous unity in all things. ''~~ In its psychological dimension, Stace's approach follows the pioneering work of the philosopher-psychologist William James; the same method was adopted by analytical philosophers, such as C.D. Broad and A.J . Ayer. James specified a so-called "mystical consciousness" which possessed in his opinion distinguishing marks, namely ~ "aneotonic quality," "transiency," and "passivity." s1 According to Ja- mes, "these four characteristics are sufficient to single out a group of states of consciousness peculiar enough to deserve a special name and to call for careful study. Let it then be called the mystical group. ''~ In the same tenor Broad asserts, "I am prepared to admit that such (mystical) experiences occur among people of different races and social traditions, and that they have occurred at all periods of his- tory. ''~8 Like James and Stace, Broad holds that these mystical experiences have "certain characteristics which are common to all of them and which suffice to distinguish them from all other kinds

McGuinness and with an introduction by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961). 17 See, for example, Prophyry's witness of Plotinus' achieving a mystical state four times in "The Life of Plotinus," in PIotinus, ed. and tr. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1966), I, 69-71. ,8 The Teaching of the Mystics, p. 9. i9 Ibid., p. 13. 2o Ibid., p. 14. ~1 The Variet&s oJ Religious Experience, pp. 380-381. ~2 Ibid., p. 382. ~3 Broad, p. 172.


of experience. ''~ A. 1. Ayer, too, in his recent criticism of "mysticism" begins his discussion by limiting his frame of reference to "mystical experience." 25 From these and other sources we conclude that one school of thought which qualifies for the discipline philosophy of mysticism, is that view which assumes: (i) that distinct from all other experiences is one that can be called "mystical;" (ii) this experience is encountered by mystics irrespective of time, national origin, language and religious beliefs; (iii) without using the method of experimental psychology a philosopher can understand and describe the salient features of these experiences; and it is the primary task of a philosophy of mysticism to describe the nature of this type of experience and to test its validity against some amystical ontology.

Our criticism of this approach is based upon two of its prima facie difficulties which may be described as an "assumption about the role of philosophy in describing contingent facts," and "a confusion of psychologism of theory. ''~6 With regard to the first diffi- cuIty we note that mystical states are contingent facts, i.e., actual events which do not happen because of necessity. Traditionally, analyses of states such as epilepsy, hysteria, and laughter belong to the provenance of psychological investigation rather than to what is considered today analytical philosophy. Philosophers studying topics such as dreaming, focus not on observable features of dreaming but on the semantical features of sentences uttered in dream states. ~7 The adoption of the "mystic state" view philosophy of mysticism implies two untenable theses: (i) that philosophy once again can do arm-chair psychology, in spite of the now generally accepted view that psychology is an empirical science, and (ii) that philosophy and psychology lead to the same results, i.e., both provide explanations for facts of behavior, in spite Of the now accepted view that the task of philosophy, i.e., the analysis of arguments and concepts, is different from the scientific enterprise, i.e. the explanation and prediction of events. Consequently, the adoption of the "mystic

2~ Broad, p. 173. e~ Ayer, p. 4. 26 For a similar mistake, which Carnap calls "'psychologism" in "deduct ive" and " induct ive" logic, see Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 37-51. 37 For example, N. Malcolm in Dreaming (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959) considers the legitimacy of utterances about dreaming states rather than empirical cases of psychological states of persons who are dreaming,


state" view of philosophy of mysticism leads to difficulties in distinguishing analytical philosophy from an empirical science.

The second difficulty is more serious; it consists in confusing the psychological state that may attend the theory of a mystic with the theoretical content of themes expressed by the mystic. The following cases show that in parallel disciplines such a connection is not made between the philosophy of a specific domain X, and the psychological states of those who express statements in X. Suppose that when engaged in mathematical analysis one raised a leg or fell into a dream-like state. Now we may inquire how this drastic observable change in what might be called "mathematical experience" would modify our views on the philosophy of mathematics which deals with non-experiential topics such as the relationship between mathematics and formal systems and the concept of infinite numbers and sets. On similar grounds one should ask why the psychological state attending experience should be relevant to the philosophical issues embedded in mystical texts. One may argue that all mystics have shared some unique experiences and were of a certain charac- ter type. This assumption is in fact false, for many writers of mystical treatises in medieval times have shown no trace of what might be called the stereotype mystical ascetic charactery Moreover, would it have made a difference if no mystic experienced that state which is traditionally described as mystical ecstacy? Let us consider the following case. Suppose we found that two of the world's greatest mystics, Plotinus and Rfimi, experienced in fact at no time a state of bewilderment. Instead, their mystical writings were written while they were enjoying good food, wine, and physical pleasures, while their servants took down their messages which were subsequently edited by sober scribes. Would such a finding change our views about the merits of their systems? It seems it would affect only our appraisal of their personal lives in specific areas, such as their avowed sincerity. But what impact would R~mi's l ife--whether he danced

2s Observe, for example, the differences between Eckhart and Sankara noted by R. Otto in Mysticism East and West (New York: MacMillan, 1925), pp. 183-235 and R. C. Zaehner's accounts of different senses of "mysticism" in his Mysticism, Sacred and Profane (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-29. According to Zaehner there are: (i) monists holding a pan- enhenism (all-is-one-ism), (ii) those who equate their souls with the Absolute, and (iii) the theistic Christian mystics; their doctrines are fundamentally different.


or sat down--have on the philosophical message of Shams-i Tabr~z~ or Mathnawi?

Let us consider some alternative positions which may hope to escape our criticism. Suppose one held the experiential dimension of the mystical state itself to be praiseworthy, according to this view, philosophizing about mysticism would then become a demonstration of the pragmatic results of right acts, i.e., of mystical behavior. Now, if it were possible to produce any behavioral state artificially, e.g., by hypnosis or drugs, and one removed the content and the alleged results from such states, then "mystical states" would be indistin- guishable from "hypnotized states" or "drugged states." Apart from singling out the behavioral features of mysticism, which can be du- plicated, the philosopher taking this position must isolate that which is praiseworthy in mysticism. By appealing to some other psychological facts, he may state thereupon that the behavior produced "voluntarily," "withcut drugs" or other agents is praiseworthy. To one taking such a position we point out that it is not a matter of defending "mysticism" in itself but the "psychological state of mystics" in addition to "a value theory X" which appraises such types of behavior. Consequently, his defense is reduced not to a defense of mysticism, but to the defense of an ethical theory which is of little rele- vance to the theoretical content of mysticism. And to the assertion of our hypothetical defender of "mystical states" that only in such states can one become acquainted with a special kind of "reality" or with "objects" and that one should render a favorable appraisal of mystical states for this reason, we reply that we are no longer dealing with a psychological theory but with an ontological doctrine about the objective world. Our next section is devoted to showing that in spite of the fact that philosophers follow such an argument, philosophy has nothing to say on the topic.

III. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE "ONTOLOGICAL" APPROACH TO THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MYSTICISM

This common approach to mysticism which investigates whether or not some objective reality in the actual world corresponds to the mystic's personal experience, often appears in conjunction with the psychological approach. Broad notes for example, "In view of this (the universality of mystical experience) I think it is more likely than


not that in religious and mystical experience men come into contact with some Reality or some aspect of Reality which they do not come into contact with in any other way. ''~~ Broad proceeds to show that this reality is not a personal God of monotheismr ~ Stace, too, considers it a legitimate task in the philosophy of mysticism to render judgment on the objectivity of mystical experience? 1 In the same tenor A. I . Ayre, who bases his entire discussion of mysticism without doubt on the hypothesis that there are unique kinds of experiences which are labelled as "mystical," notes that the question is whether they (mystical experiences) yield knowledge; and if so, what is it that

�9 9 , ~ 3 2 they establish. Russell, too, attempts to show that the mystics' ontological claims are unwarranted even though at best "mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world." ~ The metaphysical creed of mysticism, according to Russell, "is a mistaken outcome of emotion, although this emotion, as colouring and informing all other thoughts and feelings, is the inspirer of whatever is best in man. Even the cautious and patient investigation of truth by science, which seems the very antithesis of the mystic's certainty, may be fostered and nourished by that very spirit of reverence in which mysticism lives and moves, ''34

A significant implication of the objective view is that philosophers can in one way or another decide whether or not entities allegedly experienced by mystics "exist." Our misgivings to the ontological position are not based on the question whether or not the mystics encounter such special objects, but on the legitimacy with which a philosopher claims to be able to render judgement on the reality of any object X experienced by the mystic. Surely if it is impossible to conceive of X, where X is an impossible entity, such as a round square and the largest number, then we can establish that no X exists using purely analytical methods�9 But if one grants the onto- logist's view that an experience of X is possible, then X cannot be an impossible entity�9 Hence one must choose from one of the following difficult alternatives: (i) either one has to accept the concept of

"2o Broad, p. 173. ~o Ibid. , "~ Mys t i c i sm and Phi losophy, p. 135. ~2 Ayer, p, 4. ~3 Russell, p. 11. ~4 Ibid. ~5 In his celebrated account of Jewish Mysticism, G.G. Sbolem rejects the "mystic state" view of mysticism, asserting that "it would be a mistake to

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the Necessary Existent and assert that mystics know the Necessary

Exis tent in the so-called state of "ecs tacy" or " fan~ ' , " or (ii) one

cont inues to be faced wi th the diff icul t ies men t ioned ear l ier in our

analysis of the app roach according to wh ich a ph i losopher claims to

acquire knowledge of cont ingent facts using analyt ic methods . Unt i l

ontologists can show us how to overcome these diff icul t ies , we cha-

lenge the legi t imacy of their method .

IV. A DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN "THE RELIGIOUS"

AND "THE MYSTICAL"

Let us now examine an impor tan t ph i losophica l theme presuppo-

sed by many wri ters who discuss the re la t ionship be tween " the re-

l igious" and " the myst ica l ." W e note that for many his tor ians of

monothe is t ic rel igions, i.e., ]uda ism, Chris t iani ty , and Is lam, as

exempl i f ied bv G. G. Sho lem} ~ R . C . Zaehne r} G and wri ters on Sfif-

ism, "~7 " the myst ica l" is essential ly der ived f rom "the re l igious ."

W e shall show that this thesis is un tenab le in so far as it is in-

app l i cab le to our case in quest ion, near eastern myst icism.

To be br ief , let us select for a compar i son of " the re l igious" on

the one hand " the myst ica l" on the other , (what we assume to be)

assume that the whole of what we call mysticism is identical with the personal experience which is realized in the state of ecstatic meditation." Sholem enumerates the most important features of his own theory of mysticism by stating that "the point I should like to make is this - - that there is no such thing as mysticism in the abstract that is to say, a phenomenon or experience which has no particular relation to other religious phenomena. There is no mysticism as such, there is only the mysticism of a particular religious system, Christian, Islamic, Iewish mysticism and so on." Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New-York: Schocken, 1941), pp. 5-6. ~ Although Zaehner distinguishes explicitly between "religious" and "secular" mysticism (Mysticism, Sacred and Pro]ane, pp. 155-197), he ultimately favors "the religious" over "the secular" on the basis of an analysis of religious themes. Zaehner recognizes indirectly that his model of "religious mysticism" has its shortcomings with respect to the near eastern context. Since Muslim mystics emphasize "love as being the very nature of God," Zaehner considers Muslim mystics for the purpose of comparative analysis a source of confusion because of their statements that the soul is in fact identical with God. ibid., pp. 160-161. 37 Writers on SQfism often identify it with "Islamic Mysticism." For example, R.A. Nicholson asserts, "What Sfifism is you all know: I am using the word in its ordinary sense as synonymous with Islamic mysticism and as denoting that type of religious experience with which the writings of sfifis or Moham- medan mystics have made us familiar." The Idea of Personality in Islam (1922; rpt., Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1964), p. 1.


essential features of God depic ted in the Our ' f in, the book Musl ims

bel ieve to have been revealed, and assert ions about the same essen-

t ial fea ture of G o d occurr ing in the myst ica l system of two medieva l

I ran ians , ibn S{nfi and A. Nasafk ~8 Al though conversant wi th the

Our'S.n, these mystics deve loped systems which were in oppos i t ion

on the Our '~n ic themes in quest ion. Our a rgument rests on the follo-

wing hypothesis : if we succeed in d i f ferent ia t ing be tween the Our 'g -

nic and the myst ica l (in sense of ibn Slnfi 's and NasafFs systems)

t rea tments of the d ivine predica tes in quest ion, then is mus t be false

to assert that in the near eastern contexts ma jo r mystics consis tent ly

uphe ld o r thodox rel igious doctr ine. (The t rad i t iona l d ivine predi-

cates chosen for our a rgument are G o d as "c rea to r" of the wor ld

and the "d iv ine t ranscendence ." )

There is no doubt that according to the Out ' f in God created the

wor ld ex nihile and that G o d is a t ranscendent en t i ty? 9 By contrast ,

both ibn S]nfi and Nasaf l reject these doctr ines because of their

t rad i t iona l emanationistic 40 and theophanic 4~ views. For ibn S{n~ ema-

na t ion is an involun ta ry process which fol lows f rom God ' s nature . 4~

Accord ing to Nasaf l the wor ld is God, and persons are mere modes

~s Abdul Aziz Muhammad ibn Nasaf~ was a thirteenth century author of at least six mystical texts which followed explicitly the so-called illuminatio- nistic schools of philosopher-mystics inspired by S. Suhrawardi and al-GhazfilYs mystical writings. ~9 The doctrine of creation is repeated in the Qur'gn, the holy book of a monotheistic religion par excellence; for example, in S. vii. 54, it is said that, "Your Guardian-Lord is God (AIlO~h), who created (khaIaqa) the heavens and the earth in six days," In S. x. 3, the same doctrine is repeated, "Verily your Lord is God, who created (khalaqa) the heavens and the earth in six days." There is no statement in the Qur'fin allowing for belief in the eternity of the world. Several explicit passages affirm a mystical doctrine, namely that all things return to God, e.g.S. 4. "To Him will be your return-Of all of you." 4o The doctrine of emanation was upheld by almost every near eastern philosopher-mystic with the exception of very few, e.g., al-Kind[ and al-Ghaz~lL 41 "Theophany" is the doctrine that the world as it appears to us is essentially related to the Divine. It is the negation of Wittgensteinian thesis that "God" does not "reveal" himself in the world. The theophanic doctrine is a prevalent theme in near eastern mysticism. For example, al-GhazfilL who in his later writings showed a stronger affinity for monistic mysticism, asserts: "There- fore, God is the only entity that exists, Every entity has two aspects, one related to itself and one related to God. In the first aspect, it is a non (eternal) existent, while with respect to its God-aspect, it is an (eternal) existent. Consequently there is no (eternal) existent except God the almighty and the (rest of the aspects of entities which are all) God-aspects; all entities are perishable except (their divine aspects." Mishk(tt aI-Anwg~r, ed. A. eAf~fi (Cairo, 1964), p. 56. 4~ p. Morewedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn SEn(t), (New York and London, 1975) pp. 258-254.


of the divine? ~ Upholding similar doctrines, other mystics of the

same tradition show that the points in question are not mere acciden- tal issues in near eastern mysticismr 4 In addition to the problem of divine attributes which we discussed, there are many other points of

divergence between the theories of many mystically inclined philosophers and orthodox doctrines in Islam which substantiate further

that "the mystical" are not the same in numerous other contexts as well. These points of divergences between "mystical philosophy" and "theological orthodoxy" include "the survival of persons after the death of body," "God's knowledge of particulars" and "punish- ment and rewards after death. '''~5

It should be noted that our attempt to differentiate between mysticism and religion in the Islamic context is not unique. Houben, for

instance, holds the view that ibn S~ngt's mysticism makes his doctrine non-Islamic. Houben's penetrating analysis points to the peculiar notions of "love" and "will," notions which differentiate near eastern mysticism from religious orthodoxy, which Houben supports. 4~

These dialectics of the cishq (love) is the universal principle of all movement. The double movement which we find in the cosmos, the ontological descent from God by necessary emanation and the return or ascent of the creature in a movement of love towards God, these are the foundations from which indeed the highest spiritual doctrine can be evolved-short however of real (religious) mysticism unless~..unless the chain of necessary being is broken and unless this monistic conception

~3 Nasaff asserts that ultimately there is no existent but the light of God, Al-Insgn af Kgmil, p. 136. He means that a complete description of every actual entity must include the notion of the cause of that entity; the cause of the persistence of every entity is God; consequently there is no (inde- pendent) existent other than God. Elsewhere he states, "the bgtin (underlying aspect or essence) of any existent is this (divine) light which provides life (the realization or actualization) of the existent entity (in question)," ibid., p. 254. 44 The most familiar cases are those of Hallg], who was killed by the religious authorities for asserting, "'Ang aI-Haqq," or "I am reality-truth-God" and Abfi Yaz~_d, who proclimed, "Glory be to me." 4~ See, George F. Hourani, "Ibn S~_nS's 'Essay on the Secret of Destiny'," Bulletin o] the School o] Oriental and AJrican Studies XXXIX (1966), 25-48 and M. E. Marmura, "'Some Aspects of Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars," Journal o] the American Oriental Society LXXXII (1962), 299-512. M.E. Marmura, "Avicenna and the Problem of the Infinite Number of Souls," Muslim Studies, XXII (1960), 252-259. ~ l.l . Heuben, "Avicenna and Mysticism," in Avicenna Commemoration Volume, ed. V. Courtois (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), p. 217.


of being is changed into that of analogical being between God and man.

This chain, however, Avicenna does not break and that falsifies his doctrine through inherent monism. But there is yet another reason by which this doctrine is corrupted. In order to understand it better we will have to dig deeper into the meaning of his words: that the mystical experience is maCriJat

A l l dh (gnostic knowledge of Ood). Then it will be clear that this fruition is not a gratutious gift from Ood, but solely de- pendent on the human endeavour and secondly that what the mystic grasps in the encounter with the Truth is only Ood in so far as He is the Truth of their own being.

Zaehner has also upheld the view that the concept of "love" in near eastern mysticism separates mysticism from religious orthodoxy. In this tenor Zaehner notes, 47

Islam, we would have thought, was not a congenial soil in which a mystical tradition of any kind could take root. Sfifism met with the hostility of the orthodox theologians from the beginning.

Zaehner proceeds to single out the key issue in this hostility to mysticism, 4s

The theologians maintained that there could be no love between like and like, and God is totally unlike any created thing: when the Qur'fin speaks of love, then it means no more than obedience. Yet the idea that not only is love between God and man possible, but also that it can be experienced here and now, very much made its way into Sfifism,

Zaehner blames Abfi Yazld's alleged "borrowing" of non-monotheistic themes from Indian sources for the differences between later sfifism and Islamic orthodoxy. 4~

Islam starts with a conception of Ood as wholly distinct from his creation; but Sfifism teaches that God can be experienced by those who wait upon his call with a loving heart, and this

47 R.C. Zaehner, Hindu and Muslim Mysticism (London: Oxford Universi- ty Press), p. 91. 4s Ibid. 49 Ibid., p. 188.


will lead to a union with him in which the soul still retains some trace of individuality. This, the mysticism of Muh~sib{ and Dhfi' 1-Nun, receives a violent shock when VedS.ntin ideas are introduced from India via AbO Yazld of Bistfim. Mis- taking the mystical experience of the undifferentiable oneness of the self for identity with God, Abti Yaz{d changes the whole course of Islamic mysticism.

While his analysis of Abfl Yazld's position is correct, Zaehner's account of the "Indian sources" of Abfi Yazld's is questionable. There is no evidence that the last state of the S~f{c experience, fan~' contains any trace of "individuality." Moreover, as Houben and we have demonstrated, ibn Singt, a near eastern mystic-philosopher who did not have a psychologically oriented "mystical experience," does not provide an "Islamic" solution for the problem of mystical union.

Stace goes beyond the Islamic confines of our argument in apply- ing it to a universal context. He claims that religious and mystical experiences are essentially different for at least the following two reasons: the absolute of the mystics deals with an undifferentiated unity (our criteria of emanationism and theophany demonstrate Stace's case for the Islamic context), and mysticism does not support any particular religion? ~

Another objection to the equation of mysticism with religion follows from the premisses of those who support some thesis about the virtue of the universal love of man. In this respect we note Stace's account of the sui genera feature of "mystical ethics," Stace states, ~'

Since for us the essence of religion is found in the mystic experience of the saint, the only possible solution of our (moral) problem is that a moral base must lie in that (mystical) ex~ perience.

He finds that only in mysticism is "the universal love of man for man" possible and that mysticism and love are essentially related for this reason. The foundations of this relation (mysticism and love) lie in the fact that in the mystic vision all distinctions, and therefore the distinction between one man and another are tran- scended. Selfhood, in the sense in which I am one self and you are another are gone. 52 Consequently the two Godheads of the early

50 The teaching o] the Mystics, p. 23-26. 51 W.T. Stace, Religion and the Modern Mind, p. 313. 52 Ibid., p. 314.


Wittgenstein, and the 'T ' and the "divine Thou" of Buber merge into one reiteration of Hallfij that "I am the One-Reality-God" (Ang al- Haqq). Stace would recognize the mystical element in religion rather than the religious element in the mystical as the basis of a univer- sally accepted morality. Each monotheistic religion favors individuals who follows its creed. As long as there are different religions, no religion can form the basis of a universal love for all man kind. For Stace, mysticism offers such a basis.

R. Otto, proffers another perspective on this issue that mysticism is basically the knowledge of the experience of a union with God Who is without modes (sine modis)?3 According to Otto, the religious experience, which surpasses its rational contents when the emotion dominates, becomes a mystical experience; consequently "mysticism" is not derived from religion but constitutes the essential emotional tone of every religious experience. Even though we do not support the basic philosophical presuppositions of Stace and Otto in this issue, we present their positions on this question to illustrate that any derivative theory of mysticism from religion must face at least the following two objections: one--our thesis--that "mysticism" and "religion" are different doctrines in the context of the near eastern intellectual tradition, and two--the thesis of Stace-Otto--that a significant aspect of "religion" may be connected to what is essentially "mystical" without supporting a particular monotheistic religion. Until these two theses are successfully challenged, the views which base all mysticisms on religion remain unacceptable.

In conclusion we wish to summarize the following themes which have been supported in this paper: (i) a legitimate philosophical inquiry into mysticism makes a contribution to a reformulation of the key problems in mysticism, e.g., Spinoza's concept of the Sub+ stance. (ii) A legitimate philosophy of mysticism constructs an informal model for actual cases of mysticism without having a religious or metaphysical bias which precludes the formulation of themes common to various domains of mysticism. (iii) The legitimacy of mystical discourse may be examined by a philosophy which critically dis. cusses the primitives of the formulation of the domain of mysticism in question. (iv) Philosophies unrelated to mystical discourse have the same logical relation to a formal mystical theory as the solipsist's

a~ R. Otto, Mysticism East and West, pp. 158-159.


view to an axiomatized version of a physical theory. In addition we have illustrated how to evaluate various theories of mysticism, e.g., the equation of the religious and the mystical, using standard philosophical tools, e.g., "causality and dependence," in actual domains. Our discussion points at least to the following maxim: useful philosophies of mysticism should take account of actual theories in mysticism in the same sense that philosophies of various sciences take into account the theories of the sciences in question.

PARVIZ MOREWEDGE Baruch College o] CUNY

critical observations on some philosophies of mysticism

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